Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/commentariesonla01dill 


COMMENTARIES 


ON   THE   LAW   OF 


Municipal  Corporations. 


BY 

JOHN  F.  DILLON",   LL.D., 

MEMBER   L'lNSTITUT   DE   DROIT    INTERNATIONAL;     LATE   PROFESSOR  OK   REAL   ESTATE 

AND  EQUITY   JURISPRUDENCE   IN   COLUMBIA   COLLEGE   LAW    SCHOOL  ; 

FORMERLY    CIRCUIT   JUDGE  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES 

FOR   THE   EIGHTH   JUDICIAL  CIRCUIT,  AND 

CHIEF  JUSTICE  OF  THE  SUPREME 

COURT     OF     IOWA. 


FOURTH   EDITION, 
THOROUGHLY   REVISED   AND   ENLARGED. 


Vol,  I. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,    BROWN,   AND   COMPANY. 

1890. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1881, 

By  John  F.  Dillon, 
la  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Copyright,  1890, 
By  John  F.  Dillon. 


T 


University  Press  : 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


TO  THE 


HONORABLE   SAMUEL   F.   MILLER,   LL.D., 

ASSOCIATE   JUSTICE   OF   THE   SUPREME    COURT 
OF   THE   UNITED   STATES. 


TOUR    ACKNOWLEDGED    MASTERY    OF   THE    SUBJECT    TO    WIIICII 
THIS    WORK    RELATES    MAKES    IT    FITTING, 

YOUR    ESTABLISHED    AND    PERMANENT   RANK    IN    OUR    JURIDICAL    AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL    HISTORY    AS    A    GREAT   AND    ILLUS- 
TRIOUS   JUDGE    MAKES    IT    AN    HONOR, 

AND    OUR    LONG    AND    UNBROKEN    FRIENDSHIP    MAKES    IT   A 
RENEWED    PERSONAL    PLEASURE, 

ALBEIT   THE    EVENING     SHADOWS    OF    OCR    LIVES    FALL 
UPON   THE   PAGE, 

TO    REINSCRIBE    TO    YOU    WITH    UNALTERED    REGARD    AND    VENERATION 

THIS    REVISED    EDITION    OF    A    WORK    WHICH,    MORE    THAN 

EIGHTEEN   YEARS   AGO,    WAS    ORIGINALLY 

DEDICATED   TO   YOU. 


609793 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FOURTH  EDITION. 


In  the  nine  years  that  have  passed  since  the  last  edition 
of  these  Commentaries  appeared,  constitutional  provisions 
have  been  adopted,  legislative  enactments  passed,  and 
numerous  State  and  Federal  decisions  made  on  the  im- 
portant subjects  which  are  embraced  in  its  plan.  And 
thus  the  law  has  not  only  been  still  further  extended  on 
previous  lines,  but  it  has  in  material  respects  been  modi- 
fied, altered,  and  enlarged.  This  is  well  known  to  those 
who  have  kept  currently  informed  of  the  general  progress 
of  our  jurisprudence;  it  will  be  apparent  to  all  who  shall 
compare  the  chapters  of  the  present  edition  with  the 
corresponding  chapters  of  the  previous  edition  upon 
Constitutional  Limitations,  Contracts,  Streets,  Eminent 
Domain,  Taxation,  Actions  and  Liabilities. 

That  the  work  shall  adequately  present  the  law  relating 
to  our  Municipalities  as  it  exists  to-day,  the  author  has 
spared  no  reasonable  labor.  The  adjudged  cases  to  date 
have  been  examined  one  by  one,  and  the  results  thereof 
are  embodied  in  this  edition. 

Grateful  to  the  Courts  and  to  the  Profession  for  the 
favor  with  which  from  the  first  they  have  regarded  the 
work,  and  with,  as  the  author  trusts,  a  pardonable  ambi- 
tion on  his  part  to  improve  it,  he  deems  it  to  be  due  to 
them,  as  well  as  to  himself,  to  state  that  he  has  sought 
with  diligent  and  loving  care  to  make  the  revision  thor- 


VI  PREFACE   TO    THE    FOURTH    EDITION. 

ough,  and  that  to  this  end  he  has  personally  gone  over 
not  only  every  section  but  every  sentence,  and  has  made 
such  changes  as  the  expansion  of  the  law  required  and 
his  own  maturer  judgment  approved.  Scarcely  a  single 
section  is  without  alterations  or  additions. 

A  few  further  observations  may  be  permitted,  if,  indeed, 
they  are  not  required.  In  this  day  of  the  unprecedented 
multiplication  of  law  books,  there  are  two  questions  which 
the  profession  may  as  of  right  put  to  an  author.  The 
first  is,  Can  your  work  justify  its  existence?  The  justi- 
fication of  the  present  Treatise  is  placed  on  the  grounds 
quite  fully  stated  in  the  preface  to  the  first  edition,  which 
in  substance  are,  that  the  subject  is  of  acknowledged 
importance  in  all  the  States  and  Territories  of  the  Union ; 
that  no  English  work  is  applicable  or  adequate ;  and  that 
no  other  American  work  thereon  existed  or  exists. 

The  other  question  is,  Can  it  justify  its  size?  An 
elementary  treatise  may  be  wrought  out  upon  one  of  two 
different  plans.  The  one  is  to  state  as  clearly  as  may  be 
ultimate  legal  principles  without  any  or  much  elaboration 
of  their  grounds  and  reasons.  It  requires  the  mind  of  a 
master  to  frame  propositions  which  shall  be  at  once  com- 
prehensive and  exact.  Instinctively  the  profession  in  both 
countries  has  immemorially  shared  in  Lord  Eldon's  fear 
of  the  dangers  that  lurk  in  abstract  and  general  prop- 
ositions. The  other  is  to  state  such  propositions  and 
principles,  but  to  state  them  in  connection  with  the  rea- 
sons and  grounds  on  which  they  rest,  which  are  chiefly 
to  be  found  in  the  adjudged  cases.  The  latter  course  has 
been  here  pursued,  for  reasons  which  are  peculiarly  forcible 
in  a  treatise  on  this  subject  and  in  this  country.  Our 
Municipalities  are  inseparably  connected  with  the  organic 
framework  and  with  the  daily  action  of  our  political  insti- 
tutions. The  law  relating  to  them  is  developed  day  by 
day  in  the  actual  workings  of  those  institutions  in  every 


PREFACE   TO    THE    FOURTII    EDITION.  VU 

section  of  the  country,  and  this  development  registers 
itself  in  constitutional  provisions,  in  statutory  enactments, 
and  in  judicial  judgments.  In  this  work  the  people,  the 
legislatures,  and  the  Courts,  State  and  National,  all  take 
their  respective  parts,  of  which  perhaps  the  most  impor- 
tant, certainly  the  most  varied  and  constant,  is  the  part 
taken  by  the  judicial  tribunals.  It  is  the  high  and  deli- 
cate office  of  the  judiciary  department  to  elaborate  the 
rough  materials  of  our  daily  experience  and  litigation  into 
the  enduring  products  of  law  and  justice,  and  to  place  on 
record  for  our  instruction  and  guidance  the  reasons  of  the 
Judges  for  every  step  in  this  wondrous,  this  ceaseless,  this 
beneficent  process. 

No  writer  on  our  jurisprudence  is  authorized  to  speak 
oracularly,  to  excogitate  a  system,  or  to  give  to  his  views 
any  authoritative  sanction.  To  this  rule  the  most  eminent 
are  no  exception,  since  every  work  upon  our  law  is  neces- 
sarily unauthoritative.  No  author  can  alter  this  inexorable 
condition;  and  any  author  ought  to  be  content,  and  cer- 
tainly will  be  fortunate,  if  he  can  leave  on  the  imperishable 
structure  of  our  jurisprudence  some  visible  imprint,  some 
lasting  touch,  some  embodied  memorial,  however  slight,  of 
his  labors.  Even  judicial  judgments,  if  unaccompanied  by 
the  reasons  on  which  they  rest  and  which  give  to  them 
their  real  worth,  would  have  no  recognized  standing  —  and 
ought  to  have  none  —  in  the  professional  estimation  and 
regard. 

It  is  the  humble  function  —  but,  at  the  same  time,  the 
priceless  privilege  —  of  an  author  to  traverse  the  wide, 
rich,  and  varied  fields  which  the  legislative  records  and 
the  judicial  reports  of  all  the  peoples  in  both  hemispheres 
who  have  adopted  the  institutions  and  who  use  the  tongue 
of  England  thus  open  to  him ;  to  gather,  analyze,  and 
compare,  and  then  to  state  the  results  of  his  labors  and  his 
studies,  accompanied  with  his  own  reflections,  criticisms, 


Ylii  PREFACE   TO   THE    FOURTH    EDITION. 

and  conclusions,  which,  however,  have  the  value,  and  only 
the  value,  that  their  reason,  soundness,  and  justice  give  to 
them. 

The  ancient  mere-stones  of  the  law  must  not  be  removed, 
but  reverently  preserved  and  regarded.  It  is,  however,  a 
mistake  and  a  delusion  to  suppose  that  they  either  do  or 
ran  permanently  mark  the  actual  or  necessary  boundaries 
of  our  jurisprudence.  "In  all  forms  of  government,"  said 
Mr.  Burke,  "  the  people  is  the  true  legislator ;  there  are 
only  two  foundations  of  law,  —  equity  and  utility/'  This 
is  especially  true  of  the  American  States.  The  wants 
and  welfare,  the  usages,  customs,  and  settled  notions  of 
our  people  and  their  collected  will  necessarily  find  ex- 
pression in  our  constitutions,  statutes,  and  jural  system. 
While  the  function  of  the  judge  is  pre-eminently  declara- 
tive, it  is  also  necessarily,  though  subordinately,  legislative  ; 
that  is,  he  inevitably  makes  law  in  and  by  the  very  pro- 
cess of  administering  it.  Whatever  is  of  worth  in  this  or 
in  any  legal  work  comes  mainly  from  the  judgments  of  the 
courts.  The  author  desires  to  add  that  the  work  is  purely 
technical,  and  is  intended  for  the  legal  profession  in  every 
part  of  the  country,  —  for  lawyers  who  have  no  access  to 
full  libraries,  as  well  as  for  those  who  have.  For  these 
reasons  he  has  made  the  notes  as  full  as  practicable  wTithin 
the  space  allotted.  If  any  shall  complain  of  undue  elabo- 
ration in  this  respect  swelling  the  size  of  the  book,  the 
author  craves  leave  to  state  it  as  his  opinion  that  they 
probably  constitute  its  most  valuable  and  useful  feature. 

J.  F.  D. 

New  York,  May,  1890. 


PREFACE   TO   THIRD   EDITION. 


A  revision  of  this  Treatise  has  for  some  time  been  needed,  but 
the  pressure  of  other  duties  has,  until  recently,  prevented  its 
preparation.  During  the  seven  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the 
last  edition  an  unusual  number  of  cases  has  been  decided  upon 
the  various  topics  embraced  in  the  work.  The  reported  decisions 
to  December  1,  1880,  have  all  been  diligently  examined,  and  the 
results  of  such  examination  wrought  into  the  texture  of  the  pres- 
ent edition.  This  has  necessarily  increased  its  size,  and  corre- 
spondingly, it  is  hoped,  its  value.  More  than  two  hundred  new 
sections  have  been  written,  and  over  three  thousand  additional 
cases  cited.  Every  part  has  been  gone  over  with  conscientious 
care,  and  there  is  scarcely  a  section  in  which,  either  in  the  text 
or  the  notes,  additions  and  changes  have  not  been  made.  It  has 
been  necessary  to  sectionize  the  work  anew,  but  the  numbers  of 
the  former  sections  are  enclosed  in  parentheses. 

In  consulting  the  Reports  the  author  has  been  surprised  and 
pleased  to  see  the  extent  to  which  this  Treatise  has  been  used  by 
lawyers  and  judges  as  an  aid  to  their  labors ;  and  in  again  pre- 
senting it,  in  its  new  and  altered  shape,  he  gladly  expresses  once 
more  his  sincere  and  profound  gratification  for  the  favor  with 
which  it  has  been  received. 

J.  F.  D. 

Columbia  College  Law  School,  New  York, 
January  1,  1881. 


PREFACE   TO   SECOND   EDITION. 


The  favor  accorded  to  this  Treatise  by  the  profession  is  gratify- 
ing to  the  author,  and  compensates  for  the  great  labor  of  its 
preparation.  Nothing  can  be  more  pleasing  to  an  author  than 
the  knowledge  that  the  studious  care  given  to  a  work  is  appre- 
ciated by  those  for  whom  it  was  written :  their  approving  opinion 
is  the  reward  he  covets  and  enjoys. 

The  First  Edition,  published  about  twelve  months  ago  and  of 
nearly  double  the  usual  size,  has  been  exhausted,  and  at  the  re- 
quest  of  the  publishers  the  Second  Edition  has  been  prepared. 
As  before,  this  has  been  the  personal  labor  of  the  author.  All 
reported  cases,  decided  since  the  first  publication,  have  been  ex- 
amined, and  the  text  and  notes  prepared  without  the  assistance 
of  others.  While  this  edition  embraces  a  summary  of  recent 
cases  to  the  latest  date,  and  contains  substantial  additions,  the 
structure  of  the  work  is  unaltered.  Some  new  sections  have  been 
added,  and  others  re-written.  The  principal  changes  have  been 
made  in  the  chapters  which  treat  of  Municipal  Securities,  Taxes, 
and  Assessments.  The  amount  of  negotiable  bonds  of  munici- 
palities largely  exceeds  the  sum  of  the  indebtedness  of  all  the 
States,  and  it  has  been  the  earnest  endeavor  herein  to  exhibit 
accurately  the  American  law  upon  this  important  subject. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  deemed  fitting  to  express  to  the  Bench  and 
Bar  of  the  country  a  sincerely  grateful  appreciation  of  the  favor- 
able judgment  already  pronounced,  and  a  hope  that  the  same, 
upon  further  examination  of  the  work,  may  be  neither  reversed 

nor  modilicd. 

J.  F.  D. 

Davenport,  Iowa,  1873. 


PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  necessity  for  a  work  upon  Municipal  Corporations  was  so 
seriously  felt  by  the  author  when  holding  a  seat  on  the  Supreme 
Bench  of  a  State  where  questions  relating  to  the  powers,  duties, 
and  liabilities  of  municipalities  were  presented  at  almost  every 
term,  that  he  resolved,  eight  years  ago  and  more,  to  endeavor  to 
supply  the  want.  Although  the  subject  is  one  of  unsurpassed 
practical  importance,  since  nearly  every  considerable  city  and 
town  in  the  United  States  is  incorporated,  no  American  work 
upon  it  has  ever  appeared.  A  careful  examination  of  the  English 
treatises  satisfied  the  author  that  they  were,  in  a  great  measure, 
inapplicable  here,  and  that  they  fail  to  cover  a  large  portion  of 
the  existing  field  of  the  law  upon  the  subject  as  enlarged  by 
American  legislation  and  practice.  True,  our  municipal  system, 
like  the  body  of  our  jurisprudence,  was  derived  from  England, 
but  it  is  remarkable  how  many  changes  were  necessary  to  adapt 
it  to  our  system  of  government  and  mode  of  administration,  and 
to  the  wants  and  situation  of  our  people.  Accordingly,  if  the 
municipalities  of  the  one  country  be  closely  compared  with  those 
of  the  other,  it  will  be  found  that,  in  their  structure,  powers,  and 
workings,  they  present  quite  as  many  points  of  difference  as  of 
similarity. 

We  have  popularized  and  made  use  of  municipal  institutions  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  constitute  one  of  the  most  striking  features 
of  our  government.  It  owes  to  them,  indeed,  in  a  great  degree, 
its  decentralized  character.  When  the  English  Municipal  Corpo- 
rations Reform  Act  of  1835  was  passed,  there  were  in  England 
and  Wales,  excluding  London,  only  two  hundred  and  forty-six 
places  exercising  municipal  functions  ;  and  their  aggregate  popu- 


Xii  PREFACE   TO    FIRST   EDITION. 

lation  (lid  not  exceed  two  millions  of  people.  In  this  country 
our  municipal  corporations  are  numbered  by  thousands,  and  the 
inhabitants  subjected  to  their  rule  by  millions. 

Our  municipalities  are  habitually  clothed  by  the  legislatures 
with  extensive,  important,  and  diversified  powers,  and  con- 
sequently possess  a  much  more  composite  character  than  in 
England  or  elsewhere.  Strictly,  a  municipal  corporation  is  an 
institution  designed  to  regulate  and  administer  the  mere  local 
or  internal  concerns  of  the  incorporated  place  in  matters  per- 
taining to  it,  and  not  relating  directly  to  the  people  of  the  State 
at  large.  But  in  this  country,  much  more  generally  than  in  Eng- 
land, it  is  the  practice  to  make  use  of  the  municipality,  or  of  its 
officers,  as  agencies  of  the  State,  for  the  exercise,  on  its  behalf,  of 
public,  in  addition  to  corporate,  duties  and  functions.  From  the 
difference  between  these  two  classes  of  powers,  the  American 
courts  have  deduced  consequences  so  important  that  it  is  as  ne- 
cessary as  it  is  oftentimes  difficult  to  distinguish  between  them. 
Besides,  it  has  unfortunately  become  quite  too  common  with  us  to 
confer  upon  our  corporations  extraordinary  powers,  such  as  the 
authority  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  railways,  or  like  under- 
takings, which  arc  better  left  exclusively  to  private  capital  and 
enterprise,  and  to  create  in  their  corporate  capacity  indebtedness 
therefor,  enforceable  by  actions  in  the  courts,  and  which  must  be 
paid  by  taxation. 

Invested,  also,  within  certain  limits,  with  delegated  legislative 
authority  concerning  the  property  and  conduct  of  their  inhabi- 
tants ;  with  capacity,  more  or  less  extensive,  to  acquire  and  dispose 
of  property  ;  with  the  power  to  elect  their  own  officers ;  to  make 
contracts;  to  incur  liabilities  ;  to  exercise  Eminent  Domain  ;  and 
the  more  momentous  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes,  general 
and  special,  —  these  corporate  agencies  are  thus  brought  into 
intimate  and  daily  contact  with  the  most  important  rights  and 
interests  of  their  inhabitants,  and  as  a  result  we  have  an  amount 
and  variety  of  litigation  not  to  be  found  in  the  tribunals  of  other 
countries.  In  no  English  treatise  on  Municipal  Corporations  is 
there  a  chapter  upon  the  subject  of  civil  actions  and  liabilities, 
and  no  discussion  of  the  question  as  to  their  amenability  to 
respond  civilly  in  damages  to  individuals  for  acts  of  misfeasance, 
or  for  neglect  of  duty ;  and,  for  reasons  not  material  to  be  here 
stated,  the  occurrence  of  questions  of  this  kind  in  the  English 


PREFACE    TO    FIRST   EDITION.  Xlll 

tribunals  has  been  comparatively  infrequent.  The  American  Re- 
ports, however,  teem  with  cases  on  this  subject,  and  the  civil 
liability  of  municipal  corporations  upon  contracts  and  for  torts, 
and  the  mode  of  enforcing  it,  are  with  us  the  most  important 
practical  topics  requiring  treatment  in  a  work  of  this  character. 

There  being  no  American  work  on  this  branch  of  the  law,  and 
the  decisions  in  this  country  relating  to  it  being  scattered  through 
the  reports  of  the  federal  courts,  and  those  of  thirty-seven  States, 
there  was  little  to  guide  the  author,  either  as  to  the  arrangement 
of  his  subject,  or  as  to  what  had  been  decided  by  the  courts  con- 
cerning it.  Accordingly  he  had  no  resource  except  to  delve 
laboriously  for  his  materials  among  hundreds  of  volumes;  but 
these  have,  one  by  one,  been  examined  by  him  with  a  view  to 
find  all  that  could  be  advantageously  used  to  illustrate  the  sub- 
ject ;  and  the  result  is  given,  either  in  the  text  or  notes,  as  fully 
as  it  was  practicable  within  the  compass  of  a  single  volume. 
Nor  has  he  overlooked  the  aid  to  be  derived  from  other  sources. 
Every  English  publication  relating  to  the  subject  in  its  legal  or 
practical  relations  has  been  subjected  to  examination;  books 
which  could  not  otherwise  be  had  have  been  specially  procured 
from  abroad.  And,  throughout  the  present  volume,  no  incon- 
siderable pains  have  been  taken  to  set  forth  wherein  the  English 
and  American  municipalities  differ,  so  that  the  applicability  and 
precise  legal  value  of  the  judicial  decisions  of  the  former  country 
would  be  better  understood. 

When  the  work  was  resolved  upon,  the  author  hoped  to  proceed 
with  the  leisurely  care  that  would  enable  him  to  avoid  the  faults 
which  thorough  deliberation  might  result  in  correcting.  This 
hope  has  not  been  as  fully  realized  as  he  desired,  for  year  by  year 
his  official  duties  have  more  and  more  encroached  upon  his  time, 
leaving  for  this  work  only  the  diminishing  intervals  between 
courts.  In  its  preparation  he  has  often  envied  the  author  by 
profession  the  opportunity  for  continuous  and  unbroken  labor, 
and  he  cannot  but  feel  that  if  his  work  had  not  been  prepared  in 
fragments,  it  would  not  have  fallen  both  so  far  below  his  ideal, 
and  what,  under  more  auspicious  circumstances,  he  himself  might 
have  made  it.  It  is  hoped,  however,  if  it  shall  lack  the  symmetry 
and  finish  such  an  author  would  have  given  it,  that  it  may  have 
compensating  advantages  in  its  thoroughly  practical  character ; 
and  these  it  will  surely  owe  to  that  experience  to  which  the  mere 


XIV  PREFACE   TO    FIRST   EDITION. 

student  or  professional  writer  must  ever  be  a  stranger,  and  which 
can  be  had  only  upon  the  Bench  or  at  the  Bar. 

Some  peculiarities  in  the  manner  of  its  preparation  will  he 
observed.  The  aim  throughout  has  been  to  make  a  work  which 
will  be  useful  to  the  profession.  Aware  that  in  most  cases  access 
to  complete  law  libraries  cannot  be  had,  the  author  has  endeav- 
ored, as  far  as  practicable,  to  supply  this  want,  and  to  make  the 
text  and  notes  exhibit  the  substance  of  the  adjudications.  This 
explains  why  so  much  care  has  been  taken  to  cite  the  cases  bear- 
ing upon  the  subjects  discussed,  and  accounts  for  the  fulness  of 
proofs  and  illustrations  to  be  found  in  the  notes. 

He  trustfully  submits  the  work,  which  fills  up  the  interstices 
between  judicial  duties  for  nearly  nine  years,  to  the  profession 
for  whose  assistance  it  is  designed,  and  whose  final  judgment  on 
it  will  not  be  otherwise  than  just.  If  he  could  be  assured  that  it 
has  a  value  at  all  proportioned  to  the  labor  first  and  last  bestowed 
upon  it,  he  would  venture  to  hope  for  a  judgment  not  altogether 
unfavorable. 

Davenport,  Iowa,  1872. 


Note.  —  The  first  edition  of  this  work  was  dedicated  as  follows 


HONORABLE    SAMUEL    F.   MILLER,  LL.D. 

ASSOCIATE    JUSTICE    OF    THE    SUPREME    COURT 
OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

Whether  I  share  in  the  general  admiration  of  your  judicial  talents,  or  listen  to  the 
more  persuasive  suggestions  of  a  voice  that  comes  to  me  from  long  association  at  the  bar 
and  upon  the  bench,  there  is  no  one  to  whom  I  can  inscribe,  so  fittingly  as  to  yourself, 
a  work  relating  to  an  important  branch  of  that  science  which  you  have  studied  so  deeply 
and  understand  so  well. 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

MUNICIPAL  INSTITUTIONS.  —  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  AND  GENERAL  VIEW. 

Ancient  cities.  Grecian  cities.  Roman  municipalities.  State  of  towns  in 
Europe  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire.  Mediaeval  charters.  Charters 
of  community  in  France.  Modifications  of  Roman  municipal  system.  En- 
franchisement of  towns  in  Spain,  and  its  causes.  Municipal  system  of  Great 
Britain.  Historical  sketch  of  boroughs  :  their  incorporation  and  distinctive 
features.  Origin  of  popular  representation.  London  and  its  municipal  his- 
tory and  charters.  Corruption  and  abuses  in  the  English  municipal  corpo- 
rations. Reform  Act  of  1835.  Lord  Brougham's  services  in  promoting 
municipal  reform.  American  municipal  system.  Its  early  origin.  Decen- 
tralized character.  Operation  and  effects.  Corruption  and  abuses.  Reme- 
dies suggested.     Results  summed  up §§  l-l7 

CHAPTER  II. 

CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED. 

General  definition.  Municipal  corporations  defined.  Different  kinds  and  grades 
of  public  corporations.  Quasi  corporations.  New  England  towns  :  powers 
and  mode  of  government.  City  governments.  The  State  as  a  public  corpo- 
ration            §§  18"31 

CHAPTER  III. 

CREATION   AND   SEVERAL   KINDS   OF    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 

In  England.  —  Royal  and  parliamentary  corporations.  The  old  English  muni- 
cipal corporations.  Their  diverse  character.  Integral  parts.  Abuses  in 
municipal  rule.  Municipal  Reform  Corporations  Act  of  1835.  Abstract  of 
its  leading  provisions.  Constitutes  the  English  corporations  upon  a  uniform 
model. 

In  the  United  States.  —  Created  by  State  legislative  enactment.  Their 
great  numbers.     Creation  by  Territorial  legislatures.     Special  charters  and 


XVI  CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME  I. 

general  incorporating  acts.  Outline  of  ordinary  municipal  charter.  Ad- 
vantage  oi  general  incorporating  acts.  Creation  by  implication.  Accep- 
tance of  charter.  Submission  to  vote  of  inhabitants.  Local  option  laws. 
Special  constitutional  provisions  and  their  construction.  General  and  special 
acts.  Restriction  on  municipal  powers.  Title  of  incorporating  charter  or 
acts §§32-51 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PUBLIC  AND  PRIVATE  CORPORATIONS  DISTINGUISHED.  —  LEGISLATIVE  POWER 
AND   ITS   LIMITATIONS. 

Importance  of  the  distinction  between  public  and  private  corporations.  Differ- 
ence defined.  .Scope  of  legislative  authority.  Complex  character  of  ordinary 
municipalities.  Distinction  between  public  or  State  and  municipal  or  local 
powers.  Legislative  authority  over  corporate  funds  and  revenues.  Limita- 
tion in  favor  of  creditors.  Power  over  corporate  boundaries  and  public  prop- 
erty. Whether  municipal  corporations  are  in  any  respect  private.  Cases 
cited  and  criticised.  Public  powers  and  rights  held  at  the  will  of  tbe  legis- 
lature. Creditor's  rights  cannot  be  impaired.  Illustrations  from  decided 
cases.  Extent  of  legislative  power  over  the  private  property  of  municipal 
corporations  discussed.  May  be  compelled  by  the  legislature  to  pay  debts  not 
legally  binding  ;  and  to  incur  debts  against  their  will.  Power  over  trust 
property §§  52-80 


CHAPTER  V. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 

General  Municipal  Powers.  —  Their  Nature  and  Construction. 

Charters  defined.  Judicially  noticed.  Proof  of  coq -orate  existence;  user;  le- 
gislative recognition.  Repeals  and  amendments.  General  laws  and  special 
charters  ;  conflict  ;  constructions. 

Extent  of  power  ;  limitations;  canons  of  constructio  .  Usage  as  affecting  mu- 
nicipal powers.  Discretionary  powers  not  subject  to  judicial  control.  Public 
powers  and  trusts  do1  capable  of  delegation.  Legislative  powers  incapable  of 
surrender.  Mandatory  and  discretionary  powers;  difference  defined  and  illus- 
trated.    Revenues  exempt  from  judicial  seizure.     Garnishment.    §§  81-101 

CHAPTER  VI. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS    (CONTINUED). 

Special  Powers  and  Special  Limitations. 

1.  Wharves. 

2.  Ferries. 

3.  Borrowing  money. 

4.  Limitation  on  power  to  become  indebted. 


CONTENTS   OF    VOLUME   I.  XV11 

5.  Rewards  for  offenders. 

6.  Public  buildings. 

7.  Police  powers  and  regulations. 

8.  Prevention  of  fires. 

9.  Quarantine  and  health. 

10.  Indemnifying  of  officers. 

11.  Furnishing  entertainments. 

12.  Impounding  animals. 

13.  Party  walls. 

14.  Public  defence. 

15.  Aid  to  railway  companies,  and  herein  of  the  constitutional  power  of  the 

legislature  ;    cases  cited.     Power  must  be  express.     Construction  of 
special  grants  of  power ;  cases  cited §§102-164 


CHAPTER  VII. 

DISSOLUTION    OF    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 

In  England:  1.  By  act  of  parliament.  2.  By  loss  of  integral  part.  3.  By  sur- 
render. 4.  By  forfeiture.  These  modes,  except  the  first,  not  applicable  in 
this  country.  Effect  of  dissolution  on  property  and  debts.  Authorities  re- 
viewed.    Revival  of  corporation  and  its  effect §§165-174 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CORPORATE   NAME,    BOUNDARIES,    AND    SEAL. 

Corporate  name.  Nai.  is  respects  grants  and  contracts.  Name  as  respects 
suits.  Corporate  boundaries.  Legislative  enlargement  of  territorial  limits. 
Territorial  division ;  its  effect  on  property  and  rights.  Corporate  seal ; 
proof  of ,   . §§175-192 

i>         CHAPTER   IX. 

MUNICIPAL   ELECTIONS    AND   OFFICERS. 

1.  Municipal  popular  elections. 

2.  Special  tribunal  to  determine  election  contests  for  municipal  offices. 

3.  Power  to  create  and  appoint  municipal  officers. 

4.  Oath  and  official  bond. 

5.  Duration  of  official  term. 

6.  Vacancies  in  municipal  offices. 

7.  Refusal  to  serve  in  office. 

8.  Resignation  of  municipal  office. 

9.  Compensation  of  municipal  officers. 

10.  Liability  of  the  corporation  to  the  officer. 

11.  Liability  of  the  officer  to  the  corporation  and  to  others. 

12.  Amotion  and  disfranchisement    ........     »     §§  193-256 

VOL.  i.  —  b 


XViii  CONTENTS   OP   VOLUME   I. 

CHAPTER   X. 

CORPORATE   MEETINGS. 

1.  Common -law  requisites  of  a  valid  corporate  meeting. 

2.  Notice  of  corporate   meetings  at   common  law  and  under  the  English 

Municipal  Corporations  Act. 

3.  New  England  town   meetings;    requisites  of  notice  and  power  of  ad- 

journment. 

4.  Constitution  and  meetings  of  councils  or  of  select  governing  bodies;  and 

herein  of  quorums  and  majorities;  of  integral  parts;    and  of  stated, 
special,  and  adjourned  meetings. 
*      Mode  of  proceeding  when  convened §§257-292 


CHAPTER   XI. 

CORPORATE    RECORDS   AND   DOCUMENTS. 

Means  of  evidence.  Clerk  pro  tem.  Power  to  amend  records.  Admissibility  of 
parol  evidence.  Remedy  to  compel  delivery  of  books  and  records.  Manda- 
mus. Replevin.  Inspection  of  corporate  documents  and  records.  Records 
as  evidence.     Originals  and  authenticated  copies §§  293-305 

CHAPTER  XII. 

MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 

1.  Definition,  general  nature,  and  common-law  requisites  of  ordinances. 

2.  Signing,  publication,  and  recording. 

3.  Power  to  impose  fines,  penalties,  aud  forfeitures. 

4.  On  whom  binding,  and  notice  thereof. 

5.  Ordinances   relating  to  the  licensing,  regulating,  and  taxing  of  amuse- 

ments and  occupations,  including  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

6.  Ordinances  relating  to  public  offences. 

7.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  public  health,  safety,  and  convenience;  herein 

of  hospitals,  cemeteries,  and  burials ;  nuisances ;  markets  and  inspec- 
tion regulations;  dangerous  occupations  and  practices ;  aud  of  the 
police  powers  and  general  welfare  clause  in  charters. 

8.  Mode  of  enforcing  ordinances ;    herein  of  actions  and  prosecutions  and 

their  nature  ;  mode  of  pleading  ordinances;  requisites  of  complaints  to 
enforce  ordinances  ;  construction ;  defences ;  evidence,  &c. 

§§  306-423 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

MUNICIPAL   COURTS. 

In  England,  and  at  common  law.  American  corporation  courts.  Constitutional 
provisions.     Constructions.     Right  to  jury  trial.     Competency  of  citizens  to 


CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I.  XIX 

be  local  judges,  jurors,  and  witnesses.  Summary  convictions,  when  valid. 
Indictable  offences.  Distinctions.  Extent  of  jurisdiction.  Jury  on  appeal. 
Review  by  Superior  Courts §§  424-441 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONTRACTS. 

1.  Extent  of  power  to  contract,  and  how  conferred. 

2.  Mode  of  exercising  the  power. 

3.  Seal  not   necessary   unless   required  ;   may  be   concluded   by  vote  or 

ordinance. 

4.  When  bound  by  contracts  made  by  agents  ;  mode  of  execution. 

5.  Contracts  beyond  corporate  powers  void  ;  ultra  vires  a  defence* 

6.  Implied  contracts;  when  deducible. 

7.  Ratification  of  unauthorized  contracts. 

8.  Provisions  requiring  letting  to  the  lowest  bidder. 

9.  Contract  of  suretyship. 

10.  Rights  and  liabilities  as  respects  authorized  contracts;  cases  mentioned. 

Power  to  settle  disputed  claims  ;  to  give  extra  compensation;  to  em- 
ploy attorneys. 

11.  Contracts  for  public  works  ;  rights  of  contractors. 

12.  Same:  corporate  control  under  stipulation. 

13.  Evidences  of  indebtedness  ;  negotiable  bonds. 

14.  Ordinary  wan-ants  or  orders  ;  their  legal  nature. 

15.  Liability  of  indorsers  thereof. 

16.  Payment  and  cancellation  of  orders  and  warrants. 

17.  Rights  and  remedies  of  holders  thereof. 

18.  Defences  thereto ;  ultra  vires;  fraud;  want  of  consideration. 

19.  Orders  payable  out  of  particular  fund. 

20.  Interest  on  corporate  indebtedness'. 

21.  Railroad  aid  bonds;  course  of  decision  in  United  States  Supreme  Court. 

22.  Leading   cases  in  the  United   States   Supreme   Court  on   the   subject 

noticed. 

23.  Decision  in  State  courts  referred  to.     Author's  conclusions  stated. 

§§  442-555 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


A. 

Page 
Aaron  v.  Broiles  (64  Tex.  316)  217 

Abbett  v.  Johnson  County  (114  Ind. 

67)  1173 

Abbey  v.  Billups  (35  Miss.  618)    274,  522 
Abbot  v.  Hermon  Sch.  Dist.  (7  Me. 

118)  541 

Abbott  v.  Cottage  City  (143  Mass. 

521)  742,  760,  761,  763,  768 

v.  Mills  (3  Vt.  521)    746,  752,  763,  786 

v.  Yost  (2  Uenio,  N.  Y.  86)  324 

Abel  v.  Pembroke  (61  N.  H.  357)         209 

Aberdeen   Acad.  Trs.  v.  Aberdeen 

(21  Miss.  645)  104,  123,  135 

Aberdeen  R.  Co.  v.  Blaikee  (1  Macq. 

A.  C.  461)  514 

v.  Saunderson  (16  Miss.  663)  104,  135 

Abernethy  v.  Dennis  (49  Mo.  468)        798 

v.  Van  Buren  (52  Mich.  353)        1296 

Abilene  v.  Hendricks  (36  Kan   196)    1298 

Achlev's  Case  (4  Abb.  Pr.  35)      292,  296, 

352 
Ackley  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Hall  (113  U.  S. 

135)  87,  560,  582 

Adair  v.  Kingston  (27  U  C.  C.  P.  126)  1298 
Adams  v.  Albany  (29  Ga.  56)       397,  406, 

431 
v.  Beale  (19  Iowa,  61)  1002 

v.  Carlisle  (21  Pick.  146)  1263 

v.  Clarksburg  (23  W.  Va.  203)  709 
v.  Emerson  (6  Pick.  Mass.  57)  816 
v.  Farns worth  (15  Gray,  423)  533 
v.  Hastings  &  Dak.  R.  Co.  (18 

Minn. 260)  853 

B.Hill  (16  Me.  215)  560 

v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.  (L. 

R.  4  C.  P.  739)  1300 

v.  Lindell  (5  Mo.  App.  197)  992 

v.  London  Ry.  Co.  (2  Macn.  & 

Gor.  118)  1115 

v.  Mack  (3  N.  H.  493)  380 

v.  Memphis    &    M.    R.    Co.    (2 

Coldw.  645)  649,  676 

v.  Minneapolis  (20  Minn.  484)  257 
v.  Natick  (13  Allen,  429)  1258 

v.  Newfane  (8  Vt.  271)  715 

».  Rivers  (11  Barb.  393)  817 


Adams  v.  Rome  (59  Ga.  765)         550,  677 
v.  Saratoga  &  W.  R.  Co.  (11 

Barb.  414)  853 

v.  Saratoga  &.  W.  R.  Co.   (10 

N.  Y.  328)  707 

v.  Somerville  (2  Head,  363)  947 

v.  Walker  (34  Conn.  466)  1320 

v.  Whittlesey  (3  Conn.  560)  323 

v.  Wiscasset  Bank  (1  Me.  361)     1173 
Addis  ;;.  Pittsburgh  (85  Pa.  389)  521, 

543,  544 
Addy  v.  Janes ville  (70  Wis.  401)  1322 
Adley  v.  Reeves  (2  M.  &  S.  60)    416,  421, 

177 
Adolph  v.  Cent.   Park,   &c.  R.   Co. 

(65  N.  Y.  554)  864,  865 

Adriance  v  New  York  (1  Barb.  19)    1114 
Adsit  v.  Brady  (4  Hill  N.  Y.  630)  325 

Aerated  Bread  Co.  v.  Gregg  (L.  R. 

8Q.  B.  355)  417 

TEtna  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Middleport  (124 

U.  S.  534)  639 

jEtna  Mills  v.  Waltham  (126  Mass. 

122)  1187 

African  Soc.  for  Mut.  Reliefs.  Varick 

(13  Johns.  38)  260,262 

Agawam  v.  Hampden  County  (130 

Mass.  528)  53 

Agawam  Nat.  Bank  v.  South  Had- 

ley  (128  Mass.  503)  536,  639, 1144 

Agnew  v.  Brail  (124  111.  312)  551 

v.  Corunna  (55  Mich.  428)  1252, 1262 

Ahrens  v.  Fiedler  (43  N.  J.  L  400)     1014 

Aiken    T.    Council    v.    Harbers    (6 

.  Rich.  L.  96)  431 

v.  Lithgoe  (7  Rich.  L.  435)    752.  757, 
761,  762 
Aikin  v.  Albany,  Vt.  &  C.  R.   Co. 

(26  Barb.  289)  673 

v.  Western  R.  Co.  (20  N.  Y.  370)  182 
Airy  Street,  Re  (113  Pa.  St.  281)  87,  88 
Akron   v.    Chamberlain   (34  O.    St. 

328)  1227 

Alabama  &  Fla.  R.  Co.  v.  Kenney 

(39  Ala.  307)  683 

Alabama  Gold  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lott 

(54  Ala.  499)  1107 


XX 11 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Alabama  University  Trs.  v.  Walden 

Ala.  656)  313 

r.  Winston  (6  S.  &  P.  17)  123 

Alameda    Macad.   Co.   v.   Williams 

(70Cal.  634)  978 

Albany,  ft  (23  Wend.  277)  157, 1127.  1 131 
v.  Watervliet  T.  &  R.  Co.  (108 

N.  Y.  14)  694 

v.  Cunliff  (2  N.  Y.  165)  619.  629, 

1184 
Albany  Comr's,  &c.  (56  N.  Y.  144). 
See  Washington  Park,  &c. 
Albany   Nat.    Bank  v.  Albany    (92 

N.  Y.  363)  539 

Albany  Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Brownell 

(21  X.  V   346)  776 

Albanv  Street,  Re  (6  Abb.  Pr.  273)      157 

R  (II  Wend.  148)  693,  709,  920 

Alberger  u.  Baltimore  (64  Md.  1)         152 

Albert  Cheese  Co.  v.  Leeming  (31 

U.  C.  C.  P.  272)  538 

Albion  o.  Hetrick  (90  Ind.  545)  1264,  1285 
Albright    o.    Bedford    County   (106 

Pa.  St.  582)  316 

v.  Chester  T.  Council  (9  Rich. 

L.  399)  516 

Albritton  v.  Huntsville  ((30  Ala.  480)    138, 

1280,  1283,  1284,  1286,  1301 

Alcona  v.  White  (54  .Mich.  503)  1128 

Alcorn  v.  Horner  (38  .Miss.  652)      77,  920 

v.  Philadelphia  (44  Pa.  St.  348)  1195, 

1202 
v.  Philadelphia  (112  Pa.  St.  494)    900 
Alden  v.  Alameda  County  (43  Cal. 

270)  1028,  1142 

v.  Minneapolis  (24  Minn.  254)      1225, 

1319 
v.  Pinney  (12  Fla.  348)  788 

v.  Rounsville  (7  Met.  219)  272 

Aldred's  Case  (9  Coke,  59)  889,  890 

Aldricb  y.  Drury  (8  R.  I.  554)  817 

v.  Gorham  (77  Me.  287)       1262,  1263 
v.  Howard  (7  R.  I.  87  ;  8  R.  I. 

246)  44!),  454,  475 

v.  Londonderry  (5  Vt.  Ill)  11  13 

v.  Pelham  (1  Gray,  510)  L266 

v.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  241)  1222 

v.  Tripp  (11  R.  I.  141)         1180,  1183, 
1193,  1206,  1210 
Alexander  v.  Alexandria  (5  Cranch, 

2)  144 

v.  Baltimore  (5  Gill,  383)       70:.,  716, 
721,  726,  898,899,  919,  L098 
v.  Bennett  (60  N.  Y.  204)  507 

v.  Bethlehem  (29  X.  J.  L.  375)       483 
v.  Dist.  Columbia  (3  Mackey, 

192)  735 

v.   Greenville    T.    Council    (54 

Miss.  659)  474 

v.  Helber  (35  Mo.  334)  997 

v.  Ilovt  (7  Wend    vi,  324 

/•.  McDowell  (07  N.  C.  330)  1059 

t;.  Milwaukee  (16  WTis.  247)         1217, 
1226,  1227 


Page 
Alexander  v.   Tolleston    Club    (110 

III.  65)  671 

v.  Wilmington  &  R.  R.  Co.  (3 

Stmb   L.  r>94)  166 

Alexandria  &  F.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Alexan- 
dria &  W.  R.  Co.  (75  Va. 
780)  809 

Alexandria  Bank.    [SeeMech.  Bank 

of  A.] 
Alexandria  Canal  Co.  v.  Swann  (5 

How.  83)  552 

Alger  v.  Lowell  (3  Allen,  402)  1257, 

1269,  1264,  1287 
Allaire  v.  Hartshorne  (21  N.  J.  L. 

665)  583 

Alleghany   Co.   Sch.    Com'rs  v.  A. 

Co.  Com'rs  (20  Md.  449)       1013, 
1060 
Alleghany  Co.  Sup.  v.  Van  Campen 

(3  Wend.  49)  299 

Allegheny  v.  Campbell  (107  Pa.  St. 

530)  179,  1205,  1206 

v.  McClurkan  (14  Pa.  St.  81)        530, 
531,  638 
v.  Ohio  &  P.  R.  Co.  (26  Pa.  St. 

355)  811,  850 

v.  Zimmerman  (95  Pa.  St.  287)      449 
Allegheny  City's  Appeal  (41  Pa.  St. 

60)     "  1000 

Allegheny  County  v.  Gibson  (90  Pa. 

St.  397)  1167,  1168 

v.  Leckey  (0  S.  &  R.  106)  3B1 

v.  Shaw  (34  Pa.  St.  301)  1175 

Allen  v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  1  Virginia 
Coupon  Cases]  (114  U.  S. 
311)  9'.i0,  1120,  1121 

v.  Brooklyn  (4  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 

598)  1180 

v.  Burlington  (45  Vt.  202)  1148 

v.  Chippewa  Falls  (52  Wis.  430)  1322 

v.  Cooper  (22  Me.  133)  360,  541 

v.  Decatur  (24  111.332)  1188 

v.  Drew  (44  Vt.  174)  921 

v.  Galveston  (51  Tex.  302)     146,  520, 

933,  944,  957,  995,  1000 

v.  Hancock  (16  Vt.  230)  1264 

v.  Jay  (60  Me.  124)         233,  573,  696, 

704,  895 

v.  Jones  (47  Ind.  438)      699,  705,  724 

v.  Louisiana  ( 103  U.  S.  80)     238,  630 

v.  McKean  (1  Sumn.  276)         93,  319 

v.  Taunton  (19  Pick.  485)  53,  54, 

216,  217 

v.  Turner  (11  Gray,  426)  1116 

v.  Willard  (57  Pa.  St.  374)  1308 

Allentown  v.  Grim  (109  Pa.  St.  113)     408 

v.  Hower  (93  Pa.  St.  332)  1000 

v.  Kramer  (73  Pa.  St.  406)  1282,  1320 

Allentown  Bor.  v.  Saeger  (20  Pa.  St. 

421)  1148,1149,1154 

Aller  v.  Cameron  (3  Dillon  C.  C.  198)  (314 
AHerton  v.  Chicago  (0  Fed.  R.  555)  427 
Alletson  v.  Chichester  (L.  R.  10  C. 

P.  319)  1302 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


XX111 


Alley  v.  Adams  Co.  Sup.  (7G  111.  101)  240 
Alley  in  Pittsburgh,  Re  (104  Pa.  St. 

622)  762 

Alline  v.  Le  Mars  (71  Iowa,  G54)  1207, 1286 
Allison  v.  Juniata  County  (50  Pa.  St. 

351)  566,  570 

v.  Louisville,  H.  C.  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(9  Bush,  247)  134,  1111 

v.  Louisville,  H.  C.  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(10  Bush,  1)  227 

All  Saints'  Church  v.  Lovett  (1  Hall 

(N.  Y.),  191)  258 

Allston's  Lessee  v.  Saunders  (IBay, 

30)  797 

Alpers  v.  San  Francisco  (32  Fed.  R. 

503)  1098 

Altemus  v.  New  York  (6  Duer,  446)     547 
Alter  v.  Simpson  (46  Mich.  138)  284 

Althen  v.  Kelly  (32  Minn.  280)  816 

Alton  v.  Hope  (68  111.  167)        1158,  1223, 

1282,  1321 
v.  111.  Transp.  Co.  (12  111.  38)        659, 
764,  768,  769,  801 
v.  Kirsch  (68  111.  261)  480,482 

v.  Madison  County  (21  111.  115)    1143 
v.  Mulledy  (21  111.  76)  522,  534 

Alton  &  U.  A.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Deitz  (50 

111.  210)  865 

Altoona  v.  Lotz  (114  Pa.  St.  238)        1285 
Alves'  Ex.  v.  Henderson  (16  B.  Mon. 

131)  671,  769,  798,  803 

Alvord  v.  Ashley  (17  111.  363)  740 

v.  Barrett  (16  Wis.  175)  325 

v.  Syracuse  Sav.  Bank  (98  N.  Y. 

599)  560 

Amboy  v.  Sleeper  (31  111.  499)  437 

Ambrose  v.  State  (6  Ind.  351)  440 

Amelung  v.  Seekamp  (9  G.  &  J.  468)    786 
American  Bible  Soc.  v.  Marshall  (15 

O.  St.  537)  661 

American  Emigrant  Co.  v.  Iowa  R. 

L.  Co.  (52  Iowa,  325)  659 

v.  Wright  County  (97  U.  S.  339)    514 
American   Ins.    Co.    v.   Oakley    (9 

Paige,  496)  533 

American  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bruce  (105 

U.  S.  328)  586,  699',  601,  617 

American  Nic.  Pav.  Co.  v.  Elizabeth 
City  (4  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 
189)  1180 

American  Print  Works  v.  Lawrence 

(23  N.  J.  L.  590)  325,  1164 

American   Ry.  Frog  Co.   v.   Haven 

(101  Mass.>38)  1057 

American  Transp.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  (20 

N.  Y.  381)  948 

American  U.  Exp.  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph 

(66  Mo.  675)  909,  911 

Americus  v.  Eldridge  (64  Ga.  524)      1215, 

1328 
Amery  v.  Keokuk  (42  Iowa,  701)  914 
Ames  v.  Kansas  (111  U.  S  449)  1089 

v.  Lake  Sup.  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  (21 

Minn.  241)  724,  726 


Pago 
Ames  v.  Port  Huron  Log.  Co.  (11 

Mich.  L39)  213 

Amesbury    v.  Bowditch  M.  F.  Ins. 

Co.  (6  Gray,  696)  487 

Araey  v.  Allegheny  City  (24  How. 

364)   208,  226,  237,  407,  410,  564, 
649,  946 
Amite  City  v.  Clements  (24  La.  An. 

27)  95,  97,  998 

Amos  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (46  Wis.  695)    1304 
Amperse  v.   Kalamazoo  C.  Council 

(59  Mich.  78)  1015 

Amrine  v.  Kan.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (7  Kan. 

178)  1124 

Amy   v.  Des   Moines  Co.   Sup.  (11 

Wall.  136)   325,  1008,  1044,  1045, 
1331 
v.  Dubuque  (98  U.  S.  470)  561 

v.  Galena  (7  Fed.  R.  163)        118,  675 
v.  Selma  (77  Ala.  103)  252 

v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax.    Dist.   (114 

U.  S.  387)  552,  996 

v.  Watertown  (130  U.  S.  301)       250, 

254,  307,  577,  1053 

v.  Watertown  (130  U.  S.  320)       798, 

1053 

Anderson,  Re  (60  N.  Y.  457)  388 

v.  Commonwealth  (14  Bush,  171)    78 

v.  East  (117  Ind. 126)  1157, 1159, 1275 

t;.  Hamilton  Co.  Com'rs  (12  O. 

St.  635)  374 

v.  Kern's  Drain.  Co.  (14  Ind.  199)  426, 

700 
v.  O'Conner  (98  Ind.  168)  152.  385 
v.  St.  Louis  (47  Mo.  479)  707,  716, 1123 
v.  Santa  Anna  Tp.  (116  U.S.  356)  134, 
579,  584,  587 
v.  State  (23  Miss.  459)  952,  1116, 1169 
Anderson   Co.  Comr's  v.  Beal  (113 

U.  S.  227)  572,  595,  596,  599 

v.  Houston  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (52 

Tex.  228)  596 

Andover  v.  Grafton  (7  N.  H.  298)  54,  527, 

562 
v.  Sutton  (12  Met.  182)  883 

Andover  &  M.  Tump.  Co.  v.  Gould 

(6  Mass.  40)  815,  1231 

Andrews  v.  King  (77  Me.  224)  337 

v.  Portland  (79  Me.  484)  319 

v.  Pratt  (44  Cal.  309)  316,  671 

v.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (37  Me. 

256)  394 

v.  United  States  (2  Story  C  C. 

202)  312,  315 

Annapolis  v.  Harwood  (32  Md.  471)    941, 

999 
v.  State  (30  Md.  212)  88 

Anne  Arundel  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Duckett 

(20  Md.  468)  108,  391, 1013, 1282 
Anness  v.  Providence  (13  R.  I.  17)  1222 
Anonymous  (1  Barnard.  402)  378 

Ansley  v.  Wilson  (50  Ga.  418)  1000 

Anthony  v.  Adams  (1  Met.  284)       53,  54, 
567,  1183,  1186,  1187,  1214 


XXIV 


TAI1LE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Anthony  v.  Brecon  Markets  Co.  (L. 

'  K.  •_'  Ex.  167)  1IT 

v.  Halderman  (7  Kan.  50)  285 

,.  Jasper*  ounty  l  LO]  U.  S.693; 

I  Dillon  C.  C.  136)  577,  594,032, 

633,  634 

Anthony  Street,  Re  (20  Wend.  61b)     711. 

712,  713 
Antones  v.  Eslava's  Heirs  (9  Port. 

527)  740,  743,  767 

Antoni  v.  Greenhow  (107  U.  S.  769)     996 
Appeal  of  A.      [See  A.'s  Appeal.) 
Appeal    Tax  Court  v.  No.  Cent.  R. 

Co.  (50  .Md.  417)  969 

Appleby  v.  New  York  (15  Bow.  Pr. 

'  428)  529,  543 

Applegate  v.  Ernst  (3  Bush,  G48)  969 

Arbegust  v.  Louisville  (2  Bush,  271)  972 
Arbrush  v.  Oakdale  (28  .Minn.  61)  731 
Arents  v.  Commonwealth  (18  Gratt. 

750)  651 

Argenti   v.  San  Francisco   (16  Cal. 

255)   149,  200,  521,  531,  535,  537, 
547,558,  568,  722,923 
Argus  Co.  v.  Albany  (55  N.  Y.  495)      522 
Arimond  v.  Green  Bay  &  M.  Canal 

Co.  (31  Wis.  310)  1230,  1325 

Arkadelphia  v.  Windham   (49  Ark. 

L39)  1248,1252 

Arkwright   v.  Cantrell  (7  Ad.  &  E. 

565)  309 

Arlington  v.  Merrick  (2  Saund.  403)    301 

Armington  v.  Barnett  (15  Vt.  745)       683 

Armstrong  v.  Ackley  (71  Iowa,  76)    1298 

v.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs  (37  Pa. 

St.  237).       674,  1004,  1027,  1028, 

1037,  1038,  1056,  1058,  1069 

o.  Brunswick  (79  Mo.  319)  1158 

v.  Dalton  (4  Dev.  568)  798,  803 

v.    Dearborn     Co.     Com'rs     (4 

Blackf.  208).  94 

v.  St.  Louis  (69  Mo.  309)  716 

v.  St.  Paul  (30  Minn.  299)  1225,  1228 

v.  Topeka  (36  Kan.  432)  750 

Armstrong    County  v.   Brinton   (47 

Pa.  St.  307)  229 

v.  Clarion  Co.  (66  Pa.  St.  218)      1144 
Armsworth  v.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co. 

(11  Jur.  758)  1288 

Arn  o.  Kansas  City  (15  Fed.  R.  236)  1322 

Arnold  v.  Blaker  (L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  433)    741 

v.  Cambridge  (100  Mass.  352)      978, 

1124 
v.  Cov.  &  Cine.  Br.  Co.  (1  Du- 

vall,  372)  696,  733 

v.  Holhrook  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  96)     447, 

711 
v.  Poole  (4  M.  &  G.  860)  221 

v.  Shields  (5  Dana,  18)  717,  1133, 

1266 
Arnot  v.  Mc.Clure  (4  Denio,  45)  709 

Arnott  v,  Bradley  (23  U.  C.  C.  P.  1)  295 
Arnoult  v.  New  Orleans  (11  La.  An. 

54)  88, 267 


Page 
Aroma  v.  Auditor  (15  Fed.  R.  843)  594 
Arrow-smith  o.  -New  Orleans  (24  La. 

An.  194)  744,  757 

Ash  v.  People  (11  Mich.  347)        181,  125, 
427,  456,  458,  460 
Ashbrook  v.  Commonwealth  (1  Bush, 

139)  217,  449 

Ashbury  Ry.  C.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Riche 

(L.  li.  7  II.  L.  C.  653)  540 

Ashbj  v.  White  (1  Smith  L.  C.  264)     688 
Ashley  v.  Port  Huron  (35  Mich.296)  1188, 
1217,  1230,  1321,  1324,  1325,  1329 
v.  Reynolds  (2  Stra.  916)  1 148 

Ashton  v.  Ellsworth  (48  III   299)  386,  416 
Ashville  Com'rs  v.  Means  (7  Ired.  L. 

406)  471.940,941 

Asken  v.  Manning  (38  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

345)  1078 

Askew  v.  Hale  County  (54  Ala.  639)     42, 

43,  108, 1173,  1245 

Askin  v.  London  (1  U.  C.  Q.  B.  292)    312 

Aspen  v.  A.  Town  &  L.  Co.  (10  Col. 

191)  1006 

Aspinwall  v.  Daviess  Co.  Com'rs  (22 

How.  304)  95,  121,  230,  236,  615, 
622,  626,  627,  639,  641,  64 

1034 
Assessors   of  Philadelphia  v.  Com- 

missioners  (3  Brewster,  333)  237 

Aston  v.  McClure,  (102  Pa.  St.  322)    131  1 

v.  Newton  (134  Mass.  507)         •  1267 

Astor,  Re  (50  N.  Y.  363)  89 

Astor  (J.  J.)  v.  New  York  (62  N.  Y. 

580)  159,  977 

Astor  (W.  B.)  v.  New  York  (62N.Y. 

567)  99,100,159,360 

Astor  (and  Bailey)  v.  N.  Y.  Arcade 

R.  Co.  (113  X.  Y.93)  89,839,840 
Atchison  v.  Bartholow  (4  Kan.  124)  80,  82 
v.  Butcher  (3  Kan.  104)  134,  235,  618 
v.  Byrnes  (22  Kan.  65)  558 

v.  Challiss  (9  Kan.  603)      1320,  1325, 
1328,  1334 
v.  Jansen  (21  Kan.  560)      1245,  1272, 

1283 

v.  King  (9  Kan.  550)  409,  1261,  1281, 

12S7,  1295 

v.  State  (34  Kan.  379)  1118,  1152 

v.  Twine  (9  Kan.  350)  1167 

Atchison  &  Neb.  R.  Co.  v.  Garside 

(10  Kan.  552)  843,  848,  855 

v.  Maquilkilon  (12  Kan.  301)  111 

Atchison  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mo.  Pac. 

Ry.  Co.  (31  Kan.  660)  833 

v.  Nave  (38  Kan.  744)  879 

Athearn  v.  Millersburg  Indep.  Dist. 

(33  la.  105)  378 

Athens  v.  Carnack  (75  Ga.  429)  550 

v.  Georgia  R.  Co.  (72  Ga.  800)       423 

Atkins  v.  Randolph  (31  Vt.  226)  122,  123, 

1011 
Atkinson  v.   Goodrich  Transp.  Co. 

(60  Wis.  141)  396 

v.  Marietta,  &c.  R.Co.  (15  0.  St.  21)  82 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XXV 


Page 

Atlanta  v.  Buchanan  (76  Ga.  585)       1247 

v.  Central  R.  &  B.  Co.  (53  Ga.  120)  697 

v.  Charape  (66  Ga.  669)  1272 

v.  Gate  City  Gasl.  Co.  (71  Ga. 

106)  423,  780 

v.  Green  (69  Ga.  386)  1222,  1239 

v.  Macon  &  W.  R.  Co.  (59  Ga. 

251)  L093 

v.  Perdue  (53  Ga.  607)         1272,  1301 

r.  White  (33  Ga.  229)  456 

v.  Wilson  (59  Ga.  544)  1259 

Atlantic  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Cleino  (2 

Dillon  C.  C.  175)  953,  1121 

v.  St.  Louis  (66  Mo.  228)  879 

Atlantic  City  W.  W.  Co.  v.  Atl.  City 

(39  N.  J.  Eq.  367)    513,  826,  828, 
829 
Atlantic  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sanders 

(36  N.  H.  252)  363 

Attala  Co.   Pol.  Bd.  v.    Grant    (17 

Miss.  77)  1028,1070 

Attaway  v.  Carters ville  (68  Ga.  740)  1197 
Attornev-General  v.  Acton  Local  Bd. 

"(L.  R.  22  Ch.  D.221)  1326 

v.  Aspinwall  (2  Myl.  &  Cr.  613; 

1  Keen,  513)  221,  285,  509,  1100, 
1101 
v.  Benzie  Co.  Sup.  (34  Mich.  211)  211 
v.  Birmingham  (4  K.  &  J.  528)  452 
v.  Birmingham  (3  L.  R.  Eq.  552)  1103 
v.  Birmingham  &  O.  J.  R.  Co. 

(4  De  G.  &  Sm.  490)  1115 

v.  Boston  (123  Mass.  460)  1004,  1005, 

1018,  1057,  1000, 1061,  1084, 1085, 
1094,  1099,  1105,  1115 
v.  Boston  (142  Mass.  200)  809 

v.  Boulton    (21    Grant    (Can.), 

598)  746 

v.  Bowman  (2  B.  &  P.  532)  503 

v.  Bradford  (L.  R.  2  Eq.  71)  452 

v.  Bradley  (36  Mich.  447)         88,  267 
v.  Brown  (1  Swanst.  265)  1102 

v.  Brown  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  89)  454 

v.  By  town  &  Nepeau  Road  Co. 

(2  Grant  (Can.)  62G)  789 

v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (35 

Wis.  425)  80 

v.  Colney  (L.  R.  4  Ch.  146)  452 

v.  Davis  (44  Mo.  131)  333 

v.  Detroit  (41  Mich.  224)         545,  546 
v.  Detroit  (26  Mich.  263)  1105 

v.  Detroit  (55  Mich.  181)  521 

v.  Dorking  Union  (L.  R.  20  Ch. 

D.  595)  1320,  1326 

v.  Dublin  (1  Bligh  N.  R.  312)      1099, 
1102, 1103,  1115 
v.  Earl  Clarendon  (17  Ves  491)      340 
v.  Ely  (4  Wis.  420)  281 

v.  Exeter  (29  Beav.  44)  1103 

v.  Foote  (11  Wis.  14)  1080 

v.  Gas  Consumers'  Co.  (19  Eng. 

L.  Eq.  639)  454 

v.  Gooderich    (5    Grant    (Can.) 

402),  746, 773 


Paga 

Attorney-General  v.  Gower  (9  Mod. 

226)  246 

v.  Hackney  Local  Bd.  (L.  R.  20 

Eq  626)  L322 

v.  Heel  is  12  Sim.  &  St.  67)  1099,  1102 
v.  Heishon  (18  N.J.  Eq.  410)         782, 
788,  784 
v.  Holihan  (29  .Mich.  116)  207 

v.  Kerr  (2  Beav.  420)  259 

v.  Lake  County  (33  Mich.  289)  211 
v.  Lathrop  (2)  Midi.  2:;.",)  512 

v.  Leeds  (L.  R.  5  Ch.  App.  583)  1322 
v.  Leicester  (9  Beav.  546)  259,  1102 
v.  Lichfield  (13  Sim.  517)  185,  1101 
v.  Lichfield  (11  Beav.  120)  286,  1102 
v.  Life  &  F.  Ins.  Co.   (9  Paige, 

470) 
v.  Liverpool  (1  Myl.  &  Cr.  171)   1'-  >9, 
1102,  1115 
v.  Lock  (3  Atk.  164)  158 

r.  Metrop.  H.  Co.  (125  Mass.  51 
v.  Molson  (10  Grant  (Can.),    480)  716 
v.  Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.  (19  N.  J. 

Eq.  386)  851 

v.  Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.  (20  N.  J. 

Eq.  530)  850 

v.  New  York  (3  Duer,  119)  107 

v.  Northampton  (143  Mass.  589)  1129 
v.  Norwich  (2  Myl.  &  C.  406)        220, 
221,  553 
v.  Norwich  (16  Sim.  225)  1101 

v.  Parker  ( 3  Atk.  570)  275 

v.  Paterson  (1  Stock. (N.  J.)  624)  71'., 

L092 
v.  Plymouth  (9  Beav.  67)    1096,  1102 
17.  Poole  (4  Myl.  &  Cr.  17)      285,  509, 
1100,  1101 
v.  Radloff  (10  Exchq.  84)  503 

v.  Revnolds  (1  Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  131)  1115 
v.  Rye  (7  Taunt.  546)  261 

v.  Salem  (103  Mass.  138)    1084,  L085, 
1099,  1115 
v.  Sheffield  Gas   Cons.  Co.  (19 

Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  639)  454 

v.  Shrewsbury  (6  Beav.  220)        212, 
663,  668 
v.  Siddon  (1  C.  &J.  220)  503 

v.  Steward  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  415)  449 
v.  Stickle    (20   N.   J.   Eq.  530). 

[See  Morris  &  E.  R.  Co.  v. 

Prudden.] 
v.  Sullivan  (32  L.  J.  Ex.  92)  503 

v.  Toronto  (10  Grant  (Can),  480)  746 
r.  Tudor  Ice  Co.  (104  Mass.  239)  1115 
v.  Utica  Ins.  Co.  (2  Johns.  Ch. 

371)  352,  1075 

u.  Wisan  (5De  Gex,  M.  &  G.)  liol 
v.  Williams  (140  Mass.  329)  891 

v.  Wilson  (9  Sim.  30)  259,  1096,  1100, 

1102 
r.  Winnebago,  L.  &  F.  PI.   R 

Co.  (11  Wis.  42)  962 

v.  Worcester  (2  Phil.  3)  259 

Atwater  v.  Baltimore  (31  Md.  462)     1196 


XX  VI 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
A ul. urn  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Quick  (99  \. 

X    138)  299 

Auburn   Tbeol.   Sem.   v.  Cliilds  (4 

Paige,  419)  661 

Auckland  v.  Westm.  Local  Bd.  (L. 

R.  7  Ch.  597)  1166 

Auditor  v.  Daviea  (2  Ark.  494)  55 

Augusta  '.  Ga.  H.  i  15.  Co.  (26  Ga. 

651)  969 

V.  Harper  (59  Ga.  151)  1299,  1310 

r.  Leadbetter(16Me.45)  53,551,1139 
r.  North  (57  Me.  392)  995 

r.  Walton  (77  Ga.  517)  665 

Augusta  Bank  v.  Augusta  (49  Me. 

5i)7)  225 

Augusta  C.  Council  v.  Dunbar  (50 

Ga.387)      942,951,964,  969,  999 
v.  Port  Royal  &  A.  By.  Co.  (74 

Ga.  658)  851 

v.  Sweeney  (44  Ga.  463)  313 

Augusta  Tp.  Municipality, lie  (12  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  522)  1017 

Augusta  Tp.  Boad,  lie  (17  Pa.  St. 

71)  366,392 

Augusta  Trs.  v.  Perkins  (3  B.  Mon. 

437)  671,  769,  77.°, 

r.  Perkins  (8  B.  Mon.  207)      757,  705 

Aull  v.  Lexington  ( 18  Mo.  -101)  44:; 

Aurora  o.  Bitner  (100  1ml.  396)  1295,  1297 

v.  Colshire  (65  Ind.  484)  1267 

r.  Fox  (78  [nd.  1)  374,  818 

v.  Gillett  (66  111.  132)  1223, 1320, 1324 

v.  Ilillnian  (90  III.  61)  1298 

v.  Love  (93  111.  521)  1317 

r.  Pulfer  (56  111.  270)  1259, 1260,  1263, 

1285,  1320 

v.  Reed  (57  111.  29)      814,  1223,  L320, 

1323,  1324 

v.  West  (9  Ind.  74)  95,  164,  225 

v.  West  (22  Ind.  88)  95,  235,  236, 

560,581,618,  620,  611 

Austin  v.  Allen  (6  Wis.  L34)  374 

v.  Austin  Gasl.  &  C.  Co.  (69  Tex. 

180)  909,  952 

v.  Bethnal  Green  Guardians  (L. 

R.  9C.  P.  91)  638 

v.  Coggeshall  (12  R.  I.  329)     107,  222 
v.  Colony  (51  Iowa,  102)  185 

v.  French  (7  Met.  126)  305 

v.  Gulf,  Col.  &  S.  Fe  R.  Co.  (45 

Tex.  234)  933,957 

v.  Murray  (16  Pick.  126)        213,  404, 

413.  Ill,   165.   1S7 

v.  Santa  Fe  (45  Tex.  27)  77s 

v.  Walton  (68  Tex.  507)  481 

Austin's  Case  (1  Ventr.)  183  1240 

Austrian  v.  Guy  (21  Fed    R.  500)  76 

Avery  v.  Springport  (14  Blatchf.  272) 

639 
Ayer  v.  Emery  (14  Allen,  67)  072 

v.  Norwich  (39  Conn.  376)  1263,  1269 
Ayeridge  v.  Soc.  Circle  Com'rs  (60 

Ga.  404 )  88 

Ayers  lie  (123  U.  S.  443)  996 


Page 
Ayers  v.  Lawrence  (59  N.  Y.  192)      1 106, 

1114 
Ayres  v.  Pa.  R.  Co.  (48  N.  J.  L.44)      767 


B. 


Bab  v.  Clerk  (F.  Moore,  411)  420 

Babbit  v.  Savoy  (3  Cush.  530)  2211 

Dal, cock  r.  Buffalo  (56  N.  Y.  268) 

154,  450 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (58  Wis.  230)       1 148 

v.  Goodrich    (47   Cal.  488)   199,   527, 

563,  1030 

v.  Helena  (34  Ark.  499)  144 

Babson  u.  Rockport  (Ml  Mass.  93)     1257 

Baby  v.  Baby  (5  U.  C.  Q.  B.  510)  518 

r.  Baby  (8  U.  C.  Q.  B.  76)  300 

Bacheller  v.  Pinkham  (68  Me.  253)       324 

Sadler's  Case  (20  Pa.  St.  425)  337 

Bachler's  Appeal  (90  Pa.  St.  207)  690 

Backman  v.  Charles  town  (42  N.  H. 

125)  533,  539 

Backus  v.  Detroit  (49  Mich.  110)  166,  171, 

176,  743,  793 

v.  Lebanon  (11  N.  II.  19)  689 

Bacon    v.    Boston    (3  Cush.  (Mass.) 

174)    888,  1252,  1266,  1272,  1273, 

1283 

v.  Robertson  (18  How.  480)   242,  244, 

246,  250 

v.  Walker  (77  Ga.  336)  1098 

Badgelv   v.  Bender  (3  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

o.  s.  221)  747 

Badger  v.  Bolles  (93  U.  S.  699)  1053 

v.  Boston  (130  Mass.  170)  735 

v.  United  States  (93  U.  S.  599)    307, 

308,  1052 

Badkins  v.  Robinson  (53  Ga.  613)  456,  460 

Baes  v.  Hewitt  (20  Wis.  400)  582 

Bagg  v.  Detroit   (5  Mich.  336)  871,  921, 

1110 
Bagg's  Case  (11  Coke,  93)     328,  333.  S 

338    .1 
(2  Kyd,  52)  326,  327 

Bagley  v.  People  (5  N.  W.  R.  415)        786 
Bagot's  Case  (7  Edw.  IV.  29)  71 

Bailey  v.  Fairfield  (Brayt.  (Vt.)  126)  1288 
v.  Jamieson  (L.  R.  1  C.  P.  829)      745 
v.  New  York  (3  Hill,  531)       108,  109, 
115,324,  1162,  1167,  1180,  1194, 
1206,  1209,  1211,  1213 
[See,    also,    New     York    v. 
Bailey,  2  Denio  433| 
v.  N.  Y.  Arcade  Ry.   Co.   (113 

N.  Y.615)  840 

v.  Paulina  (69  Iowa,  463)  1150 

v.    Phila.,    W.    &     B.     R.    Co. 

(4  Harring.  (Del.)  389)     776,  794 
v.  Woburn  (126  Mass.  416)    697,  1187 
Bailey's  Case  (2   Demo,  433).     [See 

New  York  v.  Bailey.] 
Bailey  ville  v.  Lowell  (20  Me.  178)  551,  552 
Bail/,  Re,  (2  Cow.  479)  1014 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


XXVI 1 


Bailiffs  of  Brigenoth  (2  Stra.  808)      1072 
Bain  v.  Mitchell  (82  Ala.  304)  494 

Bainbridge  v.  Sherlock  (29  Ind.  364)     172 
Baird  v.  Bank  of  Wash.  (11  S.  &  li. 

411)  070 

v.  New  York  (96  N.  Y.  567)  524 

v.  Rice  (03  Fa.  St.  489)  738,  764,  700, 

776,  794 

Baker  v.  Boston  (12  Pick.  184)     152,  153, 

212,  405,  1183,  1203 

v.  Chambles  (4  Greene  (la.),  428)  524 

v.  Cincinnati  (11  O.  St.  534)  908, 

1149,  1151 

v.  Gartside  (80  Pa.  St.  498)  992 

v.  Johnson  (41  Me.  15)         1009,  1010 

v.  Johnson    County    (33    Iowa, 

151)  523,  501,  5G8,  798 

v.  Johnston  (21  Mich.  319)     738,  739, 
744,  745,  757,  759,  760,  761,  763, 
764,  700 
v.  Madison  (62  Wis.  137)  L255 

v.  Neff  (73  Ind.  68)  071 

v.  Pittsburgh  (4  Fa.  St.  49)  313 

v.  Portland  (58  Me.  199)       387,  1204, 

1287 
v.  St.  Louis  (75  Mo.  671)  716 

v.  St.  Paul  (8  Minn.  491)  738,739 
v.  Shephard  (24  N.  H  212)  321,  340 
v.  State  (27  Ind.  485)  325,  391 

v.  Utica  (19  N.  Y.  326)  312,557 

v.  Windham  (13  Me.  74)  220,  374 

Balch    v.    Essex    Co.   Com'rs    (103 

Mass.  106)  702,  708 

Baldwin  v.  Bangor  (30  Me.  518)  714 

v.  Buffalo  (35  N.  Y.  375)  745 

v.  Calkins  (10  Wend.  160)  1127 

v.  Franks  (120  U.  S.  688)  165 

v.  Green  (10  Mo.  410)  144,  808 

v.  Greenwood's  Turnp.  Co.   (40 

Conn.  238)  1203,  1278 

v.  Montgomery  C.  Council   (53 

Ala.  437)  963 

v.  Murphy  (82  111.  485)  432 

v.  Otoe  County  (111  U.  S.  1)  220 

v.  Philadelphia  (99  Pa.  St.  164)      311 

Baldwin    Co.    Ordinary    v.    Liquor 

Dealers  (42  Ga.  325)  431 

Balfe  v.  Bell  (40  Ind.  337)  953 

Ball  v.  Armstrong  (10  Ind.  181)   888,  1309 

v.  Balfe  (41  Ind.  221)  991 

v.  Brigliam  (5  Mass.  400)  1125 

v.  Fag^g  (07  Mo.  481)  296 

v.  Lappius  (3  Or.  55)  1007 

v.  Poor  (81  Ky.  20)  998 

v.  Ray  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  467)  447 

v.  Winchester  (32  N.  H.  435)       1172, 

1173,  1330 

v.  Woodbine  (61  Iowa,  83)  1157, 

1167,  1195 

Ballard  v.  Davis  (31  Miss.  525)  360 

Baltimore  v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (6  Gill, 

288)  969 

v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (21  Md.  50)    292, 

1093,  1099 


Baltimore  v.  Black  (56  Md.  333)  7 1 1 

v.  Board,     &c.    (15     Md.    376). 

[Sic  v.  State  Board,  &c] 

v.  Bouldin  (23  Md.  328)  709,  084 

v.  Brannan  (14  Md.  227)      1267,  1281 

v.  Chase  (2  Gill  &  J.  370)         997,  999 

v.  Clunet  (23  Md.  449)    389,  486,  693, 

694,  716 

v.  Eschbach  (18  Md.  276)       518,  519, 

708,  979,  1183,  1187 

v.  Gill  (31  Md.  375)       151,  197,  1109, 

1111,  1117 

v.  Green  Mt.  Cem.  Prop.  (7  Md. 

517)  9.",! 

v.  Hanson  (01  Md.  402)  916 

v.  Hook  (02  Md.  371)  707 

v.  Horn  (26  Md.  191)     132,  695,  1099, 

1117 
v.  Howard  (6  Har.  &  J.  383)  997,  999 
v.  Johns  Hopkins  Ilosp.  (50  Md. 

1)  912,933 

v.  Lefferman  (4  Gill  (Md.)  425)   1118, 

1150,  1151 

v.  Marriott  (9  Md.  160)       1013,  1261, 

1281 

v.  Musgrave  (48  Md.  272)      517,  518, 

713,  714 

v.  O'Donnell  (53  Md.  110)  1303 

v.  O'Neill  (03  Md.  330)         1193,  1199 

v.  Pendleton  (15  Md.  12)     1281,  1282, 

1293,  1393 

v.  Porter  (18  Md.  284)  133,  1099, 

1111,  1117,  1119,  1122 

v.  Poultney  (25  Md.  18,  107)  342, 

359,534,  1107 

v.  Radecke  (49  Md.)  400,  414 

v.  Reynolds  (20  Md.  1)  518,  519,  521, 

541 
v.  Root  (8  Md.  102)  K52 

v.  St.  Agnes  Hosp.  (48  Md.  419)    720, 

lis* 
v.  Scharf  (54  Md.  499)  154,  406 

v.  State  Bd.   of  Police  (15  Md. 

370)         81,  86,  95,  102,  269,  270, 

294,  562,  942,  952 

v.  White  (2  Gill,  444)      166, 169,  172, 

174,  175,  177,  178 

v.  White  (62  Md.  362)  751 

Baltimore  &   O.  R.  Co  v.  Boyd  (63 

Md.  325)  707 

v.  Jefferson  County  (29  Fed.  R. 

305)  88 

v.  Mali  (66  Md.  53)  857 

v.  Marshall  Co.  Sup.  (3  W.  Va. 

319)  952 

Baltimore  &  Susq.  R.  Co.  v.  Nesbit 

(10  How.  395)  711 

Baltimore  Turnp.,  Re  (5  Binn.  484)      361 
Bamford  v.  lies  (3  Exch.  380)  301 

v.  Turnley  (3  B.  &  S.  62)  146 

Banbury  Corp.,  Re  (10  Mod.  346)  242,  304 
Bancroft    ".  Cambridge   (120  Mass. 

438)  212 

v.  Lynnfield  (18  Pick.  566)       53,  220 


XXVlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Bangor  v.  Lansil  (51  Me.  521)  1S2U 

Bangs  r.  Snow  (1  Mass.  181)  1  IT 

Bank  for  Savings  in  N.  Y.  v.  New 

fork  (  L02  N.  V.  313)  207 

Bank  of  Alexandria,  &c.  (5  Wheat. 

326;   and  1  Pet.  299).    [See 

Mech.  B.  of  A.,  &c] 
Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle  (13  Pet.  519)  661 
Bank  of  Brighton  v.  Smith  (5  Allen, 

416)  299 

Bank   of  Charlotte,   etc.    (92   U.  S. 

122).      [See  First  Nat.  B.  of 

C,  &c.] 
Bank  of  Chenango  v.  Brown  (26  N. 

Y.  4G7)  77,  78,  391 

Bank  of  Chester  v.  Chester  T.  Coun- 
cil (10  Rich.  104)  968 
Bank   of  Chillicothe   v.    Chillicothe 

(7  Ohio,  Pt.  2,  31)    149,183,185, 
l.ss,  194 
Bank    of    Columhia    v.   Patterson's 

Adm.  (7  Cranch,  299)     275,512, 
514,  525,  527,  533,  539,  561 
Bank  of  Columbus,   &c.    (3   O.    St. 

1).     | See   Exchange   B.  of 

C,  &r.| 

Bank    of    Commonwealth    v.    New 

York  (43  N.  Y.  184)     1146, 1151, 
1191,  1202 
Bank  of  Commonwealth  of   Ky.  v. 

Wister  (2  Pet.  318)  275 

Bank  of  Dallas,  &c.  (51  Tex.  354). 

[See  City  B.  of  D.,  &c] 
Bank  of  Dubuque,  &c.  (5  How.  (U. 

S.)  213;  and  1  Greene  (la.), 

553).     [See   Miners'   Bank 

of  D.  &c.]. 
Bank    of   Ga.    v.    Savannah    (Dud- 
ley (Ga.),  130)  968 
Bank    of   Ind.,    &c.    (7  Blackf.  395; 

and  3  Ind.  43).     [See  State 

Bank,  &c] 
Bank  of  Ireland  v.  Evans  (32  E.  L.  & 

Eq.  23)  274 

Bank   of  La.,   &c.  (3  La.  An.  294). 

[See  Louisiana  State  Bank, 

&c.l 
Bank    of    Metropolis  v.  Guttschliek 

<  1  1  Pet.  19)  624 

Bank  of  Mich.  v.  Niles  (1  Doug.  401 )  658, 

670 
Bank  of    Middlebury  v.   Rutland  & 

W.  R.  Co.  (30  Vt.  159)  273 

Bank  of  Mt.  Pleasant,  &c.  (39  [owa, 

190).      |  See    Nat.    State   B. 

of  Mt.  P.,  &c.J 
Bank    of      New     <  irleans     v.    New 

Orleans  (12  La.  An.  42)         1148 
Bank   of   New    York,    &C.  (13  N.  Y. 

699).     |  See  Mech.  Bank  of 

N.  Y.,  &c] 
Bank    of    No.    America,    &c.    (108 

Mass.  197).    [See  Nat.  Bank 

of  N.  A.  of  B.,  &c] 


Bank 


of     Republic    of     N.    T.    v. 
St.  .Joseph  (31  Fed.  It.  216) 


157, 

G31 


Bank  of  Rome  v.  Rome  (18  N.  Y.  38)       78, 

86,  195,  225,  226,  235 

r.  Rome  (19  N.  Y.  20)  560,644 

Bank  of  St.  Louis,  &c.  (65  Mo.  105). 
[See  Internat.  Bank  of  St. 
L.,  &c] 

Bank  of  South  Carolina,  &c.  (3  Rich. 
L.  342).  [See  State  Bank 
of  S.  C,  &c.J 

Bank    of    Statesville    v.    Statesville 

(84  N.  C.  169)  540,  638 

Bank  of  Tenn.  v.  Dibrell  (3  Sneed, 

379)  161 

Bank   of    U.   S.   v.    Dandridge    (12 

Wheat.  64)        296,  299,  376,  521, 
533 

Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smedes  (3  Cowen, 

662)  518 

Bank  of  Va.  v.  Poitiaux  (3  Rand.  136)  670 

Bank  v.,  &c.    [See  the  following 

plaintiff  banks  which,  in  eit- 
ing,  may  not  always  have 
been  fully  named :  Che- 
mung Canal  Bank  (5  De- 
nio,  517)  ;  Commercial  (2 
Harring.  8) ;  Great  Falls 
(41  N.  II.  32)  ;  Jefferson 
Branch  (1  Black,  436)  ; 
Mech.  &  Traders'  (30  N.  J. 
L.  112)  ;  Nashville  (3 
Humph.  522)  ;  New  York 
Nat.  Exchange  (8  R.  I. 
375  ;  108  N.  Y.  660) ;  Ston- 
ington  Savings  (14  N.  J. 
Eq.  286) ;  Susquehanna  (25 
N.  Y.  312).] 

Bankhead  v.  Brown  (25  Iowa,  540)      701, 

704 

Banks  v.  Ogden  (2  Wall.  57)  740,  774 

Bannagan    v.     Dist.    Columbia     (2 

Mackey,  285)  1327,  1328 

Banton  v.  Wilson  (4  Tex.  400)  1025 

Baptist   Church,  &c.  (8  Bush,  508). 

tSee       Broadway       Bapt. 
murch,  &c] 
Baptist  Church,  &c.  (6  Barb.  213). 
[See  First  Bapt.  Church  in 
Schenectady,  &c] 
Baptist  Church,  &c.   (5  Robt.  649). 
[See     Madison    Av.   Bapt. 
Church,  &c.l 
Barber  v.  Essex  (27  Vt.  62)  1314 

v.  Rollinson  (1  C.  &  M.  330)  295 

v.  Rorabeck  (36  Mich.  399)  781 

v.  Roxbury(  11  Allen,  318)  1254, 

1255,  1256,  1270,  1276   . 
Barber   Surgeons  v.  Pelson  (2  Lev. 

252)  481 

Barbiery.  Connolly  (113  U.S.  27)  211,  398 
Barbour  v.  Ellsworth  (67  Me.  294)     1187, 

1201 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXIX 


Page 
Barbour   County   v.  Horn  (48  Ala. 

56(3)  1173,  1245,  1287 

Barclay,  Re  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  470)  259 

v.  Howell's  Lessee  (6  Pet.  498)      743, 

744,  746,  750,  753,  755,  757,  759, 

773,  783,  795,  817 

Bard  v.  Augusta  (30  Fed.  li.  906)  572 

Bard  well  v.  Jamaica  (15  Vt.  438)  881 

Bargate  v.  Shortridge  (5  Clark,  H. 

L.  297)  594 

Barker  v.   Commonwealth    (19  Pa. 

St.  412)  785,  886 

v.  Loomis  (6  Hill,  463)  184 

v.  Omaha  (16  Neb.  269)  984 

v.  Savage  (45  N.  Y.  191)      811,  1266, 

1273 
v.  State  (18  Ohio,  514)  975 

Barkley  v.  Levee  Com'rs  (93  U.  S. 

258)  250,  254,  256,  270,  1040 

Barling  v.  West  (29  Wis.  307)        398,  403 

Barlow,  Re  (30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  271)  1010 

v.  Norman  (2  W.  Bl.  959)  224 

Barnert  v.  Paterson  (48  N.  J.  L.  395)  357, 

358 

Barnes  v.  Barnes  (6  Vt.  388)  139 

v.  Beloit  (19  Wis.  93)  1122 

v.  Chicopee  (138  Mass.  67)  1257,  1258, 

1312 
v.  Dist.  Columbia  (22  Ct.  CI.  366)  551 
v.  Dist.  Columbia  (91  U.  S.  540)     46, 
808,  1194,  1210,  1268,  1280,  1290 
v.  Dyer  (56  Vt.  469)  933,  938 

v.  Marshall   County    (56   Iowa, 

20)  1029 

v.  Newton  (46  Iowa,  567)     1272,  1301 
v.  Pennell  (2  H.  L.  Cas.  497)  322 

w.Suddard  (117  111.  237)  671 

v.  Ward  (9  C.  B.  392)  1309 

Barnet  v.  Abbott  (53  Vt.  120)  300 

v.  Newark  (28  III.  62)  407 

Barnett  v.  Contra  Costa  County  (67 

Cal.  77)  1294 

v.  Johnson  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  481)  841,  886 
Barnett  Tp.  v.  Jefferson  County  (9 

Watts,  166)  272 

Barney  v.  Baltimore  (1  Hughes  C.  C. 

118)  175,  749 

v.  Bush  (9  Ala.  345)  321 

v.  Keokuk  (94  U.  S.  324)        165,  168, 

171,  172,  743,  748,  749,  759,  766, 
776,  784,  790,  793,  819,  833,  843, 

864 
v.  Keokuk  (4  Dillon  C.  C.  593)     168, 

172,  175,  743,  759,  766,  776,  784, 

790,  793,  819,  833,  843,  864 

v.  Lowell  (98  Mass.  570)  1202 

Barns  v.  Hannibal  (71  Mo.  449)  1316, 

1317 
Barnum  v.  Baltimore  (62  Md.  275)      663, 

1099 
Barnwell  v.  McGrath  (McMullan  (S. 

C.)  174)  798 

Barr  v.  Deniston  (19  N.  H.170)  1112,  1119 

v.  Oskaloosa  (45  Iowa,  275)    794,  796 


Page 
Barraclough  v.  Johnson  (8  A.  &  E. 

99)  741 

Barre  v.  Greenwich  (1  Pick.  120)  278 

Barret  v.  Henderson  (4  Bush,  255)        948, 

962 
Barrett  v.  Brooks  (21  Iowa,  144)    27,  806, 

807,  883 
v.  New  Orleans  (13  La.  An.  105)  658 
v.  Schuyler  Co.  Ct.  (44  Mo.  197)  560, 

r,  1 1 
Barrickman  v.  Harford  Co.  Com'rs 

(11  Gill  &  J.  50)  :;l'I 

Barron  v.  Baltimore  (7  Pet.  248)  683 

(2  Am.  Jur.  203)    176,  1317,  1330 

Barrow  v.  Davis  (46  Mo.  394)    1107,  1112 

v.  Nashville   &   C.    Turnp.   Co. 

(9  Humph.  304)  670 

Barrs  v.  Jackson  (1  Phillips,  582)        1078 
Barry   v.  Lowell   (8  Allen   (Mass.), 

127)  1320,  1328,  1332 

v.  Merch.  Exp.  Co.  (1  Sandf.  Ch. 

280)  184,  194 

v.  St.  Louis  (17  Mo.  121)     1303,  1304, 

1306,  1307 

Bertemeyer  v.  Iowa  (18  Wall.  129)        213 

Barter  v.  Commonwealth  (3  Pa.  253)    412, 

420,  437,  478,  496,  501,  506,  799, 

811,  812,  818 

Barthel  v.  Meader  (72  Iowa,  125)  625 

Barthet  v.  New  Orleans  (24  Fed.  R. 

563)  431 

Bartholomew   Co.  Com'rs  v.  Bright 

(18  Ind.  93)  560 

Bartle  v.  Des  Moines  (38  Iowa,  414)     208 
Bartleson  v.  Minneapolis  (33  Minn. 

468)  707 

Bartlett  v.  Amherstberg  (14  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  152)  538 

v.  Bangor  (67  Me.  460)  732 

v.  Boston  Gasl.  Co.   (117  Mass. 

533)  1311 

v.  Crosier  (17  Johns.  439)       324,882, 

1044,  117:; 

v.  Kittery  (68  Me.  358)       1270,  1297. 

1302 

v.  State  (13  Kan.  99)  1076 

Barto  v.  Himrod  (8  N.  Y.  483)         78,  220 

Barton  v.  Gadsden  (79  Ala.  495)  392 

v.  Montpelier  (30  Vt.  650)  1261 

v.  New  Orleans  (16  La.  An.  317)    312, 

313,  443 

v.  Syracuse  (36  N.  Y.  54)  1204,  1297, 

1302,  1319,  1330,  1331,  1332,  1333 

Bass  v.  Columbus  (30  Ga.  845)  635 

v.  Fontleroy  (11  Tex.  698)     102,  111, 

136 
v.  Shakopee  (27  Minn.  250)  1072, 

10'.  H 
Bassett  v  Barbin  (11  La.  An.  672)       1027 
v.  Fish  (12  Hun,  209  ;   75  N.  Y. 

303)  1176 

v.  Porter  (4  Cush.  487)  139 

v.  St.  Joseph  (53  Mo.  290)    454,  12">7, 

1263,  1267,  1279,  1283,  1296 


XXX 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Bassford,  Re  (50  N.  T.  509)  408 

Bastable  r.   Syracuse  (8   Hun,  587; 

72  N.  Y.  64)  1322 

Bateman  v.  Ashton   3  II.  &  N.  322)    512, 

618 
v.  Black  (U  E.  L.  &  Eq.  69)  745 

v.  Bamilton    (33  U.   C.   Q.  B. 

261)  1302 

v.  Megovvan  (1  Met.  (Ky.),  533)    285, 

509 
v.  Mid  Wales  R.  Co.  (L.  R.  1  C. 

P.  C.  510)     182,  185,   191,    194, 
195,548,571 
v.   Poplar  Dist.   Bd.  of  W.  (L. 

R.  33  Ch.  1).  360)  1326 

Bates  v.  Bassett  (60  Vt.  530)  672 

,-.  Mobile  (10  Ala.  15S)     00-1,  <)(•,;,,  '.170 

r.  l'ly mouth  (11  Gray,  163)  378,  1026, 

1057 
v.  Riverside    Indep.    Seh.   Dist. 

(25  Fed.  R.  192)  601 

Bates  County  v.   Winters  (07  U.  S. 

83)  629 

v.  Winters  (112  U.  S.  325)      622,  62!), 

(530 
Bath  County  v.  Amy  (14  Wall.  244)  1041, 

1044 
Bath    T.  Com'rs    v.   Boyd   (1  Ired. 

L.  194)  706,  780 

Batho  v.  Salter  (Latch,  54)  316 

Bathurst  Bor.  v.  Maepherson  (L.  R. 

4  App.  Cas.  256)   1139, 1203, 1205, 
1206 
Baton  Rouge  v.  Cre'monini  (36  La. 

An.  247)  400 

v.  Deering  (15  La.  An.  208)  494 

Baton  Rouge  Bd.  of  Sel.  v.  Spalding 

(8  La.  An.  87)  070 

Battersby  v.  New  York  (7  Daly,  16)    1261 
Battle  r.  Mobile  (9  Ala.  234)  808,  065 

Batty  r.  Duxbury  (24  Vt.  155)  1270,  1314 
Bauer  v.   Franklin  County  (51  Mo. 

205)  567 

v.  Indianapolis  (99  Ind.  56)  1273 

Baugan  v.  Mann  (59  111.  492)  750 

Bauinan  v.  Campau  (58  Mieh.  444)     1157 

v.  St.   Pancreas  (L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 

528)  889 

Baumgard    v.   New  Orleans   (9  La. 

119)  1188 

Baumgartner  v.  Hasty  (100  Ind.  575)      70, 

445,  472 
Baxendale  v.  London,  C.  &  D.  Ky. 

Co.  (lOExch.  35)  1313 

Baxter  v.  Commonwealth  (3  Pa.  253)   416 

v.  Kerr  (23  Grant  (Can.)  367)        1 102 

v.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  310)  1320, 

1323 
.      v.  Winooski  Tump.  Co.  (22  Vt. 

114)  817,1173,1252 

Bayard  v.  United  States  (127  U.  S. 

246)  1015 

Bay  era  uc  v.  San  Francisco  (1  McAll. 

175)  569 


Pag* 
Bayle  v.  New  Orleans  (23  Fed.  R. 

843)  lln7,1109,1110 

Bayley  v.  Taber  (5  Mass.  286)  033 

Bayne  v.  Jenkins  (06  N.  C.  356)  1070 

Beach    v   Frankenberger   (4  W.  Va. 

712)  1312 

v.  Ilaynes  (12  Vt.  15)       650,  662,  672 

v.  Leahy  (11  Kan.  23)  41,  44,  83 

Beachy  v.  Lamkin  (1  Idaho  T.  48)      1067, 

1074 
Beals  v.  Amador  Co.  Sup.  (35  Cal. 

624)  924 

v.  Prov.  Rub.  Co.  (11  R.  I.  381)     954 
Beamair  v.  Leake  Pol.  Bd.  (42  Miss. 

238;    15  Wall.  566)  184 

Bean  v.  Hyde  Park  (143  Mass.  245)       525 

v.Jay  (23  Me.  117)  349,551 

v.  Thompson  (19  N.  II.  290)  321 

Bearce  v.  Fossett  (34  Me.  575)  347 

Beard  v.  Brooklyn  (31  Barb.  142)  555,  557 

v.  Decatur  (64  Tex.  7)  315 

Bearden  v.  Madison  (73  Ga.  184)  3M0 

Beardslee  v.  French  (7  Conn.  125)        800 

Beardsley  v.  Hartford  (50  Conn.  529)  1258 

v.  Ontario  Bank  (31  Barb.  619)      969 

v.  Smith  (16  Conn.  368)       674.  1027, 

1032,  1172,  1173 

Beasley  v.  Beckley  (28  W.  Va.  81)     1131 

Beatty  v.  Gilmore  (16  Pa.  St.  463)       784, 

1284,  1286,  1305,  1309 

v.  Knowles  (4  Pet.  152)  138,  940 

v.  Kurtz  (2  Pet.  666)  743,  767 

v.  People  (6  Col.  538)  251 

Beauchamp  v.  Kankakee  Co.  Sup.  (45 

111.274)  1111 

Beaudean  v.  Cape  Girardeau  (71  Mo. 

392)  1266,  1283 

Beaufort  v.  Duncan  (1  Jones  L.  234)  658, 

680 
v.  Ohlandt  (24  S.  C.  158)  500 

Beaver  Creek  Tp.  v.  Hastings  (52 

Mieh.  528)  344 

Beaver  Dam  v.  Frings  (17  Wis.  398)  659 
Beazan  v.  Mason  City  (58  Iowa,  233)  1272 
Bechtel  v.  Carslake  (3  Stockt.  (N.J. 

Eq.)  500)  780,  787 

Beck  v.  Carter  (68  N.  Y.  283)  1312 

v.  Hanscom  (29  N.  II.  213)      304,  362 

v.  Obst  (12  Bush,  268)  932 

Becker  v.  St.  Charles,  (37  Mo.  13)        760 

v.  Washington  (04  Mo.  375)  483 

Beckett  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.  (L.  R.  3 

C.  P.  C.  82)  688,  1230,  1231 

Beckwith  v.  Racine  (7  Biss.  142)  254 

v.  Philby  (6  B.  &  C.  635)  295 

Bedford  Bor.  Seh.  Dir.  v.  Anderson 

(45  Pa.  St.  388)  1006 

Bedford  Union  P.  Guard,  v.  B.  Impr. 

Com'rs  (7  Exch.  777)      911,  932, 
954 
Beebe  v.  Robinson  (52  Ala.  66)  1095 

Beecher  0.  Derby  Br.  &  F.  Co.  (24 

Conn.  491)  1287,  1288 

v.  People  (38  Mich.  289)  811 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXXI 


Beekman  v.  Saratoga  &  S.  II.  Co.  (3 

Paige,  Ch.  R.  45)  720,  726 

Beekman  Street,  Re  (4  Bradf.  503)       444 

Beers  v.  Arkansas  (20  How.  527)  55 

v.  Beers  (4  Conn.  535)  507,  720 

v.  Botsford  (3  Day  (Conn.)  159J    1172 

v.  Phoenix  Glass  Co.  (14  Barb. 

358)  184 

Beesman  v.  Peoria  (16  111.  484)     492,  493 
Beggar,  Re  (34  C.  Q.  B.  144)  1078 

Belcher  v.  F;irrar  (8  Allen,  325)  443 

Belcher  S.  Ref.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Gr. 

Kiev.  Co.  (82  Mo.  121)     696,  706 
Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.  Stockton  (72 

Me.  522)  1143 

Belknap  v.  Reinhart  (2  Wend.  375)      323 
v.  Trimble  (3  Paige.  576)  787 

Bell,  Re  (2  U.  C.  C.  PI.  507)  221 

Re  (3  U.  C.  C.  PI.  400)  221 

v.  Burlington  (68  Iowa,  296)  760 

v.  Edwards  (37  La.  An.  475)  852 

v.  Foutch  (21  Iowa,  119)  806,  807,  883 
v.  Gough  (23  N.  J.  L.  624)  659 

v.  New  York  (105  N.  Y.  139)  675 

v.  Ohio  &  Pa.  R.  Co.  (25  Pa.  St. 

161)  771 

v.  Pierce  (51  N.  Y.  12)  964 

v.  Platteville  (71  Wis.  139)      54,  145, 

210,  671 

Bell  County  v.  Alexander  (22  Tex. 

350)  662,  668 

Bellamy  v.  Atlanta  (75  Ga.  167)  1297 

Belle  view  v.  Holm  (82  Ky.  1)         519,  535 
Belleville  v.  Stookey  (23  111.  441)  740 

Belleville  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Gregory  (15 

111.20)  88 

Bellfontaine  liv.  Co.  v.  Hunter  (33 

Ind.  335)  1300 

Bellinger  v.  Gray  (51  N.  Y.  610)  957, 1148 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (23  N.  Y. 

42)  1215 

Bellmyer  v.  Marshalltown  (44  Iowa, 

564)  522 

Bellows  v.  Hallo  well  Bank  (2  Mason 

C.  C.  43)  257 

Beloit  v.  Morgan  (7  Wall.  619)      561,  646 
Belt  Line  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Crabtree  (2 

Tex.  App.  C.  C.  662)  1244 

Belton  v.  Baxter  (54  N.  Y.  245)  811,  1261, 

1263 
Bement  v.  Plattsb.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (47 

Barb. 314)  969 

Bemis  v.  Becker  (1  Kan.  226)  269 

Benbow  v.  Iowa  City  (7  Wall.  313)   1033, 

1037 

Benedict  v.  Denton  (Walk.  Ch.  336)     274 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (44  Wis.  495)      1299, 

1300 

v  Goit  (3  Barb.  459)  789,  1220 

Benefield  v.  Hines  (13  La.  An.  420)      431 

Beniteau  v.  Detroit  (41  Mich.  116)        544 

Benjamin  v.  Webster  (100  Ind.  15)       147 

v.  Wheeler  (8  Gray,  409)      152,  1216, 

1219,  1231 


Page 
Bennett  v.  Birmingham  Bor.  (31  Pa. 

St.  15)  425,  939,  970 

v.  Buffalo  (17  N.  Y.  383)     1002    1 1  t'i, 

1191 
v.  Fifield  (13  R.  I.  139)       1257,  1263, 

L269 
v.  Fisher  (26  Iowa,  497)  695 

v.  Lovell  (12  R.  I.  166)  1270 

v.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An.  120) 

1158,  1195,  1215,  1320 

v.  People  (30  111.  389)  425 

v.  Whitney  (94  N.  Y.  3(  12)  325 

Bennington  v.  Smith  (29  Vt.  254)  808 

Benoist  v.  Carondelet  (8  Mo.  240)  275 

v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  668)  975 

v.  St.  Louis  (19  Mo.  179)        946,  947 

Benoit  v.  Conway  (10  Allen,  525)  151,  194 

ads.  Wayne  Co.  Bd.  of  Aud.  (20 

Mich.  176)  318,  319,  333 

Benson  v.  Albany  (24  Barb.  248)     86,  644 

v.  Cannel  (8"  Me.  112)  565,  566 

v.  Monroe  (7  Cush.  125)     1147,  1 1  is, 

1153,  1154 

v.  Morrow  (61  Mo.  345)  749 

v.  New  York  (10  Barb.  223)  182 

Bentley  v.  Chisasjo  Co.  Com'rs  (25 

Minn.  259)  146,  520,  534 

v.  Phelps  (27  Barb.  524)  319 

Benton  v.  City  Hospital  (140  Mass. 

13)  1201 

v.  Hamilton  (110  Ind.  294)  514 

v.  Jackson  (2  Johns.  C.  H.  325)        75 
v.  Milwaukee  (50  Wis.  368)  945 

Benton  Street  Case  (9  La.  An.  446). 
[See  Munic.  No.  2  v.  White, 
&c] 
Bentz  v.  Armstrong  (8  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 

40)  1321,  1323 

Bergen  v.  Clarkson  (1  Halst.  352)         210, 
364,  416,  421,  659,  999 
v.  State  (32  N.J.  L.  490)  486 

Bergen  Co.  Freeh,  v.  Merch.  Exch. 
Nat.  Bank  of  N.  Y.  (12  Fed. 
R.  743)  604 

Bergman  v.  Cleveland  (40  O.  St.  651)  432 
v.  St.  L.,  Iron  Mt.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 

(88  Mo.  678)  857 

Berkley  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (33 

Fed.  R.  794)  672 

Berks  &  D.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Myers  (6 

Serg.  &  R.  12)  261,  262 

Berlin  v.  Gorham  (34  N.  II.  266)       77,  93 
Berliner  v.  Waterloo  (14  Wis.  378)       633, 

615 
Bernhard  v.  Wyandotte  (33  Kan.  465)  301 
Beroujohn  v.  Mobile  (27  Ala.  58)  444 

Berryinan  v.  Port  Burwell  liar.  (24 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  34)  179 

v.  Wise  (4  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  366)         321 
Bessonies  j;.   Indianapolis    (71   Ind. 

189)  442 

Bestor  t\  Powers  (7  111.  126)  275 

Bethany  Congr.  Soc.  v.  Sperry  (10 

Conni  200)  303,  346 


xxxn 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Bethum  <■.  Turner  (1  Me.  ill)  768 

Bethune  u   Hughes  (28  6a.  560)    156,  460 
Bette  v.  Williamsburg  (18  Pa.  St.  26)  722 

Beveriil^i-  v.  Creelman  (42  l.  C.Q.  15 

29)  741 

Beverley  Tp.  v.  Harlow  (7  U.  C.  C. 

P.  117)  -".til 

v:  Barlow  (10  U.  C.C.  P.  178)  260,301 
Be:    '         Chicago  (65  1 11    L89)  994 

Bibb  Co.  Inf.  Ct.  Jus.  v.  Orr  (12  Ga. 

137)  562,568 

Bibb  Co.  <)nl.  v.  Cent.    It.  &  B.  Co. 

(40  Ga.  646)  968 

Bickerstaff,  Re  (TO  Cal.  35)  132 

Biddle  v.  Willard,  Gov.  (10  Ind.  63)    305, 

1016 
Bidille's  Lessee  v.  Shippen  (1  Dallas, 

19)  738 

Bietry  v.  New  Orleans  (24  La.  An. 

21)  559 

Big  Grove  v.  Wells  (65  111.  263)  564 

Big  Rapids  v.  Comstock  (65  .Mich. 

78)  796 

Bigelow  v.  Chicago  (90  111.  49)  979 

v.  Hillman  (37  Me.  52)  3GG,  392 

v.  Louisville  (3  Fisher  Pat.  Cas 

602)  545,  1181 

v.  Miss.  C  &T.  Tt.  Co.  (2  Head, 

624 )  708 

v.  Perth  Amboy  (25  N.  J.   L. 

297)  375,  377,  550 

v.  Randolph  (14  Gray,  541)  1175, 

1176,  1198,  1217 
W.Randolph  (2  Denio,  433)  1213 

v.  Rutland  (4  Cush.  (Mass.)  247)  1264 
v.  West  Wis.  Ry.  Co.  (27  Wis. 

478)  732 

v.  Weston  (3  Pick.  267)  1269 

Bigg  v.  London  (L.  R.  15  Eq.  370)      1231 
Bigler  v.  New  York  (5  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

51 )  544,  557 

Bigley  v.  Nunan  (53  Cal.  403)  843 

Bilbie  v.  Lumley  (2  East,  469)  1152 

Bill  v.  Denver  (29  Fed.  R.  344)  555 

Billard  v.  Erhart  (35  Kan.  611)  446 

Billings  v.  Monmouth  (72  Me.  174)     1143 
Hills  r.  Belknap  (36  Iowa,  583)  791 

v.  Kinson  (21  X.  II.  448)  223 

Bingham  v.  Camden   (29  N.  J.  Eq. 

404)  286 

Bird  o.  Wasco  Co.  (3  Or.  282)  311 

Birdsall  v.  Clark  (73  N.  V.  73)       154,  155 

>:  Russell  (29  N.  Y.  220)  650 

Birmingham  v.  Anderson  (40  Pa.  506)  753 

n  Klein  (Ala.  1890)  916 

r.  Riimscy  (63  Ala.  352)  673 

Birmingham  &   P.    M.   S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Birm.  S.  R.   Co.   (79   Ala. 

465)  146,  859 

Biscoe  v.  Coulter  (IS  Ark.  423)  952 

Bisher  v.  Richards  (9  O.  St.  195)  882 

Bishop  v.  Centralia  ( 19  Wis.  069)       1268 

v.  Cone  (3  N.  II.  613)  371 

'■.  Macon  (7  Ga.  200)  1164 


Pago 
Bishop  of  Rochester's  Case  (Owen, 

7.",)  247 

Bissell  v.  Collins  (28  Mich.  277)     817,  818 

v.  Jeffersonville  (24  How.  287)      L34, 

366,375,  585,  693,  601,  616,  635, 

640,644,  645,  647 

v.  Kankakee  (64  111.  249)        233,  1034 

Mich.   So.  &  No.  Ind.  R.  Co. 

(22  N.  Y.  258)  533 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (23  N.  Y. 

61)  747,790,791,792,842 

v.  Saxton  (77  N.  Y.  191)  301 

v.  Spring  Valley  Tp.  (124  U.  S. 

225)  601,  590,  594,  634 

Black,  Re  (1  O.  St.  30)  1016 

Black  v.  Baltimore  (50  Md.  236)  714 

v.  Cohen  (52  Ga.  621)       88,  523,  594, 

635,  649 

v.  Columbia  (19  S.  C.  412)  1106,  1200 

v.  Phila.  &  R.  R.  Co.  (58  Pa.  St. 

249)  '     786,  833,  848 

Black  &  W.  S.  Soc.  v.  Vandyke  (2 

Whart.  309)  338 

Blackborough  v.  Davis  (1  P.  Wms. 

48)  1060 

Blackburn,  li,  (5  Ark.  21)  1132 

v.  Walpole  (9  Pick  97)  349 

Blackerby  v.  People  ( lo  111.  266)  1074 
Blackett  v.  Blizzard  (9  B.  &  C.  851)  343 
Blackman  v.  Lehman  (63  Ala.  547)  582 
Blackstone  v.  Taft  (4Gray,260)  269,  271 
r.  White  (41  Pa.  St.  330)  139 

Black  well  v.  Toronto  S.  Ry.  Co.  (38 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  172)  1300 

Bladen  v.   Philadelphia  (60  Pa.   St. 

404)  201,  312,  521 

Blagrave's  Case  (2  Sid.  0)  338 

Blair  v.  Cuming  County  (111  U.  S. 

363)  572,  573 

v.  Forehand  (100  Mass.  136)  223 

v.  Lantry  (21  Neb.  247)  325 

Blaisdell  v.  P  .rtland  (39  Me.  113)       1258 

Blake  v.  Buffalo  (50  N.  Y.  485)  301 

v.  Ferris  (5  N.  Y.  48)  1305, 1306,  1307 

v.  Lowell  (143  Mass.  290)  1261 

.  v.  Macon  (53  Ga.  172)  548,  1112 

r.  Midland  R.  Co.  (18  Q.  B.  93)    1288 

v.  Newfield  (4  Gray,  365)  1270 

v.  Newfield  (68  Me.  305)  1257 

v.  Portsmouth,  &c.  R.    Co.  (39 

N.  H.  435)  251 

v.  St.  Louis  (40  Mo.  509)    1281,  1283, 

1303,  1306 

v.  Sturtevant  (12  N.  H.  573)  321 

v.  Walker  (23  S.  C.  517)  145 

Blakely  v.  Devine  (36  Minn.  53)  1322 

Blakie  v.  Staples  (13  Grant  (Can.) 

67)  1102 

Blanc  v.  Murray  (36  La.  An.  162)  446 

v.  New  Orleans  (1  Martin  (o.  s.) 

65)  962 

Blanchard  v.  Bissell  (11  O.  St.  96)       265, 

267,  384,  407,  408 

v.  Blackstone  ( 102  Mass.  343)        524 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXX111 


Page 

Blanchard  v.  Kansas  City  (10  Fed. 

R.  444)  1224,  1242 

v.  Porter  (11  Ohio,  138)  177 

Blandintr  v.  Burr  (13  Cal.  343)  78,  95, 

ISO,  '.121,  923,942 
Bleecker  v.  Ballon  (3  Wend.  263)  954 
Bleu  v.  Bear  River,  &c.  M.  Co.  (20 

Cal.  602)  539 

Bliss  v.  Ball  (99  Mass.  597)     746,  791,  817 
r.   Brooklyn   (4  Fisher  Pat.  C. 

596)  1180 

v.  Krauss  (16  O.  St.  54)  920 

v.  South  Hadley  (145  Mass.  91)  1252, 

1253,  1255 

Block   v.    Bourbon  Co.  Coni'rs   (99 

U.  S.  686)  582 

v.  Jacksonville  (36  111.  301 )     409,  434 

Blodgett  v.  Boston  (8  Allen,  237)         702, 

1175,  1253 
v.  Royalton  (17  Vt.  40)  701 

Bloodgood  v.  Mohawk  &  II.  Riv.  R. 

Co.  (18  Wend.  9)     234,  694,  700, 
705,  720 
Bloom  v.  Xenia  (32  O.  St.  461)  368 

Bloomer  v.  Stolley  (5  McLean,  158)      391 
Bloomrield  &  R.  N  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Cal- 
kins (62  N.  Y.  886)  822,  806 
v.  Charter  Oak  Bank  (121  U   S. 

121)     47,  54,  240,  347,  349,  1027, 
1032 
Blooming  Valley  Bor.,  Re  (56  Pa.  St. 

66)  265,  268 

Bloomington  v.  Bay  (42  111.  503)        12»1, 

1295,  1207,  1302 

v.  Brokaw  (77  111.  194)    674,  675,  710, 

1031,  1223,  1318,  1320,  1323 

v.  Chamberlain  (104  111.  268)         1208 

Bloor  v.  Uelafield  (69  Wis.  273)  1208 

Bloxham  v.  State  Bd.  of  Canv.  (13 

Fla.  55)  286 

v.  Wahl  (46  111.  489)  460 

Bluffton  v.  Mathews  (92  Ind.  213)       1262 

v.  Silver  (63  Ind.  262)  1132 

v.  Studebaker  (106  Ind   129)  216 

Blumb  v.  Kansas  City  (84  Mo.  112)  1196, 

1308 
Blunt  v.  Carpenter  (68  Iowa,  205)  629 
Blyth  v.  Birmingham  W.  W.  Co.  (11 

Exch.  781)  829 

Board  of  Agr.  &c.  (47  Ind  407).   [See 

State  Board,  &c] 
Board  of  Com'rs  of  A.  Onuntv,  &c. 

[See  A.  Co.  Com'rs,  feci 
Board   of  Ed.,  &c.   (56   Miss.  518). 

[See  State  Board,  &c.| 
Board  of  Ed.   of  Auburn  v.  Quick 

(99  N.  Y.  138)  299 

Board  of  Ed.  of  Dist.  3,  T.  3,  &c.  v. 

Neidenberger  (78  111.  58)         675 
Board  of  Ed.  of  F;iirport  v.  Fonda 

(77  N.  Y.  350)  299 

Board  of  Ed.  of  Valley  Dist.  v.  Al- 
pena Tp.Bd.  of  Ed.  (30  W. 
Va.  424)  272 

VOL.  I.  —  C 


Board  of  Ed.    of    Van  Wert  V.  v. 

o   St.  221)      769,  7  3 
Board  of  Freeholders  of  A.  County, 

&c.    [See  A.  Co.  Freeh. 
Board  of  Health  of  Buena  Vista  Tp 

v.  E.  Saginaw  (45  Mich. 257)  271 
Board  of  Health  of  La.  v.  Pooley  (11 

La.  An.  743)  422 

Board  of  Liq.  of  I. a.  v.  McComb  (92 

U.  S  531  i  1005,  loio 

v.  Municipality  (6  La.  An.  21)  07,  114 
Board  of  Police  of  A.  County,  &c. 

[See  A.  Co.  Pol.  Bd.,&c.] 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  A.  County, 
&e.     [See  A.  Co.  Sup.  &c] 
Board   of   Trade    Telegraph    Co.    v. 

Harnett  (107  111.  507)      831,  833, 
843,  1241 
Board  of  Trustees  of  A.  District,  &c. 

[See  A.  Dist.  Trs.] 
Boardman  v.  Ilayne  (2!)  la.  339)    323.  325 
Boaz  v.  Tate  (43  Ind.  60)        294,  295   296 
Bob  v.  State  (2  Yen:.  173)  11U". 

Bobbett  v.  Dreslier  (10  Kan.  9)  L05 

Bodine  v.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  198)  L56 
Bodman  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc.  (9  Allen, 

447)  262 

Bortwic  v.  Fennell  (1  Wils  233)  477,  4&J 
Boehm  v.  Baltimore  (61  Md.  259)         441, 

lio:; 
Boffing  Bor.,  Rt  (2  Str.  1003)  1023 

Bogart  v.  New  York  (7  Cow.  158)  1131 
Bogert  v.   Elizabeth   (25  N.  J.   Eq. 

426)  929,  1093 

v.  Elizabeth  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  568)        920 
v.  Indianapolis  (13  Ind.  134)  44M,   111 
Boggs  v.   Hamilton    (2   Mill  Const. 

R.  381)  325 

Bohen  v.  Waseca  (32  Minn.  176)  1274 

Bohlman  v.  Green  Bay  &  L.  P.  R. 

Co.  (30  Wis.  105)  721 

Boileau,  Re  (2  Pars.  (Pa.)  505) 
Bolles  v.  Brimfield  (120  U.  S.  759)      134, 

230,  03:, 
Boiling  v.  Petersburg  (8  Leigh.  22 1 1     672 
v.  Petersburg  (3  Rand.  563)    790,  793 
Bolte  v.  New  Orleans  (10  La.   An. 

321)  413 

Bolton  r.  Crowther  (4  Dowl.  &  Rvl. 

195)  324 

Bond  v.  Biddeford  (75  Me.  538)  1301 

7v  Hiestand  (20  La.  An.  139)  143,997 

>■.  Ilovt  (13  Pet.  266)  1155 

v.  Kenosha  (17  Wis.  284)       910,  953, 

957.  1122 

v.  Newark  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  376)  556,  559, 

991,  1002 

v.  St.  George  (L.  R.  6  C.  1'  312)    270 

Bonesteel  »•.  New  York   (22  N.    Y. 

102)  523    " 

Bonine  v.  Richmond  (75  Mo.  437)  1207 
Bonner  o.  State  (7  Ga.473)  1023,  1079 
Booker  v.  Young  (12  Graft.  303)  343 

Boom  v.  Utica(2Barb.  104)449,529,  118 j 


XX  XIV 


TABLE    OP    CASKS    CITED. 


Page 

B n  Co.  &c.  (98  1.  S    103).     [See 

Miss.  &  R  R.  Rivers,  &c] 
Booraem  -■  No.  Hud.  County  Ry.  Co. 

(39  N.  .)    !..,.  165)  760 

man  '•.  Santa  Barbara  (65  Cal. 

313)  984 

Booth  r.  State  (  1  Conn.  65)  475 

v.  Woodbury  (32  Conn.  11:--  224 

Boothe   '■•    Georgetown    (2   ('ranch 

C.  C.  149)  183 

Boothroyd,  Re  (15  M.  &  W.  1)       411,  17s 
Bordentown  X.   S.  A.  Turnp.  Co.  v. 
Camden  £  A.   R.   Co.  (IT 
N.  J.  I.  ::i  1 1  780 

linen    v.    Darke  Co.   Com'rs   (210. 

St.  311)  1015 

v.  Smith  117  III.  482)  289 

Boring  v.  Williams  (17  Ala.  Aid)  50G 

Boro   v.    Phillips  County    (1  Dillon 

C.  C.  216)  568 

Borough  of  A.  &c.    [See  A.  Bor.  &c] 
Borrowman  v.  Mitcliell  (3  U.  C  Q.  B. 

1 :;:,)  746 

Bosley  v.  Davies  (L.  R.  1  Q.B.  Div. 

si)  454 

Bossier  Par.  Pol.  Jury  v.  Shreveport 

(5  La.  An.  661)  97 

•  ,n  v.  Baldwin  (l:;1.)  Mass.  315)        449 
c.  Leeraw  ( 17  How  426;  19How. 

•J(!.;;  24  How.  188)  173,  751 

r.  Richardson  (13  Allen,  152)  746,  790, 

sir,,  817,  818,821 

,-.  Robbins  (126  Ma>>.  384)  718 

v.  Sehaffer  (9  Pick.  415)  3»1,  423, 427, 

429,  '.Hi 

v.  Shaw  (1  Met.  130)       404,  815,  977, 

987,  1231 

v.  Worthington  (10  Gray,  496)      1313 

■  >n  &   Alh.  R.  Co.,  ft  (53  N.  Y. 

57  l )  689 

Boston   &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Salem  &  L. 

R.  Co.  (2  Gray,  1)  683 

Boston  &   M.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowell  &  L. 

R.  Co.  (124  Mass.  368)  809 

Boston   £    S.  Class  Co.  v.  Boston  (4 

M,t.  (Mass.)  181)  1147,  1148, 

1110,  1153 
Boston   Beer   Co.   v.    Massachusetts 

C.i7  0.  S.  25)  213,216 

Boston,  C.  &   M.   R.  Co.  v.  Gilmore 

(37  N    H.  IKi)  969 

Boston  Glass  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Langdon 

(24  Pick.  49)  243 

Boston  Manuf.  ( '".  v.  < !ommonwealth 

(111  Mass   598)  904 

Boston    Mill    Corp.   v.   Newman  (12 

Pick.  176)  701 

on  <  Overseers  of  the  Poorv.  Sears 

(22  Pick.  122)  24,  70,  75.  303,  655 
Boston  Rolling  Mills  i\  Cambridge 

|  117  Mass.  396)  152,  1331 

Boston  Seamen's  Friend  Soc.  v.  Bos- 
ton (110  Mass.  L81)  722,  917,932. 
933,  954,  955 


Boston  Soc.  of  Redemptorist  Fath- 
ers v.  Boston  (29  Mass.  178)   953 
Boston    Turnp.    Co.   V.    Poinl'ret    (20 

Conn.  590)  371,372,375 

Boston  Water  Lower  Co.  v.  Boston 

9  Met.  (Mas..)   199)  11  17 

Boswell  r.  Laird  (8  Cal.  169)  1303 

Bosworth  v.  Bud-en  (7  Mod.  459)         490 
v.  New  Orleans  (26  La.  An.  494)    312 
Bott  v.  Pratt  (33  Minn.  323)  422 

Boucher   v.    New    Haven   (40  Conn. 

456)  1272,  1301,  1302 

Boughner  v.  Clarksburg  (15  W.  Va. 

394)  711,715,1097 

Boulder  v.  Niles  (9  Col.  415)      1260,  1284 
Bouldin  v.  Baltimore  (15  Md.  18)  434.  945, 

979,  980 
Boulton  v.  Crowther  (2  Barn.  &  <  '. 

703)  1225,  1233 

Bound  v.  Wis.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (45  Wis. 

543)  626,1111 

Bounds  v.  Kirven  (63  Tex.  159)  1244 

Bourbon  Co  Com'rs  v.  Block  (99  U. 

S.  214)  582 

Bourgeoise,  ft  (60  Miss.  663)  437 

Bourland  v.  Hildreth  (26  Cal.  161)        281 

Bouton  v.  Brooklyn  (15  Barb.  3,75)       763 

v.  McDonougli  Co.  Sup.  (84  111. 

384)  675 

Boutwell  Case  (17  Wall.  604).    [See 

U.  S.  v.  B.] 
Bovee  v.  Danville  (53  Vt.  183)  1284 

Bow  v.  Allenstown  (31  N.  II.  351)    24,  75, 

140,  056 
Bowditcli  u.  Boston  (101  U.  S.  16)     1163, 
1164,1165,  1196,1197 
Bowdoinliam    v.    Richmond    (6  Me. 

112)  273 

Bowen  v.  Morris  (2  Taunt.  374)  526 

v.  Team  (6  Rich.L.298)  798,801,803 

Bower  v.  State  Bank  (5  Ark.  234)         260 

Bowerbank   v.  Morris  (Wall.  C.  C 

R.  118)  319 

Bowerv  Nat.  Bank  v.  New  York  (63 

N.  Y.  386)  558 

Bowie  v.  Kansas  City  (51  Mo.  154)       138 
Bowles  v.  Landaff  (59  N.  IL  164)         224, 

386 
Bowley  v.  Walker  (8  Allen,  21)  796 

Bo  win!  r.  Furman  (28  Mo.  127)  671 

Bowling  Green  v.  Carson  (10  Bush, 

64)  460 

Bowlsby  v.  Spear  (31  N.  J.  L.  351)      1323 
Bowman  v.  Boston  (5  Cush.  1)    760,  1258 
,■  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (125 

('.  s.  465)  213 

r.  St.  John  (47  111.  337)  414 

Boyce  v.  Russell  (2  Cow.  444)    1008,  1010 

Boyd  v.  Chambers  (78  Kv.  140)  492. 

'  v.  Kennedy  (38  N.  J.  L.  146)         651 

Bovden  v.  Brookline  (8  Vt.  284)  313 

Boyer  v.  State  (16  Ind.  451)  755 

Bun  land  v.  New  York  (1  Sandf.  27)      52, 

1186,  1195 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


XXXV 


Page 

Boyle  v.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  1)    979,  1092 

v.  Duntla&  (25  U.  C.  C.  P.  420)     L255, 

1266 
v.  Dundiis  (27  U.  C.  C.  P.  129)    1298 
Boylston   Market   Assoc,  v.  Boston 

(113  Mass.  528)  146,728 

Boyter  v.  Dodsworth   (6  1).  &  E.  T. 

It.  681)  319 

Bozant  v.  Campbell  (9  Bob.  La.  411)   401, 

442 
Brabham    v.   Hinds   Co.    Sup.    (54 

Miss.  363)  1170,  1172 

Brackenbridije    '-'•    Fitchburg    (145 

Mass.  160)  1255 

Braconier  v.  Packard  (136  Mass.  50)  1015 
Braddy  v.  Milledgeville  (74  Ga.  516)  466 
Bradford  v.   Chicago    (25  111.    411)   1147, 

1151,  1152 
Bradley  v.  Ballard  (55  111.  413)  1140 

v.  Brown  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B.  463)  1264 
v.  Eau  Claire  (56  Wis.  168)  1143 

v.  Franklin  County  (65  Mo.  638)  635 
v.  McAfee  (7  Bush,  667)  898,  918 
v.  N.   Y.  &  N.    H.   It.   Co.    (21 

Conn.  294)  1224 

v.  Richmond  (6  Vt.  121)  161 

v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  330)  1244 

Bradnoc's  Case  (1  Vent.  196)  481 

Bradshaw  v.  Omaha  (1  Neb.  16)  974 

Bradstreet,  Re   (7  Pet.  634)  1006 

v.  Dunham  (65  Iowa,  248)  755 

Brady  v.  Fall  River  (121  Mass.  262)    1219 

v.  Lowell  (3  Cush.  121)       1252,  1253, 

1272,  1302 

v.  New  York  (20  N.  Y.  312)  529,  539, 

540,  542,  543.  566 

v.  N.  Y.  Sup.  (2  Sandf.  S.  C.  R. 

460  ;  ION.  Y.  260)  554 

v.   Northwestern    Ins.    Co.    (11 

Mich.  425)  472,  475 

v.  Weeks  (3  Barb.  157)  215 

Brady  Street,  Re  (99  Pa.  St.  591)  1221 
Brailey   v.   Southborough    (6  Cush. 

(Mass.)  141)     '  1252 

Brainard  v.  Conn.   River   R.   Co.  (7 

Cush.  506)  851 

Braintree  v.  Battles  (6  Vt.  395)  139 

Brakken  v.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 

Co.  (29  Minn.  41)     746,  762,  790, 
856 
Bramah   r.  Roberts   (3  Bing.   N.  C. 

963)  191 

Branahan   v.  Cine.  Hotel  Co.  (39  O. 

St.  333)  788 

Brander  v.  Chesterfield  Co.  Ct.  Jus. 

(5  Call,  (Va.)  548)  1017 

Brandriff  v.  Harrison  Co.  (50  Iowa, 

164)  659,  1107 

Brandt   v.  Craddock  (27  L.  J.  Exch. 

314)  295 

Branham  v.  San  Jose  (24  Cal.  585)     518, 
542,  576,  769,  794 
Brant   County,   Re   (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

450)  552 


Page 
Brashear  v.  Mason  (6  How.  97)  1015 

Braun  v.  Chicago  (110  111.  186)      427,  906 
Bray  v.  Wallingford  (20  Conn.  410)     161, 

1173 

Brayton  v.  Fall  River  (113  Mass.  218)     176 

448,  1330,  1331 

Brazil  v.  McBride  (69  Ind.  244;     312,  313 

Bread  Co.  Case  ( L.  R.  8  Q.  B   355). 

[See  Aerated,  &C.] 
Breaux's   Bridge,    />'<     (30  La.  An. 

1105)  408 

Breed  v.  Cunningham  (2  Cal.  368)        757 

v.  Lynn  (126  Mass.  367)  152 

Brehin  v.  New  York  (104  N.  V.  186)    L092 

Brenham   v.  B.  Water  Co.  (67  Tex. 

542)  146,  157,  431,  827 

Breninger  v.  Belvidere   (44  N.  J.   L. 

350)  394,  405 

Brennan  v.  Bradshaw  (53  Tex.  380)     211, 

1022,  107* 

v.  Friendship  (67  Wis.  223)  1284 

v.  St.  Louis  (92  Mo.  482)  1295 

Brevoort  v.  Detroit  (24  Mich.  322)     543, 

993,  994 
Brewer  v.  New  Gloucester  (14  Mass. 

216)  1172 

v.  Otoe  County  (1  Neb.  373)  568 

v.  Springfield  (97  Mass.  152)  989 

Brewer  Brick  Co.  v.  Brewer  (62  Me. 

62)  233,  896 

Brewis  v.  Duluth  (9  Fed.  R.  747;  13 

lb.  334)  250 

Brewster  v.  Davenport  (51  Iowa,  427)  1327 

v.  Harwich  (4  Mass.  278)        269,  271 

v.  Hyde  (7  N.  H.  206)  317 

v.  Newark  (11  N.J  Eq.  114)  984,  985 

v.  Syracuse  (19  N.  Y    116)  129,  130, 

132,  896,  913 

Brick  Presb.  Church,   Re   (3  Edw. 

Ch.  155)  444,  954 

v.  New   York  (5  Cow.  538)  157,  386, 

392  443 

Brickley  v.  Boston  (20  Fed.  R.  207)  '  674 

Bridge  v.  Cage  (Cro.  Jac.  103)  209 

v.  Grand  June.  Ry.  Co.  (3  M. 

&  W.  244)  1264 

v.  Lincoln  (14  Mass.  367)  326 

Bridge  Co.  r.  &c.    [See  the  following 

plaintiff  bridgecompanies,  which, 
in  citing,  may  not  always  have 
been  fully  named :  Central 
Bridge  Corp.  (4  Gray,  474),  Co- 
lumbia Bridge  Co.  (27  S.  C.  137), 
Dunleith  &  Dub.  (32  Iowa,  427), 
Enfield  Toll  (17  Conn.  40), 
Frankfort  (18  B.  Mon  41),  Miss. 
River  (58  Mo.  491),  Newport  & 
Cine.  (9  Bush,  (Kv.)  264),  Pas- 
saic (13  N.  J.  Eq.  503),  Red 
River  (1  Sneed,  176),  Wyandotte 
&K.  C.  (10  Kan.  26).] 
Bridgeport  ;■.  Housatonuc  R.  Co.  (15 

Conn.  475)        133,  134,  14s.  151, 
225,  255,  518,  529,  552 


\  \  Wl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Bridgeport  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  II    R.  Co. 

(36  Conn.  809,  921,  956 

Bridgea  v.  Griffin  (38  Ga.  113)  969 

,  North  London  Kv.  Co.  ( I..  R. 

6  Q,  B.  377)  1266,  1300 

Bridgford  v.  Tuscumbia  (16  Fed.  K. 

910;   I  Woods,  611)         216,  376 
Brientnall  v.  Philadelphia  (103  Pa. 

St.  156)  995 

Brieswick  v.  Brunswick  (51  Ga.  639 

420,  421 
Briggs  v.  Boat  (7  Allen,  2S7)  404 

v.  Lewiston  &  A.  Horse  R.  Co. 

(79  Me.  363)  870 

v.  Murdock  (13  Pick.  305)  347 

v.  Whipple  (6  Vt.  96)  220,221 

v.  Whipple  (7  Vt.  15)  138 

Bright   v.   Chenango   Co.   Sup.   (18 

Johns.  242)  316 

v.  Hewes  (19  La.  An.  666)  551 

u..McCullough  (27  [nd.  223)  126 

Brightman  r.   Bristol   (65  Me.  426)    148, 

449,  1167 

v.  Kirner  (22  Wis.  64)  910,  955 

Brimmer  v.  Boston  (102  Mass.  19)        146, 

157,  728 
Brinck  v.  Collier  (56  Mo.  104)  751,  760 
Brine  v.  <.t.  W.   Rv.  Co.  (2  Best  & 

S.  402)      "1215,  1320,  1321,  1323, 
1333 
Brinkmever  v.  Evansville   (29  [nd. 

187)  217,  1193,  1199 

Briscoe  v.  Bank  of  Ky.  (11  Peters, 

257)  55 

r.  Drought  (1 L  Ir.  C.  L.  R.  250)    1316 

Bristol  v.  New  Chester  (3  X.  H.  532)      77, 

269 
Bristol  &  N.  S.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  R<  (L.  R. 

3  Q.  B.  D.  iO)  1007 

British  C.  Plate  Co.  v.  Meredith   (4 

I).  &  E.  T.  R.  794)       213,  1163, 
1215,  1225,  12:;:; 
Brittain  i>.  Newland  (2  I).  ,\  15  363)      262 
Britton  v.  Cummington    (1"7  .Mass. 

347)  1253,  1257 

r.  New  York  (21  How.  Pr.  251)  157 
r.  Philadelphia  (32  Pa.  St.  387)  1002 
v.  Platte  City  (2  Dillon  C.C.I)   1032, 

HU2 
v.  Steher  (62  Mo.  370)  99,  101 

Broadhead  v.  Milwaukee   (19  Wis. 

652)  224 

Broad wav  &   S.  Av.  Ry.  Co.  v.  New 

York  (  19  Bun,  120)  864 

Broadway    Bap.  Church    v.  Mc.Atee 

(J  Bush,  508)    '.»17,  918,  932,  954 
Broadway    Surface    Ry.   Case    (111 

N   Y.  1).     [See  People  v.  O'Brien, 
feci 
Broadwell  y.Chapin  (2  111.  App.  511)   323 
r.  Kansas  City   (75  Mo.  213)       121s, 

1303 
Broburg   v.   Des  Moines  (63  Iowa, 

523)  1260 


Page 
Brocas  v.  London  (1  Str.  307)  380 

Brock  Dist   v.  Bowen  (7  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

471)  260 

Broder  v.  Saillard  (L.  R.  2  Ch.  692)      147 
Brodie  &  Bowmanville  (3  U.  C.  (I  B. 

580)  454 

Brodnax   v.  Groom   (64  N.  C.  211 1   1098, 

1120 
Brokaw  v.  Tewe  Haute  (97  tnd.  176)  713 
Bronson  v.  Kinsie  il  ll<>w.  316)  118 

v,  Wallingford(54  Conn.  513)  1333 
Brook  v.  Horton  (68  Cal.  654)  794,  796 
Brookfield  Park  Case  (48  Mo.  301).     [See 

Price  v.  Thompson.] 

Brookline  o.  Westminster  (4  Vt.224)     264 

Brooklyn  v.  Breslin  (57  N.  Y.  591)       154, 

155,404,  105,  124,  811,939 

v.  B.  Citv  R.  Co.  (47  N.  Y.  475)    157, 

846/860,   863,   866,   1305,   1312, 

1313 

v.  Cleves  (4  H.  &T>.  Sup't.231)     461 

r.  Meserole    ("26    Wend.    132)     151, 

1092 
v.  N.  Y.  Ferry  Co.  (87  N.  Y.  204)  165 
v.  Patchen  (8  Wend.  47)  725 

v.  Smith  (104  III   429)  254 

v.  Toynbee  (31  Barb.  282)  437,440 
Brooklyn   &    N.    Y.    Bridge   Case  (5 

Abb.  N.  C.  83)  126 

Brooklyn  Cent.  K.  Co.  v.  B.  City  R. 

Co.  (32  Barb.  358)    117,846,  863, 
864,  870 
Brooklyn  Citv  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Coney 
Island  &B.R.  Co.  (35  Barb. 
301)  847 

Brooklyn  Com'rs  of  Assess.,  Re  (18 

Alb.  L.J.  1'.".))  777 

Brooklyn  Park  Com'rs  v.  Armstrong 

(3  Pans.  429)  690,  770 

v.  Armstrong  (45  N.  Y.  234)  118,  120, 

690,  694,  (599,  703,  708,  769,  770, 

771 

Brooklyn     Steam    Transit    Co.    v. 

Brooklyn   (78  N.  Y.  524)       783, 
7S1,  792,  833,  850,  852 
Brooklyn    Street,    Re     (19   Am.    & 

Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  584)  757 

Brooklyn    Street,    Re   (118    Pa.   St. 

640)  719 

Brooklyn  W.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.,  Re  (72 
N.  Y.  2  15:  75  N.  Y.  335; 
81  N.  Y.  09)  840 

Brooks  v.  Baltimore  (  Is  Md.  265)  920 

v.  Mitchell  (9  M.  &  W.  15)  582 

v.  New  Durham  (55  N.  II.  559)  528 
v.  Polk  County  (52  Iowa,  460)  974 
v.  Riding  (46  End.  15)  790,  sol,  804 
v.  Somerville  (106  Mass.  271)  1293 
r.  Topeka  (3  1  Kan.  277)  752 

Brookville   v.   Arthurs   (18   Atl.    R. 

L076)  1312,1313 

v.  Gagle  (73Ind.  117)  477 

Broome  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.  (42 

N.  J.  Eq.  141)  831 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


XXXV11 


Page 

Brophy,  Re  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  290)  259 

v.  Hyatt  (10  Col.  223)  418,  488 

v.  Landman  (28  O.  St.  542)     944,  981 

v.  Perth  Amboy  (  1 1  N.  J.  L.  217)  478 

Broughton  v.  Manchester  &  S.  Water 

Works  (3  B.  &  Aid.  1)  191 

v.  Pensacola  (93  U.  S.  206)    141,  248, 

250,  251,  253,  254,  255,  270,  1053 

Brouwer  v.  Appleby  (1  San.lt'.  158)  77,  139 

Brower  v.  New  York  (3  Barb.  254)    1114, 

1211 
Brown,  Re  (116  U.  S.  401)  1006,1015 

v.  Atlanta  (66  Ga.  71)  1211 

r.  Beatty  (34  Miss.  227)  718,  721 

0.  Belleville  (30  U.  C.  Q.  B.  373)  537 
v.  Brown  (7  Oregon,  285)  661 

v.  Cape  Girardeau  (90  Mo.  377)   1182 
v.  Crego  (32  Iowa,  498)  1028 

v.  Crippin  (4  H.  &  M.  173)  1096 

v.  Dist.  Columbia  (127  U.  S.  579)  359, 

551 
v.  Duplessis  (14  La.  An.  842)  861,  862 
v.  Fitehburg  (128  Mass.  282)  989 

v.  Gates  (15  W.  Va.  131 )  40,  159,  161, 
673,  674,  1027,  1028,  1031,  1032, 
1037 
v.  Glasgow  (57  Mo.  156)     1263,  1266, 

1279 
v.  Heath  (45  N.  H.  168)  162 

v.  Hunn  (27  Conn.  332)  475 

v.  Jefferson  County    (16    Iowa, 

339)  1282,  1300 

v.  Jerome  (102  111.  371)  492 

v.  Lindsay  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  509)    516, 
537,  538 
v.  London  (9  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  726)       120 
v.  Lowell  (8  Met.  172)  814,  815,  1219. 

1225 

v.  Manning  (6  Ohio,  298)        739,  750, 

753,  758,  763,773,  787,  1116 

v.  Maryland  (12  Wheat.  419)  903,  970 

v.  New  York  (63  N.  Y.  239)  132,  133, 

993 
v.  Nicholson  (5  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  468)  478 
v.  Painter  (44  Iowa,  368)  1154 

v.  Rundlett  (15  N.  H.  360)  323 

v.  Sarnia  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  87)       1322, 

1324 
v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  (3  La.  An.  177)  244 
v.  United  States  (20  Ct.  CI.  416)  650 
v.  Utica  (2  Barb.  104)  567 

v.  Vinalhaven  (65  Me.  402)  213,  1187, 
1195,  1201 
v.  Watson  (47  Me.  161)  1288 

v.  Winterport  (79  Me.  305)    349,  307, 

540 
Brown  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Butt  (2  Ohio, 

348)  1174 

Browne  v.  Bowdoinham  (71  Me.  144)   742 
Browning  v.  Camden  &  W.  R.  Co.  (3 

H.  W.  Green  Ch.  47)  716 

v.  Owen  Co.  Com'rs  (44  Ind.  11)  1182, 

1184,  1186 

v.  Springfield  (17  111.  143)    1240,  1281 


Page 
Brownlow  v.  Metrop.  Bd.  of  W.  (13 
C.   B.    (n.  s.)   768;    16  lb. 
546)  1214 

Brown ville  v.  Cook  (4  Neb.  101)  437,  440, 

497 
Brownsville   Tax.    Dist.    Com'rs   v. 

Loague  (129  U.  S.  493)         1033, 

1035,  1036 

Bruce  v.  Bruce  (2  B.  &  P.  229)      279,  370 

v.  Croinar  (22  U.  C.  Q.  B.  321)       260 

v.  Dickey  (116  111  527)  539 

v.  U.S.  (11  How   437)  301 

Bruce's  Case  (2  Str.  819)  328,  336 

Bruker  v.  Covington  (69  Ind.  33)        1285 

Brurnagim    v.    Tillinghast    (18  Cal. 

256)  1150 

Bruner  v.  Bryan  (50  Ala.  523)  319 

Brunnetti  v.  New  Orleans  (9  La.  430)  429 

Brunswick  v.  Braxton  (70  Ga.  193)     1297 

v.  Fahm  (60  Ga.  109)  318 

v.  Litchfield  (2  Me.  28)  123 

Brusso  v.  Buffalo  (90  N.  Y.  679)         1247, 

1268,  1303,  1305 

Brvan  v.  Bates  (15  111.  87)  294,  483 

v.  Cattell  (15  Iowa,  538)  309,  310,311, 

1016,  1057,  1058 

v.  Chicago  (60  111.  507)  958, 

v.  Page  (51  Tex.  532)      146,  518,  520 

521,  533,  534,  540 

Bryant  v.  Estabrook  (16  Neb.  217)        758 

v.  St.  Paul  (33  Minn.  289)   1193,  1201 

Bryant's   Lessee   v.  McCandless   (7 

Ohio,  Pt.  2,  135)  669,  743 

Bryson  ;;.   Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St. 

329)  157 

Buccleuch  v.  Metrop.  Bd.  of  W.  (L. 

R.  5  H.  L.  C.  418)  1231 

Buchanan  v.  Curtis  (25  Wis.  99)  752 

v.  Litchfield  (102  U.  S.  278)  596.  608, 

610,  612 

Buck   v.  Danzebacker  (37  N.  J.  L. 

359)  510 

v.  Lockport  (6  Lans.  251)  1301 

Buckbee  v.  Brown  (21  Wend.  110)       179 

Bucknall  v.  Story  (36  Cal.  67)     942,  1000 

v.  Story  (46  Cal.  589)  1151 

Buckner,  Re  (9  Ark.  73)  1126,  1127 

v.  Augusta  (1  A   K.  Marsh.  9)       769 

Bucroft  v.  Council  Bluffs  (63  Iowa, 

646)  535,  555 

Buell  v.  Ball  (20  Iowa,  282)   360,  390,  974 
v.  Buckingham  (16  Iowa,  284)      343, 
357,  358 
v.  State  (45  Ark.  336)  453,  469 

Buena  Vista  Tp.  Bd.  of  H.  v.  E.  Sag- 
inaw (45  Mich.  257)  271 
Buffalo,  R<>  (64  N.  Y.  547)  690 
Re  (68  N.  Y.  167)  689 
Re  (78  N.  Y.  362)  707 
v.  Bettinger  (70  N.  Y.  393)  1139 
v.  Holloway  (7  N.  Y.  493)    556,  1298, 

1305 
v.  Le  Couteulx  (15  N.  Y.  451)       948, 

949 


XXXV1U 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Buffalo  o.  Webster  (lo  Wend.  100)    404, 
122,  123,  156,  159 
Buffalo  ,t  II.  Tump.  Co.  <■.  Buffalo 

(58  \.  V  639)  L188,  1190 

Buffalo  a  X    F.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  (5 

Hill,  209)  165,857 

Buffalo  City  Cemetery  v.  Buffalo  (40 

N.  Y.  503)     '  955 

Buffett  v.  Troy  &  B.R.Co.  (40  NY. 

168)  11  in 

Buffington    Wheel  Co.  v.  Burnham 

(60  Iowa,  493)  388 

Bulkley  v.  Eckert  (3  Pa.  Si  161 

Bull  v.  Read  (13  Gratt.  78)     77,  898,  1119 

v.  Suns  (23  N.  Y.  570)      562,  565,  569 

Bullock  r.  Curry  (2  Met.  (Ky.)  171)     660 

r.  Geomble  (  15  III.  218)  "  41!) 

>■   New  York  (99  N   V  654)         1285 

Bullwinkle  v.  Guttenberg  (17   Wis. 

585)  1142 

Bulow  v.  Cliarleston  C.  Council  (1 

N.  &  M.  527)  968 

Bummell  v.  Houston  (68  Tex.  10)         996 
Bunch  v.  Edenton  (90  N.  C.  431)       1258, 

1312 
Buncombe  v.  McCarson  (1  Dev.&B. 

1079 
Bunnell's  Appeal  (69  Pa.  St.  59)  786 

Burbach  v.  Schweinler  (56  Wis.  386)  759 
Burbank  v.  Fay  (65  N.  V.  57)  659,  800 
Burch  v.  Hardwicke  (30  Gratt.  24)  99, 
102,  294,  1196 
Burckholter  v.  MeConnelsville  (20 

I ).  St.  308)  431 

Bunion  v.  Stein  (27  Ala.  104)  697 

Burdett,  ll<  (127  Q.  S.  771)  1010 

v.  Swenson  (17  Tex.  489)        446,  449 

Burford  v.   Grand  Rapids  (53  Mich. 

98)  149,  1158,  1160,  1205 

Burges  v.  Mabin  (70  Iowa,  633)  025 

Burgess  v.  Jeff*  rson  (21  La.  An.  143)  545 

v.  Pue  (2  Gill  (Md.),  254)       321,  363, 

898,  899 

v.  Seligman  (107  U.  S.  20)  587 

Burginhofen    v.    Martin    (3   Ycates, 

479)  1078 

Burk  v.  State  (5  Lea,  349)  I  11 

Burke,  ft  (62  N.  V.  224)  959,  976 

v.  Edgar  (67  Cal.  182)  312 

v.  Elliott  (  I  Ired.  L.  355)  1079 

v.  .Jeffries  (2(>  Iowa,  146)  71 

Burleigh  v.  Rochester  (5  Fed.  R.  667)  582 

Burlington  v.  B.  &  Mo.  R.  Co.  (41 

Iowa.  134)  798,  so::, '.1:15,  998,  999 
V  B  Street  R.  Co.  (49  Iowa,  111)  871 
V.  Dank  ward  (73  Iowa,  170)  460 

v   Eastlolw  I  13  N.  J.  E.  113)  391 

v.  Gilbert  (31  Iowa,  356)        '.iso,  1224 
v   Kellar  (18  Iowa,  69)  120,  4:11 

v.  Palmer  (67  Iowa,  681)         961,991 
v.  Putnam    Ens.   <  !o.    (31    Iowa, 

102)  970 

v.  Quick  (47  Iowa.  222)  721,  1001 

v.  Schwartzman  (52  Conn.  181)      783 


Page 
Burlington   &   II.   C.    Ferry  Co.    v. 

Davis  (48  Iowa,  I33j  180 

Burlington  &  Mb.  R.  R.  Co   v.  Lan- 
caster County  (4  Neb.  293)      938 
v.  Mount  Pleasant  ( 12  Iowa,  1 12)  1122 
r.  otoe  Co.  Sup.  (10  Wall  667)    231, 

57:;,  1121 

v.  Reinhackle  (15  Neb.  279)    842,  847 

v.  Spearman  (12  Iowa,  112)    207,  922 
956,  968,  974,  976 
Burlington  [ndep.  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Bur- 
lington (60  Iowa,  500)  398 
Burlington    Lumber  Co.  v.  Willetts 

(lis  ill.  559)  904 

Burlington  Tp.  v.  Beaslev  (94  U.  S. 

310)  573,577,704 

Burlington  Water  Co.  v.  Woodward 

(49  Iowa,  58)  204 

Burmeister,  /,',  (56  How.  Pr.  416)        985 

//■   (76  N.  V    174)  959 

Burnes  v.  Atchison  (2  Kan.  454)      68,  78, 

235,  237,940,941,946,  1107,  1116 

Burnett,  Re  (30  Ala.  461)      147,  433,  134, 

471 
v.  Abbott  (51  Ind.  254)  549 

v.  Buffalo  (17  N.  Y.  383)         707,  940 
v.  Portage  Co.  Aud.  (12  O.  St. 

57)  1030 

v.  Sacramento  (12  Cal.  76)      923,  979 

Burnham  v.  Boston  (10  Allen,  290)    1257, 

1312 
v.  Brown  (2:1  Me.  400)  582 

v.  Byron  (46  Mich.  555)  1252 

v.  Chicago  (24  111.  496)  976 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (15  Wis.  193)         161 
Burns,  Re  (1  Term.  Ch.  83)  72 

v.  Baltimore  (48  Md.  198)  990 

v.  Clarion   County    (62  Pa.   St. 

122)  95,130 

v   Elba  (32  Wis.  605)  1281 

v.  Harper  (59  111.  21)  162 

v.  La  Grange  (17  Tex.  415)  1126 

v.  Milw.  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  (9  Wis. 

450)  694 

v.  Toronto  (42  U.  C.  Q.  B.  560)  1255, 

1266 

Burr  r.  Atlanta  (64  Ga.  225)  904 

v.  Carbondale  (76  III.  455)      199,  649, 

906 
v.  Chariton  County  (12  Fed.  R. 

SIS)  632 

v.  Leicester  (121  Mass.  241)   817,1219 

v.  Plymouth  (48  Conn.  460)  1260 

Burr's  Trial,  355  332 

Burrell  Tp.  v.  Uncapher  (117  Pa.  St. 

353)  1269 

Burrill  v.  Augusta  (78  Me.  118)  1198, 

1199 

v.  Boston  (2  Cliff.  590)      54,  524,  526, 

527,  529,  537,  539  ' 

Burritt  v.  New  Haven  (42  Conn.  174)  853, 

858,  881,  1224,  1252 

Burrton  v.  Harvey  Co.  Saw  Bank  (28 

Kan.  390)  563 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


XXXIX 


Page 
Burt  v.  Boston  (122  Mass.  223)  L31 1 

v.  Merch.   Ins.   Co.    (106    Mass. 

35G)  697 

v.  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  (31 

Minn.  972)  76,  356 

Burton  v.  Chattanooga  (7  Lea,  739)     1322 
v.  Patton  (2  Jones  L   124)   1079,  1888 
v.  Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (4  Hai- 
ring. (Del.)  252)  865 
Busbee  v.  Wake  Co.  Corn'rs  (93  N.  C. 

143)  911 

Bush  v.  Beavan  (1  Hurl.  &  C.  500)  1010 
v.  Carbondale  (78  111.  74)  151,  550 
v.  Dubuque  (60  Iowa,  233)  150 

v  Johnston  (23  Pa.  St.  209)  754,  1308 
v.  Seaburv  (8  Johns.  418)  459 

v.  Shipman  (5  111.  190)  94,  103 

v.  Whitney  (1  Chip.  369)        677,  678 
Bushel  v.   Commonwealth   Ins.  Co. 

(15  S.  &R.  176)  67 

Bushnell  v.  Beloit  (10  Wis.  195)  564 

v.  Robeson  (62  Iowa,  540)  447 

Bussier  v.  Pray  (7  S.  &  R.  447)     315,  316 

Butcher  v.  Camden  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  478)  286, 

314 
Butchers'  Benefic.  Assoc.  (35  Pa.  St. 

151 ;  38  lb.  298)  335,  336 

Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock  (3  B.  &  Pul. 

434)  414,  484 

v.  Mercy  (1  H.  Bl.  370)  421 

Butchers'  Union,  &c.  Co.  v.  Crescent 
City  Live  Stock,  &c  Co. 
(Ill  U.  S.  740)  211 

Butler  v.  Bangor  (67  Me.  388)  1268,  1303 
v.   Bray  Tp.  Com'rs  (L.  R.    11 

Ir.  C.  L.  R.  181)  1302 

v.  Charlestown  (7  Gray,  12)  151,  521, 
527,  554 
v.  Chicago  (56  111.  341)  984 

v.  Detroit  (43  Mich.  552)      1107,  1116 
v.  Dunham  (27  111.  474)  225,  518, 

640,  646 
v.  Hunter  (7  H.  &  N.  826)  1308 

v.  Milwaukee  (15  Wis.  493)  563 

v.  Muscatine  (11  Iowa,  433)  974 

v.  Muscatine  (8  Wall.  575)  1028 

v.  Neosho  Co.  Com'rs  (15  Kan. 

178)  316,  1144 

v.  Nevin  (88  111.  575)       146,  520,  944, 
993  995 
v.  Palmer  (1  Hill  (N.  Y.)  324)      '  117 
v.  Passaic  (44  N.J.  L.  71)  384 

v.  Pennsylvania  (10  How.  402)       311 
v.  Ravine   Road  Sewer   Com'rs 

(39  N.  J.  L.  665)  714 

v.  Saginaw  Co.  Sup.  (26  Mich.  22)  984 

v.  Thomasville  (74  Ga.  570)  1092 

v.  Toledo  (5  O.  St.  225)  993,  994 

v.  United  States  (21  Wall.  272)      298 

Butler's  Appeal  (73  Pa.  418)  899 

Butman  v.  Fowler  (17  Ohio,  101)  807 

Butolph  v.  Blust  (5  Lans.  84)  483 

Butt  v.  Imperial  Gas   Co.  (L.  R.   2 

Ch.  App.  158)  889,  890 


Page 
Butterfield  v.  Forrester  (11  East,  60)  1264 
Butternut  u.  O'Malley  (50  Wis.  329),  551 

55:: 
Butterworth   v.    United   States  (112 

U.  S.  50)  1005 

Buttrick  v.  Lowell  (1  Allen,  172)  108,  213, 

293,  540,  1167,  119.;,   L196,  1197, 

1207 

Butts  v.  Little  (68  Ga.  272)  203 

v.  Wood  (37  N.  Y.  317)  514 

Butz  v.  Muscatine  (8  Wall.  575)     82,  1  L8 

198.  237,  250,  584,  585,   586,  587, 

649,  942,  946,  1035,  1042,  1055 

Byars  v.  Mt.  Vernon  (77  111.  1»',7)  108 

Byers  v.  Commonwealth   (42  Pa.  St. 

89)  470,471,479,500 

v.  Olney  Trs.  (16  111.  35)      431.   132 

434 
Byles  v.  Golden  (52  Mich.  612)  1012 

Byram  v.  Detroit  (50  Mich.  50)  1119,  L123 
Byrnes  v.  Cohoes  (67  N.  Y.  204)  13*2 


C. 


Cable  Co.  Case,  &c  (104  N.  Y.  38). 
[See  New  York  Cable  Co.] 
Cabot  v.  Britt  (36  Vt.  349)  371 

v.  Rome  (28  Ga.  50)  512 

Cadmus  v.  Farr  (47  N.  J.  L.  208)  357 

Cady  v.  Conger  (19  N.  Y.  256)  787 

v.  Watertown  (18  Wis.  322)  523 

Caerdiffe    Br.    Case.     [See  King  v. 

Glamorganshire.] 
Cagwin  v.  Hancock  (84  N.  Y.  532)        602 
( lahaba  T.  Council  v.  Burnett  (34  Ala. 

400)  1148,1150,1151,1154 

Cahill  v.  Kalamazoo  M.  Ins.  Co.  (2 

Doug.  124)  139 

Cain  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(54  Iowa,  255)  852 

v.  Davie  Co.  Com'rs  (86  N.  C 

8)  956 

v.  Syracuse  (95  N.  Y.  83)      454,  1276 

Cairo  v.  Allen  (3  111.  App.  398)    674,  675. 

1007 

v.  Bross  (101  111.  475)  74,  425 

v.  Campbell  (116  111.  305)  900 

v.  Everett  (107  111.  75)  1032 

Cairo  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Trout  (32  Ark. 

17)  709,  724 

v.  Turner  (31  Ark.  495)  718 

Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparta  (77 

111.  505)  122,  240,  635 

Cairo  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  People  (92  111. 

777)  854.  - 

v.  Stevens  (73  Ind.  278)  1310 

Calais  v.  Dyer  (7  Me.  155)  883 

Calaveras   County    v.  Brockway   (30 

Cal.  325)  loos 

Calder  v.  Kurby  (5  Gray,  597)  432 

v.  Smallev  (66  Iowa,  219)  1309 

Calder  &  II.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Pilling  (14 

M.  &  W.  76)  431 


xl 


tat.lf:  of  cases  cited. 


Page 
Caldwell  v.  Alton  (33  111.  41G)       147,  165. 

467,  160 
,■  Boone  (51  Iowa,  687)  1196,  1197 
v.  Burke  ( !o.  Jus.  |4  Jones  Bq. 

323)  "J"),  220.  237,  898,  899 

V.  Harrison  (11  Ala.  766)  361 

v.  Rupert  d<>  Bush,  179)        636,  918, 

939 
Caldwell  County  v.  Herbert  (tis  Tex. 


Ogilvie    (2 


7 '.is 


123(1 
397 

659 


321 

<  laledonian    1!\     <  to 

Macq.  229) 
Calhoun  v.  Fletcher  (63  Ala.  574) 
Calhoun  Co.  v.  Am.  Emigrant  Co. 

(93  IJ.  s.  ,2H 
Calhoun  Co.  Sup.  v.  Galbraith  (99 

U.S.  211)  582,593,631 

California  v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (127 

U.S.I)  904 

California  City  v.  Howard  (78  Mo. 

88)     '  759,  789 

Calking  v.  Baldwin  (4  Wend.  067)       325, 

718,  720 
Calkins  u.  Hartford  (33  Conn.  57)  1270 
Call  v.  Chadbourne  (  16  Me.  206)  77 

Callagan  v.  Hallett  (1  Caines,  104; 

Col.  &  C.  179)  310 

Callahan  <     Des   Moines   (63  Iowa, 

705)  1318 

v.  New  York  (66  \.  V.  656)  492 

Callam  u  Saginaw  (50  Mich.  7)    124,  129, 

210,  659 
Callan  v.  Wilson  (127  U.  S.  540)  502,  507, 

724 
Callanan    v.    Madison    County    (45 

Iowa,  561)  1154 

Callaway  County  v.  Foster  (93  U.  S. 

567)  593,  631 

Callender  v.  Marsh  (1  Pick.  418)  814, 

816,  1215,  1217,  122:',,  1224,  1225, 

1230,  1231,  1233 

Calvert  Co.  Com'rs  v.   Gibson    (36 

Md.  229)  1169,  1282 

r.  Milled-,. villc  (48  Ga.  309)         1146 
Cambridge  v.  Cambridge  H.  Co.  (10 

Allen,  50)  871 

v.  Charlestown   Branch  R.  Co. 

(7  Met.  70)  1134,  1135 

v.   Middlesex  Co.   Com'rs    (125 

Mass.  519)  1217 

Cambridge  University  v.  Crofts  (10 

Mod.  208)  262 

Camden  v.  Allen  (26  N.  J.  L.  398)        673, 

995,  999 

v.  Block  (65  Ala.  236)  509 

r.  Mulford  (20  N.  J.  L.  49)     715,  979, 

1120,  1129 

<  lame  o.  Brigham  (39  Me.  39)  663 
Cameron.  ft  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  190)        389 

ft  (60  N.  Y.  502)  558 

v.  Stephenson  (69  Mo.  372)  897 

Cam]. an  v.  Detroit  (14  Mich.  270)         715, 

725.  727 

Campbell,  Re,  (74  Cal.  20)  441,  405 


Page 
Campbell  v.  Elma  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

296)  618 

v.  Fair  Haven  (54  Vt.  336)  1297 

v.  Kenosiia  (5  Wall.  194)       86,  120, 

512.  684,  035 

v   Laclede  Gas  L.  Co.  (84   Mo. 

352)  749 

v.  New  Orleans  (2  La.  An.  34)      1153 
v.    Philadelphia    (108    Pa.    St. 

3no,  1225 

v.  Polk   County    (3  Iowa,  407)     562, 
505,  566,  56K.  509,  1009 
v.  Race  (7  Gush.  408)  1205,  1200 

>■.  Stillwater  (32  Minn.  308)  1314 

v.  Wright  (108  Pa.  St.  300)  1221 

Campbell's  Adm.  v.  Montgomery  C. 

Council  (53  Ala.  527)   1157,  1160, 
1167,    1174,    1186,     1194,     1197, 
1254,  1280,  1281 
Campbell  Co.  Ct.  v.  Newport  (12  B. 

Mon.  538)  757,  765,  773 

Canaan  v.  Derush  (47  N.  II.  211)  533 

v.  Hanover  (49  N    II.  415)  322 

Canada  Co.  v.  Oxford  (9  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

567)  389 

Canal  Bank,  &c.    (5  Denio,   517).     [See 

Chemung  Canal  Bank,  &c] 
Canal  Co.  v.  &c.  [See  (at  their  al- 
phabetical places)  the  following 
plaintiff  canal  companies  which, 
in  citing,  may  not  always  have 
been  fully  named :  Alexandria 
(5  How.  (U.  S.)  83),  Chesapeake 
&  O.  (4  G.  &  J.  1),  Grand  Surrey 
(1  Man.  &  Gr.  393),  Louisville  & 
T.  (7  B.  Mon.  160),  Pennsylvania 
&  0.  (63  Pa.  St.  290),  Tuckahoe 
(11  Leigh,  42).] 
Canal  Fund  Com'rs  v.  Perry  (5  Ohio, 

57)  321 

Canal  Nav.  Prop.,  &c.    (L.  R.  1  E.  & 

I.    A  p.  254).     [See  Staffordshire 
&  W.  C.  N.  Prop.,  &c.| 
Canal  Street,  Re,  (11  Wend.  155)  711,  713 
ft  (12  N.  Y.  406)  510 

Canal   Trustees,   &e.  (11    111.554;  12 

111.    248,   403).      [See   Illinois   & 
Mich.  Canal  Trustees,  &c] 
Canning   v.  Williamstown    (1  Cush. 

(Mass.) i  451)  1288 

Cannon  v.  Janvier  (3  Houston,  27)      1057 
v.  New  Orleans  (20  Wall.  577)        106 
Canova  v.  Baker  Co.  Com'rs  (18Fla. 

512)  254 

Canton  v.  Nist  (9  O.  St.  439)  406 

Cantril  v.  Sainer  (59  Iowa,  26)  388 

Cape   Girardeau  v.   Riley    (52  Mo. 

424)  389,  396,  397 

Cape  Girardeau  Co.  Ct.  v.  Hill   (118 

U.  S.  68)  119,  897,  903 

Cape  May  &  S.  L.  R.   Co.  v.  Cape 

May  (35  N.  J.  Eq.  419)    392,  1098 
Card   v.  Ellsworth   (05   Me.  547)     1263, 

1269 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xli 


Page 
Carder  v.  Fayatte   Co.  Com'rs  (16 

O.  St.  353)  262 

Cardigan  v.  Page  (6  N.  H.  182)  347 

Cardington  v.  Fredericks  (40  O.  St. 

000)  1281>  1295 

Carleton  v.  Bath  (22  N.  H.  559)        53,  54 
v.  Franconia  Iron  &  S.  Co.  (99 

Mass.  216)  1205 

v.  People  (10  Mich.  250)  356 

v.  Washington   (38    Kan.  726)     216, 

563 
Carli  v.  Stillwater  Street  Ry.  &  T. 

Co.  (28  Minn.  373)  842 

Carlisle  v.  Blamire  (8  East,  487)  260 

v.  Brisbane  (113  Pa.   St.  544)  1259, 

1286,  1295 

Carlton  v.  Salem   (103  Mass.  141)    1102, 

1115 
Carlton  Street,  Re  (16  Hun,  497)  367 

Carman  v.  Steub.  &  Ind.   R.  (4  O. 

St.  339)  1306,  1308 

Caro  v.  Metrop.  Ro.  Cy.  (14  J.  &  S. 

138)  878 

Carondelet   v.   McPherson   (20  Mo. 

192)  771 

Carondelet  Canal  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  New 

Orleans  (38  La.  An.  308)         986 
Carpenter  v.  Bristol  Co.  Com'rs  (21 

Pick.  258)  1057 

v.  Cohoes  (81  N.  Y.  21)      1246,  1247, 
1258,  1268 
v.  Ely  (4  Wis.  420)  1021 

D.Jennings  (77  111.  250)  722 

v.  Lathrop  (51  Mo.  483)  593,  644 

v.  Oswego  &  S.  R.  Co.  (24  N.  Y. 

655)  791,  842 

Carpenter's  Case  (2  Pars.  535)  281 

(Raym.  439)  1063 

Carpenteria  Sch.  Uist.  v.  Heath  (56 

Cal.  478)  760 

Carr  v.  Northern   Liberties   (35  Pa. 

St.  324)       158,  1158,  1220,  1320, 

1325,  1328,  1334 

v.  St.  Louis  (9  Mo.  190)      313,  314, 

397 
Carrick  v.  Johnston  (26  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

65)  1266 

w.Lamar  (116  U.S.  423)  1015 

Carrier  v.  Shawangunk  (10  Fed.  R. 

220)  596 

Carriger  v.  Morristown  (1  Lea,  116)      975 
Carrington  v.  St.  Louis  (89  Mo.  208)  1198, 

1201,  1211 
Carroll  v.  Lynchburg  (6  S.  E.  R.  133)    475 
v.  Perry  (4  McLean,  25)  896 

v.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  Ap.  191)         1189 
v.  St.  Louis  (12  Mo.  44)  316,  554 

v.  Siebenthaler  <37  Cal.  193)  318 

v.  Tishamingo  Co.  Pol.  Bd.  (28 

Miss.  38)       568,  1028,  1056,  1169 

v.   Tuscaloosa   (12  Ala.   173)      423, 

425,  971,  1126,  1127 

v.  Tvler  (2  H.  &  G.  54)  316 

v.  Wall  (35  Kan.  36)  351 


Carroll  County  v.  Graham  (98  Ind. 

279)  1147 

v.  Smith  (111   U.  S.  556)      231,  579, 
614,618 
Carroll   Co.   Sup.   v.   United    States 

(18  Wall.  71)         567,  584,  1028, 
1054,  1055 
Carrolton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winthrop  (6 

La.  An.  36)  171,  174,  668 

Carron  v.  Martin   (26  N.  J.  L.  594)     146, 
520,  979,  981,  1092,  1126,  1129 
Carson   r.  Central  R.  Co.  (35  Cal. 

325)  841,  808 

v.  Hartford  (48  Conn.  68)        711,  719 
Carter   v.    Cambridge  &  B.   Bridge 

Prop.  (104  Mass.  236)       125,  129 
v.  Chicago  (57   111.  283)        742,  783, 
1097,  1118 
v.  Dow  (16  Wis.  298)       426,  428,  910 
v.  Harrison  (5  Blackf.  138)  326 

v.  La  Grange  (60  Tex.  636)  797 

v.  Monticello  ((JS  Iowa,  178)  1297 

Carter  County  v.  Sinton  (120  U.  S. 

517)  87 

Cartersville  v.  Baker  (73  Ga.  686)        210 

v.  Lanham  (67  Ga.  753)  418,  471 

v.  Lyon  (69  Ga.  577)  499 

Cartwright    v.    Belmont    (58    Wis. 

370)  1267 

Cary  v.  Ottawa  (8  Fed.  R.  199)  594 

v  Pekin  (88  111.  454)  974,  975 

Cascalvo  Street,  Re  (20  La.  An.  497)  909, 

924 

Case  v.  Hall  (21  111.  632)  418,  471 

v.  Johnson  (91  Ind.  477)  514 

v.  Mobile  (30  Ala.  538)   138,  481,  482, 

483 

v.  Waverly  (36  Iowa,  545)  1301 

Casey  v.  Inloes  (1  Gill,  510)         720,  1188 

v.  Leavenworth   (17  Kan.  189)      555, 

556 
Cash  v.  Union  Depot,  &c.  Co.  (32 

Minn.  101)  842 

Caskey    v.    Greensburgh    (78    Ind. 

233)  297 

Cass  v.  Bellows  (31  N.  H.  501)  371 

v.  Dillon  (2  O.  St.  607)   208,  225,  631 
Cass    County   v.    Banks    (44    Mich. 

467)  745,  760,  761 

v.  Gillette  (100  U.  S.  585)      583,  628, 

629,  631 

v.  Johnston  (95  U.  S.  360)     57!',  584, 

593,  636 

Cass   Co.   Com'rs   v.  Ross  (46  Ind. 

404)  554 

Cassedy  v.  Stockbridge  (21  Vt.  391)  1255, 

1264,  1287 
Castleberry  v.  Atlanta  (74  Ga.  164)     815, 

1222,  1241 
Castleton  v.  Langdon  (19  Vt.  210)     659, 

662 
Castor  v.  Uxbridge  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

113)  1247,  1255, 1258,  1264,  1269, 
1298,  1301 


xlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Caswell  r.  St.  Mary  &  P.  L.  J.  PI. 

R.  (  o.  (281  ,  C.  Q.  B.  247)    1255 
Cathcarl  v.  Comstock  (56  Wis.  590)       42 
lie   Soc.   i;    &   l-  Ed.  v.  New 
i  Cleans  (10  La.  An.  73)         1152 
Catlin  v.  Valentim  575)        787 

Cator  v.  Lewisham  (5  B  &  S.  115)      1328 
Cattel  v.  [reson  |  E.  B.  &  E.  91)  504 

Catterlin  >■.  Frankfort  (79  Ind.  547)   1312. 

L313 
Caulfield  v.  State  (1  S.  C.  401)  296 

Cavanagh  v.  Boston  (139  Mass.  420)    691, 

1184,  1186 

Cavelier'a  Sue.  (2  Hoi).  (La.)  438)        668 

Caverly  o.  Lowell  (1  Allen.  289)  314 

Cawley  v.  People  (95  111.  249)  297 

- — Cemetery  v.  &c.     [See  the  following 

plaintiff    cemetery    associations, 

which,  in  citing,  may  not  always 

have  been  fully  named  :   Buffalo 

City   Cemetery  (46  X.   V.  503), 

Concordia   (121  111.    199),   Deans- 

ville  (66  X.  Y.  569),  Evergreen 

I  !;;   Conn.  234),  Washington  (08 

X.  V.  591),  Wyandotte  City   (14 

Kan.  312).] 

Central   v.  Sears   (2  Col.   588)     312,  313, 

384 
,-.  Wilcoxsen  (3  Col.  566)  560 

Central    Branch    Union  Pae.  It.  Co. 

v.  Andrews  (30  Kan.  590)        841 
v.  Smith  (•_'•'!  Kan.  745)  233 

v.  Twine  (23  Kan.  585)  841 

Central   Bridge   Corp.  v.  Lowell  (15 

Gray,  L06)  350,683 

Central  Land  Co.  v.  Providence   (15 

R.  I.  246)  759 

Central    Park  Com'rs,  Re  (61  Barb. 

40)  794 

Central   Park  Com'rs,  Re  (50  N.  Y. 

493)  143 

Central  Park  Ext.,  lit  (10  Abb.  Pr. 

698 
Central    It.    &   B     Co.   v.   Claghorn 

(Speers  Eq.  545)  510 

Central  It.  Co.  of  N.  J.  v.  Penn.  R. 

Co.  (31  N.  J.  Eq.  475)  835 

Centralia  v.  Krouse  (64  111.  19)   1284,  1280, 

121)0 
v.  Scott  (59  111.  129)  1281 

Centre  Street  Vac,  fie  (115  Pa.  St. 

217)  795,912,917 

Centreville  v.  Miller  (57  Iowa,  56)         435 

v.  Woods  (57  Ind.  192)        1280,  1281, 

1283,  1287 

Cerro    Gordo   v.    Wright   (50  Iowa, 

439)  1142 

Chad  v.  Tilsed  (5  J.  B.  Moore,  185)       150 
Chadbourne  v.  Newcastle  (48  N.  H. 

L96)  1167 

Chaddock    v.    Wilbraham   (5  C.   B. 

645)  478 

Chadwell,  R  (3  Baxter,  98)  72 

Chad  wick  v.  Colfax  (51  Iowa),  70        675 


Page 

Chadwick  v.  Melvin  (08  Pa.  St.  333)  270 
i  liaffee  o.  Granger  (6  -Mich.  51)  512,  1110 
Chaffee's  Appeal  (56  Mich.  244)  718 

( lhahoon's  ( lase  (21  Gratt.  (Va.)  822)  493 
Challiss  '■■   Atchison  T.  &  8.  F.  It. 

Co.  (10  Kan.  117)  690 

Chamberlain  v.  Burlington  (19  Iowa. 

396)  236,548 

v.  Cleveland  (34  O.  St.  551)  920 

v.  Dover  ( 13  Me.  460)     348,  350,  37 1 , 

374 
v.    KHz.   S.  Cord.  Co.  (41   X.  J. 

Eq.  43)  835,842,847,818 

v.  Enfield  (43  X.  II.  350)  1270 

v.  Kvansville  (77  Ind.  542)     141,  373, 

392 
v.  Sibley,  Gov.  (4  Minn.  309)  1010 
v.  West  End  L    &  C.  P.  R.  Co. 

(2  15   &  S.  005)  688 

Chambers  v.  Cine.  &  Ga.  R.  Co.  (69 

Ga.  320)  1240 

v.  Green  (L.  It.  20  Eq.  552)  1057 

v.  St.   Louis   (29  Mo.    513)     l^,  655, 

657,  658,  660,  661,  662,  667,  070 

v.  Satterlee   (40  Cal.  497)     923,924, 

1229 
Chambers  County  v.  Clews  (21  Wall. 

317)  570,  589,  590,  614 

Champaign  v.  Harmon  (98  111.  4',)1)     Oct), 

1000 
Chance  v.  Temple   (1  Iowa,  179)      1002, 

1003,  1074 
Chancellor  of  Oxford's  Case  (10  Co. 

87  6)  201 

Chandler  v.  Hay  St.  Louis  (57  Miss. 

327)    "  562,505,1159,1187 

v.  Boston  (112  Mass.  200)        207,  208 
v.  Bradish  (23  Vt.  416)  303 

v.  Lawrence  (138  Mass.  213)  337 

v.  Brown  (15  H.  I.  579)  757 

Chapin  v.  Osborn  (29  Ind.  99)  1011 

v.  Sullivan  It.  Co.  (39  N.  H.  564)  817 
v.  Vt.  &  Mass.  R.  Co.  (8  Gray, 

575)  560 

v.    Winchester   Sch.    Dist.     (35 

N.  II.  445)  262,  009 

v.  Worcester  (124  Mass.  404)  721 

Chaplin  v.  Hill  (24  Vt.  628)  541 

Chapman  v.  Brooklyn  (40  N.  Y.  372)     913 

v.  Charleston  (28  S.  C.  373)      ^    1180 

v.  Douglas  County   (107  U.    S. 

348)  1192 

v.  Gates  (54  N.  Y.  132)  720 

v.  Gordon  (29Ga.250)  .767,  787 

v.  Lowell  (4  Cush.  378)  558 

v.  Miller  (2  Speers,  769)  166 

Chariton  v.  Barber  (54  Iowa,  360)         394 
v.  Bolliday  (00  Iowa,  390)  389 

Charity  Hospital  v.  Stickney  (2  La. 

An.  550)  423,  909 

Charles  v.  Finchley   L.   Bd.    (L.  R. 

23  Ch.  D.  7G7)  1320 

v.  Hoboken    (3   Dutch.    (N.  J.) 

203)  331,  337,  359,  3G0 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


xliii 


Page 
Charles  River  Br.  Prop.  v.  Warren 

Br.  Prop.  (11  Pet.  420)    180,  637, 

953 

Charleston  v.  Oliver  (1G  S.  C.  49)     424, 

479  995 
v.  Reed    (27  W.  Va.  681)     145,'472, 

1230 
Charleston  C.  Council  v.  Ahrens  (4 

Strob.  241 )  397, 403,  425,  433,  904 
v.  Benjamin  (2  Strob.  508)  397,  468 
v.  Boyd  (1  Mill  Const.  352)  442 

v.  Clmr  (2  Bailey,  104)  462,  483,  488 
v.  Condy  (4  Rich.  L.  254)  949 

v.  Corleis  (2  Bailey,  189)  485 

v.  Dttnn  (1  McCord,  333)  485 

v.  Elford  (1  McMullan,  234)  472 

v.  Feekman  (3  Rich.  Law,  385)  485 
v.  Goldsmith  (2  Speers,428)  397,  462 
v.  Goldsmith  (12  Rich.  L.  470)  429 
v.  King  (4  McCord,  487)  422,  498 

v.  Moorhead  (2  Rich.  L.  430)  274 

v.  Payne  (2  N.  &  McC.  475)  213,  294 
v.  Pepper  (1  Rich.  L.  364)     422,  427, 

498 
v.  Pinckney  (1  Tr.  Const.  42)  959 
v.  St.  Phillip's  Church  (1  Mc- 
Mullan, Eq.  139)  949 
v.  Seeba  (4  Strob.  319)  482 
v.  Smidt  ( 11  Rich.  L.  343)  485 
ads.    State    (2   Speers   L.    623, 

719)  949,  969,  970 

v.  Wentworth  St.  Bap.  Church 

(4  Strob.  306)    236,  404,  433,  443 
Charlton  v.  Allegheny  (1  Grant  (Pa.) 

Cas.  208)  1220 

Chase  v.  Cleveland   (44  O.  St.  505)  1260, 

1297 
v.  Lowell  (7  Gray,  33)  296,  314 

v.   Merrimack   Bank    (19  Pick. 

564)  1027,  1172 

Chastain  v.  Calhoun  T.  Council  (29 

Ga.  333)  431 

Chatfield  v.  Wilson  (28  Vt.  49)  1216 

Chattanooga  v.  Geiler  (13  Lea,  612)    522, 

731 
v.  State  (5  Sneed,  578)  1134 

Chaunt  v.  Smart  (1  B.  &  P.  477)  1072 
Cheaney  v.  Hooser  (9  B.  Mon.  330)  93, 
267,  898,  972,  1167 
Cheatham  v.  Shearn  (1  Swan,  213)  449 
Cheek  v.  Aurora  (92  Ind.  107)     783,  796, 

804 

Cheeney  v.  Brookfield  (60  Mo.  53)    529, 

537,  563,  566,  567,  1140 

Cheesbrough,  Re  (17  Hun,  561)  701 

Cheetham   v.   Hampson   (4  D.  &  E. 

318)  1311 

Cheever  v.  Shedd  (13  Blatch.  258)  1220 
Chegaray  v.  Jenkins  (5  N.  Y.  376)  324 
Chelmsford    Co.     v.    Demarest    (7 

Gray,  1)  300 

Chemung  Canal   Bank  v.  Chemung 

Co.   Sup.   (5   Denio,   517)     184, 
195,  219,  519,  565,  568 


Page 
Chenango  Bank  v.  Brown  (26  N.  Y. 

467)  77,  78 

Chenery  v.  Waltham  (8  Cush.  327)       266 

Cheny  v.  Shelby ville  (IS  Ind.  84)  425 

Cherokee  v.  Fox  (34  Kan.  10)  904 

v.  Sioux   C.  &  I.  F.  T.  Lot  Co. 

(52  Iowa,  279)  705 

Cherokee  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Wilson  (109 

U.S.  021)  1067 

Cherokee  Ins.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Whitfield 

Jus.  (28  Ga.  121)  968 

Chesapeake  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v.  Bait. 

&  O.  R.  Co.  (4G.  &  J.  1)     144, 
243 
Chess  v.  Birmingham  (1  Grant  (Pa.) 

Cas.  438)  939 

Chester  Countv  v.  Brower  (117  Pa. 

St.  647)  1244 

Chestnut  Av.,  Re  (68  Pa.  St.  81)  978 

Chestnutwood  v.  Hood  (68  111.  132)     1112 

Chicago  v.  Allcock  (86  111.  384)  569 

v.  Baer  (41  III.  306)  922,  979 

v.  Bartee  (100  111.  57)  905 

v.  Bixby  (84  111.  82)  1259,  1261 

v.  Chicago  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  (105 

111.  73)  1179 

v.  Colby  (20  111.  614)  955 

v.  Crooker    (2  111.  App.  279)     1272, 

1301 
v.  Dermody  (61  111.  431)     324,  1196, 

1306 
v.  Edwards  (58  111.  252)  315,  334 

v.  Evans  (24  III.  52)       387,  871,  1077 
v.  Fowler   (60   111.   322)     1277,  1281, 

1297 
v.  Gage  (95  111.  593)  297,  298 

v.  Gallagher  (44  111.  295)     1258,  1281 
v.  Hasley  (25  111.  595)     161,  674,  675, 

1031 
v.  Hesing  (83  111.  204)  1259,  1293 

v.  Hislop  (61  111.  86)  1259,  1260 

v.  Hoy  (75  111.  530)  1269 

v.  Huenerbein  (85  111.  594)  1318 

v.  Johnson  (53  111.  91)  1281,  1297 

v.  Johnson  (98  111.  618)  752 

v.  Joney  (60  III.  383)    324,  1196,  1306 
v.  Keefe  (114  111.  222)  1283 

v.  Kelly  (69  111.  475)  1189,  1287 

v.  Laflin  (49  111.  172)  450 

v.  Langlass   (52  111.  256)   1189,  1287, 

1288 
v.  Langlass   (66  111.  361)     1272,  1273, 

1301 
v.  Larned  (34  HI.  203)    722,  926,  927, 

955 
v.  McCarthy  (75  111.  602)  1272,  1301 
v.  McGinn  (51  111.  266)  881 

v.  McGiven  (78  111.  347)       1260,  1300 
v.  McGraw  (75  111.  566)  1183 

v.  Major  (18  111.  349)  1259,1293 

v.  Martin  (49  111.  241)  1287,  1288 

v.  Murphy  (84  111.  322)  1297 

v.  O'Brennan  (65  111.  160)    1177,  1311 
v.  O'Brien  (111  111.  531)  1261 


xliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Chicago  o.  People  ( 18  III.  416)     •">:,:,,  556 
,-.'  pe0|  li      -     [II  327)      555,  569,  994 
,-.  Phoenix  [as.  Co.  (126  III.  276)     Vi  I 
.  Powers  |  >-  111.  169)     881,  882,  883 
v.  Quimby  (38  111.  274)  415,  163 

v.  ltohbinV  (2  Black  (('.  S.)   llM    s:;|, 

Ml.  11 '.»."),  12M>,  i:;o:;,  i::m,  l::ii:>, 

I  106,  L308,  1309,  131 1,  [312,  1313 

[See  also  Robbina  u.  ( Chicago  ( 1 

Wall.  657).] 

v.  Rumpff  |  15  111.  90)       180,400,  129 

,-.  Rumsey  (87  111.  348)         781,  1234 

r.  Sansum  (87  111.  182)         1033,  1059 

v.  Scxt..ii  (115  111.  230)  322 

v.  Sheldon  (9  Wall.  50)  584,  580 

v.  Starr  (42  111.  171)  1293 

v.  Stearns  (105  111.  554)  1297 

r.  Taylor  (125  U.  S.  161)      088,  1221, 

1223,  1228,  1230,1235,  1241 

i-    Turner  (sil  111    119)  1184 

v.  Union   Build.  Assoc.  (102  111 

379)      794,  795,  1093,  1117,  1223, 

1235,  1241 

v.  Ward  (30  111.  9)  994 

v.  Wheeler  (25  111.  478)    710,  712,  714 

v.  Wright  (32  111.  192)    940,  941,  944, 

1000 

v.  Wright  (08  111.  586)  883,  1259 

v.  Wright  (69  111.  318)      99,  703,  743, 

711,  747,  789,801 

Chicago    &   Alton  R.   Co.   v.  Adler 

(56  111.  344)  94,  L03 

v.  Engle  (70  111.  317)  408,488 

Chicago*  N.  W.  Ii.  Co.  v.  Elgin  (91 

111.  251 )  804,  833 

r.  Fort   Howard   Bor.  (21   Wis. 

44)  969,1121 

Chicago   &  Pac.    R.   Co.  v.  Francis 

(70111.238)  1228,1234,1241 

Chicago   &    R.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Whipple 

(22111.105)  1126 

Chicago   &  W.   I.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayres 

(100  111.511)  1242 

?•.  Dunbar  (100  111.  110)  851 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  It.  v.  Aurora 

(99  111.  205)  044 

r   Banker  (41  111.20)  739 

v.  Haggerty  (07  111.  113)  857 

v.  Iowa  (94  U.  S.  155)  92 

v.  McGinnis  (79  111.  -JO'.))  833 

v.  Otoe   County  (1  Dillon  C.  C. 

338)  236,  501 

v.  Otoe  County  (10  Wall.  007)    614, 

032,  636 

v.  Payne  (59  111.  534)  852 

r.  Siders  (88  111.  321)  1107 

Chicago  City   R.    Co.  v.  Story  (73 

U1.541)  835 

o.  Young  (62  111.238)  865 

Chicago,  1).  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

(121  111.  170)  847 

Chicago,  I).  &  V.  It.  Co.  v.  Smith  (62 

111.  268)  225 

v.  St.  Anne  (101  111.  151)  645 


Pago 
Chicago  Dock  Co.  v.  Canity  (115 

III.  155)  111,  109,855 

Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Osage 

County  (88  Kan.  697)  623 

Chicago   Lake   Front  Case  (33  Fed. 

R.  730)       88,  170,  171,  175,  177, 
697 
Chicago,   M.,  &  St.  P.  R.  It,  Co.  v. 

Ackle\   (94  I'    S    [79)  92 

Chicago,  N.  &  S.  W.  It.  Co.  v.  New- 
ton (36  Iowa,  299)  834,848 
Chicago  Packing  &  P.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

(88111.221)  266,422,427 

Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Joliet 

(79  111.25)  485,739,  803,  WU 

v.  Reidy  (66  111.  43)  857 

Chick  v.  Newberry  County  (27  S.  C. 

419)  1240,  1248,  1252 

Chickasaw   Co.  Sup.  v.  Sunnier  Co. 

Sup.  (58  Miss.  019)  267 

Chicopee   Hank  v.  Chapin  (8  Met. 

(Mass.)  40)  583 

Chicot   County    v.  Kruse  (47   Ark. 

80)  1034 

Chidsey  v.  Canton  (17  Conn.  475)     1173, 

1175,  1247,  1252,  1288 

Child  v.  Boston  (4  Allen,  41)     1193,  1214, 

1325,  13-20,  1328,  1331,  1332,  1333 

v.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.  (2  P.  Wms. 

207)  393 

Childress  v.  Nashville  (3  Sneed,  347)    452 
Childs  r.  Nelson  ((i'.i  Wis.  125)  754 

Chilton  v.  London  &  C.   It.  Co.  (16 

M.  &  W.  212)  420 

Chilvers  v.  People  (11  Mich.  43)  181,  182, 

427 
Chinguacousy   Corp.,  Tie  (25  U.  O.  Q.  B. 

61).     [See  Perdue  v.  &c] 
Chin  Yan,  Be  (60  Cal.  78)       398,  400,  400 
Chope  v.  Eureka  (39  All).  L.  J.  420)    1294 
Choquette  v.  Barada  (33  Mo.  249)        079 
Chosen    Freeholders    of    A.    County,  &c. 

[See  A.  Co.  Freeh.  &c.] 
Christ   v.   Polk   County    (48    Iowa, 

302)  313 

Christ's  Church   v.   Woodward    (26 

Me.  172)  347 

Christian  Church  of  Pella  v.  Scholte 

(2  Iowa,  27)       743,  755,  767,  803 
Christie  v.  Maiden  (23  W.  Va.  667)     1 10, 
165,  108,  172,  1118 
Christopher  v.  New  York  (13  Barb 

507)  543,  1114 

Christy's  Adm.  v.  St.  Louis  (20  Mo. 

143)  1150 

Church  v.  Cherryfield  (33  Me.  460)    1257, 

1270 
v.  Milwaukee  (31  Wis.  512)  1227 

Church   v.  &c.      [See    the   following 

plaintiff  churches  which,  in  cit- 
ing, may  not  always  have  been 
fully  named  :  Brick  Presbyterian 
(6  Cow.  538),  Broadway  Baptist 
(8  Bush,  508),  Christian  (2  Iowa, 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xlv 


( Church  v.  SfC.  Continued.) 

27),  Congregational  (10  Conn. 
200),  First  Baptist  (6  Barb.  213), 
First  Congregational  (23  Conn. 
34),  First  Presbyterian  (36  Ind. 
338),  Madison  Av.  Baptist  (5 
Robt.  649),  Methodist  Episcopal 
(38  Ind.  3),  Methodist  Prot.  (0 
Gill,  391),  St.  Luke's  (7  Cush. 
226).] 
Churchill  v.  Walker  (68  Ga.  681)         141, 

1076 
Churchill  Tp.  v.  Cummings  Tp.  (51 

Mich.  446)  273 

Churchman  v.  Indianapolis  (110  Ind. 

259)  944,  1150 

Cicero  v.  Williamson  (91  Ind.  541)       268 
Cincinnati  v.  Bryson  (15  Ohio,  625)     423, 

426,  941 
v.  Buckingham  (10  Ohio,  257)       416, 
418,  426,  456,  941 
v.  Cameron  (33  O.  St.  336)  107 

v.  Coombs  (16  Ohio,  181)        707,  710 
v.  Evans  (5  O.  St.  594)  797,  803 

v.  Gwynne  (10  Ohio,  192) 


v.  Morgan  (3  Wall.  275) 
v.  Penny,  (21  O.  St.  499) 


151,  385, 
406,  507 
593,  617 

818,  821, 
1226 
468 


v.  Rice  (15  Ohio,  225) 
v.  Stone  (5  O.  St.  38)  1293,  1306, 1307 
v.  Walls  (1  O.St.  222)  177 

Cincinnati's  Lessee    v.  First  Presb. 

Church  (8  Ohio,  299)        797,  798 
v.  Hamilton  Co.  Com'rs  (7  Ohio, 

Pt.  1,  88)  739,  753 

Cincinnati  &  S.  G.  Av.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Cumminsville  (14  O.  St.  523)  855, 
863,  868,  871 
Cincinnati  &  S.  R.  Co  v.  Longworth's 

Ex.  (30  O.  St.  108)  734 

Cincinnati  College  v.  State  (19  Ohio, 

110)  953 

Cincinnati,  H.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan 

(32  <).  St.  152)  858 

Cincinnati   Mut.    Health   Assoc,    v. 

Rosenthal  (55  111.  85)  905 

Cincinnati  P.  B.   S.  Packet  Co.  v. 

Catlettsburg  (105  U.  S.  559)  165 
Cincinnati  So.  Ry.  Trs.  v.  Haas  (42 

O.  St.  39)  717 

Cincinnati  Trs.  v.  White's  Lessee  (6 

Pet.  431)   739,  742,  744,  750,  752, 
755,  703,  791,  817 
Cincinnati,  W.  &  Z.  R.  Co.  v.  Clinton 

Co.  Com'rs  (1  O.  St.  77)    78,  225 
Circleville  v.  Neuding  (41  O.  St.  465) 

1303,  1306 
Cisco  v.  Roberts  (36  N.  Y.  292)  166 

Citizens'  Coach  Co.  r.  Camden  H. 

R.  Co.  (33  N.J.  Eq.  267)         868 
Citizens'  Gas  &  M.  Co.  v.  El  wood 

(114  Ind.  332)  384,  400,  808,  824, 
1096 


Page 
Citizens'  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Louisville  Gas 

Co.  (81  Ky.  263)  827 

Citizens'  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sortwell 

(8  Allen,  217)  365,  369 

Citizens'  Sav.  &  Loan  Assoc,  v.  To- 

peka  (3  Dillon,  376)    83,  234,  238 
(20  Wall.  655)  573,  $39,  895 

Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jones  (34 

Fed.  R.  579)  826,  860 

Citizens'  Water  Co.  v.  Bridgeport  11. 

Co.  (55  Conn.  1)      134,  824,  825, 
826,  827 
City  c  &c.     [See  the  following  plain- 
tiff cities  which,  in  citing,  may 
not  always   have   been  fully  or 
alphabetically  named  :  Central  (2 
Col.  588),  Jeffersonville  (27  Ind. 
100),    Kenosha    (9    Wall.    477), 
Mount  Pleasant    (6  Iowa,   646), 
Philadelphia  (60  Pa.  St.  136),  St. 
Louis  (23  Mo.  483).] 
City  &  Suburban  Ry.  Co.  v.  Savan- 
nah (77  Ga.  731)  866 
City  Bank  of  Dallas  v.  Bogel  (51 

Tex.  351)  968 

City  Cem.  Assoc.  &c.  (142  Kan.  312). 

[See  Wyandotte  City,  &c] 
City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Corlies 

(21  Wend.  367)  1165 

City  of  London,  Re,  &c.     [See  Lon- 
don, Re,  &c] 
City  Railway  Co.   v.   &c.     [See   the  fol- 
lowing plaintiff  city  railway  com- 
panies which,  in  citing,  may  not 
always  have  been  fully  named  : 
Jersey  City  &  B.  R.  Co.  (20  N.  J. 
Eq.  61),  Louisville  City  Ry.  Co. 
(4  Bush,  478,  and  8  Bush,  415), 
and   Memphis  City   Ry.   Co.    (4 
Coldw.  406).  ] 
Claflin  v.  Hopkinton  (4  Gray,  502)       222, 

1110 
v.  Iowa  City  (12  Iowa,  284)  162 

Clague  v.  New  Orleans  (13  La.  An. 

275)  1197 

Claiborne  County  v.  Brooks  (111  U. 

S.  400)       187,  190,  195,  236,  573, 

584 

Claiborne  Street,  Re  (4  La.  An.  7)       706, 

707,  712 

Clancy  v.  Byrne  (56  N.  Y.  129)  1276 

Clapp  v.  Cedar  County  (5  Iowa,  15)      560 

v.  Hartford  (35  Conn.  66)        138,  722, 

914,  988,  990 

v.  Walker  (25  Iowa,  315)  163 

Clarence  v.  Auburn  (66  N.  Y.  334)      1158 

Clark  v.  Barrington  (41  N.  H.  44)      1257, 

1264 
v.  Brookfield  (81  Mo.  503)  656 

v.  Cape  May  (50  N.  J.  L.  558)        331 
v.  Commonwealth  (14  Bush,  166)  784, 

806 
v.  Corinth  (41  Vt.  449)  1257 


xlvi 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Pag« 

Clark  v.  Cuckfield  Union  (11  Eng.  L. 

I  q    142)  527 

r.  Davenport  |1 1  lows,  194)  1  IT,  1  19, 

237,  946,  1042 

r.  Dayton  (6  Neb.  192)  644 

,.  Des  Moines  (19  [owa,  L99)        195, 

237    529,  547,  560,  662,  563,  666, 

.      667,  568,  569,  615,  807,  883 

v.  Dist.   Columbia   (3  Mackey, 

L260 
r.  Easton  ll  16  Mass.  43)  1187 

r.  Fry  (8  0.  St.  358)  884,  1307 

,-.  Hallock  (16  Wend.  607)  324 

v.  Iowa  City  (20  Wall.  583)    560,681 
v.  Janesville  (1  Hiss.  (.)8).     [See 

( llarke  v.  J.| 
v.  Janesville  (10  Wis.  130)     183,  208, 
225,407,  560 
,-   Lewis  (35  111.417)  222,  H9 

v.  Lockport  (49  Barb.  580)  1300 

v.  McCarthy  (1  Cal.  453)  810 

v.  Miller  (54  N.  Y.  528)  325 

v.  Mobile  Sch.  Com'rs  (36  Ala. 

621)  161,162 

v.  New   Brunswick  (43  N.  J.  L. 

118)  425 

v.  New  York  (1  N.  Y.  338)  559 

v.  Norton  (49  N.  V.  243)  324 

v.  People  (15  III.  213)  331,  1080 

v.  Polk  County  (19  Iowa,  248)     520, 
5(32,  567 
r.  Pratt  (17  Me.  55)  679 

,-.  Richmond  (83  Va.  355)   1257,  1268 
v.  Saline    Co.    Com'rs    (7    Neb. 

616)  1143,1144 

v.  Saybrook  (21  Conn.  313)  1224 

v.  School  Dist.  1  T.  27  (78  111. 

474)  185 

v.  South  Bend  (85  Ind.  276)    216,  393 

v.  Syracuse  (13  Barb.  32)      448,  450, 

453,  1097 

t\  Union  Ferry   Co.   (35  N.  Y. 

485)  1205 

v.  Utica  (18  Barb.  451)  727 

v.  Waltham  (128  Mass.  567)         1312 
,-.  Washington  (12  Wheat.  40)      155, 

522 
17.  Wilmington  (5  Harr.    (Del.) 

243)  1323 

Clark  Co.  Sup.  v.  Lawrence  (03  111. 

32)  224 

Clark's  Case  (2  Pars.  521)  281 

Clarke   r.    Bank   of   Miss.   (10  Ark. 

516)  138 

v.  Blaekmar  (47  N.  Y.  150)    842,  848, 

849 
v.  Dutcher  (9  Cow.  674)     1148.  1162, 
1163,  1154 
v.  Farmers'  Woolen  M.  Co.  (15 

Wend.  256)  275 

o.  Hancock  Co.  Sup.  (27  111.  305)  239, 
277,  504 
v.  Leicestershire,  &c.  Canal  Co. 

(6  Q.  B.  898)  1057 


Pago 

Clarke  v.  Lyon  County  (8  Nev.  181)    539, 

653 
r.  Newport  (•">  R.  1.  333)  712 

r.  Potter  County  1 1  Pa.  St.  163)  262 
r.  Rochester  (28  X.  V.  en:,)  78,  86 
,-.  Rochester  (•">  Abb.  Pr.  107)  244 
v.  Rochester  (21  Barb.  446)       70,  86, 

225 

v.  School  Dist.  (3  R.  I.  199)   is::,  185, 

562,  564 

v.  Tucket  (2  Vent.  182)  488,  999 

Clarke  Co.  Com'rs  v.  State  (61  Ind. 

75)  1007 

Clarke  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  v.  Paris,  W.  & 

Kv.  R.  Turnp.  Co.  (11  B. 

Mon.  113)  027,  1070 

Clarke's  Case  (5  Co.  64)  420 

Clason  v.  Milwaukee  (30  Wis.  316)      390, 

403,  OH,  .",13 

Clay  v.  Grand  Rapids  (00  Mich.  451)   989 

v.  Nicholas  Co.  Ct.  (4  Bush,  154)  238, 

645 
Clay  County  v.  Mc  Aleer  (115  U.  S. 

010)  946,  1034 

v.  Simonsen  (1  Dak.  Ter.  403  ;  2 

lb.  112)  323 

Clay  Co.  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Neil  (36  Kan. 

617)  446 

Clayards  v.  Dethick  (12  Q.  B.  439)     1300 
Clayburgh  v.  <  Ihicago  (25  111.  535)       535, 

12111,1232 
Clayton    v.   Heidelbergh    (17   Miss. 

623)  1132,1133 

Clear    Lake    W.    W.    Co.    v.    Lake 

Countv  (45  Cal.  90)  1168 

Clearv  v.  Trenton  (50  N.  J.  L.  331)       331 
Cleburne  v.  Gulf,  Col  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 

(66  Tex.  457)  574 

Clegg  v.  Richardson  Co.  Sch.  Dist. 

56  (8  Neb.  178)  81 

Cleghorn   v.  Postlethwaite   (43  111. 

428)  '.'s  i 

Clemence  v.  Auburn  (66  N.  Y.  334)  1220, 

1281,  1331 
Clements  v.  Anderson  (40  Miss.  581)    798, 

803 
Clerk  v.  Tucket  (3  Lev.  281)  416,  421 
Clerk's  Case  (2  Cro.  506)  336 

Cleveland  v.  Cit.  Gasl.  Co.  (20  N.  J. 

Eq.  203)  149 

v.  Jersey  City  (39  N.  J.  L.  629) 

1009,  H)70 
v.  King  (132  U.  S.  295)       1174.  1280, 
1281,  1295. 129S,  1304 
v.  St.  Paul  (18  Minn.  279)   1281,  1296 
v.  Trim,  (13  R.  I.  50)  914 

v.  Wick  (1S«>.  St.  303)   722,  723,920 
Cleveland  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ball  (6  O. 

St.  568)  733 

Cleveland,  P.  &  A.   R.  Co.   v.  Penn- 
sylvania (15  Wall.  300)  901 
Clifton  v.  Cook  (7  Ala.  114)  281 
Cline  v.  Cornwall  (21  Grant,  129)        884, 

886 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xl 


vn 


Page 
Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rap.  &  Mo.  River 

R.   Co.   (24   Iowa,  455)    94,  121, 

747,  776,  8:11,  841,  850,  853,  863, 

870 

v.  Howard  (42  Conn.  294)  1263 

v.  Phillips  (58  111.  102)  39G 

v.  Strong  (9  Johns.  370)  1148 

Clintonville  Trs.  v.  Keating  (4  Denio, 

341)  143,  431,433 

Close  v.  Burl.  C.  R.  &  N.  Ry.  Co.  (64 

Iowa,  149)  672 

Clothier  v.  Webster  (12  C.  B.  (n.  s.) 

790)  1331 

Clough  v   Hart  (8  Kan.  487)  553,  554 

v.  Unity  (18  N.  H.  75)  711 

Cloughessey  v.  Waterbury  (51  Conn. 

405)  1260 

Coal  Float  v.  Jeffersonville  (112  Ind. 

15)  178,  392,  405 

Coast  Line  R.  Co.  v.  Cohen  (50  Ga. 

451)  786,  863,  866 

Coates  v.  Campbell  (37  Minn.  398)        234 

v.  Canaan  (51  Vt.  131)        1259,  1267, 

1300 

v.  Dubuque  (68  Iowa,  550)    814,  1217 

v.  New  York  (7  Cowen,  585)        212, 

215,  443,  444,  478,  483 

[See  also  Cotes,  &c] 

Cobb  v.  Boston  (112  Mass.  181)  212 

v.  Dal  ton  (53  Ga.  426)  1156 

v.  Kingman  (15  Mass.  197)  271 

v.  Portland  (55  Me.  381 )  1198 

v.  Standish  (14  Me.  198)     1264,  1284, 

1296 
Cobbett  v.  Slowman  (9  Exch  633)  503 
CobiH-n  v.  Ellen  wood  (4  N  H.  99)  679 
Cochran  v.  McCleary  (22  Iowa,  75)  289, 
292,  340,  352,  355,  1022,  1075, 
1076,  1095 
Cockburn  v.  Bank  (13  La.  An.  289)     379, 

380 
Cocke;;.  Halsey  (16  Pet.  71)  304 

Codd  v.  Cabe  (13  Cox,  202)  295 

Codding  v.  Mansfield  (7  Gray,  272)      209 
Coe  v.  Caledonia  &  M.   R.   Co.  (27 

Minn.  197)  644 

v.  Columbus,  P.  &  I.  R.  Co.  (10 

O.  St.  372)  969 

v.  Wise  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  711)  179 

v.  Wise  (5  B.  &  S.  440)  1207 

v.  Wise  (7  B.  &  S.  831)  1331 

Coffin  r.  Field  (7  Cush.  355)  222 

v.  Nantucket  (5  Cush.  209)    155,  359, 

1165 
v.  Plymouth  (49  N.  H.  173)  322 

v.  Portland  (27  Fed.  R.  412 ;  11 

Saw.   C.  C.  600)     740,  743,  749, 

769,  773 

v.  State  (7  Ind.  157)  311 

Cofran  v.  Cockran  (5  N.  H.  458)  679 

Coggeshall  v.  Pelton   (7  Johns.  Ch. 

292)  661,  668 

Coggswell  v.  Lexington  (4  Cash.  307) 

1256,  1265,  1270 


i '•[_'. 
Cogswell  v.  N.  Y.  N.  II.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.  (103   N.  V.  10;   rev.   26 
J.  &S.  31)  7-2,  784,  1220 

Coghlan  v.  Ottawa  (1  App.  (Can.)  51) 

1328 

Cohen  v.  Cleveland  (43  O.  St.  190)      1227 

v.  New  York  (113  N.  Y.  532)       1162, 

LI  85 
r.  Wigfall  (8  Rich.  L.  237)  278 

Cohn  v.  Parcels  (72  Cal.  367)  766 

Coite   v.    Societv   for   Savings   (32 

Conn. 173i  894 

Coker  v.  Birge  (10  Ga.  336)  4  19 

Colbeck  v.  Brantford  Corp.  (21  U.  C 

Q.  B.276)    1247,  1248, 1271,1298 
Colburn    v.   Chattanooga    (17   Am. 

Law  Reg.  N.  s.  191)        568,  1112 

Colby  v.  Beaver  Dam  (34  Wis.  285)    1267 

v.  Coates  (6  Cush.  559)  161 

Colchester  v.  Brooke  (7  Q.  B.  383)      242, 

246 

v.  Goodwin  (Carter,  121)  488 

v.  Lawton  (1  Ves.  &  B.  220)  671 

v.  Seaber  (3  Burr.  1866)        242,  244, 

246,  248,  257,  262 

Coldsprins  Iron  Works  v.  Tolland 

(9  Cush.  492)  263,  264 

Coldwater  v.  Tucker  (36  Mich.  474)    263, 

£17   1333 
Cole  v.  Black  River  Falls  (57  Wis.' 

110)  1079 

v.  Drew  (44  Vt.  49)  817 

v.  Green  (25  111.  104)  674 

v.  Hanchett  (13  111.  615)  1111 

v.  Kezler  (64  Iowa,  59)  449 

v.  La  Grange  (113  U.  S.  1)     695,  895 
v.  Medina  (27  Barb  218)  1157 

v.  Muscatine  (14  Iowa,  296)         1224, 
1229  1231 
v.  Nashville  (4  Sneed,  162)         'll61, 

1187 
v.  Newburvport  (129  Mass.  594) 

1197,  1271 

v.  State  (102  N.  Y.  48)  130 

Colegrove  v.  Breed  (2  Denio,  125)         321 

Coleman  r.  Chester  (14  S.  C  286)       1166 

v.  Neal  (8  Ga.  560)  1030 

v.   San  Rafael  Turnp.   Co.  (49 

Cal.  517)  657 

v.  Second  Av.  R.  Co.  (38  N.  Y. 

201 )  860 

Colero  v.  Cleburne  (131  U.  S.  162)      371, 

408,  577,  590 

Coles  v.  Madison  County  (1  111.  115)      94, 

99 
v.  Williamsburg  Trs.  (10  Wend. 

658)  343,  358,  369 

Coles  Count v  v.  Allison  (23  111.  383)   281, 

362,  485 

Collector  v.  Day  (11  Wall.  113)  951 

v.  Hubbard  (12  Wall.  1)       537,  1145, 

1155 
College  of  Phvsicians  v.  Salmon  (3 

Salk.  102)  258 


xlviii 


TAIJLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

College   v.  &c.     [See   the   following 

plaintiff  colleges  which,  in  citing, 

may  not  always  have  been   fully 

oamed  :    St.  Mary's  Collegi      LO 

Ean.  442),  Washburn  College  (8 

Km   344).] 

Colley  v.  Westbrook  (57  Me.  181)       1302 

Collings  v.  Camden  (27  N.J.  Eq.  293)  1123 

Collins  v.  Council  Bluffs  (32   Iowa, 

324)  L261, 1287,  1288 

v.  Davis  (57  Iowa,  256)  1 126 

v.  Dorchester  (6  Cush.  396)   382,  1270 
v.  Hatch  (18  Ohio,  523)  149,  393,  397, 

406 
v.  Holyoke  (146  Mass.  298)    300,  386, 

USD 

0.  Louisville  (2  B.  Mon.  134)        423, 

463,  941,944 

v.  Macon  (G9  Ga.  542)    752,  754,  1183 

v.  Philadelphia  (93  Pa.  St.  272)  1317, 

1328 

v.  Savannah  (77  Ga.  745)  1157 

v.  State  (8  Ind.  344)  305 

v.  Swindle  (6  Grant,  282)  51(3 

Collinsville  v.  Scanland  (58  111.  221)      471 

Coloma  v.  Eaves  (92  U.  S.  484)    593,  597, 

599,  618 
Colton  v.  Hanchett  (13  111.  615)    151,  807, 

883,  1111 
v.  Price  (50  Ala.  424)  319 

r.  Rossi  (9  Cal.  595)  721 

Columbia  v.  Beasly  (1  Humph.  232) 

'  396.  399,  425,  941,  947 

o.  Duke  (2  Strob.  530)  469 

v.  Harrison  (2  Const.  213)       477,  485 

v.  Hunt  (5  Rich.  550)       413,  940,  941 

Columbia  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kline  (Bright. 

320)    '  662 

v.  Columbia  (27  S.  C  137)  964 

Columbia  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Bryson  (13 

Fla.281)  1073,  1107 

v.  King  (13  Fla.  451)   584,  1028,  1038, 
1052,  1060,  10G4 
Columbia  Del.  Br.  Co.  v.  Geisse  (35 

N.  J,  L.  558)  688 

Columbian   Ins.  Co.   v.   Wheelright 

(7  Wheat.  534)  1074 

Columbian  L.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y. 
v.  Wilson's  Heirs  (8  Pet. 
291)  1006,  1056 

Columbus  v.  Arnold  (30  Ga.  517)  183 

v.  Cutcomp  (61  luwa,  672)  432 

v.  Dahn  (36  End.  330)       744,  752,  759 
v.  Grey  (2  Bush,  476)  177,  178 

v.  Hydr.    W.   Mills  Co.  (33  Ind. 

435)  1231,1332 

v.  Jaques  (30  Ga.  506)     765,  783,  784 
v.  Sold  ill  O.  St.  479)  980 

v.  Story  (35  Ind.  97)  946 

v.  Street  Ry.  Co.  (45  O.  St.  98)    966, 

967 
Columbus  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Witherow 

(82  Ala.  190)  747,  852,  1239 

Colwell  v.  Peden  (3  Watts,  327)         1148 


Page 
Comer  v.  Folsom  (13  Minn.  219)  224 

Commercial   Bank    v.  Lockwood   (2 

Harring.  8)  254 

Commercial  Nat  Bank  of  Cleveland 

v.  Iola  (2  Dill.  353)    82,  233,  235, 
237,  238,  587,  906 
r.  Iola  (20  Wall.  655)  233,  235 

Commissioners  for  filling,  &c.  (62  Mo. 
217).  [See  St.  Louis  Slough 
Com'rs.  &e.| 
Commissioners  of  A    (city,  county 
or  town)  &c.   [See  A.  Com'rs, 
&c] 
Commissioners  of  Assessment,  &c. 
(18  Alb.   L.J.   199).     [See 
Brooklyn  Com'rs,  &c] 
Commissioners  of  the  Canal  Fund,  &c. 
(5   Ohio,  57).     [See   Canal 
Fund  Com'rs,  &c] 
Commissioners  of  Highways  of  Gen- 

esseo  v.  Harper  (38  111  103)  1126 
Commissioners  of  Highways  of  Niles 

Tp.  v.  Martin  (4  Mich.  557)    1173 
Commissioners  of  Highways  of  So- 
nora  v.  Carthage  Sup.  (27 
111.  140)  1126 
Commissioners   of  the  Poor,  &c.   (2 
Mc   Cord,   170).      [See  St. 
Paul's   Par.    Poor    Com'rs, 
&c] 
Commissioners  of  Schools,  &c.   (20 
Md.  449).     [See  Alleghany 
Co.  &c] 
Commissioners  of  Streets  of  George- 
town v.  Taylor  (2  Bay,  282)  762, 
801 
Commissioners  v.  &c.     [See  the  fol- 
lowing    counties     wherein      the 
plaintiff,  not  being  specified    in 
the  reporter's   caption,   may,  in 
citing,  not  always  have  been  fully 
named  :  Bourbon,  &c.  (99  U.  S. 
686),  Dodge  &c.  (96  U.  S.  205), 
Leavenworth,  &c.  (99  U.  S.  624). 
See  also  Drain  Com'rs,  &c.   (57 
Mich.  127).] 
Commonwealth  v.  Adams  (114  Mass. 

323)  466,  1287 

v.  Alburger  (1  Whart.  (Pa.)  469)  738, 

744,  752,  759,  7G4,  769,  799 

v.  Alger  (7  Cush.  53)     165,  166,  177, 

212 
v.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs  [Arm- 
strong, rel.],  (37  Pa.  St.  277)  674, 
1004,1027,  1028, 1037,  1038,  1056, 
1058,  1069 
v.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs   [Mid- 

dleton,  rel  |,  (37  Pa.  St.  237)  192, 
194,618,  1059,  1061,  1069 
v.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs  [Thom- 
as, rel.],   (32  Pa.  St.  218)    1005, 
1007,  1008,  1028,  1088 
v.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs  (16  S. 

&  It.  317)  1030 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


X 1 1 X 


Page 
Commonwealth  v.  Allen  (128  Mass. 

308)  1076 

v.  Allen  (70  Pa.  St.  KJ5)  285 

v.  Arrison  (15  S.  &  R.  130)  352 

v.  Athearn  (3  Mass.  285)  378,  L088 
v.  Bacon  (ti  s.  &  U.  822)  313 

y.  Bank  of  America   (10  Phila. 

].-,!■,)  toso 

i'.  Bank  of  Pa.  (28  Pa.  St.  389)  352 
v.  Baxter  (35  Pa.  St.  263)     285,  288, 

1077 
>:  Bean  (14  Gray,  52)  399,  471,  482 
v.  Bean  (Thach.  ('rim.  Cas.  86)  482 
v.  Belden  (13  Met.  10)    754,  760,  761, 

762 
v.  Berkshire  Ins.  Co.  (98  Mass. 

25)  904 

v.  Binns  (17  S.  &  R.  219)  310 

v.  Blaisdell  (107  Mass.  234)  785,  889 
v.  Borden  (61  Pa.  St.  272)  483 

v.  Boston  (97  Mass.  555)  830 

v.  Bowman  (3  Pa.  St.  203)  457,  764, 
765,  766 
v.  Breed  (4  Pick.  463)  703 

v.  Brennan  (103  Mass.  70)  432 

v.  Brice  (22  Pa.  St.  211)  1175 

v.  Brooks  (99  Mass.  434)  808 

v.  Brooks  (109  Mass.  355)  465 

v   Brown  (147  Mass.  585)  499 

v.  Bumm  (10  Phila.  162)  1086 

v.  Bussier  (5  S.  &  R.  451)  329 

v.  Cambridge  (7  Mass.  158)  696,  796 
v.  Canal  Com'rs  (9  Watts,  466)  361 
v.  Cary  Impr.  Co.  (98  Mass.  19)  904 
v.  Central  Bass.  Ky.  (52  Pa.  St. 

506)  863,  107o,l083 

v.  Charlestown  ( 1  Pick  179)  705,  762 
v.  Chase  (6  Cush.  248)  381 

v.  Cluley  (56  Pa.  St.  270)  279,  1075, 
1079,  1086 
v.  Cole  (26  Pa.  St.  187)  754 

v.  Comly  (3  Pa.  St.  372)  323 

v.  Commercial  Bank  of  Pa.  (28 

Pa.  St.  389)  352 

v.  Coupe  (128  Mass.  03)  754 

v.  Cuilen  (13  Pa.  St.  133)  244 

v.  Curtis  (9  Allen,  266)  471,  810 

v.  Dallas  (3  Yeates,  300)  291,  292,  494 
r.  Davis  (140  Ma>s.   is.",)  ;;oii,  4(>7 

v.  Deerfield  (6  Allen,  149)  881 

v.  Dow  (10  Met.  382)  433,  487 

v.  Dugan  (12  Met.  233)  293 

v.  Duquet  (2  Yeates,  493)  385 

v.  Ellis  (11  Mass.  465)  1125 

r.  Emery  (11  Cush.  406)  507 

v.  Em.    Indus.   Sav.    Bank   (98 

Mass.  12)  650 

v.  Erie  &   M.  F.  R.  Co.  (27  Pa. 

St.  344)  860 

v.  Erie  &   N.  E.  R.  Co.   (27  Pa. 

St.  339)     811,  833,  846,  850,  851, 

853 

v.  Fahey  (5  Cush.  408)  443,  444,  480, 

483,  484 

VOL.  I.  —  d 


Page 
Commonwealth  v.   Fairfax  Co.   Ct. 
Jus.  (2  Va.   'as   9)  I 

17.  Kenton  (139  Ma>s.  195) 
v.  Ford  (6  Pa.  67)  310 

v.   Fowl,.,-    i  10    Mass.    290;     11 

Mass.  339)  L082,  1089 

v.  Garriguea  (28  Pa.  St.  9)    288,  1077 
v.  Gay  (5  Pick.  H)  480,  183 

v.  Genther  (17  s.  &  R.  L35)  32  I 

v.  German  Soc.  ( 15  Pa.  St.  251)     337 

;;;;   , 

v.  Gill  (8  Whart.  228)  1080 

v.  G Irich  (13  Allen,  546)    401,  143, 

l.M 
v.  Guardians  of  Poor  (6  S.  &  R. 

469)  329,  335 

v.  Ball  1 7  Watts,  290)  1175 

v.  Hamilton  Manuf.  Co.  (12   Al- 
len, 298)  904 
v.  Hampden  ( !o.   Sess.  Jue 

Pick.  414)  1057 

v.  Hastings    (9   Met.   259)     293,294, 

295 
v.  Ilawkes  (123  Mass.  525)  308,  195 
v.  Henry  (49  Pa  St.  530)  1014,  L015 
v.  Hitcliings  (5  Gray,  482)  487 

v.  Hopkinsville  (7  B.  Men.  38)     1135 
V.  Home  (ID  Phila.  101)  K)86 

p.  Ipswich  (2  Pick   70)  356 

v.  Johnson  (2  Binnev,  275)  1010 

v.  Jones   (12   Pa.  St.  365)  278,  1086, 

IDs!  i 

v.  Kepner  (10  Phil.  510)  352 

17.  King  (13  Met   115)  885 

v.  Lasiorio  (141  Mass.  81)  165 

v.  Lancaster  (5  Watts,  152)  365,  1030 
v.  Lebanon  Co.  Q.  Sess.  Judges 

(8  Pa.  St.  391)  77,  78 

v.  Leech  (44  Pa.  St.  332)       283,  285. 

287,  288,  1077 

17.  Low  (3  Pick.  408)  754,762 

v.  Lowell  Gasl.  Co.  (12   Allen, 

75)  967 

v.  Lyndall  (2  Brewster,  425)  1070 

v.  Mann  (5  W.  &  S.  418)  313 

17.  Markham  (7  Bush,  486)      425,  944 
v.  McCaffertv  (145  Mass.  384)       396, 

167 

v.  McCarter  (98  Pa.  St.  607)         1085 

17.  McCloskey  (2  Rawle,  309)        285, 

509,  Hi77    1078 

v.  McDonald  (16  S.  i  R.  390)       759, 

799,  803 

v.  Mc Williams  (11  Pa.  St.  61) 

v.  Meeser  (1 1  Pa.  St.  341)      285,  2^7. 

in;.;,  1077,  1086 

17.  Miliman  (13  S.  &  R.  U>-  785 

v.  Milton  (12  B.  Mon.  212)  905 

17.  Montrose  (52  Pa.  St.  391)  7:: 

i7.  Moorehead  (118  Pa  St.  344)      762 

i?.  Nashua  &  L.  R.  Co.  (2  Gray, 

54)  1134 

17.  New   Bedford   Br.    Prop.    (2 

Gray,  339)  1133 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Pago 
<  '•  mmonwealth  v.  Newbury  (2  Pick. 

51)  711 

v.  Noxon  (121  Mass.  42)  816 

v.  old  Col.  ,^i  F.  R.  R.  Co.  (14 

Gray,  93)  852 

v.  rain:,.-  (10  Pa.  St.  214)  77,  7* 

v.  Park  (it  Phila.  181  I  H>|  I 

v.  Park  (10  Phil.   Illi  loll 

v.  Passmore  (1  S.  &  R  217)  Ml 

r.  Patch  (97  Mass.  221)  399,  404 

v.  Patton  (88  Pa.  St.  258) 
/■.  Pennsylvania  Benef.  Inst.  (2 

S.  &R    111)  337,338 

r.  Perkins  (43  Pa.  St.  400)     22-"..  674, 

102* 
v.  Perkins  (47  Pa.  St.  189)  22-") 

v.  Philadelphia  (27  Pa.  St.  497)  1154 
v.  Philadelphia  &  T.  R.  Co.  (6 

Whart.  25;  27  Pa.  St.  339)  844 
r.  Philadelphia    C.   Council    (7 

Am.  Law  Reg.  in.  s.)  362)  298 
v.  Phila.  Co.  Com'rs  (1  Whart. 

1 )  1030 

v.  Philadelphia    Co.    Com'rs    (2 

Whart.  (Pa.)  280)  721,  1030 

v.  Philadelphia   Co.   Com'rs    (5 

Rawle,  7-"))  281,  1025 

v.  Philanthropic    Soc.    (5   Binn. 

486)  336 

v.  Pindar  (11  Met.  539)  507 

v.  Pittsburgh  (14  Pa.  St.  177)        206, 

366,  los! 

v.  Pittsburgh   (34   Pa.  St.  496) 

185,  192.  194,  195,  237,  564,  946, 

1004,1007,1013,1027,  1028,1037, 

1038,1042,1062,1063,1065,1069, 

1070 

/-.  Pittsburgh  (41  Pa.  St.  278)        184, 

51  il 
v.  Pittsburgh  (43  Pa.  St.  391)  649 
v.  Pittsburgh  (88  Pa.  St.  66)        1029, 

1032 

v.  Read  (1  Gray,  475)  497 

v.  Rice  (9  Met.  253)  462 

v.  Roark  (8  dish.  210)  507 

v.  Robertson  (5  Cush.  438)    396,  404, 

465,  486 

v.  Roxbury  (!)  Gray,  451)         25,  148, 

174,  177,  246 

v.  Roy  (140  Mass.  432)  394 

v.  Rush  (11  Pa.  St.  186)         457,  763, 

764,  705,  709,  782,  783 

v.  Ryan  (5  Mass   90)  198,  199 

v.  St.   Patrick's  Benev.   Soc.    (2 

Hi. m.  441)  327,329,  331,  335 

v.  Sawin  (2  Pick.  517)  090 

v.  Shaver  (3  W.  &  S.  338)  330 

v.  Shaw  (1  Pittsburg  (Pa  )  492)  195 
v.  Shepp  (10  Phila.  618)  1086 

v.  Shuman's   Adm.    (18   Pa.  St. 

343)  694 

r.  Small  (27  Pa.  St.  31)  1023 

v.  Smead  (II  Mass  71)  1089 

v.  Smith  (45  Pa.  St.  59)  1088 


Page 
Commonwealth  v.  Smith  (132  Mass. 

289)  281 

v.  Springfield  (7  Mass.  9)  1252 

v.  Steffee  (7  Hush,  161)  396 

i\  Stodder  (2  Cush.  502)         402,  403, 

404,   125,  427,  429,  441,  465,  466, 

187 

v.  Sutherland  (3  S.  &  R.  145)         320, 

330,  334 

v.  Swasey  (133  Mass.  538)  1087 

v.  Taylor  (36  Pa.  St.  -JO:'.)  1072 

v.  Temple  (14  Gray,  69)         865,808 

v.  Tewksbury  (11  Met.  55)  212 

v.  Turner  (1  Cush.  493)  147,  384,  893, 

397,  432 

v.  Union  Ins.  Co.  (5  Mass.  230)      243 

v.  Upton  (6  Gray,  473)  440 

v.  Van  Sickle  ( Bright.  69)      449,  450 

v.  Vt.  &  Mass.  R.  Co.  (4  Gray, 

22)  1133 

v.  Wentworth  (Bright.  (Pa.)  318) 

784 
v.  Westboro'  (3  Mass.  406)  796 

V.  Wilder  (127  Mass.  1)  070 

v.  Wilmington  (105  Mass.  599)     1257 
v.  Woelper  (3  S.  &  R.  29)  277 

r.  Wolbert  (6  Binn.  292)  300 

v.  Wood  (1  -  Pa.  St  93)  738 

v.  Woods  (11  Pa   St.  113)  721 

v.  Worcester  (3  Pick.  402)      141,  404, 
•100.480,483 
Compton  v.  Waco  Br.  Co.  (62  Tex. 

715)  453 

Conboy  v.  Iowa  City  (2  Iowa,  90)        407, 

481,  509 

Concord  v.  Boscawen  (17  N.  II.  465)     660 

v.    Portsmouth    Sav.   Bank    (92 

U.  S.  625)  121,230,  610,613,622, 

623,  625,  027 

Concord  Com'rs  v.  Patterson  (8  Jones 

L. 182)  970 

Concord  R.  Co.  v.  Greeley  (17  N.  H. 

47)  704 

Concordia  Cem.  Assoc,  v.  Minn.  &N. 

W.  R.  Co.  (121  111.  199)  215 

Condict  v.  Jersey  City  (46  N.  J.  L. 

157)  1201,  1253,  1282 

Condon,  Re  (L.  R.  9  Ch.  App.  609)     115:; 
Cone  v.  Hartford  (28  Conn.  363)  722,  819, 

921,  988 
Conery  v.  New  Orl.  W.  W.  Co.  (39 

La.  An.  770)  1108 

Congdon  v.  Norwich  (37  Conn.  414)    1200 
Congregational  Soc.  of  Bethany  v. 

Sperry  (10  Conn.  200)     303,346 
Congregational  Soc.  of  Southington 

r.  At  water  (23  Conn.  34)  668 

Congressional    Tp.    11   v.    Weir    (9 

End.  224)  195,529,562 

Congrevc  v.  Morgan  (5  Duer,  495)      1270 

v.  Morgan  ( 18  N.  Y.  84)       1309,  1310 

v.  Smith  (18  N.  Y  79)  1309 

Conklin  v.  Filmore  Co.  Com'rs  (13 

Minn.  454)  1116 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


li 


Page 
Oonklin  v.  Lyon  Co.  Sell.  Dist.  (22 

Kan.  521)  44 

Conner?;.  Bent  (1  Mo.  235)  99 

v.  New  Albany  (1  Blackf.43)         182 

v.  New  York  (5  N.  V.  286)      311,  313 

Connersville  v.  Hank  of  Ind.  (16  Ind. 

105)  908 

v.  C.  Hydr.  Co.  (86  Ind.  184)         662, 

566 
Connett  v.  Green  Pond,  W.  &  B.  R. 

(23  S.  0.  427)  002 

Conniff  v.  San  Francisco  (07   Cal. 

45)  1187 

Connolly  v.  Griswold  (7  Iowa,  416)      716, 

727 
Connor  v    Green  Pond,  W.  &  B.  R. 

Co.  (23  S.  C.  427)  602 

v.  Morris  (23  Cal.  447)  1030 

Conrad  v.  Ithaca  Trs   (16  N.  Y.  158)  159, 

1176,  1201, 1204,  1267,  1280,  1293, 

1334 

[See  also  Konrad,  &c] 

Conservators  of  River  Tone  v.  Ash 

(10  B.  &C  349)  74,75 

Constables  of  Eiipperholm,  Re  (5  D. 

&  L.  79)  1130 

Converse  v.  Ft.  Scott  (92  U.  S.  503)     633 

v.  United  States  (21  How.  403)       316 

Conway  v.  Beaumont  (61  Tex.  10)       1156 

Conwell  v.  Einrie  (2  Ind.  35)  1163 

v.  Emrie  (4  Ind.  200)  321 

Cook  r.  Anamosa  (66  Iowa,  427)         1297 

v.  Boston  ('J  Allen,  393)      1147,  1 1 18, 

1149,  1151 

v.  Buffalo  (1  Clinton  Dig.  Buffalo, 

§2)  199 

v.  Burlington  (30  Iowa,  04)  745,  748, 
757,  769,  7S7,  821,  849,856 
v.  Charlestown  (98  Mass.  80)  1203 
v.  Charlestown  (13  Allen,  190)  1270 
v.  Harris  (til  N.  Y.  44S)  731),  713 

v.  Hillsdale  (7  Mich.  115)        755,  759 
v.  Macon  (54  Ga.  400)  1197 

v.  Mi  Idlesex  Co.  Freeh.  (26  N. 

J.  L.  326)  1151 

v.  Milwaukee  (24  Wis.  270)  1261 

v.  Milwaukee  (27  Wis.  lid)  1260 

v.  Racine  (49  Wis.  243)  545 

v.  Shipman  (24  111.  614)  532 

v.  South    Park  Com'rs    (61  111. 

115)  569,730,736 

v.  Sumner  &  M.  Manuf.  Co.  (1 

Sneed,  698)  235,237 

Cook  County  <•.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Co. 

111.  460)  1107,  1120 

v.  McCrea  (93  111.  230)  1  15,  1  16 

Cooley    v.   Board   of    Wardens    (12 

How.  296)  166 

v.  Essex  Co.  Freeh.  (27  N.  J.  L. 

415)  881,  1133,  1169,  1245 

v.  Granville  (10  Cush.  56)         53.,  1  17 
r.  Westbrook  (57  Me.  181)  1301 

Coolid^e    v.    Brookline    (114   Mass. 

692)  64 


Pace 

Coolidge  v.  Learned  (8  Pick.  504) 
Coombs  v.  Purringtou  (12   Me.  332) 

1266,  1273,  12*1 
Cooney  v.  Hartland  (95  111  616)  llb7 

Cooper  v.  Alden  (Harr.  Ch.  72)    76 

v.  Atlanta  (53  Ga.  038)  I  L83 

v.  Detroit  |  12  Mich   584)  157 

v.  Dismal  Swamp  Canal  Co.  (2 

Murpbej ,  195)  1006 

v.  Gostling  (9  L.  T.  (n.  a.)  77)       717 
v.  Lampeter  (8  Watts,  128)  361 

v.  Phibbs  (L.  R.  2  II.  L.  140)        1153 
v.  Savannah  (4  Ga.  68)  997 

v.  Smith  ('.»  S.  &  R.  26)  790 

Copey.  Hartford  (28  Conn.  363) 

v.  Thames,  II.    1).  &  R.  Co.  (3 

Exch.  841)  221 

Copeland  v.  Packard  (16  Pick.  217)  696 
Copes  v.  Charleston  (10  Rich.  491)      225, 

236,  635 
v.  Matthews  (18  Miss.  398)  323 

Copp  v.  Neal  (7  N    II   275)  679 

Corbett  v.  Duncan  (63  Miss.  84)  1 126 

r.  Troy  (53  Hun,  228)  1286 

Corbin  v.  Am.  Mills  (27  Conn.  274)  1307 
Corby  v.  Hill  (4  C.  B.  (y.  s.)  556)  1270 
Cordiell  v.  Frizzell  (1  Nev.  130.)  304 

Corey  v.  Rice  (4  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  141)  883 
Corfield  v.  Coryell  (4  Wash.  C.  C. 

380)  904 

Corlett  v.  Leavenworth  (27  Kan.  073) 

1285 

Cornell  v.  Barnes  (1  Denio,  35)  299 

v.  Guilford  (1  Denio,  510)        74.  222, 

321,  5 is,  529 

v.  People  (107  111.  372)  U4 

Cornell  College  v.  Iowa  County  (3,2 

Iowa,  520)  1116 

Corning  v.  Greene  (23  Barb.  33)        79,  84 

v.  Lowerre  (6  Johns.  Ch.  430)        852 

Cornish  v.  Pease  (19  Me.  184)  349 

v.  Toronto  Street  By.    Co.   (23 

IT.  C.C.  P.  355)  1300 

Corn  man  v.  Eastern  Counties  By.  (5 

Jur.  (n.  s.)  057)  865 

v.  Eastern  Counties  By.  Co.  (4 

II.  &  N.  781)  1262 

Cornwall  v.  Metrop.   Sewer  Com'rs 

(10  Ex.  771)  1258,1309 

Corporation   of   A.  v.  &c.    [See  A. 

Corp.  v.  &c] 
Corpus  Christi  v.  Woessner  (58  Tex. 

462)  1032 

Corrcll  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.   (38 

Iowa,  120)  857 

Corrigan  v.  Gage  (68  Mo  541)  397 

Corrothers    v.   Clinton    Di<t.   Bd.  of 

Ed.  (16  W.  Va.  627)  1107,  1119 
Corsicana  v.  White  (57  Tex.  382)  1190 
Corvalis  v.  Carlile  (10  Or.  139)     145,  1  16, 

469 
Corwein  o.  Hames  ( 1 1  .hems.  7  ') 
Corwinu.  Wallace  (17  Iowa,  334)  541 


lii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


i  twensboro  &  R.  R.  Co.  (10 

Bush,   288)      783,  788,  833,  848, 

854,  863 

Costar  v.  Brush  (25  Wend.  628)     L67,  180 

Costello  v.  New  York  (63  X.  V.  48)      290 

.  Albany  |  13  N.  V.  399)    794,  795 

Cotes  u.Davenport   (9  Iowa,  227)     1224, 

1323,  1324 
Cotton    v.    Kllis,   Gov.    (7  Jones   (N. 

C.)  L.  545)  311,1016 

Cotter  v.  Doty   (5  Ohio,  304)     413,  H6, 

420 
Cotton  v.  Hamilton  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  (14 

l\  C.  Q.  B.  87)  718 

r.  Leon  Co  Com'rs  (6  Fla.  610)     225 
17.  New   Providence  (47  N.  J.  L. 

401)  CM 

r.  Wood   (8  C.   B.  (».  s.)  508)      865, 

1262 
Cougot   r.  New  Orleans  (16  La.  An. 

21)  456,459 

Coulson   v.  Portland    (Deady,  481)     152, 

204,  206,  716,  1111,  1119,   1121, 

1148,  1150 

Coulter  v.  Robertson  (24  Miss.  278)     240, 

250 
Council  Bluffs  r.  Stewart  (51  Iowa, 

3851  202 

Counden  v.  Clerke  (Hob.  32)  261 

County  of  A.  v.  &c.    [See  A.  Coun- 
ty v.  &c.] 
County  Commissioners  of  A.  v.  &c. 
|  See  A.  <  'o.  I  'om'is  r.  &c] 
County  Court  of  A.  v.  &c.     [See  A. 

Co.  Court  r.  &c] 
County    Supervisors    of    A.    v.   &c. 

[See  A.  Co.  Sup.  v.  &c-l 
Courtright  v.  Brooks  Tp.  (54  Mich. 

I  s_! )  269 

Court   Square   Case   (72  Cal.  170). 

[See  San  Leandro,  &c.  | 
Cousins  v   State  (50  Ala.  113)  970 

Coventry's  Case  (2  Salk.  429)  1072 

Coverdale  v.  ( Iharlton  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B. 

D.  104)  777 

Covill  v.  Phv  (26  111.  432)  507 

Covington  v.  Boyle   (6  Bush,  201)     390, 

•     918 
v.  Bryant  (7  Bush,  248)     1281,  1293, 

1312 
v.  Casey  (3  Bush,  698)  979,  981 

17.  Hast  St.  Louis  (78  111.  548)  71,  267, 
386,  401 
v.  Hoadley  (83  Kv.  444)  109 

o.  Ludlow  (1  Met.  295)  371,  •' 57 3,  374, 

390 
v.  Mavberrv  (9  Bush,  304)  316 

v.  Rockingham  (93  X.  C.  134)       1 L07 
Covington  >.<•  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingles  (15 

B.  Mon.  637)  322 

Covington    &    <>.    ];.  Co.  v.  Barren 

Co.  (10  Bush,  604)  121 

Covington    County   v.   Dunklin  (52 

Ala.  28)  1029 


Tage 
Covington    County   v.   Kinney    (45 

Ala.  176)  1245 

Covington  Street   R.  Co   v.   Coving- 
ton (9  Push,  127)      157,  ^JS.  850, 
860 
v.  Packer  (9  Bush,  455)  866 

Cowan  i7.  Fulton  (23  Gratt.  579)  1006 

Cowan's  Case  (1  Overton,  311)  806 

Cowdin  t7.  Buff  1 10  End   83)  311 

Cowdrey   v.   Canadea   (16  Fed.  R. 

532)  239,529 

Cowen  v.  West  Troy  (43  Barb.  48)     397, 

510,  709,  984 

Cowles  v.  Brittain  (2  Hawks,  204)        904 

17.  Gray  (1  1  Iowa,  1)  759,  768 

v.  Mercer  County  (7  Wall.  118)    1140 

Cowley  17.  Rushville  (00  Ind.  327)         433 

».   Sunderland   (6  II   &  X.  505)  1195, 

L205,  1207,  1210,  1334 

Cox  i».  Burlington  (43  Iowa,  612)  313 

v.  Griffin  (18  Ga.  728)  707,  783 

17.  Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(48  Ind.  178)    721,740,747,841, 

854,  856 

v.  New  York  (103  N.  Y.  519)  311 

y.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo    131  I  481 

r.  Westchester  Tump.  Co.  (33 

Barb.  414)  1265 

Coy  v.   Lyons  (17  Iowa,  1)      1029,  1030, 
1032,  1033,  1042 
Craft  v.  Jackson  Co.  Com'rs  (5  Kan. 

518)  1116 

Crafter  v.  Metrop.  R.  W.  Co.  (L.  R. 

1  C.  P.  300)  1258,  1262 

Craig  v.  Andes  (93  X.  T  405)  602 

v.  Burnett  (32  Ala.  728)  324 

v.  Leitensdorfer  (123  U.  S.  209)    1006 

17.  Philadelphia  (89  Pa.  St.  205)     937, 

983 
v.  Rochester,  C.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (39 

N.  Y.  404)  867 

v.  Sedalia  (63  Mo.  417)     1266,  1279, 

1280,  1283,  1284,  1286 

v.  Vicksburg  (31  .Miss.  216)  560 

Cramer  v.  Burlington  (45  Iowa,  627) 

1300 

Crandall  v.  Amador  (20  Cal.  72)  1 «  m  i*. i 

17.  Nevada  (6  Wall.  35)  902 

Crane,  Re  (5  Pet.  190)  1006 

v.  Des  Moines  (47  Iowa,  105)  314 

v.  Fond  du  Lac   (16  Wis.  196)     074, 

1021) 

v.  Janesville  (20  Wis.  305)  944 

».  TJrbanna  (2  111.  App.  559)   557.  501 

Crangle  v.  Harrisburg  (1  Pa.  St.  132)  721 

Cranston  v.   Augusta  (61  Ga.  572)     211, 

1197 

Craw  v.  Tolona  C.tC,  111.  255)  924,991 

Crawford  v.  Purrell  (53  Pa.  St.  219)      952 

17.  Delaware  V.  (7  Ohio  St.  459)    856, 

871,  1220 

v.  Mobile  &  G.  R.  Co.  (76  Ga. 

405)  766 

17.  Powell  (2  Burr.  1013)  378 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


liii 


Crawford  County  v.  Iowa  County  (2 

Chand.  14)  200 

v.  Wilson  (7  Ark.  214)  662,  506 

CrawfordsvilLe  v.  Bond  (96  Ind.  236)  1317, 

L327,  1331 

v.  Smith  (79  Ind.  308)  L26P,  1270 

Crawshaw  v.  Roxbury  (7  Gray,  374)   208, 

2(H).  639 

Cravcrat't  v.  Selvage  (10  Bush,  69b)    518, 

535,  666,  558,  913,  978,  995 

Creal  v.  Keokuk  (4  G.  Gr.  (la.)  47)     814, 

1224 
Creamer  v.  Bates  (49  Mo.  523)  550 

Creighton  v.  Manson   (27  Cal.  613)     407, 

923 

v.  Piper  (14  Ind.  182)  291 

v.  San  Francisco  (42  Cal.  446)       95, 

130,  131,  1011 

v.  Scott  (14  O.  St.  438)    920,  976,  978 

v.  Toledo  (18  0.  St.  447)  550 

Crepps  v.  Durden  (Covvp.  040)  415 

Crescent   v.  Anderson   (114  Pa.  St. 

643)  1285 

Cresson's  Appeal  (30  Pa.  St.  437)         663 
Crete  v.  Childs  (11  Neb.  252)  1287 

Crissev  v.  Hestonville,  M.  &  F.  Pass. 

Ry   Co.  (75  Pa.  St.  83)  1269 

Crist  v.    Brownsville  Trs.  (10  Ind. 

452)  361 

Crockett  v.  Boston  (5  Cush.  182)  606,  745 
Croft  v.  Peterborough  (5  U.  C.  C.  P. 

35)  380,  1322 

Cromarty  v.  Boston  (127  Mass.  329)   1272 
Crommett  v.  Pearson   (18  Me.  344)     360, 

374 
Crompton    v.   Zabriskie    (101  U.   S. 

001)  1109,1118 

Cromwell   v.   Brown   S.   Q.  Co.  (50 

Conn.  470)  709 

v.  Sac.  County  (96  U.   S.  51)     561, 

582,  5s::,  594 

v.  Sonoma  County  (25  Cal.  315)  1294 

Cronan   v.    Municipality  (5  La.  An. 

537)  555 

Cronin  u.  Delavan  (50  Wis.  375)  1208 

v.  Jersey  City  (38  N.  J.  L.  410)      914 

r.  l'eopie  (82  N.  Y.  318)  401,  442 

Crook  v.  People  (106  111.  237)       140,  305, 

1080 
Crooke   v.  Flatbush  Water   Co.  (27 

Hun,  72;  29  Hun,  245) 
Crosby  v.  New   London    W.  &  P.  R. 
C.  (20  Conn.  121) 
u.Warren   (1    Rich.  Law,  385) 
121) 
Cross  v.  Kansas  City   (90  Mo.  13) 


650 
413, 

415 
815, 
L220 


v.  Morristown  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  305)   1  !8, 

385,  512,  701,  707,  800,  so:;,  806, 

oil,  1092 

v.  Plymouth  County  (125  Mass. 

557)  734 

v.  St.  Louis,  K.  C.  &  N.  Ry.  Co. 

(77  Mo.  318)  842,  849 


Pa 
Crossett  v.  Janesville  (28  Wis.  420)  1180, 
L188,  1219,  1229,  L231 
Croton   Dam  Case  (2    Denio,    133). 
|  Sec  New  York  v.  Bailey.] 
Crow  v.  Oxford  Tp.  (  110  1.  S.  215)    572, 

595,  634 
Crowder  v.  Tinkler  (19  Ves.  617)  1 19 

Crowell  v.  Sonoma  County  (25  Cal. 

313)  1169,  1172,  117  1,  1175 

Crowleyw.   Burlington,  C.   K.  &  N. 

Ry.  Co.  (65  Iowa,  058)  857 

v.  Copley  (2  La  An.  329)  933 

r.  Davis  (63  Cal.  460)  843 

Croxall  v.  Sherard  (5  Wall.  208)  637 

Croydon  Hospital  v.  Farlev  (6  Taunt. 

467)  261 

Cruger   v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.  (12 

N.  Y.  190)  709,  725,  727 

Cruikshanks  v.  Charleatown  C.  Coun- 
cil (1  McCord,360)   722,  921,  959 
Crump  v.  Colfax  Co.  Sup.  (52  Miss. 

107)  534 

Crystal  v.  Des  Moines  (65  Iowa,  502) 

1206,  1279 
Cuckfield  Burial  Bd.,  Re  (19  Beav. 

153)  717 

Cuddon  v.  Eastwick  ( 1  Salk.  143)         412 
Cuff  v.  Newark  (35  N.  J.  L.  17)  1306 

Culbertson  v.  Cincinnati  (16  Ohio, 

579)  1116 

Cullen  v.  Carthage  (103  Ind.  196)  220 

Culpepper   Co.   Sup.  v.  Gorrell  (20 

Gratt.  484)  1132 

Culver  v.  Jersey  City  (45  N.  J.  L.  256)  918 
v.  Streator  (22  N.  E.  R.  810)         1107 
Cumberland   v.    Magruder    (34  Md. 

381)  143,  198,  237 

v.  Willison  (50  Md.  138)     1196,  1211, 
1214, 1215,  1230,  1316,  1318 
Cumberland  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Barren 

Co.  Ct.  (10  Bush,  (i(il)  627 

v.  Washington  County  (10  Bush, 

504)  645 

Cuming  v.  Grand  Rapids  (46  Mich. 

150)  978 

v.  Prang  (24  Mich.  514)  818 

dimming   v.    Brooklvn    (11    Paige, 

596)  312,  557,  722.  000 

v.  Rapides  Par.  Pol.  Jury  (0  La. 

An.  503)  909 

r.  Savannah  (R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.) 

26)  970 

Cummings  v.  Fitch  (40  O.  St.  50)  200 

r.  Saux  (30  La.  An.  207)  516 

r.  St.  Louis  (90  Mo.  269)      709,  1108 

Cummins  v.  Seymour  (79  Ind.  401)     780, 

1306,  1327 
Cunningham  v.  Almonte  (21  U.  C.  C. 

1'.    159)  392 

v.  Squires  (2  W.  Va.  422)     510,  1126, 

1 1 27 
Curnen  v.  New  York  (79  N.  Y.  511)  322 
Curran  v.  Arkansas  (15  How.  312)      246, 

250 


liv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Page 
Curran  v.  Louisville  (83  Kv.  628)  704,801 
v.  Shattuck  (24  Cal.  127)  720 

Currier  o   Lowell  (16  Tick.  (Mas 

170)  131  I,  1315 

Curry   v.  Bunk  of  Mobile  (8  Port 

27  1 
v.   Decatur  Co.  Sup.  (61  Iowa, 

71)  1122 

v.  Mannington  (23  W.  Va.  11)     1279, 
1301,  1305 
v.  Mt.  Sterling  (15  [11   320)     705,  709 
v.  Savannah  (Ga.  1879)  071,  075 

v.  Si. mix  City  Dist.  Tp.  (62  [owa, 

L02)  39,  11 

v.  Stewart  (8  Bush,  500)  310 

1'urtis  /-.   Butler  County    (24   How. 

435)  236,361,664 

v.  Hope  (19  Conn.  154)  760 

v.  Keesler  (14  Barb.  521)  739 

v.  Leavitt  (15  X.  Y.  9)  184,  194 

v.  Portland  (59  Me.  is:',)  525 

v.   St.   Paul,  S.  &  T.  F.  R.  Co. 

(20  Minn.  28)  733 

v.  Whipple  (24  Wis.  350)        234,  573 
Curtis'  Adoi.  v.  Fiedler  (2  Black  (U. 

S.),461)  537 

Curwen  v.  Salkeld  (3  East,  538)  457 

Cushing  v.  A. lams  (is  Pick.  110)  SS5 

Bedford  (125  Mass.  520)  1263, 

120:) 

v.  Boston    (122    Mass.  173:    124 

Mass.  434;   L28  Mas..  330)      784 

v.  Frankfort  (57  Me.  541)        340,  355 

Cusliinan  v.  Smith  (34  Me.  217)  718 

Cusick  v.  Norwich  (40  Conn.  376)        818, 

1301 

Cutcomp  v.  Utl  (60  Iowa,  156)  388 

Cuthherl  v.  Conley  (32  Ga.  211)  431 

r.  Lewis  (6  Ala.  262)  1030 

Cutler  r.  Madison  Co.  Sup.  (56  Miss. 

115)  584 

v.  Russellville  (40  Ark.  105)  368 

Cutliff  r.  Albany  (60  Ga.  597)  910 

Cutting,  ft  (94  U.  S.  14)  I"  "'■ 

v.  Stone  (7  Vt.  471)  263 

Cuyler  v.  Rochester  (12  Wend.  165)    529, 

508,  1180 


I). 


Daily  v.  Columbus  (49  Ind.  169)  185 

v.  St.  Paul  (7  Minn.  390)  101 

v.  State  (8Blackf.  329)  291 

v.  Worcester  |  131  Mass.  452)        1312 

Dair  v.  United  States  (16  Wall.  1)        208 

Dale  County'w.  Gunter  |  1''.  Ala.  118)  1107 

Dallam  v,  Oliver  (3  Gill,  145)  1001 

Dalrymple  v.  Whittingham  (26  Vt. 

"       345)  562 

Dalton  v.  North  Hampton  (19  N.  II. 

362)  726 

v.  So.  E.  By.  Co.  (4C  B.  (n.  s.) 

2%)  1288 


Page 
Dalzell  v.  Davenport  (12  Iowa,  437)    1224, 

1231 
Dameron  v.  Irwin  (8  bed  L.  421)  323 
Damodhar  Gordhani  v.  Deoran  Kanji 

(L.  l;    1.  App.  I).  332)  72 

Damon  v.  Granby  (2  Pii  k   345)      79,  343, 

356,  359,  36  I,  361,  300,  525,  527, 

528,  564 

v.  Scituate  (119  Mass  66)  1284 

r.  Scituate  (20  Am.  K.  315)  L300 

Damour  v.  Lyons  (44  [owa,  276)  815,863, 

1195,  1324 
Dana,  ft   (7  Bened.  1)  508 

v.  Jackson   St.    Wharf  Co.   (31 

Cal.  118)  170,658 

v.  San  Francisco  (19  Cal.  486)  562 
Danaheru.  Brooklyn  (51  Hun,  663)  1213 
Danbury  &  X.  R    Co.  v.  Norwalk  (37 

Conn.  109)  454,  1331 

Dane  v.  Derby  (64  Me.  95)  1070,   1075 

Danforth'u.  Schoharie  Tump.   Co. 

(12  Johns.  227)  533 

Daniel  v.  Memphis  (11  Humph.  585)   135, 

145,  553 
v.  New  Orleans  (2G  La.  An.  1)      909, 

'.'7',) 
v.  North  (11  East,  375)  789 

r.  Potter  (4  ('.  &  P.  262)  1309 

v.  Richmond  Trustees  (78   Ky. 

542)  903 

v.   Sinclair    (L.   R.   0    App.    C. 

181)  1153 

Danielly  v.  Cabaniss  (52  Ga.  211)        135, 
L52,  186,649 
Daniels  v.  Burfortl  (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

481)  320,389,1102 

v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (35 

[owa,  12D)  718 

v.Denver  (2  Col. 669)         1327,  1328 

v.  Hilgard  (77  111.  640)  216 

v.  Wilson  (27  Wis.  492)  763 

D'Antignac  v.  Augusta  (31  Ga.  700)     944 

Dantzeiser  v.  Cook  (40  Ind.  05)  1296 

Danvers   Sch.   Dist.    v.    Tapley    (1 

Allen,  49)  272 

Danville  v.  Shelton  (70  Va.  325)    1 15,  388 
v.  Sutherlin  (20  Gratt.  555)  500 

Danville,  H.  &  W.  R.  Co    v.  Com- 
monwealth (73  Ta.  St.  38)      854 
Danville  Lumber  &  M.  Co.  r.  Parks 

(88  111.  463)  969 

Darby  v.  Crowland  (38  U.  C.  Q.  P>. 

338)  389.1139,1328 

Dargan  v.  Mobile  (31  Ala.  400)  1 107, 

B  1200 

v.  Waddell  (9  [red.  244)  449 

Darling  ».  (Minn  (50  111.  424)  984 

v.Ht.  Paul  (10  .Minn.  389)       154,424, 

425 
v.  Westmoreland  (52  N.  II.  401)   1270 
Darlington  v.  Commonwealth  (41  Pa. 

St.  08)        378,410,709,753,756 
v.  Jackson  County   (101    U.   S. 

G88)  594 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


IV 


Page 
Darlington  v.  New  York  (31  N.  Y. 

164)      95,  110.  111.  112,  121,  122, 

182,  1027,  1167,  1210 

Darrow  v.  People  |8  Col.  414)    1126,  1 128 

Darst  v.  People  (51  111.  286)  U8 

».  People  (02  111.  306)      286,  4-49,  450, 

1077 
Dart  v.  Houston  (22  Ga.  506)  103 

Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward  (4 

Wheat.  518)    38,  92,  93,  112,  114 
Dashiell   v.    Atty.-Gen.  (5   II.  &  J. 

302)  666 

v.  Baltimore  (45  Md.  615)  961 

Dassler,  Re  (35  Kan.  678)  467 

Daublin  v.  New  Orleans  (1  Martin, 

184)  783 

Dauphin  &  La  F.  S  Ily.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nedy (74  Ala   583)  954 
Davenport  v.  Bird  (34   Iowa,  524)         437, 
478,  470,  496 
v.  Chicago  R.  I.  &P.  R.Co.  (38 

Iowa,  033)  996,  908 

v.  Dav.   &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (38 

Iowa,  90)  848 

v.  Dodge   County    (105    U.   S. 

237)  572,  1044 

v.  Hallowell  (10  Me.  317)        518,  524 
v.  Kauffman  (34  Iowa,  194)  973 

v.  Kelly  (7  Iowa,  102)  458,  460 

v.  Kleinschmirlt   (6    Mont.  Ter. 

502  ;  13  Pac.  R.  249)        146,  543, 

826, 1108 

v.  Lord  (9  Wall.  409)  1028,  1037, 

1045,  1063,  1065,  106(5,  1073 

v.  Miss.  &   M.  R.  Co.  (16  Iowa, 

348)  895,  910,  048,  049,  068 

v.  Peoria  M.  &  F.  Ins.  Co.    (17 

Iowa,  276)  274,  533,  673,  674 

v.  Richmond  (81  Va.  636)  216 

v.  Ruckman  (37  N.  Y.  568)  1264, 

1274,    1281,    1283,     1284,    1295, 

1300,  1309 

v.  Ruckman  (10  Bosw.  20)  1301 

v.  Stevenson  (34  Iowa,  225)     841,  854 

Davenport  &  N.   R.  Co.  v.  Ren  wick 

(102  U.  S.  180)  171 

Davenport  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Davenport 

Gasl.  Co.  (43  Iowa,  301)  860 

Davenport  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Davenport  (13 

Iowa,  229)  203,500 

David  v.  Portland  Water  Com'rs  (14 

Or.  98)  04,  102 

Davidson  v.  New  Orleans  (90  U.  S. 

97)  684,  923,  932 

v.  Portland  (69  Me.  116)  1287 

v.  Ramsey  Co.  (18  Minn.  482)        226 

v.  Woodruff  (68  Ala.  356)  287 

Davidson  College  v.  Chambers'  Ex. 

(3  Jones  Eq.  253)      657,  658,  670 
Davies  v.  Corbin  (112  U.  S.  36)  1005, 1074 
v.  Lowden  (Carter,  20)  414 

v.  New  York  (83  N.  Y.  207)  678 

v.  New  York  (93  N.  Y.  250)  62 1 

v.  Stephens  (7  C.  &  P.  570)  741 


Page 
Davk'ss   Countv    v.  Dickinson  (117 

I     s  657)  195,  236,  604,  607,  639 
v.  Buidekoper  (98  U.  S.  98) 
Davis  v.   American  Soc.   (75  X.  Y. 

362)  1098 

u.Anita  (73  Iowa,  32:,)  396 

v.  Bangor  (12  Me.  522)  7*2,  785, 

1134,  1135,  L255,  1256,  1257,  1 209, 
L270 
v.  Bath  (17  Me.  241) 
v.  Bradford  Sch.  Dist.  (21  Me. 

349)  511 

r.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  Rv.  Co.  (46 

Iowa,  389)  841 

v.  Clifton  (8  U.  C.  C.  P.  236)  886 

v.  Clinton  (50  Iowa,  585)         81*.  821, 

i 
v.  Crawfordsville  (119  Ind.  1)      1319, 

1322 
v.  Des  Moines  (71  Iowa,  500)         202, 

205 
Dudley  (4  Allen,  557)      1263,  1278 


Fulton  (52  Wis.  657) 
Graves  (38  N.  J.  L.  104) 
Guilford  (55  Conn   351  j 
Harrison  (46  X.  J.  L.  79) 


1261 
162 
1257 
1129, 
1131 
1 257 


1301 
1314 

184 

944 


v.  Hill  (41  X.  H.  329) 

v.  Jackson  (61  Mich.  530) 

v.  Lamoille   PI.  R.  Co.   (27  Vt. 

602) 
v.  Leominster  (1  Allen,  182) 
v.  Lowell  M.  H.  Prop.   (8  Met. 

321) 
v.  Macon  (64  Ga.  128) 
v.  Montgomery   C.   Council  (51 

Ala.  139)     1157,  1160,  1199,  1281 
v.  New  York  (14  N.  Y.  506)  116, 

157,  387,  786,  842,  848,  859,  860, 

1114 

v.  New  York  (1  Duer.  451)  1072.  1094, 

1098 
v.  New  York  (2  Duer,  663) 
v.  Old  Colonv  R.  Co.  (131  Mass. 

258) 
v.  Reed  (65  N.  Y.  566) 
v.  Russell  (5  Bing.  355) 
v.  Sabita  (63  Pa.  St.  90) 
r.  State  (7  Md.  151) 
v.  State  (4  Stew.  &  P.  83) 
v.  Winslow  (51  Me  264) 
v.  Woolnough  (9  Iowa,  104) 
Dawes  v.   Hawkins  (4  L.  T.  (x.  6 

v.  Hightsown  (45  N.  J.  L.  501] 
Daws,  Re  (8  A.  &  E.  736) 
Dawson  t\  Frederick  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  (2 
II.  &  M.  132) 
v.  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (15 
Minn. 136) 
Dawson  Countv  v.  McXamara  (4  X 

W.  R."991)  .  578 

Day  v.  Green  (4  Cush.  433)  155,  359,  125, 

467,  1191 


1104 


5H 

958 
295 
7.-,: 
88 
137 
885 

87,  492 

5.) 

746 

809 

1131 


1006 


1116 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Daj  v.  Kent  (1  Or.  123)  281 

"  ,-.  Milford  (5  Allen,  98)        1274,  1276 
v.   Mount    Pleasant    (70    Iowa, 

1258,  1269 
v.  Schroeder  ( 16  Iowa,  546)  77 
Dayton  v.  Pease  (4  0.  St.  BO)    1158,  1202 

[293,  L317 

v.  Quigley  (29  X.  J.  Eq.  77)    396 

v.  Rounds  [zl  Midi.  82)  224 

v.  Rutland  (84  111.  279)  760 

Dean  v.  Borchsenius  (30  Wis.  236)      545, 

977,  993,  Ml-'. 

u  Charlton  (23  Wis.  590)     515,  1105 

v.  Davis  (51  Cal.  106)  91 

Gleason  (16  Wis.  1)    910,941,  953, 

957,  1122 

v.  Madison  (7  Wis.  I  208 

v.  New   Milford  Tp.  (5  W.  &  S. 

545  1202,1282 

Dean  &  C.  of  Windsor,  Re  (Godb. 

211)  217 

Deane  v.  Randolph  (132  Mass.  475)    1183 
v.  Todd  C2-2  Mo.  90)      151,  111-',  1120 
Deansville  Cemetery  Assoc,  Re  (66 

N.  V.  569;  rev.  5  Hun,  482)  445, 
696,  704 
De    Annas    v.    New   Orleans  (5  La. 

132)  772 

Deaton  v.  Polk  Co.  (9  Iowa,  594)  733 

1'.-    Baum   ?'.  New  York   (16  Barb. 

392)  1111 

o  r.  Girard  (1  La.  An.  30)  400 

Debolt  v.  Cincinnati  Tp.  Trs.  (7  O. 

St.  237)  316 

v.  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  (1  0.  St.564)    157 

Decatur  v.  Fisher  (5:)  111.407)  1281,  1287, 

1288,  12:17 
r.  Paulding  (11  Pet.  407)  1015 

v.  Vermillion  (77  III.  315)       315,  :!17 
Dechert  v.  Commonwealth  (113  Pa. 

St.  229)  101  I 

n     k(  r  v.  Hughes  (68  111.  33)        237,  646 

ah  v.  Bullis  (25  Iowa,  12)    353,  355, 

356 
v.  Dunston  (38  Iowa.  96)  424 

v.  Gillis  (1<»  Towa,  234)  485 

De   Cordova  v.  Galveston  (4  Tex. 

170)  661,668 

Dedham  Bank  v.  Chickering  (3  Pick. 

335)  301 

Deeds  o.  Sanborn  (20  Iowa.   119)  974 

Deeflirv.  Bowen  (61  [nd.  29)  1107 

;,  v.  Johnson  (111  Mass.  23)      1015 

Deerfield  v.  Conn.  River  R.  Co.  (144 

Mass.  325)  659 

ng,  /:•  (93  N.  V.  361)  825 

Deford  t>.  Mercer  (24  [owa,  118)  694 

De  Grave  '•.  Monmouth  (1  C.  &  P. 

411)  355.  539 

D,.  Groot,  ft  (6  Wall.  497)  mi:, 

Deiman  '•.  Fort  Madison  (30  Iowa, 

511)  '.171 

Deitz  v.  Central  (1  Col.  323)    68,  431,  431, 

1-2 


Page 
Delabigarre  <-.   Municipality  (3  La. 

An  230)  801 

Delacv   u  Neuse  River  Nav.  Co.  (1 

Hawk,,  -7  1i  338,  KI20 

Delafield  0   Illinois  (2  Hill,  159)     65,  195, 

619,  539,  642 

Delahantv   0.  Warner  (75  111.  185)     •;•;'.), 

L025,  1026,  1095 

Delancey,  /■'■  (52  N.  Y.  80)  1151 

Delaney,  ft  l  13  Cal.  478)  175 

v.  Salina  (34  Kan.  632)  662 

Delaplaine  v.   Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.  (12  Wis.  214)  171 

Delaware  Co.  Com'rs  v.  McClintock 

(51  [nd.  325)  <iJ7,  1111 

Delaware  Railroad  Tax,  Re  (18  Wall. 

206)  952 

Delger  v.  St.  Paul  (14  Fed.  R.  507)     1282 
Delmonico   '■.   New   York  (1  Sandf. 

222)  1203,1331 

Delphi  v.  Bowen  (61  Ind.  21')      899,  1 120, 

1121,  1122 

v.  Evans  (36  Ind.  '.Hi)      368,  373,  375, 

377,814,815,818,  819,  '.'15,  979, 

1221,  1229 

v.  Lowery  (74  Ind.  520)        1258,  1208 

v.  Start/man  (104  Ind.  343)  268 

Demarest  '•.  New  Barbadoes  (40  N. 

J.  L  604)  317 

v.  New  York  (71  N.  Y.  161)      94,  140 

v.  Wickham  (OS  N.  Y.  320)    352,  365, 

1019,  1070,  1114 

Dempsey   v.   Burlington    (66  Iowa, 

687)  388 

Den  v.  Vreelandt  (2  Halst.  352 )  274 

Dennehy  v.  Chicago  (120  111.  027)        432 
Denning  v.  Roome  (6  Wend .051)      367, 
380,  381,  744,  1212 
Dennis  v.  Hughes  (8U.C.Q.  B.  444)  707 
v.  Maynard  (15  111.477)  105 

Dennison  v.   Kansas   City   (05  Mo. 

410)  080 

Denniston  v.  Clark  (125  Mass.  216)     816, 

819 

Denton  v.  Jackson  (2  Johns.  Ch.  320)  74, 

650,660,  1116 

Denver  v.  Bayer  (7  Col.  113)       856,  1184, 

1221,  1239 
v.  Capelli  (4  Col.  25)  i::2S,  l:::;i,  13:12 
w.Clements  (3  Col.  4M )  752 

v.  Dean    (10   Col.   375)        321,  1184, 
1204,  1270,  1283 
v.  Dunsmore  (7  Col.  328)    1204,  1279, 

I ",-.". 

v.  Mullen  (7  Col.  245)  445 

v.  Rhodes  (9  Col.  554)  l:;:il 

r.  Vernia  (8  Col.  399)  1219 

Denver  &  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I).  City  Ry. 

Co.  (2  Col.  673)     784,  789,  860, 
864 
Denver  Bd.  of  Aid.  v.  Darrow  (22 

Pac.  R.  784)         1126,  1128,  1129 
Denver  Circle  R.  Co.  v.  Nestor  (in 

Col.  403)  808,1184,1224 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


lvii 


Page 
Department  of  Public  Parks,  A'e  (86 

N.  Y.  439)  90 

De  Pauw   v.  New  Albany  (22  Ind. 

204)  896 

De  Pere  v.  Bellevue  (31  Wis.  120)  271 
Derby  v.  Ailing  (40  Conn.  410)  741,  758 
Derecourt  v.  Corbisliley  (5  E.  &  B. 

188)  295 

Dermont  v.  Detroit  (4  Mich.  435)       1328, 

1331,  1333 
De  Russy  v.  Davis  (13  La.  An.  468)  147 
Des   Moines   v.   Casady    (21   Iowa, 

570)  1002 

v.  Chic,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.   (41 

Iowa,  500)  966 

v.  Gilchrist  (67  Iowa,  210)  388 

v.  Hall  (24  Iowa,  234)     738,  741,  746, 
761,  792,  818,  821 
v.  Hillis  (55  Iowa,  643)  313 

v.  Layman  (21  Iowa,  153)       724,  725 
Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

(44  Iowa,  505)   152,  386,  387,  828 

Des  Moines  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Des  M. 

Broad-Gauge  S.  Ry.  Co.  (73 

Iowa,  513)  859 

Desmond  v.  Dunn  (55  Cal.  242)  72 

v.  Jefferson  (19  Fed.  R.  483)  145,  471 

r.  McCarthy  (17  Iowa,  525)  378 

Des  Plaines  v.  Poyer  (123  111.  348)      1097 

Detroit  v.  Beckman  (34  Mich.  125)     1180, 

1181,  1212,  1215,  1220,  1293 

v.  Blackeby  (21  Mich.  84)   1180, 1181, 

1245,  1249,  1252,  1253,  1275,  1282, 

1294,  1295 

v.  Corey   (9  Mich.  165)       108,  1139, 

1293,  1303,  1307,  1331,  1333 

v.  D.  &  Erin  PL  R.  Co.  (12  Mich. 

333)  782,  808 

v.  Det.  &  Howell  PI.  R.  Co.  (43 

Mich.  140)  112,  115,  117,  124 

v.  Det.  &  Milw.  R.  Co.  (23  Mich. 

173)  738,  750,  752,  754,  757,  761, 
789 
v.  Det.  City  Ry.  Co.  (43  N.  W. 

R.  447)  849,871,971 

v.  Jackson  (1  Doug.  106)  523,  539 
v.  Jepp  (52  Mich.  458)  995 

v.  Martin  (34  Mich.  170)     1148,  1149, 

1151 
v.  Moran  (46  Mich.  213)  306 

v.  Putnam  (45  Mich.  265)  1252,  1266 
v.  Redfield  (19  Mich.  376)  315,  316 
v.  Robinson  (38  Mich.  108)  545 

v.  Robinson  (42  Mich.  198)  545 

v.  Somerset  Co.  Com'rs  (35  Me. 

373)  374 

v.  Whittemore  (27  Mich.  281)         554 
Detroit,  E.  R.  &  111.  11.  Co.  v.  Bearss 

(39  Intl.  598)  347 

Detroit  Park   Case   (28  Mich.  228). 
[See  People  v.  Detroit,  &c] 
(44  Mich.  602).      [See  Mayor 
of  Detroit  v.  Park  Com'rs 
&c.l 


Detroit   Y.   M.   Soc.  v.   Detroit  (3 

Mich.  172)  953 

De  Varaigne  v.  Fox  (2  Blatch.  C. 

C.  95)  690,  691 
De   Vaux  v.  Detroit  (Harring  Ch. 

Midi.  98)  796 

Devereaux  v.  Brownsville  (29  Fed. 

K.  742)  251,  253 

Deverill  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  (25 

D.  C.  Q.  B.  517)  1262 
Devlin  v.  New  York  (63  N.  Y.  8)   88,  513, 

1139 
Devor  v.  McClintock  (9  Watts  &  S. 

80)  272 

Devore's  Appeal  (56  Pa.  St.  163)  265,  268 
De    Voss    v.    Richmond    (18    Gratt. 

338)  108,  193,  194,  560,  615,  1141 
Devoy  v.  New  York  (39  Barb.  169)      312 
Dew  v.  Parsons  (2  B.  &  Aid.  562)       1148 
v.  Sweet  Springs  Dist.  Ct.  Jus. 

(3  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  1)  1024 

Dewey  v.  Detroit  (15  Mich    307)     1158, 
1197,  1296,  1301 
v.  Niagara  Co.   Sup.  (62  N.  Y. 

294)  1146 

Dewhurst  o.  Allegheny  (95  Pa.  St. 

437)  90 

Dewitt  v.  Duncan  (46  Cal.  342)  814 

v.  Ithaca  (15  Hun,  568)  741 

v.  San  Francisco  (2  Cal.  289)  210,659 

Dexter  v.  Tree  (117  111.  532)  757 

Dey  v.  Jersey  City  (19  N.  J.  Eq  412)  342, 

351,  359,  407,  521 

v.  Lee  (4  Jones,  238)  323,  367 

De  Zeng  v.  Beekman  (2  Hill,  489)  678,  679 

Diamond  o.  Cain  (21  La.  An.  309)         102 

v.  Lawrence  County  (37  Pa.  St. 

353)  560,  650 

Dickenson  v.  Fitchburg  (13  Gray, 

546)  731 

Dickey  v.  Hurlhurt  (5  Cal.  343)     276,  280 

v.  Reed  (78  111.  261)      286,  288,  1D77, 

1095 
v.  Worcester  (7  Allen,  19)  1820 

Dickinson  v.  Me.  Tel.  Co.  (46  Me. 

483)  1266 

v.  New  York  (92  N.  Y.  584)  797 

v.  Poughkeepsie  (75  N.  Y.  65)       534, 

543 
v.  Worcester  (7  Allen,  19)  1320 

v.  Worcester  (138  Mass.  555)  959 

Dickinson  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Nat.  Land 

Co.  (23  Kan.  196)  1151 

Dickinson  Tp.  v.  Linn  (36  Pa.  St.  431)  325 
Dickson  v.  Racine  (61  Wis.  545)  912 

Diefenthaler  v.  New  York  (111  N.  Y. 

331)  1149 

Diggle  v.  London  &  B.  R.  Co    (5 

Exch.  442)  521 

Diggs,  Re  (52  Ala.  381)  1025 

Dighton's  Case  (1  Vent.  82)  302 

Dill  v.  Roberts  (30  Wis.  178)  993 

v.  Wareham  (7  Met.  438)        53,  518, 

529,  533, 1143,  1191 


lviii 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Dillard  v.  Webb  (55  Ala.  168)  L079 

Dillenbach  o.  Xenia  ill  0.  Si  --'"7)  856 
Dillingham  v.  Snow  (5  Mass.  547)  53,  139 
Dimes  v.  lViKy  (10(2.  B.  276)  117 

Dimmick  11.  Uom'rs  v.  Waltham  11. 

:  rs  l  100  111.  631)  881 

Dimock  v.  Suffleld  (30  Conn.  L29)       1270 
v  r.  Boston  (10U  Mass.  54  II       212, 
145,  690,  691,  700 
Din-man  v.  People  (51  111.  277)  157 

Dishon  i?.  Smith  (K)  Iowa,  212)  281 

District  of  Columbia  v.  Armcs  (107 

r.  s.  519)  L298 

v.  Bait.  &  Pot.  R.  Co.  (1  Mackey, 

314)  L308,  1312 

v.  McEUigott  (117  U.  S.  621)        1284 
p.  Saville  (1  McArthur,  581  I  39  I 

v.  Wagaman  (1  Mackey,  328)         396 
17.  Wash.  &  G.  R.Co.  (1  Mackey, 

361)  804 

District  of  Columbia  Com'rs  v.  Bait. 

&  Pot.  R.  Co.  (114  U.S.  453)  780 
Dively  u.  Cedar  Falls  (21  Iowa.  565)   500, 

502,  563 
17.  Cedar  Falls  (27  Iowa,  227)         203, 

SS3 

Diveny  r.  Elmira  (51  N.  Y.  506)  498, 

12S1,  12s:;.  1295 
Divine  y.  llarvie  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  440)  1016 
|!i\  p.  Dummerston  (19  Vt.  263)  552 

Dixon  v.  Baker  (65  111.  518)      1223,  1323, 

1331 

17.  Cincinnati  (14  Ohio.  210)  715,  1127 

v.  Mayes  (72  Cal.  166)  974 

r.  Robinson  (3  Mod.  108)  457 

Dixon  County  v.  Field  (111  U.S.  83)  180, 

596,  608,  610,  611,  031 

Dodd  >:  Hartford  (25  Conn.  232)  151, 

1120,  1121 
17.  Miller  (11  Ind.  433)  55 

Dodge  v.  B    C.  R.  &  M.  R.  Co  (34 

[owa,  270)  857 

p.  Council  Bluffs  (57  Iowa,  500)   1 1  lo 
v.  Davenport  (57  [owa,  560)  829 

17.  Fssex  Co.  Com'rs  (3  Met.  380)  718, 

721 
17.  Gridley  (10  Ohio,  173)  422 

I,.  People  (113  111.  491)  1089 

17.  Platte  County  (82  N.  Y.  218)      615 
17.  Williams  (46  Wis   70)  657 

Dodge  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Chandler  (96 

U.S.  205)  577,704 

Dodson  y  Cincinnati  (34  O.  St.  270)   1227 

Due  u   Attica  (7  Ind.  641)      740,  757,  763 

17.  Barnes  (8  Q   B.  1043)  350 

17.  Chunn  (1  Blackf.  330)  Kino 

v.  Jones  (11  Ala.  63)        175,  71°,.  748, 

755,  772 

17.  Manchester,  B.  &  R.  R.  Co. 

(14  M.  &  W.  687)  718 

/.  Norton  (11  M.  &  W.  913)  250 

Doering  v.  State  i  lo  [nd.  56)        293,  295 

Doherty  >:  Waltham  (1  Gray,  590)    1257, 

1270 


Page 

Dolan  v.  Baltimore  (4  Gill.  394)  955 

17.  New  fork  (02  N.  V.  472)  981 

17.  New   Fork  (68  N.  V.  279)  318 

17,  New  York  (4  Abb.   1'r.  n.  s. 

897)  445 

Dollr.  State  (45  0.  St.  145)  576 

Dollar  Sav.   Bank  v.  United  States 

(10  Wall.  277)  995,998 

Domestic  Tel.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Newark 

I  19  N.J.  L.  344)  820 

Donahue  y.  Graham  (61  I  'al.  276)  1  13 
Donaldson  r.  Boston  (10  (nay.  50S)  1302 
Donnaher  u.  State  ( 10  Miss.  649)        834, 

857 
Donnelly  r.  Teasdale  (21  Fla.  652)       339 
17.  Tripp  (12  1(    I.  07)  _        1185,  L190 
Donoho  v.  Vulcan  Iron  W.  (75  Mo. 

401)  1284 

Donohue  v.  New  York  (3  Daly,  165)  1331 
Donovan   v.   Bd.   of  Ed.   (85  N.    Y. 

117)  1170 

v.  New  York  (33  N.  Y.  291)  529 

r.  Springfield  (12  Mass.  371)  734 

17.  Vicksbure-  (20  Mi-   217)    416,  418 

Doolan  v.  Manitowoc  (  18  Wis   312)       312 

Dooiey  v.  Kansas  City  (82  Mo.  444)    1187 

v.  Meriden  (44  Conn.  117)  1200 

v.  Sullivan  (112  Ind.  451)     050,  1193, 

1200,  1306 

Doolittle  p.  Broome  Co.  Sup.  ( Is  N.  Y. 

155)     787,  l<  96,  1104,  1111,  1114 
v.  Galena  &  C.  U.  R.  Co.  (14  111. 

381)  1126 

Doran  v.  De  Long  (48  Mich.  552)  284 

Dorathy  v   Chicago  (63  III.  79)  991 

Dorchester  v.  Fnsor  (L.  R.  4  Ex.  335)  457 

17.  Wentworth  (31  N.  11.451)         715, 

1120 

Dore  v.  Gray  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  358)      920 

v.  Milwaukee  (42  Wis.  18)     140,  520, 

815,  1219,  1229 

Dorey  v.  Boston  (146  Mass.  336)  366 

386,  989 
Dorgan  v.  Boston  (12  Allen,  223)  507,  722, 

917 
v.  Boston  (94  Mass.  223)  928 

Dorian  v.   Shreveport   (28   I-'ed.   R. 

287)  193 

Dorlon  v.  Brooklyn  (46  Barb.  504)      1207 
Dorman  ('.Jacksonville  ( 13  Fla.  538)  1220, 

1224,  1231 
Dorrance  Street,  Re  ( t  R.  I.  230)  020 

Dorrosan  17.  Iluttner  (48  Ga.  133)        1166 
Dorsey  v.  Ansley  (72  Ga.460)  10s5 

17.  Smyth  (28  Cal.  21)  318,  319 

Dorwin  i7.  Strickland  (57  N.  Y.  492)     324 
Dosdall  17.  Olmsted  County  (30  Minn. 

96)  1174 

Dotton  i;.  Albion  (50  Mich.  129)  1297. 

Dougherty  17.   Hitchcock  (35  Cal.  512)  oc, 

Doughty  17.  Hop'1  (:;  Denio,  249)  709 

17.  Somerville  &  E.  R.  Co.  (21 

N.  J.  L.  412)  708 

Douglas,  Re  (3  Q.  B.  825)  447 


TABLE    OF  CASES    CITED. 


lix 


Page 
Douglas  v.  Chatham  (41  Conn.  211) 

225,  240,  L012 
v.  Niantic  Sav.  Bank  (97  111.  228)  572 
Douglas    Co.    Coni'rs  v.  Bolles   (94 

U.  S.  202)  593 

Douglass,  /;,    (  Id  N.  Y.  42)  388 

R>   ( 1  Utah  Ter.  108)  435 

v.  Branch  Bank  (19  Ala.  050)         200 

v.  Commonwealth  (108  Pa.  St. 

550)  1007 

v.  Commonwealth  (2  Rawle,  262)  472 
v.  Essex  Co.  Freeh.  (38  N.  J.  L. 

211)  291,  1021 

v.  Harrisonville  (9  W.  Va.  102)  1002, 

1120 
v.  Lincoln  County   (5  Fed.   R. 

775)  634 

v.  Placerville  (18  Cal.  613)  149,  1100, 

1112 

v.  Pike  County  (101  U.  S.  677)     584, 

587,  594,  030,  650 

v.  State  (31  Ind  429)  319 

v.  Virginia  City  (5  Nev.  147)         184, 

195,  512,  549,  564 

Douglasville  v.  Jones  (60  Ga.  423)       1147 

Doulson  v.  Clinton  (33  Iowa,  397)       1200 

Dovaston  r.  Pavne  (2  Smith  L.  C. 

142,  185)  791 

Dover  v.  Twombly  (42  N.  H.  59)  300 

Dover  Trs.  v.  Fox  (9  B.  Mon.  200)       740, 

743,  763 

Dover  Street,  Re  (18  Johns.  500)  711,  712 

Dow  v.  Bullock  (13  Gray,  136)  303 

v.  Humbert  (91  U.  S.  294)  325 

Dowdney  v.  New  York  (54  N.   Y. 

180)  1002 

Do  well  v.  Portland  (13  Or.  248)  536,  1000 
Dowlan  v.  Sibley  County  (36  Minn. 

430)  41 

Downer  v.  Boston  (6  Cush.  277)    977,  987 
Downing  v.  Marshall  (23  N.  Y.  366)    657, 

661 
v.  Miltonvale  (36  Kan.  740)  410,  488 
v.  Rugar  (21  Wend.  178)        324,  361, 

363 

Dows  v.  Chicago  (11  Wall.  108)  1092, 

1107,  1120,  1121 

v.  Elm  wood  (34  Fed.  R.  114)    88,  635 

Doyle  v.  Austin  (47  Cal.  353)       895,  924, 

950,  951,  953 

v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (94  U.  S. 

535)  905 

v.  Falconer  (1  Privy  Coun.  App. 

329)  332 

v.  Raleigh  (SON.  C.  133)  1022 

Dr.  Gaskin's  Case  (8  1).  &  E.  T.  R. 

209)  333 

Drain  Com'rs  ».   Baxter  (57  Mich. 

127)  266 

Draining  Co.   &c.   (11  La.  An.  338). 
[See  New  ( Irleans  Draining 
Co.,  &c] 
Drake  v.   Hudson   River  R.  Co.   (7 

Barb.  508)  853,  854 


Page 
Drake  v.  Lowell  (13  Met.  292)  L266,  127 1, 

L276 

v.  Phillips  (40  111.  888)  942,  L109, 

mi,  1113 

Draper  v.  Ironton  (  12  Wis.  696)  L299,  L300 

v.  Springport  (in I  1'.  S.  501)         522 

Dreher  v.  Fitchburg  (22  Wis.  075)      1278 

Drew   v.   New    River  Co.  (6  C.  &  P. 

754)  L831 

v.  Sutton  (55  Vt.  586)  1312 

Driftwood    Val.   Tump.  Co.  v.    Bar- 
tholomew Co.   Com'rs    (72 
Ind.  226)  529 

Driggs  v.  Phillips  (103  N.  Y.  77)   755,  784, 

797 
Drisooll  v.  Smith  (59  Wis.  38)  1131 

Drisko  v.  Columbia  (75  Me.  73)  350 

Driver  v.   Western    U.   R.  Co.   (32 

Wis.  500)  731,732 

Drogheda,  Re  (1  O'M.  &  II.  252)  281 

Droneberger  v.  Reed  (11  Ind.  420)        "20 
Droz  v.  Baton  Rouge   (30  La.   An. 

307)  152,  161,  1114 

Drucker  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (100 

N.  Y.  157)  877 

Drury  v.  Natiek  (10  Allen,  169)  1115 

v.  Worcester  (21  Pick.  44)  1258 

Duane  v.  McDonald  (41  Conn.  517)    1039 

Duanesburgh   v.  Jenkins  (57   N.  V. 

177)  133,635,645,1011 

v.  Jenkins  (40  Barb   574)  235 

Dubach  v.   Han.  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  (89 

Mo.  483)  833,  847 

Dublin  v.  Attorney-Gen.  (3  CI.  &  F. 

289)  603 

Dublin  Case  (38  N.  H.  450)  609 

[See  also  Atty.-Gen.  v.  Dublin.] 
Dubois  v.   Augusta   (Dudley    (Ga.) 

30)  393,  397,  442 

v.  Budlong  (10  Bosw.  700)  440 

v.  Campau  (24  Mich   360)  1000 

v.  Del.  &  H.  Canal  Co.  (4  Wend. 

285)  526 

v.  Kingston  (102  N.  Y.  219)  1255, 

12>5 
Dubordieu  v.  Butler  (40  Cal.  512)  1009 
Dubuque  v.  Benson  (23  Iowa,  248)      740, 

747,  821 
v.  Chicago,  D.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (47 

Iowa,  196)  940 

v.  Harrison  (34  Iowa    163)  990 

v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (39  Iowa,  56)  94:'., 
968,  969,  995,  998 
v.  Maloney  (9  Iowa,  450)        743,  7  16, 
75",  7S3,  820,  S21 
v.  Miller  (11  Iowa,  583)  156,  462 

v.  Northwestern  L.  Ins.  Co.  (29 

Iowa,  9)  962,969 

v.  Rebman  (1  Iowa,  441)  510 

v.  Stout  (32  Iowa,  47,  80)        175,  L78 
v.  Wooton  (28  Iowa,  571)       388,  7  in. 

958 
Dubuque   County  v.  D.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(4  Greene  (la.),  1)  208,  226 


lx 


TABLE    OP    CASES   CITED. 


r.-iL'i- 
Dubuque  Fem.  College  v.  Dubuque 

Dist.  I'i'.  I  13  [owa,  555)  539,  5 12 
Ducal  v.  Chicago  (10  Wall.  410)  905 

i    Chicago  (4s  111.  172)  905 

Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case  (20  How. 

St.  Tr.  35  1078 

Ducksworth  v.  Johnson  (4  II.  &  N. 

653)  1288 

Duck  wall   v.   New   Albany  (25  Ind. 

283)  182 

Dudley    v.    Frankfort    Trs.    ( 12    B. 

Mon.  tilii)       798,803,808,  1097, 

1098 

v.  Weston  (1  Met.  177)  382 

v.  Weston  (3  N.  Y.  'J)  1078 

Duffey  '•■  Tilton  (11  La.  An.  283)         78< 

Duffield  v.  Detroit  (15  Mich.  474)        715 

Duffield's  Case  (Bright.  Elec.    Cas. 

646)  1025,  1020 

Duffy  v.    Baltimore   (Taney    C   C. 

200)  1167 

v.  Dubuque  (63  Iowa,  171 )   1275, 1277 

Dugan  v.  Baltimore  (1  G.  &  J.  499)     997, 

998 
v.  Baltimore  (5  G.  &  J.  357)  175,  177, 

749 

v.  Baltimore  (3  Bland  Ch.  383)    165, 

172, 177 

v.  United  States  (3  Wheat.  172)    297, 

321 
Duggen  v.  McGruder  (Walk.  (Miss.) 

112) 
Duiiro,  lie  (50  N.  Y.  513) 
Duke  o.  Brown  (96  X.  C.  127) 

v.   Cahaba   Nav.    Co.    (10  Ala. 

372) 
v.  Koine  (20  Ga.  635) 
Duke  of  Buccleuch  v.  Metrop.  Bd. 
of  Works  (L.  R.  5  H.  L.  C. 
.418) 

Dumesnil  v.  Dupont  (18  B.  Mon.  800)  449, 

454 
Dummer  v.  Jersey  City  (20  N.  J.  L. 

86)  743,  767,  783,  788 

Dunbar   v.    San   Francisco    (1    Cal 
355) 
v.  Soul.-  (129  Mass.  284) 
Duncan  v.  Hayes  (22  X.  J.  Eq.  25) 
v.  Louisville  (8  Bush,  98) 
r.  Xiles  (32  111.  532) 
>:  Torre  Haute  (85  Ind.  104) 
Duncombe  <-.  Fort   Dodge  (38  Iowa, 

281)  522,524 

Dundy  v.  Richardson  Co.  Com'rs  (8 

Neb.  5ns, 
Dunham  v.  Chicago  (55  111.  357) 
v.  Hyde  Park  (75  111.  3711 
v.  New  Britain  111  Atl.  R.  364) 
v.  Rochester  Trs.  (5  Cow.  462) 

404,   U6,   126,   128,  429,  459,  460 
Dunion  v.  People  (17  III.  110)  740 

Dunlap   v.  Gallatin   County  (15  111. 

9)  997 

Dunleith  v.  Reynolds  (53  111.  45)  964 


113.1 
515 
639 

1079 
1101 


1231 


1164 
661 
449 
712,  loll 
323 
695 


si 
954 
si  t 
474 
396, 


Page 
Dunleith  &  Dub.  Br.  Co.  v.  Dubuque 

(32  Iowa,  427)  910,  948,  968 

Dunlop  v.  York  (16  Grant,  216)  717 

Dunmore  Borough's  Appeal  (52  Pa. 

St.  371)        95,  13,i,  -70,273,479, 
5((1 
Dunn  o.  Charleston  (Harper  L.  189 

701 
v.  St.  Andrew's,  &c.   (14  Johns. 

118)  533 

Dunning  v.  Aurora  (10  111.  481)  786 

v.  N\w  Albany  &  S.  R.  Co.  (10 

Ind.  437)  139 

Dunnoyan  v.  Green  (57  111.  63)        22.  208, 
238,645,  '.i27,  1124 
Du  Page  Co.  >:  Jenks  (05  III   275)        1107 
Da  Pratt  i\  Lick  (38  Cal.  691  I  1303 

Durach's  Appeal  (02  Pa.  St.  49] )  95,  103, 

971 
Durango  v.  Pennington  (8  Col  257)    521, 

539 
Durant  v.  Albany  Co.  Sup.  (26  Wend. 

66)  996 

v.  Carter  (L.  R.  9  C.  P.  261)  279 

v.  Iowa  Co.  (1  Woolw.  69)  560,  583 
v.  Jersey  City  (25  X.  J.  L.  309)  985 
r.  Kauffman  (34  Iowa,  L94)  973 

v.  Palmer  (29  N.  J.  L.  544)  1267, 

1282,  1309,  1311 
Durch  v.  Chippewa  County  (60  Wis. 

227)  138 

Durfey  v.  Hoag  (1  Aiken,  286)  375 

Durgin  v.  Lowell  (•".  Alien,  398)  755 

Durham's    Case   (1   Sid.  33).     [See 

Mayor  of  Durham,  &c] 

Durkee  v.  Janesville  (28  Wis  404)        89, 

942,  1002,  1304 

v.  Kenosha  (59  Wis.  123)  1190 

Durkin  v.  Troy  (61  Barb.  437)  1201, 

1263,  1285 
Durr  v.  Howard  (6  Ark.  461)  505 

Dusenbury  r.  Newark   (25  N.  J.  Eq. 

295)  1123 

r.  Mut.  Union  Tel.  Co.  (11  Abb. 

X.  C.  440)  831 

Dusseau  v.  Municipality  (6  La.  An. 

575)  716,  1131 

Dutchess  Cotton  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Davis 

(14  Johns.  238)  258 

Dutchess  County   Ins.   Co.  v.  Hatch- 
field  (1*111111.  075)  651 
Dutton  v.  Aurora  (114  111.  138)  548 
v.  Strong  (1  Black,  23)           168,  169, 

170 
Dwengen  v.  Chicago  &  G.  T.  Ry.  Co. 

(98  Ind.  153)  841,  856 

Dwight  v.  Hampden  Co.  Com'rs  (11 

Cush.  201)  731 

v.  Springfield  (4  Gray,  107)  714, 

1120,  1129,  1130 
Dwight  Printing  Co.  v.  Boston  (122 

Mass.  5S3)  698 

Dwyer  v.  Brenham  (65  Texas,  526)     138, 

146 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxi 


Dvckman  v.  New  York  (5  N.  Y.  434)  099, 

707,  708,  940 

Dyer  v.  Brogan  (70  Cal.  136)  576 

v.  Chase  (52  Cal.  440)  970 

v.  St.  Paul  (27  Minn.  457)   1225,  1228 

v.  Wightman  (00  Pa.  St.  425)        735 

Dygert  u.'Sehenck  (23  Wend.  440)      882, 

1309 


E. 


Eager,  Re  (46  N.  Y.  100)     543,  545,  945, 

976 
Eagle  v.  Charing  Cross  Ry.  Co.  (L. 

11.  2  C.  P.  C.  638)  688 

v.  Kohn  (84  111.  292)  631,646 

Eakin  v.  Brown  (1  E.  D.  Smith,  44)  1310 
Eames  v.  New  Eng.  Worsted  Co.  (11 

Met.  570)  735 

v.  Savage  (77  Me.  212)  1027,  1172 
Earl  of  Ripon  v.  Hobart   (3  Mylne 

&  K.  169)  455 

Earle  v.  New  Brunswick  (38  N.  J.  L. 

47)  750 

Earle's  Case  (Carth.  173)  336 

Earley's  Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  273)  529 
East  &  W.  India  Docks  Co.  v.  Gattke 

(3  McN.  &  G.  155)  688 

East  Anglian  Rys.  Co.  v.  E.  Coun- 
ties Ry.  Co.  (11  C.  B.  775)  1140 
East   Hartford   v.  Hartford   Br.   Co. 

(10  How.  511)  97,110,269,271 
East   Hartford  v.  Hartford  Br.   Co. 

(17  Conn.  80)  179,181 

East  Kingston  v.   Towle   (48  N.  H. 

57)  223 

East  Lincoln  v.  Davenport  (94  U.  S. 

801)  593,630 

East  Lincolnshire  R.  Act,  Re  (1  Sim. 

(n.  s.)  2G0)  717 

Eastman  v.  Clackamas  County  (32 

Fed.  R.  24)  1246,  1248,  1252 

v.  Meredith   (36  N.    H.  284)     51,  56, 

179,  1172,  1173,  1174,  1176,  1201, 
1203,  1211.  1252,  1331 
East  Nissouri  v.  Horseman  ( 16  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  588)  320,  1102 

v.  Horseman  (9  U.  C.  C.  P.  191)  1102 
Easton  v.  Callender  (11  Wend.  90)  324 
v.  Neff  (102  Pa.  St.  474)  1283 

Easton  Bor.  v.  Rinck  (116  Pa.  St.  1)  757 
Easton  Road,  Re  (3  Rawle,  195)  808 

Easton's  Case  (12  A.  &  E.  645)  503 

East   River  Br.   &  C.  I.  S   Transit 

Co.,  Re  (26  Hun,  490)  872 

East  River  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Donnelly  (93 

N.  Y.  557)  324 

East   St.  Louis   v.  Amv  (120  U.  S. 

600)  143,  907,  1034,  1056 

v.  E.  St.  L.  Gas  &  C.  Co.  (98  III. 

415)  206,  530,  1141 

v.  Giblin  (3  111.  App.  219)  1307 

v.  Klug  (3  111.  App.  90)  1307 


Page 

East  St.  Louis  v.  Maxwell  (99  111.  439) 

143 
v.  O'Flynn  (119  111.  200)  733,  795 

r.  People  (124  111.  655)  01:;,  907 

v.  St.  John  (47  III.  403)  706 

r.  School  Tp.    Treas.    (102    111. 

489)  424 

v.  Underwood  (105  111.  308)  946 

v.  United  States,  ex  rel.  Zebley 

(110  U.  S.  321)  946,1034 

v.  Wehrung  (46  111.   392)      154,  425, 

432,  958 

i?.  Wehrung  (50  111.  28)  155 

r.  Wider  (46  111.  351)  1012 

East  Union  Tp.  v.  Ryan   (86  Pa.  St. 

459)  566 

Eaton  v.  Boston  C.  &   M   R.  Co.  (51 

N.  PI.  504)    686,  1227,  1230,  1234, 
1335 
v.  Manitowoc  Co.  Sup.  (44  Wis. 

489)  39,  84,  1000 

v.  State  (7  Blackf.  65)  1080,  1089 

v.  Woburn  ( 127  Mass.  270)  1269 

Eaves  v.  Shattuck  (35  N.  H.  189)  54 

Ebbw  Vale  Co.  (L.  R.  8  Eq.  C.  14)     1140 

Ecclesiastical  Com'rs  v.  Clerkenwell 

(4  L.  T.  (n.  s.)  599)  889 

Eddy  v.   People  (127  111.  428)     639,  646, 

648 
Edenton  v.  Wool  (65  N.  C.  379)  494 

Edey  v.  Shreveport  (26  La.  An.  636)    658 
Edgar  v.  Dodge  (11  Mass.  670)  1125 

Edgerly  v.  Concord  (59  N.  H.  78)       1166, 

1198,  1199 
Edgerton  v.  Green  Cove  Springs  (19 

Fla.  140)  722 

v.  Huff  (26  Ind.  35)  692,  706 

v.  Municipality  (1  La.  An.  435)       97, 

160 
Edmunds  v.  Gookin  (20  Ind.  477)  267 
Edmundson  v.  Pittsb.  M.  &  Y.  H.  Co. 

(Ill  Pa.  St.  310)  1196,1307 

Edwards   v.  Grand  June.  R.   Co.   (1 

Myl.  &  Cr.  650)  382 

v.  Jersey  City  (40  N.  J.  L.  176)      993 
v.  People  (88  111.  310)  240 

v.  United  States  (93  U.  S.  599)     1053 
v.  Vesey  (Cas.  t.  Hardw.  128)        379 
Ege  v.  Koontz  (8  Pa.  St.  109)    1148,  1153 
Egerton  v.  Green  Cove  Springs  (19 

Fla.  140)  933 

Eggington,  Re  (2  E.  &  B.  717)  503 

Egleston   v.   Charleston   C.  Council 

(1  Mill  Const.  (S.  C  )  45)        492 
Egremont   v.  Benjamin   (125  Mass. 

15)  323 

Egyptian   Levee  Co.  v.  Hardin  (27 

Mo.  495)  722,  911,  933,  955 

Egvpt    Street,    Re    (2   Grant    (Pa.) 

Cas.  455)  1 12,  143 

Ehrgottr.  New  York  (90  N.  Y.  264)  1189, 
1194.  1264,  1281,  1283,  1287 
Eichels  v.  Evans vills  S.  R.  Co.   (78 

Infl.  261)  144,  870,  881 


lxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Eidetniller  v.  Wyandotte  City  (2  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  376)  716 
Eiken berry  v.  Bazaar  ("_''-'  Kan.  550)    1174 

v.  Oshkosli  i  1  1  Wis.  037) 
Kla  v.  Smith  (5  Gray,  121)  292 

Elder  v.  D  wight  Manuf.  Co.  (4  Gray, 

201)  507 

Eldon  Tp.  Corp,  /'  (6D  C.  L.J.  207)  552 
Eldora  v.  Burlingame  (62  Iowa,  32)  375 
Eldred  v.  Seaton  (5  Ohio,  215)  321 

Eldridge  i:  Smith  (34  Vi    184)  701 

Election  Cases,  &c.    [See    Gibbons 

v.  &c.  65  Pa.  St.  20).] 
Elevated  Railway  Cases  (70  X.  Y. ; 
90  N.  V.:  105  X.  V.;  112 
X.  V.  [See  Gilbert,  &c, 
Kings,  &c  ,  Lahr,  &c.,  New 
York  Elevated,  &c,  l'ond, 
&c,  Story,  &c  | 
Elgin  >:  Beekwith  (119  111.  367)    748,  753, 

T.V.i 

v.  Katun  (S3  111  535)  1222,122s,  1230. 

1232,  1234,  1241 

v.  Kimball  (90  III.  356)  L324 

Elias  r.  Nightingale  (8  E.  &  B.  698)      117 

Elizabeth  v.  Force  (29  X.  ,).  Eq.  587)  650, 

651 
v.  Meeker  (  15  X.  J.  L.  157)  919 

Elizabeth    Com'rs,  Re  (49  N.  J.  L. 

488)  88,993 

Elizabethtown  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son (79  Ky.  52)  841,  842 
Elizabethtown,  L.  v1.    l'».  S.  R,  Co.  v. 

Combs  (10  Bush,  382)  7'. '2.  854, 
855,  856,  1287 
Elizabethtown  Trs.  v.  Leffler(23  111.90)  181 
Elkhart  v.  Wickwire  (87  End.  77)  1312 
Elkins  v.  Athearn  (2  Denio,  191)  1014 
Elkton   Land  Co.  v.  Ayres  (02  Ala. 

1107 
Ellerman    >-.  McMains  (30  La.  An. 

190)  107,  lio.  165,  L66 

Elliot  v.  Concord  (27  N.  H.  204)  1314 

Elliott  v.  Fairhaven  &  W.  R.  Co.  (32 

Conn.  579)  8G8 

v.  Philadelphia   (75  Pa.  347)      1196, 

1197,  1198 

v.  Swartwout  (10  Pet.  137)  326,  1148, 

1 1 55 
v  Williamson  (11  Lea.  38)      804,  996 
Elliott  County  v.  Kitchen  (14  Bush, 

289)  1037 

Ellis  v.  Bridgenorth   (4  L.  T.  (n.  s.) 

112)  457 

v.  Iowa  City  (29  Iowa,  229)         1124, 
1181,  1320 
v.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.  (23  L.J.  Q. 

B.  42)  821 

v.  State  (I  Ind.  1) 

v.  Washoe  County  (7  Nev.  291)  553 
Ellison  v.  Raleigh  (89  X.  C.  125)  327,  1022 
Ellyson,  Re  (20  Gratt.  10)  288,  L132 

Ellsworth  v.  Grand  Rapids  (27  Mich. 

250)  659 


Pag* 

Elmendorf  v.  Albany  (17  Hun,  SI)       921 
v.  Kwrn  (2  X.  V.  Leg.  Obs.  85)     244, 

292 

v.  New   York  (25  Wend.  693)      244, 

263,  272.  303,  367,  107,  1131 

Elmore  County  v.  Long  (52  Ala.  277)  1029 

Elm  wood  Tp.   o.  Marcy   (92   U.  S 

289)  1,599,636 

Elrod  v.  Bernadotte  (53  111  368)  674  675, 

1031 
Elston  v.  Chicago  (40  111.  514)  1148,  1150 
v.  Crawfordsville  (20  Ind.  272)      '--'.7 
Elwell   v.   Birmingham  Canal   Nav. 

(3  11.  of  K.  C.  812)  800 

v.  Greenwood  (26  Iowa,  377)  787 
Elwood  v.  Bullock  (0  Q.  B.  383)  131,  488 
Ely  v.  Morgan  Co.  Com'rs  (112  Ind, 

361)  979 

v.  Niagara  Co.   Sup.   (30  N.  Y. 

207;  452,  1107 

,v.  Parsons  (55  Conn.  83)  754 

v.  Rochester  (26  Barb.  133)  210 

Embury  v.  Conner  (3  N.  Y.  511)  090.  693, 

705,  70S 

Emerson  v.  Babcock  (66  Iowa,  257)      810 

v.  Blairsville  (2  Pittsb.  39)  197 

v.  Lexington  (69  Mo.  157)  1216 

v.  Newberry  ( 13  Kick.  .".7  j  )  539 

v.  Saltmarsh  (7  A.  &  K.  266)  920 

Emery  v.  Lowell  (104  Mass.  13)  1214, 

1330,  1331,  1334 

v.  Lowell  (127  Mass.  ]:',>)    1147,  1150 

v.  Mariaville  (50  Me.  315)  502 

v.  San  E.  Gas  Co.  (28  Cal.  345)    722, 

923.  940,  955,  991 

v.  Washington  (1  Bray  ton  (  Vt.), 

12S)  761 

Emigrant   Co.  v.  &c.     fSee    Amer- 
ican Em.  Co.  &c.  (97  U.  S. 
339).  ] 
Eminence  v.  Grasser's  Ex.  (81  Ky. 

52)  594 

Emmerton  ».  Mathews  (7  II.  &  N. 

586)  464 

Empire  Tp.  v.  Darlington  (101  U.  S. 

87)  629 

Emporia  v.  Bates  (10  Kan.  495)     993,  994 
v.  Gilchrisl  (37  Kan.  532)  986 

v.  Norton  (13  Kan.  509,  1874)         134 
v.  Norton  (16  Kan.  236)  109 

v.  Schmidling  (33  Kan.  485)        1283, 

L285 

v.  Soden  (25  Kan.  588)  698.  L097 

v.  Volmer  (12  Kan.  022)        425,   180, 

481,483,  507 

Enfield  v.  Jordan  (119  U.  S.  680)   40,  230, 

583 
Enfield  Toll  Br.  Co.  v.  Hartford  & 

X.  II.  R.  Co.  (17  Conn   40)      683 
England  v.  Davidson  (11  A.  &  E.  856) 

209 
English  v.  Chicot  County  (26  Ark. 

454)  235,  237 

v.  People  (91  111.  560)  896,  939 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxiii 


Page 

Episcopal  Char.    Soc.    v.   Dedham 

Episcopal  Church  (1  Pick. 

372)  360  639 

Erd  v.  St.  Paul  (22  Minn.  443)  13  2 

Erie  v.  Butler  (120  Pa.  St.  374)     557,  991 

v.  Calkins  (85  Pa.  247)       1304,  1306, 

1307 
v.  E.  Canal  Co.  (59  Pa.  St.  174)      95, 

125 

v.  Ktiapp  (29  Pa.  St.  17:1)  161 

v.  Magill  (101  Pa.  St.  616)  1286 

v.  Reed's  Ex.  (113  Pa.  St.  4G8)      897, 

899,  976,  1098 

v.  Schwingle  (22  Pa.  St.  384)      1202, 

121)5,  1281,  1286 

Erie's  Appeal  (91  Pa  St.  398)        205,  200 

Erie  Acad.  Trs.  v.  Erie  (31  Pa.  St. 

515)  111,  302,  410 

Erie  County  v.  Erie  City  (113  Pa.  St. 

308)  950 

v.  Erie  Water  Com'rs  (113  Pa. 

St.  368)  951 

Ernst  v.  Kunkle  (5  O.  St.  520)  1231 

Erskine   v.  Van  Arsdale  (15  Wall. 

75)  1155 

Eschbach  v.  Pitts  (G  Md.  71)       997,  1000, 

1001 

Essex  u.  Day  (52  Conn.  483)  582 

v.  Park  (11  Ex.  C.  C.  P.  473)         301 

v.  Strong  (8  U.  C.  L.  J.  15)  301 

v.  Strong  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  149)         301 

Essex  Co.  Freeh,  v.  Barber  (18  N.  J. 

L.  64)  425,  944 

Estabrook  ads.  State  (0  Ala.  653)         898 
Estelle  v.   Lake  Crystal   (27   Minn. 

243)  1208,  12s:, 

v.  Owen  (90  Mo.  113)  814,  960 

Estep  v.  Keokuk  Co   (18  Iowa,  190)      529 
Estes  v.  Bethel  School  District  (33 

Me.  170)  53 

Estey  v.  Starr  (5(3  Vt.  690)  367 

v.  Westminster  (97  Mass.  324)        542 

Estwick  v.  London  (Sty.  43)  1063 

Etherington  v    Wilson  (L.  R.  1  Ch. 

Div. 160)  278 

Ethridge  v.  Hill  (7  Porter,  47)  1090 

Eudora  v.  Miller  (30  Kan.  494)  1247 

Eufaula  v.  McNab  (67  Ala.  588)  145,  529, 

573,  670 
Eureka  v.  Davis  (21  Kan.  578)  434 

Eureka  Basin  W.  &  M.  Co,  Re  (96 

N.  Y.  42)  896 

Eustace  v.  Johns  (38  Cal.  3)       1262,  1274 
Evan  v.  Avon  (29  Beav.  44)  1100 

Evans  v.  Erie  County   (66  Pa.  St. 

222)  797,  7!  18,  Si V) 

v.  Evansville  (23  Ind.  229)      753,  757 
v.  Job  (8  Xev.  322)  84 

v.  Philadelphia  Club  (50  Pa.  St. 

107)  327,320,  335,  336 

v.  Trenton  (24  N.  J.  L.  764)  315,  316, 

323 
v.  Utica  (69  N.  Y.  166)        1261,  1263, 

1284 


Page 

Evansville  v.  Decker  (84  Ind.  325)     1327, 

1329 
v.  Evans  (37  Ind.  229)  711 

v.  Hall  (14  Ind.  27)  964 

v.  Martin  (41  Ind.  145)  15] 

v.  Paige  (23  Ind.  525)  755 

v.  Pfisterer  (31  Ind.  36)  1123 

v.  State  (118  Ind.  382)  899 

v.  State  (21  N.  E.  K.  267)  73,81,  100, 
101,  103 
v.  Wilter  (86  Ind.  414)  1297 

Evansville  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller  (30 

Ind.  209)  727 

Evansville,   I.  &  C.  S.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Evansville  (15  Ind.  395)  151,193, 
194,  196,  230,  504,  509,  002,  617, 
645 
Everett  v.  Council  Bluffs  (46  Iowa, 

06)  449,  791,  810 

v.  Grapes  (3  L.  T.  (n.  s.)  669)  446    150 
v.  Marquette  (53  Mich.  450)  449 

Evergreen  Cem.  Assoc,  v.  New  Haven 

(43  Conn.  234)  444,  705 

Everson  v.  Syracuse  (100  N.  Y.  577)  1190 
Evertson  v.  Newport  Nat.  Bank  (66 

N.  Y.  14)  651 

Every  v.  Smith  (26  L.  J.  Exch.  344)     740 

Ewbanks  v.  Ashley  (36  111.  177  I  410,  477, 

478,  480,  496 

Ewing  v.  Filley  (43  Pa.  St.  384)  281,  283, 

288,  501,  509 

v.  Hoblitzelle  (85  Mo.  64)  835 

v.  St.  Louis  (5  Wall.  413)       715,  716, 

1092,  1121,  1122,  1123,1126, 1127, 

1130 

v.  Thompson  (43  Pa.  St.  384)         287 

Exchange  Alley,  Re  (4  La.  An.  4)     700, 

707 
Exchange    Bank    of    Columbus    >\ 

Hines  (3  0.  St.  1)  908,962 

Exchange  Bank,  &c.  ( 108  N.  Y. 

660  ;    8    R.  I.  375).      [See 
New     York    National    Ex- 
change   Bank,    &c] 
Exeter  v.  Glide  (4  Mod.  37)  337 

y.  Starre  (2  Show.  158)  306 

Exeter  Academy,  &c.  (58  N.  H.  306). 
See  Phillips  Exeter  Acad. 
Trs.  &c] 

Express  Co.,  &c.  (28  Town.  370). 

See  United  States,  &c] 
Everly   v.  Jasper  County  (72  Iowa, 

149) 
Eyerman  v.  Blaksley  (78  Mo.  145) 


Eyman  v.  People  (Gill.  8) 


F. 

Faber  v.  St.  Paul   M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co. 

(29  Minn.  465) 
Facey  v.  Fuller  (13  Mich.  527) 


1029 

722, 

911 

1136 


857 
352 


Ixiv 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


Page 
Factors  &  Tr.  Ins.  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans (25  La.  An.  I  1152 
Fahey  v.  Harvard  (62  111.  28)     1297,  L305 
Fair  v.  London  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (21 

I..   I'.  R.  (n.  s.)  326)  1288 

v.  Moore  (3  l".  C.  C.  P.  484)  292,  525 
r.  Philadelphia  (88  Pa.  St.  309)   1320, 

1328 
Fairbanks  v.  Fitchburg  (132  Maes.  42J  989 
v.  Kerr  (70  Pa  785 

Faircliil.l  v.  Ogd.,  C.  &  R.  R.  Co.  (15 

N.  V.  337)  562,565 

Fairfield  r.  Gallatin  County  (100  U. 

S.  I7i  230 

v.  People  (94  111.  244)  911 

r.  Ratcliff  (20  Iowa,  396)        940,  '.'II 
Fairport  l".   F.  Sch.  Bd.   v.  Fonda 

(77  N.  Y.  350)  299 

Fallen  v.  Boston  (3  Allen,  38)  1284 

Fallick  r.  Barber  (1  M.  &  S.  108)  209 

Falls   o.  Cairo  (58  111.  403)       1147.  1148, 

1161,  1152 
Falmouth  v.  Watson  (5  Bush,  600)  944 
Fane's  Case  (Doug.  153)  328 

Fanning  v.  Gregoire  (10  How.  524)      181, 

522 

v.  Osborne  (102  N.  Y.  441)  852 

r.  Wilson  (34  Minn.  254)        212,423 

Faribault  r.  Misener  (20  .Minn.  390)     939, 

998 
Fanners'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Carroll  (5 

Barb.  613)  668 

Farmington  v.  1'illsbury   (114  U.  S. 

138)  582,1140 

Farmington  River  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Berk- 
shire ( !o.  Com'rs  ( 112  Mass. 
206)  1130 

Famsworth   v.   Boston    (121    Mass. 

173)  712,  714,  1001,  1067 

v.  Pavvtt'.eket  (13  R.  I.  82)  519 

Farnum  v.  Concord  (2  N.  II.  392)       1173, 

1252,  1285 

Farr  v.  Lyons  (13  Fed.  R.  377)  561 

Farrar  v.  Greene  (32  Me.  574)   1263,  L264 

v.  St.    Louis  (so  M«).  379)      912.  960, 

980 
Farrell  v.  Bridgeport  (45  Conn.  191)   294, 

318 

v.  King  (41  Conn.  448)  372 

v.  London  (12  O.  C.  Q.  B.  3 13)    L139, 

11  lo,  1201,  1329,  1331 

v.  Oldtown  (09  Me.  72)     1270,  1271, 

1301 

Farrelly   v.   Cincinnati    (2    Disney 

(Ohio),  516)  1287 

Farwell  v.  Cambridge  (11  Gray,  413)   731 
r.  Smith  (16  X.  J.  L.  L33)  483 

Fash   v.  Third  Av.  R.  Co.  (1   Daly, 

148)  sor, 

Faulkner  v.  Aurora  (85  Ind.  130)  1205 
Fauntlerov  v.  Hannibal  (1  Dill.  118)  138 
Fausl  v.  Huntington  (91  tad  493)  755 
Fauvia  v.  New  Orleans  (20  La.  An. 

410)  1167 


Fawcett  v.  Charles  (13  Wend.  473)     329, 

384 
Fay,  B    (15  Pick.  243)      152,  181,  1126, 

1129,  1130 

v.  Davidson  (13  Minn.  523)  L308 

v.  Noble  (12  Cush.  1)  184 

Fayette  v.  Shafroth  (25  Mo.  445)  507 

Fayette    Co.  Com'rs   V.  Chit  wood  (8 

Ind.  50  1)  :;77 

Fazakerly  v.  Wiltshire  (1  Stra.  409)     112, 

12  1 
Fazende  v.  Houston  (31  Fed.  R.  95)  522 
Fearing    v.  Irwin    (4   Daly,  385 ;  55 

N.  V.  186)  701,  795 

Fecheimer  v.  Louisville  (84  Ky.36)      9U4 
FeitaJ    v.   Middlesex  Ry.    Co.    (109 

Mass.  398)  1270 

Feiten    r.  Milwaukee    (47   Wis.  494)     713 
Feldman  v.  Charleston  (23  S.  C.  57)    234, 

895,  896 
Fell  v.  State  (42  Md.  71)  78,417 

Fellowes    v.  New    Haven   (44   Conn. 

240)  1220 

Fellows  r.  Fayette  Sch.  Dist.  (39  Me. 

559)  '  1148 

v.  Gilman  (4  Wend.  414)  299 

v.  Walker  (39  Fed.  R.  651)    585,  1093 
Feltmakers'  Co.  v.  Davis   (1   Bos.  & 

P.  98)  396,  483,  484 

Felts  v.  Memphis  (2  Head,  263)  659 

Fenelon's  Petition  (7  Pa.  St.  175)         914 
Fennel  v.  Guelph  (24  U.  C.  Q.  B  238)  411, 

414,  401 
Fennimore   v.  New    Orleans  (20  La. 

An.  121)  1205 

Ferguson  v.  Chittenden   Co.  (0  Ark. 

479)  368 

v.  Davis  County  (57  Iowa,  601)  1249 
v.  Earl  Kinnoull  (9  CI.  &  F.  289)  340 
v.  Selma  (43  Ala.  398)  4  13,  450,  451 
Fernald  v.  Boston  (12  Cush.  574)  1231 
r.  Lewis  (6  Me.  204)  1172 

Ferrenbach    v.    Davis    County    (57 

Iowa,  601)  1249 

v.  Turner  (86  Mo.  416)  821 

Ferson's  Appeal  (96  Pa.  St.  140)  914 

Fertilizing  Co.,  &c   (97    U.  S.   059). 
|  See     Northwestern     Fert. 
Co.,  &c] 
Fetterly   v.  Russell  (14  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

433)  538 

Field  v.  Carr  (59  111.  198)      740,  744,  757, 

759 
v.  Coleman  (5  Cush.  267)  223 

v.    Commonwealth    (32  Pa.  St. 

478)  319,  333,  1023 

v.  Des  Moines  (39  Iowa,  575)      1163, 

1164,  1188 

v.  Girard  College  (54  Pa.  St.  233)  290, 

334 
v.  West  Orange   (30  N.  J.  Eq. 

118)  13,  19,  1322 

Fields  v.  Stokley   (99  Pa.  St.  306)      450, 

473 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxv 


Fifth  Nat.  Bank  of  N.  Y.  t>.  N.  Y. 
Elev.  K.  Co.  (24  Fed.  It. 
114)  841,875 

Fifth  Street,  Re  (17  Wend.  (307)  1220 

Filbey  v.  Combe  (2  M.  &  W.  677)         216 
Finch  v.  Temalia  Co.  Sup.  (21)  Cal. 

455)  962 

v.  Toledo  Bd.  of  Ed.  (30  O.  St. 

37)  42,  1170,  1176 

Findler   v.  San  Francisco   (13  Cal. 

534)  678 

Fink  v.  Milwaukee  (17  Wis.  26)   480,  482, 

496 

v.  Newark  (40  N.J.  L.  11)  719 

v.  St.  Louis  (71  Mo.  452)     849,  1224, 

1304,  1315,  1331 

Finley  v.  Dietrick  (12  Iowa,  516)         1268 

v.  Philadelphia  (32  Pa.  St.  381)      964 

Finnegan    v.   Fernandina    (15   Fla. 

379)  995 

Finnell  v.  Kates  (19  Ohio  St.  405)         991 
Finney  v.  Oshkosh  (18  Wis.  220)  556,  945, 

984 
Fire  Department  v.  Helfenstein  (16 

Wis.  130)  426,  910 

v.  Kip  (10  Wend.  267)  77,  139 

v.  Wright  (3  E.  1).  Smith,  478)      903 
First  Bap.  Church  in  Sclien.  v.  Utica 

&  S.  II.  Co.  (6  Barb.  313)       780, 
781 
First  Cong.  Soc.  of  South,  v.  Atwater 

(23  Conn.  34)  668 

First  Eccl.  Soc.  of  H.  v.  Hartford  (38 

Conn.  274)  1147 

First  Evangel.  Church  Trs.  v.  Walsh 

(57  III.  363)  444,  744,  752 

First  Metli.  E.  Church  So.  v.  Atlanta 

(76  Ga.  181)  925 

First  Municipality,  &c.     [See  Muni- 
cipality No.  1,  &c] 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  A.  v.  Americus 

(68  Ga.  119)         1145,1150,1154 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Charlotte  v.  Nat. 
Exch.  Bank  of  Bait.  (92  U. 
S.  122)  1139 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Louisville  v.  Com- 
monwealth (9  Wall.  353)         902 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Shawneetown  v. 

Cook  (77  III.  622)  1107 

First  Parish  in  Sudbury,  &c.  (21  Pick. 
148).      [See  Sudbury  First 
Par.,  &c] 
First  Parisli  in  Sutton,  &c.  (3  Pick. 
232).      [See    Sutton    First 
Par.,  &c] 
First  Presb.  Church  of  Ft.  W.  v.  Ft. 

Wayne  (36  Intl.  338)        938,  956 
Fish  v.  Rochester  (6  Paige.  268)  817 

v.  Weatherwax    (2  Johns.   Cas. 

217)  310,  1019 

Fisher   v.   Attleboro   Sch.   Dist.    (4 

Cush.  494)  359,  541 

v.  Beard  (32  Iowa,  346)  744,  757 

v.  Beard  (40  Iowa,  625)  763 

vol.  I.  —  e 


Page 
Fisher  v.  Boston  (104  Mass.  87)  217,  1164, 
1166,  1195,  1199,  1201 
r.  Carpenter  (36  Kan.  1»4)  759 

v.  Charleston  (17  W.  Va.  595)      1032 
v.  Graham  (1  Cine.  113)  408 

y.   llarrisburgh  (2  Grant  Cases, 

291)  396,  404,412,  819,  98G 

v.  McGirr  (1  Gray,  1)       212,  451,  487 
v.  Prowse  (2  Best  &  S.  770)   741,  745, 

1312 
v.  St.  Louis  (44  Mo.  482)  535 

v.  Thirkell  (21  Mich.  1)        833,  1310, 

1311 
v.  Val  de  Travers  Asphalte  Co. 

(L.  R.  1  C  P.  D.  511)  1313 

v.  Vaughan  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.492)   259, 

387,  395 

Fisk  v.  Havana  (88  III.  208)  752 

v.  Jefferson  Par.  Pol.  Jury  (116 

U.  S.  131)  311,  1032,  1036 

Fiske,  Re  (72  Cal.  125)  407,  473 

v.  Hazzard  (7  R.  I.  438)  224 

Fitch  v.  Pinckard  (5  III.  76)    139, 147,  485, 

944,  961 
Fitz  v.  Boston  (4  Cush.  365)  1255 

Fitzacherly    v.    Wiltshire  (11   Mod. 

353)  487 

Fitzgerald  v.  Berlin  (51  Wis.  81)        1258, 

1265 
v.  Weston  (52  Wis.  354 >  1287 

Fitzgibbon  v.  Toronto  (25  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

137)  789 

Fitzhugh  v.  Custer  (4  Tex.  391)  1062 

Fitzsimmons  v.  Brooklyn  (102  N.  Y. 

536)  319 

Flagg  v.  Hudson  (142  Mass.  280)         1262 

v.  Palmyra  (33  Mo.  440)         618,  643, 

1028,  1037 

v.  Worcester  (13  Gray,  601)        1315, 

1219,     1231,    1316,    1320,    1321, 

1328,  1334 

Flanagan  v.  Plainfield  (44  N.  J.  L. 

118)  181,425 

Flanagan's  Adm.  v.  Wilmington  (4 

Houst.  548)  1143 

Flanders  (-.Norwood  (141  Mass.  17)    1251 
Flatbush,  lie  (60  N.  Y.  398)  106,  126,  700, 

1011 
Flatbush  Avenue,  Re  (1  Barb.  286)  920 
Fleckner  v.  U.  S.  Bank  (8  Wheat. 

338)  522 

Fleishel  v.  Hightower  (62  Ga.  324)        674 

Fleming,  Re  (4  Hill,  581)  1005 

v.  Appleton  (55  Wis.  90)  1142 

v.  Manchester  (44   L.  T.  (n.  s.) 

517)  1328 

v.  Mershon  (37  Iowa,  413)  1113,  1119 

v.  Shenandoah  '71  Iowa,  456)       1287 

Fleming's  Appeal  (65  Pa.  St.  444)         219 

Flemingsburg  v.  Wilson  (1  Bush,  203)  783 

Fletcher  v.  Auburn  &  S.  R.  Co.  (25 

Wend.  462)  792,  842,  854 

v.  Lowell  (15  Gray,  103)  292 

v.  Oshkosh  (18  Wis.  228;        556,  945 


lxvi 


I  LBLE   OF   CASES   CI  DED. 


Page 

Fletcher  v.  Peck  (6  Cranch,  87)    115,  31lj 
Flewellyn  o.  Webster  (6  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

...  259 

Flint  v.  Clinton  Co.  (12  X.  11.  4:50)        070 
v.  Russe  I  (5  Dillon,  loll         149,  155 
Flint  River  Steamboat  Co  v.  Foster 

L94)  479 

Florence,  ft  (78  Ala.  419)  487 

Flori  v.  St.  Louis  (09  Mo!  341)  1170,  1172, 

1177 
Flournoy  v.  Jeffersonville  (17  Intl. 

169)  55(5,  993,  996 

Flower  v.  Adams  (2  Taunt.  314)         1264 
Floyd  v.  Eatonton  Com'rs  (1  1  Ga. 

854)  I7'.i,  402,  100,  400,  :,i) 7 

r.  Gilbreath  (27  Ark  676)  1107 

i>.  Turner  (23  Tex  293)  718 

Floyd  Acceptances  (7  Wall.  666)  562,006, 

015,  649 
Floyd  Countv  v.  Rome  Street  Ry. 

Co.  ("77  Ga.  614)  833,  808 

Floyd  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Day  (19  [nd. 

150)  185,  562,  666,  677 

Flynn  v.  Canton  Countv  (40  Md.312) 

1158,  1262.  127:; 
v.  Nahant  (98  Mass.  578)  1263, 

127S 

v.  Nahant  (100  Mass.  278)  126;],  1284 

!  Haverhill  (144  Mass.  352)     1127, 

114") 
v.  Passaic  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  216)         1093 
Folkeii-on  v.  Easton  Bor.  (116  Pa.  St. 

623)  814.  1244 

I     llett  v.  People  (12  N.  Y.  273)  881 

Follman  v.  Mankato  (35  Minn.  522)    1286 

o.  New  Orleans  (109  U.  S.  285)     1108 

Fullmer  v.  Nuckolls  Co.  Com'rs   (0 

Neb.  204)  544,1111 

Folsom,  Re  (56  N.  Y.  00)  959 

v.  N.w  Orleans  (109  U.  S.  285)     1168 

v.  School  Directors  (91  111.  402)     185 

v.  Underbill  (36  Vt.  580)       760,  1300 

Fond  dii  Lac  v.  Moore  (58  Wis.  170)    300 

Fonda  v.  Canal  Appr.  (1  Wend.  288)  1129 

Foot  r.  Broii8on  (1  Fans.  47)  1321 

v.  Prowse  (1  Str.  625)      301,  302,  304 

v.  Prowse  (3  Bro.  P.  C.  169)  301 

Foote  v.  Cincinnati  (11  Ohio,  408)  78 

v.   Johnson    County    (5    Dillon 

C.  C.  208,  281)  584,030,650 

v.  Milwaukee  lis  Wis.  270)  556,1122 

r.    Pike  Countv   (101    II.   S.  OSS)        f,0  1 

r.  Salem  (II  Allen,    187)  208 

Fopper  v.  Wheatland  (59  Wis.  623)    1255 

Force  v.  Batavia  (61  111.  99)  230,  277,  280, 

638 
Forcbeimer  v.  Mobile  (4  So.  R.  113)  473 
Ford,  ft  (6  Lans.  92)  950,  984 

v.  Chicago  &   X.  W.  Co.  R.  Co. 

(14  Wis.  609)     842,860,864,868 
v.  Clough  (8  Me.  334)  53 

V.   Hart   i  I.    R   9  C    P.  273)  270 

v.  New  York  (63  X.  V.  640)  619 

v.  Pye  (L.  R.  9  C.  P.  269)  270 


Pag» 
Ford  v.  Santa  Cruz  R.  Co.  (59  Cal. 

290)  si  1,842 

v.  Williams  (13  N.  Y.  577)  626 

Foreman  v  ( Canterbury  |  L.  R.  6  Q.  15. 

214)    1202,  1203,  1269,  1282,  1204 
V.  Marianna  (43  Ark.  824  201 

Forest  Park  Case  (68  Mo.  176).    [See 

St.  Louis  Counts',  \r.| 
Forristal  v.  People  (3  111.  App.  470)      304 
Forster  v.  Forster  (4  B.  &  S.  187)       1057 
Forsyth  v.  Atlanta  (45  Ga.  152)  1 160 

v.  Kreuter  (100  Ind.  27)  070 

o.  Wheeling  (19  W.  Va.  318)  803 
Forsythe  v.  Hooper  (11  Allen,  419)  1307 
Fort  Dodge  v.  Moore  (37  Iowa,  388)  950 
Fort  Edward  &  Ft.  M.  PI.   R.  Co.  v. 

Payne  (17  Barb.  667)  789 

Fort  Smith  v.  Avers  (43  Ark.  82)  420 

v.  Dodson  (46  Ark.  290)  418 

v.  McKibbin  (41  Ark.  45)      659,  755, 

798 
Fort  Wayne  v.  Cody  (43  Ind   107)       814 
>-.  Coombs  (107  Ind.  75)       1297,  1332 
v.  Dewitt  (17  Ind.  3911        1281,  1208 
v.  Jackson  (7  Blackf.  36)  262 

v.  Lehr  (88  Ind   62)  529 

v.  Rosenthal  (75  Ind.  156)  514 

v.  ShoalT  (106  Ind.  66)  912 

Fort   Worth   v.   Crawford    (64   Tex. 

202)  1164 

v.  Davis  (57  Tex.  225)  944 

Fort  Worth  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rosen- 
dale  S.  Ry.  Co.  68  Tex.  169)  800 
Fortin  v.  East  Hampton  (145  Mass. 

196)  1297 

Fortune  v.  St.  Louis  (23  Mo  539)  101 
Forward  v  Bartels  (7  U.  C.  C.  P.  533)  279 
Fosdick  o.  Perrvsburg  (14  O.  St.  472)  236 

237,  946 

Foss  v.  Chicago  (56  111.  354)  957,  958,  994 

Fossett  r.  Bearce  (29  Me.  523)      347,  371 

Foster  v.  Brown  (55  Iowa,  686)  435 

v.  Callaway  Co.  (3  Dillon  C.  C. 

201)  631 

v.  Coleman  (10  Cal.  278)  567 

v.  Fowler  (00  Pa.  St.  27)         01,  673, 

674,  075 

v.  Kansas  (112  U.  S.  201)     213,  1089, 

1095 
v.  Kenosha  (12  Wis.  010)  86,  120,  584 
v.  Lane  (30  X.  II.  305)  44 

v.  McKibben  (14  Pa.  St.  168)  325 
v.  Rhoads  (10  Johns   191)  422 

t-.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App  564)  1224 
v.  St.  Louis  (71  Mo.  157)  1319,  1327 
v.  Scarf  (15  O.  St.  535)  277 

r.  Shaw  (7  S.  &R.  163)  274 

Fotherby  v.  Metrop.  Ry.  Co.  (L.  R. 

2  C.  P.  C.  196)  712 

Fourth  Avenue,  ft  (4  Wend.  452)       920 

Fowle  v.  Alexandria  (3  Peters,  398)     141, 

1159,  1161,  1174 

Fowler,  ft>  (53  N.  Y-  00)  703,  819 

v.  Pierce  (2  Cal.  105)  1016,  1070 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxvii 


Fowler  v.  St.  Joseph  (37  Mo.  228)       1123 

v.  Strickland  (107  Mass.  552)  583 

Fox  v.  Glastenbury  (29  Conn.  204)     1300 

v.  Hart  (11  Ohio,  414)  801 

v.  Northern  Liberties  (3  W.  &  S. 

103)  1190 

v.  Rockford  (38  III.  451)  807 

v.  Sackett  (10  Allen,  535)  1300 

v.  State  (5  How.  410)  440 

Fox's  Will  (52  N.  Y.  530;  94  U.  S. 

315)  GG1 

[See  also  Philadelphia  v.  Fox 
(64  Pa.  St.  169).  1 
Francis  v.  Cockrell  (L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  184)  179 
v.  Troy  (74  N.  Y.  338)      146, 520,  621 
Franey  v.  Miller  (11  Pa.  St.  435)  738 

Frank,  Re  (52  Cal.  606)         147,  399,  401, 
404,  425,  905 
v.  San  Francisco  Sup.  (21  Cal. 

668)  141,  1032 

Frankford  &  Phila.  Pass.  R.  Co.  v. 

Philadelphia  (58  Pa.  St.  119)  425, 
427,  862,  863,  864 
Frankfort  v.  Aughe  (15  N.  E.  R.  802)  482 
Frankfort  Br.  Co.  v.  Frankfort  (18 

B.  Mon.  41)  533,538 

Franklin  v.  Fisk  (13  Allen,  211)  1320 

v.  Maberry  (6  Humph.  368)    921,  927 

v.  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  (3  H.  &  N.  211)   1288 

Franklin  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Lathrop   (9 

Kan.  453)  740,  764,  771,  788 

Franklin  Tp.  Trs.  v.  State  (11  Ind. 

205)  1009 

Franklin  Wharf  Co.  v.  Portland  (67 

Me.  46)  176,  448,  885,  1204,  1330 
Frazee,  Re  (63  Mich  396)  396,  412,  438 
Frazier  v.  Warfield  (13  Md.  279)  151,  464 
Freburg  v.  Davenport  (63  Iowa,  119)  1323 
Frederick  v.  Augusta  C.  Council  (5 

Ga.  561)"  134,  237,  472,  962,  1119 
v.  Groshen  (20  Md.  436)  1111 

Frederick  Co.  v.  Winchester  (5  So. 

E.  R.  844)  766 

Fredericktown  v.  Fox  (84  Mo.  59)  75 

Freedom  v.  Ward  (40  Me.  383)  883 

Freeholders  of  A.  County,  &c.     [See 

A.  Co.  Freeh.  &c] 
Freeland  v.  Hastings  (10  Allen,  570)   224, 

234 

v.  Muscatine  (9  Iowa,  461)  1231 

Freeman  v.  Cornwall  (10  Johns.  470)    324 

Freeport  v.  Bristol  (9  Pick.  46)  696 

v.  Isbell  (83  111.  440)  1257,  1268 

v.  Marks  (59  Pa.  St.  253)         390,  391 

Fremont    Build.  Assoc,   v.  Sherwin 

(6  Neb.  48)  578 

French  v.  Boston  (129  Mass.  592)  1252 
v.  Brunswick  (21  Me.  29)  1256,  1270 
v.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  614)  202,  207 
v.  Cowan  (79  Me.  420)  1010,  1078 
v.  Edwards  (13  Wall.  511)  347 

v.  Milwaukee  (49  Wis.  584)  1227 

v.  New  Orleans  &  C.  R.  Co.  (2 

La.  An.  80)  768 


Page 
French  v.  Quincy  (3  Allen,  9)       210,  211, 
662,  672,  761,  773 
v.   Springwells   II.    Com  rs   (12 

Mich.  267)  714 

v.  Teschemaker  (24  Cal.  518)         235 

Frend  v.  Dennett  (4  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  576)  443, 

521 
Frewin  v.  Lewis  (4  Myl.  &  C.  249)      1099, 

1118 
Friday  v.  Floyd  (63  111.  50)  223,  419 

Frisbie  v.  Clarksville  (78  Ind.  269)      1026 
Frith  v.  Dubuque  (45  Iowa,  406)  854 

Fritsch    v.    Allegheny    (20  A.  L.  J. 

373)  1255,  1209,  1282 

Fritz  v.   Hobson    (19   Am.   L.  Reg. 

(n.  s.)  615)        447,  777,  795,  886 
v.  Hobson  (L.  R.  14  Ch.  Div.  542)  878, 

886 
Frolickstein  v.  Mobile  (40  Ala.  725)  468 
Frommer  v.  Richmond  (31  Gratt.  646)  428 
Frost  v.  Belmont  (6  Allen,  152)  1101, 

1115 
v.  Chester  (5  E.  &  B.  531)  304,  1022 
v.  Leatherman  (55  Mich.  33)  944 

v.  Waltham  (12  Allen,  85)  1265,  1285, 

1300 
Fry,  Re  (3  Mackey,  135)  508 

v.  Albemarle  County  (         Va. 

[1889])  1174 

v.  Booth  ( 19  O.  St.  25)  281 

v.  Montgomery  Co.  Com'rs  (82 

N.  C.  304)  1032 

Frv's  Election  (71  Pa.  302)  279 

Fullam  v.  Brookfield  (9  Allen,  1)         525, 

5^7   528 
Fuller,  Re  (25  Ark.  261)  1057 

v.  Atlanta  (66  Ga.  80)  1217,  1222 

v.  Chicago  (89  111.  282)  204 

v.  Edings  (11  Rich.  L.  239)  166 

v.  Groton  (14  Gray,  340)  220 

v.  Heath  (89  111.  296)  204 

Fulliam  v.  Muscatine  (30  N.  W.  P. 

861)  1266,1279,1286 

Fulton  v.  Davenport  (17  Iowa,  404)     973, 

974 
v.  Dover  (6  Cent.  R.  848)  760 

v.  Lincoln  (9  Neb.  358)  146,  520,  546, 

945 
v.  Mehrenfield  (8  O.  St.  440)  738,  739 
Fulton  Co.  Sup.  v.  Miss.  &  W.  R.  Co. 

(21  111.  338)  239 

Fulton  Iron  Works  v.   Kimball   (52 

Mich.  146)  882 

Fulweiler  v.  St.  Louis  (61  Mo.  479)       499 
Furman  v.  Knapp  (19  Johns.  248)  947 

v.  New  York   (5  Sandf.  16;  10 

N.  Y.  567)  114, 177 

v.  Nichol  (8  Wall.  44)  118 

Furman  Street,  Re  (17  Wend.  649)      263, 

729,  730,  758,  814 

Furnell  v.  Cotes  (19  O.  St.  405)  709 

v.  St.  Paul  (20  Minn.  117)  1272,  1281, 

1283,  1297,  1301 


lxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


G. 

Page 

Gabler  v.  Elizabeth  (42  N.  J.  L.  79)  929 
Gabriel  v.  Clerke  (Cro.  Eliz.  76)  808 

Gachet  v.  McCall  (50  Ala.  307)  L161 

Gaddia  v.  Richland  County  (92  111. 

1H»  i  236,239 

Gaffney  o.  Gough  (36  Cal.  104)  1002 

Gafnev  v.  San   Francisco    (72   Cal. 

146)  815 

Gage  v.  Graham  (57  111.  114)  906 

( lager  v.  <  Ihippewa  Co.  Sup.  (47  Mich. 

167)  1126 

( rahagan  v.  Boston  &  L.  It.  Co.  (1  Allen 

(Mass  )  187)  858 

Galbraith  v.  Littiech  (73  III.  200)  574 

Galbreath  v.  Armour  (4  Bell  App.  C. 

374)  821,834,860 

v.  Moberly  (80  Mo.  484)  313 

Gale  v.  Kalamazoo  (23  Mich.  344)        155, 

157,  429,  439,  457,  458,  459,  524, 

1360 

v.  Mead  (2  Denio,  100)  324 

v.  South  Berwick  (51  Me.  174)      208 

Galena  v.  Amy  (5  Wall   705)         118,  585, 

1028,  1032,  1033,  1042 

v.  Corwith  (48  111.  423)  193,  194,  199, 

511,564 

Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson  (75  111.  152)    40, 

264,  265 

v.  Higlev  (61  111.  287)  1305 

Gall  ».  Cincinnati  (18  (J.  St  563)         456, 

457,  751,  814 

Gallagher  v.  St.  Paul   (28  Fed.   11. 

305)  1267 

Gallerie  v.  Lowell  (144  Mas*.  491)  1252 
Gallia  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Holconib  (7  Ohio, 

Pt.  1,232)  147,  ss:5 

Galliard  v.  Laxton  (2  B.  &  S.  363)  295 
Galloway  v.  Chatham' R.  Co.  (63  N. 

C.  147)  1119 

v.  Corbitt  (52  Mich.  460)  1131 

v.  London  (L.  R.  1  II.  L.  34)         659, 

1097 
Gallup  o.  Tracy  (25  Conn.  60)  131 

Galveston  v.  Barbour  (62  Tex.  172)   1180, 

1287,  1297 
v.  Heard  (54  Tex.  420)  558,  911,  984, 

990 

v.  Loonie  (54  Tex.  517)  512 

v.  Menard  (23  Tex.  349)   170, 177,  70s, 

801,  803 

v.  Morton  (58  Tex.  409)  539 

v.  Posnainsky  (62  Tex.  118)        1170, 

1180,  1210,  1252 

v.  Williams  (6  So.  W.  R.  860)         75s 

Galveston  City  Co.  v.  Galveston  (56 

Tex.  486)  1148, 1149 

Galveston  R.  Co.  v.  Fuller  (63  Tex. 

407)  1224 

Galveston    Wharf  Co.  v.  Galveston 

(63  Tex. 14)  168,  949,  950 

Gal  way  Sup.  v.  Stimson  (4  Hill,  136)  320 
Gamble  v.  St.  Louia  (12  Mo.  617)  755 
Gannon  v.  Hargadon  (10  Allen,  106)  1320 


760 
851 
964 

0S6 


Page 
Gano  v.  State  (10  O.  St.  237)  1090 

Garden  City  v.  Abbott  (34  Kan.  283)    394 

v.  Johnston  (12  Atl.  K    888) 
Gardiner  v.  Boston  &  Wor.  R.  Corp. 

(9Cush.  1) 
Gardiner  Cotton  &  W.  F.  Co.  v.  Gar- 
diner (5  Me.  1 33) 
Gardner  v.  Boston  (106  Mass.  549) 

v,  Haney  (86  In.l.  17)  561,035 

v.  Newburgh  Trs.  (2  Johns.  Ch. 

162)  697,  701,716,  1317 

v.  Ogden  (22  N.  Y.  327)  614 

v.  State  (21  N.  J.  L.  557)        948,  967 

Garland  v.  Towne  (55  N.  H.  55)  785,  1262, 

1276 
Garnett  v.  Jacks.  St  A   &  II.  Ry  Co. 

(20  Fla.  889)  787 

Gamier  v.  St.  Louis  (37  Mo.  554)  312 

Garrett  v.  Janes  (65  Md.  266)         889,  890 

v.  Memphis  (5  Fed.  R.  860) 

v   St.  Louis  (25  Mo.  505) 


250 
723,  925, 
933,  955 

454 


v.  State  (49  N.  J.  L.  94) 
Garrigus   v.   Parke  Co.   Com'rs   (39 

Ind.  66)  240 

Garrison  r.  Chicago  (7  Biss.  480)  153, 

199  823 

r.  New  York  (21  Wall.  196)    712,'  714 

Gartside  v.  East  St.  Louis  (43  111.  47)  811, 

1093 
( farvey,  Rp  (77  N.  Y.  523)      140,  520,  961 
Garvie  v.  Hartford  (54  Conn.  440)  102,  311 
Garvin  v.  Daussman  (114  Ind.  429)       983 
B  Wells  (8  Iowa,  286)  481 
Gas    Co.  t-.   &c.     |  See  the  fol- 
lowing   plaintiff    gas   com- 
panies which,  in  citing,  may 
not  always  have  been  fully 
named :    Parkersburg    Gas 
Co.   &c.    (30   W.   Va.  435) 
San  Francisco,  &c.  (6  Cal. 
190;     9    Cal.    453),    West 
Chester,   &c.    (30  Pa.    St. 
232).] 
Gaskill  v.  Dudley   (0  Met.   (Mass.) 

546)  1027,  1172 

Gaskin's  Case  (8  D.  &  E.  T  R.  209)     333 
Gaskins  i».  Atlanta  (73  Ga.  746)  1268 

Gass  v.  Greenville  (4  Sneed,  62)  464 

v.  State  (34  Ind.  425)  281,285 

Gassett  v.  Andover  (25  Vt.  342)  533 

Gatch  v.  Des  Moines  (63  Iowa,  718)     919 
Gates  v.  Delaware  County  (12  Iowa, 

405)  307,  309 

v.  Hancock  (45  N.  H.  528)  542 

Gatling  v.  Carteret  Com'rs  (92  N.  C. 

536)  995 

Gault's  Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  95)  1002 

Gaunt  ».  Fynney  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  8)    446 
Gause  v.  Clarksville  (5  Dillon  C.  C. 

105)190,  192,  193,  194,  1140,  1144 

v.  Clarksville  (1  Fed.  R.  353)         635 

Gavin  v.  Chicago  (97  111.  66)  1283 

Gay  v.  Bradstreet  (39  Me.  580)  714 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxix 


Page 
Gay  ».  Cadby  (L.   R.  2  C  P.  Div. 

391)  216 

v.  iMut.  Union  Tel.  Co.  (12  Mo. 

App.  485)  831 

Gavle  v.  Owen  Co.  Ct.  (83  Ky.  61)      101!) 
Gearhart  v.  Dixon  (1  Pa.  St.  224)        376, 

380,  945 
Gebhardt  v.  Reeves  (75  111.  301)  738,  739, 

747,  773 
Geddis  v.  Bann  Reservoir   (L.  R.  3 

App.  C.  455)  1215 

Gedge  v.  Common  wealth,  (9  Bush,  61 ) 

760,  762 
Gee  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  R.  Co.  (6  H. 

&N.  211  1288 

v.   Metropolitan   Ry.    (L.    R.   8 

Q.  B.  177)  1264,  1300 

v.  Wilden  (Lutw.  1320)  476 

Geiger  v.  Filor  (8  Fla.  325)    166,  833,  846 

Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque  (1  Wall.  175)       196, 

226,  236,  250,  560,  581,  582,  583, 

584,  586,  593,  614,  617,  685,  645 

Geneseo  T.  H.  Com'rs  v.  Harper  (38 

111.  103)  1126 

Geneva  v.  Cole  (61  111.  397)  76,  997 

Geneva,  The  (16  Fed.  R.  874)       165,  172 
Geneva  Col.  Med.  Inst.  v.  Patterson 

(IDenio,  61)  76 

Genois  v.  Lockett  (13  La.  545)     292,  1097 
v.  St.  Paul  (35  Minn.  330)    814,  1225 
Gentile  v.  State  (29  Ind.  409)  84 

George  v.  Oxford  Tp.  (16  Kan.  72)        280 
Georgetown  Street  Com'rs  v.  Taylor 

(2  Bay,  282)  762,  801 

Gerard  v.  Cook  (2  Bos.  &  P.  109)  888 

Gerberling  v.  Wunnenberg  (51  Iowa, 

125)  755 

German  Bank  v.  Brenham  (35  Fed. 

R.  185)  127 

German    Sav.     Bank    v.    Franklin 

County  (128  U.  S.  526)  586,  587, 
595,  599,  622,  623,  626,  627,  631, 
634,  637,  638,  647 
German  Theol.   School  v.  Dubuque 

(64  Iowa,  736)  1328 

Germania,  The,  v.  State  (7  Md.  1)       424, 

9T0 
Gerry  v.  Stoneham  (1  Allen,  319)  222,  347 
Getchell  v.  Benedict  (57  Iowa,  121)      755, 

762 
Ghenn  v.  Provincetown   (105  Mass. 

313)  1270,  1283,  1296 

Gibbes  v.  Beaufort  (20  S.  C.  213)         180, 

1180 
Gibbons  v.  Dist.  Columbia  (116  U.  S. 

404)  902 

v.  Mobile  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (36  Ala. 

410)  208,  225 

r.  Sheppard,  (65  Pa.  St.  20)  1127 

Gibbs  v.  Liverpool  Docks  (3  H.  &  N. 

164)  179 

Giboney  v.  Cape  Girardeau  (58  Mo. 

141)  267,975 

Gibson  r>.  Bailey  (9  N.  H.  168)  371 


Page 
Gibson  v.   Preston  (L.  R.  5   Q.   B. 

218)  1206,  1214 

Gibson  Tp.  Ov.  Poor  v.  Nicholson 
Tp  Ov.  Poor  (2  S.  &  R. 
422)  272 

Giesy  v.  Cine,  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (4  O. 

St.  308)  703,  731,  734 

Gifford  v.  N.  J.  R.  &  Transp.  Co.  ( 10 

N.  J.  Eq.  171)  1109 

Gilbert  v.  Boston  ( L39  Mass.  313)         1255 

v.  Luce  (11  Barb.  91)  308 

v.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  102)       375, 

634 
v.  Roxburv  H00  Mass.  185)  1261 

v.  Shovverman  (23  Mich.  448)         449 
v.  Trinity  House  (L.  R.  17  Q.  B. 

D.  795)  1158 

Gilbert  Elev.  R.  Co.,  Re   (70  N.  Y. 

361)  386,  778,  788,  819,  838,  861, 
872 
Gilchrist  v.  Garden  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  1) 

1258 
v.  Little  Rock   (1  Dillon  C.  C. 

261)  579,649 

v.  Schmidling  (12  Kan.  263)  419 

Gilchrist's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  600)     263, 

264,  963 
Gilder  v.  Brenham  (67  Tex.  345)  752,  758, 

761 
Gildersleeve  v.  Alexander  (2  Speers, 

298)  278 

Giles's  Case  (2  Stra.  881)  1014 

Giles  v.  Sanbornton   Sen.  Dist.   (31 

N.  H.  304)  44,  278,  347 

Gilfeather  v.  Council  Bluffs  (69  Iowa, 

310)  1318,  1323 

Gilham  v.  Wells  (64  Ga.  192)        396,  433 
Gilkerson  v.  Frederick  Jus.  (13  Gratt. 

(Va.)577)  909,919,970 

Gilkey  v.  Watertown  (141  Mass.  317) 

1127 
Gill  v.  Brown  (12  Johns.  385)  323 

Gillery  v.  Madison  (63  Wis.  510)        1330 
Gillespie  v.  Forrest  (18  Hun,  110)  787 

Gillett  v.  Lyon  Co.  Com'rs  (18  Kan. 

410)  1175 

Gillette  v.  Hartford  (31  Conn.  351)        975 
Gillison  v.  Charleston   (13   W.   Va. 

282)  1322 

Gilluly  v.  Madison  (63  Wis.  518)       1334, 

1335 

Gilman  v.  Deerfield  (15  Gray,  577)     1284 

v.  Laconia  (55  N.  H.  130)  1172,  1173, 

1317.  1330 

v.  Milwaukee  (61  Wis.  588)    145,  770 

v.  Sheboygan  (2  Black,  510)  120,  121, 

898,  910,  942,  962 

v.  Waterville  (59  Me.  491)  1147 

Gilmer  v.  Atlanta  (77  Ga.  688)  1298 

i?.  Lime  Point  (18  Cal.229;  19 

Cal.  47)  697,  708 

Gilmore  v.  Fox  (10  Kan.  509)  1122 

v.  Hentig  (33  Kan.  156)  987 

v.  Holt  (4  Pick.  258)  222 


I XX 


TABLE   OF   CASKS   CITED. 


Page 

Gilmore  o.  Lewis  (12  Ohio,  281)    219,  816, 

317 

v.  Norton  (Hi  Kan.  491)  82 

r.  Pope  (5  Mass.  191)  821 

Giranl  v.  Philadelphia  (7  Wall.  1)         98, 

L05,  106,  L35,  1  K),  111,  246,  252, 

255,  2."i  7,  260,  267,  666,  662,  664 

Girard's  Heirs  v.  New  Orleans  (2  La. 

An.  897)  000,  C.62,  666 

Girard  1't.  S.  Co.  v.  Southwark  Foun- 
dry Co.  (105  Pa.  St.  251)        673 
Giranl  Will  Case  (2  How.  127)  669 

Given  o.  Des  Moines  (70  Iowa,  637)     815 
Givens  v.  Van  Studdiford   (86   Mo. 

149)  145 

Glantz  v.  South  Bend  (106  Ind.305)  1293 
Glasby  v.  Morris  |  is  N  .J.  Eq.  72)      819, 

821 
Glascock  v.  Lyons  (20  Ind    1)  319 

Glasgow  r.  Rowse  (  18  Mo.  179)    895,  909 
r.  St.  Louis  (87  Mo.  678)  769 

Glass  r.  White  (5  Sneed,475)  974 

Glastenbury   v.   McDonald  (44   Vt. 

450)  568 

Glencoe  v.  People  (78  111.  382)    270.  HU  1, 
1019,1057,  1065,  1066 
Glenn  u.  Baltimore  (07  Md.  800)  752 

Glidden  v.  Unity  (30  N.  II.  104)  150 

v.  Unity  (33  N.  11   571)  322 

Glossop  u.  Heston  &  I.  Local  Bd.  (L. 

R.  12  Ch.  1).  102)         1005,  1320, 
1326 
Gloucester  v.  Osborn  (1  H.  L.  Cas. 

285)  663 

Glover  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (19  J. 

&  S.  1 )  874 

v.  No.  Staffordshire  Ry.  Co.  (16 

Q.  B.  912)  688 

Gloversville  v.  Howell  (70  N.  Y.  287)     78, 

386 
Godchaux  v.  Carpenter  (19  Nev.  415) 

707 
Goddard,  Re  (16  Pick.  504)  143,  467,  480, 

496 

v.  Jacksonville  (16  111.  588)     482,  134 

r.  Smithett  (3  Gray,  116)  1075 

Goddin  «\  Crump  (8  Leigh,  120)    225,  808 

Godfrey  v.  Alton  (12  111.  29)  740,  748,  768 

v.  Claflin  (21  Pick.  1)  1162 

Goelet  v.  Newport  Bd.  of  Aid.  (14  R. 

I.  295)  754 

Goetler  v.  State  (45  Ark.  454)  139 

Gold  v.  Philadelphia  (115  Pa.  St.  1S1)  SS5 
Goldschrnidt  v.  New  Orleans  (5  La. 

An.  4.3G)  566 

Goldsmid  v.  Tunbridge  Wells  Impr. 

Com'rs  (L.  R  1  Eq.  161)        452 
Goldsmith  v.  New   Orleans  (31  La 

1)40)  434 

Goldthwaite  ".  East  Bridgewater  (5 

Gray,  61)  1255 

v.   Montgomery  C.  Council   (50 

Ala.  ISO)  483,  610,  970 

Gooch  v.  Gregory  (65  N.  C.  142;  673,  675 


Page 
Goodale  v.  Fennell  (27  O.  St.  42G)        1L8, 

120 

v.  Tuttle  (29  N.  Y.  459)       1316,  1323 

Goodall  v.  Milwaukee  (5  Wis.  32)        814, 

L227 
Goodel  v.  Baker  (8  Cow.  286)  850 

Goodell,  Hi  (l  i  Johns.  325)  1012 

v,  Jackson  (20  Johns.  706)  056 

Goodenow  v.  Buttrick  (7  Mass   140)     142 
Goodfellow  v.  New  York  (100  N.  Y. 

15)  1297 

Goodin  v.  Cine.  &  W.  Canal  Co.  (18 

(I.  St.  169)  729 

Goodloe  v.  Cincinnati  (4  Ohio,  500)    1220 

Goodman  v.  Harvey  (4  A  &  E.  870)     582 

v.  Simonds  (20  How.  343)  683 

Goodnough  v.  Oshkosh  (24  Wis.  540) 

1301 
Goodnow  r.  Ramsey  Co.  Com'rs  (11 

Minn.  31)  502,563 

Goodrich  v.  Brown  (30  Iowa,  291)        481, 

507 
v.  Chicago  (20  111.  445)  153, 158, 1013, 

1158 

v.  Detroit  (12  Mich.  279)        201,  512, 

550,  557 

v.  Milwaukee  (24  Wis.  422)  1227 

v.  Omaha  (10  Neb.  98)  1222 

Goodson   v    Des  Moines   (66  Iowa, 

255)  1297 

Goodtitle  a.  Alker  (1  Burr.  133)  746,  791, 

816 

v.  Alker  (1  Kenyon,  427)  816 

Goodwin,  Re  (U   C.  C  P  254)  200 

v.  Des  Moines  (55  Iowa,  671)      1267, 

1312 
v.  McGehee  (15  Ala.  233)  076 

v.  Robarts  (L.  R.  1   App.  Cas. 

470)  682 

Goodwine  v.  State  (81  Ind.  109)  301 

Gordon  v.  Appeal  Tax  (3  How.  U.  S. 

133)  968 

v.  Baltimore  (5  Gill,  231)       953,  9G8, 
997,  1147,  1151 
v.  Dearborn  Co.  Com'rs  (52  Ind. 

322)  549 

v.  Farrar  (2  Doug.  411)  326 

v.  Preston  ( 1  Watts,  385)  676 

v.  Richmond  (83  Va,  436)  1208 

v.  Taunton  (126  Mass    849)  1187 

Gorgier  v.  Mierville  (8  B.  &  C.  45)       682 
Gorham  v.  Campbell  (2  Cal.  135)         282 
v.  Cooperstown  (59  N.  Y.  660)     1209, 

1296 

v.  Springfield  (21  Me.  58)  77,  267,  271 

Goring  v.  McTaggart  (92  Ind.  200)     1000 

Gorman  v.  Low  ( 2  Ed  w.  Ch.  324)  1 2< » 

Goshen  >:  Croxton  (81  Ind.  239)    480,  482 

,-.  Kern  (63  Ind   468)  420,  168 

v.  Myers  (119  Ind.  196)       1247,  1281 

Goshorn  v.  Ohio  Co.  Sup    (1  W.  Va. 

308)  237 

Gosling  v.  Veley  (19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  (n.  s) 

135)  387 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


lxxi 


Page 
Gospel  Soc.  v.  Pawlet  (4  Pet.  480)         76, 

140 

v.  Young  (2  N.  H.  310)  258 

Gosport  v.  Evans  (112  Ind.  133)  1285 

Gosselin  v.  Chicago  (103  III.  623)  739 

Gosselink  v.  Campbell  (4  Iowa,  296)    419, 

422 
Goszler  v.   Georgetown    (6   Wheat. 

593)         157,  212,  812,  813,  1220, 
1222,  1225 
Gottschalk  v.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q  R. 

Co.  (14  Neb.  550)  1222,  1243 

Goudier  v.  Corraack   (2  E.  D.  Smith 

254)  1307 

Gould  r.  Atlanta  (60  Ga.  164)  1189 

v.  Baltimore  (59  Md   378)       956,  961 
v.  Booth  (66  N  Y.  62)         1316,  1317, 
1320,  1323,  1333 
v.  Gapper  (5  East,  345)  1132 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.  (6  N.  Y. 

522)  170 

v.  Paris  (68  Tex.  511)  198,  200,  203, 
v.  Raymond  (59  N.  H.  260)  224,  386 
v.  Rochester  (105  N.  Y.  46)  448 

v.  Sterling  (23  N.  Y.  439)       226,  235, 
238,  560,  584.  615,  644 
v.  Taylor  Orphan  As.  (46  Wis. 

106)  657 

v.  Topeka  (32  Kan.  485)        784,  1278 
Goundie  v.  Northampton  W.  Co.  (7 

Pa.  St.  233)  670 

Gourley  v.  Allen  (5  Cow.  644)  1014,  1017 

v.  Hankins  (2  Iowa,  75)  679 

Govan  v.  Jackson  (32  Ark.  553)  283 

Governor  v.  Allen  (8  Humph.  176)  55 

v.  Clark  Co.  Inf  Ct.  Jus.  (19  Ga. 

97)  1174 

v.  McEwen  (5  Humph.  241)  95 

v.  Plummer  (2  Humph.  500)  55 

Governor  &  Co.  &c.  (4  D.  &  E   T.  R. 
790).     [See  British  C.  Plate 
Co.  &c.J 
Goyne  v.  Ashley  County  (31  Ark. 

552)  567 

Graff  v.  Baltimore  (10  Md.  544)    713,  714 
Graffins  v.  Commonwealth  (3  P.  & 

W.  502)  322 

Graffty  v.  Rushville  (107  Ind.  502)       905 
Graham  v.  Carondelet  (33  Mo.  262)     351, 

373,  408 

v.  Greenville  (67  Tex.  62)  267 

v.  Parliam  (32  Ark.  676)  1043 

v.  State  (1  Ark.  171)  492 

Granby  v.  Thurston  (23  Conn.  416)        47, 

264,  270 
Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar   (15  Wall 

355)     577,  593,  614.  617,  618,  619 
Grand  Rapids  v.  Blakely  (40  Mich. 

367)  1146 

v.  Gr.   Rap.  &  Ind.  R.   Co.  (58 

Mich.  641)  708 

v.  Hughes  (15  Mich.  54)  412,  414,  510, 

809 
v.  Wyman  (46  Mich  516)  1252 


Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Heisel 

(47  Mich.  393)  852,  868 

Grand  Rapids  El.  L.  &  P.  Co.  v.  G. 
It.  Edison  El.  L.  &  F.  G.  Co. 
(33  Fed.  R.  659)       149,  405,  777, 
808,  823,  828,  829 
Grand  Rapids,  N.  &  L.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

Gray  (38  Mich.  461)  494 

Grand  Surry  Canal  Co.  v.  Hall  (1  M. 

&G.  392)  751,800 

Granger  v.  Avery  (64  Me.  292)  264 

y.  Buffalo  (6  Abb.  N.  Cas.  238)      900 

v.  Pulaski  County  (26  Ark.  37)  1173, 

1245 
Grant  v.  Brooklyn  (41  Barb.  381)       1293, 

1331 

v.  Courier  (24  Barb.  232)  86 

v.  Davenport  (18  Iowa,  179)  169,  170, 

176,  177,  680,  759,  768 

v.  Davenport  (36  Iowa,  396)  202,  203, 

205,   206,   513,    823,    967,    1110, 

1113 

v.  Erie  (69  Pa.  420)       158,  217,  1158, 

1199,  1320,  1328 

v.  Fancher  (5  Cow.  309)  321 

v.  Sligo  Harbor  Com'rs  (L.  R.  11 

Ir.  C.  L.  190)  1302 

v.  Stillwater  (35  Minn.  242)  884 

Grant  Co.   Com'rs  v.  Bradford  (72 

Ind.  455)  209,  553 

Grassick  v.  Toronto  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

306)  1240 

Graves  v.  Colby  (9  Ad.  &  E.  356)         484 

v.  Cole  (3  Dak.  Ter.  301)  1058 

v  Otis  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.)  466)  1220 

v.  Shattuck  (35  N.  H.  257)  885 

Gray  v.  Brooklyn  (10  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  s.) 

186)  95,  103,  110,  1167 

v.  Danbury  Bor.  (54  Conn.  574)  1293 
v.  Iowa  Land  Co.  (26  Iowa,  387)  776, 
794,  795 
v.  Knoxville  (85  Tenn.  99)  1217, 1223 
v.  Pullen  (5  B.  &  S.  970,  980)  1299 
v.  Pullen  (32  L.J.  R.  (n.  s.)  Q. 

B.  169)  1307 

v.  Rollingsford  (58  N.  H.)  322 

v.  St.  Paul  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  (13 

Minn.  315)  842 

v.  Sheldon  (8  Vt.  402)  263 

v.  State  (2  Harring.  76)  492,  507 

Grayville  v.  Whittaker  (85  111.  439)    1246 

Great  Falls  Bank  v.  Farmington  (41 

N.  H.  32)  562,  564 

Great  Western  R.  Co.  of  1859  v.  De- 
catur (33  111.  381)  852,858 
Great  Western  Railway  Co.,  Re  (23 

U.  C.  C.  P.  28)  391,  392 

Greaves  v.  Newfoundland  Co  (23  L. 

T.  53)  717 

v.  Jacksonville  (17  Fla.  174)  891 

Greeley  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.  (53  Me. 

200)  1320 

v.  People  (60  111.  19)  54,  722 

Green  v.  Canaan  (29  Conn.  157)  751 


[XX 11 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Green  v.  Cape  May  (41  N.  J.  L.  45)     140, 
147,  216,  640 
v.  Cheek  (5  In. I.  L06)  263 

v.  Chicago  C'7  111.  870)  780,  732 

-■.  Danby  (12  Vt.  388)  L266,  L261 

V.  Durham  (1  Burr.  131)  353 

,-.  Hotaling  |  II  N.J.  I*  347)  950,  989 
r.  Indianapolis  (25  Ind.  4'.Mi)    si,  :;si. 

482 
v.  Lake  (60  Miss.  451)  449 

r.  Marks  (25  111.221)  674 

v.  Miller  (6  Johns.  39)  300 

v.  New  York  (5  Abb.  Pr.  503)  95,557 
v.  Oakes  (17  111.  249)  "54 

r.  Portland  (32  Me.  431)  853 

»■.  Heading  Bor.  (9  Watts,  382)  814, 
833,  1220,  12:;:; 
v.  Rutherforth  (1  Ves.  Sr.  462)  662 
v.  Savannah  (It.  M.  Charlt.  368)  87, 
507,  970 
v.  Savannah  (6  Ga.  1)  213,  450,  451 
v.  Spencer  (67  Iowa,  410)  1142 

v.  Swift  (47  Cal.  536)  213 

r.  Underwood  (42  X.  Y.  140)  450 

v.  Ward  (82  Va.  324)  939,944 

v.  Ward  well  (17  111.  278)  298 

Green  Bay  v.  Brauns  (50  Wis.  204)     367, 

385 
Green  Conntv  v.  Conness  (109  U.  S. 

104)*  587,  637 

Green  Tp.,  Re  (9  Watts  &  S.  22)  244 

Greeneastle  v.  Allen  (43  Ind.  347)         535 

v.  Martin  (74  Ind.  449)  1204 

Greene  v.  Mumford  (5  R.  I.  472)         1121 

v.  New  York  (60  N.  Y.  303)    543,  547 

v.  State  (8  Ohio,  310)  377 

Green  County  v.  Daniel  (102  U.  S. 

187)  1031,  1044 

v.  Eubanks  (80  Ala.  204)  42 

Greene  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Huff  (91  Ind. 

333)  766, 804 

Greene  Tp.  Trs.  v.  Campbell  (16  O. 

St.  11)  262 

Greenfield  v.  Moore  (113  Ind.  597)  1037 
Greenhow  v.  Vashon  (81  Va.  336)  996 
Greenough  v.  Wakefield  (127  Mass. 

275)  222 

Greensboro  v.  Ehrenreich   (80  Ala. 

579)  398 

r.  Mullens  (13  Ala.  341)  425,  438 

Greensburg  Bor.  v.  Young  (53  Pa. 

St.  280)  914,  933 

Greenville  v.  Mason  (53  N.  H.  515)      136, 

270,  271 
Greenwich  v.  Easton  &  A.  Pi.  Co.  (24 
N.  .1.  Eq.  217  ;  25  N.  J.  Eq. 
565)  788 

Greenwood  v.  Freight  Co.  (105  U.  S. 

13)  115 

v.  Louisville  (13  Bush,  226)  1107, 

1198 
Greer  v.  Covington  (83  Ky.  410)  995 

Gregory  v.  Adams  ( 14  Gray,  242)      1252, 

1257,  1296 


Page 
Gregory  v.  Bridgeport  (41  Conn.  76)   156, 

220,  221 

v.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  390)      513 

v.  Lincoln  (13  Neb.  352)  759 

r.  New  York  (40  N.  Y.  273     442,  448 

Grenada  Co.  Sup.  v.  Brogden  (112  U. 

S.  261)  134,635,637 

Gribble  v.  Sioux  City  (38  Iowa,  390)  1285 
Gridley  v.  Bloomington  (68  111.  47)      832, 

L809,  1812 
v.  Bloomington  (88  111.  554)  467,  942, 

1201 

Grier  v.  Shackleford  (3  Brev.  491)        288 

v.  Shackleford  (Tr.  Const.  642)    285, 

509 
v.  Taylor  (4  McCord  (S.  C),  206)  1077 
Grierson  v.  Ontario  (9  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

623)  387,  395 

Griffin  v.  Coleman  (4  H.  &  N.  265)        295 

v.  Inman  (57  Ga.  370)  143,  193 

v.  Martin  (7  Barb.  298)  817 

v.  New  York  (9  N.  Y.  456)  1157, 

1159,  1280,  1284, 1295, 1296, 1301, 

1311 

v.  Rising  (2  Gush.  75)  710 

v.  Steele  (1  Edm   Sel  Cas.  505)   1074 

v.  Willow  (43  Wis.  509)  1300 

Griffin's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  150)  755 

Griffing  v.  Pintard  (29  Miss.  173)        1001 

Griffith  v.  Follett  (20  Barb.  620)  325 

v.  Harries  (2  M.  &  W.  335)  478 

Griffon   v.  New  Orleans   (5  Martin, 

n.  s.  (La.)  279)  459 

Griggs  v.  Foote  (4  Allen,  195)     719,  1140, 

1193,  1219 
Grim  r.  Weissenberg  Sch.  Dist.  (57 

Pa.  St.  433)  1149,1150 

Grimes  v.  Keene  (52  N.  H.  330)  322,  1203, 

1206,  1302 
Grimley  v.  Santa  Clara  County  (68 

Cal.  575)  1145 

Grimshawe  i».  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co. 

(19  U.  C.  Q.  B.  493)  718 

Grindley  v.  Barker  (1  Bos.  &  P.  236)  360, 

361 

Grinham  v.  Willey  (4  II.  &  N.  496)       295 

Griswold  v.  Bay  City  (35  Mich.  452)    819 

v.  Pelton  (34  0.  St.  482)  1120 

v.  Stonington  (5  Conn.  367)  552 

Grocers'  Co.  v.  Donne  (3  Bing.  N.  C. 

34)  1331 

Groenvelt  v.  Burwell   (1  Ld.  Raym. 

454)  H25 

Grogan  v.    Broadway   Foundry    Co. 

(87  Mo.  321)  1277 

v.  Hay  ward  (6  Saw.  498)  760 

v.  San  Francisco  (18  Cal.  590)         95, 

112,  130,  542,  670,  771,  1143 

Grossenbach  v  Milwaukee  (65  Wis. 

31)  1260,1273 

Groton  v.  Haines  (36  N.  II.  388)  1317 

Grove  v.  Fort  Wayne  (45  Ind.  429) 

1248,  1274,1275,1276 
Grube  v.  Nichols  (36  111.  93)  752,  755 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxxiii 


Grube  v.  St.  Paul  (34  Minn.  402)  1198 
Grumbine   v.  Washington  (2  McAr- 

thur,  578)  1195,  1197 

Guardians  of  Poor  of  Holborn  v.  Ves- 
try of  St.  Leonard's  (L.  R. 

2  Q.  B.  Div.  145)  216 

Guelpb,  Re  (24  U.  C.  Q.  B.  238)  461 

v.  Canada  Co.  (4  Grant  (Can.), 

632)  745,  773 

Guerin  v.  Reese  (33  Cal.  292)  990,  1002 
Guernsey  v.  Burlington  Tp.  (4  Dillon 

C.C.  372)  577,704 

Guerrero,  Re  (69  Cal.  88)  407,  408,  434 
Guest  v.  Brooklyn  (69  N.  Y.  500)         715, 

934,  1092 
Guilder  v.  Otsego  (20  Minn.  74)  125 

Guilford  v.  Chenango  Co.  Sup.  (13 

N.  Y.  143)  129, 130, 132,  896,  913, 
1096 
Guillotte  '"  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

432)  417, 464 

Gulf  City  Hy.  Co.  v.  Gulf  City  Street 

Ry.  Co.  (63  Tex.  529)  880 

Gulf  City  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Galveston 

City  Ry.  Co.  (65  Tex.  502)     880 
Gulf  Col.  &  S.  Fe.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddins 

(60  Tex.  656)  841,  1244 

v.  Fuller  (63  Tex.  467)  841,  854,  1244 
v.  Graves    (1    Tex.   App.   C.  C. 

§  579)  1244 

Gulf  R.  Co  &c.  (7  Kan.  210).     [See 

Missouri  River,  Ft.  S.  &  G. 

R.  Co.,  &c] 
Gulick  v.  Connely  (42  Ind.  134)  558 

v.  New  ( 14  Ind.  93)  280,  292,  493 

Gulline  v.  Lowell  (144  Mass.  491)  1255 
Gunmakers'  Sou.  v.  Fell  (Willes,  384)  430 
Gunn's  Adm.  v.  Pulaski  County  (3 

Ark.  427)  1013,  1028 

Gunnarssohn  v.  Sterling  (92  111.  569)  432 
Gurner  v.  Chicago  (40  111.  165)  959,  994 
Gurnsey  v.  Edwards  (26  N.  H.  224)  374 
Guthrie  v.  Armstrong  (5  B.  &  Aid. 

628)  360 

v.  New  Haven  (31  Conn.  308)  761,  807 
Gutzweller  v.  People  (14  111.  142)  94,  104 
Guy  v.  Baltimore  (100  U.  S.  434)  902,  903 
Gwynn  v.  Homan  (15  Ind.  201)  752 

Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati  (3  Ohio,  25)  695,  750 
v.  Rees  (2  U.  C.  P.  R.  282)  259 

H. 

Haag  v.  Vanderburgh   Co.  Com'rs 

(60   Ind.   511)       185,  448,  1183, 
1184,  1186 
Hackett  v.  Ottawa  (99  U.  S.  86)  593 

Hackettstown  ads.  Swackhamer  (37 

N.  J.  L.  191)     182,188,193,194, 

195,  563 

Hacknev  Election  (31  L.  T.  ».  8.  69)    281 

Haddock's  Case  (T.  Raym.  439)   335,  490 

Hadley  v.  Albany  (33  N.  Y.  603)  285,  288, 

318,  330,  337 


Hadley  v.  Chamberlain  (11  Vt.  618)    379 

v.  Peabody  (13  Cray,  200)  101 

v.  Taylor  (L.  R.  1  C.  P.  53)  1309 

Hadsell   v.  Hancock    (3  Gray,  526)     220, 

349 
Hafford  v.  New   Bedford   (16  Gray, 

297)  1164,  1106,  1193,  1196,  1198, 
1199, 1201,  1207 
Hagan  v.  Campbell  (8  Port.  9)       170,  171 
Hagar  v.  Reclamation  Dist.  (Ill  U. 

S.  701)  932 

v.  Yolo  Co.  Sup.  (47  Cal.  222)        894 

Hager  v.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  661)     945, 

979 
Hagerstown  v.  Dechert  (32  Md.  369)  494, 

1167 
Hagner  v.  Heyberger  (7  W.  &  S.  104)    289, 
352,  1077,  1095 
Hague  v.  Philadelphia  (48  Pa.   St. 

527)     30,  519,  523,  529,  540,  541, 

542,  543,  566 

Haight  v.  Keokuk  (4  Iowa,  199)    749,  821 

v.  New  York  (24  Fed.  R.  93)        1198, 

1201 
v.  New  York  (24  Fed.  R.  313)      1194 
Haines  v.  Readfield  Sch.   Uist.  (41 

Me.  246)  1148 

Halbert  v.  State  (22  Ind.  125)  322 

Halbut  i'.  Forrest  City  (34  Ark.  246)    522, 

528 

Hale  i'.  Cushman  (6  Met.  425)  1114 

v.  Houghton  (8  Mich.  458)      219,  513 

v.  Kenosha   (29  Wis.  599)      910,  953, 

957,  963 

v.  People  (87  111.  72)         222,  906,  907 

Haley  v.  Philadelphia  (68  Pa.  St.  45)   719 

Haliburton  v.  Frankford  (14  Mass. 

214)  527 

Hall  Re  (10  Neb.  537)  391 

v.  Baltimore  (56  Md.  187)  757 

v.  Bristol  (L.  R.  2  C.  P.  C.  322)    688, 
1228,  1230,  1239 
v.  Chippewa  Falls  (47  Wis.  267)    945 
v.  Cockrell  (28  Ala.  507)  323 

v.  Kansas  City  (54  xMo.  598)  1263 
v.  London  C.  &  D.  Ry.  Co.  (14 

L.  T.  (n.  s.)  351)  717 

v.  Lowell  (10  Cush.  260)  1261,  1302 
v.  McCaughey  (51  Pa.  St.  43)  785 
v.  Manchester  (39  N.  H.  295)  321 

v.  Manchester  (40  N.  H.  410)      1261, 

1270 
v.  Marysville  (19  Cal.  391)  950 

v.  Meriden  (48  Conn.  416)  763 

v.  New  Orleans  (19  Fed.  R.  870)  572 
v.  People  (57  111.  307)  1057,  1059 

v.  Smith  (2  Bing.  156)  324 

v.  Somersworth  Selectmen   (39 

N.  H.  511)  1007 

v.  State  (20  Ohio,  8)  781 

Hallenbeck  v.  Hahn  (2  Neb.  377)  227 

Hallowed  &  A.  Bank  v.  Hamlin  (14 

Mass.  178)  381,  488 

Halpin  v.  Campbell  (71  Mo.  493)  925 


Ixxlv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Pag.  i 

Balpin  v.  Kansas  City  (76  Mo.  335)    12 

L812 
Halstead  o.  Boston  Pol.  Hoard  (1-12 

Mass.  HO)  184 

v.  Mayor  (3  N    V    130)  219,  529,  531, 

664,  562,  666,  567 

v.  Mayor  (5  Barb  218)  218,  632 

Ham  v.  Miller  (20  Iowa,  450)  999 

r.  New   York  (To  N.  V.  459)         1194 

Salem  (10  Mass.  350)  697 

Bambleton  v.  Dexter  (89  Mo.  188)    244, 

L031 
Hamden  v.  New  Haven  &  N.  R.  Co. 

(27  Conn.  158)  851 

r.  Bice  (24  Conn.  350)  601,  668 

Hamerick  v.  Bouse  (17  Ga  56)  1098 

Hamersley  v.  New   York  (56  N.  Y. 

711 
Hamilton  u   Carthage  (24  III.  22)     76,  485 
v.  <  lolumbus  (52  Ga.  435)  1331 

17.  Dubuque  (50  Iowa,  213)  1154 

v.  Fort  Wayne  (40  [nd.  491)  908,910 
v.  McNeil  (13  Gratt.  389)  263,  266 
v.  X.  Y.  &  Hari.  B.  Co   (9  Paige, 

171)  854 

v.  Newcastle  &  D.  R.  Co  (9  End. 

359)  522,  566,  679 

v.  State  (3  Ind  152)  1012,  1057,  1120 
v.  Slate  (3  Tex.  App.  643)  438 

Hamilton  County  v.  Garrett  (62  Tex. 

602)  44,  1166 

v.  State  (115  Ind.  64)  585 

Hamilton  Co.  <  om'rs   v.  Mighels   (7 

().  St.   109)        42,43,  147,  1174, 
1180,  1245 
Hamlin  v.  Dingman  (5  Lans  61)  355 

Haminar  v.  Covington  (3  Met.  (Ky  ) 

49  1)  322,  BUT,  1135 

Hammarskeld  v.  Bull  (11   Rich.  L. 

193)  323 

Hammerslough   v.  Kansas  City  (57 

Mo.  219)  716 

Hammett  v.  Philadelphia  (65  Pa.  St. 

1  16)   910,  914,  015,  917,  918,  920, 

936,  900 

Hammond  v.  Haines  (25  Md.  541)  78,  143, 

i;;i 

v.  McLachlan  (1  Sandf.  323)  747 

Hampshire  ( 'ountv  v.  Franklin  Coun- 
ty (16  Mass.  76)      111,  269,271, 
273 
Hampson  v.  Taylor  (15  R.  I.  83)  1264 

Hamsworth    v.    Boston    (121    Mass. 

17.;  i  1018 

Hancock  v.  Bowman  (49  Cal.  413)      1001 

17,  Chicol  Co.  (32  Ark.  575)  645 

y.  Hazzard  (12  Cusli.  112)       320,  323 

Hancock    County    v.  Clark  (27    111. 

305)  239 

Hand  17.  Brookline  (120  Mass.  324)     1 163, 

1206 

».  Newton  (92  N.  Y.  88)  677 

Handv  v.  Collins  (60  Md.  229)  961 

«7.  New  Orleans  (39  La.  An.  107)  1108 


Page 
Hang  Kie,  fi  (69  Cal.  149)  470 

Hanger  v.  Des  Moines  (5^  Iowa,  193)  146, 

209 
Hanlon  r.  Keokuk  (7  Iowa,  477)  1300 

Hanna    v.    Allen     Co.    Com'rs     (8 

Blackf.  352)  896 

Ilannewinkle     v.     Georgetown    (16 

Wall.  548)  715,  1092,  1120,  1121 
Ilanncv  v.  Kansas  City  (94  Mo.  834)  1263 
Hannibal  v.  Draper  (1*5  Mo.  034)  739.  757, 

7<i7,  789 
v.  Fauntlerov  (105  U.  S.  408)  602 
17.  Han.  &  St.  J.  It.  Co.  (49  Mo. 

■isii)  809,  852 

v.  Richards  (82  Mo.  330)  1 15,  1  IS 

v.  Winchell  (54  Mo.  172)       170,  809, 

852 
Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  v.  Husen 

(95  U.  S.  465)  214 

v.  Marion  County  (36  Mo.  294)     156, 

646 

v.  Shacklett  (30  Mo.  550)  952 

Ilannon  v.  Agnew  (96  N.  Y.  439)      1196, 

1197 
v.  Grizzard  (89  N.  C.  115)  278 

17.  Halifax  Co.  Com'rs  (89  N.  C. 

123)  1021 

17.  St.  Louis  County  (62  Mo.  313)      45, 

1170.  1179,  1180,  1193,1210,1213 

Hanover  v.  Baton  (3  N.  II.  38)  527 

Hanscom  v.  Boston  (141  Mass.  242)  1251, 

1257,  1297 

17.  Omaha  (11  Neb.  37)     920,  925,  933 

t7.  Vernon  (27  Iowa,  28)    97,  220,  229, 

237,  573,  704,  895,  897,  898 

Hanson  v.  Eastman  (21  Minn.  509)      745, 

759 
Harbaugh  v.  Monmouth  (74  111.  371)  432 
Harbeck  v.  Toledo  (110.  St.  219)  705,  707, 

708,  709 
Harbor   Master  v.   Southerland  (47 

Ala.  511)  166 

Hardcastle  v.  Md.  &  Del.  R.  Co-  (32 

Md.  32)  1008 

u.  So.  Yorkshire  Ry.  Co.   (4  H. 

&N.  67)  1309,1312 

v.  State  (27  N.  J.  L.  552)  347 

Hardenbrook v.  Ligonier  (95  Ind.  70)  485 

Harding  r.  Hale  (61  111.  192)  752,  755 

17.  Bockford,  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  It 

Co.  (65  111.  90)      239,  240,  280, 

564,  647 

v.  Vandewater  (40  Cal.  77)  303 

Hardy  v.  Brooklyn  (91  N.  Y.  435)       1313 

17.  Keene  (52  N.  II.  370)      1252,  1257, 

1262,  1276 

i7.  Merriweather  (14  Ind.  203)        185 

17.  Waltham  (3  Met.  163)  53,217 

Harker  v.  New  York  (17  Wend.  199)    481 

Ilarkins  v.  Sencerbox  (2  Minn.  344)    1070 

Harlem   Gasl.   Co.  v.  New   York  (33 

N.  Y.  309)  543,  546,  1105 

Harlow  v.  Humiston  (0  Cow.  189)      1309, 

1311 


Harman  ,.  Brotherson  (1  Denio,  537)  325 
v.  Lynchburg  (33  Gratt.  37)  1164 
v.  lappenden  (1  East,  555)  syq 

v.  lappenden  (3  Espin.  278)  340 

Harmon  v.  Chicago  (110  III.  400  £2 

v.  Omaha  (17  Neb.  548)       1222  1*43 
Harmony  Tp.  Trs.  v.  Osborne  (9Ind! 

^^   /  °77    oir» 

Harness  »   Cl.es.  &  O  Canal  Co.  (1 
„  Md.  Ch.  248)  (       7m 

Harney  v.  Indianapolis  (32Ind.244)  11 10, 

Harpendi-ng  „.  Haight,  Gov.  (39  Cal.   "" 

Harper  ..Brooklyn   Elev.    R.    Co    ^ 

O.  Reg.  000)  g72 

v.  Elberton  (23  Ga.  586)  ago 

v.  Milwaukee  (30  Wis.  365,  448,  1211 

1253,    1207,    1284,    1306,     1324,' 

Harper's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  9) 
Harpswell^.  Phippsburgh  (29  Me. 

Harrington  ^Berkshire  Co.  Com'rs 
(22  Pick  263) 
v.  Berkshire  Sch.  Dist.  (30  Vt. 

*•  MileMll  Kan.  80)  ^  4%4 

v.  Plain  view  (27  Minn.  224)  618,  1107, 

v.  St    Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.  (17  "^ 

„      .       Minn.  215)  [        M9 

Barns    Re  (52  Ala.  87)      1006,  1009  1023 

'•'•  Atlanta  (62  Ga.  290)  1197 

v.  Baker  (4  M.  &  S.  27)  4[ 

g7-y   Lmngston   (28   Ala. 

&-Mobb8(L.R.3EX.D.268)148'885 

*  Nesbitt  (24  Ala.  398)         %2,  W84 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 
Page 


Hi 


XV 


Page 


991 
322 
712 


1257 

89 
1095 
484 
209 
376 


Newbury  (128  Mass.  321) 
v.  People  (59  N.  Y.  599) 
v.  Schryock  (82  111.  119) 
v.  Wakeman  (Say.  254) 
v.  Watson  (Peake,  72) 
v.  Whitcomb  (4  Gray,  433) 

bounty  v.  Taylor  (58  Tex. 

Harrisburg  v.  Saylor  (87  Pa.  St.  216)'  ^ 

.;.  Sheck  (104  Pa.  St.  53)     ^  ^ 

Harrisburg  &  Pot.  r.  Co.  ».  Moore 

„      .       (4W.N.C.37)  °re    73« 

Harrison  v.  Baltimore  (1  Gill,  264)      151 

i>  -j  218,  219  1201 

v.  Bndgeton  (16  Mass.  16)  '    135  271 

"•Brooks  (20  Ga.  537)      '  '44, 

"•Collins  (86  Pa.  153)         1306,1307 

«.Godman(lBurr.  12)  Sn 

v.  Good  (L.  R.  11  Eq.  C.  338)         447 

v.  Alilvvaukee  (49  Wis.  247)  945  1148 


Harrison  v.  New  Orl.  Pac.  Ry.  Co  (34 

,,  kt   fnA'^  4d2}      833>  834,841,  847 
T<£  k  Ca  Ct  Jus-  (2  Leigh, 

*  Parker  (6  East,  154)  ^ 

R  ^ona.  A-  &  »•  R.  Co.  (77  111. 

v.  State  (9  Mo.  526)  180  ^sf 

"'  m?u?hurg  (U  Miss-  581)    899'  903 
».  Wilhams  (3  B.  &  C.  162)      40  379 
Harrold  v  Simcoe  &  O.  Ry.  Co   (16 
U.C.C.P.43;18U.C.(C 

Harshman^atesCo^V2!'1302 

509;  3  Dillon,  C.  O.  150)     "   675 

v        „  622«  627>  628,  629  630 

v.  Knox  Co.  Ct.  (122  U.S.  306)  1083, 

».  Winterbottom  (123  U.  S  2S)  ^ 
Hart  „.  Albany  (9  Wend.  571)       17/  m 

413,  415,  416,  419,  453,  785   1212 
'"      S6jfleM  Tp>  Trs'  <15  Ind 
»■  Bridgeport  (13  Blatch.  289)      Jg7 
".  Brooklyn  (36  Barb.  226)  810,  1266, 

v.  Burnett  (15  Cal.  580)  12?69  ^J 
v.  Gaven  (12  Cal.  476)  'III 

v.  New  Orleans  (12  Fed.  R.  292)  673 
v.  Red  Cedar  (63  Wis.  634)  '  125? 
v.  Stone  (30  Conn.  94)        '  ^ 

Harter  ».  Kernochan  (103  U.  S.  562)    572, 

Hartford  ,.  Franey  (47  Conn.  76)  °*  801 
v.  Talcott  (48  Conn.  525)     1274   1310 

*     4e6l)Middle  I)iSt>  (45  Conn' 
Hartford  &\  Y.  S.  Co.  „.  New  York  ^ 

Hartford  Bank  r.  Hart  (3  Dav  493)   'S? 
Hartford  Bridge  Co.  ,  East  SrS  ^ 
(16  Conn.  149)  182,  269  270  271 
ads.  East  Hartford  (10 How.  oil) 

I  See  East  Hartford,  &c.l 
W*  U™n  Ferry  Co.  (29  Conn. 

HartfordCo.  Com'rs  v.  Hamilton  (60  189 

Hartford  F  Ins.  Co.  „.  State  (9  Kan.1246 

Hartlepool  Collieries  Co.  v.  Gibb  (L 

R.  5  Ch.  Div.  713)  '    qqc 

Hartley,  &  (3l  L.  J.  M.  C.  232)  |2 

Hartman  i>.  Greenhow  (102  U.  S.  672) 

».  Muscatine  (70  Ind.  511)  ifS 

Hartshorn  «,  Potroff  (89  111.  509)  694 

Hartwell  v.  Littleton  (13  Pick.  229)      371 
Harvard  College  ..  Boston  (104  Mass. 
tt  47i'>  146,  728  917  9^9 

Harvey  ?.  Dewoody  (18  Ark.  252 1      '  451 

v.  OIney  (42  111.  336)  '      if Jj 

».  Bochester  (35  Barb.  177)  118? 

»•  Eush  County  (32  Kan.  159)        511 


lxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Page 
Harward  v.  St.  Clair,  &c.  Levee  Co. 

(61111.180)  122,906,1119 

Harwood  v.  Lowell  (4  Cush.  310)       L253. 

1288 
v.  Marshall  (9  Md  83)         1024,  1074 
v.  Marshall  (10  Md.  451)      1062,  1070 
Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee  (13   Wis. 

37)  122,130 

r.  Milwaukee  (21  Wis.  217)  623,  648, 

644 
r.  Milwaukee  (25  Wis.  122)   118,1028 
Hascard   v.  Somany   (Freem.  K.   B. 

604)  679 

Hasev  v.  White  Pigeon  Sugar  Co.  (1 

Doug.  (Mich.)  190)  502 

Haskell  r.  Burlington  (80  Iowa,  232)   999 

v.  New  Bedford  (108  Mass   208)    170, 

452,  1214,  1330 

v.  New  Gloucester  (70  Me.  305)  1257, 

1299 

v.  Penn  Yan  (5  Lans.  43)     1282,  1311 

Hassen  v.  Rochester  (05  N   Y.  510)      053 

Hastings  v   Columbus  (42  O.  St.  685)  407 

v.  Tliorne  (8  Neb   1G0)  1142 

Hastings's  Case  (1  Mod.  21)  289 

Haswell  v.  New  York  (81  N.  Y.  255)    312 

Hatch  v.  Barr  (1  Ohio,  390)  524 

v.  Buffalo  (38  N.  Y.  27G)       715,  1120 

v.  Mann  (15  Wend.  44)  316 

v.  Pendergast  (15  Md.  251)  459 

Hathaway   v.  Cineinnatus  (02  N.  Y. 

434)  1143 

v.  New  Baltimore  (48  Mich.  251)     99 
Haughey  v.  Hart  (02  Iowa,  9G)  1312 

Hausmeister  v.  Porter  (21  Fed.  R. 

355)  1091 

Havemeyer  v.  Iowa  Co  (3  Wall.  294)250, 

583,  58G 
v.  Mineral  Pt.  Sup.  (22  Wis.  396) 

1068,  1072 

Haven  v.  Asylum  (13  N.  II.  532)  381 

v.  Lowed  (5  Met.  36)  301 

Hawes  v.  Fox  Lake  (33  Wis.  438)       1312 

Hawk  v.  Marion  County  (48  Iowa, 

472)  209 

Hawkes   v.    Kennebec    County    (7 

Mass  401)  1027 

Hawkins  v.  Carroll  County  (50  Miss. 

735)  579 

v.  Conway,  Gov.  (1  Pike  (Ark.), 

570) "  1016 

v.  Huron  Mun.  Council  (2  U.  C. 

C   P  72^  259 

v.  Jonesboro  (03  Ga.  527)  105 

v.  Rochester  (1  Wend.  54)  712 

v.  Sanders  (45  Mich.  491)  449 

v.  Starke  Co.  Com'rs  (14    Ind. 

521)  ini)7,1012 

Hawks  v.  Charlemont  (107  Mass.  414) 

1186 
Hawley  v.  Baltimore  (33  Md  270)        757 
v.  Fayetteville  Com'rs  (82  N.  C. 

•h)  1028 

v.  Harrall  (19  Conn.  142)        695,  810 


Haw  ley's  Case  (1  Vent.  143)  336 

Hawthorne  v.  East  Portland  (13  Or. 

27 1 )  945 

v.  Hoboken  (32  N.  J.  L.  172)  136 

v.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo.  60)  161,  102 

Hay  v.  Alexandria  &  W.  It.  Co.  (20 

Fed.  R.  15)  531 

v.  Cohoes  Co.  (2  N.  Y.  159)  1308,  1324 
Hayden  v.  Atlanta  (70  Ga.  817)     925,  933 
v.  Attleborough  (7  Gray,  838)       761, 
1256,  1257,  1205 
v.  Madison  (7  Me.  79)  541 

v.    Middlesex    Tump.    Co.    (10 

Mass.  897)  322 

v.  Noyes  (5  Conn.  391)    263,  349,  403 
Hayes  v.  Appleton  (24  Wis,  544)    147,  403 
v.  Cambridge  (130  Mass.  402; 

138  Mass.  461)  1251,1260 

v.  Holly  Springs  (114  U.  S.  120)  231, 
635,  037,  648 
v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (Ill  U.  S. 

228)  466,  857 
v.  New  York  (74  N.  Y.  264)        1299, 

1301 

v.  Oshkosh  (33  Wis.  314)  1104,  1198, 

1199,  1205 

Ilayford  v.  Belfast  (69  Me.  G3)  1147 

Haygood  v.  Clark  Co.  Inf.  Ct.  Jus. 

(20  Ga.  845)  1174 

Haynes  v.  Burlington  (38  Vt.  350)  1317 
v.  Cape  May  (50  N.  J.  L.  55)  396,478 
v.  Covington  (21  Miss.  408)  321,  518 
v.  Haynes  (1  1).  &  S.  426)  712 

v.  Municipality  (5  La.  An.  700)       97 
v.  Pac.  Mail.  Stp.  Co.  (17  How. 

598)  965 

v.  Thomas  (7  Ind.  38)     744,  786,  787, 
795,  866 
v.  Washington   County  (19  111. 

66)  281 

Hays  v.  State  (8  Ind.  425)  738 

Hayward  v.  Davidson  (41  Ind.  212)     549, 

658,  670 
v.  Manzer  (70  Cal.  476)  755 

v.  No.  Bridgewater  Sch.  Dist.  (2 

Cush.  419)  346,  541 

Haywood  v.  Savannah  (12  Ga.  404)     142, 

395,  397 
Hayzlett  v.  Mt.  Vernon  (33  Iowa, 

229)  954 
Hazard's  Case  (2  Roll.  11)  307,  336 
Hazen  v.  Essex  County   (12  Cush. 

477)  703,  704 

v.  Strong  (2  Vt.  427)  443 

Iluzlehurst  Rec,  v.  Freeman,  Tr., 

(52  Ga.  245)  851 

Heacock  v.  Sherman  (14  Wend.  68)     882 
Head    v.    Providence    Ins.    Co.    (2 

Cranch,  127)  147,  521,  564 

Healey  v.  Batley  Corp.  (L.  R.  19  Eq. 

375)  741,  1240 

v.  New  Haven  (47  Conn.  305)       1217 
v.  New  Haven  (49  Conn.  394)      1217, 

1224 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


lxxvii 


Health  Dept.  v.  Knoll  (70  N.  Y.  530)    443 
Heard  v.  Brooklyn  (00  N.  Y.  242)        091, 

843 
Heath,  Re  (3  Hill,  42)  282,  285,  509,  1021, 

1025,  1078 
v.  Barmore  (50  N.  Y.  302)  691,  843 
v.  Des  Moines  &  St.  L.  By.  Co. 

(61  Iowa,  11)  846,847,  854 

v.  State  (36  Ala.  273)  1079 

Heazy  v.  Black  (90    nd.  534)  1093 

Hebel  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.  (33  Mich. 

407)  161 

Hebert  v.  Lavalle  (27  111.  448)  771 

Hebrew  Benev.  O.  A.  Soc,  Re  (70 

N.  Y.  476)  956 

Heckel  v.  Sand  ford  (40  N.  J.  L.  180)    257 
Heckerman  v.  Hummel  (19  Pa.  St. 

64)  782,  783,  786 

Hedges  v.  Dam  (72  Cal.  520)  320 

v.  Madison  County  (6  111.  567)      882, 

1169,  1173,  1174,  1245,  1246 

Hedrick  v.  Olathe  (30  Kan.  348)  841 

Heeney  v.  Heeney  (2  Denio,  625)        169, 

170 
v.  Sprague  (11  R.  I.  456)        158,  387, 
1158,  1262,  1274 
Heffner  v.  Commonwealth  (28  Pa.  St. 

108)  1059 

Heidelberg  Sch    Dist.  v.  Horst  (62 

Pa.  St.  301)  525 

Heine  v.  Levee  Com'rs  (19  Wall.  655) 

250,  251,  939,  1000,   1001,   1005, 
1028,  1033,  1040,  1041,  1046,  1050 
Heiple  n.  East  Portland  (13  Or.  97)       806 
Heirs  of  A.  &c.    [See  A's  Heirs,  &c] 
Heise  v.  Columbia  T.  Council  (6  Rich. 

L.  404)  413,  415,  417,  418 

Heisembrittle  v.  Charleston  (2  Mc- 

Mullan,  233)  393,  397,  433 

Heiser  v.  New  York  (104  N.  Y.  68)    1217, 

1220,  1231,  1232 

Heiskell  u.  Baltimore  (65  Md.  125)      146, 

357,  358 
Heland  v.  Lowell  (3  Allen,  407)   386,  387, 

421,  1287 

Helena  v.  Harvey  (6  Mont.  Ter.  114)  706 

v.  Thompson  (29  Ark.  569)  1179, 

1180,    204,1316,  1317 

Hellen  v.  Noe  (3  Ired.  493)  419 

Heller  v.  Sedalia  (53  Mo.  159)  1199 

v.  Stremmel  (52  Mo.  309)  39,  45 

Hemphill  v.  Boston  (8  Cush.  195)        761, 

762 
Hempstead  v.  Des  Moines  (52  Iowa, 

303)  1217,  1224 

v.  Des  Moines  (63  Iowa,  36)  815, 

1225  1229 

Henback  v.  State  (53  Ala.  523)         '    395 

Hendee  v.  Pinkerton  (14  Allen,  381)     274 

Hendershott  v.  Ottumwa  (46  Iowa, 

658)  1225 

Henderson  i\  Baltimore  (8  Md.  352)    940, 

944,  978,  979 

v.  Barnes  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B.  176)      1262 


Page 
Henderson  v.  Covington  (14  Bush, 

312)  149 

v.  Jackson  County  (2  McCrary 

C.  C.  615)  972 

v.  Lambert  (8  Bush,  607)  972 

v.  Lambert  (14  Bush,  24)         918,  992 
v.   Midland    R.    Co.    (24    L.    T. 

(n.  s..)  881)  1229 

v.  Minneapolis  (32  Minn.  319)        814, 

1225,  1320,  1326,  1331 

v.  New  Orleans  (3  La.  563)  292 

Hendersonville  v.  McMinn  (82  N.  C. 

532)  483 

Hendrick   v.  West   Springfield  (107 

Mass.  541)  557 

Hendrick's  Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  358)  1221, 

1243 
Henke  v.  McCord  (55  Iowa,  378)  145 

Henkel  v.  Detroit  (49  Mich.  249)  446, 

811,  1157 
Henker  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (71  Wis.  616)  1312 
Henley  v.  Lyme  Regis    (2  CI.  &  F. 

331)  1205,  1208,  1280 

Hennen,  Re  (13  Pet.  230)  319,  333 

Hennepin  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Dayton  (17 

Minn.  260)  764 

Henry  v.  Atkinson  (50  Mo.  266)  679 

v.  Chester  (15  Vt.  460)  940 

v.  Dubuque  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  (10 

Iowa,  540)  716 

v.  Pittsburg  &  A.  Br.  Co.  (8  W. 

&  S.  85)  833,  1220 

v.  State  (98  Ind.  81)  323 

v.  Thomas  (119  Mass.  583)  979 

Henshaw  v.  Hunting  (1  Gray,  203)      748, 

801 
Hensoldt  v.  Petersburg  (63  111.  Ill)  482 
Hentig  v.  Gilmore  (33  Kan.  234)  987 

Hentz  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  (13  Barb. 

646)  781,  857 

Hepburn  v.  Griswold  (8  Wall.  603)       195 
Heppe  v.  Johnson  (73  Cal  265)  301 

Herbert  v.  Benson  (2  La.  An.  770)      782, 

783,  788 
Herhold  v.  Chicago  (108  111.  467)  755 

Hering  v.  Scott  (107  111.  600)  796 

Heriot's  Hospt.  Feoffees  v.  Ross  (12 

CI.  &  F.  507)  1201 

Herman  v.  Crete  (9  Neb   350)  1142 

Heme  v.  Garton  (2  E.  &  E.  66)  504 

Herrings.  Dist.  Columbia  (2  Mackey, 

87)  1327 

v.  Dist.   Columbia   (3   Mackey, 

572)  1322 

Herrington  ».  Lansingburg  (HON.  Y. 

145)  1305,  1306,  1307,  1308 

Herschberger  v.  Pittsburgh  (115  Pa. 

St.  78)  1001 

Hersey  v.  Milw.  Co.  Sup.  (16  Wis. 

185)  953 

Hershoff  v.  Beverly  (45  N.  J.  L.  288)  487, 

497 

Herzo  v.  San  Francisco  (33  Cal.  134)  402, 

533,  676,  1143 


lxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

B  m  r.  Braddock  (3  Burr.  1847)    478, 

184,  190,  498 
Heslep  w.  Sacramento  (2  Cal.  5»0)  316 
II,..,  ,..  Pegg  (7  Nev.  'J-'!)  666 

Hester'a  Case  (2  W.  &  S    U6)  1030 

Heth  v.  1m. ml  .lu  Lac  (03  Wis.  228)     1322 
Lieis  (  10  Cal.  255)   945,984,  985 
Hewison  v.  New   Haven  (84   Conn. 

186)  1255,  1256,  1270,  1276 

v.  New  Haven  (37  Conn.  475)      1195, 

1253 
Hewitt  /-.  Normal  Sen.  Dist  (94  111. 

528)  564 

Hewitt's  A]. peal  (88  Pa.  St.  66)  972 

Hexamer  v.  Webb  (KH  X.  V.  377)       785 
Hey  v.  Philadelphia  (81  Pa  44)         1258, 
1259,  1'278,  1281 
Heyneman  v.  Blake   (19  Cal.   67'.)) 

706,  726 

Heyward  v.  New  York  (8  Barb.  48G)  821 

v.  New  York  (7  N.  Y.  314)    659,  662, 

690,  691 

Heywood  v.  Buffalo  (14  N  Y.  534)     1092, 

1107.  1120,  1122,  1127 

Hibbard  o.  People  (4  .Mich   126)  451 

Hickerson  v.  Mexico  (58  Mo.  61)         753, 

1187 

Hickman  v.  O'Neal  (10  Cal.  294)  493 

Hickok  r.  Plattsburg  (15  Barb  427)     159 

v.  Plattsburg  (10  N.  Y.  101)        1204, 

1295 

Iliekox  v.  Cleveland  (8  Ohio,  543)       1226 

Hicks  v.  Dora  (12  N.  Y.  47)  1215 

v.  Launcelot  (1  Rol.  Abr.  513)       304 

Hiestand  v.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An. 

330)  315 

Higbee  v.  Camden  &  A.  R.  &  Transp. 

Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  435)  786 

Higert  v.  Greencastle  ( 13  Iml.  574)    1272, 

1275,  1281,  1286,  1205,  1300 

Higgins  v.  Chicago  (18  111.  276)    710,  711, 

712,  714,  719,  1001 

v.  Livingstone  (4  Dow,  341)  324 

v.  Midland  Co.  Sup.   (52  Mich. 

16)  1011 

v.  Princeton  (4  Halst.  Ch.  300)       458 

Higginson  v.  Nahant  (11  Allen,  530)    702, 

1253 
High  v.  Shoemaker  (22  Cal.  363)  924 

Highland  Tump.  Co.  v.  McKean  (10 

Johns.  154)  139,880,881 

Hight   v.    Monroe    Co.   Com'rs    (68 

Ind.  575)  549,553 

Hightower  v.  Slaton  (54  Ga.  108)         161 
Highway    Com'rs,  &c.     [See    Com- 
missioners of  Highways,  &c.] 
Higley    v.   Bunce   (10    Conn.   567) 

407,  408 
Hilbish  v.  Catherman  (64  Pa.  St.  154)  224, 

895 
Hildreth  v.  Lowell  (11  Gray,  345)        699, 
985,  0S8.  1187,  1188,  1214 
Hildreth's   Heirs   v.    Mclntire's    De- 
vi-,- (1  J.  J.  Marsh.  206)        356 


Hill  v.  Boston  (122  Mass.  344)         24,  46, 

47,  48,  60,  108,  217,  1027,  1171, 

1172,  1 176,  117,  1178,  1187,  1195, 

1199,  1207,  1209,  121  i,  L213,  1214, 

1227,  1240, 1246,  1261,  1252,  1268, 

1289,  1294 

v.  Charlotte  (72  N.  C.  55)     1157,  1167 

v.  Chicago,   St.  L.  &  N.  O.  R. 

Co.  (38  La    An.  699)  834 

v.  Dalton  (72  Ga.  314)  492,  500 

v.  Decatur  Com'rs  (22  Ga.  203)      87, 

385,  431 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (56  Wis.  242)      1260, 

1273 
v.  Forsythe   County   (67  N.  C. 

367)  226 

v.  Higdon  (5  O.  St.  243)  86,  908,  920, 

'.'.-,7 
v.  Kahoka  (35  Fed.  R.  32)  252 

v.  La   Crosse  &  M.  R.  Co.  (11 

Wis.  214)  969 

v.  Livingston  Co.  Sup.  (12N.Y. 

52)  881,  882 

v.  St.  Louis  (59  Mo.  412)  1219 

v.  Scotland  County  (32  Fed.  R. 

716)  1045 

v.  State  (4  Sneed,  443)         1134,  1135 

Ililliard  r.  Richardson  (3  Gray, 340)  1196, 

1305,  1306,  1307 

Hilsdorf  v.  St.  Louis  (45  Mo.  94)         1 196 

Himmelmann  v.  Byrne  (41  Cal.  500)    991 

v.  Cofran  (36  Cal.  411)  991,  994,  1011 

v.  Danos  (35  Cal.  441)  945 

v.  Hoadley  (44  Cal.  213)  813 

v.  Oliver  (34  Cal.  246)  945,  984 

p.  Spanagel  (39  Cal.  389)      901,  1001 

Hinchman  v.  Detroit  (9  Mich.  103)       794 

v.  Paterson  Horse  It.  Co.  (17  N. 

J.  Eq.  75)  787,  841,  850,  855,  860, 
863,  868,  869,  879 
Hinckley   v.    Somerset    (145   Mass. 

326)  1297 

Ilincks  r.  Milwaukee  (46  Wis.  559)    1304 
Hinde  v.  Wabash  Nav.  Co.  (15  111. 

73)  1195 

Hinds  r.  Hinds  (1  Iowa,  36)  278 

Hine  v.  Keokuk  &  1).  M.  R.  Co.  (42 

Iowa,  036)  833,  834 

v.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  478)         474 

Hines  v.  Charlotte  (40  N.  W.  R.  333)    475 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (71  Wis.  74)         1312 

v.  Leavenworth  (3  Kan.  186)  925, 

933,  993 

v.  Lockport  (41  How.  Pr.  435)       976 

v.  Lockport  (5  Laos.  17)  1281 

r.  Lockport  (50  N.  Y.  236)  1282,  1332 

Ilinson  v.  Lott  (8  Wall.  151)  902 

Hinton  v.  Lindsay  (20  Ga.  746)  305 

Hipperholm  Cons.,  Re  (5  I).  &  L  700)  1130. 

Hitchcock    v.    Galveston    (06   U.   S. 

341)    156,  196,  200,  516,  520,  531, 

958,  981,  988 

Hitchins  v.  Frostburg  (68  Md.  100)    1322, 

1335 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


lxxix 


Hite  v.  Goodman  (1D.&B.  Eq.  3G4)  323 
Hixon  v.  Lowell  (13  Gray,  59)  1252,  1253, 
1254,  1255,  125G,  1257, 1276,  1277 
Hoadley   v.  San  Francisco  (50  Cal. 

2(55)  659 

Hoadley's    Adm.   v.    San  Francisco 

(124  U.  S.  639)  671 

Hoagr.  Durfey  (1  Aiken,  280)  271 

v.  Lake   Shore  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 

(85  Pa.  St.  293)  1262 

v.  Lamont  (60  N  Y.  96)  509 

Hoagland   v.   Sacramento    (52   Cal. 

142)  131 

Hoard  v.  Des  Moines  (G2  Iowa,  326)  1323 
Hobart  v.  Butte  Co.   Sup.  (17  Cal. 

23)  78 

v.  Detroit  (7  Mich.  246)  1105 

v.  Detroit  (17  Mich.  246)        544,  545 

v.  Milwaukee  (27  Wis.  194)    863,  868 

Hobhs  v.  Lowell  (19  Pick.  415)  760 

o.  Yonkers  (102  N.  Y.  13)       313,  317 

Hoblyn  v.  Regem  (6  Bro.  P.  C.  520)      353 

Hoboken  v.  Bailey  (37  N.  J.  L.  519)      182 

v.  Gear  (27  N.  J.  L.  265)       314,  318, 

329,  334,  407,  409 

v.  Pa.  R.  Co.  (124  U.  S.  650)  169, 170, 

171,  172,  741,  748,  749 

Hoboken  Land  &  I.  Co.  v.  Harrison 

(30  N.  J.  L.  73)  290,  300 

v.  Hoboken  (36  N.  J.  L.  540)        171, 

'     172,  741,  749,  788,  795 

Hobson  v.  Monteith  (15  Or.  251)  757 

Hodgdon  v.  Lincoln  Co.  Com'rs  (68 

Me  226)  1126 

Hodges  v.  Bait.  Union  Pass.  Ry.  Co. 

(53  Md.  603)  863,  868 

v.  Buffalo  (2  Denio,  110)      147,  210, 

222,  518,  519,  529,  533,  539,  540, 

542,567,  1110 

v.  Nashville  (2  Humph.  61)  428 

v.  Schuler  (22  N.  Y.  114)  565 

Hodgman  v.  Chicago  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (20  Minn.  48)  1116 

Hodgson  v.  Dexter  (1  Cranch,  345)  323 
Hoehl  v.  Muscatine  (57  Iowa,  444)  1317 
Hoff  v.  Jasper  County  (110  U.  S.  53)  633 
Hoffman  v.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L. 

172)  290, 406 

v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  651)      814,  1223 
v.  Van  Nostrand  (42  Barb.  174)     257 
Hogan  v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (71  Cal. 

83)  841 

Hogencamp  v.  Paterson  H.  Ry.  Co. 

(17  N.J.  Eq.  83)  855 

Hogg  v.  Ward  (3  II.  &  N.  417)  295 

Hold  v.  Westford  (33  Wis.  324)  1009 

Hoke  v.  Henderson  (4  Dev.  1)       311,  317 
v.  Perdue  (62  Cal.  545)  91 

Holberg  v.  Macon  (55  Miss.  112)      910, 

1126 
Holborn  Union  Guard,  v.  Vestry  of 
St.  Leonard's   (L.   R.  2   Q. 
B.  D.  145)  216 

Holbrook  v.  Dickinson  (46  111.  285)     1000 


Holdane  v.  Cold  Springs  Trs.  (21  N. 

Y.  474)  745 

Holds  worth  v.  Dartmouth  (11  A.  & 

E.  490)  221,  274 

Holl  v.  Manchester  (40  N.  H.  410)      1257 
Ilolladay  v.  Frisbie  (15  Cal.  631)  659,671, 

673 

v.  March  (3  Wend.  142)  422 

Holland  v.  Baltimore  (11   Md.  186)     144, 

151,  '.US,  979,  980,  1122 

v.  San  Francisco  (7  Cal.  361 )  135 

Holland's  Case  (11  Md.  186)      1099,  1117 

Hollenbeck     v.     Marshalltown     (62 

Iowa,  21)  500 

v.   Winnebago  County  (95  111. 

148)  1172,  1173,  1174 

Holliday  v.  People  (10  111.  216)  94,  99 

v.  St.  Leonard's   Par.   (11  C.  B. 

(n.  s.)  192)  1331 

Hollingsworth  v  Detroit  (3  McLean, 

472)  569 

v.  Tensas  Par.  (17  Fed.  R.  109)     212, 

719 

Hollister  v.  Union  Co.  (9  Conn.  436)   1224 

Hollwedell,  Re  (74  Mo.  395)  499 

Holman,  Be  (28  Iowa,  88)  1032,  1045 

v.  Townsend  (13  Met.  297)  1263 

Holmes  v.  Finklenburg  (54  111.  203)      492 

v.  Jersey  City  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  299)  722, 

7li0,  918,  1092,  1097,  1126,  1129 

v.  Mattoon  (111  111.  37)  552 

v.  Paris  (75  Me.  559)  1297 

r.  Khreveport  (31  Fed.  R.  113)        193 

v.  Wilson  (10  A.  &  E.  503)  447 

Holroyd  v.  Pumphrey  (18  How.  69)  1000 

Hoist  v.  Streitz  (16  Neb.  249)  759 

Holt  v.  Somerville  (127  Mass.  408)        691 

Home  v.  Earl  Camden  (2  H.  Bl.  533)  1132 

v.  Rouse  (8  Wall.  430)  157 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Augusta  C.  Council 

(93  U.  S. 116)  104,  105 

Homersham  v.  Wolverhampton   W. 

W.  Co.  (4  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  426)  521 
Hood  v.  Lynn  (1  Allen,  103)  150,  222 

Hooker  v.  New  Haven  &  N.  Co.  (14 

Conn.  146)  814,  1224 

Hooksett  v.  Amoskeag  Manuf.  Co. 

(44  N.  H.  105)  810,  883 

Hoole  v.  Attorney-General  (22  Ala. 

190)  454,  750,  755 

Hooper  v.  Bridgewater  (102  Mass. 

512)  1130 

v.  Ely  (46  Mo.  505)  1109 

?;.  Emery  (14  Me  375)  53 

Hope  v.  Deaderick  (8  Humph.  1)  898 

Hopkins  v.  Mason  (61  Barb.  469)  986 

v.  Mehaffy  (11  S.  &  R.  126)  524 

v.  Rush  River  (70  Wis.  10)  1285 

v.  Swansea  (4  M.  &  W.  621)  386,  387 

v.  Whitesides  (1  Head,  31)  254 

Hopkinson  v.  Marquis  of  Exeter  (L. 

R.  5  Eq.  63)  327 

Hopkinton  r.  Springfield  (12  N.  H. 

328)  322 


Ixxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Hopper  v.  Covington  (8  Fed.  R.  777)  187, 

6tK5 

v.  Covington  (118  D.  S.  1  i8)  676 

Horn  v.  Baltimore  (30  Md.  218)    518,  519, 

1187 
v.  Dea  Moines  (03  Iowa,  447)  1199 
v.  New  Lots  (83  N.  Y.  100)  893,  1147 
v.  People  (23  Midi.  221)  174,  17(5 
r.  Whittier  (6  N.  H.  88)  300 

Ilornback   v.   Cine.  &  Z   R.  Co.  (20 

i).  St.  81)  673 

Hornbeck  v.  Westbrook  (9  Johns.  73)  055, 

668 
Ilornblower  v.  Dunden  (35  Cal.  014)  553 
Horner  v.  Coffey  (25  Miss.  434)  074,  1031 
Homey  o.  Sloan  (1  Smith,  130)  422 

Hornstein  v.  Atl.  &  Gt.  \V.  R.  Co. 

(51  Pa.  St.  87)  733,  1234 

Horst  v.  Moses  (48  Ala.  129)  824 

Horton  n   Bristol  (4  Lea,  39)  1157 

v.  Grand  Haven  (24  Mich.  405)      727 

v.  Ipswich  (12  Cush  488)  1261,  1263, 

1286,  1300 

v.  Mobile  Sch.  Com'rs  (43  Ala. 

698)  86 

v.  Nashville  (4  Lea,  47)  1327 

v  Taunton  (97  Mass.  266)  1270 

v.  Thompson  (71  N.  Y  513)  220,  540, 

050,  1011 

Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Williamson 

(45  Ark.  429)  1224,  1239 

Hotchin  v.  Kent  (8  Mich.  526)  542 

Hotchkiss   v.   Nat.  Banks  (21   Wall. 

354)  581 

Houck  v.  Whitney  (14  Grant,  671)       538 
Houfe  v.  Fulton  (29  Wis.  290)    790,  1258, 

1278 
v.  Fulton  (34  Wis.  608)  882,  1207 

Hough  c.  Cook  County  Land  Co.  (73 

111.  23)  071 

Houghton    v.  Davenport   (23   Pick. 

235)  347 

Houghton's  Case  (Sir  R.  T.  Boyd, 

215)  447 

Hounsel    v.    Smyth    (7    C.  B.  n.   s. 

729)  1312 

House  v.  Greensburg  (93  Ind.  533),      138, 

796 
v.  Montgomery  Co.  Com'rs  (60 

Ind.  580)  1173,  1249,  1274 

Householder  v.  Kansas  City  (83  Mo. 

488)  1224,  1243 

Houseman   v.   Commonwealth    (100 

Pa.  St.  222)  328 

Houston   v.   Clay   County   (18   Ind. 

396)  323 

v.  Isaaka  (08  Tex.  116)        1297,  1300 
Houston  &  Tex.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Odum 

(53  Tex.  343)  841,851 

Hovelman  v.  Kansas  City  II.  R.  Co. 

(79  Mo.  632)  847,849 

Hover  v.  Barkhoof  (44  N.  Y.  113)  325 

Hovey  v.  Mayo  (43  Me   322)         152,  814, 

815,  817,  819,  1223,  1231 


Page 
Howard  v.  First  Indep.  Ch.  (18  Md 

451)  5;;;;,  722,  919 

v.  Gage  (6  Mass.  462;  1024,  1088 

v.   No.     Bridgewater    (16    Pick. 

189)  1134,  1255,  1250,  1203,  1265, 

1266 

r.  Providence  (0  R.  I.  514) 

v.  Rogers  (4  liar.  &  J.  278) 

v.  San  Francisco  (51  Cal.  52) 


731 

758 

1104, 

1198 

397 
281 


v.  Savannah  (T.  Charlt.  173) 
v.  Shields  (1GO.  St.  184) 
v.  Shoemaker  (35  Ind.  Ill)    291,  292, 

494 
Howard's  Case  (Hutton,  87)  242 

Howard  Co.  Comr's  v.  Legg  (93  Ind. 

623)  881,1249 

Howard    County   v.   Paddock   (110 

U.  S.  384)  631 

Howe,  Re  (1  Faige,  214)  668 

v.  Boston  (7  Cush.  273)  1147 

v.  Crawford  Co.  Com'rs  (47  Pa. 

St  361)  1017 

v.  Freeman  (14  Gray,  566)  969 

v.  Keeler  (27  Conn.  538)  539 

v.  Lowell  (101  Mass.  99)      1297,  1302 
v.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An.  481)  108, 
1159,  1167,  1277,  1309,  1312 
v.  Norris  (12  Allen,  82)  403 

v  Plainfield  (41  N.  H.  135)  1257,  1S01 
v.  Plainfield  Treas.  (37  N.  J.  L. 

145)  78,  437,  494,  500 

Howell  v.  Bristol  (8  Bush,  493)     722,  913, 

918 

v.  Buffalo  (15  N.  Y.  512)       940,  1146, 

1183,  1187,  1190,  1191 

v.  Buffalo  (37  N.  Y.  207)        913,  993, 

994 
v.  Commonwealth   (97  Pa.  St 

332) 
v.  Peoria  (90  III.  104) 
v.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St.  471) 
v.  State  (3  Gill,  14) 
Howerton  v.  Tate  (66  N.  C.  231) 
Howes  v.  Racine   (21    Wis.  514) 


208 
1113 
1000 

'.•CO 
1023 
1110, 
1122 

310 
1312 


Ilowland  v.  Luce  (16  Johns.  135) 

v.  Vincent  (10  Met.  371) 
Hoxie  v.  Somerset  Co.  Com'rs  (25 

Me.  333) 
Hoyle  v.  N.  O.  City  R.  Co.  (23  La. 
An.  535) 
v.  Plattsburgh  &  M.  R.  Co.  (54 
N.  Y.  314) 
Hoyt,  Re  (13  Pet.  279) 

v.  Braden  (27  Minn.  490) 

v.  East  Saginaw  (19  Mich.  39) 

914,917,919,921,933,  990 
v.  Hudson  (27  Wis.  056)     1316,  1320, 
1323  1324 
v.  N.  Y.  Tax  Com'rs  (23  N.  Y.' 

228)  964,  965 

v.  Thompson's   Ex.   (19  N.   Y. 

207)  539 


1056 

846 

969 

1006 

644 

395, 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


lxxxl 


Page 

Hubbard  t>.  Concord  (35  N.  II.  52)      12-7, 
1261,  1266,1269,  L272,  1273,  1296, 
1302 
v.  Fayette  (70  Me.  121)  1286 

v.  Lyndon  (28  Wis.  674)  562 

v.  Mason  (60  Iowa,  400)  1287 

v.  St.  Joseph  &  C.  B.  R.  Co.  (63 

Mo.  68)  673 

v.  Winsor  (15  Mich.  146)  350 

Hubbell  v.  Viroqua  (67  Wis.  343)       1100, 

1271 
v.   Waterloo    (U.   S.   C.   C.   E. 

Wis.)  1046 

v.  Yonkers  (104  N.  Y.  434)  1259 

Huber  v.  Gazley  (18  Ohio,  18)       757,  763, 

787 
Hubert  v.  People  (49  N.  Y.  132)  88 

Huddleson  v.  Huffin  (6  O.  St.  604)  406,  420 
v.  West  Belleview  (111  Pa.  St. 

110)  1322 

Hndmon  v.  Slaughter  (70  Ala.  540)    1014 

Hudson  v.  Geary  (4  R.  I.  485)        408,  470 

v.  Hoboken  (41  N.  J.  L.  71)  425 

v.  Marietta  (64  Ga.  286)  203 

v.  Thome  (7  Paige,  261)        400,  404, 

450,  472,  473, 474 

Hudson  C.  Council  v.  Whitney  (53 

Mich.  158)  1007 

Hudson    Co.   Freeh,     v.   State    (24 

N.  J.  L.  716)         77,  78,  363,  364, 
*  305,  985 

Hudson    Countv    Land,    &c.    Co.    v. 

Seymour  (35  N.  J.  L.  47)     102, 
107 
Hudson  River  Br.   Co.  v.  Patterson 

(74  N.  Y.  365)  966 

Hudson  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City 

(49  N.  J.  L.  303)  830 

Huesing  w.  Rock  Island  (128  111.  465)    3t»3 

Huff  v.  Knapp  (5  N.  Y.  65)  1044 

v.  Lafayette  (108  Ind.  14)  208 

v.  Powesbiek  County  (60  Iowa, 

520)  1281 

Huffman  v.  Greenwood  Co.  Com'rs 

(23  Kan.  281)  316 

v.  San  Joaquin  County  (21  Cal. 

426)  882,  1167,  1245,  1294 

Hugg  v.  Camden  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  6)  553 

v.  Camden  (39  N.  J.  L.  620)         1012, 

1071 

Hughes  v.  Cairo  (92  III.  339)  •  905 

v.  Kline  (30  Pa.  St.  227)  1120 

v.  Parker  (20  N.  H.  58)  289,  352 

v.  Prov.  &  Wore.  R.  Co.  (2  R.  I. 

493)  780,  852 

v.  Sch.  Dist.  No.  29  (72  Mo.  643)  272 
Huidekoper  v.  Dallas  County  (3  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  171)  631 
Hull  v.  Kansas  City  (54  Mo.  601)        1278 
v.  Marshall    County   (12   Iowa, 

142)  563 

v.  Oneida  Co.   Sup.   (19  Johns. 

259)  1014,  1017 

v.  Richmond  (2  W.  &  M.  337)       1255 

VOL.  I. — / 


Page 
Hullin  v.  Municipality  (11  Rob.  97)     711, 

713 
Hullman  v.  Honeomp  (5  O.  St.  237)     352, 

1U22 
Humboldt  City  v.  McCoy  (23  Kan. 

249)  84 

Humboldt  'I  p.  v.  Long  (02  U.  S.  642)  5!  I , 

582,  51)3,  599,  604 

Hume  v.  New  York  (47  N.  Y.  639)     1296, 

1298,  1299 
v.  New  York  (74  N.  Y.  264)         1274. 

1276 
Humes  v.  Knoxville  (1  Humph.  403)    814, 

1223 
Hummel  v.  Brown  (24  Pa.  St  311)  570 
Hummer  v.  Hummer  (3  Greene  (la.) 

42)  285,  509,  1078 

Humphrey,  Re  (10  Wend.  612)  362 

v.  Mears  (1  M.  &  R.  187)  324 

Humphreys    v.   Armstrong   County 

(56  Pa.  St.  204)      881,  1285,  1300 
Hundlev  v.  Lincoln  Park  Com'rs  (67 

"  111.  559)  '.)27 

Hnneman  v.  Fire  District  (37  Vt.  40)   216 
Hunnewell    v.     Boston    (106   Mass. 

35  ')  1124 

Hunnewinkle     v.    Georgetown    (15 

Wall.  547)  1107 

Hunt  v.   Ambruster   (17  N.  J.   Eq. 

208)  223,  224 

v.  Boonville  (65  Mo.  620)     957,  1187, 
1188,  1189,  1100,  1224,  1287 
v.  Chicago  (98  111.  147)  759,849 

v.  Lambertville  (4  N.  J.  L.  279)      384 
v.  New  York  (109  N.  Y.  134)       1278, 

1283 
v.  Norwich  Sch.   Dist.   (14  Vt. 

300)  347,  348,  349 

v.  Philadelphia  (35  Pa.  St.  277)     429 
v.  Pownal  (9  Vt.  418)        1263,  1264, 

1278 
v.  Rousmaniere's  Adm.  (1  Pet. 

15;  8  Wheat.  174)         1152,1153 

v.  Salem  (121  Mass.  294)  1253 

v.  Utica  (18  N.  Y.  442)  556,  707 

Hunter  v.  Chandler  (45  Mo.  452)         319, 

1088,  1089 
v.  Field  (20  Ohio,  340)  321 

v.  Middleton  (13  111.  50)  792 

v.  Newport  (5  R.  I.  325)  705 

v.  Sandy  Hill  Trs.  (0  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

407)    738,  739,  743,  755,  767,  791 
v.  Winsor  (24  Vt.  327)  1203 

Huntington  v.  Breen  (77  Ind.  29)        1298 
Huntington   Co.  Com'rs  v.  Boyle  (9 

Ind.  296)  534 

Huntley  v.  Luscombe  (2  B.  &  P.  530)  503 
Hunrsville  v.  Phelps  (27  Ala.  55)  414 

Hurber  v.  Baugh  (43  Iowa,  514)  417 

Hurford  v.  Omaha  (4  Neb.  336)    146,  158, 
521,  898,  925.  945,  957,  1232 
Hurlburt  v.  Litchfield  (1  Hoot,  520)    1202 
Hurley  v.  Miss.  &  R    R.   Room   Co. 

(34  Minn.  143)  738,  739,  757,  759 


Lxxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Page 

Huron  D.    Council  v.  London  Dist. 

C[.  (I  U.  C.  Q    B.  302)  1139 

Hussen  v.  Rochester  (65  N.  Y.  616)      722 
II n-i < ui   r.  Fort    Atkinson   (56    Wis. 

350)  819 

Hutchings  r.  Scott  (4  Halst.  218)  493,507 
Hutchins  v.  Littleton  (124  Mass.  289) 

1302 
Hutchinson  v.   Parkersburg  (25  W. 

Va.  226)  81  1.  1224,  1245 

v.  Pratt  (11   Vt.  402)       370,  371,  377, 
705,  766 
v.  Trenton   Bd.  of  II.   (39   N.J. 

Eq.  569)  398 

Hutson  v.  New  York  (9  X.  Y.  163)     1274, 

1280,  12D5,  1298 

Hutton  v.  Camden  (39  X.  J.  L.  122)     443 

v.  Windsor  (34  U.  C.  Q.  B.487)  1255, 

1265,  1266,  1300 

Huydekoper  v.  Buchanan  County  (3 

Dillon  ('.('.  175)  694 

v.  Dallas  Count v  (3  Dillon  C.  C. 

171)  631 

Hyatt  w.RondoutTrs.  (44  Barb.  385)  1267 

Hyde,  /'.'<  (15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  477)  993 

v.  Franklin  County  (27  Vt.  185) 

v.  Jamaica  (27  Vt.  442)  760,  1252, 

ij  •  : 
Hyde  Park  v.  Bordon  (94  111.  26)        795, 

942,  1123 
v.  Chicago  (124  111.  156)  1092,  1096 
r.  Dunham  (85  III.  569)  735 

r.  [ngalls  (87  111.11)  1124 

v.  Oakwoods  Cem.  Assoc.  (119 

111.  Ill)  705 

v.  Spencer  (118111.446)  982 

r.  Washington  Ice  Co.  (117  111 

233)    '  735 

Hydes  v.  Joyes  (i  Bush,  464)        154,  958 
Hymes  v.  Aydelott  (20  Ind.  431)  726 


Idaho  Springs  v.  Filteau  (10  Col.  105) 

1184,  1186 
v.  Woodward  (10  Col.  104)  1184, 

1186 
Illinois  r.  111.  Cent.  R  Co.  (33  Fed. 

R.  730)         88,  170,  171.  1T.\  177. 
748,  750 
Illinois  &  Mich.  Canal  Trs.  v.  Chi- 
cago (12  111.  403)  706 
v.  Havens  (11   111.  554)            743,  792 
>■.  People  (12  111.  248)                    1056 
Illinois  &  St.   L.   R.  &  C.  Co   v.  St. 

Louis  (2  Dillon  C  C.  70)        157. 
165,  168,  175 
Illinois  Cont.  1!.  Co.  '•   Bloomington 

(70  111.  117)  866 

i    C.  B.  &  N    R    Co    (122  111.  17 
ilena  i  10  IM   344) 
Ulinois  Ins.  Co.  v.  Littlefield  (67  III. 

368)  747.  752,  755,  7G0 


Illinois    State    IIosp.    for    Insane   r. 

Higgins  [15  111.  is;,)       262,  1030 
Haley  v.  Stubbs  (5  .Mass.  283)  223 

v.  Imberry  (17  Ind.  175)         375,  :;77 
Inilav  v.  Union   IJ.  R.  Co.  (20  Conn. 

868 
Imler  v.  Springfield  (55  Mo.  119)         814, 
122:;,  1316,1320,  1324,  1331,  1332 
Imperial  Land  Co.  of  Marseilles,  /,'. 

(L.  R.  11   Eq.  478)  594 

Inchbald  v.   Robinson  (L.  R.  4  Ch. 

A p.  388)  448 

Independence  v.  Moore  (32  Mo.  392)  437, 

471 
Independent  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Burlinijton 

(60  Iowa,  500)  398 

Indiana  v.  Woram  (6  Hill,  33)  55 

Indiana    Cent.    R.  Co.  v.   Hunter  (8 

Ind.  74)  72n,733 

p.  Oakes  (20  Ind  9)  718 

Indianapolis  v.  Blythe  (2  Ind.  75)  1 10 

v.  Cook  (99  Ind.  10)  1273 

v.  Croas  (7  Ind.  9)  744,  753,  787,  788, 
795,  806 
v.  Doherty  (71  Ind.  5)  1258 

v.  Emmelman  (108  Ind.  530)        1259 
v.  Geisel  ( 19  Ind.  344)  336 

r.  Huegle  (18  X.  E.  R.  172)  435 

v.  Huffer  (30  Ind.  235)  1327 

v.  Imberry   (17   Ind.   175)     375,  377, 

945 
r.  Indianapolis  Gasl.  &   C    Co. 

(66  Ind.  396)      II",  111,  147,  154, 
157,  219,  25M,  386,  393,  512,  513, 
218,  549,  550,  823,  S24,  826 
v.  Indianapolis  Home  for  F.  W. 

(50  Ind.  213)  105 

v.  Kingsbury  (101  Ind.  200)  605,  7  hi, 
761,  759 
v.  Lawyer  (38  Ind.  348)  957,  1317 
r.  McAvov  (86  Ind.  587)  263,  1146 
v.  McClure  (2  Ind.  117)  882 

v.  Mansur  (15  Ind.  112)  921,982 

v.  Murphy  (91  Ind  382)  1297 

v.  Patterson  (112  Ind.  344)  750 

v.  Wright  (19  Ind.  346)  336 

r.  Scott  (72  Ind.  196)  1297 

v.  Skeen  (17  Ind.  628)  523 

Indianapolis  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Indian- 
apolis (12  Ind.  020)        674,  752, 
767,  770 
Indianapolis  &  Cine.  R.  Co.  v.  Law- 

renceburg  (34  Ind.  304)  849,852, 
1135 
r.  State  (37  Ind.  489)  1007,  1008, 

1018,  1315 
Indianapolis    St.    L.   R.    Co.   v.   Cal- 
vert (110  Ind.  555)  850 
Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart- 
ley (07  HI   439)        777,833,  841/ 
842,  843,  854,  850,  1241,  1316 
v.  Smith  (52  Ind.  428)                    1315 
Indianapolis  C.  Council  v.  McLean  (8 

Ind.  328)  952 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


Tage 
Indianapolis,  P,  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hood 

(W  Ind.  580)  G72 

v.  Ross  (  17  Ind.  25)  801,  955 

Indianapolis  Water,  v.  Burkhart  (41 

Ind.  364)  692,706 

Indianola  v.  Jones  (29  Iowa,  282)        367, 

368,  523 
Industrial  School  &c.  (45  Md  310). 

|  See  St.  Mary's,  &c  | 
Industrial    Sch.   Dist.  v.  Whitehead 

(13  N.  J.  Eq.  290)  142 

Ingle  v  Jones  (43  Iowa,  286)  138 

Inglis  v.  Gt.  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (16  E. 

L.  &  Eq.  55)  370,  408 

v.  Hughes  (61  Ind.  212)  43 

!7.  State  (61  Ind.  212)  323 

Ingraham,  Re  (64  N.  Y.  310)  986 

v.  Chicago,  D.  &  M.  R.  Co.  (34 

Iowa,  219)  841,848 

Ingram  v    St.   Tammany   Par.    Pol. 

Jury  (20  La.  An.  226)  801 

Inhabitants  of  Congressional  Tp.,  11, 
&c.  (9  Ind.  224).     [See  Con- 
gressional Tp.,  &c.j 
Inhabitants  of  Ipswich,  Pet.  (13  Pick. 

431).     |  See  Ipswich,  &c] 
Inman  v.  Tripp  (11  11.  I.  520)    1222,  1318, 

1321 
Innes  v  Wylie  (1  Car.  &  K.  257)  336,  338 
Insane   Hospital,    &c.   (15   111.   185). 

[See  Illinois  State  Hosp.,  &c] 
Intendant,  &c.  (6  Ala.  899).    [See 
Marion  Council,  &c] 
(31    Ala.    542.)      [See   Living- 
ston Council,  &c] 
Iowa  City  r.  Foster  (10  Iowa,  189)        314 
Iowa  College  Trs.  v.   Davenport  (7 

Iowa,  213)  716 

Iowa  R.  Land  Co.  v.  Sac  County  (39 

Iowa,  124)  1042 

Ipswich,  Pet.  (13  Pick.  431)  264 

Ipswich   Mills  v.  Essex  Co.  Com'rs 

(108  Mass.  363)  698,  1187 

Ipswich  Tailors'  Case  (11    Rep.  54 
a).     [See   Taylors    of   Ips- 
wich, &c] 
Ireland  v.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.  (20 

J.  &  S.  450)  878 

Irish  v.  Webster  (5  Me   171)  321 

Iron   Co.,  &c.   (7   Cow.  540).      [See 

Peru  Iron  Co.,  &c] 
Iron  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironton  (19  O.  St. 

299)  168 

Ironton  v.  Kelley  (38  O.  St.  50)       1295, 

1296,  1303 
Irvin  v.  Devors  (65  Mo.  625)  389 

v.  N.  O.,  St.  L.  &  C  R.  Co.   (94 

111.  105)  965 

Irvine  v.  Wood  (51  N.  Y.  224)      832,  888, 
1309,  1310.  1311 
Irwin  v.   Bradford   (22  U.  C.  C.  P. 

19)  1270 

v.  Dixion  (9  How.  10)     750,  751,  752. 

755 


Page 
Irwin  v.  Great  Southern  Telephone 

Co.  (37  La.  An.  63)  417,  780, 

830,  -  .1 

w.  Lowe  (89  Ind.  5  Id)  589 

v.  Mariposa  (22  1'    C.  C.  P  367)    221 

v.  Mobile  (57  Ala.  6)  916,  982 

v.  Ontario  (3  Fed.  It.  49)  596 

Isaacson,  Re  (36  La   An.  56)  325 

Iske  v.  Newton  (54  Iowa,  586)  1129 

Isom  v.  Miss.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (36  Miss. 

300)  733 

Ison  v.  Manley  (76  Ga.  804)  449 

Israel  v.  Jacksonville  (2  111.  290)  477,  178 
v.  Jewett  (29  Iowa,  475)  733 

Ives  v  Hulet  (12  Vt.  314)  323 

Ivinson  v.  Ilance  (1  Wy.  Ter.  270)       18>; 
Ivory  v.  Deer  Park  (116  N.  Y.  476)    1268 


Jacks  v.  Helena  (41  Ark.  313)  626 

Jackson  u.  Bellevieu  (30  Wis.  259)      12(53 

v.  Bowman  (39  Miss.  671)       157,  518 

v.  Cory  (8  Johns.  385)  655,  669 

v.  Hartwell  (8  Johns.  429)      G55,  662, 

669 
v.  Hathaway  (15  Johns.   447)      746, 

817 
v.  Hyde  (28  U.  C.  Q.  B.  294)  1262 
c.  Le  Roy  (5  Cow.  397)  656 

v.  Morris  (1  Denio,  199)  223 

v.  Newman  (5)  Miss.  385)  941 

v.  People  (9  Mich.  Ill)  450,  510,  809, 
1126,  1130 
v.  Phillips  (14  Allen,  59)  657 

v.  Pike  (9  Cow.  61)  662 

v.  Pratt  (10  Johns.  381)  274 

v.  Vicksburg,  S.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (2 

Woods,  141)  650 

v.  York  &  C.  R.  Co.  (48  Me.  147)  560 
Jackson    County  v.  Applewhite  (62 

Ind.  464)  549,  1 1 14 

Jackson  Co.  H.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Interstate 

R.  T.  Co.  (24  Fed.  R.  306)      880 
Jackson   Co.  Sup.  v.  Brush   (77   III. 

59)  154,239,  240,  581,  1110 

Jacksonport  v.  Watson  (33  Ark.  704)  227, 
236,  1110, 1111 
Jacksonville  v.  iEtna  S.  F.   Engine 

Co.  (20  Fla.  100)  217 

v.  Basnett  (20  Fla.  525)  911 

v.  Drew  (19  Fla.  106)  881,  1304 

v.  Holland  (19  111.  271)  480 

v.  Jacksonville    R.  Co.    (67    111. 

540)  739,  764,  768,  769,  770 

v.  Lambert  (62  111.  519)  1323 

v.  L'Engle  (20  Fla.  344)  269 

Jacksonville,  N.  &  S.  R.  Co.   v.  Vir- 

den  (104  111.  339)  638 

Jacksonville    R.  Co.  r.   Jacksonville 

(114  111.562)  206 

Jacksonville  Trs.  v.  McConnel   (12 

III.  138)  147,  953,  969 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


.  Louisville  (9  1  tana,  111) 

Jacobs,  Hi  (y8  N.  V.  211 

Bangor  (16  Me.  187)  1300 

v.  Hamilton  Co.  Com'rs  (4  Fisher 

Pat.  Cas.  81)  43,1180 

Jaeger  v.  Burr  (36  0.  St  164)  912 

v.  Doherty  (61  lml.  628)  1112 

James  v.  Milwaukee  ( 16  Wall,  159)     238, 

620 
r.  Pine  Bluff  (49  Ark.  199)  979 

r.  Portage  (5  N.  W.  R.  31)  1267 

/•.  Putney  (Cro.  (ar.  198)  I  M 

v.  San  Francisco  (0  Cal.  528)       i:;n  i, 

1303 
James    River   Co.   v.    Anderson  (12 

Leigh, 276)  776,834 

Jameson  v.  People  (16  111.  257)      139,  1  10, 

776 
Jamestown   i\   Chicago,  B.  &  N.   R. 

Co.  (69  Wis.  64S)  850 

Jamison  r.  Fopiana  (43  Mo.  565)  679 

v.  Springfield  (53  Mo.  224)      718,  733 

Janesville  v  Markoe  (18  Wis.  350)        144 

Janey's  Executors  v.  Latane  (4  Leigh, 

327 i  6G8 

Jansen  v.  Atchison   (16  Kan.  368)       1262, 
1274,  1280,  1305,  1314 
i;.  Ostrander  (1  Cow.  670)  321 

January  v.  .Johnson  County   (3  Dil- 
lon C  C.  392)  634 
Janvrin  o.  Exeter  (is  N.  H.  83)             209 
Jarman  v.  Patterson  (7  Mon.  644)         418 
Jarrolt  v.  Moberly   (5  Dillon  C.   C. 

253)  631 

v.  Moberlv  (103  U.  S.  580)      62<  I,  630 

Jarvis  v.  Barnard  (30  Vt.  492)  1203 

v.  Dean  (3  Bing.  4  17)  711 

v.  New  York   (2  N.  Y.  L.  Obs. 

396)  319,  339 

v.  Shelby  (62  lml.  257)  557 

Jasper  County  v.  Ballon    (103  U.  S. 

745)'  635,637,646 

.Jay's  Case  (1  Vent   302)  327,  340 

Jefferson  Branch  Bank  v.  Skelly  (1 

Black,  436)  953 

Jefferson  City  v.  Courtmire  (9  Mo. 

683)  437,  470 

v.  Curry  (71  Mo.  85)  658 

v.  McCarty  (74  Mo.  55)  998 

v.  <>pel  (49  Mo.  190)  953 

v.  Whipple  (71  Mo.  521)       996,  1000 
Jefferson    County    v.    Arrighi    (54 

Miss.  668)  540,  566 

v.  Cowan  (54  Mo.  234)  979 

v.  People  (5  Neb.  136)  L25 

v.  Slagle  (66  Pa.  St.  202)  361 

Jefferson  Far.  Pol.  Jury  v.  McCor- 

mack  (32  La.  An.  624)     272.  769 
r.  Villabiabo  (12  La.  An.  788)        422 
Jeffersonville  v.  Ferry  Co.  (27   Ind. 

lii(i)  172,  179,  182 

v.  Ferry  Co.  (35  Ind.  19)  166,172,  534 
v.  Patterson  (32  Ind.  140)      292,  996, 

1107 


Pag* 

Jeffersonville  v.  Weems  (5  Ind.  547)    268 
Jeffersonville,  M   &  1.  R  Co.  v.  Bar- 
bour (89  Ind.  375)  672 
Jefferya  o.  Gurr  (2  B.  &  Ad.  841)  75 
Jeffries  v.  Ankeney  (11  Ohio,  374)        326 

v.  Lawrence  (42  Iowa,  498)     62l 

Jelliff  v.  Newark  ( 18  N.  J.  L.  l(*t)         959 

Jcnkms  r.  An. lover  (103  Mass.  '.'1)      234, 

57::.  906,  1098 

v.  Cheyenne  (1  Wy.  Ter.  287)        478 

v.  Thomasville  (35  Ga.  145)  500 

v.  Waldron  (11  Johns.  11 1)  326 

Jenks  v.  Chicago  (56  111.  397)  958 

r.  Chicago  ( 18  111.  296)  984 

v.  Lima  Tp.  (17  Ind.  326)     1148,  L149 

v.  Osceola  Tp.  (45   Iowa,  554)      162, 

163 

v.  Wilbraham  (11  Gray.  142)        1264 

Jenner  v.  Jolliffe  (9  Johns.  382)  326 

Jenning's  Case  (12  Mod.  402)  307 

Jennings,  Rt  (6  Cow.  518)  1059,  1070 

v.  Fisher  (103  Ind.  112)  388 

v.  Le  Roy  (63  Cal.  397)  1225 

v.  Tisbury  (5  Gray,  7:))  760,  761,  762 

v.  Van  Schaick  (108  N.  V.  530)    1311 

Jennings  County  v.  Verbarg  (63  Ind. 

107)  549 

Jennison  v.  Kirk  (9s  U.  S.461)  1216 

Jensen    v.   Folk  Co.    Sup.   (47   Wis. 

298)  126 

Jersey   City   v.   Central   R.  Co.  (40 

N.J.  Eq.  417)  788 

v.  Dummer  (20  N.  J.  L.  106)  748 

v.  Fitzpatrick  (30  N.  J   Eq.  97)      790 
v.  Ilorton  (38  N.  J.  L.  88)  1*12 

v.  J.  C    &  B.  R.  Co.  (20  N.  J. 

Eq.  360)  94,  143,841.849,801 
v.  Lembeck  (31  N.  J.  Eq  255)  1093 
v.  Morris   Canal   &    B.    Co     (12 

N.J.  Eq.  547)  745,  71s.  710  760i 

800,  801,  803 

».  O'Callaghan  (4  N.  J.  L.  349)    1152 

v   Quaife(26  N.J.  L.  63)  312 

ads.  Hiker  (38  N.  J.  L.  225)         1148, 

1152 

v.  Sackett  (44  N.  J   L.  428)  719 

v.  State  (30  N.  J.  L.  521)       306,  760, 

794,  797,  800,  803,  1129 

Jersey  Citv  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  J.  C.  & 

B.  IF  R.  Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  61) 
841,  863,  864,  868,  869,  871,  879, 

880 
Jersey  City  &  Hob.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  J. 

C.  &  B.  R.  Co.  (21  N.  J.  Eq. 
550)  847 

v.  Hudson  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  420)  454,  829 
Jersey  City  Water  Com'rs  R<  (31  N. 

J.  L.  72)  711 

Jessen  v.  Sweigert  (66  Cal.  182)  1312 

Jeter  v.  Hewitt  (22  I  tow.  352 )  1036 

Jetl  v.  Richmond  (7-".  Ind.  316)  435 

Jex  v.  New   York  (111  N.  Y.  339)      1149 
Jewettr.  New  Haven  (38  Conn.  368)  1198, 

1199 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


lxxxv 


Page 
Jewhurst   v.    Syracuse   (108   N.    Y. 

303)  1266 

John  v.  Cincinnati,  R.  &  Ft.  W.  R. 

Co.  (35  Ind.  539)  230 

John  &  Cherry  Streets,  Re  (19  Wend. 

659)  690,694,747,771 

Johnes  v.  State  Aud.  (4  O.  St.  493)     1063 

Johns  v.  Nicholls  (2  Dallas,  184)  329 

Johnson,  Re  (73  Cal.  228)       441,  452,  505 

v.   Alameda    County    (14   Cal. 

100)  719 

v.  Allen  (62  Ind.  57)  980 

v.  Americus  (46  Ga.  80)  295,  296,  499 
v.  Barclay  (16  N.  J.  L.  1)  500 

v.  Boston  (118  Mass.  44)  1269 

17.  Drummond  (20  Gratt.  419)         965 
v.  Haverhill  (35  N.  H.  74)  1255,  1257, 

1283 
>■.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.  (  6  Duer, 

631)  1289 

v.  Indianapolis   C.  Council    (16 

Ind.  227)  260,  556 

v.  Irasburgh  (47  Vt.  28)  1287 

v.  Jacqui  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  552)  828 

v.  Joliet  &  C.  R.  Co.  (23  III.  202)    709 
v.   La:ul>pton    (40  U.   C.   Q.  B. 

297)  281 

v.  Lexington  (14  B.  Mon.  648)        969 
v.  Mann  (77  Va.  265)  304 

v.  Milwaukee  (40  Wis.  315)  914 

v.  Milwaukee  (46  Wis.  568)         1267, 
1299,  1301 
v.  Municipality  (5  La.  An.  100)  1190, 

1197 
v.  Norway  (Winch,  37)  247 

v.  Oregon  City  (2  Or  327)  969 

v.  Parkersburg  (16  W.  Va.  402)  1224, 

1245 

v.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  382)      201 

v.  Philadelphia  (69  Pa.  St.  445)     157, 

425,  427 

v.  Simonton  (43  Cal.  342)       217,  387, 

442,  468 

v.  Stanley  (1  Root,  245)  324 

v.  Stark  County  (24  111.  75)     561,  569 

v.  Stedman  (3  Ohio,  91)  321 

v.  Thorndike  (56  Me.  32)  1116 

v.  Whitefield  (18  Me.  286)  12G6,  1269 

v.  Wilson  County  (34  Kan.  670)  1108 

Johuson  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Hicks  (2  Ind. 

527)  1009 

v.  January  (94  U.  S.  202)        593,  595 
v.  January  (94  U.  S.  631)  593 

Johnston  v.  Becker  Co.  Com'rs  (27 

Minn.  64)  946 

v.  Boyle  (8  U.  C.  Q.  B.  142)  741 

v.  Charlestown  (1  Bay,  441)  283,  289, 

741 
r.  Charleston  (3  S.  C.  232)  1166,  1305, 

1311 
v.  Cleveland  Co.  Com'rs  (67  N.  C. 

101)  1072 

v.  Dist.    Columbia  (1   Mackey, 

427)  1327 


Johnston  v.  Dist.  Columbia  (118  U. 

S.  19)  1318,  1326 

v.  Irwin  (3  S.  &  R.  291)  797 

v.  Macon  (62  Ga.  645)  957 

r.  Trenton  (43  X.  J.  L.  166)  914 

Johnstone  v.  Scott  (11  Mich.  232)  740 

,-.  Wilson  (2N,  H.  202)  321,  349 

Joliet  v.  Conway  (119  111.  489)  1288 

v.  Harwood  (86  111.  110)  L306 

v.  Seward  (86  111.  402)         12'.i7,  1306 

v.  Verlev  (35  111.  58)     158,  882,  1158, 

1258,  1263,  1281 

Jonas  i'.  Cincinnati  (18  Ohio,  318)        201, 

940,  942 

Jones,  Re  (78  Ala.  419)  149 

Re  (7  Exch.  586)  295 

v.  Andover  (9  Pick.  146)  349,  360,361, 

762 
v.  Bird  (5  B.  &  Al.  837)  1331 

v.  Boston  (104  Mass.  75)      1256,  127(5 
v.  Boston  (104  Mass.  461)     715,  1093, 

1125 
v.  Carmarthen  (8  M.  &  W.  805)  312 
v.  Columbus  (25  Ga.  610)  235 

v.  Columbus  (62  Ind.  422)  899 

v.  Firemen's  Fund  Ins.   Co.  (2 

Daly,  307)  386 

v.  Jefferson  (66  Tex.  576)  1052 

v.  Lancaster  (4  Pick.  119)  534 

v.  Little  Rock  (25  Ark.  301)  563 

v.  Loving  (55  Miss.  109)  318,326,391 
v.  McAlpine  (64  Ala.  511)  389 

v.  Mersey  Docks  (11  H.  L.  C. 

443)  1208 

v.  New  Haven  (34  Conn.  1)  108, 1201, 
1253,  1276,  1277,  1331 
v.  Richmond  (18  Gratt.  517)  513, 

1164,1197 
v.  Robbins  (8  Gray,  329)  507 

v.  Schulmeyer  (39  Ind.  119)  1002 

v.  Soulard  (24  How.  41)  264 

v.  Stanstead,  S.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (L. 

R.  4  P.  C  98)  718 

v.  State  Auditor  (4  O.  St.  493)     1063 

r.  Waltham  (4  Gush.  299)  1257 

r.  Williams  (Ambl.  651)  1115 

Jonesboro  v.  Cairo  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 

(110  U.  S.  192)  87,  231 

v.  McKee  (2  Yerg.  167)  997 

Jordan  v.  Cass  County  (3  Dillon  C.  C. 

185,  245)  575,  631,  1051 

v.  Hannibal  (87  Mo.  673)  1247 

v.  Lisbon  Sch.  Dist.  (38  Me.  164)  322, 

347,  349,  377,  541 

Joyce  v.  Woods  (78  Ky.  386)  _      449,  970 

Jovner   v.   Egremont  Sch.   Dist.   (3 

Cush.  567)  H4I'. 

Judge  v.  Meriden  (38  Conn.  90)  454. 1202, 

1328,  1334 
Judkins  v.  Hill  (50  N.  H.  140)  283 

Judson  v.  Bridgeport  (25  Conn.  426)    707, 

710 

w.  Reardon  (16  Minn.  431)  488 

Juilliard  v.  Greenman  (110  U.  S.421)    195 


lxxxvi 


TABLE    or    (ASKS    CITED. 


Page 

Juker    v.   Commonwealth    (20    Pa. 

184]  276 

Julia  Build.  Assoc,  v.   Bell  Teleph. 

t     830,  831,  1243 

Junction  It.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  (88 

Pa.  424)  914,92] 

Junkins  v.  Doughty  Falls  Union  Sch. 

Dist.  [39  Me.  220  360,  524 

Justice  v.  Logansport  (loi  Ind.  326)    899, 

1002 

Justices  of  A.  County  Court,  &c. 
|  See  A.  ( !o.  (  t.  Jus.  &c.  The 
following  plaintiffs  may  not 
always  have  been  fully 
earned  in  citing:  Bibb 
County,  &o.  (12  Ga.  157), 
Clarke,  &c.  (11  B.  Mon. 
143),  King  William,  &e.  (2 
Leigh,  168),  Pike,&o.  (9Ga. 
475)  and  (15  Ga.  39),  and 
Randolph  (  13  Gratt.  523.] 

Justices'  Opinion  (38  Me.  Appendix)   280 

Me.  591)  895 

(7  Mass.  525)  47,  280 

(15  Mass.  537)  47,280 

(0  Cush.  580)  208,  271 


K. 


Kaime  v.  Harty  ( 1  Mo.  App.  357)  302,750 
Kaiser  v.  Weise  (85  Pa.  366)  975 

Kalbrier  r.  Leonard  (31  End.  497)         975 
Kane  v.  Baltimore  (15  Md.  240)    690,  698, 

706 
,-.  People  (  1  Neb.  509)  285 

Kankakee  v.  .Etna  L.  Ins.  Co.  (106 

U.S.  668)  572 

v.  K.  &  Ind.  R.  Co.  (115  111.  88)      553 
v.  Potter  (119111.  327)  982 

Kansas  y    &c.   (31  Kan.  431).     See 

State,  &c.l 
Kansas  City  v.  Clark  ((is  Mo.  588)       392 
v.  Corrigan  (86  Mo.  07)  sir, 

v.  Flanagan  (69  Mo.  22)  146,482,  520 
p.  Huling  (sT  Mo.  203) 
v.  Johnson  (7s  Mo.  661)  900,  047 

v.  Payne  (71  Mo.  159)  1000 

v.  Swope  (79  Mo.  146)  145 

v.  White  (69  Mo.  261)  391 

Kansas  City,  St.  J.&  C.  B.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nodaway  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  |  17 
Mo.  349)  631 

Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Wyandotte 

Co.  Com'rs  (10  Kans.  587)   1147, 
1148,  1140,  1151 
Karst  v.  St.  Paul,  S.  ,<:  T.  F.  R.  Co. 

(22  Minn.  118)  157,811,  852, 

1225 
v.  Stillwater  &  T.  F.  R.  Co.  (22 

Minn.  118)  1210 

Karwisch  o.  Atlanta  (II  Ga.  '.''ill         468 
Kathman  v.  New  Orleans  (11  La.  An. 


II.,) 


PafM 

Katzenberger  v.  Aberdeen  (121  U.S. 
172)  134,231, 

r  Aberdeen  (10  Fed.  R.  745)  236 
Kavanaugh  o.  Sanders  (8  Me.  1  t2)  300 
Kaveny  v.  Troy  (  L08  N.  Y.  571)  1260 

Kayser  v.  Bremen  Trs.  (10  Mo.  88)       72, 

265 

Kean  v.  Asch  (27  X.  .1.  Eq.  57)  709 

Kearney,  R*  (7  Wheat.  38)  332 

v.  Andrews  (10  N.  .J.  Eq.  70)         291, 

2'.  IS.   1-7 

v.  Covington  (1  Met.  (Ky.)  330)    556, 

557 
v.  London,  B.  &  S.  C.  Ry.  Co. 

(L.  R.5Q.  B.  Ill)  1270 

Kearny,  Exp.  (55  Cal.  212)  397 

Keasy  v.  Louisville  (4  Dana,  154)        1225 
Keating    v.    Cincinnati    (38    O.    St. 

141)  1227 

v.  Kansas  City  (84  Mo.  415)  518, 

1157 
v.  Sparrow  (1  Ball  &  I'.   367)  420 

Keckely  v.  St.  John's  Par.  R.  Com'rs 

(4  MeCord,  257)  423 

Keeler  v.  Frost  (22  Barb.  400)  361 

r.  Milledge  (24  N.  J.  L.  142)  470,  481, 

[82,  483,  510 

Keeley  v.  Atlanta  (69  Ga.  583)  971 

Keen   v.  Driggs  Drain  Co.  (45  N.  J. 

L.  91)  032 

Keene  u  Bristol  (26  Pa   St.  46)  721 

Keeney  v.  Hudson  (27  N.  J.  L.  302)      528 

KeeseV    Denver  (111  Col.  112)  980,990 

Kehreru  Richmond  (81  Va.  745)      1220, 

1320 

Keith  v.  Brockton  (136  Mass.  119)       1200 

v.  Easton  (2  Allen,  552)       1250,  1257, 

1265,  1267,  1270.  1270 

Keithsburg  r.  Frick  (34  111.  405)  542,  055, 

637,  046 
Kellar  v.  Savage  (17  Me.  444  ;  20  Me. 

199)  ^  321,  371,374 

Keller  i'.  Corpus   Christi    (50  Tex. 

011)  213,  1105,  1104,  1166 

v.  Hicks  (22  Cal.  457)  505 

v  Hyde  (20  Cal.  593)  1030 

v.  State  (11  Md.  525)  004,070 

Kelley  v.  Brooklyn  (4  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

203)     103,  105,  521,  502,  503,  568 

v.  Kennard  (60  N.  II.  1)  662 

v.  Lindsey  (7  Gray,  287)  1144 

v.  Milan  (127  U.  S  139)  195,  235,  236, 

2:17,  572,  626,  1058,  1141 

|  See  also  Kellej  v.  Milan.] 

Kellinger  v.  Forty-Second  Street,  &c. 

R.  Co.  (50  N.  Y.  200)      792,  794, 

705,  SO.-,,  867,  870,  871 

Kellogg  v.  Ely  (15  O.  St.  64)       980,  1152 

r.  Janes ville  (34  Minn.  132)  1272 

v.  Northampton  (4  Gray,  05;  8 

Gray,  504)  1256,  1258,  1265, 

1266,  1209 

v.  Thompson  (66  N.  Y.  88)  801,  1316, 

1317 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


lxxxvii 


Kelly  v.  Baltimore  (53  Md.  134) 

v.  Baltimore  (65  Md.  171) 
v.  Chicago  (02  111.  279) 


Page 

1111, 

1119 

815 

540, 1015, 

1110 

v.  Cleveland  (34  0.  St.  468)  920 

v.  Columbus  (41  U.  St.  263)         12.:;), 

120.5,  1312 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (31  Wis   179)       1207 

v.  Madison  (43  Wis.  688)  1142 

v.  Milan  (21  Fed.  R.  842)       145,  2:.:.. 

236,  572,  001 

[See  also  Kelley  v.  Milan.] 

v.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  83)      151,  153, 

1158 

v.  New  York  (11  N.  Y.  432)         1306, 

1307,  1308 

v.  Pittsburgh  (85  Pa.  St.  17u)        204, 

972,  975 

v.  Pittsburgh  (104  U.  S.  78)    92:1,  '.'72 

v.  Toronto  (23  U.  C.  Q.  B  426)      461 

v.  Wimberly  (01  Miss,  548)  1028, 

1007,  1079 

Kelly's  Case  (8  Gratt.  032)  700 

Kelly's  Lessee  v.  Greenfield  (2  H.  & 

McH.  132)  798,  803 

Kelsey  v.  Glover  (15  Vt.  708)  1255 

v.  King  (32  Barb.  410)  818,  828 

v.  King  (33  How.  Pr.  39)  743 

v.  Wright  (1  Root,  83)  303,  304 

Kelsh  v.  Uyersville  (68  Iowa,  137)         130 

Kemper  v.  Louisville  (14  Bush,  8.")      499, 

1220,  1317 

Kendall  v.  King  (17  C.  B.  483)       184,  274 

v.  Post  (8  Or.  14)  727,  817 

v.  Stokes  (3  How.  87)  320,  1005,  1058 

v.  United  States  (12  Pet.  524)      1005, 

1015,  1014,  1048 

Kendell  v.  Camden  (47  N  J.  L.  64)      284, 

287 
Kenicott  v.  Wayne  Co.  Sup.  (16  Wall. 

425)  593,  614 

Kennard  v.  Cass  County  (3  Dillon 

C.  C.  147)  576 

v.  Morgan  (92  U.  S.  480)  922 

Kennedy  v.  Covington  (8  Dana,  50)     175, 

671,769 
v.  Covington  (17  B.  Mon.  567)  177 
v.  Cumberland  (05  Md.  514)  701,  702 
v.  Municipality  (10  La.  An.  54)  65S 
v.  Newman  (1  Sandf.  187)  709 

v.  New  York  (73  N.  Y.  Wo)         1205, 

1259 
v.  Phelps  (10  La.  An.  227)  445,  450, 
451,  454 
v.  Phila.  Bd.  of  H.  (2  Pa.  St.  309)  450 
v.  Sacramento  (19  Fed  It  580)  1028 
v.  Sowden  (1  MeMullan  L  323)  413, 
419,  42H 
v.  Troy  (77  N.  Y.  493)  1127 

v.  Washington   (3  Cranch  C.  C. 

596)  1014 

Kennison  v.  Beverly  (146  Mass.  467)  1323, 

1333 


Page 
Kenosha  v.  Lamson  (9  Wall.  477)  86, 

120,  184,  501,  508.5M,  586 
Kensington  Com'rs  v.  Wood  (10  Pa. 

St.  93)  1220,  1320,  1333 

Kent  v.  Cheyenne  (2  Wy.  Ter.  0)        1160 

v.  Dickinson  (25  Gratt.  817)  1006 

v.  Walton  (7  Wend.  250)     '  520 

v.  Worthing  Local  Bd.  (L.  R.  10 

Q.  B.  D.  118)  1206 

Kent   County   v.  Grand  Rapids  (01 

Mich.  144)  773 

Kentucky  r.  Dennison  (24  How.  00)      55, 

1005 
Kentucky.  Seminary  v.  Wallace  (15 

B.  Mon.  35)  200,  202 

Keogh  v.    Wilmington   (4   Del.  Ch. 

491)  547,1014 

Keokuk  v   Dressed  (47  Iowa,  597)         478 
v    K.   &e.  Packet  Co.  (45  Iowa, 

196)  105,  168,  169,  178 

v.  K.  Indep.  Sell.  Dist.  (53  Iowa, 

352)  1262,  1273,  1313 

v.  Scroggs  (39  Iowa,  447)  388 

Keokuk,  &e.  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk 

(95  U.  S.  80)  105 

Kepner  v  Commonwealth  (40  Pa.  St. 

124)  351,385,407 

Kepple  v.  Keokuk  (61  Iowa,  653)         811, 

1221 

Kerlin  v.  Campbell  (15  Pa.  St.  500)      659 

Kerr  o.  Corry  (105  Pa.  St   282)  013 

v.  Dougherty  (79  N.  Y.  327)  001 

v.  Preston  (L.  R.  6  Ch.  D.  403)    1166 

p.  So.   Park  Com'rs   (117  U.  S. 

379)  730,  736 

v.  Trego  (47  Pa.  292)      287,  289,  352, 

354,  355,  1020,  1021,  1023 

Ketchum  v.  Buffalo  (14  N.  Y.  356)      184, 

185,  194,  199,  456,  457,  504,  657, 

784, 1113 

Kettering  v.  Jacksonville  (50  111.  39)     70, 

432,  485 

Kettle  v.  Fremont  (1  Neb.  329)      787,  794 

Keyes  v   Tait  (19  Iowa,  123)  754 

v.  Westford  (17  Pick.  273)     147,  360, 

525 
Keys  v.  Marcellas  (50  Mich.  439)       1258. 

1259,  1200 
Keyser  v.   Sunapee  Sch.    Dist.    (35 

N.  H.  477)  360,539,541 

Kibele  v.  Philadelphia   (105  Pa.  St 

41)  1200.  1214,  1297,  1331 

Kidd  v.  Pearson  (128  U.  S.  1)  213 

Kidder  v   Peoria  (29  III.  77)  707,  709 

Kidderminster  v.  Hardwick  (L.  R.  9 

Exch.  13)  538 

Kidderminster  T.  Council  v. Court  (1 

E.  &  E.  770)  346 

Kieffer  v.  Elder  (18  Pa.  St.  388)  583 

Kiernan,  Re  (62  X.  Y.  457)  979,  981 

Kilbourne  v.  St.  John  (59  N.  Y.  21)    1114 
v.  Thompson   (103  U.  S.  1G8)         332 
Kile  a.  Yellowhead  (80  111.  208)  694 

Kiley  v.  Cranor  (51  Mo.  541)  371 


.viii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


Kiley  v.  Forsee  (57  Mo.  390) 
v.  Kansas  City  (69  Mo   L02) 

v.  Kansas  I'm   (87  Mo.  103) 
Kimball  v.  Boston  1 1  Allen,  117) 

,-.  Cushman  ( 103  Mass    194) 
v.  Kenos  .-1) 

i .  Lamprey  |  L9  N.  11.  215) 

v.  Marshall  (44  N.  1!.    I 
v.  Rockland  (71  Me    L37] 
v.  Rosendale  (42  Wis.  407) 


297,  ■■■■> 

1277 
L159 
1193, 
1 190 
L2GJ 
690,  794 
350,  378, 

350,  362 

719 

80,  635, 

1304 

r.  Roxbury  Sell.  Dist.  (28  Vt.  8)  541 
Kimble  v.  White  W.  Val.  Canal  Co. 

(llnrl.  2  718,720 

Kimmish  v.  Ball  (129  CJ.  R.  217)  214 

Kincaid  r.  Hardin  County  (53  Iowa, 

130)  117(i."  1172.  117:;,  1171 

Kincaid's  Appeal  (66  Pa.  St.  Ill)  111 

Kinder  v  Gillespie  (63111.88)      418,420, 

■171 
Defenbaugh  (64  111.  291)  727 

King  v.  Abington  (1  Ld.  Raym.  561) 

1019,  1064 
v.  Abington  (2  Salk.  699)    1064,  1065, 

1008 
v.  Allen  (2  U.  C.  Q.  B.  101)  746 

v.  Amery  (2D.  &  E.  T.  R.  515; 

1  lb.  122;  2  Bro.  P.  C.  336)    241, 

248.  265,  108'J 

.'.  Andover  (1  Ld.  Raym.  710)       333 

v.  Andover  {■',  Salk.  229)  336 

v.  Arclid.  of  Middlesex  (3  A.  & 

E.  615)  1061 

v.  Ashwell  (12  East,  22)  391,414 

r.  Atkins  (3  Burr.  1700)  447 

v.  Atkins  (3  Mod.  3)  301,  342 

r.  Atwood  (1  B.  &  A!.  481)  488 

v  Axbridge  (2  Cowp.  523)     318,  338, 
1026,  HI71 
v.  Axbridge  (2  D.  &  E.T.  R.  1 

338 
v.  Babb  (3  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  579)       379, 

1027 
r.  Bailiffs  of  Eye  (1  B.  &  C.  80)  158 
v.  Bank  (2  B.  &  Aid.  620)  1026 

v.  Bank  nf  England  (Doug.  500) 

1011 
v.  Bankes  (3  Burr.  1454)  1019 

v.  Barber  Surgeons  (1  Ld.  Ravin. 

585)  395 

o.  Barker  (3  Burr,  1205)  1004 

v.  Barnard  (Comb.  416)  289 

v.  Bedford  (6  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  560)  279 
r.  Bedford  II  East,  80)  1021 

v.  Bedford  (1  Barnard   242)  1076 

v.  Beeston  (3  1>  &  E.  T.  II   592)  360, 

361 
v.  Benchers  of  Gray's  [nn  (Doug. 

339  '  1010 

v.   Boll  ringer  (4  D.  &  E.  T.  R 

810)  342,343 


Pag» 

King  v.  Bird  (13  East,  367)  39! 

v.  Bond  (6  1).  &  R.  333)  3Q9 

v.  Bower  (2  1).  &  R.  701)  300 

v.  Bower  (1  B.  &  Cr.  492,  585)      306, 

843 
v.  Brecknock  &  A.  Canal  Co,  (8 

A.  &  E.  217)  1059,  1001 

>■.  Bridgman  (2  Sir.  1203)  379 

v.  Bristol  (I  D.  &  R.  389 j  5  B.  & 

Aid.  731)  1026 

<    Bristol  Dock  Co.   (6  B.  &  C. 

181)  1014,1017 

r.  Broughton  (5  Burr.  2700)  1240 

v.  Brown  (3  I).  ,v  E.  T.  li.  574 
v.  Buller  (8  East,  388) 
?•.  Bumstead  (-'  B.  &  Ad.  609) 


1086 
1026 

277, 
291 
323 

278, 


Butler  (15. Johns.  281) 
Cambridge  (4  Burr.  2008) 

1010,  1023,  1025,  1064 
Cambridge  (2  D.  &  E.  T.   R. 

461)  1069 

( 'amnion  (1  Sid.  14)  1020,  1071 

Carlile  (6  C.  &  P.  636)      785,  885, 

ss,; 

Carlisle  (Fortesc.  200)  335 

Carlisle  (1  Str.  385)  364 

Carmarthen  (1  M.  &  S.  007)  338 
Carter  (Cowp.  50)  342,343 

Chalke  (1   Ld.  Raym.  225;  5 
.Mod.  257)  327,  336,337,  338,  339, 

340 
Chalke  (Comb.  :,.'.I7)  335 

Chase  (15  N.  11.  1)  1313 

Chester  (1  M.  &  S.  101)  151,  158 
Chester  (2  I).  &  E.  T.  R.  505)  1083 
Chitty  (5  Ad.  &  E.  009)      277,201, 

336 
Clapham  (1  Wils.  305)  378 

Clark  (1  East,  38)  1078 

Clarke  (2  Ld.  Raym.  848)  1068 
Cleveland  (28  Fed.  R.  835)  1303 
Colchester  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

259)  1010,  1023 

Com'rs  of  Fens  (2  Keble,  48)  509 
Com'rs  of  Sewers  (1  B.  &  Ad. 

232)  221 

Com  rill  (1  B.  &  Aid.  67)  455,457 
Coventry  (1  Ld.  Raym.  391)  333 
Croke  (Cowp.  29)    '  200,  353 

Cross  (2  C.  &  1'.  483)  446 

Cross  (3  Camp.  224)    453,  785,  884, 

885 
.  Cusack  (2  Roll.  113)  1083 

Davenport  (98  111.  305)  -115,472 
Davey  (5  Eps.  217)  446 

Dawes  (1  Burr.  2022)  1086 

Dawes  (4  Burr  2277)  343 

Dean  (1  Str.  539)  297 

Debenhara  (2  B.  &  Ad.  187)  380 
Derby  (C.  T.  I  lard  w.  155)  335,839 
Derby  (7  A.  &  E.  410)  1019 

Derby  (2  Salk.  436)  1062,  1067 

Devon  (Ry.  &  M.  144)  882 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxix 


King  v.  Devonshire  (1  B.  &  C.  600)  343 
v.  Dimpsey    (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

96)  311 

v.  Doncaster  (Barnard.  265)  336,  340 
v.  Doncaster  (2  Burr.  738)  327,  333, 
345,  364 
v.  Doncaster  (2  Ld.  Ray  in.  150.)  302, 
336,  340 
v.  Doncaster  (Say.  38)  328,  334 

v.  Downshire  (4  A.  &  E.  232)  715 
v.  Dublin  (1  Stra.  540)  1002 

v.  Duke  of  Richmond  (6  D.  &  E. 

T.  R.  560)  279,  379 

v.  East  India  Co.  (4  B.  &  Ad. 

530)  1061 

v.  Eastrington  (5  A.  &  E.  765)  1240 
v.  Ecclesfield  (1  B.  &  Al.  348)  1240 
v.  Egerly  (3  Salk.  183)  785 

v.  Essex  (4  I).  &  E.  T.  R.  501)  221 
v.  Everett  (Cas.  T.  Hardw.  261)  1012 
v.  Exeter  (Comb.  197)  278 

v.  Exeter  (12  Mod.  251)  1068 

v.  Exeter  (1  Ld.  Raym.  223)  1068 
v.  Eve  Bailiffs  (1  B.  &  C.  186)  1019 
v.  Eye  Bor.  (2  D.  &  R.  172)  1014 

v.  Faversham  Fishermen's   Co. 

(8  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  356)      328,  338, 

339,  345 

v.  Ford  (70  Ga.  628)  223 

v.  Fowey  (4  D.  &  R.  614)    1068,  1072 

Foxwell  (1  L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  518)  278 


King 


Frost  (8  A.  &  E.  822) 
Gaborian  (11  East,  87) 
Glamorganshire  (1  Ld.  Raym. 

580) 
Glossop  (4  B.  &  Aid.  616) 
Gloucester  (3  Bulst.  190) 
Godwin  (Doug.  397) 
Gordon  (Doug.  593) 
Grant  (1  B.  &  Ad.  104) 
Greene  (6  A.  &  E.  549) 
Greet  (8  B.  &  C.  363) 
Griffiths  (3  B.  &  Aid.  735) 


1058 
342 


1125 

478 

1065 

308 

381 

142 

1020 

343 

338, 

1071 

Grimes  (5  Burr.  2601)         338,  345 
Grosvenor  (7  Mod.  199)  242 

Grosvenor  (1  Wils.  18;  2  Str. 

1193)  306 

Gwyn  (1  Str.  401)  380 

Hard  wick  (11  East,  578)  382 

Harris  (1  B.  &  Ad.  936)      336,  337, 
338,  346,  364,  365 
Harris  (6  Ad.  &  El.)  1087 

Harrison  (3Burr.l328)  387,395,487 
Hastings  (1  D.  &  R.  148)  1013 

Hastings  (5  B.  &  Aid.  692)  158,  490 
Head  (4  Burr.  2521)  353 

Headley  (7  B.  &  C.  496)  343 

Hearle  (1  Str.  627)  301 

Heath  (1  Barnard.  417)  278 

Heaven  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  772)    327 
Hebden  (Andr.  391)  343 

Hereford  (2  Salk.  701)    1063,  1065, 
1067 


Page 
v.  Hereford  (1  Ld.  Raym.  559)  1064 
.  Hertford  (1  Ld.  Raym.  426)  352 
.  Hill  (4  B.  &C.  441)  345 

.  Hodge  (2  B.  Ov  A.  344)  1086 

.  Hopkins  (1  Q.  1'..  161)  1026 

.  Hughes  (5  B.  &  C.  886)       307,  309 
.  Hungerford  (II  Mod.  L32)  306 

.  Hungerford  Market  Co.  (4  B 

&  Ad.  327) 
.  Hyde  (21  L.J.  Mag.  C.  94) 
.  Iuoledon  (13  East,  164) 
.  Ingram  (1  W.  Bl.  50) 
.  Jacksonville  (3  111.  306) 
.  Johnson  (1  Wils.  325) 
.  Jones  (8  Campb.  229) 


Jones  (6  East,  230) 
Kent  (13  East,  220) 


711 

478 
477 
378 
477 

447 
453,  884, 

885 
884,  885 

242 


v.  Kingston  (8  Mod.  210;  11  Mod. 


1062 
1056 


345 


382;  1  Stra.  578) 
Lancashire  (12  East,  366) 
Land  Tax  Com'rs,   &c.  (1  D 

&  E.  T.  R.  148.)     [See  v 

St.  Martin's,  &c] 

Langhorn  (4  Ad.  &  E.  538) 

Leake  (5  B.  &  Ad.  469)      741,  762, 

1240 

Lediard  (Sayer,  6)  1130 

Leicester  (4  Burr.  2089)  338 

Leyland  (3  M.  &  S.  184)  306,  1019, 

1021 

Lindsev  (14  East,  317)  881 

Lisle  (Andr.  163)  304 

Liverpool  1  Barnard.  83)    1019 

Liverpool  (2  Burr.  723)   327,  333, 

334,  338,  339,  345,  364 

Liverpool  (3  East,  86)      1240,  1315 

Llandilo  Dist.   R.    Com'rs  (2 

D.  &  E.  T.  R.  232)  1017 

Lloyd  (Cald.  309)  1130 

Lloyd  (1  Campb.  200)  741 

Lloyd  (4  Esp.  200)  446,  448 

London  (2  Show. 263)  18 

London  (6  Vin.  Abr.  296)  303 

London  (2  D.  &  E.  R.  182)  318,  337, 
1026 
Lord  Gordon  (Doug.  593)  318 

Lord  of  Milverton  (3  A.  &  E. 

284)  1001 

Lucas  (10  East,  235)  379,  1027 

Lvme   Regis   (Doug.  85,  153, 

177)  327,  328,  334,  339 

Madison  (17  Ind.  48)  968 

Malet  (2  Barnard.  408)  278 

Marchioness  of  Downshire  (4 

A.  &  E.  232)  745 

Margate  Pier  Co.  (3  B.  &  Aid. 

2-1)  1056 

Market    St.    Com'rs  (4  B.  & 

Ad.  335)  711 

Marquis  of  R.  (4  Campb.  189)  881, 

882 
Marshall  (2  B.  &  A.  341)  310 

Marten  (4  Burr.  2120)  1086 


xc 


TAlIl.i:    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


Page 
345 
343 


King  v.  May  (5  Burr.  2i 

17.  Maj   i  I  B.  .v  Ad.  843) 

v.  .Mi  reliant  Tailors'  Co.  (2  Lev. 

21)0) 
r.  Middlesex  Archil.  (3  A.  &  E. 

615) 
;■.  Miller  (6  I).  &  E.  T.  R.  277) 

342,  343,  395,  1079 
v.  Milverton  (3  A.  &  E.  284)  1061 

v.  Mitchell  i  IU  East,  51  I  |  279,  379 
v.  Mondaj  (Cowp.  530)  278,  342,  343 
v.  Moore  (3  B.  &  Ad.  184)  448,  885 
v.  Morely  (2  Burr.  1040)      509,  1078, 


■lull 


1061 

■_' I -J, 


r.  Morris  (3  Fast,  213) 

j\  Morris  ( t  Fast,  26) 

v.  Mothersell  (1   Stra.  93) 


1131 
241 
381 

370,  380, 
381 
446 
446 

379,  1027 
447 


v.  Xeill  (2  C.  &  P.  485) 

v.  Neville  (1  Peak,  92) 

v.  Newcastle  (2  Str.  1223) 

v.  Newdigate  (Comb.  10) 

v.  Now  Radnor  (2  Ld.  Kenyon's 

N.  498)  1087 

v.  New  York  (102  X.  Y.  171)  7 lit 

v.  New    York  C.  &  II.  River  R. 

Oo.  (66  N.  V.  181)  1306,  1307 
v.  Nicholson  (1  Str.  299)  243,  1076 
v.  Norris  (1  Ld.  Ravm.  337)  260 

v.  Norris  (1  Earn.  K.  B.  385)  362 

v.  Northampton  (2  M    &  S.  262)    789, 
881,  882 
r.  North  Curry  (4  B.  &  C.  959)      278, 

379 
v.  Norwich  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1244)   1069, 

1070 
v.  Norwich  (1  B.  &  Ad.  310)  1019 
v.  Norwich  (1  Stra.  55)  1065,  L067 
>■.  Norwich  (2  Salk.  436)  1067 

r.  Nottingham  ( I   Sid.  :ll  i  378 

v.  Nottingham,  W.  W.   (6  A.  & 

F.  355)  1007 

v.  Nottingham  Jus.  (Saver,  217)  lull 
v.  Ogden  (10  B.  &  C.  210)  lose, 

v.  Osbourne  (1  Fast,  326)  242,  1079 
r.  Oxford  (2  Salk.  428)  333,  L029 
v.  Oxford  (Palm.  155)  336,  345 

r.  Oxford  (Cas.  t.  Ilardw.  178)  1019 
r.  Oxford  (7  Fast,  345)  1055 

v.  Oxford  (6  Ad.  &  E.  349)  1064 

V.  Oxfordshire  (1   B.  &  Ad.  289) 
v.  Oxfordshire  (  1  B  &  < '.  194) 
V.  Oxfordshire  (  16  Fast,  223) 


1210 

1133, 
1135 


V.  Pagham  Sewer  Coin'rs   (8  B. 

&  C.  355)  1318 

v.  Parry  (6  Ad.  &  El.  810)  1086 

v.  Pasmore  (3  D.&  E.  T.  R.  241)  241, 
2  12.  244,  2  Id,  2o7,  2d:.,  304 
v.  Paterson  ( 1  B.  &  Ad.  9)  307,  308 
r.  Payne  (2  Chittv,  366)  307 

r.  Penderryn  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

513)    '  1240 

v.  Philips  (1  Str.  394)  302 


King  v 


Pigram  (2  Burr.  707) 
Plymouth  (1  Barnard,  si) 


Page 

378 
1064 


,-.  Portsonby  1 1  Ves.  Jr.  1)  327,  1088 
v.  Poole  (Cas.  t.  Hardw.  23)  304 

v.  Portland  (2  Or.  i  16)  933 

v.  Powell  (Sayer,  239)  1087 

v.  Priest  (6  D.  &  F  T  R.  538)  411 
v.  Pumell  (1  Wils.  2  12)  379 

v.  Radford  1 1  East,  80)  1019 

v.  Reed  i  13  N.  J.  L.  186)  '.    9 

v.  Richards  (8  1).  &  E.  T.    R. 

634)  117 

v.  Richardson  (1  Burr.  617)  327,  328, 
334,  335,  336,  388,  339 
v.  Richmond  (6  I).  &   F.  T.  R. 

560)  379 

v.  Rippon  (1  Ld.  Raym.  563)  307 

r.  Round  (4  Ad.  &  El.  139)  378 

v.  Howe  (Carth.  199)  338 

v.  Rowe  (I  si^w.  188)  338 

v.  Russell  (6  B.  &  C.  566)  884,  885 
v.  Russell  (6  Fast,  427)    153,  7!  5,884, 

886 
v.  Russell  (:'.  E.  &  B.  942)  447 

v.  Sadler  (4  C.  &  P.  218)  447 

v.  St.  Benedict  (1  B.  &  Aid.  447)  711 
r.  St  George  (3  Campb.  222)  1315 
v.  St.  Martin's  Land  Tax  Com'rs 

(1  1).  &  E.  T.  R.  148)    1004,  1019 
V.  Salop  (Fuller's  N    P.   198)  1072 

v.  Salop  County  ( 13  East,  95)  881 
v.  Salway  (9  B.  <S  C  424)  151 

v.  Sandys  (2  Barnard.  302)  337 

v.  Sankey  (5  A.  &  E.  423)      221,  663 
v.  Sargent  (5  D.  &  E.  T.R.  406)   279, 
379,  1086 
v.  Sarmon  (1  Burr.  516)  785,  886 

v.  Saunders    (3  Fast,  119)      242,246, 
1081,  1082 
v.  Sawyer  (10  B.  &  C.  486)  1022 

r.  Scarborough  (2  Stra.  1180)  1019 
v.  Scale  (8  East,  568)  411,  478 

v.  Severn  ,x  Wye Ry. Co.  (2  B.  & 

Aid.  640)  1008,  inf)7 

r.  Shelley  (3D.  &  E.  T.  R.  142)  379 
v.   Shrewsbury    (Cas.  t.  Ilardw. 

147)  338,  345,  1027 

v.  Shrewsbury  (7  Mod.  202)  :!:-;s 

1026 

1086 

342 

380 

1003,  1004, 

1007 

411 

277,  291 

1056 


Slatford  (5  Mod.  316) 
Wythe  (6  B.  &  C.  2  12) 
Smart  (I  Burr.  21  Id) 
Smith  (1  Str.  126) 
Smith  (2  M.  &  S.  598) 


Smith  (5  M.  &  S.  133) 
Spencer  (3  P.urr.   1S27 

Stacey  (1  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  13) 
Stafford   (3   1).   &  E.   T.    R 

651) 
Stainforth  &  K.  Canal  Co.  (1 

M.  &  s.  132)  Kill,  1056 

Stead  (SI).  &E.  T.  R.  142) 
Stewart  (  I  Fast,  17) 
Storr  (3  Burr.  1698) 


1008 


447 
241 
477 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


XC1 


King  v.  Stratford  (14  East,  348)  1133 

v.  Stratford  (1  Lev.  291)  333 

v.  Symonds  (1  Last,  189)  411 

v.  Taylor  (3  SaLk.  231)  327,  328,  336, 

337 
v.  Taylor  (2  Str.  1167)  449 

v.  Tenterden  (8  Mod.  114)  1075 

v.  Theodorick  (8  East,  545)    345,  346, 

347 
v.  Thetford  (12  Vin.  Abr.  90)  380 
v.  Thetford  (8  East,  270)  1019 

v.  Thompson  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

18)  478 

v.  Thornton  (4  East,  308)  301 

v.  Tidderly  ( 1  Sid.  14)  307,  327 

v.  Tizzard  (17  Eng.  C.  L.  193)  309 
v.  Tooley  (12  Mod.  312)  1068 

v.  Totness  (5  D.  &  R.  483)  335 

v.  Tower  (4  M.  &  S.  162)  1027 

v.  Trafford  (1  B.  &  Ad.  874)  447,  882 
v.  Tregony  (8  Mod.  Ill)  242,  355, 
1019,  1066 
v.  Trelawney  (3  Burr.  1615)  308 

v.  Trevenen  (2  B.  &  Aid.  479)     1056, 

1086 
v.  Truro  (3  B.  &  A.  592)  335,  1019 
v.  Varlo  (Cowp.  250)  342 

v.  Ward  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  210)  1056 

v.  Ward  (4  Ad.  &  El.  384)      782,  884, 

885 
v.  Wardroper  (4  Burr.  1904)  1086 
v.  Warlow  (2  M.  &  S.  70)  1087 

v.  Watson  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  204)  322 
v.  Watts  (M.  &  M.  281)  446 

v.  Wells  (4  Burr.  1999)  336 

v.  Wells  (4  Dovvl.  P.  C.  562)  490 

v.  West  Looe  (3  B.  &  C.  685)  1067 
v.  WTest  Looe  (5  D.  &  R.  416)  335 
v.  West  Riding  (2  East,  342),  881,  882 
v.  West  Riding  (7  East,  596)  881 

v.  Westvvood  (4  B.  &  C.  721)  353,  466 
v.  West  Yorkshire  (5  Burr.  2594)  789 
v.  Weymouth  (7  Mod.  371)  277,  291 
v.  White  (1  Burr.  333)  446 

v.  Whitney  (3  A.  &  E.  69)  882 

v.  Whitwell  (5  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  86)  306, 

1088 
v.  Wigan  (3  Burr.  1645)  1068 

v.  Wildman  (2  Str.  879)  378,  1062 
v.  Williams  (1  Burr.  402)  352,  1076 
v.  Williams  (2  Kenvon,  75)  1076 

v.  Williams  (2  M.  &  S.  141)  362,1012 
v.  Williams  (1  Russ.  321)  449 

v.  Williams  ( 1  W.  Black.  93)       1087, 

1088 
v.  Willis  (7  Mod.  2G2)  1062 

v.  Wilson  (1  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.555)  226, 
579,  586,  587,  1045,  1119 
v.  Wilton  (5  Mod.  259)  338 

v.  Wilton  (2  Salk.  428)  338 

v.  Winchester  (7  Ad.  &  E.  215)  282, 
1019,  1022,  1023 
v.  Woodrow  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

732)  306,  1019 


King  v.  Wyatt  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1478) 
v.  Yates  (Stiles  ;  8  Mod.  101) 
v.  York  (4L>.  &  E.  T.  R.  669) 


Pago 
411 

336 
1019, 
1021 

1009 


1010 
447 


540 

714 
568 


1270 


v.  York  (6  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  495) 
v.   Yorkshire,    &c.    (1   A.  &  E. 

503) 
v.  Yorkshire  (7  T.  R.  407) 
King  William  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  v.  Mun- 

day  (2  Leigh,  165)        1006,  1008, 

1009 

Kingman  v.   No.  Bridge  water   Sch. 

Dist.  (2  Cush.425) 

v.  Plymouth  Co.  Com'rs  (6  Cush. 

306) 

Kingsberry  v.  Pettis  County  (48  Mo. 

207) 
Kingsbury    v.    Dedham    (13   Allen, 
186) 
v.  Quincy  Sch.  Dist.   (12  Met. 

99)  343,  349,  359,  300,  524 
Kings  County  Elev.  R.  Co.,  Re  (105 

N.  Y.  97)  872 

Kings  County  F.  Ins.  v.  Stevens  (101 

N.  Y.  411)  671,796 

Kingsland  v.  New  York  (110  N.  Y. 

569)  165,  172 

Kingsley    v.   Brooklyn    (5  Abb.  N. 

C.  1)  547 

Kingston  v.  Horner  (Cowp  102)  139 

Kingston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker  (33  Barb. 

196)  301 

Kinney  v.  Troy  (108  N.  Y.  567)  1260 

v. Zimpleman  (36  Tex.  554)  899 

Kinnie  v.  Waverlev  (42  Iowa,  437)       554 

Kinsella  v.  Auburn  (26  N.  Y.  St.  R. 

884)  698 

Kinsley  v.  Chicago  (124  111.  359)  425,  468, 

474 
v.  Norris  (60  N.  H.  131)  539 

Kinzie  v.  Chicago  (2  Scam.  (111.)  18S)  275 
Kip  v.   N.   Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.  (6 

Hun,  24;  67  N.  Y.  227)  872 

v.  Paterson  (26  N.  J.  L.  298)  396,  425, 
462,  479,  481,  482,  496,  944,  1126 
Kirby  v.  Bovlston  Market  Assoc.  (14 

Gray,  249)  467,  1262,  1266,  1272, 

1273,  1310,  1311 

v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.  (48  Md.  108)     988 

v.  Shaw  (19  Pa.  258)       896,910,914, 

934  972 

Kirk  v.  King  (3  Barr,  436)  '  068 

v.  Nowill  (1  D.  &E.  T.  R.  118)     413, 

416,  421 

Kirkbride  v.  Lafavette  County  (108 

U.  S.  208)  620 

Kirkham  v.  Russell  (76  Va.  956)  146,  396 
Kirkman  v.  Handy  (11  Humph.  406)  479 
Kirtland  v.  Hotchkiss  (100  U.  S.491)  964, 

969 
v.  Macon  (66  Ga.  385) 
Kistner  i».  Indianapolis  (100  Ind.210)  848 
Kitredge  v.  Milwaukee  (20  Wis.  46)  1252, 

1267,  1314 


XC.l 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Battering  v.  Jacksonville  (50  111.  89)     lx" 
Kittle  v.  Pfeiffer  (22  Cal.  190)  757 

Klau  v.  Milwaukee  (53  Wis.  196)       1257 
Klein  v.  New  <  ►rleana  (99  U.  S.  1 19)    674, 

675 
v.  Smith  Co.  Sup.  (54  Miss. 254)  1028, 
1032,  1056 
v.  Warren  Co.  Sup.   (51    Miss. 

1028,  1032,  10S  i 
Klingler  v.  Bickel  (117  Pa.  St.  326)      17.' 

173 
Klinkener  >■■  McKeesport  Sch.  Dist. 

(11  Pa.  St.  Ill)        743,767,  789 
Knapp  v.  Grant  (27  Wis.  117)  635 

v.  Hoboken  (38  N.  J.  L.  371;  39 

N.J.  L.  3!  I:  193,  1031 

Knaust,  ft  (101  X.  V.  188)  90 

Kneedler  v.  Norristown  (100  Pa.  St. 

368)  396,404 

Kneeland  v.  .Milwaukee  (15  Wis.  401)   953, 

971 
Knibbs  v.  Hall  (1  Esp.  279)  1154 

Knight  v.  Ashland  (  11   Wis.  233)  270 

r.  Carrollton  K.  Co.  (9  La.  An. 

284)  700 

v.  Heaton  (22  Vt.  480)      800,  803,  848 
i«.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  11. 

Co.  (7<)  Mo  231)  408 

v.  Nasli  (22  .Minn.  452)  163 

v.  Wells  (1  Ld.  Lavm.  80)  256 

v.  Wells  ii  Lut.  519)  246 

Kniperw.  Louisville  (7  Bush, 599)  424,425, 

939 
Knoblock  v.  Chicago  &  St.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (31  Minn.  I  857 

Knowles  v.  Muscatine  (20  Iowa,  248)    808 

v.  Plantation  No.  4  (14  Me.  25)      541 

v.  fates  (31  Cal.  82)  277 

Knowlton  v.  Rock  Co.  Sup.  (9  Wis. 

11  I)  9G2 

r.  Watertown  (130  U.  S.  327)     798, 

1053 
Knox  r.  Baton   Rouge    (36  La.   An. 

137)  901,1028 

v.  Lee  (12  Wall.  457)  195 

v.  Peterson  (21  Wis.  247)      944,  1000 
Knox  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Aspinwall  (21 

How.:.;::))  226,561,581,  685,590, 

591,  5  .97,  698,  601,  615, 

616,  619,  643,  644,  645 

v.  Aspinwall  (24  How.  376)  1037, 

1045,  1070,  1071 

v.  Jones  (7  Ind.  3)  301 

[cComb  (19  O.  St.  320)  ''.71 

v.  Montgomery  (109  Ind.  69)        1173 

v.  Nichols  ( 14  ( ).  St.  200)        G02,  018 

Knox  Co    Ct.  v.  United  States  (109 

U.S.  229)  1034 

Knoxville  v.  Bell  (12  Lea,  157)  1304 

o.  Bird  (12  Lea.  121)  472 

v.  King  (7  Lea,  441)        418,  419,  122. 

423 
Knupfle  '••  Knick.  Ice  Co.  (84  N.  Y. 

488)  1273 


•Page 
Kobs  v.  Minneapolis  (22  Minn.  159)  1202, 
1203,  1817,  1331,  1333 
Koehler  v.  Black  Liver  K.  Lou  Co. 

(2  Black  (U.  S.),  715)  274 

Koester  v.  Ottumwa  (34  Iowa,  11 )      1257, 

1268,  1281,  1296 

Kohl  v.  United  Suites  (91  U.  S  367)    697 

Kohlhepp  v.  W.  Roxbury  (120  .Mass. 

696)  374 

Kokomo  v.  Mahan  (100  Ind.  242)  81  1, 

959,  1222 
Konrad  v.  Rogers  (70  Wis.  492)  671 

Koons  r.  Lucas  (52  Iowa,  177)  81  1 

Koontz  v.  Hancock  (64  Md    134)  355 

Koppikus  v.  State  Cap.  Com 'rs  (16 

Cal.  248)  726 

Korah  v.  Ottawa  (32  III.  121)        810,  882, 

883 
Kosmak  v.  New  York  (22  N.  E.  R. 

945)  1326 

Kountze  v.  Omaha   (6  Dillon,  C.  C. 

443)  974 

Kranz  v.  Baltimore  (64  Md.  491)  754, 

1330,  1332 
Krause  v.  Sacramento  (48  Cal.  221)  1054, 

L303 
Kreigh  v.  Chicago  (80  III.  407)  808 

Krickle  v.  Commonwealth  (1  B.  Mon. 

361)  483,486 

Kucheman  v.  Chicago,  C.  &  D.  R.  Co. 

(46  Iowa,  3  6)  841,  843 

Kumler  v.  Silsbee  (38  O.  St.  445)         780 
Kundinger  v.  Saginaw  (59  Mich.  355)  499, 

709 
Kunkle  v.  Franklin  (13  Minn.  127)  224 
Kuntz  v.  Troy  ( 104  N.  Y.  3 1 1 1  1297 

Kunner  v.  Augusta  So.  Par.  (12  Mass. 

185)  360 

Kyle  v.  Malin  (8  Ind.  34)       149,  185,  707, 

941,  979 
Kynaston   v.    Shrewsbury    (2    Stra. 

1051)  345 


Labette  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Moulton  (112 

U.  S.  217)    1033.  1044,  1063,  1067 
Labourdette  v.  Municipality  (2  La. 

An.  527)  343,359 

Lackland  v.  No.  Mo.  R.  Co.  (31  Mo. 

180;  31  Mo.  259)  708,  834,  853, 
855 
Lacon  v.  Page  (48  111.  499)  1263,  1273 
Laconia  v.  oilman  (55  N.  11.127)  810 
Lacour  v.  New  York  (3  Duer,  40G)  1157, 
1204,  1211,  1331 
Lade  v.  Shepherd  (2  Stra.  1004)  743,  716 
Lafayette  v.  Allen  (81  Ind.  166)         L198, 

1199,  1204 
v.  Blood  (40  Ind.  G2)  1310 

v.  Bush  ( 19  Ind.  320)       716,  720,  814, 

1221 
v.  Cox  (5  Ind.  38)    147,  149,  185,  197, 

236 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


XC111 


Lafayette  v.  Fowler  (34  Ind.  140)        81  t, 

917,  921,  960,  978,  982,  1122,  1221 

i7.  Jenners  (10  Ind.  74)        72,  80,  8U6 

v.  Larson  (7:!  Ind.  367)  1297 

v.  Male  Orphan  As.  (4  La.  An. 

1)  955 

v.  Nagle  (113  Ind.  425)  1222 

v.  Sclmltz  (44  Ind.  «J7)  712,  714 

v.  Spencer  (14  Ind.  399)  1221 

v.  Timberlake  (88  Ind.  330)110(3,  12U5 
v.  Wortman  (107  Ind.  404)  814.  1219, 
1222,  1232 
Lafayette  &  I.   It.  Co.  v.  Smith  (0 

Ind  240)  718,720 

Lafayette,  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger 

(34  Ind.  185)  78,230 

Lafon  v.  Dufrocq  (9  La.  An.  350)    88,  493 
La    Grange  v.   State  Treasurer  (24 

Mich.  46(1)  378 

Lahr  v.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.  (104 

N.  Y.  2G8)         743,  777,  778,  780, 

788,  790,  793,  819,  832,  837,  850, 

853,  855,  856,  867,  870,  873,  874, 

886,  889,  1230 

Laird  v.  De  Soto  (22  Fed.  R.  421)        141, 

250,  253 
v.  De  Soto  (25  Fed.  R.  76)  1031 

Lake  r.  Aberdeen  (57  Miss.  260)  450 

v.  Decatur  (91  III.  596)  979 

v.  Florida  (18  Fla.  501)  84 

v.  Williamsburg  Trs.   (4  Denio, 

520)  195,  568,  991 

Lake  Count}'  v.  Graham  (130  U.  S. 

674)  202,  611 

v.  Pollins  (130  U.  S.  662)       202,  611 
Lake  Erie,   W.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 

Heath  (9  Ind.  558)  726,  727 

Lake  Front  Case  (33  Fed.  R.  730). 
[See  Illinois  v.  111.  Cent.  R. 
Co.  &c.] 
Lake  Pleasanton  W.  Co.  v.  Contra 

Costa  W.  Co.  (67  Cal.  659)    697, 
825 
Lake  Shore  &  Mich.   So.  R.  Co.  v. 

Chicago  (56  111.  454)  958 

Lake  View  v.  Decatur  (01  111.  506)       979 

v.  Le  Balm  (120  111.  92)  757,  761 

v.  Letz  (44  111.  81)  444,445 

v.  Miller  (25  Mich.  274)  1286 

Lakin  v.  Ames  (10  Cush.  198)        269,  271 

Lamar  County  v.  Clements  (49  Tex. 

347)  751,  752,  757,  758,  763 

Lamb  v.  Lane  (4  O.  St.  167)  724 

i7.  Lynd  (44  Pa.  St.  336)  285,  288,  310, 

1019,  1020 

v.  Shays  (14  Iowa,  567)  674 

Lambar  v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  610)        1320 

Lamborn   v.   Dickinson   Co.  Com'rs 

(97  U.  S.  181)     1147,  1148,  1149, 
1153,  1154 
Lamoille  Val.  R.  Co.  v.  Fairfield  (51 

Vt.  257)  589,  830,  647 

v.  Du  Hadway  (97  Ind.  565)         1000 

Lancaster  v.  Richardson  (4  Lans.  136)  470 


Page 
Lancaster  u.  Walsh  (I  M.  &  W.  10)  209 
Lancaster  Canal  Co.  v.  Rama  by  (11 

A   £  E.  222)  1208 

Lancaster  County   v.    Brinthall   (29 

Pa.  St.  38)  798 

Lance's  Appeal  (55  Pa.  St.  16)  706 

Lancey  v.  Bryant  (30  Me.  466)  382 

Land  v.  Coffman  (50  .Mo   243)  670 

Lander  v.  McMillan  (8  Jones  L.  174)  1068 
v.  Smithfield  Sch.  Dist.  (33  Me. 

239)  347 

Landers  v.  Staten  Island  It.  Co.  (53 

N.  Y.  450)  493,  507 

Landis  v.  Hamilton  (77  Mo.  554)  750 

Landolt  v.  Norwich  (37  Conn.  615)     1260, 

1261,  1283 
Lane,  Re  (76  Cal.  587)    441,  476,  4»2,  505 
v.  Boston  (125  Mass.  519)  1219 

v.  Cotton  (1  Salk\  17)  324 

v.  Crombie  (12  Pick.  177)  1205 

v.  Embden  (72  Me.  354)  596 

v.  Kennedy  (13  O.  St.  42)      796,  797, 

803 
v.  Saginaw  (53  Mich   442)  707 

v.  Schomp  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  82)  1097 

v.  Sewell  (1  Chitty,  175)  316 

v.  Wevmouth  Sch".  Dist.  (10  Met. 

462)  541 

v.  Woodbury  (58  Iowa,  462)         1173 

Lane  County  v.  Oregon  (7  Wall.  71)    896, 

995 
Lanfear  v.  New  Orleans  (4  La.  97)  417 
Langan  v.  Atchison  (35  Kan.  318)  1274 
Langdon  v.  Castleton  (30  Vt.  285)        313, 

554,  569 
v.  N.  Y.  Fire  Dep.   (17  Wend. 

234)  947 

v.  New  York  (93  N.  Y.  129)  116,  165, 

170,  172,  177,  771 

Langhorne  v.  Robinson  (20  Gratt.  661)  897 

Langley  v.  Gallipolis  (2  O.  St.  107)      764, 

765,  766 
Langsdaler.  Bonton  (12  Ind.  467)        375, 

376,  377 
Langworthy  v.  Dubuque  (13  Iowa, 

86)  974 

v.  Dubuque  (16  Iowa,  271)     973,  074 
Lanier  v.  Macon  (59  Ga.  187)  971 

Lansing  v.  County  Treasurer  (1  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  522)         118,  250,042, 
1045,  1049,  1072,  0173 
v.  Smith  (4  Wend.  9)  169,  177 

v.  Toolan  (37  Mich.  152)     UK),  1212, 
1258,  1294 
v.  Van  Gorder  (24  Mich.  456)        557, 

1009 
LaPointe  v.  O'Mallev  (46  Wis.  35)  301 
Laramie  Co.  v.  Albany  Co.  (92  U.  S. 

307 )     94,  267,  270,  271,  273,,  1290 

Laredo  l>.  Macdonnell  (52  Tex.  511)     540 

v.  .Martin  (52  Tex.  548)  180 

v.  Nalle  (65  Tex.  159)  163 

Larkin  v.  Saginaw  County  (11  Mich. 

88)  ^ 1169,  1173,  1180,  1212,  1245 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


Page 

Larmon  v.  Dist.  Columbia  (6  Mackey, 

330)  1297 

Lamed  v.  Briscoe  (62  Mich.  393)         370, 
L188,  L196,  1217 
La  Rosa  v.  New  Orleans  (1  La.  An. 

24)  159 

bee  v.  Peabody  (128  Mass.  561) 

1312 
Larson  o.  Grand  Forks  (3  Dak.  307)  L274 
Larue  v.  Farren  Hotel  Co.  (116  Mass. 

1311 
Lasala  v.  Holbrook  (4  Paige,  169)  1220 
La  Salle  (  bounty  v.  Simmons  ( 10  III. 

513)     '  322,  1148,  L151 

Lates  v.  Briggs  (64  N.  Y.  404)  990 

Lathrop  '•   »  entral  [owa   K\ .  Co.  (69 

Iowa,  105)  796,  858 

v.  Cum    Bank  of  Scioto  (8  Dana, 

111)  274 

v.  State  (6  Blackf.  502)  322 

Lauenstein  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (28  Wis. 

336)  155,059 

Lauglin    v.   Washington    (63    Iowa. 

652)  7(51,  763 

Launder  o.  CI  ieago  (111  ill   291)         427 
Laundry   License  Case  (22  Fed.  R. 

*  701)  393,  426 

Laumz  v.  People  (113  111.  137)      290,  2  17, 

343,  365 

Lavalle  v.  People  (68  111.  252)  1089 

Laver  v.  McGlachlin  (28  Wis.  3(14)       355 

Law  v.  Crombie  (12  Pick.  17(i)  1286 

r.  Dodd  (1  Ex.  845)  216 

v.  Pe  >p!e  (87  111.  385)  204,  1113 

Lawe  v.  Kaukauna  (70  Wis   306)  750 

Lawhorne,  ft  (18  Gratl   85)  303 

Lawrence,  Re  (69  Cal   608)  432 

v.  Chicago  &   N.  W.  R.  Co.  (94 

(J.  S.  164)  92 

v.  Fairhaven  (5  Gray,  110)  1214,1317 
v.  Greal   No.   Ry.  Co.  (16  Q.  B. 

643)  1215 

v.  Hedger  (3  Taunt.  II)  295 

v.  Ingersoll  (12  S.  W.  R.  522)       1025 
v.  Ji  il'erson    Par    Pol.   Jury   (35 

La.  An.  601)  750 

v.  Kiliam  (11  Kan.  409)  195,  513,  516, 

976 
v.  Nahanl  (136  Mass    177)       816,  818 
Lawrence    County   v.    Chattaroi    R. 

Co.  (81  Ky.  225)  42 

Lawrence  R.  Co.  v.  Williams  (35  0. 

St.   108)  s|s 

Lawrenceburg  v.  Wuest{16  Ind.  337)  425, 

440 
Lawson  v  Milw.  &  N.  Ry.  Co   (30 

Wis  597)  226 

v.  Sett  (1  Yerp.  02)  1125 

Lawton    v.   Cambridge    Com'rs    (2 

Caines,  179)  509,  1078,  1121 

v.  Erwin  (9  Wed   233)  299 

Lay  v.  Wissman  (36   Iowa,  305)  583 

Laycock  i>.  Baton  Rouge  (35  La.  An. 

4751  518,  521,  520 


Page 

Layton  v.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

L05,  267,  273 
Lazarus  d.  Toronto  (19  U.  C.  Q.  B  9)  166 
Lea  o.  Hernandez  (10  Tex.  137)  2  II 

v.  State  (  Hi  Lea,  478)  251 

Leach  v.  Cargill  (60  Mo.  316)        944,  981 
Learned  v    Burlington  (2  Am.  L.  li. 

(N.  s.)  394)  237,946 

Leathers  v.  Aiken  (9  Fed.  R.  679)         165 

Leavenworth  v.  Booth  (15  Kan.  627)  425, 

426,  905,  (J08 

y.  Casey  (McCahon  (Kan.  Ter.) 

124)  1320,  1325 

r.  Kinney  (99  U   S  023)  1051 

v.  L.-unc  (6  Kan.  274)  957 

v.  Mills  (6  Kan.  288)  555,  656 

v.  Norton  (1  Kan.  432)    237.  940,  941, 
946,  1110 
v.  Rankin  (2  Kan.  357)  618,  526,  529, 

556 
v.  Stille  (13  Kan.  530)  550 

Leavenworth   &  Des  M.   R.   Co.  v. 

Platte  County  (42  Mo.  171)    158, 
644 
Leavenworth   County  v.  Barnes  (94 
U.  S.  7oi 
v.   Brewer  (9  Kan.  307)  316 

r.  Keller  (6  Kan.  510)  662,  567 

v.  Miller  (7  Kan.  479)  208,  225 

v.  Sellew  (99  L.  S  021)     1051,  1073, 

1071 

Leavitt  v.  Eastman  (77  Me.  117)  374 

Leazure  v.  Hillegas  (7  S.  &  R.  313)      070 

Lebanon  v.  Heath  (17  N.  II.  353)  533 

v.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  Co.   (77  111. 

530)  899,  1107 

v.  Warren  Co.   Com'rs   (9  Ohio, 

80)  753,  763 

Le  Claire   v.   Davenport    (13  Iowa, 

210)  456,458,460.1160 

Le  Clereq   v.   Trustees  of   Gallipolls 

(7  Ohio,  Pt.  1,  218)  691,  703,  77::, 

i   6,787 

Le  Couteulx  v.  Buffalo  (33  N.Y.  33.3)  147, 

667,  002 
Lecraw  Case  (17  How.  426).     [See 

Boston  v.  Lecraw .  &c.] 

Ledwich  v.  McKim  (53  N.  Y.  307)        650 

Lee  v.  Flemingburg  (7  Dana,  50)         208 

v.  Lake  (14  Mich.  12)       744,  750,  752 

v.  Minneapolis  (22  Minn.  13)        1225, 

1319 

v.  Mound  Station  (118  111.  304)       703 

v.  Sandv  Hill  (40  N.  Y.  442)         745, 

1188,  1180,  1100 

v.  Templeton  (13  Gray,  470)        1147, 

11  10 
r.  Thomas  (40  Mo.  112)  953 

v.  W.dlis  (1  Kenyon,  202)      410,  421, 

487 
Lee  County  v.  Rogers  (7  Wall.  181)    118, 
683,  580,  1045 
Lee   Co.   Supervisors   v.  Rogers    (7 

Wall.  175)  1049 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


XCV 


Page 

Lee  Tong,  Re  (18  Fed.  R.  253)  145,  489 
Leech  v.  State  (78  Ind.  570)  308 

Leeds,  Re  (53  N.  Y.  400)  544 

v.  Richmond  (102  Ind.  372)   057,  689, 
1184,  1188 
Leeper  v.  South  Bend  (106  Ind.  375)    975 
Leftvvich  v.  Plaquemine  (14  La.  An. 

152)  766 

Legg  v.  Annapolis  (44  Md.  203)  1069, 

1071 
Legrand  v.   Hampden  &  S.   Col.   (5 

Munf.  324)  275 

Lehigh  County  v.  Hoffort   (116  Pa. 

St.  119)  1158 

v.  Kleckner  (5  W.  &  S.  181)  1143 

Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.  v.  Chicago  (26 

Fed.  R.  415)  731,  1221,  1228 

Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.  v.  Trone  (28  Pa. 

St.  206)  170 

Lehigh  Water  Co's  Appeal  (102  Pa. 

St.  515)  157 

Lehn  >\  San  Francisco  (66  Cal.  76)  1329 
Lehrman  v.  Kohinson  (59  Ala.  219)  034 
Leicester  u.  Pittsford  (6  Vt.  245)       1257, 

1283 
Leiteh  v.  Wells  (48  N.  Y.  586)  583 

Leland  v.  Portland  (2  Or.  46)  750 

Leloup   v.   Mobile   Port   (127   U.   S. 

640)  904,  005 

Leman  v.  New  York  (5  Bosw.  414)  1183 
Lemington  v.  Blodgett  (37  Vt.  215)  1143 
Lemon  v.  Hayden  (13  Wis.  159)  747 

Lemont  v.  Sinner,  &o.  Stone  Co.  (98 

111.  95)  1107 

Le  Neve  v.  Mile  End  (8  E.  &  B.  1054)  741 
Lennig   v.    Ocean    City    Assoc.    (41 

N.  J   Eq.  24)  759,  767 

Lennon  v.  New  York  (55  N.  Y.  361)     132, 

485,  695,  709,  777,  993 

Lent  <:  Tillson  (72  Cal.  404)  984 

Leominster     Canal     Nav.     Co.     v. 

Shrewsbury  &  H.  R.  (3  K. 

&  J.  654)  1115 

Leonard  v.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  498)      675 

o.  Canton  (35  Miss.  189)       149,  434, 

1148 

v.  Storer  (115  Mass.  86)       1276,  1311 

Lerov  v.  New  York  (20  Johns.  430)     1127 

v.  Springfield  (81  111   114)  804 

Les  Bois  v.  Bramell  (4  How.  449)  771 

Leslev  v.  White  (1  Speers,  31)     323,  533, 

1160 
Leslie  v.  St.  Louis  (47  Mo.  474)    707,  716, 
1112,  1121,  1123 
Lessee  of  A.,  &c.     [See  A.'s  Lessee, 

&e.l 
Lester  v.  Baltimore  (29  Md.  415)         1154 
v.  Pittsford  (7  Vt.  158)  1270 

Lethbridge  v.  Winter  (1  Campb.  263)  741 
Levant  Trs.  r.  Parks  (10  Me.  441)  75 

Levasser   v.    Washburn    (11    Gratt. 

572)  803 

Levee   Co  &c.  (27  Mo.  495).     [See 
Egyptian  Level  Co.,  &c] 


Page 
Levering   v.    Mempliis    (7    Humph. 

553)  271 

Lew,  Re  (63  N.  Y.  637)  969 

o.  Chicago  (113  111.050)  982 

v.  New  York  (1  Sandf.  465)         1159 

v.  Salt  Lake  City  (3  Utah  Ter.  t 

03)  145,  1169,  1204,  1206 

Lewenthal   v.  New  York    (5   Lans. 

532)  L331 

Lewis,  Re  (2  Gall.  483)  172 

r.  Atlanta  (77  Ga.  756)  1258 

c.Barbour  Co.  Com'rs  (105  U. 

S.  739)  572,  607,  615,  633,  649 
v.  Elizabeth  (25  N.  J.  Eq  29b)  1094 
v.  Henley  (2  Ind.  332)  1119 

v.  Litchfield  (2  Root,  436)  882 

v.  Marshall  Co    (16  Can.  102)       1019 
v.  Oliver  (4  Abb.  Pr.  R.   121)      3  '■>, 

1023 
v.  Rochester  (9  C.  B.  n.  s.  401)      220, 

553 
v.  San  Antonio  (7  Tex.  288)  755,  801 
v.  Sherman   Co.  Com'rs  (5  Fed, 

R.  269)  577 

v.  Shreveport  (108  U.  S.  282)         540 
v.  Shreveport  (3   Woods   C.  C. 

205)  235,  539,  635 

v.  State  (21  Ark.  211)  505 

v.  Toronto  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  343)     389, 

1140 
v.  United  States  (Morris  (Iowa), 

199)  429 
Lewiston  v.  Proctor  (27  111.  414)  478,  480, 

496 

Lexington  v.  Butler  (14  Wall  282)      561, 

5S2.  593.  618,  620 

v.  Headley  (5  Bush,  508)       373,  374, 

390,  945,  979 

v.  Long  (31  Mo.  369)  498,  706 

v.  McQuillan's    Heirs   (9   Dana, 

513)  722,  913,  918,  925,  933 

v.  Mulliken    (7    Gray    (Mass.), 

280)  1028,  1031 

v.  Wise  (24  S.  C.  363)  500 

Lexington  &  O   R.  Co.  v.  Applesate 

(8  Dana,  289)    841.  848,  863,  870 
Libby  v   Downey  (5  Allen,  299)  463 

Liberty  Bell  Case  (23  Fed.  R.  843). 
[See  Bayle  v.  New  Orleans, 
&c] 
Lichfield  v.  Simpson  (8  Q.  B   73)  342 

Liddy   v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.   (40  Mo. 

506)  865 

Liebman  y.  San  Francisco  (24  Fed. 

R.  705)  572 

Liebstein  v.  Newark  (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

200)  991,  1093,  1123 
Life  &  F.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y.v.  Adams 

(9  Pet.  57  i)  1006 

v.  Wilson's  Heirs  (8  Pet.  291)      1006, 

1056 
Life   Assoc,   of   Am.   v.    St.   Louis 

Assess.  Bd.  (49  Mo.  512)  953 

Liffin  v.  Beverly  (145  Mass.  549)         1301 


xcvi 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


Ligonier  v.  Ackerraan  1 16  End.  552)     S881 
1147,  H  19,  L151,  1152 
Lilly  ,-.  Taylor  (88  \   C.  189)       647,  L027 
Lima  v.  L.  <  'em.  Assoc.   (I-  0.  St. 

1001 
Limestone  Cn  Cora'rs  Ct.  v.  Rather 

(  I-  Ala.  433)  ln:;7 

Lincoln  v.  Boston  1 1  18  Mass.  578)       1 1  * *> T 
v.  Boston  (20  N.  E.  B.  329)  1312 

/■.  Cambria  Iron  Co.  (103  U.  S. 

412)  599 

>:  Chapin  (132  Mass.  470)  320 

v.  Gillilan  (is  Neb.  114)  1283 

v.  Hapgood  (11  Mass.  350)  320 

r.  Sinnh  127  Vt.  354)  151 

,-.  Stockton  (75  Me.  141)         529,  539 
v.  Walker  (is  Neb.  2  1258 

v.  Worcester  (8  Cush.  55)  11 15 

Lincoln  Park  Case  (51  III   17).    [See 

1  'eople  v.  <  Ihicago,  &c.  |  ' 

Linden  v.  Alameda  Co.  Sup.  (45  Cal. 

6)  1059 

v.  Case  (46  Cal.  171)  1114 

Lmdholm  u   St.  Paul  (la  Minn.  215)  1279, 

1301 
Lindsay  v.  Chicago  (115  111.  120)  390,  HO 
Lindsey  o.  Luckett   (20  Tex.  51(1)      305, 

1023,  1025 

v.  Rottaken  (32  Ark.  019)  563 

Linegar  v.  Rittenhouse  (94  111.  208)      2^5 

Linehan,  /:■  (72  Cal.  114)  442 

Lining  v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (1 

McCord,  345)  963 

Linton  v.  Athens  (53  Ga.  588)  971 

Lipp  v.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa    St.  503)   990 
Lippincott  v.  Tana  (92  111.  24)      18G,  239, 

639 
v.  Smyth  (2  L.  T.  (n.  s.)  79)  717 

Li  Protti,  Rt  (68  Cal.  035)  425 

Liquidators  of  City  Debts  v.  Munici- 
pality (6  La.  An.  21)  119 
Liquidators  of   Imperial   Merc.    Cr. 
Assoc,  v.  <  loleman  (L.  R.  6 
II.  L.  C.  189)                           51 1 
Litchfield  o.  Ballon  (114  U.  S.  190)      198, 
537.  538,  539,  557,  812,  635 
v.  Polk  County  (18  Iowa,  70)        1122 
v   Vernon  (41  X.  Y.  123)      776,  896, 
S9S,  913,  92S,  979,  !  S3,  990 
r.  Wilmot  (2  Hoot  (Conn.),  288)  800, 
801,  so:: 
Little,  Rt  (60  N.  Y.  343)                         388 
/•.  Madison  (12  Wis.  643)     885,  1197. 

1271 
v.  Madison  (49  Wis.  605)  1197,  1271 
».  Monill  do  Pick.  543)  321.  346,349 
'•.  Union  Tp.  Com.  (40  N.  J.  L. 

307)  106,556 

Littlefield  v   Maxwell  (31  Me.  134)        768 
v.  Norwich  (40  Conn.  106)  1212,  1301 
Little  Meadows  Bor.,  Re  (35  Pa.  St. 

268 
Little  Miami  P.  Co.  v.  Collett  (6  0. 

St    182)  733 


Page 
Little  Hock  v.  Barton  (33  Ark.  436)    212, 

971 
v.  Board  of  Impr.  (12  Ark.  152)  1052 
v.  Merch.    Nat.    Bank  (98    U.  S. 

308)  520,537,563 

v.  Parish  (36  Ark.   166)  266 

v.  State  Bank  (8  Ark.  227)  564 

v.  Willis  (27  Ark.  572)  L316 

Littler  v.  Lincoln  (  106  111   353)  711 

Little  Schuylkill  Nav.    P.  &  C.  Co.  r. 

Norton  (24   I'a.  St.   165)    915,  921 
Littleton    r.   Richardson   (34  N.   II. 

179)  1313,1315 

Livaudais  v.  Municipality  (16  La.  512, 

5  La.  An.  8)  759,  767 

Liverpool  Ins   Co.  v.  Massachusetts 

(  Pi  Wall.  666)  905 

Livingston  v.  Albany  (11  Ga.  21)  963 

v.  McDonald  (21  Iowa,  160)         1321, 

1323 

v.  New  York  (8  Wend.  85)     722,  726, 

r  57,  758 

v.  Paducah  (80  Ky.  656)  909 

V.  Pippin  (3,1  Ala.  512)  216,  530 

Livingston  Council  &  Int.  r.  Pippin 

(31  Ala.  542)  1093 

Livingston    County    v.    Portsmouth 

Bank  (128  U.  S.  102)      625,629, 
630 
Livingston  Co.  Sup.  v.  Weider  (64  111. 

427)  649,906,927,1111 

[See    also     Lovingston     v. 

Wiiler]. 

Lloyd  v.  New  York  (5  N.  Y.  369)  94, 

1156,  121'.",,  1204,1280,1293,  1331 

,:  Queen    (6  L.  T.  H.  n.  s.  610)     1082 

Loan  v.  Boston  (106  Mass.  450)  1257, 

1263,  1273 
Loan  Assoc.  &c.  (3  Dillon  C.C  376; 
20  Wall.  655).    [See  Citizens' 
Sav.  &  Loan  Assoc.,  &c.] 
Lobdell  v.  New  Bedford  (1  Mass.  153)  882 
Locke  v.  Central  (1  Col    65)  312,  313 

v.  Lexington  (122  Mass.  290)        I  L80 
r.  Hochcster  (5  Lans.  11)        34S,  366, 

367 
Locke's  Appeal  (72  Pa.  St.  491)  78 

Lockhart  v.  Troy  (48  Ala.  579)       87,  134, 

355,  1080 
Lock-port  v.  Gaylord  (61  III.  276)  ss,  L95 
Lockwootl  v.  New  York  (2  Hilton,  66) 

1306 
v.  New  York  &  N.  II.  R.  Co.  (37 

Conn.  391)  749 

v.  St.  Louis  (24  Mo.  20)  151,722,911, 

933,  955,  1120,  1121,1123 

Loeb  i'.  Attica  (82  [nd.  175)  432 

v.  Duncan  (63  Miss.  89)  1126 

Loeser  v.  Redd  (14  Bush,  18)  918 

Loewer  v.  Sedalia  (77  Mo.  43,1)  1285 

Lofink  v.  Allegheny  (5  \Y.  N.  C.  3; 

34  L.  Int.  448)  1000 

Logan  v  Pyne  (43  Iowa,  524)       150,  180, 

428,  430 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCV11 


Page 
Logan  County  v.  Lincoln  (81  111.  156)  485, 

804 
Logansport  v.   Blakemore    (17  Ind. 

318)  523,  627 

v.  Crockett  (64  Ind.  319)        368,  370, 
372,  373,  485 
v.  Dick  (70  Ind.  65)  130"),  1306 

v.  Dunn  (8  Ind.  378)        752,  757,  767 
v.  Humphrey  (84  Ind   467)  1000 

v.  Justice  (74  Ind.  378)  1297 

v.  La  Rose  (99  Ind.  117)  268 

v.  Legg  (20  Ind.  315)  358,  368 

v.  Pollard  (50  Ind.  151)  1222 

v.  Shirk  (88  Ind.  563)  773 

v.  Wright  (25  Ind.  512)  1331 

Lohrum   v.    Eyerman  (5  Mo.  App. 

481)  991 

Loker  v.  Brookline  (13  Pick.  343)        529, 

530,  534,  541, 1261 

v.  Damon  (17  Pick.  (Mass.)  284)  1258 

Lombard   v.  Cheaver  (Morris   (la.), 

473)  429 

London,  Re  (3  Hargr.  St.  Tr.  545)      1089 

Re  (8  Howell  St.  Tr.  1340)      18,  1083 

v.  Bernardiston  (1  Lev.  16)  484 

v.  Cox  ( L.  R.  2  H.  L.  C.  239)        1057 

v.  Lynn  Regis  (1  H.  Bl.  206)  379, 

1072,  1094 

v.  Vanacre  (12  Mod.  270)        306,  423 

v.  Vanacre  ( 1  Salk.  142)  306 

v.  Vanaker  (1  Ld.  Raym.  496)      306, 

396,  421 

v.  Wilmington  (78  N.  C.  109)       1107, 

1120 

v.  Wood  (12  Mod.  674)  420,  490 

Londonderry  o.  Andover  (28  Vt.  416)  139, 

140 

v.  Derry  (8  N.  H.  320)  269 

Long  v.  Battle  Creek  (39  Mich.  323)    374, 

745 
v.  Fuller  (68  Pa.  St.  170)  721 

v.  New  York  (81  N.  Y.  425)  312 

v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax.  Dist.  (7  Lea, 

134)  396 

Lougmore  v.  Gt.  W.  R.  Co.  (35  L.  J. 

C.  P.  135)  179 

Longworth  v.  Cincinnati  (34  O.  St. 

101)  721 

Longworth's  Ex.  v.  Evansville   (32 

Ind.  322)  84 

Loomis  v.  Spencer  (2  Paige,  150)  324,  326 

Lord  v.  Anoka  (36  Minn.  176)  344 

v.  Bigelow  (6  Vt.  465)  76 

v.  Gov.  Cop.  Miners  (2  Phill.740)  352 

v.  New  York  (3  Hill,  426)  1165 

i?.  Oconto  (47  Wis.  386)  146,  155,  156, 

671,  958 

Lord  Bruce's  Case  (2  Stra.  819)    328,  336 

Lord  Colchester  v.  Kewney  (L.  R.  1 

Exch.  368)  952 

Lord  Hawley's  Case  (1  Vent.  143)        336 
Lorie  v.  No.  Chicago  C.  Ry.  Co.  (32 

Fed.  R.  270)  841 

VOL.  I.  —  g 


Page 

Lorillard  v.  Monroe  (11  N.  Y.  392)         73, 

L096,  L169,  1173,  1191,  121)2 

Loring  v.  Small  (50  Iowa,  271)  675 

Los  Angeles  v.   Los   A.    Water  Co. 

(61  Cal.  65)  971 

v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (67  Cal.  433)      966 
Los  Angeles  Gas  Co.  v.  Toberman 

(61  Cal.  199)  521 

Lott  ads.  Ala.  Gold  L.  Ins.  Co.  (54 

Ala.  499)  1107 

v.  Cox  (43  Ala.  697)  96  i 

v.  Ross  (38  Ala.  156)       941,  944,  9  19 

Loud  v.  Charlestown  (99  Mass.  5208)    1124 

v.  Charlestown  (103  Mass.  278)      9(33 

Loughborough  v.  Blake   (5  Wheat. 

318)  902 

Loughlin   v.   Washington  (63  Iowa, 

652)  761 

Loughran  v.  Des   Moines  (72  Iowa, 

382)  1318 

Louisburg  Com'rs  v.  Harris  (7  Jones 

L.  281)  414,437,440 

Louisiana  City   v.  Wood    (102  U.  S. 

294)  537,557,585,635,1140, 

1144,  1192 
Louisiana   (State)    v.    New    Orleans 

(109  U.  S.  285)  1168 

v.  Pillsbury  (105  U.  S.  278)  119,  392, 

942 
v.  St.    Martin's   Par.   Pol.  Jury 

(111  U.  S.  716)       118,  392,  1032, 
1037 
Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Orleans  Nav. 

Co.  (3  La.  An.  294)  97,  147,  195, 
548,  561 
Louisville   v.  Bank  of  Ky.  (3  Met. 

148)  997 

v.  Bank  of  U.  S.   (3  B.  Mon. 

138)  817 

v.  Commonwealth  (1  Duvall,  295)  95, 
108,  657,  673,  950 
v.  Henderson  (5  Bush,  515)  556 

v.  Hennins;  (1  Bush,  381)      969,  1152 
v.  Higdon  (2  Met.  526)  304 

v.  Hyatt  (2  B.  Mon.  177)         918,  979 
v.  Louisville  Rolling  Mill  Co.  (3 

Bush,  416)  814,  1226 

v.  McKean  (18  B.  Mon.  9)      143,  431, 

1065,  1067,  1073,  1074 

v.  McKegney  (7  Bush,  651)  370,  376, 

378 
v.  Nevin  (10  Bush,  549)  444,  535,  955 
v.  Osborne  (10  Bush,  226)  820 

v.   Portsmouth  Sav.  Bank  (104 

U.  S.  469)  231 

t>.  Taylor  (105  U.  S.  454)  631 

v.  University  of  Louisville   (15 

B.  Mon.  642)     103,  108,  121,  123, 

136 

v.  Webster  (108  111.  414)  473 

v.  Wible  (84  Ky.  290)  217 

v.  Zanone  (1  Met.  (Ky.)  151)         1148 

Louisville  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown  (17 

B.  Mon.  763)  848 


XC'VIU 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

\.  R.  Co.  o.  State  (25 
In. I.  177)  969,  1009 

Louisville  &   N.   R.  Co   v.  Davidson 

Co  Ct.  (1  Sneed,  692)  79 

».  Stair  (3  Head,  528)  1134,  1135 

Louisville  &  P-  Canal  ('<>.  17.  Com- 
monwealth (7  B.  Mon.  16  I)     952 
Louisville  &  P.  Street  R.  Co.  v.  L. 

City  R.  Co.  (2  Duvall,  175)    847, 
870 
r.  Smith  (2  Duvall,  550)  865 

Louisville   Bridge  Co.  v.   Louisville 

(81  Ky.  189)  254,  963 

Louisville,  Cine    &  C.  R.  Co   v.  Let- 
son  (2  How.  (U.  S.)  497)        1140 
Louisville  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Louisville 

(4  Hush,  478)   782,  863,  864,  966, 

967 

v.  Louisville  (8  Bush,  415)      157,  468, 

517,  820,  848,  siiii,  863 

Louisville  Gas  Co.  v.  Citizens' Gas 

Co.  (115  V   S.  683)   117,822,826, 
827 
Louisville  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires 

(108  111.617)  139,381 

Louisville  Pol.  Com'rs  v.  Louisville 

(3  Bush,  597)  100,  102,294 

Louisville  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Com- 
monwealth (9  Wall.  353)         902 
Loute  r.  Allegheny  County  ( 10  Pitts. 

L.  J.  241)    1033,  1037,  1069,  1072 

Love  v.  Hinckley  (Abb.  Adm.  436)       151 

i7.  Jersey  City  (40  N.  J.  L.  456)     313, 

314 

o.  Ramsour  (12  Ired.  L.  328)  105,  270 

v.  Schenck  (12  Ired.  L.  304)   105,  270 

Loveland  v.  Detroit  (41  Mich.  867)       208 

Lovell  '•   St.  Paul  (10  Minn.  290)  555 

Lovett   o.   Salem  &  S.   D.   R.  Co.  (9 

Allen  (Mass.),  557)  865 

17.  Steam  S.  M.  Assoc.  (6  Paige, 

54)  679 

Lovingston  v.  Wider  (53  HI.  302)        906, 

1120 
Low  i7.  Commissioners  of  Pilotage 

(R.  M.  Charlt.  302)  296,  479,  567 
v.  Evans  (16  Lid.  180)  295,  296 

v.  Lewis  (46  Cal.  549)  950 

v.  Pettingill  (12  X.  II.  340)  371 

v.  Towns,  Gov,  (8  Ga.360)  1016,  1079 
Lowlier  /•.    Xew    York    (5   Abb.    IV. 

325;  7  Id,  248)  70,95,244 

Lowden,  /?<  (89  N.  Y   548)  989 

i7,  Cincinnati  (2  1  hsney,  203)  655 

Lowe  v.  Clinton.l  136  Mass   24)  1267 

r    Howard  County  (91  Ind.  553)     674 

Lowell  i7.  Boston  (111  Mass. 454)  233,573, 

895.  906 
v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.  (2?.  Pick. 

24)       851,  1308,  1313,  1314,  1315 
t7.  French,  (6  Cush.  223)  991,  992 

17.  Hadley  (8  Met,  180)  1127 

w.  Middlesex  Co.  Com'rs  (3  Allen, 

550)  902 


Page 

Lowell  17.  Oliver  (8  Allen,  247)  22  I 

17.  Short    (1   Cush    276)        1276,  1311, 

L815 
17.  Simpson  (10  Allen,  88)  888 

17.  Spaulding  (4  Cush.  275)  888,  1266, 
1272,  1311,  1815 
17.  Watertown  (58  Mich.  668)  1285 
17.  Wentwortli  (6  Cush.  221)  984,  991 
17.  Wheelock  (11  Cush.  391)  376.  991, 

992 
17.  Wyman  (12  Cush.  273)     991,  1166, 

1167 
Lowell  Five  C.  Sav.  Bank  t7.  Win- 
chester (8  Allen,  109)  519 
Lower  Macungie  17.  Merkhofler  (71 

Pa.  276)  1259 

Loweree  17.  Newark  (38  N.J.  L.  151)  720 
Lowery  v.  Delphi  (55  Ind.  250)  1247 

Low mies   Co.   Com'rs  v.  Bowie  (34 

Ala.  461)  720 

17.  Ilearne  (59  Ala.  371)  368,  373 

17.  lhu.ter  (49  Ala.  507)  1175 

Lownsdale  v.  Portland  (Deady,  139)     750 

Lowry  u.  Rainwater  (70  Mo  152)         451 

Loze'r    Xew  Orleans  (2  La    427)  486 

Lozier  t?.  Newark  (48  X  .1    L.  452)       397 

Lucas,  /.',  (29  Dp.  Can   Q.  B  81)         504 

17.  Lottery  Com'rs  (11  Gill  &  J. 

506)  424,425 

v.  New  York  (21  Bail..  245)  1288 

17.  Pitney  (27  X.  J.  L.  221)     182,  184, 

563 
v.  San  Francisco  (7  Cal.  463)  555 
v.  Tippecanoe  Co.   Com'rs   (II 

Ind.  524)  95,  103,  105 

Luck  17.  Ripon  (52  Wis.  190)  1287 

Ludlow  i?.  (  inc.  So.  Ry.  Trs.  (78  Ky. 

357)  955' 

v.  Tyler  (7  C.  &  P.  587)  259 

Luehrman  v.  Shelby  Tax.  Dist.  (2 

Lea,  425)  25,  59,  87,  95,  107,  251, 

292 

Lumbard  v   Aldrich  (8  N.  H  81)  381,488 

Lumsden  v.  Cross  (10  Wis.  282)  910,  957, 

962 

v.  Milwaukee  (8  Wis.  485)      726,  727 

Lund  17.  Tyngsboro'  (11  Cush.  508)    1263, 

1270 
Lutterloh  v.  Cedar  Keys  (15  Fla.306)  440, 

787 
17.  Cumberland    Co.  Com'rs  (65 

N.  C.  403)  1071 

Lutz  17.  Craw  fords  ville  (109  Ind.  466)  91 
Lycoming  17.  Union  (15  Pa.  St.  166)  130 
Lyddy  v.  Long  Island  City  (104  N.  Y. 

218)  529,  553 

Lyman  17.  Amherst  (107  Mass  339)     1285 

17.  Burlington  (22  Vt.  181)  715 

17.  Edgarton  (29  Vt.  305)  1203 

v.  White  Itiver  Br.  Co.  (2  Aiken 

(Vt.).  255)  1195 

Lyme  Regis  y.  Henley  (3  B.  &  Ad. 

77)  H33 

17.  Henley  (2  CI.  &  F.  331)  242 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XC1X 


Page 
Lynah  v.  St.  Paul's  Par.  Com'rs  (2 

McCord,  170)  1009,  1011 

Lynch,  Re  (2  Hill,  45)  1010 

v.  Alexandria  (9  La.  An.  498)  9U(J 
v.  Eastern  La  F.  &   M.  Ry.  Co. 

(57  Wis.  430)  1107 

v.  Lafland  (4  Coldwr.  96)  303,  305 

u.New  York  (76  N.  Y.  60)  1318,  1319, 
1320,  1321,  1335 
v.  People  (16  Mich.  472)  483 

v.  Smith  (104  Mass.  52)  1284 

Lynchburg  u.  Norfolk  &  N.  W.  R. 

Co.  (80  Va.  237)  971 

v.  Norvell  (20  Gratt.  601)  569 

v.  Slaughter  (75  Va.  57)  560 

Lyiule   v.    Winnebago   County    (16 

Wall.  6)     189,  190,  238,  560,  570, 
581,  593,  597,  614,  620,  649 
Lyndon  v.  Stanbridge   (2   H.  &  N. 

45)  216 

Lynne  Regis,  Re  (10  Co.  122)  260 

Lyon  v.  Adams  (4  S.  &  R.  443)  1030 

v.  Adamson  (7  Iowa,  509)  524 

v.  Cambridge  (136  Mass.  419)  1268 
v.  Commonwealth  (3  Bibb,  430)  278 
v.  Elizabeth  (43  N.  J.  L.  158)       675, 

894 
v.  Fishmongers'  Co.  (L.  R.  1  App. 

Cas.  662)  171,  887 

v.  Irish  (58  .Mich.  518)  324 

v.  Rice  (41  Conn.  245)  1058 

v.  Tax  Receiver  (52  Mich.  271)    1148 

Lyons    v.    Chamberlain    (89   N.    Y. 

578)  602 

v.  Coolidge  (89  111  529)  1032 

v.  Desolette  (124  Mass.  387)         1286 

v.  Munson  (99  U.  S.  684)  594 

Lyons  Highway    Com'rs  u.   People 

(38  111.  347)  1063 


M. 


Maas  v.  Missouri  R.  R.  (11  Hun,  8)      651 
Maberry  ads.   Franklin   (6   Humph. 

368)  1009 

Mabon  v.  Halsted  (39  N.  J.  L.  640)        712 
Macbeath  v.  Haldimand  (1  D.  &  E. 

T.  R.  172)  323 

Macclesfield  v.  Pedley  (4  B.  &  Ad. 

397)  455 

Macdonald  v.  &c.      [See  McDonald, 

&c] 
Macey  v.  Titcombe  (19  Ind.  135)  543 

Machell  v.  Nevinson  (2  Ld.  Raym. 

1355)  364 

Mack  v.  Jones  (21  N.  H.  393)  961 

Maokey  v.  Vicksburg  (64  Miss.  777)  1211 
Maukinnon  v.  Penson  (25  Eng.  L.  & 

Eq.  457)  1171 

Macklot     c.    Davenport     (17    Iowa, 

379)  285 

Macomber   u.    Godfrey    (108   Mass. 

219)  1316 


Macomber  v.  Nichols  (34  Mich.  212)    812, 

885 
Macon  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Macon 

(59  Ga.  648)  957 

v.  Franklin  (12  Ga.  239)  741,  751,  787 
v.  Harris  (75  Ga.  761)  854 

v.  Hill  (58  Ga.  595)        816,  819,  L222 
v.  Huff  (60  Ga.  221)  514,  516 

v.  Jones  (67  Ga.  489)  963 

v.  M.  Sav.  Bank  (60  Ga.  133)       957, 

968 
v.  Patty  (9  Rep.  613;  57  Miss. 

378)  168 

v.   Shaw  (14  Ga.  162;   16  Ga. 

280 ;  19  Ga.  468 ;  21  Ga.  280)    331, 
L126,  112'.),  1131 
v.  Shaw's  Adm.  (25  Ga.  590)  317,  331 
Macon  County  v.  Shores   (97   U.  S. 

272)  582,  593,  631 

Macon    Co.   Case   (99   U.   S.   582). 

[See  U.  S.  v.  Macon,  &c] 
Macy  v.  Indianapolis  (17  Ind.  267)       814, 
815,  1221,  1222 
v.  Titcombe.     [See  Macey,  &c] 
Maddox    v.   Graham   (2   Met.  (Kv.) 

56)      225,  518,  521,  560,  569,  649, 

1028,  1037,  1038,  1052, 1058, 1059, 

1061,  1065,  1069,  1070,  1073 

Madison  v.  Baker  (103  Ind.  41)      129 

v.  Fitch  (18  Ind.  33)  965 

v.  Hatcher  (8  Blaekf.  341)  440 

r.  Kelso  (32  Ind.  79)  313 

v.  Korbly  (32  Ind.  74)     296,  330,  334, 

337,  339 

v.  Ross  (3  Ind.  236)  1318 

v.  Smith  (83  Ind.  502)  589, 1014, 1111 

v.  Whitney  (21  Ind.  261)         965,  968 

Madison  Av.  Bap.  Church  v.  Oliver 

St.  Church   (5  Robt.  649)         356 
Madison  County  v.  Alexander  ( Walker 

(Miss.),  523)  1028 

v.  Bartlett  (2  111.  67)  570 

Madison  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Brown  (89  Ind. 

48)  882,  1297 

Magarity  v.  Wilmington  (5  Houston, 

530)  1323 

Magee  v.  Calaveras  Co.  Sup.  (10  Cal. 

376)  1014,  1021 

v.   Commonwealth    (46   Pa.   St. 

358)  798,  915 

Macrgie  P.,  The  (25  Fed.  Rep.  202)  513 
Magill  v.  Kauffman  (4  S.  &  R.  317)  533 
Maginnis  v.  Brooklin  (26  N.  Y.  St. 

R.  689)  1217 

Magrath  v.  Brook  Tp    (13  IT.  C.  Q. 

B   62'. I)  694 

Magruder  v.  Swann,  Gov.   (25  Md. 

173)  1016 

Maguire  i\  Smock  (42  Ind.  1)  533,  981 
Maiia.lv  v.  Bushwick  R.  Co.  (91  N.  Y 

148)     777,  864,  865,  870,  871,  885 
Mahan  v.  Union   Depot,  &c.  Co.  (34 

Minn.  29)  857 

Mahaska  v.  Ingalla  (16  Iowa,  81)  301 


TABLE    OF    (ASKS    CITED. 


Page 
Maher  i>.  Chicago  (38  111.  26G)      531,  633, 

555 
Mahomet  v. Quaekenbush  (117  U.S. 

509)  s7 

Mahon  v.  Columbus  (58  Miss.  310)       07b 
r.  N.  V.  Cent.  II.  Co.  (24   N.   V. 

658)  792,842 

v.  Utiea  &  S.  R.  Co.  (Ilill&  1). 

Suppl.  (N.  V)  156)  854 

Mahonev  v.  Bauk  of  State  (4  Ark. 

620)  75 

v.  Metrop.   K.    Co.   (104   Mass. 

73)  1285 

Main  v.  Fort  Smith  (49  Ark.  480)         366 
v.  McCarty  (15  111  441)  294,  483 

Major  v.  Randolph  (1  W.  &  S.  514)  102(1 
Malchus  v.  Highlands  (4  Bush,  547)  926 
Maleverer  v.  Spinke  (1  Dyer,  36  b)  1163 
Malloch  ;•.  Anderson  (4  U.  C.  Q.  13. 

181)  789 

Mallory    v.  Courtland    Co.  Sup.  (2 

Cowen,  531)  31G 

v.  Mallett  (6  Jones  Kq.  345)  254 

Malone  v.  Murphy  (2  Kan  250)  507 

v.  Toledo  (28  O.  St.  643)  691 

Malone's  Estate,  Re  (21  S.  C.  435)  94,  108 
Maloy  v.  Marietta  (11  Ohio,  636)  86,  933 
Maltus  v  Shields  (2  Met.  (Ky.)  553)  972 
Manchester  v.  Hartford   (30    Conn. 

118)  1266,  1270,  1296,  1301 

v.  Herrington  (10  N.  V.  104)  321 

v.  Hoag  (66  Iowa,  649)  745 

v.  Quimby  (60  N.  H.  10)  1311 

Manderschid  v.  Dubuque  (25  Iowa, 

108)  1207 

v.  Dubuque  (29  Iowa,  73)       752,  754, 
755,  761,  881,  1203,  1283,  1312 
Mangan   v.  Atterton  (L.  R.  1   Ex. 

239)  1264 

Manhattan   Co.,   Ex  p.  (22   Wend. 

653)  829 

Manhattan  Manuf.  &  Fert.  Co.  v. 
Van  Keuren  (23  N.  J.  Eq. 
251)  448 

Manice  v.  New  York  (8  N.  Y.  120)      557, 

940 
Mankato  v.  Arnold  (36  Minn.  62)  500 

v.  Fowler  (32  Minn.  364)  396 

>•   Meagher  (17  Minn.  265)      750,769 
».  Manitowoc  (52  Wis.  423)  1009 

,■   Warren  (20  Mum.  Ill)  745 

n.  Willard  (13  Minn    13)  783 

Manko  v.  Chambersburg  (25  N.  J.  Fq. 

168)  sin),  801 

Manley  v.  St.  Helen's  Canal  Co.  (2 

II.  &  N.  840)  1215 

Manly  v.  Gibson  (13  111.  312)        740,  742, 

747 
Mann  v.  Pentz  (2  Sandf.  Oh.  257)  274 
Manners    v.    Haverhill    (135    Mass. 

165)  1187 

Manning  v.  Gloucester  Fifth  Parish 

(6  Pick   6)  374,381 

v.  Lowell  (130  Mass.  21)  1322 


Page 

Manning  v.  Manning  (L.  R.  2  P.  & 

D.  223)  279 

v.  Mathews  (66  Iowa,  675) 
Manns  v.  Givens  (7  Leigh,  689)  1006 

Manny,  R*  (11  How.  24)  1006 

Manrose  v.  Parker  (90  1,1.  581)  7.',.". 

Mansfield  >■.  Fuller  (.",()  M„.  ;;;]s)  1031 

v.  Moore  (124  III.  133)  1208 

Mansfield  &  S.  K.  Co.  v.  Veeder  (17 

chin.  558 

Manuel  v.  Cumberland  Co.  Com'rs 

(98  N.  C.  9)  42,  1246 

Manufacturing  Co.,   &c.  (14  Johns. 
238).     [See  Dutchess    Cot- 
ton Manuf.  Co.,  &c] 
Marathon    Sell.    Dist.  v.    Gage    (39 

Mich.  484)  161 

Marble  v.  Worcester  (4  Gray,  305)    1259, 

1203,  1270 
Marbury  v.  Madison  (1  Cranch,  137)   297, 

1048,  1058 
March  v.  Commonwealth  (12  B.  Mon. 

25)  394,437 

Marchant    v.   Langworthy   (6  Hill, 

646;  3  Denio,  520)  348 

Marcy  v.  Oswego  Tp.  (92  U.  S.  037)  593, 

598,  599,  603,  604 

v.  Tavlor  (19  III.  634)  755 

Maiden  u.  Portsmouth  (59  N.  II.  18)     313 

Marietta  v.  Fearing  (4  Ohio,  427)  95,  397, 

405,  422 
Mariner  v.  Mackev  (25  Kan.  669)  074 

Marini  v.  Graham  (67  Cal  130)  784 

Marion   Council   &    Int.   v.  ( 'handler 

(6  Ala.  899)  148,  434,  715,  898, 

1125,  1126 
Marion  Co.  Com'rs  v.   Harvey    Co. 

Com'rs  (20  Kan.  181)  88 

Market  v.  St.  Louis  (50  Mo.  189)       1272, 

1301 
Market  Street  llv.  Co.  v.  Central  Ry. 

Co.  (51  Cal.  583)  864 

Markham  y.  Atlanta  (23  Ga.  402)       814, 

1222 
Markle  v.  Akron  (14  Ohio,  586)    151,385, 

400,  507 
v.  Wright  (13  Ind.  548)         352,  1077 
Marmet  v.  State  (45  O.  St.  63)  426 

Marquis   of  Stafford  v.   Covney    (7 

B.  &  C.  259)  741 

Marr  v.  Enloe  (1  Yerger,  452)  927 

v.  Vienna  (10  U.  C.  L.  J.  275)        278 
Marriage  v.  Lawrence  (3  B.  &  Ad. 

144)  380 

Marriott  v.  Baltimore  (9  Md.  160)       1190 
v.  Hamyiton  (2  Esp.  540  ;  2  Smith's 

L.  C.  237)  1145,  1152,  1153 

r.  Stanlev  (1  M.  &  G.  568)  1204 

Marsh  v.  Brooklyn  (59  N.  Y.  280)  715, 1120 

v.  Fulton  County  (10  Wall.  676)  235, 

236,  238,  518,  519,  529,  540,  542, 

585,  594,  015,  618,  630,  639,  641, 

645,  646,  648,  1034 

v.  Little  Valley  (64  N.  Y.  112)      1081 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CI 


Page 
Marshall  v.  Anderson  (78  Mo.  85)        760, 

759 
v.  Elgin  (8  Fed.  R.  783)  037 

v.  Guion  (11  N.  Y.  401)  177 

v.  Kerns  (2  Swan,  08)  277 

v.  SUliman  (01  111.  218)  134,  210,  280, 
636,  1111 
v.  Smith  (L.  R.  8  C.  P.  416)  415 

v.  Vicksburg  (15  Wall.  140)  955 

Marshall  Co.  C.  v.  Calloway  Co.  Ct. 

(2  Bush,  93)  270 

Marshall  Co.   Sup.  v.  Cook  (38  111. 

44)  239,  277,  504,  039,  045 

v.  Sehenck  (5  Wall.  772)        542,  573, 

584,  593,  594,  598,  017,  630,  0K», 

040 

Marshalltown   v.    Blum    (58    Iowa, 

184)  902,  904 

v.  Forney  (01  Iowa,  578)  794 

Martel  v.  East  St.  Louis  (94  111.  G7)      485 

Martin,  Re  (27  Ark.  407)  398 

v.  Branch  Bank  (15  Ala.  587)         670 

v.  Brooklyn  (1  Hill  (N.  Y.),511)    108, 

157,  324,  529,532,711,1167,  12:)4, 

1331 

v.  Caddo  Par.  Pol.  Jury  (32  La. 

An.  1022)  560 

v.  Carron  (23  N.  J.  L.  228)  928 

v.  Dix  (52  Miss.  53)  94,  972 

v.  Evansville  (32  Ind.  85)        177,  748 

v.  Gleason  (139  Mass.  183)  607 

v.  Lemon  (20  Conn.  192)  360,  361 

v.  O'Brien  (34  Miss.  21)  107 

v.  People  (87  111.  524)  40 

v.  People  (88  111.  390)  432 

v.  San  Francisco  (16  Cal.  285)        568 

v.  Tripp  (51  Mich.  184)  1007 

Martindale  v.  Palmer  (52  Ind.  411)      292, 

351, 408,  486 

Martini,  Re  (23  Fla.  343)  421 

Martinsville  v.  Shirley  (84  Ind.  546)  1179 

Mason  v.  Bristol  (10  N.  II.  30)  527 

v.  Ellsworth  (32  Me.  271)    1288,  1302 

v.  Fearson  (9  How.  218)  158 

v.  Kennebec  &  P.  R.  Co.  (31  .Me. 

215)  1223 

v.  Lancaster  (4  Bush,  406)      944,  970 
v.  Muneaster  (9  Wheat.  445)  656 

v.  Pitt  (21  Mo.  391)  209 

v.  Sliawneetown  (77  111.  533)  386 

v.  Spencer  (35  Kan.  512)         134,  987 
Mason  City  S.  &  M.  Co.  u.  Mason  (23 

W.  Va.  211)  1097 

Massey  v,  Columbus  (75  Ga.  658)       1283 
Massing  v.  Ames  (37  Wis.  645)  944 

Masters  v.  Troy  (50  Hun,  485)  1286 

v.  Warren  (27  Conn.  293)  1287 

Masterson  i».  Mt.  Vernon  (58  N.  Y. 

391)  1161 

Matheny  v.  Golden  (5  O.  St.  375)  157 

Mather  v.  Brown    (L   R.  1   C.  P.  D. 

596)  281 

v.  Ottawa  (114  III.  659)    195,  233,  906 

Mathews  v.  Biddulph  (3  M.  &  G.  390)   295 


Page 

Mathews  v.  Kelsey  (58  Me.  56)     846,  886 

Matthews  v.  Alexandria  (68  Mo.  115)  155, 

156,  07u,  iiTl,  769,  958 

v.  Barraboo  (39  Wis.  074)  1207 

Matthiessen  &  11.  Zinc  ( !o.  v.  La  Salle 

(117  111.411)739,  740,  747,750,773 
Matthiessen  &  W.  Sugar  Kef.  Co.  v. 
Jersey   City    (26  N.  J.  Eq. 
247)  809,  1092 

Matthis  v.  Cameron   (62  Mo  504)      562, 

1121 
Mattingly  v.  Dist.  Columbia  (99  U. 

S.  687)  133,  902 

Matts  v.  Hawkins  (5  Taunt.  20)  22  1 

v.  Plymouth  (100  Ind.  545)  814,  1220, 

1222 
Mau  v.  Liddle  (15  Nev.  271)  1014 

Mauch  Chunk  Bor.  v.  Kline  (100  Pa. 

St.  119)  1260 

v.  Shortz  (61  Pa.  St.  399)        911,  986 
Maultby  v.  Leavenworth   (28  Kan. 

745)  1285 

Maupin  v.  Franklin  County  (67  Mo. 

327)  529 

Maurin  v.  Smith  (8  R.  I.  192)  1016 

Maxmilian  v.  New  York  (62  N.  Y. 

160)      108,115,1180,1193,1194, 
1198,  1199,  1201 
Maxwell  v.  Stanislaus  Co.  Sup.  (53 

Cal.  389)  543,  1129 

May  v.  Detroit  (2  Mich.  C.  C.  230)       543 

v.  Juneau   County   (30  Fed.  R. 

241) 
v.  Logan    County    (30   Fed. 

250) 
v.  Mercer   County  (30   Fed. 

247) 
v.  Milw.  &   M.   R.   Co.  (3  Wis. 

219) 
v.  Princeton  (11  Met.  442) 
v.  School  Dist.  (22  Neb.  205) 
Mayer,  Re  (50  N.  Y.  504) 

v.  New  York  (63  N.  Y.  455)  557,  990, 

1151 
Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head  (13  Allen,  129)  368, 

373,  375 

Mayo  v.  James  (12  Gratt.  17)      616,  1132 

o.  Murchie  (3  Munf.  358)  752 

v.  Springfield  ( 136  Mass.  10)  692 

Mayor,  &c.  of  A.  City,  &c.    [See  A. 

City,  feci 
Mayor    of    Detroit,    Rel.    v.    Park 

Com'rs  (44  Mich.  602)      L24,  699 
Mayor  of  Durham's  Case  (1  Sid.  33)  301, 

L025 
Mayor   of    New    Orleans,    Pros.    v. 

Lockett  (13  La.  545) 
Mayor  of  New  York.  >£e.,  Re  Nassau 

Street  (11  Johns.  77)  573. 

Mayor  of  New    York,  Re  (99  N.  Y. 

569)  699,  927 

Mays  v.  Cincinnati  (1  O.  St.  268)   147, 

395,  426,  429,  908,  940,  941,  1150, 

1151,  1154 


R. 


R. 


1181 

1180 

1180 

725 

1263 

798 

89 


292 


cu 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Maysville  v.  Shultz  (3  Dana,  10)  141 

May  wood  Co.  p.  Maywood  (118  111. 

61)  739,740,764 

McAden  p.  Jenkins  (64  N.  C.  796)       1104 
McAlister  v.  Clark  (33  Conn.  91)  452 

McArthur  p.  Saginaw  (58  Mich.  367)  1157, 

L252 
McAvoy  v    New  York  (54  How.  Pr. 

245)  1163 

McBean  p.  Chandler  (9  Heisk.  349)     466, 
927,  933,  938,  955,  956 
Mo  Brian  p.  Grand  Rapids  (56  Mich. 

95)  544 

McBride   v.  Detroit   (Mich.  236 ;  49 

Mich.239)  316 

v.  Grand  Rapids  (47  Mich.  236)    1007 
McCabe  p.  Fountain  Co.  Coui'rs   (  16 

Ind.  380)  549,654 

McCafferty  p.  Spuyten  Duyvil  &  P. 

M.  R.  Co.  (61  N.  V.  178)      1306, 
1308 
M.(  all    r.    Byram    Manuf.    Co.    (6 

Conn   428)  303,  304 

p.  Hancock  (10  Fed.  R.  8)  G01 

McCalla  v.  Multnomah  County  (3  Or. 

424)  1246 

McCallum  v.  Bethany  Tp.  (42  Mich. 

■157)  995 

McCann  v.  Otoe  Co.  Com'rs  (9  Neb. 

324)  146,728 

v.  Sierra  County  (7  Cal.   121)      720, 

721 
McCartee  v.  Orph.  As.  Soc.  of  N.  Y. 

(9  Cow.  137)  657,  658,  661 

McCarthy  v.  Boston  (135  Mass.  197)  1186, 

1193 
v.  Chicago  (53  111  38)  297,  8»7 

v.  Commonwealth  (110  Pa.  St. 

243)  80 

v.  DeArmit  (99  Pa.  St.  63)  325 

v.  Metrop.Bd.of  W.  (L  It.  7  C. 

P.  C.  508;  8  lb.  191)    688.    L228, 
1231 
v.  Oshawa   V.   (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

245)  1248,  1266 

v.  Portland  (67  Me.  167)  1253 

v.  St.  Paul  (22  Minn.  527)     815,  1225 

v.  Syracuse  (46  N.  Y.  194)     779,  7ss, 

816,  832,  833,  1296,   1326,    L327, 

1328,  1331,  1332 

McCarty  p.  Bauer  (3  Kan.  237)  1202 

McCauitlicv  r.  Providence   (12  R.I. 

149)  1210 

McClosky  r.   Kreeling  (18  Pac.  II. 

433)  -17'1 

McClung  <■.  St.  Paul  (11  Minn.  120)      313 

v.  Silliman  (6  Wheat.  598)  1015,  1044 

McClure  v.  Bennett  i  1  Blackf   189)      195 

u.Oxford  Tp.  (91  U.S.  429)  672,  590, 

629 
v.  Red   Wing  (28   Minn.   186)      724, 

1322 

McCluskev  p.  Cromwell  (11  N.  Y. 

698)  301 


Page 

McComber  p.  Taunton  (100  Mass. 

256)  1270 

McCombs     p      Akron     Council     (15 

<»hio,  474;   18  Ohio,  229)        1226 
McConnel    p.    Lexington  Trs.    (12 

Wheat   582)  743 

McConnell  v.  Dewey  (5  Neb.  385)      321, 

325,  1172,  1175 

p.  Ilanun  (16  Kan.  22s )  233 

Mc<  ouvill   p.  Jersey  City  (39  N.  J. 

L.  38)  191 

McCord  p.  Ochiltree  (8  Blackf.  15)      608 
p   Pike  (121  11-  288)  1092 

McCormack  p.  Brooklyn  (108  N.  Y. 

49)  558,  719 

McCormick   p.  Bay   City    (23  Mich. 

457)  323,  367,  368,  389 

v.  Kansas  City,   St.  J.  &    C.  B. 

R.  Co.  (67  Mo  433)  1215 

v.  Lafayette  (1  Ind   48)  7^0 

p.  Patchen  [53  Mo.  33)  814,959,900 
v.  Washington  (112  Pa.  St.  185)  882 
v.  West  Chicago    Park   Com'rs 

(118  111.655)  721 

McCoy  p.  Briant  (63  Cal.  247)      235,  518, 

521,  1114 
v.  Chillicothe  (3  Ohio,  370)  324,  326 
v.  Harnett  Co.  Jus.  (4   Jones  L. 

180)  1008 

McCracken  p  San  Francisco  (16  Cal. 

591)  297,  358,  368,  621,  533,  534, 
548,  542,  676,  1143 
McCready   v.  Phila.  Guard.  Poor  (9 

S.  &  R.  99)  361 

McCreary  p.  Rhodes  (63  Miss.  308)    1126 
McCrickart  p.  Pittsburg  (88  Pa.  St. 

L33)  1154 

McCrory  p.  Griswold  (7  Iowa,  248)  715 
McCrowell  c.  Bristol  (5  Lea,  685)  449, 
1131,  1135,  1159,  1199 
McCubbin  P.  Atchison  (12  Kan.  166)  557 
McCulloch  p.  Maryland   (1    Wheat. 

316)  67,894,807,902 

r.  State  (11  Ind.  424)  391 

McCullom  p.    Black  Hawk  County 

(21  Iowa,  409)  807,8(18,  1281 

McCullough  p.  Brooklyn  (23  Wend. 

458)  568,  1009,  1204 

v.  Moss  (5  Denio,  567)  563,  571 

v.  San  F.  B.  of  Ed.  (51  Cal.  418)   766 

McCunn's  Case  (19  N.  Y.  188)  308 

McCutchen,  /.'<  (22  V   C.  Q.  B.  613)  1329 

McCutcheon  p.  Homer  (11  C.L.J. 

16;  43  Mich.  483)  1245 

McCutchin   v.  Horner  (5  N.   W.  R. 

668)  H80 

McDade  p.  Chester  (117  Pa.  St.  41  1) 

1157,  1158,  1160 
McDerinctt  p.  Kingston  (57  How.  Pr. 

196)  1295 

McDermond    r.    Kennedy    (Bright. 

(Pa.)  332)  942 

McDermott   p.   Boston   (133    Mass. 

349)  1205 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


C1U 


Page 
McDermott  v.  Metrop.  Pol.   Board 
(5  Abb.  Pr.  422)  2 9  I 

v.  Miller  (45  N.  J.  L.  251)      357,  358, 

1021 
McDonald  v.  Elfe  (1  Nott  &  McC. 

410)  1132 

v.  Mass.  Gen.  Ilosp.  (120  Mass. 

432)  1201 

v.  Murphree  (45  Miss.  To."))  1107 

v.  Newark  (42  N.J.  Eq.  130)         147, 

457,  784 

v.  New  York  (08  N.  Y.  23)      21 II  I,  52 1 . 

529,  537,  538,  540 

v.  Red  Wing  (13  Minn.  38)  1164 

v.  Schell  (6  s.  &  R.  240)  507,  720 

r.  Schneider  (27  Mo.  405)  078 

McDonell  v.  Int.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  (60 

Tex.  590)  180 

McDonoush  v.  Nevada  City  (0  Nev. 

90)  1281 

McDonough's  Sue.  (8  La.  An.  171)      602, 

666 
McDonough  Will  Case  (15  How.  367) 

55,  653,  055,  661   602,  066 
McDougal  v.  Hennepin  Co.  Sup.  (4 

Minn.  184)  161 

McDowell  v.  Mass.  &  S.  Constr.  Co. 

(96  N.  C  514)  240 

McElroy  v.  Albanv  (65  Ga.  387)         1197 
v.  Kansas  City  (21  Fed.  R.  257) 

1224,  1242 
McEwen  v.  Taylor  (4  G.  Greene,  532)  180 
McFarland  v.  Orange  &  N.  H.  C.  R. 

Co.  (13  N.J.  Eq.  17,501)        863 
McFarlane  v.  Kerr  (10  Bosw.  249)        059, 

801 
v.  Milwaukee  (51  Wis.  691)  1312 

v.  Triton  Ins  Co.  (4  Denio,  392)   380 
McFee  v.  Greenfield  (62  Ind.  21)  433 

McGaffin  v.  Cohoes  (74  N.  Y.  387)  1142 
McGarty  v.  Deming  (51  Conn  442)  51 
McGary  v.  Lafayette  (12  Bob.  668  ; 

4  La.  An.  440)     1189   1190,  1287 
McGear  v.  Bridgeton  Treas.  (33  N.  J. 

L.  213)  483,  500 

McGee's  Appeal  (114  N.  Y.  470)    478,  794 

McGehee  v.  Columbus  (09  Ga.  581)    1148 

v.  Mathis  (21  Ark.  40)    722,  907,  921, 

933 
McGinity  v.  New  York  (5  Duer,  074) 

1296,  1301,  1311 
v.  Woodville  (59  Miss.  648)  752 

McGintv  v.  Keokuk  (66  Iowa,  725)  1285 
McGlue   v.   Philadelphia   (10   Phila. 

348)  557 

McGonigle  v.  Allegheny  (44  Pa.  St. 

118)  914,  978 

McGrath  v  Newton  (29  Kan.  364)  970 
McGraw  v.  Wliitson  (09  Iowa,  348)     365, 

:lss 

McGregor  v.  Boyle  (34  Iowa,  268)       786, 

819,  1331,  1334 

v.  Calcutt(18U.  O.O.  P.  39)  745 

v.  Logansport  (79  Ind.  166)  514 


Page 

McGuiness  v.  New  York  (52  How.  Pr. 

150)  1205 

McGuinn  v.  Peri  (16  La.  An.  326)  070 
McGuire  v.  Spence  ('.»1  N.  V.  303)  12£  I 
Mclnerny  v.  Heed  (23  Iowa,  410)         958, 

999,  lool 
Mclnery    v.    Galveston    (58   Texas, 

334)  313 

Mrlmire  v.  State  (5  Blackf.  384)  733 

Mclntvre  v.  Easton  &  A.  R.  Co.  (26 

X.  J.  Eq.  425)  700 

v.  Sch.  Trs.  of  Tp.  9,  &c.  (3  111. 

A pp.  77)  301 

v.  Wood  (7  Cranch,  504)   ^  Mil 

Mclntyre  Poor  School  Trs.  v.  Zanes- 
ville  Canal&M.  Co.  (9 Ohio, 
203)  243 

McKay  v.  Buffalo  (74  N.  Y.  619)         1197 
v.  Detroit  &    E.    PI.   R.   Co.  (2 

Mich   138)  808 

McKean  v.  Louisville  (18  B.  Mon.9) 

1014 
McKee  v.  Anderson  T.  Council  (Rice, 

L.  24)  429,  1132,  1144,  1117 

v.  Bidwell  (74  Pa.  St.  218)  1269 

v.  Brown  (23  La.  An.  306)  979 

v.  Huron  Dist.  Ct.  (1  U.  C  Q.  B. 

368)  269 

v.  McKee  (8  B   Mon.  433)      41S,  42  I, 

471 

v.  Perchment  (69  Pa.  St.  342)        753, 

755,  757 

v.  St.  Louis  (17  Mo.  184)         743,  752 

v.  Vernon  County  (3  Dillon  C. 

C.  210)  581 

McKeigue  v.  Janesville  (68  Wis.  50)  1285, 

1287,  1297 
McKellar  v.  Detroit  (57  Mich.  153)    125-.', 

1262 
McKenna  v.  Boston  (131  Mass.  143)     755 
v.     Lancaster     Road      Com'rs 

(Harper  (S.  C.)  L.  381)  757 

McKenzie   v.   Northfield    (30    Minn. 

450)  1285 

McKevitt  v.  Hoboken   (45  N.  J.  L. 

482)  814,  819 

McKibbin   v.  Fort   Smith    (35   Ark. 

352)  212,445 

McKinney  v.  O'Connor  (26  Tex.  5)      281 
McKnight  V.  Grant  Par.  (30  La.  An. 

361 )  675 

v.  New  Orleans  (24  La.  An    412)    513 
McLauehlin   v.  Charlotte  &  S.  C.  R. 

Co.  (5  Rich.  L.  583)         786,  855 
McLaughlin   r.    Cluley    (56  Pa.  St. 

270)  279 

v.  Corry  (77  Pa.  St.  100)      1261,  1282 
r.  Municipality  (5  La.  An.  504)    711, 
713,1204 
v.  Stevens  (18  Ohio,  94)  177 

v.  Stevens  (2  Cranch  C.   C.  R. 

148)  437 

McLaury  v.  McGregor  (54  Iowa,  717) 

1284 


CIV 


TABLE    OP    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

McLean  v.  Brantford  Council  (16  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  347)  638 

v.  Flagg  i  16  V  V    Hi])  744,  823 

v.  Great  W.  Ry.  Co.  (33  U.  C.  Q. 

B.   198)  718 

McLean    Co     Precinct  Deposit 

Bank  (81  Ky.  264)  997,  998 

McLellan  v.  Young  (54Ga.  399)     161,  162 
McLimans  v.  Lancaster  (63  Wis.  590) 

L297 
McLott  v.  Davenport  (17  Iowa,  379)  1120 
McMahon  v.  Cine  &  ('.  S.  L.  K.  Co. 

(6Ind.413)  To- 

v.  Savannah  (66  Ga.217)  277 

McMasters    v.    Commonwealth    (3 

Watts,  292)  721,  914 

McMaugli   r.    Milwaukee    (32   Wis. 

200)  1300 

McMicken  v.  Cincinnati   (4   O.  St. 

394)  709 

McMillen  v.  Boyles  (6  Iowa,  304)  134,  635 
McMinn    Acad.  Trs.  v.    Reneau   (2 

Swan,  9  1)  262 

McMullan  ('.Charleston   C.  Council 

(1  Hay,  46)  413,  507 

McMurray  v.  Baltimore  (54  Md.  103)  165, 

175,  749 
McNally,  Re  (73  Cal.  632)  434 

v.  Cohoes  (60  Hun.  202)  1281 

McNamara  v.  Ciintonville  (62  Wis. 

207)  1287 

r.  Estes  (22  Iowa,  246)  977 

McNaughton  v.  Elkhart  (86  Ind.  384) 

1312 

McPhee  v.  Venable  (77  Ga    772)         1000 

McPherson  v.  Chebanse  (114  111.  46)     468 

v.  Foster  (43  Iowa,  48)    202,  203,  639, 

1034 
McPikew.  Parr  (51  Mo.  63)  347 

McRae   v.  O'Lain   (1    McMullan  L. 

328)  419 

McShane  v.  Moberly  (79  Mo.  41)  750 

MeSpedon  v.  New  York   (7   Bosw. 

601)  534,556 

McVeany   ».  New   York  (80  N.  Y. 

185)  287,318 

McVoy  v.  Knoxville  (85  Tenn.  119)    1287 
McWhinnev  v.  Indianapolis  (98  Ind 

182) 
McWhorter  v.  IVople  (05  111.  290) 


1147 
240, 
56  1 

767 


Mc Williams  v.  Morgan  (til  111.  89) 
Meacliam  v.   Fitchburg    R.  Co.    (4 

Cush.  291)  731 

Mead,  Re  (74  N.  Y.  216)  777,  1111 

v.  Acton  (139  Mass.  341)  224 

v.  Ballard  (7  Wall.  290)  67:; 

v.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  72)        1183, 

1198 
Meagher  v.  Storey  County  (5  Nev. 

211)  '    312,318,494 

Mealing   i\    Augusta   (Dud.    (Ga.) 

221)  1132 

Means  v.  Ilendershott  (24  Iowa,  78)     209 


Page 
Meares  v.   Wilmington    Com'rs    (9 

Ired.  L.  73)  1229,  1323,  1331 

Mears  v.  Graham  (8  Blackf.  144)  195 

Mech.  &  Tr.  Bank  v.  Bridges  (30 

N.  J.  L.  Ill)  142,143 

Mechanics'   Bank   v.  Kan.    City   (73 

Mo.  555)  119 

Mechanics'  Bank  (N.  Y.)  v.  N.  Y.  & 

N.  11    R   Co   (13 N.  Y.  609)     560 
Mechanics'    Bank  of  Alexandria  v. 
Bank  of  Columbia  (5  Wheat. 
326)  524 

v.  Seton  (1  Pet  299)  365 

Mechanicsburg  v.  Meredith  (54  111. 

84)  881,1246 

Medical  Institution  of  Geneva  Col. 
r.  Patterson  (1  Denio,  01  ; 
5  lb.  618)  76 

Medina  v.  Perkins  (48  Mich.  67)  882 

Medway  Cot.  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Adams 

(10  Mass.  360)  260 

Meech  v.  Buffalo  (29  N.  Y.  198)  551 

Meek  v  Whitechapel  Bd.  of  W.  (2 

F.  &  F.  144)  1331 

Meeker  v.  Van  Rensselaer  (15  Wend. 

397)  378,  443,  448 

Megowan  v.  Commonwealth  (2  Met. 

(Ky.)  3)  433,  469 

Mehan  v.  Hudson  County  (40  N.  J.  L. 

270)  312 

Meinzer  v.  Racine  (70  Wis.  561)  1219 

Meissner  v.  Toledo  (31  O.  St.  387)        920 
Melick  v.  Washington  (47  N.  J.  L. 

254)  412,414 

Mellen  v.  Lansing  (20  Blatch.  278)       647 
v.    Western    R.    Co.    (4    Gray, 

301)  1881 

Mellinger  v.  Houston  (68  Tex.  37)        996 
Melpomene    Street   Inhab.    v.    New 

Orleans  (14  La.  An.  452)        153 

Melvin  v.  Lisenby  (72  111.  63)        640,  650 

Memphis  v.  Adams  (9  Heisk.  518)        149, 

274,  553,  554 

v.  Battaile  (8  Heisk.  524)  811 

v.  Brown  (97  U.  S   300)  1012 

v.  Brown  (20  Wall.  289)         316,  648, 

553,  554,  555,  550,  583 

v.  Hernando  Ins.  Co.  (0  Baxter, 

527)  900 

v.  Kirabrough  (12  Heisk.  133)  1205 
v.  Laski  (9  Heisk.  511)  161 

v.  Passer  (9  Humph.  757)  1331 

v.  Lenore  (6  Coldw.  412)  801 

r.  O'Connor  (53  Mo.   168)  482 

v.  Pay  (19  Wall.  468)  431 

v.  United  States  (87  U.  S.  293)  1042 
v.  Winfield  (8  Humph.  707)  396,  399 
v.  Woodward  (12  Heisk.  499)  318 

v.  Wright  (6  Yerg.  497)  768 

Memphis  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Neighbors 

(51  Miss.  412)  672 

v  Payne  (37  Miss.  700)  718 

Memphis  &  St  L.  Packet  Co.  v.  Gray, 

(9  Bush,  137)  177,  757,  759 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CV 


Memphis  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Memphis 

(4  Coldw.  406)  860,  863 

Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Memphis  (4 

Coldw.  419)  701,  704 

Memphis  K.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son (24  Kan.  170)  644 
Menasha  v.  Hazard  (102  U.  S.)     594,  629, 

630,  634 
Mendel   v.    Wheeling    (28    W.    Va. 

233)  1200 

Mendota  v.  Thompson  ('20  111.  197)        70, 

244,  485 
Mentz  v.  Cook  (108  N.  Y.  504)  618 

Mercer  v.  Pittsburgh  &  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R. 

Co.  (36  Pa.  St.  99)  121,  705,  776, 
808,  833,  84G,  863 
v.  Woodgate  (LR.  5  Q.  B.  26)       741 
Mercer  Bor.  Road,   Re  (14  S.  &  R. 

447)  808 

Mercer  County  v.  Hackett  (1  Wall. 

S3)     193,  226,  560,  582,  593,  602, 

(ill,  617,  618,613,  644,  645 

v.  Hubbard  (45  111.  139)  646 

v.  Jackson  (54  111.  397)  1307 

v.  Pittsburgh  &  E.R.  Co.  (27  Pa. 

St.  389)  643 

Merchants'  Bank  v.  Cook  (4  Pick. 

405)  1172 

Merchants'  Exch.  Nat.  Bank  of  N.  Y. 
v.  Bergen  County  (115  U.  S. 
384)  604,  648 

Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Little  Rock 

(5  Dill.  299)  563 

Merchants'    Union   B.   Wire  Co.  v. 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  (70 

Iowa,  105)  384,  846 

Meriden  v.  Camp  (46  Conn.  284)  918 

Meriwether  v.  Garrett  (102  U.  S.  472)  93, 

107,   108,   118,  140,  160,  245,  248, 

250,  251,  254,  671,  674,  897,  900, 

939,  995,  1000,  1027,  1033 

Merrell  v.  Campbell  (49  Wis.  535)        161 

Merriam,  Re  (84  N.  Y.  596)  514 

v.  Moody's  Ex.  (25  Iowa,  163)      147, 

149  999 

v.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An.  318) '  423 

486,  909 

v.  Yuba  Co.  Sup.  (72  Cal.  517)      1114 

Merrick  v.  Amherst  (12  Allen,  500)      906, 

909,  933 
v.  Baltimore  (43  Md.  219)  714 

v.  Burl.  &  W.  PI.  R.  Co.  (11  Iowa, 

74)  539 

Merrifield  v.  Worcester  (110  Mass. 

216)  1214,1327,1330 


Merrill  v.  Abbott  (62  Ind.  549) 
v.  Burbank  (23  Me.  538) 
v.  Dixfield  (30  Me.  157) 
v.  Hampden  (26  Me.  234) 
v.  Humphrey  (24  Mich.  170) 

v.  Monticello  (14  Fed.  R.  628) 
v.  Monticello  (22  Fed.  R.  589) 


981 

679 

551 

1255 

1120, 

1124 

187 

185, 

187 


Merrill  v.   No.  Yarmouth  (78  Me. 

2()(i)  1286 

v.  Plainrield  (45  N.  II.  126)  220,  11U9, 

1111,  1112 

v.  Portland  (4  Clif.  C.  C.  138)   1252, 

1253,  1263,  1264,  1276,  1285, 121(9, 

1301 

Merrimac  River  Canal,  &c.  Prop.  v. 

Lowell  (7  Gray,  223)  1214,  1330, 

1334 

Merritt  v.  Portchester  (71  N.  Y.  309)  940, 

944,  984 
Mersey  Dock  Cases    (11   H.   L.   C. 

687)  1205,  1207,  1215,  1220,  1297 
1334 
Mersey  Dock  Trs.  v.  Gibba  (L.  R.  1 

H.  L.  93)      179,  1156,  1201,  1207, 
1209,  1282,  1297. 
v.  Penhallow  (L.  R.  1  H   L.  93  ; 
1  H.  &  N.  439 ;  3  H.  &  N. 
164;  7  H.  &N.  329)      1150,  1298 
Merwin  v.  Chicago  (45  111.  133)     161,  162 
Merz  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (88  Mo. 

072)  857 

Messenger  v.  Buffalo  (21  N.  Y.  196)     523, 

559 
Metcalf  o.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo.  103)      385, 

443 
Metcalfe  v.  Hetherington  (11  Exch. 

257)  179 

v.  Hetherington  (5  H.  &  N.  719)     179 
Methodist  Chapel  Corp.   v.  Herrick 

(25  Me.  354)  374 

Methodist   Church,    Re    (66    N.    Y. 
395).     [See  Second  Av.  M. 
E.  Church,  &c] 
Methodist   E.  Church  v.  Wyandotte 

(31  Kan.  721)  1217,  1218 

Methodist  E.  Church  of  Hob.  v.  Hobo- 
ken  (33  N.  J.  L.  13)  741,  745,  758, 
766,  769,  783,  789,  1222 
Methodist  E.  Church  of  Wabash  v. 

Ellis  (38  Ind.  3)  952,  953 

Methodist  Prot.  Church  r.  Baltimore 

(6  Gill,  391)       153,  387,  395,  705, 
710,  716,  726 
Metropolitan  Bd.  of  Excise  v.  Barrie 

(34  N  Y.  657)  432 

Metropolitan  Bd.  of  Health  v.  Heister 

(37  N.  Y.  661)     27,  294,  442,  776 
Metropolitan  Citv  Ry.  Co.  v  Chicago 

(96  111.  620)  454,  789 

Metropolitan  Elev.  R.  Co.,  Re   (18 

N.  Y.  Sup.  C.  134)  872 

Metropolitan  R.    Co.   v.   Quincy  R. 

Co.  (12  Allen,  262)  870 

Metropolitan  Ry.  Co.,  Re  (14  W.  Dig. 

520)    *  872 

Metzger  v.  Attica  &  Arc.  R.  Co.  (79 

N.  Y.  170)  1106, 1114 

Meuser  v.  Risdon  (36  Cal.  239)     154,  958, 
991   993  994 
Meyer   v.   Bridgeton    (37   N.  J.'  L.  ' 

160)  483 


cvi 


TABLE    OP    CASES   CITED. 


Page 

M.  yer  v.  Brown  (65  Cal.  583)  1027 

'  v.  Burlington  (52  Iowa,  500)      1217, 

L224 
v.  Carolan  (9  Tex.  250)  1013 

v.  Frornm  (108  tnd.  208)  407 

,-.  Johnson  (53  Ala.  241)  909 

v.  Lindell  By.  Co.  (6  Mo.  App. 

27 j  865 

r.  Metrop.   Elev.    Kv.    Co.  (D. 

Keg.  [18801)  s77 

w.Muscatine  (1  Wall.  384)     151,  196, 
226,  236,  548,  560,  564   56 

593,  598,  61  I,  HIT 
v.  Newark  (6  Am.  L.  Rev.  570)  735 
v.  Porter  (65  Cal.  07)  252 

Meyers  v.  Cliicago,  K.  I.  >&  P.  R.  Co. 

(57  [owa,  555)  396,  857 

Meylert's  Ex.  v.  Sullivan  County  (19 

Pa.  St.  189)  1148 

Michel  v.  Terribonne  Par.  Pol.  Jury 

(9  La.  An.  67)  555 

o.  Wesi  Baton  Rouge  Pol.  Jury 

(3  La.  An.  123)  555 

Michener  v.  Philadelphia  (118  Pa.  St. 

535)  819 

Michie,  Rt  ( 11  U.  C.  C.  P.  379)     152,  980 
Michigan  City  v.  Roberts  (34  Ind. 

471)  1014,  1017 

Middleport  v    yEtna  L.  Ins.  Co.  (82 

111.502)  186,239 

Middlesex  II.  &  M.  Soc.  v.  Davis  (3 

Met.  (Mass.)  133)  258 

Middlesex   It    Co.  v.  Charlestovvn  (8 

Allen,  330)  966 

r.  Wakefield  (103  Mass.  261)  803 

Middleton  y.  Allegheny  Co.  Com'rs 

(37  Pa.  2117)    192,  194,618,  1059, 
1009 
v.  Lowe  (30  Cal.  596)  1016 

Middleton  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dubuque  (15 

[owa,  394)  070,  078,  679 

Middletown  Vil.,  Re  (82  N.  V.  190)     697 

708 
Mikesell  v.  Durkee  (36  Kan.  97)  849,  854 
Milan  &  R.  PL   R.  Co.  v.  Busted  (3 

O.St.  578)  157 

Milan  Taxp.  v.  Tenn.  Cent.  R.  Co. 

(11  Lea,  330)  236,575 

Milarkey  v.  Foster  (0  Or.  378)     781,  784, 

786 
Milburn  v.   Cedar   Rapids   (12  Iowa, 

246)  820,  850,  853,  870 

Miles  v.  Bough  (3  Oale  &  D.  119)     370, 

408 

v.  Chamberlain  (17  Wis.  440)         U3, 

410,  H8 

u.  Charleton  (29  Wis.  400)  88 

v   Duncan  (6  B.  &  C.  671)  1118 

Milford  v.  Holbrook  (9  Allen,  17)       1076. 

1311,  1312,  1313 

Milford  &  C.  Tump.  Co.  v.  Brush  (10 

Ohio,  111)  261 

Milhau  v.  Sharp  (15  Barb.  193)     822,  828, 

853,  800,  1114 


Page 

Milhan  v.  Sharp  (19  Barb.  435)  155 

o.  Sharp  (27  N.  V.  011)  110,  157,  7S2, 

786,  787,  788,  863,  860 

Military  Parade  Ground,  2&  (60N.Y. 

310)  711 

Mill  Dam  Foundry  Prop.  v.  Hovey 

(21  Pick.  417)  273 

Millard  v   Lafayette  (5  La.  An.  112)     711 
Mille  Lacs  Co.  Treas.  ads.  State  (20 

Minn   363)  1016 

Miller  r.  Aracoma  (30  W.  Va.  600)      751 

v.  Burch  (32  Tex.  209)    378,  383,  419, 

454 
v.  Dearborn  Co.  Com'rs  (00  Ind. 

102)  185 

v.  English  (21  N.  J.  L.  317)  277 

v.  Ford  (4  Kick  L.  370)  323 

v.  Grundv  (13  Mich   540)  1116 

r.  Hull  (4  Denio,  144)  520 

v.  Iron  County  (29  Mo.  122)         1175 
v.  Jones  (80  Ala.  89)  1126 

v.  Lerch  (1  Wall.  Jr.  210)  662 

v.  Lynchburg  (20  Gratt  330)         563 
v.  McWilliams  (50  Ala.  427)  074, 1029, 

1172 

v.  Milwaukee  (14  Wis.  012)  513 

v.  Mobile  (17  Ala.  163)   710,  720,  979, 

980,  1092 

v.  No.  Fredricksburgh  Corp.  (25 

U.  C.  Q   K.  31)  1248 

v.  O'Reilly  (84  Ind.  168)  478 

v.  Race  (1  Burr.  452)  582 

v.  Sacramento  Co.  Sup.  (25  Cal. 

93)  307 

v.  Savannah   Fire  Co.   (26  Ga. 

678)  217 

v.  School  Trs.  (88  111.  20)    1125,  1126 

v.  Stewart  (9  Wheat.  680)  301 

v.  Thomson  (3  M.  &  G.  570)  562 

Millers  v.  Augusta  (63  Ga.  772)  1211 

Millerstown  Bor.  v.  Frederick  (114 

Pa.  St.  435)  203,004,013,639 
Milliard  v.  Lafayette  (5  La.  An.  112)  713 
Milliken  v.   Weatherford   (54  Tex. 

388,)  332,403 

Millison  v.  Fisk  (43  111.  112)  163 

Mills  v.  Brooklyn  (32  N.  Y.  489)        1158, 

1220,1317,1319,132:',,  L325,  1327, 

L328,  1331,  1332,  1333.  1332 

v.  Charleton  (29  Wis.  400)     122,  543, 

545,  993,  994,  1125 

v.  Gleason  (11  Wis.  470)  183, 185, 188, 

357,  542 

v.  Gleason  (8  Am.  Law  Reg.  083)  1%, 

539 

r.  Parlin  (100  111.60)  855 

v.  Thornton  (20  111.  300)  964 

v.  Williams  (11  Ired.  558)  77,  91 

Mill's  Case  (T.  Kaym.  152)  1072 

Milne   v.    Davidson   (5   Martin,  N.  s. 

409)  385,380,442,451 

v.  Mayor  (13  La.  69)  206 

Milner's  Adm.  v.  Pensacola  (2  Woods 

C.  C.  032)  141,  193,  250,  255 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CV11 


Milnes  v.  Duncan  (6  B.  &  C.  G71)        1153 
v.  Huddersfield  (L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  D. 

125)  1205,  1213 

Milton  Road,  Re  (40  Pa.  St.  300)  808 

Milward  v.  Thatcher  (2  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

87)  308,309 

Milwaukee  v.  Davis  (6  Wis.  377)       1298, 

1300 
v.  Koeffler  (116  U.  S.  219)  1121 

v.  Milwaukee  T.  (12  Wis.  93)        271 
v.  Milw.  &,  Beloit  R.  Co.  (7  Wis. 

85)  833,  850 

Milwaukee  &  Minn.   R.   Co.,  .fie  (5 

Wall.  188)  1074 

Milw.  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  v.  Waukesha 
Co.  Sup.  (3  Am.  L.  Reg. 
679)  910 

Milwaukee  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fari- 
bault (23  Minn. 167)  689 
Milwaukee  Fire  Dep.  v.  Helfenstein 

(16  Wis.  136)  426,910 

Milwaukee  Iron  Co.  v.  Hubbard  (2J 

Wis.  51)  1121 

v.  Schubel  (29  Wis.  444)     1127,  1131 
Minden  v.   Silverstein   (36  La.  An. 

912)  432 

Miners'  Bank  of  Dubuque  v.  United 

States  (1  G.  Greene,  553)        391 
v.  United  States  (5  How.  (U.  S.) 

213)  1090 

Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach  (37 

Cal.  543)  91,519,  678,  1140 

Minick  v.  Troy  (83  N.  Y.  514)  1284 

Minneapolis  v.  Wilkin  (30  Minn.  140) 

724 
Minneapolis  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Minneapolis 

(3(3  Minn.  159)  154 

Minnesota  v.  St.  Paul  (2  Wall.  609)      969 
Minnesota      Linseed      Oil     Co.     v. 

Palmer  (20  Minn.  468)    942,  976, 
1092 
Minns  v.  West  (38  Ga.  18)  583 

Minor  v.  Mech.  Bank  of  Alex.  (1  Pet. 

46,  69)  320 

Minot  v.  Boston  Asylum  (7  Met.  416)  262 

v.  Curtis  (7  Mass.  441)  271 

v.  West  Roxbury  (112  Mass.  1)      53, 

54,  1101 

Minturn  v.  Larue  (23  How.  435)  147,  148, 

180 
Mirande,  R?  (73  Cal.  365)  364,  425 

Mississippi  &  R.  Rivers  Boom  Co.  v. 

Patterson  (98  U.  S.  403)         729, 
730,  731 
Mississippi  River  Br.  Co.  v.  Ring  (58 

Mo  491)  733 

Mississippi  Society  of  Arts  and 
Sciences  v.  Musgrove  (44 
Miss.  820)  439 

Missouri  River,  Ft.  S.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v. 

Morris  (7  Kan.  210)  1124 

Mitchell  v.  Burlington  (4  Wall.  270)    197, 

231,  564,  586 

v.  Foster  (9  Dowl.  P.  C  527)         280 


Page 
Mitchell  v.  Franklin  &  C.  Turnp. 

Co.  (3  Humph.  456)         718,  720 
v.  Hay  (37  Ga.  581)  1012 

v.  Kirkland  (7  Conn.  229)  7<)7 

v.  Lemon  (34  Md.  176)  483 

v.  .Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  92)  544,  1122 
v.  Rockland  (41  Me.  363)  522,  543 
v.  Rockland  (45  Me.  196)  53,  143 

v.  Rockland  (52  Me.  118)        213,  293, 
1172,  1174,  1187,  1195,  1201 
v.  Rome  (49  Ga.  19)     802,  1222,  1228 
Mitchellville  v.  Polk  Co 

Iowa,  554) 
Mix  v.  Ross  (57  111.  121) 


Moale  v.  Baltimore  (5  Md. 


Sup.     (64 

951 
996,  '.'98,  1000, 
1001,  1002 
314)    684,  721, 
758,  898,  919 
v.  Baltimore  (61  Md.  224)  961 

Moberry   v.  Jeffersonville  (38   Ind. 

198)  945,  979 

Mobile  v.  Allaire  (14  Ala.  400)  438 

v.  Baldwin  (57  Ala.  61)  940,  965,  966, 

1107 
v.  Barton  (47  Ala.  84)  475 

v.  Dargan  (45  Ala.  310)  392,  899,  916, 

963 
v.  Eslava  (9  Port.  577) 
v.  Jones  (42  Ala.  630) 
v.  Moog  (53  Ala.  561) 
v.  Richardson  (1  Stew.  &  P.  12) 


171 

480 
174 
719, 
728 
438 
162 


v.  Rouse  (8  Ala.  515) 

i".  Rowland  (26  Ala.  498) 

v.  Royal  Street  R.  Co.  (45  Ala. 

322)  899 

v.  Watson  (116  U  S.  289)        93,118, 

245,  252,  253, 1053 

v.  Yuille  (3  Ala.  137)      148,  412,  414, 

416,  417,  420,  423,  429,  464,  941, 

970 

Mobile  &  S.  H   R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy 

(74  Ala.  566) 
Mobile  County  v.  Kimball  (102  U.  S 

691) 
Mobile  Port  v.  Leloup  (76  Ala.  401) 
Mobile  Sav.  Bank  v.  Oktibbeha  Co. 

Sup. (24  Fed.  R.  110) 
Mochler  v.  Shaftsbury  (46  Vt.  580)  1266, 

1270 
Mohan  v.  Jackson  (52  Ind.  599) 
Mohawk   &   H.    R.  R.  v.   Clute    (4 

Paige,  384) 
Moir  v.  Munday  (Saver,  181) 
Moises  v.  Thornton  (8  D.  &  E.  T.  R. 

303) 
Molett  v.  Keenan  (22  Ala.  484) 
Moliter  v.  Sheldon  (37  Kan.  236) 
Mollandin  v.  L'nion  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (14 

Fed. R.  394) 
Monaghan  v.  Philadelphia  (28  Pa.  St. 

207)  1029,1037,1131 

Monies  v.  Lynn  (124  Mass.  165)  1302 

Mon     v.  New    Utrecht  (104  N.   Y. 

552)  1287 


954 

932 
905 

601 


291 

968 

486 

274 

709 

747 

1239 


CVU1 


TABLE   OF    C  LSES    CITED. 


Page 

Monk  Election,  /.'-   (32  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

147)  281 

Monmouth  v.  Gardiner  (35  Me.  247)   882, 

883 
Monongahela  v.  Fischer  (ill  Pa.  St. 

l>)  1266,  1279 

Monroe   <     Gerspach   (33  La.   An. 

Kill)  441,  II") 

/■.  Hoffman  (29  La.  An.  651)  475 

v.  Meuer  (35  La.  An.  1192)  5U0 

Monroe  Co   Sup.  v.  Clark  (92  N.  Y. 

391)  299 

igue  if.  Boran  (12  Wis.  699)        669 

Montclair  if.  Liamsdell  (107  U.  S.  117)  87, 

88,  601,  649 

Monterey  v.  Berkshire  Co.  Coni'ra  (7 

Cush.  394)  714,  1129 

Montezuma  v.  Minor  (70  Ga.  191)         111 

v.  Minor  (7:;  Ga.  484)  498 

Montgomery,  ex  p.  (64  Ala.  463)         899, 

908,  971 
».  Huglies  (65  Ala.  201)  13s,  -100 

r.  M.  VV   UOrks  (79  Ala.  233)      1140 
v.  Sayre  (65  Ala.  564  |  1107 

v.  Scott  (34  Wis.  338)  1300 

>■.  Wright  (72  Ala.  411)        138,  1281, 
L282,  1299 
Montgomery   C.  Council   v.   Gilmer 

(33  Ala.  110)       1216,  132(1,  1325, 
1331,  1334 
v.  M.  &   VV.  PL   R.  Co.  (31  Ala. 

7';)       147,  408,40'.),  f.ls,  532,  533 
v.  Townsend  (80  Ala.  489;  84 

Ala.  478)       710,  732,  1221,  1238, 
1239,  1244 
y.  Van  Dorn  (41  Ala.  505)  162 

Montgomery   County   if.  Barber  (45 

Ala.  237)  512,521,522 

Montgomery    Co.     Sell.    Com'rs   v. 

Dean  (2  Stew.  &  P.  190)  75 

Montpelier  v  East  Montpelier  (27  Vt. 

704;  29  Vt.  12)         107,  112,  123, 

135,  27(1 

Montross  v  State  (61  Miss.  429)  492 

Montville  v.  Haughton  (7  Conn.  543)  300 

Moody  v.  Niagara  Co.  Sup.  (40  Barb. 

659)  1107 

Mooers  v.  Smedley  (6  Johns.  Ch.  28)  1092 
Moon  v.  Howard  Co.  Com'rs  (97  Ind. 

176)  1144 

Mooney  v  Kennett  (19  Mo.  551)  481 

Moor  if.  Cornville  ( 13  Me.  293)  541 

v.  Newfield  (4  Me.  44)    346,  317,  375, 

381,  188 

Moore,  Z?e  (62  Ala.  471)  1079 

p.Abbott  (32  Me.    16)       1263,  1264, 

1265,  1286 

».  Albany  (98  N.  Y.  396)       539,  1218 

v.  Atlanta  (70  Ga.  611)        1094,  1240 

v.  Chicago  (60  111.  243)  958 

w.  Favetteville  Com'rs  (80  N.  C. 

154)  910 

t>.  Fitehburg   It.   Co.   (4    Gray, 

465)  1190 


Page 
Moore  v   Gadsden  (87  N.  Y.  84  ;  93 

N.  V.  12)  127.'.,  127  1 

v.  Langdon  (2  Mackey,  127)  146 

t>.  Little  Rock  (  12  Ark.  66)     7.".".  ;.v. 
if.  Los  Angeles  (72  Cal.  287)      1217, 

1317 
r.  Minneapolis  (19  Minn.  300)  1272, 
L281,  1297,  1301 
w.  New  York  (8  N.  Y.  110) 
v.  New  York  (73  N.  V.  238)  530,  535, 
540,  641,  615,  11  10,  1112,  1183 
if.  New  York  (  I  San.lt    400)  690 

v.  People  (II  How.  13)  440 

v.  State  (10  Ala.  Ill)  438 

if.  State  (11  Lea,  35)  419 

tf.  State  (48  Miss.  147)  439 

if.  Walla    Walla   (2   Wash.  Ter. 

184)  454 

Mootry  v.  Danbury  (45  Conn.  550)      454, 

1317,  1321 
Moran  v.  Elizabeth  (9  Fed.  It.  72)       1031 
if.  Lindell  (52  Mo.  229)  978 

if.  Long  Island  City  ( 101  N.  Y. 

439)  144 

v.  McCleara  (63  Barb.  185)  1320 

v.  Miami  Co.  Com'rs   (2    Black, 

722)    238,  500,  582,  585,  593,  598, 

617,  018 

v.  New  Orleans  (112  U.  S.  09)      397, 

'.Mil 

v  Palmer  (13  U.  C.  C  P.  450)        292 
M orange  v.  Mix  (44  N.  Y.  315)  912 

Morano  if.  New  Orleans  (2  La.  217)      450, 

402 
Morant  v.  Chamberlain  (6  II.  &  N. 

541)  711 

Morbeck  if.  state  (28  Ind.  86)  322 

Morden  v.  Porter  (7  C.  B.  n.  b.  041)      504 
Morey  if.  Newiane  (8  Barb.  045)  94,  1172, 

1174,  1217 
Morford  if.  Barnes  (8  Yerger,  444)      607, 

720 
y.  I'nger  (8  Iowa,  82)        87,  207,  974 
Morgan  tf.  Atlanta  (77  Ga.  662)  138 

t.  Beloit  (U.  S.  C.  C.  Wis.)  1046 

w.  Binghampton  (102  N.  Y.  500)  1327 
v.  Chicago  &  A.  It.  Co.  (96  U 

S.  716)  744,  757 

if.  Cree  (  16  Vt.  773)  966 

v.  Dos  Moines  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(64  Iowa,  689)  843 

v.  Dubuque  (:>  Iowa,  575)  555 

v.  Hallowell  (57  Me.  375)  1253 

v   Menzies  (60  Cal.  341)  518 

v.  Parham  (16  Wall.  471)  965 

v.  Quackenbush  (22  Barb.  72)      282, 

288 
i>.  United  States  (113  U.  S.  470)  650 
if.  Waldeck  (17  Fed.  It.  286)  272 

Morgan  Co.  Com'rs  o.  Pritchett  (85 

Ind.  68)  1249 

Morley  if.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  (16 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  504)    "  1288 

Morrell  v.  Dixfleld  (30  Me.  157)    322,  541 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


C1X 


Morrell  v.  Sylvester  (1  Me.  248)  298 

Morrill  v.  State  (38  Wis.  428)       904,  908, 

910,  970 
Morris,  Re  (11  Gratt.  292)  1006,  1074 

y.  Baltimore  (5  Gill,  244)  1148,  1151 
v.  Bowers  (Wright  (Ohio),  750)  738 
v.  Brower  (Anth.  N.  P.  308)  44'J 

v.  Burdett  (1  Camp.  218)  316 

v.  Chicago  (11  111.  650)  706 

v.  Council  Bluffs  (67  Iowa,  343)  1323 
v.  Nashville  (6  Lea,  337)  268 

v.  People  (3  Denio,  381)  84,  219 

v.  Rome  C.  Council  (10  Ga.  532)  470 
v.  Sea  Girt  Impr.  Co.  (38  N.  J. 

Eq.  304)  699 

v.  State  (62  Tex.  728)  94,  118 

v.  State  (65  Tex.  53)  245 

v.  Underwood  (19  Ga.  559)  1088 

Morris  &   Essex  R.  Co.  v.  Newark 

(10  N.  J.  Eq.  352)     833,  848,  850 
v.  Prudden  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  530)         786 
Morris  Canal  &  Bank.  Co.  v.  Central 

R.  Co.  (16  N.J.  Eq.  419)         749 
v.  Fagin  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  430)  782 

v.  Fisher  (1  Stockt.  Ch.  (N.J.) 

667)  560 

v.  Jersey  City  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  252, 

547)  748,  1092,  1126,  1129 

v.  Jersey  City  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  294)  720 
v.  State  (24  N.  J.  L  62)  882 

Morris   County    v.    Hinchman    (31 

Kan.  729)  539 

Morris  Tp.  v.  Carey  (27  N.  J.  L.  377)  324 
Morrison  v.  Hershire  (32  Iowa,  271)    915, 

978,  1123 
v.  Hinkson  (87  111.  587)  674,  675,  829, 

1031 

v.  Lawrence  (98  Mass.  219)   367,  368, 

375,  376,  1186,  1193,  1195 

v.  McDonald  (21  Me.  550)       292,  494 

Morristown  v.  Shelton  (1  Head,  24)        72 

Morrow  v.  Wood  (06  Ala   1)  299 

Morse  ;-.  Belfast  (77  Me.  44)      1265,  1266 

v.  Boston  (109  Mass.  446)  1272 

v.  Haynes  (22  U.  C.  Q  B.  107)     1329 

v.  Hodsdon  (5  Mass.  314)  299 

v.  Richmond  (41  Vt.  435)   1257,  1263, 

1270 

v.  Worcester  (139  Mass.  389)      1317, 

1326,  1330,  1334 

v.  Zeize  (34  Minn.  35)  752,  702 

Moses  v.  Kearney  (31  Ark.  261)  1057 

v.  Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(21  111.  516)       792,  833,  841,  846, 
851,  863,  870,  1222,  1316 
v.  Risdon  (46  Iowa,  251)  153 

v.  St.  Louis  Sec.  Dock   Co.  (84 

Mo.  242)  708,  751 

Mosey  v.  Troy  (61  Barb.  580)    1261,  1302 
Mosher  v.  Ackley  Indep.  Sch.  Dist. 

(44  Iowa,  122)  131,202 

Mosley  v.  Walker  (7  B.  &  C  40)  455 

Moss  v.  Burlington  (60  Iowa,  438)      1264, 

1278 


Page 
Moss  v.  Cummings  (44  Mich.  359)     1146, 

1151 
v.  Harpeth  Academy  (7  Heisk. 

283)  185 

v.  Oakland  (88  111.  109)  409 

v.  Oakley  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  205)       562 

Mott  v.  Hicks  (1  Cow.  513)   323,  524,  533, 

563 

v.  Pa.  R.  Co.  (30  Pa.  St.  9)  157 

v.  Reynolds  (27  Vt.  206)         371,  372 

v.  Schoolbred  (L.  R.  20  Eq.  22)     885 

Motz  v.  Detroit  (18  Mich.  495)    933,  1123 

Moulton   v.  Evansville  (25  Fed    R. 

382)  600 

v.  Reid  (54  Ala.  320)  1094 

v.   Sandford  (51  Me.  127)  1263,  1264, 

1270,  1278 

v.  Scarborough  (71  Me.  267)  1210 

Moultrie  County  v.  Rockingham  T. 

C.  Sav.  Bank  (92  U.  S.  631)      593, 

622 
Moundsville  v.  Fountain  (27  W.  Va. 

182)  431,  500 

Mount   Carbon    Coal   &  R.    Co.   v. 

Blanchard   (54   111.   240)       1111, 
1119 
Mount  Carmel  v.  Wabash  Co.  (50111. 

69)  425, 434 

Mount  Desert  v.  Monmouth  (72  Me. 

348)  270 

Mount   Morris  Square,   Re  (2   Hill, 

14)  367,  1126,  1131 

Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith  (100  U. 

S.  514)       120,  252,  254,  269,  271, 

1040 

v.  Breeze  (11  Iowa,  399)      394,  439, 

468 
v.  Clutch  (6  Iowa,  546)  423 

v.  Vansice  (43  Mich.  301)  432 

Mount  Pleasant  Bank,  &c.  (39  Iowa, 
490).     [See  Nat  State  B.  of 
Mt.  P.  &c] 
Mount  Vernon  v.  Dusouchett  (2  Ind. 

587)  1285 

v.  Hovey  (52  Ind.  563)  225 

Mount   Washington    Road   Co.,   Re 

(35  N.  H.  134)  702,  726 

Mouse's  Case  (12  Coke,  13,  63)  1103 

Mowatt  v.  Wright  (1  Wend   355)        1152 
Mower  v.  Leicester  (9  Mass.  247)  53, 1171, 
1174,  1175,  1176,  1252 
Mowery  v.  Camden  (49  N.J.  L.  106)  1129 
v.  Salisbury  (82  N.  C.  175)  223 

Mowrey  v.  Central  City  R.  Co.  (51 

N.  Y.  666)  865 

Moyamensing    Com'rs    v.   Long  (1 

Pars.  (Pa.)  145)  783,  784 

Moylan  i\  New  Orleans  (32  La.  An. 

673)  556 

Moynihan   v.  Whidden    (143   Mass. 

287)  1255 

Mozlev  o.  Alston  (1  Phill.  790)  352 

Mugle'r  v.  Kansas  (123  U.  S.  623)         213, 

684 


ex 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


Page 
Miililenbrinck  v.  Long  Branch  Com'rs 

(  12  N.  J.  L.  364)  425 

Mulcairna  v.  Janesville  (67  Wis.  24)  1193, 

12^7 
Mulherrin  v.  Del.  L  &W.R.Co.  (81 

Pa.  St.  366)  915,  921 

Mulholland  v.  Des  Moines  A   &  W. 

K.  Co.  (60  [owa,  740)     815,  843, 
1224 
Mullarkey  v.  Cedar  Falls  (19  Iowa, 

21)  155,520,883 

Mullen  v.  Erie  Co.  Com'rs  (85  Pa.  St. 

288)  953 

v.  St.  Johns  (.".7  N.  V.  567)  1270 

Muller  v.  1  )ist.  ( Columbia  (5  Mackey, 

286)  1299 

v.  Rutland  (55  Vt.  77)  125 

Mulligan  v.  Smith  (59  Cal.  206)     707,  1*79 
Mullikin    v     Bloomington   (72  Ind. 

151)  268 

Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.  (8  Pet.  281)   115, 

117,243,246 

Munday  v.  Rahway  (43  N.  J.  L.  338)  897, 

930,  1027 
Munger  v.  Marshalltown  (50  Iowa, 

216)  1285 

v.  Tonawanda  R.  Co.  (4  N.  Y. 

349)  1284 

Municipality  No.  1  v.  Blineau  (3  La. 

An*  688)  401,  154 

v.  Cutting  (1  La.  An.  335)     384,  156, 
458,  462,  478,  180,  186 
v.  Gas  Light  Co.  (5  La.  An.  439)    810 
v.  Kirk  (5  La.  An   34)  768 

v.   La.  State   Hank   (5   La.  An. 

394)  968 

v.  McDonough  (2  Rob.  (La.)  244)  194. 

660 
v.  Orleans  Theatre  Co.  (2  Rob. 

(La.)  209)  134 

v.  Pauee  (6  La.  An.  515)  999 

d   Pease  (2  La.  An.  538)  165,  178 

v.  Sinking  Fund  Com'rs  (1  Rob. 

(La.)  279)  141 

v.  Wheeler  (10  La.  An.  745)  911 

v.  Wilson  (5  La.  An.  747)       437,  440 
Municipality  No.  2  ;;.  Botts  (8  Rob. 

(La.)  198)  994 

v.  Caldwell  (3  Rob.  (La.)  368)        323 
/•.  Commercial  Bank  ofN.O.  (5 

Rob,  (La.)  151)  917,  953 

v.  Dubois  (10  La.  An.  56)  423,  909 
v.  Duncan  (2  La.  An.  182)  909,  962 
v.  Dunn  (10  La.  An.  57)  722,909,913, 
917,  924,  959 
v.  Guillottc  (14  La.  An.  297)  909,  924, 

992 
v.  Morgan  (1  La.  An.  Ill)  487,488 
v.  N.  O.  &  Car.  R.  Co.  (10  Rob. 

(La.)  187)  947,  953 

v.  Orleans  ( !ot.  Press  (6  Rob.  (La.) 

Ill)  947 

v.  Palfrey  (7  La.  An.  197)  759 

B.White  [9 La.  An.  440)  909,  '913,924 


Page 

Municipality  No.  3  v.  Blanc  (1  La. 

An.  385)  471 

v.  Hart  (6  La.  An.  570)  L60 

v.  Johnson  (6  La.  An.  20)       962,  963 
v.  Levee  Steam  Cot.  Press  (7  La. 

An.  270)  712,  746 

v.  Michoud  (6  La.  An.  I  976 

p.    Ursuline    Nun-    (2    La.    An. 

611)  975 

Municipality  of  A.,&c.    [See  A.  Mu- 
nicipality, &c] 
Munn  v.  Illinois  (94  U.  S.  313)      92,  178, 

211 
v.  People  (69  111.  80)  92 

v.   Pittsburg  (40  Pa.  St.  364)      1331, 

L333 
Munsell  v.  Temple  (8  111.93)  429 

Munson    y.   New    York    (3    Fed.    R. 

338)  1180 

Murdock   v.  Aikin    (cited  36  N.  Y. 

224)  044 

v.  .Memphis  (20  Wall.  590)  142 

v.    Phillips  Academy   (12   Pick. 

244)  337,339 

v.  Warwick  (4  Crav,  178)    1278,  1286 
v.  Woodson  (2  Dillon  C.  C.  188)     84, 

88 

Murfree  v.  Leeper  (1  Overt.  1)  1078 

Murphy,  Rt  (7  Cow.  153)  283 

y.  Chicago  (29  111.  279)  833,  854,  1222, 

1316 
v.  Dean  (101  Mass.  455)  \^\ 

v.  Gloucester  (105  Mass.  470)      1257, 
1258,  1270,  1296 
!•.  Indianapolis  (83  Ind.  76)  1278 

v.  Jacksonville  (18  Fla.  318)  209 

v.  Louisville  (9  Bush,  189)       95,  521, 
5:17,  540,  541,  542.  557,  945 
v.  Lowell  (124  Mass.  504)     1206,  1306 
V.  Lowell   (  128  Mass.  396)  1334 

v.  Montgomery    (.'.  Council  (11 

Ala.  586)  "  109,  173,  178 

V.  People   (2  Cow    815)  506 

v.  People  (120  111.  234)  906 

V.  Peoria  (119  111.  509)  813 

v.  State  (9  Lea,  373)  87 

v.  Webster  (131  Mass.  482)  330 

Murray   v.  Charlestown  ('.Council 

(96  U.  S.  432)  901,  964 

v.  Lardner  (2  Wall.  110)      661,  583, 

651 
v.  Tucker  (10  Bush,  240)        940,  958, 
9'.  1 1,992 
Murray's  Lessee  v.  Hoboken  Land  & 

Impr.  Co   (18  How.  272)  922 

Murtaugh  v.  St.  Louis  (14  Mo.  479)    1200 
Muscatine  v.  Hershey  (10  Iowa,  39)     177, 

178 
v.  Keokuk,  &c.   Packet  Co.  (45 

Iowa,  185)       174,  178,  1148,  HM 
v.  Miss.  &  Mo.  R.  Co.  (1  Dillon 

C.  C.  53G)  118,  120,  910,  942,  962 
v.  Steck  (2  Iowa,  220)  292 

v.  Steck  (7  Iowa,  505)      292,  492,  510 


TABLE    OP   TASKS   CITED. 


CXI 


Muscatine  Turnverein  v.  Funck  (18 

[owa,  169)  244,  254 

Musgrave  v.  Nevison  (1  Stra.  684)        345 
v,  Nevison  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1359)      345 
Musgrove  v.  <  latholic  Church  (10  La. 

An.  431)  392,  1 1 ! 

Musselman  v.  .Manly  (42  Ind.  4G2)      368, 

Musser  v.  Johnson  ( 12  Mo.  74)  274 

Mutual  Benefit  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eliza- 
beth (42  N.  J.  L.  235)  604 

Mutual  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Eustin  (40  Mo. 

200)  1153 

Mutual  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Chicago  (16 

Fed.  R.  309)  830 

Muzzy  v.  Shattuck  (1  Denio,  233)         322 

Myall  v.  St.  Paul  (30  Minn.  294)         1092 

Myers  w.  Croft  (13  Wall.  291)  070 

v.  Irwin  (2  S.  &  R   368)  70 

v.    Manhattan   Bank   (20  Ohio, 

283)  68 

v.  People  (26  111.  173)  492,  507 

v.  St.  Louis  (82  Mo  367)  169 

v.  Simms  (4  Iowa,  500)  715 

v.  Snyder  (Bright.  (Pa.),  489)       1305 
v.  United  States  (I  McLean, 493)  301 
v.  York  &  C.  R.  (43  Me.  362)  581,  650 
Mygatt  ».  Green  Bay  (I  Bissell  C.  C. 

292)  591 

Myrick  v.  La  Crosse  (17  Wis.  442)      709, 

984,  1122 
Mvtton  17.  Duck  (26  U.  C.  Q.  B.  61)       73!) 


N. 


Nagle  v.  Augusta  (5  Ga  546)  811 

Nance  v.  Kails  City  (10  Neb.  85)         1142 
Nantieoke   Bor.   v.  Warne  (100  Pa. 

St.  373)  1272,  1286 

Napa  17.  Easterby  (61  Cal.  509)      407,  488 
Napa  Valley  It.  Co.  v.  Napa  Co.  (30 

Cal.  435)  1014 

Napier,  Re  (18  Q.  B.  695)  1007 

Napman  v.  People   (19  Mich.  352)      403, 

465,  482,  188 

Nash  17.  EI  Dorado  Countv  (24  Fed 

R.  252)  501,  570 

i;.  St.  Paul  (11  Minn   174)      540,543, 
544,  566 
Nash  &  McCracken,  Re  (33  U.  C 

Q.  B.  181)  431,416 

Nashville  i'.  Althrop  (5  Coldw.  554)      970 

v.  Bank  of  Tenn    (1  Swan,  209)    900, 

951 
».  Brown  (9  Heisk.  1)  1.304,  1307 

v.  Lowrv  (37  Minn.  261)  847 

v.  Nicol  (3  Baxter,  338)  1223 

v.  Ray  (19  Wall.  168)      187,  188,  193, 
194,  520,  560,  565,  567,  572,  576, 
583 
v.  Smith  (80  Tenn.  213)  950 

v.  Thomas  (5  Coldw.  600)       900,  968 
».  Toney  (10  Lea,  643)  538,  1143 


Nashville  i7.  Towns  (5  Sneed,  186)        L03 
-    Weiser  (54  111.  245)  984,  086 

Nashville  Bank  17.  l'etwav  (3  Humph. 

522)  304 

Nason  v   Boston  (1  1  Allen,  508)  1260 

Nassau  Street,  ft   (  I  I  Johns   77)  573,  954, 

955 
National   Hank  of  Chemung  v.  El- 

mira  (63  N.  V.  49)  '  1 1  16 

National  Bank  of  Louisville  v  Com- 
monwealth (9  Wall.  353)        902 
National  I!. mk  of  Mich.  v.  Green  (33 

Iowa,  140)  583 

National  Bank  of  No.  America  of 
Boston  17.  Kirby  (ins  Mass. 
497)  583 

National  Hank  of  Republic  of  N.  Y. 
r.  St.  Joseph  (31  Fed.  R. 
216)  157,  631 

National    Hank   of    Washington    v. 

Texas  (20  Wall.  72)  583 

National  Exchange  Bank  (8  R.  I. 
375;  108  N.  Y.  060).  |See 
New  York  Nat.  Exch.  Hank, 
&c] 
National  State  Bank  of  Mt.  Pleasant 
v  Marshall  Indep.  Sch.  Dist. 
(39  Iowa,  490)  202 

National    W.  W.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City 

(28  Fed.  R.  921)  '  822,  828 

Natoma   W.  &   M.  Co.  Clarkin    (14 

Cal.  544)  670 

Nauvoo  v.  Hitter  (97  U.  S  389)  593 

Navasota   v.  Pearce  (46  Tex.  525)      1249, 

1252 
Naylor  v.  Galesburg  (56  111.  285)  327 

Neal  v,  Pittsburgh    R.  Co.  (2  Grant, 

137)  708 

Neale    v.    Allegheny    Overseers    (5 

Whart.  538)  298 

Neales  v.  State  (Hi  Mo.  498)  495 

Nealis  v.  Hay  ward  (48  Ind.  19)      295,  857 
Neall  v.  Hill  (16  Cal   145)  .;-.» 

Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell  (2  Black, 

590)  1258,  1280,  1287 

17.  Lampkin   (6  Neb.  27)      815,  1222, 

1232 

v.  Nebraska  (0  Neb.  339)  546 

v.  Rathbone  (20  Neb   288)  1262 

Neely  v.  Yorkville  (10  S.  C.  141)  257.-260, 

618,  528,  539 

Neenan  v.  Donoghue  (50  Mo  493)        558 

».  Smith  (60  Mo.  525;  (it)  Mo.  292)  91  1, 

978,  992,  996 

Negus,  Re  (10  Wend.  34)  1126 

Neiffer  v.  Hank  of  K.  (1  Head.  162)     521 

Neitzel  v.  Concordia  (1  1  Kan.  4  16)        181 

Nelson,  Re  (1  Cow    117)  1010,  mil 

y,  Canisteo  (100  N.  V.  89)   1281,  1282 

i)  Godfrey  (12  III.  22)  788,  8  12 

17.  La  Porte  (33  Ind.  258)        822,  942 

u.  Milforii  (7  Pick.  18)  220,  551 

r.  Newark  (49  N.  J,  L  246)  254 

r.  New  York  (63  N.  V.  535)    200,  537 


CX11 


TAI'.LK    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Nelson  w.St.  Martin's  Par. (Ill  IT.  S. 

716)  118,  392,  1032,  1037 

Nemaha  I  'otinty  v.  Frank  ( 120  U.  S. 

II)  672 

Neosho  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Stoddard  (13 

Kan.  207)  1111 

Neuer  v.  Fallon  (18  Mo.  277)  161 

Nlmhti  r.  ii.»stoii  (120  .Ma.-s.  ::::s)     1103, 

L164,  1166 
Neuse  River  Nav.  Co.  v.  Newberne 

Com'rs  (0  Jones  L.  201)       1006, 

1060 

Nevada  v.  Hampton  ( 18  Nev.  Ill)        130 

v.  Hutchins  (69  [owa,  606)  451 

Nevill  v.  Ross  (22  U.  C.  C.  P.  187)       389 

Neville  o.  Kelly  (12  C.  B.  n.  s.  740)     209 

Nevin  v.  Roach  (5  S.  W.  R.  646)  488 

Kevins  v.  Peoria  ill  111.  502)     1221,  1222, 

122:;,  1316,  1320,  1321,1323,  L329 

New  Albany  v.  Meekin  (8  Ind.  481)      964 

/•.  Sweeney  (13  Ind.  215)        555,  556 

New  Albany  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Connelly 

(7  Ind.  32)  718 

v.  O'Daily  (IS  Ind.  35:1)  720,  792,  834, 
841,  855,  850,  803,  870 
New  Albanv    Bank   v.  Danville   (00 

Ind,  504  185 

Newark  v.  Elliott  (5  Ohio,  118)     671,  672 

v.  Funk  (  15  Ohio,  462)  163 

v.  Murphv  (40  N.  J.  L.  115)  483 

v.  Stau-  (34  N.J.  L.  523)  912 

r.  Stockton   (44  N.  J.  Eq.  179)      707, 

770,  771,  795 

Newark   ,<:   N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Newark 

(23  N.  J.  Eq.  515)  847 

Newark  Bank  v.  Assessor  (30  N.  J. 

L.  22)  138 

New  Bedford  &  F.  Street  II.  Co.  v. 
Acushnet  Street  R.  Co.  (143 
Mass.  200)  144 

Newberry  v.  New  York  (31  N.  Y.  Sr. 

Ct.  300)  1107 

New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton  (12  N.  H. 

409)  139 

New   Brighton  Bor    r.  Peirsol  (107 

Pa    St.  280)  1221,  1243 

r.  U.  I 'rob.  Church  (96  Pa   St. 

331)  1221,1243 

New  Brunswick  v.  Fitzgerald  (48  N. 

J.  L   157)  334 

New  Brunswick  Rubber  Co.  p.  N.  B. 
Street  Com'rs  (38  N.  J.  L. 
190)  937 

New  Buffalo  v.  Cambria  Iron  Co. 

(105  1T.  S.  7:1.)  684,  830 

Newby  v.  Platte  Countv  (25  Mo.258)  733 
Newcastle,  Re  (12  Clark  &  Fin.  402)    112. 

663 
Newcomb  >•.  E.  Baton  Rouge  Pol. 

Jury  (  I  Rob.  (La.)  233)  555 

Newell  v.  Minneapolis,  L.  &  M.  I J  v . 

Co.  (39  Minn.  112)  859,801,  809 
v.  People  ;7  N.  Y.  9)  107 


Page 
New   England,  &c.  Co.  v.  Robinson 

(25  Ind.  536)  185 

New  Gloucester  Sch.  Fund  Trs.  v. 

Bradbury  ill  Me.  118)     135,  136 
New  Hamptou  v.  Conroy  (50   Iowa, 

498)  435 

New  Haven  v.  Fair  Haven  &  W.  1!. 

Co.  (38  Conn  422)  921,  967,  1001, 

1123 

v.Sargent  (38  Conn.  50)      814,  81 7, 

818 
v.  Whitney  (36  Conn.  373)  977 

New  Haven  &  E.  11.  Toll  Br.  Co.  v. 

Betswortli  (30  Conn.  380)        322 
New  Haven,  M   &  YV.  R  Co.  ,•.  Chat- 
ham (42  Conn  465)  240,  370,  018, 
1012 
New  Jersey  v.  Yaid  (05  U.  S.  112)        138 
New  ,lei>ey  &  N.  E.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Jer- 
sey Co.  Fire  Com'rs  (34  N. 
J.  Eq    117)  529 

NewJersev  So.  R.  Co.  v.  Long  Branch 

Com'rs  (39  N.  .1    L.  28)  809 

Newlin  Tp.  v.  Davis  (77  Pa.  St.  317)  1250, 

1282 
Newling  v.  Francis  (3  I).  &  E.  T.  R. 

IS'.))  277 

New  London  v.  Brainard   (22  Conn. 

552)  117,111(1,1111,1116 

v.  Montville  (1  Boot.  184)       269,  272 

Newman  v.  Emporia  (32  Kan.  450)      384, 

945 
v.  Metrop.   Elev.  Ry  Co.  (       N. 

Y.         [1890]  )  1241 

v.  Scott  Co.  Jus.  (5  Sneed,  005)    1027 

v  Scott  Co.  Jus.  (1  Heisk.  787)    1028 

v.  S\  Lvester  (42  Ind.  100)        200,  536 

New   Market  Meth.  Trs.  v.  Peaslee 

(15  N.  H.  317)  202,668 

Newmeyer  v.  Mo.  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  (52 

Mo.  81)  1111,1112,1124 

New  Orleans  v.  Anderson  (0  La.  An. 

323)  421 

v.  Becker  (31  La.  An.  644)  1108 

v.  Boudro  (11  La.  An.  303)  422,  481 
v.  Brooks  (36  La.  An.  641)  364,  388 
v.  Carondelet  C.  &  Nav.  Co.  (36 

La.  An.  390)  052 

v.  Clark  (05  U.  S.  054)    100,  120,  13(1, 
131,  134,  822 
v.   Commercial   Bank  of  N.  O. 

(K)  La.  An.  735)  909,  068 

v.  Costello  (14  La.  An.  37)     413,  420, 
476,  492 
v.  Crescent  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (25  La. 

An.  390)  1109 

v.  Daublin  (1  Martin,  184)  783 

v.  Davidson  (30  La.  An.  541)  005 

v.  Elliott  (10  La.  An.  50)  ■  909 

v.  Finnerty  (27  La.  An.  081)  319 
v.  Graihle  (0  La.  An.  501)      281,  907, 

009 
v.  Gravier  (11  Martin,  n  s.  602)  782, 

788 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


CX11I 


Page  I 
New  Orleans  v.  Great  So.  Tel.  Co. 

(4  La.  An.  41)  474 

v.  Guillotte  (12  La.  An.  818)        45G,  | 

549 
v.  Hill  (30  La.  An.  654)  995 

v.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.   (23  La. 

An.  01)  100,073 

v.  Hopkins  (13  La.  320)    122,  772,  77;; 
i;.  Hoyle  (23  La.  An.  740)  96,  97 

v.  Kault'man  (29  La.  An.  283)        90S) 
r.  Koen  (38  La.  An.  328)  425 

v.  Lambert  (14  La.  An.  247)  450 

v.  Leverich  (18  La.  332)         772,  773 
v.  Locket t  (13  La.  545)  292 

v.  Maggioli  (4  La.  An.  73)  801 

v.  Magnon  (4  Martin  (La.)l)  801,  803 
v.  Meeh.  &  T.  Bank  (15  La.  An. 

107)  908 

v.  Michoud  (10  La.  An.  763)  975 

v.  Miller  (7  La.  An.  651)         437,  440 
v.  Morgan  (7  Martin,  (n.  s.)  1)      283, 
385,  509 
v.  Morris  (105  U.  S.  600)  67:; 

v.  Morris  (3  Woods  C.  C.  103)       673, 

075 
v.  Miile  (38  La.  An.  826)  424 

v.  New  Orleans,  M.  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(27  La.  An.  414)  167 

v.  Peyroux  (6  Martin,  n.  s.  155) 

459 
v.  Philipi  (9  La.  An.  44)  393,  397 
v.  Poutz  (14  La.  An.  853)  134,  911 
v.  St.    Anna's  Asylum    (31  La. 

An.  2'. i2)  953 

v.  St.  Louis  Church  (11  La.  An. 

244)  366,  392,  443,  444,  549 

v.  Southern   Bank  (11  La.  An. 

41)  909,968 

v.  Southern   Bank  of  N.  O.  (15 

La.  An.  89)  787 

v.  Stafford  (27  La.  An.  417)  455 

v.  Staler  (11  La.  An.  68)  909 

w.  Turpin(13  La.  An.  56)       423,909 
v.  United  States  (10  Pet.  662)        165, 
178,  738,  743,  748,  755,  757,  765, 
769,  771,  772,773,  796,801 
v.  Wilmot  (31  La.  An.  65)     110,  105, 

172 
New  Orleans  &  C  R.  Co.  v.  Munici- 
pality (1  La.  An.  128)      833,  848 
v.  Municipality  (7  La.  An.  148)     160 
New  Orleans    Draining  Co.,   Re  (11 

La.  An.  338)     700,  723,  909,  92 1, 
956 
New  Orleans   Kiev.  R.   Co.   v.  New 

Orleans  (39  La.  An    127)         408 
New  Orleans   Gas  Co.  v.  Louisiana 

Light  Co.  (115  U.  S.  050)       117, 
211,  213,  822,  823,826 
New  Orleans,  J.  &  G.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 

Move  (39  Miss.  374)  733 

New  Orleans,  M.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  New 

Orleans  (26  La.  An.  47S)  91,  10s, 
122,  770,  bo4 
VOL.  I.  —  h 


Page 

New  Orleans,  M.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Eller- 

man  (in:,  r.  s.  L66)  97,  110,  1'-"., 
166,  167,  168,  172,  17  1,  177 
V.  So.  &  Atl.  Tel.  Co.   (-7:;   Ala. 

211)  831 

New  Orleans,  S.  F.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Del- 

amore  (114  U.  S,  501)       lit;,  si; 
New  Orleans   W.  Co.   ,-.   La.  Sugar 

Ref.  Co.  (35  La.  An.  1111)      829 
New  Orleans   W.    W.  Co.    >■.    Rivers 

(115  U.  S.  074)  117,  822,  826,  829 

Newport  v.  Berrv  (80  Kv   354  1015 

v.  N.  Light  Co.  (84Ky.  167)  826,  827 

v.  Taylor's  Ex.  ( 16  15."  Rlon.  699)   17"., 

177,  748,  749,  757,  759,  76 

798 
Newport  &  Cine.  Br.  Co.  v.  Foote  (9 

Bush,  261) 
Newport  Charter,  Re  (14  R.  I.  655) 

Newport  Marsh   Trs.,  Re  (16  Sim. 

346)  75 

New  Providence  v.  Ilalsey  (117  U.  S. 

336)  560,  582,  604,  1140 

New  River  Co.  v.  Johnson  (2  E.  &  E. 

435)  688 

New  Rochelle  Trs.  v.  Pelton  (7  Johns. 

Ch.  292)  i  !6 1,668 

New  Salem   v.  Eagle   Mill  Co.  (138 

Mass.  8)  446 

New  Shoreham  v.  Ball  (14  R.  I.  566)    659 


1226 
lol, 
277 


Newton  v.  Atchison  (31  Kan.  151) 


86 
•121 
397 
808 


v.  Belger  (143  Mass.  598) 
Newville  Road  Case  (8  Watts,  172) 
New  York,  R»  (11  Johns.  77  ;  99  N. 
Y.   569).     [See    Mayor  of 
N.  Y.,  Re,  &c.] 
v.  Bailey  (2  Denio,  433)         324   698 
1162,  1193,  1194,1201,  1209,  L317 
v.  Broadway  &  Seventh  Av.  R. 

Co.  (17  Hun,  212)  866,  967 

v.  Carleton  (113  N.  Y.  284) 
v.  Cashman  (10  Johns.  96)  I  54 

v.  Colgate  (12  N.  Y.  140)       90,  ]oui, 

1002 

v.  Furze  (3  Hill.  612)     158,  324   1017 

1158,  1274.  1280,  1324,  1332 

v.  Hart  (95  N.  Y.  443)     169,  170,  171, 

177.  748 

v.  Hyatt  (3  E.  D.  Smith,  150)        406, 

437,  463 

v.Kelly  (98  N.  Y.  4671  299 

v.  Lord  (17  Wend.  285;  18  Wend. 

126)  lie,;;,  n,:;,,  n,,,; 

u.N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  S.N.  Co.  (106 

N.  Y.  28)  180 

v.  Nichols  (4  Hill,  200)     397,  406,  163 
v.  Ordrenan  (12  Johns.  122)    112,  II".. 

416 
v.  Pentz  (24  Wend.  008)  1105,  1 106 
v.  Scott  (1  Caines,  543)  177 

v.  Second  A  v.  R.  Co.   (82  N.  Y. 

261)     116,  157,  412,  425,  428,  944 


CX1V 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Page 
New  York  v.  Sheffield  (1  Wall.  189) 

1247,  1280,  1293,  1296,  1301 
y.  Slack  (3  Wheeler,  237)  143 

v,  Starin  (106  N.  Y.  1)  I 

v.  Stuyvesant's  Heirs  (1.  N.  Y. 

759,  764 
v.  Tenth  Nat.   Bank  (111   N.  Y. 

132 
v.  Third  Av.  R.  Co.   (33  N.  Y. 

42)  412,863 

p.  Williams  (15  X.  Y.  502) 
New  York  African  Soc.  v.  Varick  (13 

Julius.  ..    )  262 

New  York  &  B.  Bridge,  A'e  (72  X.  Y. 

527)  '.'ii 

.  New  York  &  I?.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brink 

lyn  (71  N.  Y.  580)         1187,  1194 
New  York  &  Harlem  R.  Co.  v.  New 

York  (1  Hilton,  562)        152,  157, 
846,  863 
New  York  &  X.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Water- 
bury  (35  Conn.  19)  351,  407 
New  York  &  N.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  New 

Haven  (42  Conn.  279)     921,  938, 

New  York  Cable  Co.  v.  New  York 

(104  X.  Y.  1)      777,78::.,  792,  850 
New  York  Cable  Ry.  Co.,  Re   (109 

N.  Y   32)    "  872 

New  York  Cent.  &  II.  Paver  R.  Co.,  Re 

(15  Hun,  63)  877 

v.  Metrop.  Gasl.  Co.  (63  N.  Y. 

326)  689,825 

New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Marvin 

(11N.Y.  276)  510 

New  York  Conference   v.   Clarkson 

(1  Halst.  Ch.  541)  200 

New  York   Dist.   Ry.  Co.,  ft    (107 

X.  Y.  42)   777,  778,  788,  832,  839, 
841,  844 
New  York  Elev.  Ry.,  Be  (3  Abb. 

X.  ('.  101)  872 

Re  (36  Hun,  427)  877 

ft  I7D  N.  Y.  327)  819,  837,872 

New  York  Elev.  R.  Cases,  &c.  (70 

X.  Y.  361;  90  N.  Y.  122; 

164  X.  Y.  268;   105  N.  Y. 

97;    112   X.  Y.  180).     [See 

Gilbert,   &c. ;    Kings,    &c; 

Lahr,&c.  ;  Pond,  &c. ;  Story, 

&c] 
New  York  Fire  Dep.  v.  Kip  (10  Wend. 

267)  77,130 

v.  Wright  (3  E.  D.  Smith,  478)      903 
New  York  Institute  r.  How  (  10  N.  Y. 

8 1 )  262 

New  York,  Lack.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,   Re 

(29  Hun,  1 ;  99  N.  Y.  12)       872, 
877 
New  York,   Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 

STard  (48  X.  J    L.  121,  632)     749 
New  York  Nat.  Exch.  Bank  v.  Hart- 
ford, P.  &  F.  R.  Co.  (8  R.  I. 

375)  501 


Page 
New    York    Nat    Exch.    Bank    v. 
Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.  (108 
N.  5  877,878 

New  York,  New  Haven  &  II.  R.  Co. 

v.  New  Britain  (49  Conn.  40)  955 
New  York  Presbytery  Tre.,  R(  (57 

I  Lav.  Pr.i  154 

New  York  I 'rot.  E.  Pub.  School,  R« 

i  17  \.  Y.  556)  388,  992 

New  York  Ry.,  ft   (99  X   Y.         )        689 
New  York,  S.  M.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn (71  X.  Y.  580)         1187,  1194 
New  York,  W   S.  &  Buf.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Sutherland  (35  Hun,  200)       872, 
877 
Xey  v.  Troy  (20  X.  Y.  St.  R.  321  i       1286 
Niagara  Falls  Susp.  Br.  Co.  v.  Bach- 
man  (66  N.  Y.  261)  7  in,  751, 
752,  7."»:;,  759,  760,  761 
Xiblett  v.  Nashville  ( 12  Heisk.  684)     1 18, 

L259,  1295 
Nichol  v.  Nashville  (9  Humph.  252)       95, 
ins.  l  t9,225,  226,  235 
Nicholls  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  (27 

l\  C.  Q.  B.  382)  300 

Nichols,  Re  (6  Abb.  X.  (   is.  174  ;  57 

How.  Fr.  95)  338 

r.  Athens  (66  Me.  402)        1270,  1278 
v.  Boston  (98  Mass.  39)  292,  322 

v.  Bridgeport  (23  Conn.  ISO)  707, 

708,  709,710,  722.  920,  921 
v.  Crabbe,  Compt.  (  1  Stew.  &  F. 

154)  1016 

>:  McLean  (101  X.  Y.  526)  319 

v.  Minneapolis  (33  Minn.  430)      1285 
Nicholson  v.  Bradford  Union  Guard. 

(1  L.  R.  E.  &  I.  C.  620)  538 

v.N.  Y.  X.  &1I.  R.  Co.  (22  Conn. 

74)  852 

Nickerson  v.  Dyer  (105  Mass.  320)       323 
Nicolay   v.   St.    Clair  Co.  (3  Dillon 

C.  C.  163)  613,631 

Nicoll  v.  Gardner  ( 13  Wend.  289)  169 

v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.  (12  X.  Y. 

121)  652,657 

Nicolson  Pav.  Co.  v.  Painter  (35  Cal. 

699)  545,945 

Nicoulin  v.  Lowery  (49  N.  J.  L.  301  |  397, 

441,  443 
Nielson  v.  Wakefield  (43  Mich.  434)  709 
Nightingale,  Re  (11  Pick.  108)      450,  401, 

463,  464 
Niles  v.  Muzzy  (33  Mich.  61)  369 

v.  Niles  (11  Am.  &  Eng.  C.  C. 

200)  206 

Niles  Tp.  Highway  Com'rs  v.  Martin 

(4  Mich.  557)  1100,  1178 

Niles  Water  W.  v.  Niles  (59  Mich. 

311)  109,209 

Xill  v.  Jenkinson  (15  Ind.  425)  1119 

Nims  v.  Troy  (59  N.  Y.  500)      1319,  1330, 

l.'Vl    F'o'J 
Ninth  Ave,  Re  (4-r>  X  Y.  729)  '    691 

Noble  v.  Bullis  (23  Iowa,  559)  1152 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxv 


Noble  v.  Richmond  (31  Gratt.  271) 

v.  St.  Albans  (56  Vt.522) 
Nodine  v.  Union  ( L3  ( )r.  587 ) 
Nolan  p.  New  Orleans  (10  La.  An 

106) 
Nolin  v.  Franklin  (4  Yerg.  163) 
Noonan  y.  Albany  (79  N.  Y.  470) 

v.  Stillwater  (33  Minn.  198) 
Norfleetp.  Cromwell  (70  X.  C.  634) 
Norfolk  v.  Ellis  (20  Gratt.  224) 


I'.i/,- 
1268, 
L301 
1322 
482 

SIS 

451 
1322 

1272 
700 
908,  913, 
933 
Normand  v.  Otoe  Co.  Com'rs  (8  Neb. 

18)  1109 

Norris  y.  Abingdon    Acad.    Trs.    (7 

G.  &J.  7)  97,123,136 

v.  Baltimore  (41  Md.  606)  713,  7  I 
v.  Boston  ( 1  Met.  (Mass.)  282)  902 
v.  Litchfield  (35  N.  H.  271,  918)  1284, 

1286 

v.  Smithville  (1  Swan,  164)  2G7 

v.  Staps  (Hobart,  210)    394,  396,  481, 

484,  486 

v.  Waco  (57  Tex.  635)  895,  1119 

Norristown  y.  Fitzpatrick  (04  Pa.  St. 

121)  1107,1105,1196 

v.  Moyer  (67  Pa.  St.  355)     885.  1274, 
1276,  1277 
North  Beach  &  M.  Street  R.  Com- 
pany's Appeal  (32  Cal.  499)  864, 
871,  921,  923,  966 
North  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lake 

View  (105  111.  183,  207)  857 

North  Dumfries  y.  Waterloo  (12  U.  C 

Q.  B.  507)  269 

Northeastern    R.    Co.    v.   Payne    (8 

Rich.  L.  177)  851 

Northern  Bank  of  Toledo  v.  Porter 

Tp.  (110  U.  S  608)  594,  596,  609, 
632,  634 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Baltimore 

021  Md.  93)       155,  389,849,850, 
862 
v.  Jackson  (7  Wall.  262)  901 

Northern  End.  R.  Co.  v.  Connelly  (10 

O'.  St.  159)        898,  908,  921,  922. 
025,  968,  978 
Northern    Liberties    y.    St.    John's 

Church  (13  Pa.  St.  104)  955, 

1001 
Northern  Liberties  Tp.  Com'rs  v.  N. 

L.  Gas  Co   (12  Pa.  St.  318)    396, 
398,  404,  776,  794 
Northern  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Port- 
land (14  Or.  24)  707 
Northern  Transp.   Co.  of  O.  v.  Chi- 
cago (99  l'.  S.  635)           780,  781, 
1215,  1217,1225,  1227,  1228,  1229 
L233,  1235 
North   Hempstead  w.  Hempstead  (2 

Wend.  109)  74,  75,  270.  271,  655, 
656,  660,  668,  70s 
North  Hudson  R.  Co.  v.  Hoboken  (41 

N.  J.  L.  71)  428 


North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold  (47  Pa.  St. 

488)  1172 

North   Manheim  v.  Arnold  (119  Pa. 

St.  880)  L269 

North  Missouri  R,  Co.  v.  Maguire 
(49  Mo.  482)      L30,894,89i 

,  1112 
y.  Maguire  (20  Wall  052 

North  Pac.  Lumbering  &  Manufac- 
turing (  o  r  East  Portland 
(14  Or.  3)  521,524 

Northrop  y.  Graves  (19  Conn.  548)      1153 
North    Vernon  y.  Voegler  f  103  End. 

314)  1220,  1327,  E329,  1331 

Northwestern  Fert.  Co.  y.  Hyde  Park 

(97  EJ.  S.659)  '213,  214,  215 

Northwestern  Packet  Co.  v.  Atlee  (2 

Dillon,  C.  C.  470)  105,  170 

y.  Atlee  (21  Wall.  389)  165,  170 

v.  Keokuk  (95  EJ.  S.  80)  966 

v.  St.  Louis  (4  Dillon  C.  C.  10)    165, 
178,  966 
v.  St.  Louis  (100  TJ.  S.  423)  966 

v.  St.  Paul  (3  Dillon  C.  C.  454)      166 
Northwestern   University  v.  People 

(80  111.  333)  953 

North  Whitehall  y.  South  Whitehall 

(3  S.  &  R.  117)  272 

North  wood  v.  Barrington   (9  N.  H. 

369)  347 

North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings  (45  Me. 

133)  93,  135,  136,  209,271 

Norton  v.  Brownsville  Dist.  Tax- 
Corn 'rs  (36  Fed.  R.  99; 
129  U.  S.  470)  020 

v.  Dyersburg  (127  U.  S.  100)         1.  5, 
235.  236,  237,  575,  1038 
v.  Mansfield  (16  Mass.  48)  r^ 

v.  Peck  (3  Wis.  714) 
v.  Shelby  Countv  (1  IS  EJ.  S.  425 

610,  020,  641,  1080,  1083 
Norway  Dist.  Tp.  v.  Clear  Lake  Tp. 

(11  Iowa,  500)  1143 

Norwich  y.  Breed  (30  Conn.  535)        12    i 

1312 
v.  Hubbard  (22  Conn.  587)  986,  II 
r.  Story  (25  Conn.  44)  307 

Norwich   Gasl.  Co.  v.  Norwich   City 

Gas  Co.  (25  Conn.  19)      95,  822, 

24 

Norwich  Ov.  Poor  v.  New  Berlin  ( »v. 

(18  Johns.  382)  272 

v.  Pharsalia  Ov.  ( 15  N.  Y.  341 )      519 

Nott'sCase  (11  Me.  20s )  in 

Nottingham,  Re  (1  O'MS  II.  245)        284 

Nowell  v.  Worcester  (!)  Exch.  457)      184, 

271.  512 
y.  Wright  (3  Allen,  166)        325,  1195 
Nowlin  r.  State  (10  Ala.    Ill  1134 

Noyes    y.  Mason  City    (5  N.  W.  R. 

595)  117.  1229 

v.  Morristown  (1  Vt.  357)  1264 

v.  Ward  (19  Conn.  250)  738,  740.  742, 

744,  310 


I'Wl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ps  -■ 
i  v.  Putnam  Co.  Sup.,  &c.  (10 
w  all.  -Hi         622,627,  629,  630 

v.  Stale  (18  Ala.  521)  492 


<>. 


Oakes  v.  Hill  (10  Pick.  833)  24,  70 

v.  New  Orleans  (1  La.  1)  962 

Oakland  v.  Carpenter  (  1:;  Cal.  640)        155, 

L57;  325,  358,  1093,  1096 

v.  Whipple  I-':1  Cal.  112)        96 

Oakland   Paving  Co.    v.  Hilton  (69 

Cal.  179)  inn: 

r.  Rier  (52  Cal.  270)  813,  923 

Oakley    v.    Williamsburg    Trs.    (6 

Paige,  262)  7*7,  814 

Oates  v.  Hudson   (5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

469)  1148 

O'Brien  v.  Colusa  County  (67  Cal. 

503)  1145 

v.  Pa.  S.  Val.  K.  Co.  (119  Pa.  St. 

L84)  1244 

r.  St.  Paul  (18  .Minn.  170)  1333 

17.  St.  Paul  (25  Minn.  331)  1225,  1319, 

1321 
v.  Trenton  (7  U.  C.  C.  P.  24G)       710, 

789 
O'Brien   Countv  v.  Brown  (1  Dillon 

C.  C.  588 )  1096 

O'Byrne  v.  Philadelphia  (93  Pa.  St. 

225)  1000 

( •  ( lonner  u.  Memphis  (6  Lea,  730)      251, 

252 
O'Connor  v.  Otonabee  (35  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  73)  1271 

v.  Pittsburgh  (18  Pa.  St.  187)        770, 
si  1,  833,  844,91  1,  1220,  1233 
Oconto  Co.  Sup.  <■.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 

R.  Co.  (44  Wis.  231)  866 

v.  Hall  (47  Wis.  208)  369 

Odell  Trs.  v.  Schroeder  (58  III.  353)    421, 

510,  675,  1159,  1196,  1197 

( i'l  ),k  lierty  v.  Archer  (9  Tex.  295)      285, 

288 
O'Donnellw.  Bailey  (24  Miss.  386)  900, 968 
V.  Philadelphia  (7  Phila.  234)  502 

Oebricke  v.  Pittsburgh  (7  Am.  L.  R. 

725)  235 

O'Ferrall  v.  Colby  (2  Minn.  180)         1021 
n  ,■    Daviess  Countv  (102  U.  S. 

634)  572,  573,  630,  632 

v.  Raymond  (22  Conn.  379)  323 

Oggw.  Lansing  (35  Iowa,  495)  1193,1196, 
1197,  1198,  1200 
O'Gorman  v.  Morris  (26  Minn.  267)  1296 
o  Hale  v.  Sacramento  (1*  Cal.  212)  1303 
O'Hara  v.  New  Orleans  (30  La.  An. 

152)  523,543 

v.  Portland  (3  Or.  525)  95 

,-.  State  (112  X.   Y.  140)  130,  133 

Ohio  v  &c.     [See  State  v.  &c.l 
Ohio  L.  Ins.  s  T  Co.  v.  Merchants' 

Ins.  &  T.  Co.  (11  Humph.  1)532 


Page 
O'Kaner.  Treat  (26  111.  557)  807 

O'Laughlin  v.    Dubuque  (42  Iowa, 

539)  1267 

Olcott  v.  Pond  du   Lac  Co.  Sup.  (16 

Wall.  078)   83,  231,  f>73,  :,7'.t,  583, 

687,  636,  Kill 

old  Col.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller  (125  Mass.  I)  719 

old  So.  Soe.  v.  Boston  (127  Mas-  378)  953 

O'Leary  v.  Mankato  (21  Minn.  66)    1269, 

1281 

v.  Sloo  (7  La.  An.  25)  924, 

Oleson  r.  Tolford  (37  Wis.  3.27)  L300 

oim  v.  Meyers  (55  Iowa,  20!  I  868 

<  CLinda  v.  Lothrop  (21  Pick.  202)        833, 

884,  888,  889 

<  ttiphanl  v.  Atchison  Co.  Com'rs  (18 

Kan.  386)  374 

Olive  Cemetery  v.  Philadelphia   (93 

Pa.  si.  129)  955 

Oliver  v.  Americus  (99  Ga.  165)  340 

v.  Kansas  City  (69  Mo.  79)  12s0, 

1295,  i 
v  Keightley  (24  Ind.  514)  1109 

v.  Washington   Mills   (11  Allen, 

268)   '  904 

v.  Worcester  (102  Mass.  489)         108, 

1139,  1175,1180,  1199, 1201,  1211, 

1212,  L252,  1253,  1312 

Oliver,  Information,  &c.    (21   S.   C. 

318)  488 

Olmsted  v.  Dennis  (77  N.  Y.  379)  308,355 

Olney  v.  Harvey  (50  III.  453)        141,257, 

270,  074,075,  1031,  KI32 

v.  Pearce  (1  R.  I.  292)  298 

v.  Wharf  (115  111.  510)  855,  1241, 

1242 

u.  Wickes  (18  Johns.  122)  323 

Olson  v.  Worcester  (142  Mass.  530)    1251 

1297 
Olson    v.    Chippewa    Falls    (71    Wis. 

558)  1257 

Omaha  v.  Hammond  (94  U.  S.  98)     558, 

v.  Olmstead  (6  Neb.  4  16)      499,  1280 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Strudden 

(22  Neb.  343)  1222 

O'Maley  v.  Preeport  (90  Pa.  St.  24)    306, 

425 
( i'Mally  v.  McGinn  (53  Wis.  353)  381 
O'Meara  v.  New  York  (1  Daly,  425)  1198 
Omnibus  1!   Co.  v.  Baldwin  (57  Cal. 

160)  81 
Oneida  Bank  v.  Ontario  Bank  (21  N. 

V.  190)  194,  531 

O'Neil  v.  Detroit  (50  Mich.  133)  1200 

O'Neill  r.  Caddo  Par.  Police  Jury  (21 

La.  An.  586)  182 

v.   Hudson  County   (41  N.  J.  L. 

161)  712 
v.  Lowell  (6  Allen,  110)  1261 
v.   New    Orleans    (30    La.    An. 

202)  1272 

Onondaga   Co.   Sup.    v.    Brigg8   (2 

Denio,  20,  2  Hill,  135)  1152,  1153 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXYll 


Onstott  v.  Murray  (22  Iowa,  46G)  762,  754. 

755,  801 
Ontario  Bank  v.  Bunnell  (10  Wend. 

106)  948,949,968 

Opelika  v.  Daniel  (59  Ala.  211)  227 

Opelousas  i>.  Andrus   (37   La.   An. 

699)  407 

Opinion,  &c.     |  See  Justices,  &c] 
Orange  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexandria 

(17  Gratt.  176)  143,941,948,953, 
908 
Ordinary  of  A.  Co.  &c.    [See  A.  Co. 

Ordinary,  &c] 

Oregon  v.  Jennings  (119  U.  S.  74)        586, 

595,012,  617,626 

v.  McKennon  (8  Or.  485)  285 

r.  l'vle  (1  Or.  149)  311 

Oregon  S.  Nav.   Co.  v.  Portland  (2 

Or.  81)  940 

O'Reilley  v.  Kingston  (114  N.  Y.  439)  915, 

922,  923 
Orford  U.  Cong.    Soc.  v.  W.   Cong. 

Soc.  (55  X.  H.  403)  662 

Oridge  v.   Sherborne  (11  M.  &  W. 

371)  582 

Original  Hart.  Col.  Co.  v.  Gibb  (L. 

R.  5  Ch.  D.  713)  885 

Orleans  v.  Piatt  (99  U.  S.  070)       583,  599 
Orleans  Co.  Sup.  v.  Bowen  (4  Lans. 

24)  521,  1139 

Orman  v.  Pueblo  (8  Col.  292)  299 

Orme  v.  Richmond  (79  Va.  80)  1204,  1257, 

1259 
Oroville  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Plumas  County 

Sup.  (37  Cal.  354)     79,  140,  1060 
Orphan  Asylum's  Appeal  (111   Pa. 

St.  135)  936,  960 

Orr  v.  Baker  (4  Ind.  86)  953 

Ortli  v.  Milwaukee  (59  Wis.  336)        1204 
Orton  v.  State  (12  Wis   509)  554 

Osage  Street,  Re  (90  Pa.  St.  114)  795 

Osborn  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.  (9  Wheat. 

738)  67,  902 

v.  Danvers  (6  Pick.  98)    ^  1147 

Osborne  v.  Adams  County  (7  Fed. 

R. 441)  1031 

v.  Adams   County    (106   U.   S. 

181)  573 

v.  Detroit  (32  Fed.  R.  36)     680,  119.3, 

1298 
v.  Mobile  (44  Ala.  493)  898 

v.  Mobile  (10  Wall  479)        902,  903, 
904,  905 
v.  Tunis  (25  N.  J.  L.  633)  071) 

Osgood  v.  Clark  (26  N.  II.  307)  265 

v.  Green  (33  N.  II.  318)  223 

v.  Manhattan    County  (3  Cow. 

612)  382 

Oshkosh  v.  State  (59  Wis.  425)  1126 

Osterhoudt  v.  lligney  (98  N.  Y.  222)  HOC, 

1114 
Oswald  v.  Genet  (15  Tex.  118)  759 

Oswego  v.  Osw.  Canal  Co.  (6  N.  Y. 

257)  758,  760 


Page 

Oswego  Nat.  Bank  v.  Walcott  (7  Fed. 

R.  892)  594 

Otis  v.  Janesville  |  IT  Wis.  122)  1286 

v.  Stockton  (70  Me.  506)  539 

Otoe  County  v.  Baldwin  (111  XL  S.  1)  81 

134,  635 
Ottawa  v.  Carey  (108  U.  S.  110)  1  15,  187, 
{:>■',,  236,  -v, 
>-.  Chicago  &  B.  I.  R.  Co.  (25 

111.  13)  984,  986,  1127 

v.  La  Salle  County  (12  111.  339)      1 13 
v.  Macey  (20  [11.  11-  984 

r.  People  (48  111.  233)     88,  158,  1008, 
in]:;,  1017,  1057,  1058 
v.  Portsmouth  First  Nat.  Bank 

(105  U.  S.  342)  582,594 

v.  Spencer  (36  111.  211 ;  40  III.  211)  722, 

926,912.  955 

r.  Sweely  (65  111.  434)  12-7 

v.  Walker  (21  111.  605)  807 

Ottawa    Co.    Com'rs    '•.   Nelson   (19 

Kan.  234)  909,  925 

Ottawa  Dist.  Council  v.  Low  (6  Can. 

o.  s.  546)  11 -'19 

Ottawa  Glass  Co.  v.  McCaleb  (81  111. 

556)  969 

Ottendorfer  v.  Agnew  (13  Daly,  16)  1111 
Otto  Tp.  v.  Wolf  (100  Pa.  St.  608)  1283 
Ottumwa  v.  Parks  (43  Iowa,  119)  1308, 
1309,  1312,  1313 
Ouachita  Packet  Co.  v.  Aiken  (121 

U.  S.  444)  165,  166 

Ouachita    Par.  Pol.  Jurv  v.  Monroe 

(37  La.  An.  641)  518 

v.  Monroe  (38  La.  An.  630)       41,  551 
Oubre  v.  Donaldsonville  (33  La.  An. 

386)  528,  560 

Ould  u.  Richmond  (23  Gratt.  461)  958,  963, 

970 
Over  v.  Greenfield  (107  Ind.  231)       275, 

522 
Overacre  v.  Garrett  (5  Lans.  156)  301 
Overing  o.  Foote  (65  X.  V.  263)  994 

Overman  v.  May  (35  Iowa,  89)  816 

Overseers  of  Poor  of  Boston  r.  Sears 

(22  Pick.  122)       24,  70,  75,  303, 
655 
Overseers  of  Poor  of  Gibson  Tp.  v. 
Overseers,     &c.    Nicholson 
Tp.  (2  S.  &  B.  422)  272 

Overseers  of  Poor  of  Norwich  v. 
( >verseers,  &c.  New  Berlin 
(18  Johns.  W)  272,  529 

v.  Overseers,  &c.  Pharsalia  (15 

N.  Y.  341)  519 

Owen  v.  Smith  (31  Barb.  041)       246,  254 
Owens  v.  Milwaukee  (47  Wis.  461)      945, 

1227 
Owinga  v.  Speed  (5  Wheat.  420)       139, 

381 
Owners,  &c,  Re  Pine  Street  v.  Al- 
bany (15  Wend,  :'.71)      699,  709, 
763 
Oxford's  Case  (10  Coke,  44)  261 


CXV1U 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Page 

Oxford  Bank  v.  Wheeler  (72  N.  Y. 

201)  L142 

Oxford  Tp.  v.  Columbia  (38  O.  St. 

87)  7D7,  803 


Pacific  v.  Seifert  (7'.'  Mo.  210)  486 

v.  Lieb  (83  111.  602)  969 
Pacific  Junction  v.  Dyer  ('.'I  Iowa, 

38)  902 

Pacific  Mail   Stp.   Co.  v.  Joliffe  (2 

Wall.  150)  106 

Pacific  K.  Co.  v.  Cass  County  (53 

Mo.  17)  952,  969 

v.  Chrystal  (25  Mo.  544)  733 

r.  Leavenworth  (1   Dillon  C.  C. 

393)  776,  846,  849,  850,  862,  870 
,-.  Price,  Gov.  (2:1  Mo.  353)  389,  1016 
v.  Seely  (45  Mo.  212)  657 

Pacific  R.  Co.,  &c.  (1   Dillon  C.  C. 
:;l  1 1.      [See    Union   Pacific 
R.  Co..  &c.l 
Pack  r.  New  York  (8  N.  V.  222)         1306, 

1307,  1308 
Packard   v.  New  Bedford  (9  Allen, 

200)  1257,  1270 
Packet  Co.  &c.   [See  the  follow- 
ing plaintiff  packet  compa- 
nies, which,  in  citing,  may 
not  always  have  been  fully 
named  :  Cincinnati,  &c.  (105 
i:.  s.  569),  Keokuk,  &c.  (95 
U.    S.    80),    Memphis  &   St. 
L.  (9  Hush,  137),  Northwes- 
tern (21  Wall.  389;  2  Dillon 
C.  C.  479;   3   Dillon  C.  C. 
45-1  :    4    Dillon    C.    C.    10), 
Ouachita  (121  V    S.  444).] 
Padelford  V.  Savannah  (11  (ia.   138)       970 
Paducah  v.  Cully  (9  Bush,  323)    21)9,  301 
Page  v.  Alien  (58  Pa.  St   338)  L109 
v.  Baltimore  (34  Md.  558)  168 
v.  Chicago  (60  111.  411)                    958 
v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  liy.  Co. 

(70  111.324)  735,  L228 

v.  Clopton  (30  Gratt.  415)  L006 

v.  Frankforl  (9  Me.  155)  220 

v.  Graham  (57  [11.  Ml)  906 

v.  Hardin  (8  B.  Mon.  648)       319,  334 
v.  Heineberg  (  in  Vt.  81)  662 

v,  O'Toole  (Ml  Mass.  303)  691 

v.  St.  Louis  (20  Mo.  L36)        151,  953 
r.  State  (11  Ala.  849)  431 

v.  Sumpter  (53  Wis.  652)  1287 

Paige  v.  Fazackerly  (36  Barb.  392)     463, 

4  ( i  I 
v.  Heinburg  (40  Vt.  81)  657 

Paine,  ft  (1  Hill,  665)  i"'''; 

v.  Boston  (124  Mass.  486) 
v.  Delhi  (116  N.  V  224)  1092 

v.  Portage  <  !o.  Com'rs  (Wright 

(O.j  417)  798 


Page 
Paine  v.  Spratlev  (5  Kan.  525)        86,   1  17, 
955,  957,  999,  L000 
Painter  v.  Pittsburgh  (  16  Pa.  St.  21."., 

221 1  i     6,  1307 

Palatine  v.  Kreuger  (121  111.  72'   806,  819 
Palestine  v.  Panics  (50  Tex.  639)  I 

Pallister  v.  Gravesend  (9  C  B.744)     184, 

27  1 
Palmer  v.  Andover  (2  Cush.  600)      1257, 

1263,  1264 

Carroll  (24  \.  II.  314)  320 

v.  Hicks  (6  Johns.  133)  263 

p.  Lincoln  (5  Neb.  136)  1307 

v.  New  York  (2  Sandf.  318)    315,  316 

v.  Portsmouth  (43  X.  II.  265)        1257 

v.  Poultney  (2  Salk.  158)  447 

v.  St.  Albans  (56  Vt.  622)  1295 

v.  Strumpf.  (27  Ind.  329)        42::,  933 

Palmyra   v.   Morton    (25   Mo.  593)      709, 

722.  911,  984,  985,  1001 

Pana  v.  Bowler  (107  U.  S.  529)     572,  686, 

599,  on,  649 

Pangborn    v.    Westlake    (36    Iowa, 

546)  739 

Papworth    v.    .Milwaukee    (64    Wis. 

.>'.■)  833,  1312 

Paralee  v.  Camden  (45  Ark.  165)  453 

Parel  v.  Bayonne  (40  X.  J.  L.  333)       720 
Paris  v.  Graham  (33  Mo.  94)  397 

v.  People  (27  111.  74)  322,  1135 

Paris  Tp.  Trs.  y.  Cherry   (8  O.  St. 

604)  78,529,568 

Parisli  v.  Eden  (62  Wis.  272)  1284 

Parish,  &c.  (3  Pick.  232).     [See 

Sutton,  &c] 
(21  Pick.  148).      [See  Sudbury, 

&c] 
(8  Cush.  204).    [See  Sherburne, 
&c.l 
Park  Bank  v.  Watson  (42  X.  Y.  490)    583 

Park  Com'rs,  &C.  (51  111.  57;  91 

III.  49).      [See  South   Park 
Com'rs,  &c] 
(103  111.  33).     [See  West  Chi- 
cago, &c.l 
(28  Mich.  228).     [See  People  v. 

Detroit,  &c] 
(II  Mich.  002).     [See  Mayor  of 

Detroit,  Pel.  &C.] 
(45  N.  Y.  234).     [See  Brooklyn 

Park,  &C.1 
(50  N.    Y.  493).      [See  Central 

Park,  &c] 
(56  N.  Y.  144).     [See  Washing- 
ton Park,  &C.J 
Parke  Co.  Com'rs  v.  O'Conner  (86 

Ind.  531)  675 

Parker,  ft  (120  U.  S.  730)  1006,  1015 

V.  Corn it  wealth  (6  Pa.  St.  507)      78 

v.  Great  Western  Ky.  Co.  (7  M. 

&G.  253)  1149 

v.  Green  (2  B.  &  S.  299)  504 

r.  Lowell  (11  Gray,  353)     1214,  1317, 

1331 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


CX1X 


Parker  v.  Macon  (39  Ga.  725)      454,  L276, 

1309,  1312 
v.  Portland  Trustees  (54  Mich. 

308)  1015 

v.  Nashua  (59  N.  II.  402)  L329 

v.   New  Brunswick  (30  N.  J.  L. 

395)  155 

v.  Rutland  (56  Vt.  224)  1052 

v.  Williamsburg  (13    How.  Pr. 

250)  •v'1 

Parkersburg  v.  Brown  (Mi J  U.  S.487J  573, 
594,  895,  946 
Parkersbvirg  Gas  Co.  v.  Parkersburg 

(30  W.  Va.  435)        146,823,  828 
Parkhill  v.  Brighton  (61  Iowa,  103)    1285, 

1286 

Parks  0.  Boston  (8  Pick.  218)   152,  G96, 

708,  714,  1125,  1126,  1127,  1129, 

1130 

v.  Newbury  port  (10  Gray,  28)      1320 

Parks  Dep.,  lie  (W  N.  Y.  13)  90 

Parmelee  v.  Chicago  (00  111.267)  586,922, 

979 
v.  Youngstown  (43  O.  St.  102)       912 
Parmley  o.  St.  L.,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 

"  (3  Dillon,  25)  1108 

Parnaby  v.  Lancashire  Canal  Co.  (11 

A.  &  E.  223)  179, 1170 

Parr  v.  Atty-Genl.  (8  CI.  &  F.  409)      285, 

509,  1100,1101 

v.  Greenbush  (72  N.  Y.  463)  526 

Parrott  v.  Bridgeport  (44  Conn.  180)  1009 

r.  Eyre  (10  Bing.  283)  324 

Parry  v.  Berry  (Comyns,  269)  352 

Parsel  v.  Barnes  (25  Ark.  261)  517 

Parsons  v.  Atlanta  Univ.  Trs.  (44  Ga. 

529)  757,  760,  761,  787,  788 

v.  Bethnal  Green  (17  L.  T.  n.  s. 

211)  1332 

v.  Brainard  (17  Wend.  522)  351 

v.  Goshen  (11  Pick.  396)     52,  54,  529 
v.  Lindsay  (26  Kan.  426)  1287 

v.  Monmouth   (70  Me.  202)      37.  63, 

1143 
v.  St.  Matthew's  Vestry  (L.  R. 

3  C.  P.  66)  1214 

Passaic  Br.  Prop.  v.  Hoboken   Land 

&  I.  Co.  (13  N.J.  Eq.  503)    1169 
Paston  v.  Urber  (Ilutt.  103)  330 

Patch  v.  Covington  (17  B.  Men.  722) 

1199 
Paterson  v.  Barnet  (46  N.  J.  L.  62)       385 
v.  Society  for  E.  U.  Manuf.  (24 

N.  J.  L.  385)      77,  7s,  81,  93,  94, 
95,  266,  928,  955,  956,  989 
Paterson  &  P.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Paterson 

(24  X.J.  Eq.  158)     83:!.  817,  871 
Paterson  Gasl.   Co.  v.  Brady  (27  X. 

J.  L.  245)  825 

Patrick  v.  Cross  Roads  Com'rs  (4  Mc- 

Cord,  540)  692 

Patterson  v.  Bowes  (4  Grant,  170)     1101, 

Hi)'.) 
v.  Duluth  (21  Minn.  493)        758,  788 


Pago 
Patterson  v.  Miss.  &  R.  River  Boom 
Co.  (3  Dill.  465;  98  U.  S. 
103)  190,  729,  731 

r.  Vail  (42  Iowa,  143)  791 

Pattison  v.  Yuba  Co.  Sup.  (13  Cal. 

175)  208 

Patton  v.  Springfield  (99  Mass.  627)     987 
r.  Stephens  (11  Bush,  324)  209 

Paul  v.  Carver  (24    Pa.  St.  207 ;  26 

Pa.  St.  223)  794 

v.  Detroit  (32  Mich.  110)  786 

v.  Kenosha  (22  Wis.  266)       194,  538, 

1111 
v.  Newark  (G  Am.  L.  I!    576)  735 

v.  Virginia  (8  Wall.  177)        903 
Pawlet  v.  Clark  (9  Cranch,  292)   112,  739, 

743 

Paxson  v.  Sweet  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  196)     404, 

180,  928,  977 

Payne  v.  Brecon  (3  H.  &  N.  572)  184,  274, 

v.  McKinley  (54  Cal.  532)       787,  843 
v.  Treadwell  (16  Cal.  222)  771 

Peabody  v.  Flint  (6  Allen,  52) 
Peachy  v.  Somerset  (1  Str.  447)     _       420 
Peagram  v.  Cleaveland  Co.  Com'rs 

(64  N.  C.  557)  1028 

v.  Cleaveland    Co.    Com'rs    (65 

N.  C.  114)  1052,1074 

Pearce  v.  Augusta  (37  Ga.  597)  970 

v.  Madison  &  I.  R.  Co.  (21  How. 

441)  H40 

v.  Milwaukee  (is  Wis.  32)  1227 

Pearl  Street,  fi<   (111  Pa.  St.  505)         757 

Pearsall  v.  Post  (20  Wend.  Ill)    76::,  767, 

768 
[See  also  Post  v.,  &c] 
Pearson  v.  Zable  (78  Ky.  170)    122' 
Pease  v.  Cornish   (19  Me.  191)      53,566, 

v.  Dayton  (4  O.  St.  80)  1281 

Peay  v.  Little  Rock  (32  Ark.  31)  722,907, 

908,  927 
Peck  v.  Austin  (2  Tex.  162)  1159 

v.  Austin  (22  Tex.  261)  459 

v.  Booth  (42  Conn.  271)  -"'17 

v.  Elder  (3  Sandf.  126)  7^7 

v.  Ellsworth  (36  Me.  393)  1252 

v.  Fox  Lake  (28  Wis.  583)  1121 

v.  Lockwood    (5   Day    (Conn.), 

22)  403 

v.  Prov.  S.  E.  Co.  (8  R.  I.  353)      740 

v.  Sherwood  (56  N.  Y.  614)  913 

v.  Smith  (1  Conn.  103)  790,817 

Peddicord  v.  Bait..  C.  &  E    M.  Pass. 

liv.  Co.  (34  Mil.  163)  868 

Pedrick  v.  Bailey  (12  Gray,  161 )  292 

398,  810,  1274 

Pees  v.  Leeds  (1  Stra.  640)         1064,  1067 

Peete  v.  Morgan  (19  Wall.  581)  166 

IVkin  v.  Brereton  (67  111.  477)    855,  1221. 

122:;.  L234,  1211.  1316,  L324 

v.  Newell  (26  Dl.  320)  L184 

r.  Reynolds  (31  111.  529)  569 


cxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Pekin  o.  Smelzel  (21  111.  404)       481,  132, 

v.  Winkel    (77    111.  50)       1221,  1223, 
1217,  L324 
Pekin,  L.  ,v  1).  It.  Co.  v.  Logan  Co. 

Sup.  (63  111.  874)  239,  L069,  1070 
Pell  r.  Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  71)  836 

Pella  Christian  Ch.  v.  Scholte  C-'l 

[owa,  283)      743,  755,   767,  798, 

8ul,  803 

Pender  v.  King  (6  Vin.  Aim.  296)         304 

Pendergast  v.  Peru  (20  111.  51)  400 

Pendlebury  y.  Greenbalgh  (1  Q.  15. 1). 

36)  1295 

Pendleton  i?.  Bank  of  Kv.  ( 1  Mon.  177)  260 
v.  Pi  rkina  (49  Mo.  565)  161 

Pendleton  County  v.  Amy  (13  Wall. 

297)  576,593,  594,  617,618, 

621,  till 
Peninsular  It.  It.  Co.  v.  Howard  (20 

Mich.  18)  613 

Pennington  v.  Baehr  (48  Cal.  565)       681 

v.  Taniere  (12  Q.  B.  1011)     521,  528, 

678 

v.  Willard  (1  It.  I.  93)  752 

Pennoyer  v.  Saginaw  (8  Mich.  534)  1320, 

1325 
Pennsylvania  &  O.  Canal  Co.  v.  Gra- 
ham (63  Pa.  St.  290)    1216,  1287, 
1297 
Penn.,  Del.  &  Md.  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
v.  Dandridge  (8  Gill   &  J. 
248)  518,  533 

Penn.  District  Election  (2  Pars.  520)     281 
Penn.  Globe  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Scranton 

(97  Pa.  St.  538)  408 

Penn.  Hall,  lie  (5  Pa.  St.  204)     507,  1107 
Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Duquesne  Bor.  (46 

Pa.  St.  223)  808,  882 

v.  I  leister  (8  Pa.  St.  445)  733 

v.  Jersey  City  (47  N.  J.  L.  286)      397 
v.  Lippincott  (110  Pa.  St.  472)     1221, 

1-244 
v.  Marchant  (110  Pa.  St.  541)     1239, 

1244 

v.  McCloskey  (23  Pa.  St.  526)      1288 

v.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  198)    229, 

230,  237 

v.  Pittsburgh  C,r.  Elev.  Co.  (50 

Pa.  St.  199)  747,  701 

v.  Porter  (29  Pa.  St.  L65)  70S 

v.  Rathgeb  (32  <  >.  St.  66)     1261,  1263 
v.  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T.  H.  It.  Co. 

(118  U.  S.  290)  078 

Penn.    It.   Co's   Appeal  (93  Pa.  St. 

150)  689 

Penny  Pot  Landing,  Re  (10  Pa.  St. 

7!))  759,  708,  799 

Penobscot  Boom  Corp.  v.  Lawson  (10 

Me.  225)  93 

Pensacola  Tel  Co.  >■.  Western  Union 

(96  D .  S.  1)  830 

Pentz  v.  Ailna.  Ins.  Co.  (9  Paige,  568) 

11G5,  1160 


Pags 
People  v.  Adams  (9  Wend.  333)    367,  381, 

443 
v.  Albany  (11  Wend.  539)  179,  1212 
v.   Albany  ( !o.  Sup.,  ( 12  Johns. 

IN  1014,  1017,  1043 

v.  Alb.  &  Susi[.  It.  Co.  (5  Lans. 

25)  1104 

v.  Albertson  (55  X.  V.  50)    25.  2s,sl, 
100,  HO,  102,  294,  1081 
v.  Alleghany  Co.  Sup.  (15  Wind. 

198)  1127 

v.  Assessors  (1  Hill,  020)  55 

v.  Attorney-General   (22  Barb. 

114)    "  1057 

v.  Baron  (18  Mich.  247)  1067 

v.  Baker  (35  Barb.  105)  1050,  1069 
v.  Bank  ol  Niagara  (6  I  low.  L96)  1089 
v.   Bank  of  Pontiac   (12  Mich. 

527)  1088 

v.  Baraga  (39  Mich.  554)  518 

r.  Barnard  (110  N.  Y.  548)  850,  b59 
>-.  Bartlett  (6  Wend.  422)  305,355 
v.  Batchelor  (22  N.  Y.  128)  100,  362, 
363,  364 
v.  Batchelor  (53  N.  Y.  128)  125,  635, 
1011,  1139 
v.  Bearfield  (35  Barb.  254)     330,  337, 

339 

v.  Bedell  (2  Hill.  196)  290.  296 

v.  Bennett  (20  Mich.  451 )     57,  72,  73, 

107,  265,  2f,s,  1082,  1324 

v.  Benson  (30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  24)     822, 

826 
v.  Benzie  Co.  Treas.  (41  Mich.  6)  211 
v.  Bissell,  Gov.  (19  III.  229)  1010 
v.  Blake  (60  Cal.  107)  754 

v.  Bloomington  (63  111.  207)  1017, 1060 
v.  Board, &c.  (89  N.  Y.&c).  [See 


r.  Brooklyn,  &c.J 
v.  N.  Y.  &c] 


v.  Board,  &c.  (64  X.  Y.  &c).  [See 


v.  Board  of  Trade  (45  III.  112)      320, 

330 
v.  Bond  (10  Cal.  503)  120 

v.  Brenham  (3  Cal.  477)  480 

v.  Brennan(39Barb.522),  [Tay- 
lor, ltel.[  184,  1030 
t'.  Brennan  (39  Barb.  651),  [Op- 
dyke,  Mayor,  K.l.|  1015 
v.  Brennan  (45  Barb.  157)  1010 
v.  Briggs  (50  N.  Y.  653)  89,  108 
v.  Brighton  (20  Mich.  57)       707,  710, 

715 
v.  Bristol  &  It.  Tump.  Co.  (23 

Wend.  222)  1078 

v.  Broadway  Wharf  Co.  (31  Cal. 

33)  172,  059 

v.  Brooklyn  (21  Barb.  484)  977 

v.  Brooklyn  (1  Wend.  318)    712,  1009 

v.  Brooklyn  (4  N.  Y.  410)       130,  721, 

722,  N00,  S'.tS,  <ios,  913,  014,  919, 

920,  921,  922,  925,  934,  954,  9S3, 

087 

v.  Brooklyn  (05  N.  Y.  349)    806,  1314 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


CXX1 


Page 
People  v.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  495)  979,  994 
v.  Brooklyn   Bd.  of  Assess.  (39 

N.  Y.  81)  1127 

v.  Brooklyn  I5il.  of  Assess.  (Ill 

N.  Y*.  505)  949 

v.  Brooklyn  Bd.  of  Coin'rs,  Fire, 

&c.  (106  N.  Y.  64)  338,1131 

v.  Brooklyn  C.  Council  (22  Barb. 

101)  1011,  1013,  1057 

v.  Brooklyn  C.  Council  (77  N.  Y. 

503)       307,  310,  1019,  1020,  1058 
v.  Brown  (2  Utah  Ter.  402)  435 

v.  Buchanan  ( 1  Idaho  Ter.  081 )       48 1 
v.  Bull  (40  N.  Y.  57)  100,  1079 

v.  Butte  (4  Mont.  Ter.  174)  68,  77,  78 
v.  Cairo  (50  111.  155)  1032 

v.  Callaghan  (83  111.  128)  1085 

v.  Campbell  (72  N.  Y.  496)  10i5 

v.  Canaday  (73  N.  C.  198)    24,  27,  69, 
277,  278 
v.  Canal  Board  (55  N.  Y.  390)       1099 
v.  Canty  (55  111.   33)     122,  290,  906, 

927 

v.  Carpenter  (24  N.  Y.  86)    263,  265, 

272,352,  1081,  1082 

v.  Carpenter  (1   Mich.  273)    765,  782, 

785,  848 

v.  Carrique  (2  Hill,  93)  309,  310,  1019 

v.  Cass  Co.  Corn'rs  (77   111.  438)  239, 

240,646,  1014 

v.  Cassidy  (2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  294)    966 

v.  Central  I'ac.  R.  Co.  (43  Cal. 

398)  707,  902 

v.  Chapman  (66  111.  137)  646 

v,  Chautauqua  Co.   Sup.    (43  N. 

Y.  10)  89,  838 

v.  Chenango  Co.  Sup.  (8  N.  Y. 

317)  1007,  1043 

v.  Chenango  Co.  Sup.  (11  N.Y. 

563)  1009,  1030 

v.  Chicago   (51  111.  17)     27,  102,  122, 
906,  1056 
v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  (67  111. 

118)  858 

v.  Chicago  &  N.  \V.  Ry.  Co.  (118 

HI.  520)  806 

v.  Cicott  (16  Mich.  283)  283  289 

v.  Clark  (70  N.  Y.  518)  1082 

i'.  Clark  (47  Cal.  456)  958 

v.  Clark  Co.  Sup.  (50  111.  213)       1030 
v.  Clayton  (88  111.  45)  211) 

v.  Clunie  (70  Cal.  504)  71   144 

v.  Clute  (50  N.  Y.  451)  100,  279 

v.  Clute  (52  N.  Y.  576)         1081,  1090 
v.  Coleman  (4  Cal.  46)  426,  921 

v.  Collins  (7  Johns.  649)  1012 

v.  Collins  (3  Mich.  347)  ;',!»1 

v.  Collins  (19  Wend.  05)      1004,  1052, 

1057 
v.  Columbia  Co.  Sup.  (10  Wend. 

363)  10D7,  1009,  1011 

i'.  Commissioners,  &c.  (59  N.  Y., 
N.  Y.,  &c).  ISee  v.  N.  Y., 
&c] 


People  v.   Commissioners,  &c.   (106 

N.  Y.,  &c).    [See  v.  Brook- 

lyn,  &c.]. 
v.  Commissioners  of  Highways 

(22  N.  E.  K.  696)  1017 

v.  Commissioners  of  Highways 

(88  111.  112)  1006 

v.  Commissioners  of  Highways 

(6  Wend.  559)  1069 

v.  Comptroller  (77  N.  Y.  45)        1009, 

1196 
v.  Comptroller  (20  Wend.  595)    329, 

334 
v.  Conover  (17  N.  Y.  64)  296 

v.  Conover  (6  Abb.  l'r.  K.  220)  1089 
v.  Contracting  Board   (46  Barb. 

254  ;    27  N.  Y.  378  ;   33  N. 

Y.  382)  1015 

v.  Cook  (14  Barb.  259)  281,  352 

v.  Cook  (8N.  Y.  07)  352 

v.  Coon  (25  Cal.  635)  121,  236.  551 
v.  Cooper  (6  Hill,  516)  8S  1 

v.  Cooper  (57  How.  Pr.  416)  338 

v.  Cornell  (47  Barb.  329)  379 

v.  County  (11  Cal.  170)  562 

v.  Court'(l  Hill  (N.  Y.),  674)  1130 
v.  Court  (5  Wend.  114)  1017 

v.  Covert  (1  Hill,  674)  1128,  1138 

v.  Crissey  (91  N.  Y.  616)  277,  287,  313 
v.  Croton  Aq  Bd.  (26  Barb.  240)  547 
v.  Crotty  (93  III.  180)  1006 

v.  Cunningham  ( 1  Denio,  524)  785,  881 
v.  Curly  (5  Col.  412)  99,  492 

v.  Davidson  (30  Cal.  379)  379 

v.  Dayton  (55  N.  Y.  367)  630,  896 
v.  Denslow  (1  Caines,  177)  781 

v.  Detroit  (18  Mich.  338,445)  440,  479, 
480,  1022,  1023 
v.  Detroit  (28  Mich.  228)     24,  25,  27, 

28,  41,  45,  48,  94,  99,  100,  101, 
102,  108,  110,  112,  115,  123 
v.  Detroit  &  H.  PI.  R.  Co.   (37 

Mich.  195)  781 

v.  Detroit   Rec.   Ct.  Judge   (40 

Mich.  64)  809 

v.  Doe  (36  Cal.  220)  771 

v.  D'Oench  (111  N.  Y.  359)  213 

v.  Draper  (15N.  Y.532)  27,  80,  86,99, 

100,  101, 102,  269,  293,  352,  1081 
v.  Dutcher  (56  111.  Ill)  (ill 

v.  Dutchess  Co.  R.  (58  N.  Y.  152)  852, 
1017,  11)71,  1135 
v  Dutchess  Co.  Sup.  (1  Hill.  50)  882, 
1014,  1017 
v.  Dutchess  Co.  Sup.   (9  Wend. 

51  IS)  1010 

v.  East  Saginaw  (40  Mich.  336)  1009 
v.  K.ldy  (43  Cal.  33:1)  953 

r.  Edmonds  (15  Barb.  529)  1009,  1010 
v.  Erie  Co.  Med.  Soc.  (24  Barb. 

570)  329 

v.  Esopus  Aud.  (74  N.  Y.  310)     1203, 

1246 
v.  Essex  Co.  Sup.  (70  N.  Y.  228)    130 


CXX11 


TABLE    OP    CASES   CITED. 


I'l.-i- 

People  v.  Everett  (1  Caines,  8)  1072 

,.  Fairbury  Trs.  (51  ill.  149)  244,280, 

281,  303,  1020 

v.  Farnham  (35  111.  562)  140,  260 

v.  Ferris  1 16  Hun,  219)  1076 

v.  Fi(  Ids  (58  N.  Y.  491)  105,108,  113, 

115,  1104,  l  I   0 

r.  Finger  (24  Barb.  341)  L0G9 

v.  Fire  Com'ra  (100  N.  V.  82)        1131 

v.  Fire  Com'rs  (106  N.  Y.  04)        338, 

1131 
/-.  Fire  Com'rs  (106  N.  Y.  257)  1131 
v.  Fitzgerald  (41  Mich.  2)  284 

v.  Flagg  (17  N.  Y.  584)  539,  543,  566, 
809,  1030 
v.  Flagg  (46  N.  Y.  401)  120,  91  : 

1011 
v.  Flanagan  (66  N.  Y.  237)  282,  1079 
v.  Fletcher  (3  111.  487)  1023 

v.  Fort  Edward  (70  N.  Y.  28)  2.30 
v.  Fort  Street  Ry.  (41  Mich.  413)  866 
v.  Fulton  County  (14  Barb.  50)  534 
v.  Galesburg  (18  111.485)  1077 

r.  Gilbert  (18  Johns.  227)  797 

v.  Goodwin  (5  N.  Y.  568)  980 

v.  Governor  (29  Mich.  320)  1016 

v.  Granville  (104  111.  285)  630 

v.  Gray  (23  Cai.  125)  502 

v.  Green  (58K.  Y.  304)  310 

v.  Green  (64  N.  Y.  606)  1220 

w.Greene  <  \>.  Sup.  (64  N.  Y.  600)  1070 
v.  Hall  (80  N.  Y.  117)  287,  1076,  1077 
v.  Halsey  (53  Barb.  547)  1067 

v.  Hanifan  (96  111.420)  308,310 

v.  Harper  (07  111.  62)  240 

v.  Harper  (91  111.  357)  463 

v.  Harris  |  I  Cal.  9)  210 

r.  Harshaw  (00  Mich.  200)  284,  351 
v.  Hartwell  (12  Mich.  508)  1087,  1088 
v.  Harvey  (58  Cal.  337)  276 

v.  Hatch  (83  111.  9)  1053 

v.  Hawley  (3  Mich.  330)  213 

r.  Hayden  (6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  359)  720 
v.  Ilavt  (66  N.  Y.  606)  1056,  1003 
v.  Head  (25  111.325)  1023,1026 

v.  Henry  (02  CM.  557)  290,  294 

v.  Henshaw  (76  Cal   430)  493 

v.  llerbel  (96  111.  384)  750 

v.  Higgins  (15  III.  110)  331 

v.  Higgins  (3  Mich  233)  281 

v.  Highway  Com'rs  (88  111.  45)  240 
v.  Highway  Com'rs  (22  N.  F    R. 

596)    '  1017 

v.   Highway   Com'rs  (0  Wend. 

559)     '  1009 

v.  Highway   Com'rs    (7  Wend. 

171)     '  1217 

r.  Hill  (7  Cal.  97)  95,  105,  296 

v.  Hillhouse  (1   Fans.  87)  1127 

v  Hilliard   (29  111.   413)  1023,   1026, 
1050,  1064 
v.  Hills  (35  N.  Y.  4  19)  89,  90 

v.  Hillsdale  &  C.  Tump.  Co.  (2 

Johns.  19H)  lH-l 


People  r   Hoge  (55  Cal,  012) 
v.  Hoi  len  (28  Cal.  123) 
v.  Holden  (91  111.  446) 
v.  Holmes  (2  Wend.  281) 
v.  Hopson  (1  Denio,  571) 
v.  Howard 


■Page 
72 

1077 
240 
299 
355 
145 


v.  Hudson,  &c,  Com'rs  (0  Wend. 

559)  1069 

v.  Hudson,  &c,  Com'rs  (7  Wend. 

171)  1247 

v.  Humphrey  (23  Mich.  471)  697 

v.  Hurlbut  (24  Mich.  II)      24,  39,  41, 

81,  88,  99,  100,  108,  110, 

112,213,  220,291.  899 

v.  Hyde  Park  (117  111.  462)    707,  97s, 

1007 
v.  Ingersoll  (58  N.  Y.  1)         105,  l1  8, 
1  13,  115,  1102,  1104,  1106 
v.  Ingham   Co.  Sup.   (20  Mich. 

95)  791,795 

v.  Jackson  (7  Mich.  432)         745,  782 
v.  Jackson  (8  Mich    llii)  437,  140 

v.  Jackson  County  (92  111.  444)     240, 

1034 
v.  Jaehne  (103  N.  Y.  182)  30,  1  1 1 
v.  Johnson  (30  Cal.  98)  412,480 

v.  Johnson  (100  III.  537)  562 

v  Johr  (22  Mich.  461)  300 

v.  Jones  (7  Col.  475)  140 

v.  Jones  (G  Mich.  176)  739,  761 

v.  Justices  (74  N.  Y.  40G)        600,  501 
v.  Keeling  (4  Col.  127)  281 

v.  Kelly  (5  Abb.  N.  Cas.  383)        126, 

1044 
v.  Kelsey  (34  Cal.  470)  899 

v.  Kerr  "(27  N.  Y.  188)     121,  747,  792, 

794,  833,  834,  841,  803,  867,  870, 
871 
v.  Kilduff  (15  III.  492)  285,  1023, 

1025,  1026 
v.  Kimball  (4  Mich  95)  727 

v.  Kingman  (24  N.  Y.  545)  745 

v.  Kip  (4  Cow   (X.  Y.)  383)         1023 
v.  Klopke  (92  111.  134)  502 

v.  Klumpke  (41  Cal.  263)  759 

v.  Knight  (13  Mich.  124)  281 

v.  Kniskern  (54  N  Y.  52)  707 

v.  Lambier  (5  Denio,  9)  748,  758 

v.  La  Salle  Co.  Sup.  (84  111.303) 

1014,  1017 
v.  Faw  (34  Barb.  194)  841 

r.  Lawrence  (6  Hill,  244)       219,  1044 
v.  Lewis  (7  Johns.  73)  320 

v.  Fieb  (85  111.  4>  I)  1006 

v.  Livingston  Co.  Sup.  (34  N.  Y. 

516)  194 

v.  Loef  helm  (102  N.  Y.  1)  762 

v.  Logan  Co.  Sup.  (45  111.  162)  644 
v.  Logan  Co.  Sup.  (63  111.  374)  239, 
1009,  1070 
v.  Londoner  (22  Pac.  R.  764)  1128 
v.  Loomis  (8  Wend.  390)      282,  1088, 

1090 
v.  Love  (19  Cal.  676)  260 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXXlll 


Page 

People  v.  Lowber  (7  Abb.  Pr.  158)      1104 

v.  Lowber  (28  Barb.  65)  457 

v.  Lynch  (6]  Cal.  15)         27,99,  100, 

130,  138,924,  933 

v.  Mahaney  (13  Mich.  481)       86,  88, 

100,284,311 

v.  Manhattan  Co.  (9  Wend.  351)      77, 

139 
v.  Marsh  (2  Cow.  485)  1011 

v.  Mania  (5  N.  Y.  22)  350,  364 

v.  Marx  (99  N.  Y.  377)  211 

p.  Mathewson  (47  Cal.  442)  2sn 

v.  Matteson  (17  111.  167)       282,  1022, 

1023 
v.  Mauran  (5  Denio,  389)  662 

v.  May  (9  Col.  81 ;  404)  202 

v.  Maynard  (15  Mich.  463)      76,  140, 
1082,  1110 
v,  McAdams  (82  111.  356)  122 

u   McClintock  (45  Cal.  11)      219,  058 
p.  MeCreery  (34  Cal.  432)      895,  923, 
951,  953 
v.  McDonald  (09  N.  Y.  362)     27,  102, 

993 
v.  McKinney  (10  Mich.  54)  321 

v.  .McKinney  (52  N.  Y.  374)  100,  208 
v.  McRoberts  (02  111.  38)        726,  727, 

1234 
v.  Mead  (24  N.  Y.  114)  226,  566,  584 
v.  Mead  (36  N.  Y.  224)  601,  615,  618, 
644,  649 
p.  Medical  Soc  (24  Barb.  570)  329 
v.  Mellen  (32  III.  181)  88 

v.  Metrop.  Pol.  Bd.   (19  N.  Y. 

188)  278, 293 

v.  Metrop.   Pol.  Bd.   (26  N.  Y. 

316)  308,  1026,  1070 

p.  Metrop.  Pol.   Bd.   (39  N.  Y. 

506)  1127 

v.  Metzker  (47  Cal.  524)  285 

v.  Mich.  Univ.  Regents  (4  Mich. 

98)  1057 

v.  Miller  (24  Mich.  458)  319 

v.  Miner  (2  Bans.  396)  1104 

v.  Mitchell  (35  N.  Yr.  551)      225,  235, 

635 
p.  Morgan  (55  N.  Y.  587)  647 

r.  Worrell  (21  Wend.  563)  81,272,3,11 
v.  Morris  (13  Wend.  325)       9,  39,  77. 
93,  94,  103,  107,  140 
p.  Morse  (43  Cal.  534)  121 

v.  Mott  (1  How.  Br.  247)  37'',  380 
v.  Mulholland  (82  N.  Y.  321)  424,  I  12 
r.  Murray  (15  Cal.  321)  276 

p.  Murray  (57  Mich.  306)  381,  389 
p.  Murray  (73  N.  Y.  535)  253,,  1089 
p.  Mut.  Gasl.  Co.  (38  Mich.  154)  1084 
v.  Nallv  (49  Cal.  478)  78 

v.  Nearing  (27  N.  Y,  306)  700 

v.  Nevada  (6  Cal.  143)  265 

p.  Newton  ( 112  N.  Y.  396)  863 

v.  New   York  (9  Abb.  Pr.  253; 

10//).  144)  1104 

p.  New  York  (5  Barb.  43)       296,  557 


Page 

People  v.  New  York  (32  Barb.  102)    1104 

r.  New  York  (-1  Hill  (N.  Y),  9)      509, 

715,  L126,  L128,  1131 

P.  New  York  (7  How.  Pr.  R.  81)      481 

v.  New  York  (3  Johns.  Las.  7(J)  1073, 

1078 
p.  New  York  (82  N.  Y.  491)  884 

p.  New  York  (10  Wend.  393)        1008, 

1 1 

v.  New  York  (25  Wend.  680)       1009, 

1010 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Harl.  It.  Co.  (45  Barb. 

73)  863 

v.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Appr.  (64  N.  Y. 

627)  1031 

v.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Fire  Com'rs   (72 

N.  Y.  415)  331 

v.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Police  (107  N.  Y. 

235)  1007 

v.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Sup.  (1  Hill,  362)  312, 
362,  530,  1014 
p.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Sup.  (32  N.  Y. 

473)  1010 

p.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Tax  Com'rs  (58 

N.  Y.  242)  965 

p.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Tax  Com'rs  (59 

N.  Y.  40)  964 

v.  N   Y.  Bd.  of  Tax  Com'rs  (64 

'    N.  Y.  541)  964 

p.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Tax  Com'rs  (82 

N.  Y.  462)  966 

p.  N.  Y.  Bd.  of  Tax  Com'rs  (95 

N.  Y.  554)  952 

v.  Nichols  (79  N.  Y.  582)         334 
p.  Niles  (35  Cal. 282)  '.i,;i 

v.  Nolan  (102  N.  Y.  530)  319 

p.  North  (72  N.  Y.  124)  277,  287 

v.  No.  Chicago  Ey.  Co.   (88  111. 

537)  1085 

v.  No.  San  F.  H.  &  E,  Assoc.  (38 

Cal.  564)  1104 

p.  Nostrand  (46  N.  Y.  375)  159,  310, 

355,  1019 

p.  Nyland  (41  Cal.  120)  493 

v.  Oakland    Co.   Bank   (1  Doug. 

(Mich.)  282)  117.1088 

p.  O'Brien,  Eec.  (Ill  N.  Y.  1)  30,  89, 

92,  105,  113,  115,  117,  243,  246, 
254,  392,  771 
v.  Ogdensburgh   (48  N.  Y.    390)   964, 
969,  1127 
v.  Oldtown  (88  111.  202)  239,  240 

p.  O'Neil  (109  X.  Y.  261)  1  M 

v.  I  taondaga  Sup.  ( 16  Mich.  254)   130, 

p.  Oran  (121  111.  650)  804 

r.  Pacheco  (29  Cal.  210)  1058 

v.  Palmer  (52  N.  Y.83)  100,159,  360 
p.  Park  Com'rs  (07  X.  Y.  37)  1128 
p.  Pearson  (4  111.  271)  1070 

r.  Pease  (27  X.  V  289 

p.  Peoria,  D.  &  E.  E.  Co.  (110  111. 

410)  900 

v.  Phillips  (1  Denio,  388)  277 


CXX1V 


TAP.LK    OF    CASKS    CITKI). 


Page 
People  r.  Police  Board,  &c.  (26  N.  Y. 

39  \.  V  ,  &c.    [See  v.  .Metro- 
politan, &a  ] 
v.  Police   Board,  &c.  (107  X.  Y., 

&c.)     [See  r.  N.  Y.  Bd.,  &c] 
r.  Police  Justice  (7  Mich.  45G)        510 
v.  Pope  (53  Cal.  1 17 1  659 

r.  Porter  (6  Cal.  26)  309 

v.  Potter  (35  Cal.  110)  138 

v   I', .ucr  (25  III.  187)  104 

v.  Pratt  (30  Cal.  223)  1056 

r.  President,  &c.,(9  Wend.  351)  77,139 
v.  Prison  [nsp.  (4  Mich.  187)         1057 
.  1'ueblo  Co.  (2  Col.  360)  237 

v.  Queen's  Co  Sup.  (1  Hill,  195)  1127 
v.  Queen's  Co.  Sup.  (112  X.  Y.  685)  27, 
28,  120 
o.  Ransom  (2N.Y.490)  1007,  1056 
r.  Reclamation  Dist.  (53  Cal.  346)  ".'1 
v.  Rector,  &c.  (48  Barb.  603)  351 

v.  Reynolds  (10  111.  1)  77 

v.  Richardson  (4  Cow.  100)  1075, 1079, 
1083,  1080 
v.  Richmond  Co.  Sup.  (28  N.  Y. 

112)  1070,1074 

v.  River  Raisin  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  ( 12 

Mich.  387)  147 

v.  Riverside  (66  Cal.  288)  1085 

v.  Riverside  (70  Cal.  461)  71 

r.  Rochester  (21  Barb.  656)  979,  1131 
v.  Rochester  (44  Hun,  166)  397,  138 
v.  Rochester  (5  Lans.  142)  364,993 
v.  Rochester  (50  N.  Y   525)  89 

v.  Runkel  (9  Johns  147)201,303,304, 
305,  355 
r.  St.  Franeiscus  Benev.  Soc.  (24 

How.  Pr.  216)  338 

v.  St.  Louis  (10  111.  372)  454 

v.  Salem  Tp.  Bd.  (20  Mich.  452)    229, 

234,  579,  898 

v.  Salomon  (4G  111.  415)         950,  HUM,, 

1088,  1021 

v.  Salomon  (51  III.  37)         77,  85,  122, 

463.  569,  '."it;,  100G,  1008,  1016 

r.  San  Francisco  (36  Cal.  594)      1057 

v.  San  F.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  (35  Cal. 

60(5)  923,924 

v.  San    F.  Sup.  (20  Cal.  691)         1012 

v.  San  F.  Sup.  (27  Cal.  655)  407,  528, 

551,  618,  646,  1056,  1068 

v.  San  Luis  Obispo  Co.  Sup.  (60 

Cal.  661)  104 

v.  Santa  Anna  Co.  Sup.  (67  111. 

57)  240,  2ND 

v.  Saratoga   &    R.  R.  Co.     (15 

Wend.  111)  1083 

v.  Schermerhorn  (19  Barb.  540)  656 
v.  School  Dist.  (72  Mo.  643)  272 

v.  School  Tr.  (86  111.  013)  272,  1006 
u.Schuyler  (7'.'  N.  Y.  189)  1059 

v.  Scrugham  (20  Barb.  302)  1028,1025 
v.  Seaman  (5  Denio,  109)  282,  1079 
v.  Sergeant  (8  Cow.  189)  450 

v.Seymour  (1G  Cal.  332)  996 


Pigs 
People  v.  Seymour  (0  Cow.  579)        1059, 

1070,  1074 
v.  Shearer  (30  Cal.  645)  950 

v.  Shepherd  (36  X.  V.  285)       loo,  102 
v.  Slaughter  (2  Doug.  334)  440,497, 
500,  505 
v.  Smith  (21  X.  Y.  595)  703,  705 

r.  Smith  (  15  X.  V.  772)  645,  1127 

v.  Spencer  (55  X.  Y.  1)  237 

v.  State  Treasurer  (4  Mich.  27)  1059 
v.  State  Treasurer  (23  Mich.  499)  579 
V.  Steele  (1  Edm.  Sel.  (as.  505)  1074 
v.  Stephens  (02  Cal.  209)  82S 

v.  Stephens  (71  \.  Y.  627)  547 

v.  Stevens  (5  Hill,  616)   282,  305,  355, 
1008,  1009,  1022,  1025 
v.  Stilwell  (1  N.  Y.  531)  715 

v.  Stout  (23  Barb.  338)  77,  551, 

1009,  1111 
r.  Stuart  (97  111.  123)  725,  727 

,-.  Sturtevant  (9  X.  Y.  263)  116,  387 
v.  Superior  Court  (5  Wend.  114)1017 
v.  Sweetiiur  (2  Johns.  184)  1078,  loss 
v.  Swift  (31  Cal.  26)  539,  540 

r.  Syracuse  (03  N.  Y.  291)     159,  300, 

711 

v.  Tazewell  County  (22  111.  147)   239, 

669,644 

v.  Thatcher  (55  N.  Y.  525)     287,  289, 

1070,  1080 

v.  Third  Av.  R.  Co.  (45  Barb. 

63)  8G3 

v.  Thompson  (25  Barb.  73)  1010 

v.  Thompson  (10  Wend.  655)       1075, 

Kiss 
[See  also  Thompson  v.  People.  | 
v.  Throop  (12  Wend.  183)  396 

v.  Thurber  ( 13  111.  654)  424,  425 

v.  Tieman  (8  Abb.  Pr.  359)  304 

v.  Tieman  (30  Barb.  193)  804,319 
r.  Toll  (107  N.  Y.  203)  1220 

v.  Tracy  (1  Denio,  017)  1057 

v.  Treasurer  (4  Mich,  &c.)     [See 

v.  State  Treasurer,  &c] 
v.  Turner  (10  Am.    Law    Reg. 

(n.  s.)  366)  471 

v.  Ulster  Co.  Sup.  (16  Johns.  59)  1011 
v.  Utica  Ins.  Co.  (2  Johns.  Ch. 

371 ;   15  Johns.  358)       352,  1075, 

1076 

v.  Vail  (20  Wend.  12)  1025,  1079 

v.  Vanderbilt  (2G  N.  Y.  287)  110, 

171,  783,  786,  787 

v.  Vanderbilt  (28  N.  Y.  390)  171,  453, 

783,  7  80 

v.  Van  Slyck  (4  Cow.  297)  1078, 

1079,  losn 

v.  Vilas  (36  N.  Y.  459)  200 

v.  Waite  (70  111.  25)  1075,  1085,  1086, 

1087 
v.  Walker  (9  Mich.  328)  379,  380 

v.  Walsh  (96  111.  232)  777,  794 

v.  Warfleld  (20  111.  163)  79 

v.  Warren  (5  Hill,  440)  324 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXV 


Page 
People  r.  Wayne  Co.  And.  (13  Mich. 

233)  314 

v.  Wayne  Co.  And.  (11   Mich. 

l)'  314 

v.  Wayne  Co.  Aud.    (11   Mich. 

223)  1012 

v.  Waynesville  (88  111.  469)  240,  629, 

647 
v.  Weber  (86  III.  283)  L079 

v.  Weber  (89  111.  347)      1 10,  291,  520 
v.  Weisenbach  (60  N.  Y.  385)         471 
v.  Westchester  Co.  Supervisors 
(12    Barb.   410;    15    Barb. 
607)  105(5 

v.  Wharf  Co.  (31  Cal.  &c).   [See 

v.  Broadway,  &c] 
v.  Whipple  (11  Mich.  548)  172 

v.  Whitcomb  (55  III.  172)    1084,  1092 
r.  White  (54  Barb. 622)  1011 

v.  White  (24  U\nd.  520)  356 

v.  Whitlock  (92  N.  V.  191)  90 

v.  Whitney's  Pt.  (102  N.  Y.  81)      707 
v.  Whittemore,  Treas.  (4  Mich. 

27)  1059 

v.  Whyler  (41  Cal.  351)  023,  924,  953 
v.  Wiant,  l)u  Page   Co.  Treas. 

(48  111.  263)  79,  1016 

v.  Willsea  (00  N.  Y.  507)  88 

v.  Wilson  (15  111.  389)  492,494 

v.  Witherell  (14  Mich.  48)      285,  287, 
305,  1087 
v.  Wood  (7  Cal.  579)  120 

v.  Wood  (4  Parker  (N.  Y.),  Cr. 

Ill)  322 

c.  Works  (7  Wend.  486)  422 

v.  Wren  (5  111.  269)      77,  94,  242,  214 
v.  Wynhammer   (12   How.    Pr. 

260;  13  N.  Y.  378)  1164 

v.  Yates  (40  111.  126)  1063 

People's  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City  (46 

N.  J.  L.  297)  824 

People's  Pass.  R.  Co.   v.  Memphis 

C.  11.  Co.  (10  Wall    58)  157,  521, 

810,  800 

Peoria  v.  Calhoun  (29  111.  317)       404,  405 

v.  Johnston  (56  111.  45)    744,  755,  783, 

803,  1092,  1097 

v.  Kidder  (26111.  351)  722 

v.  Simpson  (110  111.  204)      1284,  1308 

Peoria   Co.  Sup.  v.  Gordon  (82  111. 

45)  1032 

Peoria  Br.  Assoc,  v.  Loomis  (20  111. 

235)  1264 

Peoria  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott  (116 

111.  401)  001 

Pepper  v.  Smith  (15  Lea,  551)  251 

Pequinot  v.  Detroit  (16  Fed.  R.  211)  1273 
Perdue  v.    Chinguacousy  Corp.   (25 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  01)  1139,  1204,  1322, 

1:121.  L329,  1331 

v.  Ellis  (18  Ga.  580)        385,  307,  431, 

434 

Perin  v.  Carey  (24  How.  465)       657,  601, 

062,  664,  065,  066,  669 


Page 

Perin  v.  Concord  R.  Co.  (44  X    II 

22:;)  2,  1070 

Perkins  ,-.  Corbin  (45  Ala.  103)  192 

v.   1  ay<  tte    |  18    Me.    162)  12  .;. 

1264,  1266,  1270,  1271,  1278,  1301 

v.  Holman  {  13  Ark   219)  201 

v.  Lawrence  (136  .Mass.  305)        1211, 

1213 
v.  Milford  (59  Me.  315)  895 

v.  Slack  (86  Pa  St.  283)  128,  129 

v.  Wash.  Ins.   Co.  of  N.   Y.  (  1 

Cow.  645)  322 

v.  Weston  (3  Cush.  549)  378 

Perkinson  v.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App. 

322)  557 

Perley  v.  Chandler  (6  Mass.  454)  7  hi 

v.  Georgetown  (7  Gray,  404)  1183, 

1100 
Perrin   v.   N.   Y.    Cent.  R.  Co.  (36 

N.  Y.  120)  759,  767 

Perrine  v.  Farr  (22  N.  J  L.  350.    i 

981 

Perry  v.  Chehovgan  (55  Mich.  250)      312 

v.  Dover  (12  Pick.  200)  310,  317 

r.  Kinnear  (42  111.  160)  1111 

v.  New  Or  cans  M.  £  C.  R.  Co. 

(55  Ala.  413)     712,  745,  74'i,  751, 
777,  780,  790,  791,  842,  81 

850 
v.  Ottawa  (23  U.  C  Q.  B  391)  538 
v.  Reynolds  (53  Conn.  527)  32  1 

v.  Rockdale  (62  Tex.  457)  899 

v.  Superior  City  (23  Wis.  64)         62  I 
r.  Torrence  (8  Ohio,  522)  960 

v.  Tynen  (22  Barb.  137)  361 

v.  Washburn  (20  Cal.  318)  895 

v.  Worcester  (0  Gray,  514)  1214, 

1215,  1317,  1334 
Perry  County  v.  Selma,  M.  &  M.  R. 

Co.  (58  Ala.  546)  998 

Perrvman  v.  Greenville  (51  Ala.  510)   138 
Perrysville  &  Z.  PI.  R.  Co.  v.  Ram- 
age  (20  Pa.  St.  95)  789 
v.  Pineman  (20  Pa.  St.  99)  7s: I 
r.  Thomas  (20  Pa.  St.  91)  7-'.' 
Peru  v.  French  (55  111.  317)       1281,  1287, 

1297 
v.  Gleason  (91  Ind.  566)  157 

Peru  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanna  (68  Ind. 

562)  922 

Peru  Iron  Co.,  Re  (7  Cow.  640)  657 

Peruvian  Railways  Co.  v.  Thames 
&  M.  M.  Co.  (L.  R.  2  Ch. 
017)  191 

Pesterfield  v.  Vickers  (3  Coldw.  205)  204, 
205,  307,  1197 
Peterborough  v.  Lancaster  (14  N   II. 

3S2)  348 

Peterborough   Corp.,   Re   (15  U.  C. 

Q  Ii.  450).  [  See  Victoria.  &c  ] 
Peters    v.    Fergus   Falls    (35   Minn. 

540)  1322 

v.  London  (2  U.  C.  Q.  B.  543)         1 1 1 
v.  Lynchburg  (76  Va.  927)  939 


CX  XVI 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


i  p.  State  (0  C,a.  109)  117  1 

jburgh  p.  Applegarth  (28  Gratt. 
321)  448,  1180,  1181 

Ma]. pin  (14  111.  193)  551 

i\  Metzki  ■  -   V)    147,413 

Ifork  (17  N.  V.  i  I 
157,  53 :.  534,  12,  543, 

657 
Petrie  v.  Doe  (30  Miss.  698)  361 

ngill    v.    Vonkers  (116   N.    Y. 

558)  1281,  1284 

rew    p.    Evansville   (25     Wis. 
223)  1217,  1298,  1320,  1321, 

L324 
Pettis  p.  Johnson  (56  Ind.  139)      i     . 
Pettv  p.  'looker  (21  X.  V.  2671  -J77 

Peverly  p.  B  l      1286 

Peynado's  Dev.  p.  Peynado's  Kx.  (82 

Ky.  5)  663 

Peyser  p.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.  (13 

Daly,  L22)  877 

p.  New  York  (To  X.  Y.497)  1117, 

1 1 52 
Peyton  p.  St.  Hospital  (3  C.  &  P.  303) 

'.',  -•> 

Pfau  p.  Reynolds  (53  111  212)    1293,  1308 

Phebe,  The  (1  Ware,  360)  172 

Phelps  n.  Lewistown  (15  Blatch.  131)  506 

p.  Mankato  (23  Minn.  277)  1267 

p.  New  York  (112  X.  Y.  210) 

1 1  IS,  1149 
Philadelphia,  p.   Burgin  (50  Pa.   St. 

537)  981 

v.  Cloud  (4  W.N.  C.  445)  995 

v.  Collector  (5  Wall.  730)  1155 

p.  Collins  (68  Pa.  St.  106)  1210 

p.  Cooke  (30  Pa.  St.  56)      1002,  11  18 
v.  Dickson  (38  Pa.  St.  217)  719 

r.  Dyer  (II  Pa.  St.  463)  719 

v.  Eastwick  (35  Pa  St.  75)  915 

v.  Elliott  (3  Rawle,  170)        662,663, 

008 

v.  Field  (58  Pa.  St.  320)  95,  107,  122, 

125,  130,  897,943 

v.  Flanigan  (47  Pa.  St.  21)         27.  30, 

201.  529 

v.  Fox  (04  Pa.  St.  169)       93,  95,  107, 

127,  1 :;.".,  Of,:],  00 i 

v.  Germantown  Pass.  R.  Co  (10 

Pa.  165)  699 

r.  Gilmartin  (71  Pa   St.  140)        1  L96 
p.  Given  (60  Fa.  St.  136)       298,  312, 

319 

Ireble  (38  Pa   St.  339)  1000 

v.  Hays  (93  Pa.  St  72)  539 

p.  Linnard  (97  Pa.  St.  242)  733 

v.  Lombard  &  S.  S.  P.  R.  Co.  (3 

Grant,  103)  840. 

v.  Miller  (49  Pa.  St.  40)  984 

v.  Phila.  &    Reading  R.  Co.  (58 

Pa.  St.  253)      671,  707,  799,  so:;, 

80S,  8}8 

r.  Phila.,  W.  &B.  R.  Co.  (33  Pa. 

St.  41)  915,  921 


Page 
Philadelphia  p.  Presb.  Bd.  of  Pub. 

(29  I.f  g.  In!.  53)  889 

p.  Randolph  |  I  W.  &  S.  51  I)         81  1, 

1216,  122!',  1017 

p.  Rule  (93  Pa.  St.  I  917,  937 

p.  Tryon  (35  Pa.  St.  10]  )       812,  818, 

913,  91  1,915,  988 

p.  Wister  (35  Pa.  St.  427)     981,  1001 

p.  Wrighl  (100  Pa.  St.  235)  1221 

Phila.  &  Reading  R.  Co.  v. Phila.  (  IT 

Pa.  St.  325)  841 

p.  Phila  &  Trenton  1!.  Co.  /,'■  (6 

Whart.  25)        771,  776,  704,833 
Phila.    &    Wilm.  R.  Co.   v.   Md.  ( lo 

Ilnv,  953 

Phila.  Assessors  p.  Com'rs  (3  Brews. 

333)  237 

Phila.  Assoc.  Dis.   F.    p.    Wood    (39 

Pa   St   "•'!)  972 

Phila.   W.  &    B.   R.  Co.   p.  Qiiipley 

(21  How.  202)  1  L70,  1183 

v.  App.Tax  Ct.  of  Bait.  (50  Md. 

397)  969 

Philip  Street,  R<  (10  La.  An.  313)  706 
Philips  p.  Wickham  (1  Paige,  590)      244, 

304,  397 

Phillips,  St  (60N.Y.16)  388,408,950,076 

p.  Albany  (28  Wis.  340)  225 

p.  Allen  (41  Pa.  St.  481)  416,419,  164, 

473 
v.  Bioomin-rton  (1  G.Greene,  408)  182 
p.  Bowers  (7  Gray,  21)  817 

p.  Coffee  (17  111.  154)  273 

p.  ( 'ommonwealth    (4  1    l'a.    St. 

107)  1133,1134 

v.  Council  Bluffs  (63  Iowa,  576)      815 
p.  J<  Eferson  Co.  Com'rs  (5  Kan. 

412)  1148 

v.  New  York  (1  Hilton,  483)  311 

v.  So.  Park  Com'rs  (119  111.  626)    710, 

721 

J!,  Tecumseh  (5  Neb.  305)  4:11 

p.  Yeaxie  (40  Me.  96)  1314 

p.  Willow  (70  Wis.  6)  1208 

Phillips  Acad.  Trs.  p.  Kinj.'  (12  Mass. 

546)  662 

Phillips  Exeter  Acad.  Trs.  p.  Exeter 

(58  X.  II.  306)  953 

Phinizey  p.  Augusta  C.  Council  (47 

'  Ga  200)  1317 

Phipsburg  p.  Dickinson  (78  Me.  457)  301 
Phcenixville,  Rt  (109  Pa.  St.  44)  87,88 
Physicians'    College    p.    Salmon   (3 

Salk.  102)  258 

Piatt  v  People  (29  111  54)  281 

Piatt  County  v.  Goodell  (07  111.  84)      804 
Pickard  p.  Collins  (23  Barb.  -144)         449 
,■   Howe  (12  Met.  198)  223 

Pickering  v.  Shotwell  (lo  Pa.  St.  27)  602 
Pickett  v.  Hastings  (47  Cal.  200)  709 

p.  School  District  (26  Wis.  551)  369 
Pickhard  p.  Smith  (IOC  B.  n.  b.  470)  1270 
Pickles  v.  McLellan   Dry  Dock  Co. 

(38  La,  An.  412)  95 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


cxxvu 


Page 
Pierce  v.  Bartrum  (Cowp.  270)    421,  422, 

455,  45!) 

u.Boston  (3  Met.  520)  995 

v.  Cambridge  (2  Cush.  611)  963 

v.  Carpenter  (10  Vt.  480)        263,  272 

v.  Chamberlain  (82  Mo.  G18)  752 

v.  Drew  (136  Mass.  75)  831 

v.  Emery  (32  N.  H.  484)  969 

v.  New  Bedford  (129  Mass.  534)  1205 

v.  Richardson  (37  N.  H.  306)  321,  371, 

372,  651 

r.  Somerworth  (10  N.  H.  369)        260 

v.  Tripp  (13  R.  I.  181)  1187 

Pieriv.Shieldsboro(42Miss.493)449,  L097 

Pierpoint.  v.  Harrisonville  (9  W.  Va. 

215)  744,  745 

Pike  v.  Megara  (44  Mo.  491)  391 

v.  Middletown  (12  N.  H.  278)  54,  220, 

221 
v.  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (94  U.  S.  164)  02 

Pike  Co.  Com'rs  v.  State  (11 111.202)  1057 
Pike  Co.  Inf.  Ct.  Jus.  v.  Griffin  &  W. 
P.  PI.  R.  Co.  (9  Ga.  475 ;  15 
Ga.  39)  1094 

Pilie  v.  New  Orleans  (19  La.  An.  274)     316 
Pillsburv  v.  Brown  (47  Cal.  478)  496 

v.  Springfield  (10  N.  H.  565)  711 

Pim  v.  Ontario  Council  (9  U.  C.  C.  P. 

304)  538 

Pimental  v.  San  Francisco  (21  Cal. 

351)   358,  368,  521,  534,  542,  676, 
1143 
Pinckney  v.  Henegan  (2  Strob.  250)  1074 
Pine  Grove  Tp.  v.  Talcott  Q9  Wall. 

666)  573,574,584,636 

Pine  Street,  fie  (15  Wend.  374)    699,  709, 

763 
Pine  Tp.  v.  Huber  Manuf.  Co.  (83 

Ind.  121)  529 

Piper  v.  Chappell  (14  M.  &  W.  624)     411, 

414,  476,  483 

v.  Moulton  (72  Me.  155)  G62 

v.  Singer  (4  S.  &  R.  351)         900,  950 

Piqua  v.  Zimmerlin  (35  O.  St.  507)        487 

Piqua  Branch   Bank   v.  Knoop  (16 

How.  380)  94 

Pittsburgh  v.  Cluley  (74  Pa.  St.  262)    374 
v.  Craft  (1  Pitts.  158)  260 

v.  Grier  (22  Pa.  St.  54)  46,  179,  1205 
l\  Knowlson  (92  Pa.  St.  116)  1000 
v.  McKnight  (91  Pa.  St.  202)  995 
v.  Scott  (i  Pa-  St.  309)  783 

v.  Walter  (69  Pa.  St.  365)  979 

r.  Woods  (44  Pa.  St.  113)  914 

Pittsburgh,  Alley  in,  Re  (104  Pa.  St. 

622)  762 

Pittsburgh  &  B.  Pass.  R  Co.  v.  Birm- 
ingham Bor.  (51  Pa.  St.  41)    803 
v.  Pittsburgh  (80  Pa.  St.  72)         1282 
Pittsburgh  &  C.  R.  Co.  (63  Pa.  St. 

126)  623 

Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Commonwealth  (66  Pa.  St. 
73)  896 


Page 
Pittsburgh,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 

Reich  (1<H  111.  157)       1223,1242 
Pittsbur-h  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Allegheny 

County  (79  Pa.  St.  210)     '      628 
Pittsburgh  Junction  R.  Co.'a  Appeal 

(6  Atl.  R.  564)  809 

Pittsburgh,  Va.  &  C.  Hv.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth ( ldl  Pa.  St.  192)   852, 
1135 
Pittsburgh's   Appeal,    (118    Pa.  St. 

458)  1096 

Pittsfield  v.  Barnstead  (40  X.  II.  477)  322 
Pittson  v.  Clark  (15  .Me.  460)  53 

Pittston  v.  Hart  (89  Pa.  St.  38  i         1257, 

1258,  1259 
Pitzman  v.  Freeburg  (92  111.  Ill)  535 

Place  v.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  1)         lloo, 
1111,  1113,  1117 
Placerville  v.  Wilcox  (35  Cal.  21)  961 

Plainview  v.  Winona  &  St.  Peter  R. 

Co.  (36  Minn.  505)  584,618 

Plank-road    Co.,  &c.  (3   Ohio, 

578).    [See  Milan  &R.,&c] 
(20  Pa.   St.  91,  95,  99.)     [See 
Perrysville  &  B.,  &c] 
Plant    v.   Long   Island    R.    Co.    (10 

Barb.  26)  853 

Plaquemines  Par.  Pol.  Jury  v.  Foul- 

houze  (30  La.  An.  64)     670,  675, 

747,  801 

Piatt  v.  Rice  (10  Watts,  352)  952 

v.  Weymouth  (147  Mass.  245)       1256 

Platter  v.  Elkhart  County  (103  Ind. 

360)  395 

v.  Sevmour  (86  Ind.  323)  1187 

Platteville  v.  Bell  (43  Wis.  488)  470 

it.  Hooper  (63  Wis.  381)  300 

Plattsmouth    v.   Mitchell   (20  Neb. 

228)  1272,  1297 

Platz  v.  Cohoes  (89  N.  Y.  219)   1204,  1287 
Player  v.  Jenkens  (1  Sid.  2  455 

Plimpton  v.  Somerset  (33  Vt.  283)       110, 

479,  501 
Plum  v.  Morris  Canal  &  B.  Co.  (10 

N.  J.  Eq.  256)  814,  1222 

Plunkett's    Creek  Tp.  v.  Crawford 

(27  Pa.  St.  107)  269,272 

Plymouth  v.  Jackson  (15  Pa.  St.  44)      95, 

135,  270 
v.  Painter  (17  Conn.  585)  305 

Plymouth    Com'rs    v.    Pettijohn    (4 

Dev.  L.  591)  422,904 

Poillon  v.  Brooklyn  (101  N.  Y.  132)     148. 

152 
Polack  v.  San  F.  Orphan  As.  (48  Cal. 

490)  794,  795 

Police  Com'rs  of  A.,  &c.     [See  A. 

Police  Com'rs,  &c] 
Police  Jury  of  Bossier  Par.  v.  Shreve- 

port  (5  La.  An.  661)  97,  110 

Police  Jury  of  Jefferson  Parish  v. 
McCormack  (32  La.  An. 
624)  272 

v.  Villaviabo  (12  La.  An.  788)        422 


cxxvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


Page 

Police  Jury  <>f  Ouachita  Parish  v. 

Monroe  (37  La.  An.  641)        518 
v.  Monroe  (38  La,  An.  080)       II.  5  .1 

Police   -lurv     of    Right    Hank,    &C.    V. 

M'l  lonough's   Sue.  (8  La. 
An.  341)  225 

Police  Jury  of  Tensas  Par.  v.  Britton 

(15  Wall.  566)  190,  193,  L94,  199, 
288,  520,  664,  570 
Police  .lurv  of  West  Baton  Rouge  v. 

Michel  |  I  La.  An.  84)  160 

Polk  v.  Cluminer  (2  Humph.  500) 
Polk    Co.  Sav.   Bank    v.   State   (69 

Iowa,  24  535, '.Mi' 

Pollard  v.  Woburn  (lol  Mass.  84)       1285 
Pollard's  Lessee  v.  Hagan  (3  How. 

212)  L65,  166,  171 

Pollock  v.  Lawrence  Countv  (7  Pitts. 

L.  J.373)  1033,  1037,  1069 

Pollock's    Adm.    v.    Louisville    (13 

Hush,  221)  1195,  1197,  1198 

[See  also  Polack,  &c] 
Pomerov  v.  Mills  (3  Vt.  279)  746,  752,765, 

790 
v.  Milw.  &  C.  R.  Co.  (16  Wis. 

640)  842,868 

Pomeroy  Salt  Co.  v.  Davis  (21  O.  St. 

555)  964 

Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga  (104  N.  Y.  459) 

1260,  1297 
Ponipton  v.  Cooper  Union  (101  U.  S. 

L96)  135,594 

Pond  v.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  (42  Hun, 

567)  877 

v.  Metrop.  Elev.   Ry.  Co.    (112 

N.  V.  186)  784,  856,  S77 

w.Negus  (3  Mass.  230)  367,  391 

>■.  Parrott  (42  Conn.  13)      1012,  1014 

Pontiae  v.  Axford  (49  Mich.  69)  373 

v.  Carter  (32  Mich.  164)        816,  1  ISO, 

1212,  1215,  1220,  L228 

Pool  v.  Boston  (5  Cusli.  219)         209,  317 

Poole  v.  Bentley  (12  East,  168)  678 

v.  Huskinson  (11  M.  &  W.  827)      741 

Pope  v.  Headen  (5  Ala.  4:):;)  1000 

St.   Luke's  Car.  Com'rs  (12 

Rich.  407)  808 

v.  Onion  (18  N.J.  Eq  282)  757, 

761 
Poppen  v.  Holmes  (II  111  :;02)  lis,  419 
Porl  y.  Russell  (36  End.  60)  514 

Port  Jervis  v.  P.  -I    First  Nat.  Bank 

(96  N.  Y.  550)  1309 

Port   of,  &c.    (76   Ala.   401).     [See 

Mobile  Port,  &c  | 
Porter  v.  Androscoggin  &  K.  R.  Co. 

(87  Me.  849)  273 

v.  Blakely  (1  Root,  440)  262 

v.  Janesville  (3  Fed.  R.  617)         1140 
v.  No.  Mo.  R.  Co.  (33  Mo.  128)      834, 
si  i.  x.-,::,  »r,r> 
r.  Rockford,   R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R. 

Co.  (76  III.  561)  MOD,  1107 

Port  Gibson  v.  Moore  (21  Miss.  157)      254 


Pa-e 

Porl  Huron  v.  Chadwick  (62   Mich. 

820)  742,  747 

r.  McCall  (  16  Mich  149 

Portland  v.  Bangor  (42  Me.  403)  171 

r.  Bangor  (65  Me.  I  471,  501 

v.  Kamrn  ( lu  Or  383J  735 

r.  Lee  Sam  I  7  <  >r.  397)  785 

v.  O'Neill  (1  Or.  218)  425,971 

v.  Richardson  (.'.1  Me.  46)  1311,  1312, 

1313 

v.  P.  Water  Co.  (67  Me.  135)         967 

v.  Srhmi.lt   (13  Or.  17)  145,  184 

v.  Whittle  (3  Or.  120]  757,  768 

Portland  &  O.  ('.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartford 

(58  Me.  23)  239,  590 

Cortland  &  W.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Portland 

(14  Or.  188)         94,  121,  C.s'.t,  7  In, 
750,  769,  77;; 
Cortland  Lumb.  &  Manuf.  Co   v.  Sch. 

Dist.  No.  1  (13  Or.  283)  675 

Cortland,  S.  &  P.  H.  Co.  v.  Saco  (60 

Me.  196)  952 

Cortsniouth   Livery  Co.  v.  Watson 

(10  Mass.  91)  138 

Cortsniouth  Sav.  Hank  v.  Springfield 

(1  Fed.  I;    270)  594 

Port  Wardens  v.  Pratt  (10  Rob.  (La.) 

459)  166 

v.  Ship  (14  La.  An.  289)  166 

Port   Whitby,  L.  S.   &  II.   R.  Co.  v. 

Whitby  (18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  40)  789 
Posey  v.  Mobile"  County  (50  Ala.  6)  554 
Posey    Co.   Com'rs    v.  Saunders    (17 

Ind.  437)  185 

Post  v.  Boston  (141  Mass.  189)  1251,  1257 

v  Pear-all  (22  Wend.  425)  743,  767,768 

v.  Supervisors  (105  U.  S.  667)       631 

Postmaster-General  v.  Pice  (Gilpin, 

554)  300 

Potomac    Steamboat  Co.  v.  Upper 

Pot.  S   Co.  (109  U.  S.  672)     169, 
170,  175,  177,  74S,  7  19.  770 
Pottawatamie  Co.   Com'rs  v.   Sulli- 
van (17  Kan    58)  734 
Potter  r   Oastleton  (53  Vt.  435)           1207 
v.  Chaffee  Co.  Com'rs  (33  Fed. 

U.  614)  604,611 

v.  Luther  (3  Johns.  431)  321 

v.  Menasha  (30  Wis.  492)        451,  787 

Potts  v    Benderson  (2  Ind.  827)  323 

Pottsville  Cor.  v.  Curry  (32  Pa.  St. 

143)  1131 

Cot  win  >■.  Johnson  (108  111.  70)  138 

Coulters  Co  v.  Phillips  (6Bing.N.  C. 

315)  404,  486 

Coultney  v.  Wells  (1  Aik.  180)     123,  135, 

534 
Pound   v.  Chippewa    Co.   Sup.  (43 

Wis.  63)  944 

Pow  v.  Beckner  (3  Ind.  475)  295 

Powell   v.  Commonwealth  (114   Pa. 

St.  265)  211 

v.  Madison  (21  Ind.  335)  905 

v.  Madison  ( 107  Ind.  106)       203,  204 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


CXX1X 


Page 
Powell  v.  Parkersburg  (28  W.  Va. 

698)  144,  1121 

y.  Pennsylvania  (127  U.  S.  678)     211 

v.  St.  Joseph  (31  .Mo.  347)  976 

Powers,  Re  (25  Vt.  261)  506 

v.  Council  Bluffs  (45  Iowa,  652)      804 

v.  Council  Bluffs  (50  Iowa,  107)  1195, 

1208,  1305,  1317 

v.  Sanford  (39  Me.  183)  1147 

v.  Superior  Court  (23  Ga.  65)         225 

v.  Wood  County  (8  Ohio,  285)       267 

Powesheik  County  v.  Ross   (9  Iowa, 

511)  378 

Powles  v.  Page  (3  Com.  B.  31)  382 

Powsheik    Co.  Sup.    v.    Durant    (9 

Wall.  736)  1003 

Prairie  v.  Lloyd  (97  111.  179)  572,  646 

Prather  v.   Lexington  (13  B.  Mon. 

559)  1167,  1196,  1197 

v.  New  Orleans  (24  La.  An.  41)     513 

Pratt  v.  Amherst  (140  Mass.  167)        1255 

v.  Oes  Moines  (72  Iowa,  249)  815 

v.  Hillman  (4  B.  &  C.  269)  223 

v.  Luther  (45  Ind.  250)  388 

v.  State  (5  Conn.  388)  263 

v.  Swanton  (15  Vt.  147)  347,  348,  511 

v.  Weymouth  (147  Mass.  245)       1193 

Pray  v.  Jersey  City  (32  N.  J.  L.  394)  1169, 

1245,  1253,  1282 

v.  Northern  Liberties  (31  Pa.  St. 

69)  573,  955 

Preachers'  Aid  Soc,  Re  (45  Me.  552)     262 
Preble  v.  Portland  (45  Me.  241)     366,  714 
Prell  v.  McDonald  (7  Kan.  426)    138,  292, 
294,  409,  483 
Presbyterian    Church,  &c.  (5  Cow. 
538).     [See    Brick    Presb. 
Church,  &c] 
(36  Ind.  338).    [See  First  Presb. 
Church,  &cl 
Presbytery   of   N.    Y.   Trs.,  Re  (57 

liow.  Pr.  500)  154 

Prescott  v.  Duquesne   Bor.  (48  Pa. 

St.  118)  179,  1006 

v.  Gonser  (34  Iowa,  175)      371,  1012, 

1056 
President,  &c,  of  the  A.   Co.,  &c. 

[See  A.  Co.,  &c] 
Preston  v.  Bacon  (4  Conn.  471)  316 

v.  Boston  (12  Pick.  7)         1147,  1148, 

1155 
v.  Hall  (23  Gratt.  600)  651 

v.  Louisville  (84  Ky.  118)  804 

v.  Navasota  (34  Tex.  684)  757 

v.  Roberts  (12  Bush,  570)        918,932 
v.  Rudd  (84  Ky.  150)  935 

Prettyman  v.  Tazwell  Co.  Sup.  (19 

111.  406)  196,  208,  225 

Price  v.  Baker  (41  Ind.  572)  280 

v.  Breckenridge  (92  Mo.  378)         752, 

759,  760,  763 

v.  Grand  Rapids  &  Ind.  R.  Co. 

(13  Ind.  58)  369 

v.  Grantz  (118  Pa.  St.  402)  447 

VOL.  I.  —  i 


Page 

Price  v.  Harried  (1  Iowa,  473)  L062 

v.  Metli.  E.  Church  (4  Ohio,  511)    773 

v.  l'iiila.  Com'rs  (1  Whart.  1)        840 

».  Plainfield  (49  N.  J.  L.  608)         764 

v.  Thompson  (48  Mo.  363)     740,  763, 

767,  769,  773,  788 

Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point  (43  Wis. 

513)  L267,  1286,  1300 
Pridgen  v.  Bannerman  (8  Jones  L.  53)  714 
Priestley  v.  Foulds  (2  Scott  N.  R.  205)  242 
Primm  v.  Belleville  (59  111.  142)    899,  906, 

927,  961,  962 

v.  Carondelet  (23  Mo.  22)  333 

Prince  v.  Quincy  (105  III.  138,  215)      204, 

205 
Prince    George  Co.   Com'rs  v.  Bla- 

densburg  (51  Md.  465)    264, 1285, 

1286 

Princeton  v.  Gebhart  (61  Ind.  187)  43 

v.  Vierling  (40  Ind.  340)  1148 

Princeville  v.  Auten  (77  111.  325)   752,  753, 

763,  766 
Prindle  v.  Fletcher  (39  Vt.  255)  1257, 

1266,  1301 
Pringle,  Re  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  254)  312 

Pritchard  v.  Keefer  (53  111.  117)  324 

v.  Stevens  (6  D.  &  E.  T.  R.  522)   223 
Pritchett  v.  People  (6  111.  529)  355 

v.  Stanislaus  County  (73  Cal.  310)    72 
Pritz,  Re  (9  Iowa,  30)  84 

Proctor  v.  Lewiston  (25  III.  153)  741 

Proprietors,  &c.  (7  Gray,  223).     [See 
Merrimac,  &c.j 
(2  Beasley,  503).     [See  Passaic, 

&c] 
(6  Hill,  501).      [See  Southold, 
&c] 
Prospect  Park  &  C.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liamson (91  N.  Y.  552)  689 
Prosser  v.  Ottumwa  (47  Iowa,  509)    1284, 

1287 
v.Wapello  County  (18  Iowa,  327)   181 
Protestant    Orphan    Asylum's    Ap- 
peal (111  Pa.  St.  135)       936,  960 
Protzman  v.  Indianapolis  &  Cine.  R. 

Co.  (9  Ind.  467)  792,841,854,856, 

860,  870 

Providence  v.  Clapp  (17  How.  161)  1251, 

1255,  1261,  1280 

v.  Merch.  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.  (12 

R.  I.  435)  969 

v.  Miller  (11  R  I.  272)  526 

Providence  &  Wore.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright 

(2  R.  I.  459)  966,^967,  968 

Providence  Bank  v.  Billings  (4  Pet. 

514)  952,  053 
Providence  Gas  Co.  v.  Thurber  (2 

R.  I.  15)  966 

Provident  Inst,  for  Sav.  v.  Allen  (37 

N.  J.  Eq.  36)  919 

v.  Jersey  City  (113  U.  S.  506)      1001 

Pruden  v.  Love  (67  Ga.  190)  325 

Pruvn  v.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  367)       569 

Pryor  v.  Pryor  (26  L.  T.  n.  s.  758)       741 


CX  XX 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Public  School  Trs.  v.  Taylor  (30  N.  J. 

Eq.  618)  lit 

Public  Schools,/?.  (N.  V.  App.  1872)  806 
Puffer  v.  Orange  ( 122  Mass.  389)  1258 
Pugh  v.  Little  K  ick  (35  Ark.  15)  528 

■  iilmore  (21  Fed.  R.  870)     236 
Pulaski   County  v.  Lincoln   (0   Ark. 

320)  361,  508 

v.  Reeve  |  12  Ark.  55)  43 

Pullen  v.  Wake  Co.  Com'rs  (GO  N.  C. 

361)  895 

Pumpelly  v.  Green  Lav  &  Miss.  Canal 

Co.  (13  Wall.  166")       1217,  1227, 

1230,  1234,  1324,  1325,  1329 

Pumphrev  v.  Baltimore  (47  Md.  145)    125, 

711,  1017,  1057 

Purcell  v.  Parks  (82  111.  346)  312 

Purdy  v.  Lansing  |  128  U.  S.  557)  639,  647 

v.  People  (4  Hill,  385)  84,  04 

Purple  v.  Greenfield  (138  Mass.  1)       131 1 

Pursley  t>.  Hays  (17  Iowa,  310)  004 

Pusey  v.  Allegheny  (08  Pa.  St.  522)    844, 

1221,  1243 
Putnam   v.   Douglas   Co.   (G   Oreg. 

318)  1234 

v.  Fife  Lake  (45  Mich.  125)  095 

v.  Grand  Rapids  (58  Mich.  41G)     555, 

1123 
v.  Johnson  (10  Mass.  488)  278 

v.  Langley  (133  Mass.  204)  1021 

Putnam   Co.  Com'rs   v.  Allen  Co. 

And.  (10.  St.  322)  1030 

Pye  v.  Mankato  (36  Minn.  373)  1317,  1322 

r.  1  'eterson  (45  Tex.  312)  449, 472, 474 

Pym  v.  Great   Northern  Ry.  Co.  (2 

B.    &    S.  750;    4   B.   &   S. 

30G)  1288 


Q. 


Queen  v.  Anderson  (2  Q.  B.  740)  1086 

v.  Archb.  of  Cant.  (11  Q.  B.  578)  1057 

v.  Atlanta  (59  Ga.  318)  318 

v.  Avery  (18  Q.  B.  570)  283 
v.  Balby  &  W.  Tp.  K.  Trs.  (16 

Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  276)  10G9 

v.  Bamber  (5  Q.  B.  279)  1302 

v.  Barnhart  (7  U.  C.  L.  .1.  103)  343 

v.  Barrett  |  1  Salk.  383)  478 

w.Bartels  (7  U.  C.  C.  P.  533)  279 

v.  Belmont  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  298)  431 
v.  Bewdley  (1  P.  Wnis.  207)  242,257 
r.  Linn  &  Gl.  Ry.  Co.  (9  Car.  & 

P.  469)  1133,1185 

t;.  Birm.  &  Gl.  Ry.  Co.   (3  Q. 

B.223)  1133 
v.  Birm.  &  O.  Ry.  Co.  (1  El.  & 

LI.  203)  1008 

v.  Blizard  (L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  634)  1087 
v.  Boardman   (30   U.  C.   Q.  B. 

553)  501 

v.  Boucher  (2  Q.  B.  644)  58 

v.  Boulton  (15  U.  C.  Q.  B.  272)  789 


Queen  v.  Boycott  (14  L.  T.  n.  s.  500) 


Page 
279 


r.  Bradbum  (0  V.  ('.  P.  R.  808)  281 
v.  Bradley  (3  E.  &  E.  034)  283 

v.  Bridgewater  (2  P.  &  1).  558)  221 
v.  Bristol  &  E.  Ky.  Co.  (4  Q.  B. 

162)  1059 

v.  Bristol  Dock  Co.  (2  Q  1'.  64  I  1007 
v.  Bristol  Dock  Co.  (2  Eng.  Ry 

&  Canal  Cas.  599)  1013 

r.  Brown,  Sua.   (13  U.  C.  C.  P. 

350)  789 

v.  Ctesar  (11  U.  C.  Q.  P..  401)  279 
v.  Chapman  (12  Cox,  4  J  295 

v.  Chapman  (0  Mod.  152)  1008 

v.  Charlesworth  (16  Q.  B.  1012)    821, 
834,  860 
v.  Chester  (5  El.  &  Bl.  531)  1078 

v.  Chorley  (12  Q.  B.  515)  1 17 

v.  Convcrs  (s  Q.  B.  981)  1062,1063 
v.  Cottle  '3  Eng.  L.&  Eq.  471)  808 
v.  Cousins  (28  L.  T.  n.  s.  110)  281 
r.  Crawley  (3  F.  &  F.  109)  464 

v.  Cridland  (7  E.  &  B.  853)  478 

v.  Cumberlege    (30  L.  T.  n.  s. 

700)  312 

v.  Davis  (24  U.  C.  C.  P.  575)  885 
r.  Davis  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  107)  710 

v.  Deighton  (5  Q   B.  806)  283 

v.  Derby  Bor.  Council.   (7  A.  & 

E.  419)  280,  1022,  1078 

v.  Derbyshire  (2  Q.  B.  7 15)  8*  1,  882 
v.  Donaldson    (24   U.  C.  C.  P. 

MS)  741 

v.  Durham  (10  Mod.  146)  304 

V.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  (10 

A.  &  E.  531;  2Q.*B.  347)       688, 
1060 
v.  East  Mark  (11  Q.  B.  877)  789 

v.  Epsom  Union  Guard.  (8  L.  T. 

n.  s.  383)  1217,  1271 

v.  Exeter  ( L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  110)  270 

v.  Eve  ('•»  A.  &  I'..  676)  1007,  L>71 

v.  Farrell  (9  Cox  C.  C.  446)  453 

v.  Fitzgerald    (30  U.  C.  Q.  P.. 

297)  790,  1205 

v.  Glamorganshire  (2  East,  350)  1 89 
v.  Gloucester  (Unit,  450)  307 

v.  Gloucestershire    (1   C.  &   M. 

500)  822 

v.  Gordon  (0  U.  C.  C.  P.  213)  789 
,-.  Governors  (8  A.  &  E.  632)  319,333 
v.  Great    Northern   Ry.  Co.   (14 

Q.  P.  2-".)  688 

v.  Great   No.  of  Eng.  Ry.  Co.  (9 

Q.  I?.  315)  1133 

v.  Great    Western    Ry.  Co.  (32 

U.  C.  Q.  B  506)  746 

v.  Greene  (2  Q.  B.  4G0)  PiNi 

v.  Greenhow   ( L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  D. 

To:',)  1302 

v.  Grimshaw  (10  Q.  B.  747)  346,  3G5 
v.  Ilaldimond  County   (7  U.  C. 

L.  J.  200)  1017 


TAIJL1-;   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CXXX'l 


Queen  v.  Halifax  Road  Trs.  (12  Q. 

B.  I  12)  1056 

v.  Hammond  (17  Q.  B.  772)  283 

v.  Harrald   (L.   R.  7   Q.   B.   C. 

361)  ,;- 

v.  HatSeld   Peverel    (14    Q.   B. 

298)  1130 

r.  Haynes  (7  Ir.  L.  R.  2)  177 

v.  Heathcote  (10  Mod.  4 J)  1008, 1072, 

1074 
i»  Hertford  Col.  (L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 

1).  590)  1  178 

v.  Hiorns  (7  Ad  &  E.  960)    280,  1019. 

1022 
v.  Holmes  (3C.  &  K.  360)  453 

v.  Horley  (8  L.  T.  n.  s.  382)  1240 
v.  Hornsea  (Dears.  C.  C.  291)  1302 
v.  Ipswich  (2  Salk.  435)  33G,  10(37 
v.  Ipswich  Bailiffs  (2  Ld.  Rayni. 

1232)  260,  262,  336,33s,  339,  378, 
1026,  1007,  1072 
v.  Jackson  (40  U.  C.  Q.  B.  290)  447 
v.  Jarvis  (3  F.  &  F.  108)  403 

v.  Johnson  (38  U.  C.  Q.  B.  549)  431 
».  Johnson  (8  Q.  B.  102)  411 

v.  Justices  of  Shropshire  (8  Ad. 

&  E.  173)  280 

v.  Kendall  (1  Q.  B.  300)  1060 

v.  Kennett  [L.  R.  4  Q  B.  507)  417 
v.  Kitchener  (L.  R.  2  C  C  88)  1240 
v.  Lane  (Fortesc.  275;   11  Mod. 

270) ,  336 

v.  Lane  (2  Ld.  Ravm.  1304)  307 

v.  Ledgard  (1  Q.  B.  610)  1064,  1005 
v.  Ledgard  (8  Ad.  &  E.  535)  280 

v.  Leeds  (7  A.  &  E.  963)  282,1019 
v.  Leeds  (11  A  &  E.  512)  1022.  1078 
v.  Leeds  (4  Q.  B.  796)  221 

v.  Leeds  &  Liv.  Canal  Co.  (11  A. 

&  E.  316)  1056 

v.  Levecque  (30  U.  C  Q.  B.  44)  452 
v.  Lichfield  (4  Q.  B  891)  185,  191, 
194,  220,  274 
v.  Light  (27  L.  J.  Mag.  C.  1)  295 

i7.  Lincomb  (2  Chit.  214)  447 

v.  Lindsay  (18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  51)  1078 
v.  Liverpool  (9  A.  &  E.  435)  1102 

ads.  Lloyd  (0  L.  T.  R.  n.  s.  610)  1082 
v.  Local  Gov.   Board  (L.  R.  8 

Q.  B.  227)  267 

v.  London  Gas  Co.  (2  E.  &  E. 

651)  829,834,860 

v.  Lordsmere  (19  L.  J.  M.  C.  215)  1240 
v.  Loughton  (3  Smith,  575)  447 

v.  Louth  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  615)  789 
v.  Muvbury  (4  F.  &  F.  90)  447 

v.  McGowan  (11  A.  &  E.  809)  302 
v.  McRae  (5  U.  C.  P.  R.  309)  300 
v.  Mitchell  (4  U.  C.  P.  R.  218)  281 
v.  Monmouth  (L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  251)  1020 
v.  Morton  (4  Q.  B.  146)  307 

v.  Munro  (24  U.  C.  Q.  B.  44)  452 

v.  Murray  (1   U.  C  L.  J.  n.  s. 

104)"  343 


Queen  v.  Mutters  (10  Cox  C.  C.  6) 
v.  .Mutters  (Leigh  &  C.'s  C.  Cas 

491) 
v.  Newbury  (1  Q.  B.  751) 


448 


308 

327,  336, 

1063 

3i' 7 


v.  Newbury  (2  Kyd,  50) 
v.  Nott  (1  Q.  15.  773)  1133 

v.  O'Hare  (24  P.  R.  18)  1078 

v.  Oldham  Bor.  (L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 

171)  954 

v.  Orchard  (3  Cox  C.  C.  248)  453 

v.  Osier  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B.  224)  387 

17.  Owens  (2  E.  &  E.  86)  304 

17.    Oxford  &  W.  Tump.  R.  Trs. 

(12  A.  &E.  427)  1017 

v.  Paget  (3  F.  &  F.  29)  HI 

v.  Paramore  (10  A.  &  E.  286)  40,  342 
17.  Paris  (12  U.  C  C.  P.  445)  789 

87.  Pembroke  (8  Dowl.  P.  C.  302)  1019 
v.  Petrie  (4  E.  &  B.  737)  789 

v.  Plenty  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  346)  281 

17.  Plunkett  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  536)  746 
v.  Pomfret  (10  Mod.  107)  336,  1009 
v.  Ponsford  (1  I).  &  L.  116)  223 

v.  Purdy  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  545)  745 
17.  Quay le  (11  A.  &  E.  508)  1086 

17.  Registrar  Joint    Stock   Cos. 

( 10  Q.  B.  839)  200 

v.  Rice  (L  R.  1  C.  C.  21)  452 

v.  Rickets  (7  Ad.  &  El.  966)  330 

v.  Roberts  (36  L.  T.  R.  090)  321,  356 
87.  Roberts  (Am.  L.  R.  414)  321,  356 
v.  Roddy  (41  U.  C.  Q.  B.  291)  504 
17.  Rogers  (2  Ld.  Ravm.  777 )  336,  490 
v.  Rowley  (3  Q.  B."l43;  6  Q.  B. 

668)  282 

17.  Rubidge  (25  U.  C.  Q.  B.  299)  745 
t7.  Sadlers'   Co.  (10  H.  L.  Cas. 

404)  338 

v.  St.  Ives  (L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  467)  279 
i?.  St.  Luke's  (L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  C. 

572 1  688,  1230 

v.  St.    Margaret's   (8  A.  &   E. 

889)  1061,  1062 

17.  St.    Margaret's    (1    P.    &   D. 

116)  1061.  1062 

v.  St.  Martin's  (17  Q.  B.  149)  1078 
i7.  St.  Mary's  (8  A.  &  E.  356)  281 
».  St.  Peter's  Jus.  (2  Ld.  Ravm. 

1249)  1240 

v.  Salford   Tp.   Ov.    (18   Q.   B. 

0S7)  1130 

r.  Saunders  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  15)  453 
v.  Scott  (2  Ld.  Ravm.  922)  12  10 

v.  Sheffield  (L.  R."6  Q.  B.  652)  221 
v.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.  (22  Eng.  L. 

&  Eq.  518)  821 

v.  Slatter  (11  A.  &  E  1022 

v.  Smith  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  518)  ^  452 
v.  Southampton  (1  Ellis,  B.  &  S. 

5)  1069 

v.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co.  (4  H.  L. 

Cas.  471)  1062 

i7.  Spence(llU.  C.  Q.B.31)    745,789 


cxxxu 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Queen  ».  Stamford  (6  Q.  B.  183)  221,  L064 
r.  Ste\  enson  (3  F.  &  V.  106  163 

i\  Sutton  i  in  Mod.  76)  330 

v.  Tart  (1  E.  &  B.  618)  283 

c.  Tewkesbury  (L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 

280 
v.  Thallman  (9  Cox  C.  C.  388)       453 

v.  l'h as  (8  Ad.  &  El.  183)  346 

v.  Touchburn  (6  U.C.  P.  R.344)     281 
v.  Train  (9  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  180)        821, 
$34,  860 
v   Treasury  Com'rs  (10  Ad.  &  E. 

374)  336 

v.  Truebody  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1275  ; 

11  Mod  338 

•    I  nited  K.  El.  Ted.  Co.  (9  Cox 

C.  C.  17  1)  830 

v.  United  K.  Fl.  Tel.  Co.  (3  F. 

&  F.  74)  1265 

r.  Walker  (23  L  .1.  Mag.  C.  123)    295 
».  Wallesey  I..  Bd.  of  11.  (L.  R. 

4Q.  B.  351)  1230 

v.  Ward  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  210)  281 

r.  Watson  (2  Cox  C.  C  376)  453 

v.  Weld)  (1  Den.  C.  C.  338)  453 

>■.  Whipp  (  1  Q.  B.  1  11)  346 

v.  Wilis  &  B.  Canal  Co.  (8Dowl. 

P.  C.  623)  1011 

v.  Wood  (o  E.  X  B.  49)  21(i,  166 

v.  Wood  |L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  559)  417 

v.  York  (2  Q.  B   850)  40,  342 

v.  Yorkville  (22  U.  C.  C.  P.  431)    790, 

1240 
Queen  Elizabeth's  Hospital  v.  Nor- 
ton (11  M.  &  W.  913)  2r,'.i 
Queen's  Bench  Rule  (11  A.  &  F.  2)    1086 
Queensbury  Tp.  v.  Culver  (19  Wall. 

83)  574,  581,  1041 

Quin  v.  Moore  (15  X.  Y.  432)  1288 

Quincy  v.  Ballance  (30  111.  185)     478,480 

v.  Barker  (81  111.  300)         1259,  1260, 

•      1261 

v.  Full  (100  111.337)  828 

v.  C.  B.  &  Q.  1!.  Co.  (92  III.  21)     804, 

8!  '•'■  i 

v.  Jackson  (113  U.  S.  332)      237,  946 

w.Jones  (70  111.  231)       783,802,  811, 

L220,  1222,  1228,  L331 

v.  Warfield  (25  111.  317)  569 

Quinette  v.  St.  Louis  (76  Mo.  402)        385 

Quinlan  v.  Utica  (11  Hun,  217)     '      1298 

Quinn  v.  Anderson  (7o  Cal.  454)  752,  77; 

v.  Paterson  (27  N.  .J.  L.  35)    795,  808, 

980,  1222 

Quinney    v.   Stockbridge    (33   Wis. 

1121 
Quong  Woo,  Re  (13  Fed.  R.  229)  424 


i;. 


Raabw.  Maryland  (7  Md.  483)  263 

Rabassa  v.  New   Orleans  (3  Martin 

o.  s.  2 IS)  902,  961 


I  Pnge 

Racine  <•   Crotsenberg  (61  Wis.  481)    789 
liackham  v.  Blucb  (9  Q    B.  691)  603 

Radcliffs   Ex.  v   Brooklyn  (4  N.  Y. 

195)  121.'.,  1216,1220,  1221,  1222, 

1225,  1226,  1227,  1230,  1819,  l   _l 

Rader  v.  Union  Road  Dist.  (36  X.  J. 

L  273) 
Radicb  v   Hutehins  (95  1'.  S.  210) 
Radway  v.  Briggs  (87  N.  Y.  250) 


Ragan  v.  McCoy  (29  Mo.  356) 


91 
1150 
L79, 
1205 

711 

Ragatz  v.  Dubuque  (I  Iowa,  349)  716,  727 
Ragnet  v.  Wade  (4  Ohio,  107) 
Railway    Saw  Inst.  v.   Railway  (49 

N.  J.  L.  384)  1038 

Railroad    Co.    r.    \v.      [See   the 

following  wherein  the  plain- 
tiff, not  being  specified  in 
the  reporter's  caption,  may, 
in  citing,  not  always  have 
been  fully  named:  Burling- 
ton &  Mo.  (16  Wall.  667J, 
Hannibal  &  St.  Jo.  (95U.S. 
465),  No.  Central  (7  Wall. 
262)  ;  Richmond,  F.  &  P. 
('.it;  \  S.  521),  St.  Paul  & 
Par.  (7  Wall.  272),  Sioux 
City  &  Far.  (17  Wall. 
Union  Pac.  (22  Wall.  444; 
98  U.  s.  :,ll).  Union  Pass. 
(1»)1  U.S. 528),  Washington 
&  G.  (15  Wall.  491] 
Railroad   Nat.  Bank   v.  Lowell  (109 

Mass  214)  1144 

Raisler  v.  Athens  (66  Ala.  194)  1154 

Raleigh  v.  Dougherty  (3  Humph.  11)  438 
Raleigh  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis  (2  Dev. 

&  B.  L.  451)  690 

Raleigh  Com'rs  v.  Sorrell  (1  Jones 

L.  49)  862,  168,464 

Raley    v.   Umatilla   County  (15  Or. 

172)  070 

Ralls  Countv  v.  Douglass  (105  U.  S. 

728)  584,631,1080 

Ralls  Co.  Court  v.  United  States  (105 

U.  S.  733)        901,  989,  940,  946, 
1028 
Ramsay   v.  Clinton   County  (42  111. 

'   225)  804 

v.  Western   Dist.  Council  (4  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  374)  519 

Ramsey  v.  Riley  (13  Ohio,  157)    324,  326 
Ramshay,  Re  (83  Eng.  C.  L.  174)        319, 

Rand  v.  Townsend  (20  Vt.  670)  715 

v.  Wilder  (11  Cush.  294)         347,  349 
Randall  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  (106  Mass. 

276)  12C.8 

v.  Elwell  (52  N.  Y.  522)  969 

v.  Van  Vetchten  (19  Johns.  (59)    525, 

527,  528,  5:;:;,  5:',:>.  5(14,  809 

Randle  v.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (65  Mo.  325)     842, 

854 


TABLE   OF    CASKS    CITED. 


CXXX111 


Page 

Randolph  v.  Bayne  (44  Cal.  366)  996 

v.  Braintree  (4  .Mass.  315)  269 

v.  Gawley  (  17  Cal.  458)  958 

Randolph    County   v.  Hutchins  (46 

Ala.  397)  1029 

Randolph  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  v.  Stalnaker 

(13  Gratt.  523)  1000 

Rankin  t>.  Beaird  (1  III.  123)  99 

v.  Buckman  (9  Or.  253)  1280 

v.  Great    Western  Ry.  Co.  (4  U. 

C.  C.  P.  463)  718 

Ranlett    >•.    Leavenworth   (1  Dillon 

C  C.  263)  579 

v.  Lowell  (126  Mass.  431)  1328 

Ranney  v.  Bailer  (07  Mo.  476)    650,  1112, 

1117 
Ransom  v.  Boal  (29  Iowa,  68)        071,  769 
v.  New  York  (1  Fisher  Fat.  Cas. 

254)  1180 

Raphael  c.  Bank  of  Eng.  (17  C.  B. 

161)  651 

Rapho  v.  .Moore  (68  Pa.  St.  404)        1282, 

1296,  1298 
Rastrick  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co. 

(27  U.  C.  Q.  B.  396)  1300 

Rathbun  v.  Acker  (18  Barb.  393)         709, 

940,  944,  984 

Ratterman   v.   Western  Union  Tel 

Co.  (127  D.  S.  411) 
Rau  v.  Little  Rock  (34  Ark.  303) 


Ravenswood  v.  Flemings  (22  W.  Va. 
52) 

Ray  v.  Jeffersonville  (90  Ind.  567) 
v.  Lynes  (10  Ala.  63) 
v.  Manchester  (46  N.  H.  59) 

v.  Petrolia  (24  U.  C.  C.  P.  73) 


831 
313, 

487 


166 

912 

1212 

1257, 

1270 
1255, 
1200 


Ray  County  v.  Vansycle  (96  U.  S 

675) 
Raymond  v.  Fish  (51  Conn.  80) 

v.  Lowell  (0  Cush.  524)      1257   1200. 

1270,  1272,  127::,  1283,  1287 

v.  Sheboygan  (70  Wis.  318)  1312 

Read  v.  Atlantic  City  (49  N.  J.  L. 

558) 

v.  Buffalo  (74  N.  Y.  463) 

v.  Perrett  (L  R.  1  Ex.  Div.  349) 

v.  Plattsmouth  (107  U.  8.  508) 

Reading  v.  Althouse  (98  Pa.  St.  196) 

v.  Commonwealth  (11  Pa  .St.  196)  108, 

122,  770,  782,  1059 

v.  Keppleman  (61  Pa.  St.  233)       140, 

1  221 » 
v.  Savage  (120  Pa.  St.  198)  73,  80 
r.  Wedder  (66  111.  80)  630 

Reading  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  (15 

Wall.  232,  284)  902 

Ready  v.  Tuskaloosa  (6  Ala.  327)      1195. 


629 
324 


198 
488 
885 
572 
844 


Reardon  v.  St.  Louis  (36  Mo.  555) 
v.  San  Francisco  (JM  Cal.  492) 


1197 

1173 
1225, 
1239 


Page 
Rector  v.  Ilartt  (8  Mo.  448) 

v.  Stan-  (6  Ark.  L87)  504 

Red  v.  Augusta  (25  Ga 
lied  River  Br.  Co.  v.  Clarksville  (1 

Sneed,  176) 
Red  Rock  >■.  Henry  (106  U.  S.  589) 
Red  Star  Stp.  I  !o.  v.  Jersey  ( lity  (  15 

N.  J.  L.  246)  mi 

Redd  v.  Henry  Co.  Sup.  (31  (iratt. 

685)  646 

Reddall  v.  Bryan  (1  1  Md.  14  1)       697,  716 
Reddick  v.  Amelia  (  I  Mo.  5)  68,  181 

Redfield  v.  Utica  &  S.   R.  Co.  (25 

Barb.  64)  79] 

Redman  v.  Phila.  M.  &  M.  11.  Co.  (33 

N.J.  Eq,  165)  720 

Reed,  Exp.  (1  (ranch  C.  C.  582)         483 
v.  Bainbridge  (1  South.  351)  158 

v.  Belfast  (20  Me.  246)       1175,  1252, 
1287,  L288 
v.  Hamilton  (5  U.  C.  C.  P  269)    1322 
v.  Home  Sav.  Bank  (130  Mass. 

443)  1170 

v.  Lynn  (126  Mass.  367)  171 

v.  Northfield  (13  Pick.  U4)    762,    i 

1285,  1290,  1300,  1301 
v.  People  (1  Parker  Cr.  R.  481)     122, 

423 
v.  State  (108  N.  Y.  407)         855, 

S77 
v.  Toledo  (18  Ohio,  161)  710 

v.  Tyler  (56  111.  288)  1002 

Reedie  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(L.  R.  4  Exch.  244)  l:;;i« 

Rees  v.  Chicago  (38  111.  322)  094,  75. 

v.  Watertown  (19  Wall.  107)         250, 

1005,  1028,  1038,  1040,  1046,  1048, 

1049 

Reeside  v.  Walker  (11  How.  272)        1015 

Reeve  v.  Wood  (5  B.  &  S.  364)  503 

Reeves  v.  Toronto  (21   U.  C.  Q.  B. 

157)  1139,  1204,  1328,  1329 

v.  Wood  Co.  Treas.  (8  O.  St.  333) 

700,  908,  957,  989 
Regents,  etc.  (9  G.  &  J.  365.)     [See 
University  of  Md.  &c] 
(12  Mich.  138.)  [See  University 

of  Mich.  &c  1 
(5  Neb.  423.)     [See   University 
of  Neb.  Sec] 
Reggio  v.  Braggiotti  (7  Cush.  166)      1313 
Regina,  &c.     [See  Queen,  &c  | 
Rehberg  v.  New  York  (91  N.  Y.  137 )    1297 
Reich  r.  State  (53  Ga   73)  438 

Reichard  v.  Warren  County  (31  Iowa, 

381)  541 

Reid,  Re  (50  Ala.  439)  1022 

v.  Atlanta  (73  Ga.  523)  1327 

v.  Edina  Bd.  of  Ed.  (73  Mo.  295)    739, 

750,  759 

v.  Wiley  (46  N.  J.  L.  473)  931 

Reify.  Paige  (55  Wis.  496)  317 

UeitT  o.  Conner  (10  Ark.  241)         366,  3  2 

Reilly  v.  Albany  (112  N.  Y.  30)  557 


CXXX1V 


TABLE   OP   CASKS   CITED. 


798 
542, 
L195 

213 

L94 

899 
804 
984, 
994 


Reilly  v.  Chouquette  1 18  Mo.  220) 
v.  Philadelphia  (60  Pa.  St.  t67) 
i6,  981, 
v.  Racine  (51  Wis.  526)     750,  761 
Reimer'e  Appeal  (100  Pa.  Si    L82) 
Reinboth  v.  Pittsburgh  (  11    Pa.  St. 

278)  192. 

Rcineman  r.  Cow,  C.  &  B.  II.  R.  Co. 

(7  Neb.  810) 
Reining  v.  Buffalo  (102  N.  Y.  3os) 
R,  is  r.  Graff  (51  Cal.  86)       146,  521, 

Keitenbaugh  v.  Chester  Val.  R.  Co. 

(21  Pa.  St.  Kid)  708 

Remington  v.  .Millard  (1  R.  I.  93)       754, 

7G0,  7G2 
Remsen  v.  Wheeler  (105  X.  Y.  573)  984 
Rem;   v.   Municipality  (11   La.  An. 

148)  658 

Ri  nsselaer  v.  Leopold  (106  Ind.  29)      697 
Rensselaer  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis  (43 

\.  V.  137)  _    657 

Rensselaer    Co.  Sup.  v.    Bates    (17 

X.  Y.  242)  519 

Renthrop  v.  Bourg  (4  Mart.  (La.)  07)    772 
Renwick  i>.  Davenport  &  X.  W.  R. 

Co.  (47  Iowa,  511)  226 

v.  Hall  (84  111.  162)  1082 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (36  N.  Y. 

133)  1300 

Reoek  v.  Newark  (33  N.  J.  L.  129)       158, 

555,558,815,  1011,  1100,  12:12 

Repair  of  Bridges  (13  Rep.  33)  1240 

Republic  L.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Pollak   (75 

111.202)  969 

Requa  v.  Rochester  (45  N.  Y.  129)       761, 

882,  1274,  1281,  1284,  1295,  1296 

Respublica  v.  Caldwell  (1  Dal.  150)      453 

v.  Dallas  (3  Yeates,  316)  310 

v.  Duquet  (2  Yeates,  193)  474 

v.  Sparhawk  (1  Dallas,  337)         1103 

Rex,  &c.     [See  King,  &c] 

Rexford  o.  Knight  (11  N.  Y.  308) 

Reynolds  v.  Albany  (8  Barb.  507) 
v.  Baldwin  (1  La.  An.  162)      97, 
362,  1022,  1075, 
v.  Los  Angeles  Co.  Supr.  Ct.  (64 

Cal.  372) 
v.  New  Salem  (6  Met.  340)     34G 
v.  Schweinefus  (1  Sr.  Ct.  Cine. 

113) 
v.  Shreveport  (13  La.  An.  426) 

1222, 

D.Taylor  (43  Ala.  420)        1010, 

Reynold's  Heirs  v.  Stark  Co.  Com'rs 

(5  Ohio,  204)     121,657,  662, 

691,  763 

Rhine  v.  McKinney  (53  Tex.  354) 

Rhinebeck  R.  Co.,  Re  (67  N.  Y.  242) 

Rhines  v.  Clark  (51  Pa.  St.  90)     470, 


710, 

7211 
210 
202, 
1076 

1131 
,  347 


Page 
Rhodes  v.  Cleveland  (10  Ohio,  159)    1211, 

1226 

,-.  Dunbar  (67  Pa.  Si   27 1)  449 

Rice  v   Austin,  Gov.  i  L9  Mum.  103)    1016 

v.  Des  Moines  (40  Iowa,  638)        208, 

1285,  1301 

r.  Kvansville  (108  End.  7)    1317,  1327 

v.  Foster  I  1  Harr.  (Deli  179)        391 

r.  Ke,,kuk  (16  [owa,  579)  208 

r.  Montpelier  (19  N't.  470)  L255 

v.  < Osgood  (9  Mass.  38)  76} 

v.  Shuey  (5  N.  W.  R.  435)  211 

v.  Smith  (9  Iowa,  570)        1021,  1112 

v.  State  (3  Kan.  Ill)        437,  430.  607 

Rice   B.   &    F.   Mach.   &    I.   Co.    v. 

Worcester  (130  Mass.  57.".)     L01  1 

Rich  v.  Chicago  (59  III.  286)  368 

r.  Mentz  (10  led    i:.  725)       239,580 

r.  Minneapolis  (37  Minn-  423)      1217 

Richards  v.  Clarksburg  (30  W.  Va. 

491)  325,327 

v.  Dag-ett  (1  Mass.  534)  271,  272 

v.  Enfield  (13  Gray,  344)     1205,  1207 

v.  Waupun  (59  Wis.  16)  1328 

Richardson  v.  Baltimore  (8  (.ill, 433)    716, 

1098 
v.  Boston  (19  How.  270)      177,  1330, 

1 : '.: ;: ! 
v  Boston  (24  How.  188)  177,  658 
v.  Grant  County  (27  Fed.  R.495)  534 
v.  llevdenfel.lt"  (46  Cal.  68)  958 

r.  Royalton  &  W.Turnp.  Co.  (6 

Vt.  496)  881,1296 

v.  Scott   River  \X.  &  M.  Co.  (22 

Cal.  150)  526 

v.  Spencer  (6  Ohio,  13)  1174 

Richardson  Co.   Sch.  Dist.  56  v.  Ins. 

Co.  (103  U.  S.  707)  81,83 

Richeson  v.  People  (115  111.  450)  227,  646 
Richland  County  v.  Lawrence  County 

(12  1 11."  1)  94,104 

Richman  v.  Muscatine  Co.  Sup.  (70 

Iowa,  627)  979 

Richmond    v.    Courtney   (32   Gratt. 

702)  1 2si,  1283,  1287 

v,  Crenshaw  (76  Va.  936)  1107.  1  119 
r.  Daniel  (11  (iratt.  3S5)  04O.  0  1 1,  069 
r.  Davis  (103  Ind.   110)  003,  DOS, 

1111 

443 

1150 


368 
198, 

1220 
1030 

'nl, 
707 
705. 
721 
711, 
714 
601, 
500 


v.  Henrico  County  (S3  Va.  20  1) 

v.  Judah  (5  Leigh,  306) 

r.   Leeds,  &c,  Municipality   (8 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  507)  518 

v.  Long's  Adm.  (17  (iratt.  375)     108, 
1156,  L180,  1107,  1200,  1204 
r.  McGirr  (78  Ind.  192)  146,  152, 

183,  185,  105,  197,  201,  210 
v.  Poe  (21  (iratt.   I  10)  803 

v.  R.  &  D.  R.  Co.  (21  Gratt.  004)    95, 
104,  000,  953,  9(58 
v.  Smith  (15  Wall.  429)  513 

v.  State  (5  Ind.  334)  668 

Richmond  &  Al.  R.  Co.  v,  Lynch- 
burg (81  Va.  473)    908,  924.  933 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXV 


Pago 
Richmond  County  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Mid- 

dletown  (59  N.  Y.  228 )     1  56,  -J.".  1 , 
W:',  823,  Nil) 
Richmond,  F.  &  Pot.  R.  Co.  v.  Louisa. 

K.  Co.  (13  How.  71)  G83 

v.  Richmond  (06  U.  S.  521)   400,  405, 
847,  849,  857 
Richmond  Mayoralty  Case  (10  Gratt. 

673)  '  100,402,403 

Ricket  v.  Metrop.  R.  Co.  (L.  R.  2 

H.  L.  175)  878,  1231 

Rickct's  Case  (2  E.  &  I.  App.  175)        088 
Riddle  o.  Bedford  County  (7  S.  &  R. 

386)  208,  319,  355 

v.   Merrimac,  &c,  Canal   Prop. 

(7  Mass.  169)       243,  1170,  1171, 
1174,  1176,  1247 
Rideout  v.  Dunstable  Sch.  Dist.  (1 

Allen,  232)  347 

Ridge  Av.,  Re  (99  Pa.  St.  400)  1221 

Ridge  Av.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia (10  Phila.  37)  1093 
Ridge  St.,  Re  (29  Pa.  St.  391)  1220 
Ridgeway  v.  West  (60  Ind.  371)  439 
Ridley  v.  Lamb  ( 10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  354)  885 
Riehst  v,  Goshen  (42  Ind.  330)  1285 
Rieman  v.  Shepard  (27  Ind.  288)  965 
Riggs  v.  Detroit  Bd.of  Ed.  (27  Mich. 

262)  764,  794 

v.  Johnson  County  (6  Wall.  1(16)  585, 

1032,  1037,  1041,  1045,  1073 

Right  Bank,  &c.   Pol.  Jury  v.  Mc- 

Donough's  Sue.  (8  La.  An. 

341)  225 

Righter  v.  Newark  (45  N.  J.  L.  104)    903, 

994 
Rigney  v.  Chicago  (102  111.  64)     686,  688, 
1215,  1221,  1228,  1230,  1235, 1241 
Rigony  v.   Schuylkill    (103   Pa.    St. 

382)  1282 

Riker  v.  Jersey  City   (38  N.  J.  L. 

225)    "  1148,  1151 

Riley  v.  Rochester  (9  N.  Y.  64)  660 

v.  St.  Joseph  (67  Mo.  401)  993 

v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  (47 

Ind.  511)  1107 

Rindge  v.  Colrain  (11  Gray,  157)         1285 
Ring  v.  Cohoes  (77  N.  Y.  83)     1264,  1270, 

1278 
v.  Johnson  County  (6  Iowa,  265) 


275, 
561 


1255 


1245 
1147 


Ringland  r.  Toronto  (23  U.  C.  C.  P. 

98) 
Ripley  v.  Essex  Co.  Freeh.  (40  N.  J. 
L.  45) 
v.  Gelston  (0  Johns.  201 ) 
Ripley  County  v.  Ward  (69  Ind.  441)    553 
Ripon  v.  Bittel  (30  Wis.  614)      1284,  1287 
v.  Ilobart  (3  Mylne  &  K.  160)        455 
v.  Joint  School  District  (17  Wis. 

83)  1152 

Risley  v.  St.  Louis  (34  Mo.  404)  700,  084, 

985.  992 
v.  Smith  (64  N.  Y.  570)  1000 


Page 

635 
1123 

,  450 

1160 


Ritchie  v.  Franklin  Countv  (22  Wall, 
67) 
v.  So.  Topeka  (38  Kan  368) 
River    Rendering   Co.   v.    Behr  (77 
Mo.  01)  398 

Rivers  v.  Augusta  C.  Council  (65  I  ra. 
376)  11- 37, 

Road,  &c.  (17  Pa.  St.  71).    [See 

Augusta  Tp.  Road,  &c.| 
(3  Rawle,   195).     Ls,i-'    Easton 

Road,  &c] 
(14Serg.  &  R  447).     [See  Mer- 
cer Bor.  Road  Co.,  &c.| 
(40  Pa.    St.  300.)     [See  Milton 
Road,  &c.  | 
Roake  v.  Am  Tel.  &  T.  Co.  (41  N. 

J.  Eq.  35)  831 

Roanoke  City  v.  Berkowitz  (80  Va. 

616)  727 

Robb  v.  Carter  (65  Md.  321)  31 1 

v.  Indianapolis  (38  Ind.  49)  422 

Robbins  v.  Chicago  (2  Black,  418;  4 

Wall.  657)  1307,  1309 

v.Jones  (15  C.  B.  n.  s.  221)  741 

v.  Lexington  (8  Cush.  292)  1130 

v.  Lincoln  Co.  Ct.  (3  Mo.  57)         569 
v.  Milw.  &  H.  R.  Co.  (6  Wis.  636)  731, 

733 
v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax.  Dist.  (120U. 

S.  489)  904 

Roberson   v.  Lambertville  (38  N.  J. 

L.  69)  483 

Robert  v.  Sadler  (104  N.  Y.  229)  778,  788, 

816,  817,  832 

Roberts,  Re  (6  Pet.  216)  1006 

v.  Bolles  (101  U.  S.  110)         594,  629 

v.  Brown  Co.  Com'rs   (21  Kan. 

247)  734 

v.  Chicago  (26  111.  240)        1222,  1229 
v.  Easton  (19  O.  St.  78)  863,  864 

v.  Karr  (1  Campb.  262)  741,  755 

v.  New  York  (5  Abb.  Pr.  41 )        1110 
v.  Ogle  (30  111.  450)  406,  445,  450,  471 
Robertson  v.  Breedlove  (61  Tex.  316)  183, 

100,  1107 
v.  Rockford  (21  111.  451)  225 

v.  Wabash,   St.   L.  &  Pac.  Ry. 

Co.  (84  Mo.  110)  857 

Robie  v.  Sedgwick  (35  Barb.  310)         140 

Robin  Street,  Re  (1  La.  An.  412)  364 

Robins,  Re  (7  Dowl.  566)  1008 

Robinson  Re  (12  Nev.  263)  804 

v.  Benton  Countv  (49  Ark.  49)      494 

v.  Bidwell  (22  Cal.  379)  225 

v.  Burlington  (50  Iowa,  240)         1152 

v.  Butte  Co.  Sup.  (43  Cal.  353)     1042 

v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (2  Rich. 

L.  317)  1148,  1150,  1154 

1-.  Dodge  (18  Johns.  351)  05S 

v.  Evansville  (87  Ind.  834)  1199 

v.  Franklin  (1  Humph.  156)  431 

v.  Gov.  London   Hospital  (21  E. 

L.  &  Eq.  371)  1070 

v.  Greenville  (42  O.  St.  625)         1167 


CXXXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Pa 
Robinson  >■.  Groseourt  (5  Mod.  K»4)      430 
y.  Jefferson  County  (6  W.  >v  S. 

1131 
r.  Jones  i  1  I  Fla.  254)  1085 

v.  Lane  ( 19  Ga.  387)  254 

v.  N.  V.  &  E.  R.  Co.  (27  Barb. 

512)  864 

y.  Robinson  (1  Duval,  162)  7:;.; 

v.  St.  Louis  [isMo.  488)        216,  626 
v.  Western  Pac.  R.  Co.  (48  Cal. 

109)  L273 

Robinson    Drain   Com'rs  v.  Baxter 

(57  Mich.  127)  206 

Roby  w.  Chicago  (64  111.  177)  485 

Rochedale  Canal  Co.  v.  Radcliffe  (18 

Q.  B.  287)  800 

Rochester  v.  Alfred  Lank  (13  Wis. 

432)  033 

v.  Collins  (12  Barb.  559)  1212 

v   Lee  i  15  Sim.  376)  259 

v.  Montgomery  (72  N.  Y.  65)       1312 
v.  Pettinger  (17  Wend.  265)  462 

v.  Queen  (27  Law  J.  Q    B.  436)    1020 
r.  Randall  (105  Mass.  295)  301 

v.  Rood  (II   &D.  Supt.  140)  461 

r.  Rush  (80  X.  V.  302) 
v.  Upman  (19  Minn.  108)  943 

Kncln  ster's  i  lase  (<  >wen,  73)  247 

Rochester  Water  Com'rs,  Re  (66  N. 

V.  413)  689,690,697,825 

Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  v.  Roch- 
ester (3  N.  Y.  463)        1202,  1203, 
1211,  1317,  1331 
Rock  Creek  v.  Strong  (90  U.  S.  271)    574, 

601 

Rockford  v.  Ilildebrand  ("61  111.155)  1272, 

1274,  1278,  1281,  1283, 1285,  1297 

v.  Tripp  (83  111.217)  1259,1270 

Rock    Island    Co.    Sup.    v.    United 

States  (4  Wall.  435)    1014,  1032, 
1037,  1042 
Rodman   ?\   Musselman   (12    Bush, 

354)  162 

Roeller  v.  Ames  (33  Minn.  132)  101 

Roffignac  Street,  Re  (4  Rob.  (La) 

357)  711,713 

Rogan  v.  Watertown   (30  Wis.  259)     87, 

220,  229,  551 

Rogers,  Re  (7  Cow.  526)        343,  300,  363, 

1  h.V.i,  1070 
v.  Burlington  (3  Wall.  654)    193,  194, 
196,   197,  231,  236,  548,  504,  573, 
585,  580,  593,  618,  640 
r.  Collier  (43  Mo.  359)  155 

v.  Greenbush  (68  Me.  390)  1147 

v.  Jones  (•">  D.  &  R.  484)  379 

v.  Jones  (1  Wend.  237)  400,437,  468, 

487 
v.  Lee  County  (1  Dillon,  C.  C. 

529)  669 

r.  People  (9  Col.  150)  452 

v.  People  (68  111.  154)  44,  1032 

p  St.  Charles  !">1  Mo.  229)  723 

v.  Shirley  (74  Me.  144)  1301 


Rolfs,  R<   (30  Kan.  178)  603 

Roll  v.  Augusta  C.  Council  (34  Ga. 

326)  S53,  1222,  r_"j>,  1320 

r.  Indianapolis  (62  1ml.  .".17)        1332 
RollersviHe  Turnp.  R.  Com'rs  v.  San- 
dusky Co.  Com'rs  (1  O.  St. 
149)  1017 

Rollins  v.  Lake  County  (34  Fed.  R. 

845)  611 

Roman  v   Strauss  (in  Md.  89)  786 

Rome  v.  Cabot  (28  Ga.  50)  219 

v.  Jenkins  (30  Ga.  164)  719 

v.  McWilliams  (52  Ga.  251)    963,  970 

o.  McWilliams  (67  Ga.  106)  946 

u.Omberg  (28Ga.46)    223,1222,1228 

Rome  Bank  v.  Rome  (18  X   Y.  88)    78,  86 

Rome  R.  Co.  v.  Rome  (11  Ga.  275)       969 

Romeo  v.  Chapman  (2  Mich.  179)  262 

Rooney  v.  .Milw.  Co.  Sup.  (40  Wis. 

23)  1304 

>:  Randolph  (128  Mass.  580)  1l'51 

Roosevelt  v.  Draper  (34  N.  Y.  318)    1096, 

1111,  1114 
Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  New  York  (84 

N.  Y.  108)  908,  954 

Root  v.  Shields  (Woolw.  C.  C.  340)      657 
Roper  v.  Lawrinburg  (90  N.  C.  427) 

r.  McWhorter  (77  Va.  214)    179,  071, 

1100,  1107 

Rosa  v.  New  Orleans  (1  La.  126)  459 

Rose  v.  Groves  (5  M.  &  G.  013)  887 

v.  Hardie  (98  N.  C.  44)    141,  418,  422 

v.  Roseburg  &   M.  Turnp.    Co. 

(3  Watts,  46)  244 

v.  St.  Charles  (49  Mo.  500)    761, 1310, 

1317 
Rosebaugh  v.  Saffin  (10  Ohio,  31)  28,  416, 

418 
Rosenbaum  v.  Bauer  (120  U.  S.  450)  572, 
1005,  1041,  1044 
v.  San  Francisco  Sup.  (28  Fed. 

R.  223)  1010 

Rosenberg  v.  Des  Moines  (41  Iowa, 

415)  1301 

Rosewell  v.  Prior  (1  Salk.  460)  1  17 

Ross  v.  Butler  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  294)  449 

v.  Clinton  (40  Iowa,  0O0)  1321 

v.  Curtis  (31  N.  Y.  006)  6  1 1 

v.  Davenport  (66  Iowa,  548)  1285 

v.  Madison  (1  Ind.  281)  377.  378,  522, 

1317,  1333 

r.  St.  Charles  (19  Mo.  500)  499 

,-.  Wimberly  (00  Miss.  345)  250 

Rossin  v.   Walker  (6  Grant  (Can.), 

019)  789 

Rossire  v.  Boston  (4  Allen,  57)  659 

Rothschild  v.  Darien  (69  Ga.  503)         394 
Rouede  v.  Jersey  City  (18  Fed.  R. 

719)  599 

Rounds  v.  Mansfield  (38  Me.  586)  222,326 

v.  Mumford  (2  R.  I.  154)      486,  1215, 

1222  1229 

v.  Stetson  (45  Me.  596)  '    222 

v.  Stratford  (20  U.  C.  C.  P.  11)    1270 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXXXVll 


Page 

Roundtreev.  Galveston  (42  Tex.  613)    933, 

957 
Rowan's  Ex.  v.  Portland   (8  B.  Mon 

232)      749,  757,787,  798,  801,  803 
Rowe  r   Addison  (34  N.  II.  306)  L202 

v.  Kern  County  (72  Cal.  353)  312 
v.  Leeds  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  575)  1248 
v.  Portsmouth  (56  N.  II.  291)  1230, 
1325,  1329,  1320 
v.  Rochester  (29  U.  C.  Q.  B.  590)  1139, 

L332 

Rowell  i>.  Lowell  (7  Gray,  100)  1257,  1263, 

1265,  L267,  1286 

v.  Montville  (4  Me.  270)  762 

v.  Williams  (29  Iowa,  210)  1 195,  1281, 

1298,  1305,  1308, 1312 

Rowland  v.  Gallatin  (75  Mo.  134)        1187 

r.  Kalamazoo  (49  Mich.  553)         1211 

Rowley  v.  London  &  N.  W   Ry.  Co. 

(L.  R.  8  Ex.221)  1288,1289 

Roxbury   v.  Boston  &  P.  K.  Co.  (6 

Cush.  424)  851,  1314 

Royal  Brit.  Bank  v.  Turquand  (6  El. 

&  Bl.  325)  594,  598 

Royal  Street,  lie  (16  La.  An.  393)  707,  979 
Royall  v.  Virginia  (116  U.  S  572)  996 
Rozell  r.  Anderson  (91  Ind.  591)  1328 

v.  Andrews  (103  X.  Y.  150)  751 

Rubey  v.  Shain  (54  Mo.  207)  1112 

Ruby  v.  Abysinian  Society  (15  Me. 

300)  541 

Rucker  v.   Pocahontas  Co.  Sup.  (7 

W.  Va.  061)  312 

Rude  v.  St.  Louis  (93  Mo.  408)  887 

Rudolphe  v.  New  Orleans  (11   La. 

An.  242)  '     1201,  1229 

Ruggles  v.  Collier  (43  Mo.  359)  154 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (53  Wis.  436)       1149 

v.  Nantucket  (11  Cush.  433)  155, 

1164,  1165 

v.  Nevada  (63  Iowa,  185)  1298 

Ruhlman  v.  Commonwealth  (5  Bin- 

ney, 26)  715,  1125 

Ruland  v.  So.  New  Market  (59  N.  II. 

251)  754 

Rulison  v.  Post  (79  111.  567)  397 

Rumford    Sch.    Dist.    v.    Wood   (13 

Mass.  193)  53,  75,  678 

Ramsey  v.  Campton  (16  N.  II.  5(57)      278 
Bundle  c  Baltimore    28  Md  356)        1131 
v.  Del.  &  R.  Canal  Co.  (1  Wall. 

Jr.  275)  94 

Rung  v.  Shoneberger  (2  Watts,  23)     764, 

799,  803 
Runyan  v.  Coster's  Lessee  (14  Pet. 

122)  661 

Runyon  v.   Bordine  (2  J.  S.  Green 

(N.  J.),  472)  782,784,786 

Ruppert  v.  Baltimore  (23  Md.  is  J)  556 
Rusch  v.  Davenport  (6  Iowa,  443)     1265, 

1281,  1286 
v.  Des  Moines  County  (1  Woolw. 

C.  C.  313)  30 

Rushville  v.  Adams  (107  Ind.  475)      1269 


Rushville  Gas  Co.  p.  Rushville  find. 
Sup.  (Jt.  1889]  (41  Alb.  L.J. 
It.;  369 

Russ  v.  New  York  (12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs. 

38)  400 

Russell,  Re  (51  Conn.  577)  317 

,-.  Burlington  (30  Iowa,  262)  1221 
r.  Canastota  (98  N.  V.  196)  1272, 1274 
v.  Chicago  (22  III.  285)  296 

v.  Colombia  (71  Mo.  180)  1296 

v.  Devon  County  (2  1).  &  E.  T. 

R.  661)      1171,  1174,  1206,  L209, 

1280 

v.  New  Haven  (51  Conn.  259)        899 

v.  New  York  (2  Denio,  461)         1164, 

1166,  L167,  1193 

v.  Steuben  (57  111.  35)  1216,  1282 

v.  The  Swift  (Newb.  R.  553)  172 

Russellville  v.  White  (41  Ark.  485)        126 

Rutherford  v.  Holly  (105  N.  V.  632)    1322 

v.  Taylor  (38  Mo.  315)    740,  765,  769, 

787 

Rutherford's  Case  (72  Pa.  82)  700 

Rutter  v.  Chapman  (8  M.  &  W.  1)  58 

Ryan  v.  Boston  (118  Mass.  248)  1219 

v.  Copes  (11  Rich.  L.  217)  449 

w.  Gallatin  County  (14  111.  83)        997 

v.  Leavenworth  Co.  Com'rs  (30 

Kan. 185)  1120 

Rychlicke  v.  St.  Louis  (11  S.  W.  R. 

■     1001)  1322,1324 

Ryder  v.  Alton  &  S.  R.  Co.  (13  111. 

523)  139 

Rylands  v.  Fletcher  (3  H.  L.  C.  330)  1323 


Sackett  v.  New  Albany  (88  Ind.  473)  205, 

1107 
Sackett,    Douglas,  &c.  Streets,    Re 

(74  N.  Y.  95)  777,  916 

Sacramento  v  Crocker  (16  Cal.  119)  924, 

970 

17.  Kirk  (7  Cal.  419)  523,  627 

17.  Str.  New  World  (4  Cal.  41)         178 

Sadler  w.  Evans  (4  Burr   1984)  319 

Sadler's  Case  (104  N.  Y.  229)     778,  788, 

810.  817 
Safford  v.  Drew  (3  Duer,  627)  PJSS 

Sane  r.  Brooklyn  (89  N.  Y.  189)   557,  72' > 
Saginaw  Gasl.  Co.  v.  Saginaw   (28 

Fed.  R.  529)  827 

St.  Albans  v.  Noble  (56  Vt.  525)  1326 

St.  Catharines  v.  Gardner  (20  U.  C. 

C.  P.  107 ;  21  lb.  190)  789 

St.  Charles  v.  Meyer   (58  Mo.   8(3)    437, 

176,  486 
17.  Nolle  (51  Mo.  122)      422,  800,  811, 

897 
r.  O'Mailey  (18  111.  407)  371,  409 

St.    Charles   County   v.   Powell  (22 

Mo.  625)    "  798,803 

v.  Rogers  (49  Mo.  530)  1126 


cxxxvm 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


St.  Charles  Tp  Sch.  Dir.  v.  Goerges 

Ao   I  >4] 
St.  Clair  Co.  v.  Keller  (86111.396) 
St.  Clair   Co.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Illinois 

(96  l'.  S.  68) 
St.  George's  Vestry  v.  Sparrow   (16 

C.  B.  n.  s.  209) 
St.   Helena   o.  Burton   (3">    La.  An. 

52 1 ) 
St.  Helen's  Chem.  Co.  v.  St.  Helen's 
Corp.  (L.  li.l  Exch.  I).  196) 
St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.  v.  Tipping 
(II  11.  L.  C.  642) 
r.  Tipping  (1  B.  &  S.  608) 
St.  John  r.  East  St.  Louis  (50  111.  92) 
,-.  McFarlan  (33  Mich.  72) 
v.  New  York  (6  Duer,  315) 
v.  New  York  (3  Bosw.  183)      157 
St.  John's  College  v.  State  (15  Md. 

330) 
St.  Johnsbury  v.  Thompson  (59  Vt. 

;; '  III,  146,386 

St.  Joseph  i'.  Anthony  (30  Mo.  537) 
v.  Hamilton  (43  Mo.  282) 
v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  (39 

Mo.  476) 
v.  O'Donoghue  (31  Mo.  345)   911 
v.  Saville  (39  Mo.  460) 
St.    Joseph    &    1).   C.  B.  Co.  v.  Bu- 
chanan Co.  (39  Mo.  485)  158 
St.  Joseph  Asylum  (69 N.  Y.  353) 
St.  Joseph    Sup.    v.   Coffenbury    (1 

Mich.  355) 
St.  Joseph  Tp.  v.   Rogers  (16  Wall. 
till)       79,231,235,579,582, 
593,  599,  617,  618,  G35,  638, 

St.  Louis  v.  Alexander  (23  Mo.  483) 
Ml',   1  1 1,  225,  235,  230,  409, 


v.  Allen  (13  Mo.  400)        56, 

v.  Allen  (53  Mo.  44)         923, 
v.  Armstrong  (56  Mo.  298) 
v.  Bentz  (11  Mo.  61)         397 
v.  Boatmen's  Ins.  &  T.  Co. 

Mo.  150) 
v.  Boffinger  (19  Mo.  13) 
v.  Bucher  (7  Mo.  App.  169) 
v.  Cafferata  (24  Mo.  94)  397, 
v.  Cleland  (1  Mo.  84) 
v.  Clemens  (30  Mo.  407)  911, 
991 
v.  Clemens  (43  Mo.  395) 
v.  Clemens  (49  Mo.  r>'>1) 
v.  Clemens  (52  Mo.  133) 

v.  Coons  (37  Mo.  44) 

v.  Tie  None  (11  Mo.  136) 

v.  Eters  [36  Mo.  456) 

v.  Fitz  (53  Mo.  582) 

v.  Foster  (52  Mo.  513)    367, 

v.  Franks  (78  Mo.  41) 


107, 
975 
925 

,  437 

(47 

386, 

437, 

978, 
992, 

91  I. 

lot. 
958, 

992, 

399, 
886, 

409, 


Page 

,803 
1006 

807 

889 

297 

1 16 

446 

485 
926 
473 
156 

,884 

103 

,  426 
992 
711 

965 

,965 

9G5 

(ill 
956 

300 

588, 

639, 
645 
78, 

643, 
646 

207, 
999 
096 
542 
470 

944 
113 
944 
468 
534 
979, 
996 
154 
978 
911, 
994 
9».q 

996 
154 
482 
389, 

IK) 
718 


Pago 

St.  Louis  v.  Gleason  (89  Mo.  67  ;  93 

Mo.  83)  707 

v.  Gorman  (29  Mo.  593)  669 

v.  Green  (7  Mo.  App.  168)  1070 

v.  Grove  (  16  Mo.  574)  428 

v.  Gurno  (12  Mo.  414)  814, 1223, 1228, 

1324 
v.  Indep.  Ins.  Co.  of  Mass.  (47 

Mo.  146)  909 

v.  Jackson  (26  Mo.  37)  166 

v.  Laughlin  (49  Mo.  559)       899,  940, 

971 
v.  Manuf.    Sav.    Bank   (49  Mo. 

574)  386 

v.  McCoy  (18  Mo.  238)  443 

v.  Meier  (77  Mo.  13)  742,  745 

,-.  Merton  (6  Mo.  170)  678 

v.  Newman  (46  Mo.  138)  798,  996 

o.  Russell  (9  Mo.  507)       50,  107,  267, 
975,  999 
v.  St.  Louis  Gas  Co.  (5  Mo.  App 

484) 
v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  (50  Mo.  94 
v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  (89  Mo.  44) 


St 


St.  Louis  Univ.  (88  Mo.  155) 


513 
966 
488, 

857 
700, 
761 

v.  Schnuckelburg  (7   Mo.   App. 

536)  1123 

v.  Schoenbush  (8  S.  W.  II.  791)    470, 
471,472 

v.  Schoenemann  ^o2  Mo.  348)        994 

r.  Shields  (52  Mo.  351)    103,  121,  177 

v.  Shields  (02  Mo.  247) 


76,  84,  85, 

594 

434 

482,   183 

925.  943 


v.  Smith  (2  Mo.  113) 
v.  Smith  (10  Mo.  438) 
v.  Spiegel  (90  Mo.  587) 
v.  Steinberg  (4  Mo.  App.  453)        971 
v.  Steinberg  (69  Mo.  289)  909 

v.  Vert  (84  Mo.  204)  478 

v.  Weber  (44  Mo.  547)    399,  404,  456, 

400 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  (39 

Fed.  R.  59)  830 

v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  (11  Wall. 

423)  894,  963,  964,966 

v.  Wigains  Ferry  Co.  (40  Mo. 

580)  904,900 

v.  Withaus  (90  Mo.  646)  345 

v.  Woodruff  (4  Mo.  App.  109)        427 
St.  Louis  A.  &  T.  II.  R.  Co.  v.  Belle- 
ville (122  111.  370)  858 
St.  Louis  &  Cine.    R.  Co.  v.  Dalby 

(19  111.353)  67 

St.  Louis  Br.  Co.  v.  E.  St  Louis  (121 

III.  238)  254,  964 

v.  People  (125  111.226)  820,988 

Louis    Build.   &   Sav.  Assoc,  v. 

Lightner  (47  Mo.  393)  953 

St.  Louis  Co.  Court  r.  Griswold  (58 

Mo.  175)  101,  202,  691,  700,  703, 

704 

v.  Sparks  (10  Mo.  117)       1023 


TABLE    OP   CASES   CITED. 


CXXX1X 


Page 
St.  Louis  Gas  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  (46 

Mo.  HI)  268 

St.  Loins    Hospital   v.  Williams  (19 

Mo.  609)  261 

St.  Louis  Pub.   Schools  v.  St.  Louis 

(20  Mo.  408)  955 

St.  Louis  Slough  Coni'rs   v.  Shields 

(02  Mo  247)  76,  Hi,  s;, 

St.  Louis,  V.  &  T  II  R.  Co.  v.  Capps 

(67  III.  007)  853,854,850 

v.  Haller  (82  III.  208)  851 

v.  Surrell  (SS  111    535)  969 

St.  Luke's  Church   I'rop.  v.  Slaek  (7 

Cush.220)  1007,1057 

St.  Martinsville  v.  Str.  Mary  Lewis 

(32  La.  An.  1293)  165,  174 

St.  Mary's  v.  Jacobs  (L.  R.  7  Q  B. 

53)  741,  746 

St.  Mary's  College  v.  Crowl  (lOKau. 

"  142)  953 

St.  Mary's   Indus.  School  v.  Brown 

(45  Ind.  310)  940 

St.  Paul  v.  Colter  (12  Minn.  41)     87,  385, 
404,  405,  466,  460 
v.  Gilflllan  (30  Minn.  298)       415,  449 
v.  Kirby  (8  Minn.  154)  1281 

v.  Laidler  (2  Minn.  190)  460 

v.  Marvin  (10  Minn.  102)  1126 

v.  Seitz  (3  Minn.  297)         1281,  1303, 

1307 
v.  Smith  (27  Minn.  364)  465 

v.  Stoltz  (33  Minn  233)  429 

v.  Tredeger  (25  Minn.  248)   425,  426, 
429,  460,  461 
v.  Troyer  (3  Minn.  291)  434 

St.  Paul  &  I'.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Paul  '21 

Minn.  526)  921,  925 

r.  Schurmeir  (7  Wall.  272)     169,  170, 

748 
St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Minne- 
apolis (35  Minn.  141)        689,  709 
St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co.  v.  St.  Paul 

(30  Minn. 359)  689 

St.  Paul  Water  Co.  v.  Ware  (16  Wall. 

506)  1308 

St.    Paul's    Par.    Poor   Com'rs   ads. 

Lynah  (2  McCord,  170)      1009, 

1011 

St.  Peter  v.  Bauer  (19  Minn.  327)  402,  499, 

510 
v.  Dennison  (58  N.  Y.  416)  1216,  1220 
St.  Peter's  Church  v.  Seott  Co.  Com'rs 

(12  Minn.  395)  952 

Salamanca  v   Wilson  (109  U.  S.  627)  1053 
Salem  v.  Eastern  Co.  (98  Mass.  431)   212, 

445,  450 

v.  Goller  (76  Ind.  291)  1285 

Salem  Mill  Dam  v.  Ropes  (6  Pick.  23)    53 

Salina  o.  Trosper  (27  Kan   544)  L297 

Saline  County  v.  Anderson  (20  Kan. 

298)  318 

Salisbury  v.  Andrews  (128  Mass.  336) 

891 
v.  Herchenroder  (100  Mass.  458)  1276 


Page 

Salisbury  Com'rs  v.  Powe  (0  Jones 

L.  134)  443 

Salmon  v.  Haynes  (50  N.  J.  L.  97)  283,  806 
Saloy   v.   New   Orleans   (33  La.  An. 

70)  169 

Salsbury  v.  Philadelphia  (44  Pa.  St. 

303)  53 1 

Salter  v.  Reed  (15  Pa.  St.  2'  1002 

Salt  Lake  (its  v.  Hollister  (lis  C.  S. 

266)  529,  117n,  U92 

v.  Wagner  (2  Utah,  400)  433 

Saltonstall  v.  Banker  (8  Gray,  195)       450 
Salvia  v.  No.  Brancepeth  Coal  Co. 

(L.  R.  9  Ch.  Ap.  705)  447 

Samis  v.  King  (40  Conn.  298)       282,  296, 
319,  372.  1080 
Sampson  v.  Goochland  Co,  Jus.  (5 

Gratt.  241)  760.  SS2 

Sams  v.  Toronto  (9  U.  C.  Q.  B.  181)     261 

Samuels  v.  Nashville  (3  Sneed,  298)      765 

Samyn  v.  McCloskey  (2  O.  St.  530)     1311 

San  Antonio  v.  Barnes  (90  U.  S.  315)  593 

r.  Gould  (34  Tex.  76)  534 

i\  Jones  (28  Tex.  19)  225 

v.  Lane  (32  Tex.  405)  582,  649 

v.  Lewis  (9  Tex.  69)  377,  523 

v.  Lewis  (15  Tex.  388)  769 

v.  Mehaffy  (96  U.  S.  312)  593 

Sanborn  v.  Deerfield  (2  N.  H.  253)  54 

v.  Minneapolis  (35  Minn.  314)         742 

Sanbornton  v.  lilton  (53  N.  H.  438; 

55  N.  H.  603)  272 

Sandford  v.  Tremlett  (42  Mo.  384)        275 
San  Diego  v.  S.  D.  &  L.  A.  Co.  (44 

Cal.  106)  678,  679 

San  Diego  Water  Co.  v.  San  Diego 

(59  Cal.  517)  540 

Sands  v.  Edmunds  (110  U.  S.  585)        996, 

1012 

v.  Richmond  (31  Gratt.  571)   913,  919 

Sandwich  v.  Queen  (10  Q.  B.  574)       1005 

Sanford  v.  Augusta  (32  Me.  536)        1252, 

1288 
San  Francisco  r.  Calderwood  (31  Cal. 

585)  659,  751 

v.  Canavan  (42  Cal.  541)  94.  105,  1 18, 
744,  715,  752.  764,  769,  l'Ul 
v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (03  Cal.  407)  904 
v.  Hazen  (5  Cal.  169)  358 

v.  Holliday  (76  Cal.  18)  753 

v.  Kinsman  (51  Cal.  92)  994 

v.  McGinn  (67  Cal.  110)  S99 

v.  O'Neil  (51  Cal.  91)  994 

v.  Real  Estate  (42  Cal.  517)  734 

r.  Spring  Val.  W.  W    (48  Cal. 

493)  83,85,747,791,794 

San  Francisco  &  O.  R.   Co.  v.  Oak- 
land (53  Cal.  602)  544 
San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  o.  Brickwedel 

(62  Cal  641)  201 

v.  Dunn  (62  Cal.  580)  157 

v.  San  Francisco  (6  Cal.  190)  384,  107 

v.  San  Francisco  (0  Cal.  453)         l||v. 

533,  538,  539 


cxl 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 
Sangamon  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan 

County  (II  III.  163)         964,  968 
Sangamon  County  v.  Springfield  (63 

111.  GO)         94,  103,  104,  111',  '270, 
535,  1143,  1444 
Sanger  v.  Kennebec  Co.  Coni'rs  (25 

Me.  291)  1057 

San  Jose  o.  Reed  ((15  Cal.  241)  730 

v.  S.  J.  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.  (53  Cal. 

176)  970 

Sank  v.  Philadelphia  (1  Pa.  Leg.  Gaz. 

259;  <s  Phila.  117)  366,  367 

San  Leandro  v.  Le  Breton  (72  Cal. 

170)    059,  740,  743,  757,  760,  763 
San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Hendrick's   (71 

Cal.  242)  432 

Sansoin  v.  Mercer  (68  Tex.  488)         1014 
Santa  Cruz   v.  Santa  C.  R.  Co.   (56 

Cal.  143)  478 

Santa  Rosa  v.  Coulter  (58  Cal.  537)    974, 

976 
Santo  v.  Iowa  (2  Iowa,  165)  391 

Sargeant's   Heirs  v.  State  Bank  of 

Ind.  (4  McLean,  339)  740 

Sargent  v.  Cornish  (54  N.  II.  18)  001,  663, 

669 
v.  Ohio  &M.  R.  Co.  (1  Handy, 

52)  868 

Sarnia  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  (21 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  02)  789,  790 

Sater  v.  Burl.  &  Mt.  I'.  PL  R.  R.  Co. 

(1  Iowa,  393)  733 

Satterlee  v.  Matbewson  (2  Pet.  380)     037 

v.  San  Francisco  (23  Cal.  214)       676, 

1143 
Saukville  v.  State  (69  Wis.  178)  1134 

Saulet  v.  New   Orleans  (10  La.  An. 

81)  744,  755,  759 

Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca  (94  N.  Y.  27)       1272, 

1281,  1297 
Sault  Ste.  Marie  H.  Com'rs  v.  Van 

Dusan  (40  Mich.  429)       540,  500 

Saunders  v.  Haynes  (13  Cal.  145)  279 

v.  Lawrence  (141  Mass.  380)  291 

r.  McLin  (1  Ired.  L.  572)  947 

Savacool  v.  Houghton  (5  Wend.  170)    234 

Savage  ».  Bamjor  (40  Me.  176)  1201,  1266 

v.  Gulliver  (4  Mass.  178)  1125 

Savannah  v.  Charlton  (30  Ga.  460)       424, 

425 
v.  Clearv  (67  Ga.  153)  1331 

v.  Crawford  (75  Ga.  35)  1119 

v.  Cullens  (38  Ga.  334)  1212 

v.  Donnelly  (71  Ga.  258)  1293 

v.  Feeley  (66  Ga.  31)  1150 

v.  Hancock  (91  Mo.  54)  704 

v.  Hartridge  (8  Ga.  23)  423,941,  963. 

968 
v.  Hartridge  (37  Ga.  113)  733 

l».  IIusm-v  (21  Ga.  80)       437,  438,  500 
v.  Jesup  (106  U.  S.  503)  947 

v.  Kelly  (108  U.  S.  184)  235 

v.  Spears  (66  Ga.  304)  1327,  1831 

v.  State  (4  Ga.  20)         87,  1012,  1050 


Page 
Savannah  v.  Steamboat  Co.  of  Ga. 

(R.  M.  Charlt.  342)  141,  743,789 
v.  Waldner  (  19  Ga,  316)     1270,  1304, 

1306 
v.  Wilson  (49  Ga.  170)  784 

Savannah,  A.  &  (i.   R.   Co.  v.  Shiels 

(33  Ga.  001)       787,  84S,  s'.o,  s52 
Savannah  &  T.   R.   Co.  V.  Savannah 

( 15  Ga.  002)  833,  834,  868 

Savings  &  L.  Assoc,  &c.  (3  Dill.  276  : 
20  Wall.  655).  [See  Citizens' 
Savings,  &c.\ 
Savings  &  L.  Soc.  v.  Austin  (40  Cal. 

415)  1107 

Savings  Bank,  &c.   (8  Allen.    109). 
|  Set-  Lowell  Five  Cent,  &C.j 
Savings  Bank,  &c.  ( 14  N.J.  Eq.  286). 
|  Sec  Stonington  Sav.  Bank, 
&c] 
(102  N.  Y.  313).     [See  Bank  for 
Savings,  &c] 
Savings  Fund  Soc,  &c.  (13  Pa.  St.  175). 
[See  Western  Sav.  Fund,&c] 
Savings  Soc,  &c  (29  Conn.  174).  [See 

Society  for  Savings,  &c.| 
Saw-Mill  Run  Bridge,  A'e  (85  Pa.  St. 

163)  917 

Sawyer,  Be  (124  U.  S.  200)  286,  287,  289, 

330,  340,  352,   354,   1022,   1076, 

1077,  1091,  1094 

v.  Alton  (4  111.  130)  807,  939 

v.  Concordia  Par.  (12  Fed.  R.  754)  lis, 

7:;7 

v.  Corse  (17  Gratt.  230)  1204 

w.Nortnfield  (7  Cush.  490)  1135,  1315 

v.  Williams  (25  Vt.  311)  272 

Saxon  Life  Ass.  Co.,  Re  (2  J.  &  H. 

408)  1153 

Saxton  v.  Beach  (50  Mo.  488)  353,  389,  535, 

556,  558,  991 

v.  St.  Joseph  (60  Mo.  153)  353,  38!), 

535,553,  555,  558,  1204.  1327 

Saylor  v.  Harrisburg  (87  Pa.  St.  216)  1202 

Sayre  v.  Tompkins  (23  Mo.  443)  1107, 1112 

Scadding  v.  Lorant  (5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

16)  356,  364 

Scales  v.  Chattahoochee  Co.  Ord.  (41 

Ga.226)  44,1174 

Scammon  v.  Chicago  (25  111.  424)  784, 1305, 

1300,  1307 

v.  Chicago  (40  III.  146)  941,  985 

P.Chicago  (42  111.192)  979 

v.  Scammon  (28  N.  H.  429)  371 

Scarborough  v.  S.  Rural  San  Auth. 

(L.  R.  1  Ex.  I).  344)  447 

Seaming  v.  Cryer  (3  Leon.  7)  414 

Scates  v.  King"  (110  111.  456)  614 

Schaeffer  v.  Bonham  (95  111.  368)         646 
Schaefler  v.  Sandusky  (33  Ohio  St. 

240)  1259,  1261,  1203 

Schaffer  v.  Cadwallader  (36  Pa.  St. 

120)  674,1032 

Schalle  v.  Omaha  (28  Neb.  325)  1243 

Schanck  v.  Mayor  (09  N.  Y.  444)  153 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


cxli 


Schattner  v.  Kansas  City  (53  Mo.  162)  si  I 

[223,  1320 
Schenck  ads.  Marshall  Co.  Sup.  (5 

Wall.  772)  646 

v.  Peay  (1  Dillon  C.  C.  267)  361 

Sehenley  v.  Allegheny  (25  Pa.  St.  128)  722, 

910,  91  1 

v.  Commonwealth  (36  Pa.  St.  29)  184, 

156,  7o(»,  757,  958,  977,  993,  994 

Schmidt,  ft  (24  S.C.  363)  500,  1126 

r.  Stearaa  County  (34  .Minn.  112)  539 

Schneider  v.  Jacob  (5  So.  W.  R    360)    757 

Schofield  i>.  Lansing  ( 17  Mich.  437)      958 

School,  &c,  Re  (47  N.  Y.  556).  [See 

New  York  School,  &C.] 
School  Com'rs,  &c.   (2   Stew    &  P. 

100).  [See  Montgomery  Co. 

Sch.  Com'rs,  &c] 
School  Directors,  &c.  (50  Mo.  194). 

[See   St.    Charles  Tp.   Sch. 

Dir.,  &c:] 
(6  Pa.  St.  31).   [See  Tyrone  Tp. 

Sch.  Dir,  &c.] 
(45  Pa.  St.  :588).     [See  Bedford 

Bor.  Sch.  Dir.,  &c] 
School  Dir.  of  Dist  No.  5,  Union  v. 

Sch.  Dir.  of  Dist.  No.  1  (105 

111.653)  804 

School  Dist.  in  Clav  County  v.  Neil 

(36  Kan.  17)  440 

School  Dist.  in  Danvers  v.  Tapley  (1 

Allen,  49)  272 

School  Dist.  in  Faulkner  County  v. 

Williams  (38  Ark.  454)  41 

School  Dist.  in   Marathon   v.  Gage 

(39  Mich.  328)  101 

School  Dist.  in  Richardson  County 

v.  Insurance  Co.  (103  U.  S. 

707)  81,  83 

School  Dist.  in  Rumford  v.  Wood  (13 

Mass.  193)  53,  75 

School  Dist.  in  Sanford  v.  Lord  (44 

Me.  374)  378 

School  Dist.  in  Steamboat  Rock,  &c. 

o.  Stone  (100  U   S.  183)  600 

School  Dist.   in    Stoneham  y.  Rich- 
ardson (23  Pick.  02)  271 
School  Dist.  in  Stoughton  v.  Ather- 

ton  (12  Met.  105)     303,  346,  347, 
349,  371,375 
School   Dist.   in   Wright  County   v. 

Thompson  (5  Minn    2K0)         562 
School   District,  &c.   (13  Conn. 

227)    [See  South  Sch.  Dist., 

&c] 
Schoolfield    v.    Lynchburg    (78  Va. 

366)  939,951 

School   Fund    Trs.  v.  Bradbury    (11 

Me.  118)  135,  136 

School  Trustees,  &c.  v.  Taylor  (30 

N.  J.  Eq.  618)  144 

School  Trustees,  &c.  (9  Ohio,  20:1). 

[See  Mclntyre  Poor  School, 

&O.J 


Page 
School  Trustees  of  Lake    View    v. 

People  (87  III.  303)  397 

School  Trustees  of  Tp.   1.  Clinton 

Co.  r.  Tatman  (13  lil.  80)  94,  97, 
L10 
School  Trustees  of  Tp.  7,  Macoupin 

Co.  v.  People  (63  ill.  299J       906 
School  Trustees  oi  Tp.  9,  Green  Co. 

r.  Mclntyre  (3  III.  App.  77)     301 
Schoonmaker  r.  lief.  1'rol.  1  >. Church 

(5  How.  Pr.  265)  755 

Sehott  v.  People  (89  III.  195)  489 

Schriber  v.  Langlade  (66  Wis.  616)     244, 

270 
Schroder  v.  Citv  Council   (2  Const. 

Rep.  721  i)  413,  192 

Schroth  v.  Prescott  (08  Wis.  078)       1265, 

L260,  1273 
Schuchardt  v  New   York  (53  N.  Y. 

202)  735 

Schuchman  v.  Homestead  Bor.  (Ill 

Pa  St.  48)  750 

Schultes  v.  Eberly  (82  Ala.  242)  41 

Schultz  v.  Milwaukee  (49  Wis.  251)  1197, 

1205 
Schumacher  v.  St.  Louis  (3  Mo.  App. 

297)  1224 

Schumacker  v.  Toberman   (56  Cal. 

508)  99,  100,  133 

Schumm  v.  Seymour  (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

143)     '  351,  991,  1123 

Schurmeier  v.  St.  Paul  &  Pac.  R.  Co. 

( 10  Minn.  82 ;  7  Wall.  272)     738, 
739,  741,  792 
Schuster  v.  State  (48  Ala.  199)  451 

Schuyler  Co.  Sup.  v.  Farwell  (25111. 

181)  501 

v.  People  (25  111.  181)      239,  368,  639 

v.  Thomas  (98  U.  S.  169)  693 

Schwab  r.  Madison  (49  Ind.  329)  413 

Schwartz   v.  Flatboats   (14  La.  An. 

243)  958 

v.  Oshkosh  (55  Wis.  490)  407 

Schweitzer  v.  Liberty  (82  Mo.  309)     407, 

434 
Schwuchow  v.  Chicago  (68  III.  444)  432 
Scioto  Val.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Lawrence  (38 

O.St.  41)  si:: 

Scipio  v.  Wright  (101  U.  S.  665)  226 

Scirele  v.  Neeves  ( 17  Ind.  289)      295,  296 
Scofield  v.  Council  Bluffs  (08   Iowa. 

695)  635,  555 

v.  Eighth  Sch.  Dist.  (27  Conn. 

499)  211,1110 

Scollay  v.  Butte  County  (07  Cal.  249)  162 

Scotland  Co.  v.  Hill  (132  U.  S.  107)    626, 

630,  631,  637 

v.  Thomas  (94  U.  S.  682)        59:5.  631 1, 

631 

Scott  v.  Alexander  (23  S.  C.  120)        1107 

v.  Chicago  (1  Bissell,  510)      882.  888 

v.  Davenport  (84  Iowa,  208)  204 

v.  Des  Moines  (34  Iowa,  552)         753, 

807 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF   casks    CITED. 


p  i  i 

irth  (4  F.  &  F.  34  148 

•l  [nd.  I)  267,625 

,..  ]  •  Hi,  1,1,  176 

r.  Manchester  II   II.  &  N.  59;  2 

U.  &  N.  204)       1203,  1205,  1206, 
L207,  1215 
v.  Montgomery  (95  Pa.  St.  ill 

1259,  1287 

v.  Phila.  (81  Pa.  St.  80)  983 

bhreveporl  (20  F<  -I    R.  714)      1  i  i, 

540 

Scovilv.  Geddings  (7  Ohio.pt.  2, 211)  1226 

Scoville  v.  Cleveland  (10.  St.  126)      1  1". 

355,  721,  896,  920,  978 

Scrafford    v.   Gladwin   County    (41 

Mich.  647)  1083 

Scranton  v.  Catterson  (94  Pa.  St. 

21 S )  1295 

o.  Dean  (2  W.  N.  C.  467)  1259 

.-.  Hill  (102  Pa.  St.  378)   1266,    1267, 

1312 

v.  Pa.  Coal  Co.  (105  Pa.  St.  145)917, 

937,  972 

Scranton's  Appeal  (121  Pa.  St.  97)     1211 

Scroggie  v.  Guelph  (36  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

534)  1331 

Scudder  v.  Trenton  D.  F.  Co.  (Saxl 

694)  TO:),  705 

Scully  &  <  >'Leary,  Re  (11  Chic.  L.  N. 

27) 
Seagraves  v.  Alton  (13  111.871) 

v.  .Mitchell  (5Cal.  -103) 

Seaman  v.  New  York  (3  Daly,  1  17) 

v.  New  York  (80  N.  Y.  239) 


495 
634 
493 
179 
1158, 
1205 
620 


v.  Patten  (2  Caines,  312) 
Seamen's  Hosp.  Soc.  v.  Liverpool  (4 

Exch.  180)  478 

Searcy  r.  Yarnell  (17  Ark.  269)  672 

I  v.  Saratoga  (39  Hun,  307)      1332 

Searle  v.  Abraham  (7:.  Iowa,  o07)       1110 

S(  ara  V.  Dennis  (105  Mass.  310)  1263 

,-.  Marshalltown  S.  Ry  Co   (65 

Iowa,  742)  s.V,,  SOS,  SCO,  S70 

v.  West  il  Murph.  291)  424,  '.'To 

Seattle  v.  Buzby  (2  Wash.  Ter.  25)    1303 

,-.  Tyler  (Wash.  Ter.  1877)  68 

Seay  v.  Hunt  (55  Tex.  645)  278,284 

Second  Av.  M.   B.  Church,  Re  (66 

N.  Y.395)  939,942,954,956,1034 
Second  Municipality,  &c.     [See  Mu- 
nicipality No,  2,  &  c 
Second  Nat.  Bank  of  Albany  v.  Dan- 
ville (60  Ind.  504)  185 
Secord  v.  <  Ireat  Western  Hy.  Co.  (15 

U.  C.  Q   B  681)    '  1288 

Secretary  of  Int.  v.  McGarrahan  (9 

Wall.  298)  1016,  loll,  1048,  1074 
Sedberry  v.  Chatham  Co.  <  lom'rs  (66 

N.  C    186)  101)7,  1070,  1072 

Sedgwick  County  v.  Bailey  (11  Kan. 

600 |  88 

i\  Bailev  (13  Kan.  631)  105,270 

Seebold  v.  People  ( J6  111.  33)  145 


Pa  e 

Seebold  v.  Shitler  (34  Pa.  St.  133)      661. 

770 
Si  ele  '••  Deering  (79  Me  1186 

Seeley  v.  Litchfield  (49  Conn.  134)     1260, 

1271 

Seel}  >■■  Pittsburgh  (82  Pa    St.  360)    914, 

917,  934,  935,  936,  937,  989,  990 

Seguin  o.  Ireland  (68  Texas,  183)       766, 

787 
Seibert  v.  Lewis  (122  U.  S.  284)   lis.  120, 
249,  1089,  1045,  1073 
Seibrecht  v.  New  Orleans  ( \-  La.  An. 

191)  529,584,549 

Seifert  v.  Brooklyn  (101  N.  Y.  136)    1092, 

1157,  1158,  1213,  1317,  1319,  1320, 

1321,  1322,  1323,  1325,  1327,  1328, 

1329,  1331,  1332,  1334 

v.  Brooks  (34  Wis.  II')  Too 

Seiple  v.  Elizabeth  (27  N.  ,1   L.  407)    158, 

300 
Selby  v.  Portland  (14  Or.  243)      312,  317, 

1010 
Selectmen,  &c.  (8  La.  An.  87).    [See 

Baton  Rouge,  &c] 
Selleck  v.  South  Norwalk  (40  Conn. 

359)  285 

Selma  <•  Mullen  (46  Ala.  411)  257,522 
r.  Perkins  (68  Ala.  145)  138,  1283 
v.  Selma    Tress   &   VV.  Co.  (67 

Ala.  430)  963 

Selma  &  Gulf  R.  Co.,  Be  (45  Ala. 

696)  227 

Rt  (46  Ala.  230)  1011,  1016,  1069 
Semtnes  v.  Columbus  (19  Ga.  471)  550 
Semple  v.  Vicksburgh  (62  Miss.  63)  1332 
Sen-ill  v.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St.  355)  976 
Serrot    r.    Omaha    (1    Dillon,   C.    C. 

312)  1296,  1296,  1297,  1301 

Sessions  v.  Newport  (23  Vt.  9)  12o5 

Seventh  Waul  Nat.  Bank  v.  N.  Y. 
Kiev.  R.  Co.  (12  J.  &  S. 
11")  878 

Severn,  v.  Eddy  (52  111.  189)      1308,  1312 
Severv    r.  Central    Pac.    K.    Co.   (51 

Cal.  194)  788 

Sewall  v.  St.  Paul  (20  Minn.  511)         925, 

939,  944,  984,  1183,  1187,  1195 

Seward  v.  Milford  (21  Wis.  185)        1267, 

1283,  1284 
Sewell  v.  Cohocs  (75  N.  V.  16)  1247,  1207 
Sewickley  Bor.  v.  Sholes  (118  Pa. 

St.  165)  'J;Jl 

Seybell  v.  Nat.  Currency  Bank  (54 

N.  Y  288)  651 

Seybert  d.  Pittsburgh  (1  Wall.  272)     193, 

194,  237,  664,  585 

Seymer  v.  Lake  (0<l  Wis  651 )  1287 

Sc'vniour  r.  Cummins  (lr.Hnil.  MS)     13IS, 

1319 
Shackford  v.  Newington  (40  N.  II. 

116)  224 

Shafer  v.  Mumma  (IT  Md.  331)    202,  438, 

452,  470,  179,  493,  494 

Shaffer  v.  Weech  (34  Kan.  595)  979 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxliii 


Page 
Shaffner  v.  St.  Louis  (31  Mo.  204)       706, 
706,  708,  720 
Shallcross  r.  Jeffersonville  (27  Ind. 

193)  182 

Shannon  v.  O'Boyle  (61  [nd.  665)  .",50,671 
v.  Portsmouth  (54  N.  II.  483)         333 
Shapleigh  v.  Pillsbury  (1  Me.  271)       707 
Sharett's  Road  (8  Pa.  St.  89)  808 

Sharon   Iron   Co.  v.  Erie  (-11  Pa.  St. 

341)  672 

Sharp,  Re  (56  N.  Y.  257)  979,  980 

v.  Dunoven  (17  B.  Mon.  223)         972 

v.  Johnson  (4  Hill,  92)    708,  940,  954, 

'.'79,  1000 

v.  Speir  (4  Hill,  76)        708,  940,  954, 

1000 
Sharpe  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(49  Ind.  296)  790 

Sharpless  v.  Philadelphia  (21  Pa.  St. 

147)    225,  228,  236,  573,  895,  972 
v.  West  Chester  (1  Grant  (Pa.), 

257)  726 

Shartle  v.  Minneapolis  (17  Minn.  308)  761, 

1281,  1287 
Shattuck  v.  Woods  (1  Pick.  175)  310 

Shaubut  v.  St.  Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.  (21 

Minn.  502)  783,  786,  788 

Shaver  v.  Starrett  (4  O.  St.  494)  724 

Shaw  v.  Allegheny  (115  Pa.  St.  4G)  1148 
v.  Charlestown  (3  Allen,  538)  719 
v.  Crocker  (42  Cal.  435)  1225 

v.  Dennis  (10  111.405)  225,897 

v.  Hill  (07  111.  455)       ,  280 

v.  Kennedy  (N.  C.  Term,  158)         419 
».  Macon   (19  Ga.  468;  21   Ga. 

280)  317,  331,  1129,  1226 

v.  Norfolk  R.  Co.  (5  Gray,  180)     637 
v.  Pickett  (26  Vt.  486)  995 

v.  Thompson  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  233)      281 
v.  Trenton  (49  N.  J.  L.  339)  543 

Shawangunk  Kill  Br.,  Re  (100  N.  Y. 

642)  754 

Shawnee  County  v.  Carter  (2  Kan. 

115)  543 

Shawneetown  v.  Baker  (85  111.  563)     552 

v.  Mason  (82  111.  337)  1223,  1227, 

1228,  1234,  1241,  1321,  1324 

Shea  v.  Lowell  (8  Allen,  136)  1261 

v.  .Mil ford  (145  Mass.  528)  361 

v.  Ottumwa  (07  I'>wa,  39)        755,757 

v.  Potrero  &  B.  V.  R.  Co.  (44 

Cal.  414)  865 

Sheaff  v.  Colwell  (87  111.  189)  74G 

Sheehan  v.  Gleason  (40  Mo.  100)       154, 

958 
v.  Good  Samar.  Hosp.  (50  Mo. 

155)  954,  955 

Sheehy  v.  Kan.  City  Cable  Ry.  Co. 

(94  Mo.  674)  1224,1243 

Sheel  v.  Appleton  (49  Wis.  125)  1143, 

1287,  1297 
Sheff  v.  Huntington  (10  W.  Va.  807) 

1253,  1298 
Sheffield  v.  Watson  (3  Caines,  69)        323 


Page 

Sheffield  Sc!i.  Tp.fl.  Andreas  (56  [nd. 

13,  185,  664 
Shelby   Co.  Com'rs  v.  Deprez  (87 

Ind.  609)  M-l 

Shelby  Co.  Ct.  v.  Cumb.  &  C.  "R.  Co. 

(8  Bush,  209)    121,623,627,  1012 
v.  Shell, v  K.  Co.  (5  Bush,  225)      130, 

Sheldon   v.   Centre    Sch.   Hist.    (25 

Conn.  224)  151,1121 

v.  Kalamazoo  (24  Mich.  383)        1188, 

1195 
Sheley  v.  Detroit  ( 15  Mich.  431)  914,  959 
Shelley   v.  St.  Charles   County    (17 

Fed.  R.  909)  580 

w.  St.  Charles  County  (30  Fed. 

R.  603)  1027 

Shellhonse  v.  State  (110  Ind.  509)        751 
Shelton  v.  Mobile  (30  Ala.  540)    459,402, 

487,  810 
Shenandoah   Val.   R.    Co.  v.  Clarke 

County  (78  Va.  269)  1107 

Shepardson  v.  Colerain  (13  Met.  55)   1256, 

1205,  I -lit) 
Shepherd  v.  Chelsea  (4  Allen,  113)      1263 
v.  Municipality  (6  Rob.  La.  349)    177 
Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  County  (21  Cal. 

113)  1172, 1173,  1174,  1200 

Sherburne   Par.   v.  Fiske  (8   Cush. 

264)  320 

Sheridan  v.  Colvin  (78  111.  237)    152,  286. 

387,  1095 

v.  Fitchburg  (131  Mass.  523)  991 

v.  Salem  (14  Or.  328)  1246 

Sherlock  v.  Bainbridge  (41  Ind.  35)     170, 

172 
v.  Winnetka  (59  111.  389)    1101,  1111, 

1118 

v.  Winnetka  (68  111.  530)        570,  927 

Sherman  v.  Carr  (SKI.  431)      220,  1111 

v.  Granada  (51  .Miss.  18:5)    1159,  1187 

v.  Kane  (80  N.  Y.  57)  754 

v.  Kortrisht  (52  Barb.  267)  1270 

r.  McKeon  (38  N.  Y.  260)      747.  77  1, 

790,  791 

Sherman    County   v.    Simons    (109 

U.S.  735)  604,612 

Sherrard   v.    Lafayette    County    (3 

Dillon  C.  C.  236)  632 

Sherwin  v.  Bugbee  (16  Vt.  439)    139.  1  10, 

151,  348,  349 

v.  Bugbee  (17  Vt.  337)     347.  349,  ::77 

Sherwood     v.    Dist.     Columbia     (4 

Mackey,  276)  1297 

r.  Hamilton    (37   U.   C   Q.   B. 

11D)  1204,  1278,  1299 

Shillito  v.  Thompson  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B. 

112)  464 

Shinbone   v.  Randolph  County  (56 

Ala.  is:: )  1029 

Shinkle  v.  Covington  (1  Bush,  017)      179, 

401,  1098 
Shipley  v    Bait.  &  Pot.  R.  Co.  (34 

Md.  336)  733 


cxliv 


TAl'.LE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Shipley    ■.    Fifty    Associates   (101 

Mass   261)  1262 

v.  Fifty  A  ■  "'■  M    is. 

194)  1276,  1277,  1811 

Shipman  v.  State  i  18  Wis.  381)  680 

Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County    il   Dillon 
c.  C.  209)    194,662,  667,  61 
Shirley  v.  Lunenburg  ill  Mass,  379)    606 
Shoalwater  v.  Armstrong  (9  Humph. 

217)  '.'17 

Shoemaker  v.  Grant  Co.  Coru'rs  (36 

1ml.  175)  !l  18,  1152 

>■.  Goshen  (14  O.  St.  587)       640,  645 

Shook  v.  State  (6  fad.  1 13)  320 

Shoolbred  v.  Cliarleston  (2  Bay,  63)  lull 

Short  r.  New  Orleans  (  1  La.  An.  281)  560 

Shorter  v.  Rome  (52  Ga.  621)  594 

Shotwell  v.  .Mott  (2  Sand.  Ch.  46)        609 

Shrader,  ft  (33  Cal.  279)  142 

Shrevenort  v.  Jones  (26  La.  An.  708)  899 

v.  Levy  (26  La.  An.  671)  469 

v.  Rooa  (35  La.  An.  1010)  -152 

v.  Walpole  (22  La.  An.  526)  801 

Shrewsbury  v.  Brown  (25  Vt.  197)       533 

Shriver   /."Pittsburgh    (GO   Pa.   St. 

1 16) 
Shuey  v.  U.  S.  (92  U.  S.  73) 
Sibley  v.  Mobile  (3  Woods,  535) 
Sic,  lie  (73  Cal.  142)  437,  441 

Sides  v.  Portsmouth  (59  N.  II.  24) 
Sidway  v.  So.  Park  Com'rs  (120  111. 

196) 
Siebenhauer,  ft  (11  Nev.  365) 
Siebrecht   v.  New   Orleans  (12   La. 

An.  496) 
Sights  v.  Yarnalls  (12  Gratt.  292) 


Sikes  v.  Hatfield  (13  Gray,  347) 

v.  Ransom  (0  Johns.  279) 
Sill  v.  Corning  (15  N.  Y.  297) 


SiUiman  v.  Wing  (7  Hill,  159) 
Silsby   v.    Dunville    (31    U.  C.  C.  P. 

.301) 
Silver  v.  Tobin  (28  Fed.  R.  545) 
Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  North  (4  Johns. 

Ch.  373) 
Silverthorn   v.    Warren    R.  Co.    (33 
N.J.  L.  17:!) 
v.  Warren    R.   Co.   (33  N.  J.  L. 
372) 
Simar  v.  Canaday  (53  X.  Y.  298) 
Simmons  v.  Camden  (26  Ark.  ii 7 < 5 ) 
v.  Cornell  (1   P.  I.  519) 
v.  Gardner  (G  R.  I.  255) 
v.  Mumford  (2  R.  I.  172) 
v.  Nahant  (3  Allen,  316) 
V.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  8) 

v.  Stale  (12  Mo.  268) 
Simon  v.  Atlanta  (67  Ga.  618) 
Simplot  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry. 
Co.  (10  Fed.  R.  350) 
v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St    P.  Ry.  Co. 
(5  McCrary  C.  C.  158) 


970 

208 

225 

,505 

1314 

315 
142 

512 
944, 
1013 
112,  .727 
1004 
106, 
507 
1148 


209, 


799 

LSI 


970 


519 
L65 

531 

1070 

1007 
695 
1224 

mi:; 
,985 

712 

272 
1226 
,  971 

784 

804 
841 


Page 
Simplot  v.  Dubuque  (49  Iowa.  030) 

6  >9,  798,  804 
Simps  »n,  Ex  p.  (17  Cal.  127)  71 

v.  Savage  i  1  Mo.  359)  1 12 

v.    Westm.    Pal.    Hotel  Co.   (8 

II.  L.  ('.  712)  671 

Sims  v.  Butler  County  ( 19  Ala.  110)   1246 

v.  Chattanooga  (1  Lea,  694)  798,  799, 

Mil,   MIL'.   Mil 

v.   Estates   Co.   (14  L.  T.  n.  i 

55) 
v.  Frankfort  (79   fad     146) 
Sinclair  v.  Baltimore  (69  Md.  592) 


Singleton  v.  Pastern  Comities  P.  Co. 

(7  C.B.  n.  s.  2-7, 
Sinking  Fund  Cases  (99  U.  S.  700) 


22 1 
804 

1258 


1204 

1 1  ■>. 
117 


Sinton  v.  Ashbury  (41  Cal.  525)  122,  130, 
131,  700,  777,  781,  mis,  911,  921, 
1011 
v.  Carter  County  (23  Fed.  R. 

535)  93 

Sioux  City  v.  S.  C.  Indep.  Sch.  Dist. 

(55  Iowa,  150)  912 

v.  Weate  (59  Iowa,  95)  193 

Sioux  Citv  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout  (17 

Wall.  657)  1299 

ads.  Stout  (2  Dillon  C.  C.  294) 
v.   Washington  County  (3  Neb. 

30)  146, 728 

Sisson  v.  New  Bedford   (137  Mass. 

255)  1127 

Sixth  Av.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr  (72  N.  Y. 

330)  690,863 

v.  Kerr  (45  Barb.  63)  847 

Skeen  v.  Lynch  (1  Rob.  (Va.)  186)      743, 

755 
Skellinger  v.  Yendes  (12  Wend.  306)  299 
Skerritt's  Case  (2  Pars.  (Pa.)  516)  281 
Skinkle  V.  Covington  (1  Push,  017)  1205 
Skinner  v.  Hartford  Br.  Co.  (29  Conn. 

523)  1224 

Skinners'  Co.   v.  Irish  Soc.   (12  CI. 

&  F.  487)  1100 

Skinner's  Ex.  v.  Ilutton  (33  Mo.  244)  807, 

938 
Slack  v.  East  St.  Louis  (85  111.  377)     1223 
r.  Maysville  &  L.  R.  Co.  (13  B. 

Mon.  I)  151,  208,  225,  898 

Slater  v.  Wood  (9  Bosw.  15)  292 

Slat  ten  v.  Des  Moines  Val.  P.  Co.  (29 

Iowa,  1  1^)         846,  Ms,  856,  863 
Slattery,  R  (3  Ark.  484)  492,505 

Slaughter    v.    Commonwealth    (13 

Gratt.  767)  423,  905,  909 

v.  People  (2  Doug.  (Mich.  334)      440, 

497,  500 

Slaughter  House  Cases  (10  Wall.  36)  107, 

827 
Slee  v.  Bloom  (5  Johns.  Ch.  366)  303,  304 
Sleeper  v.  Bullen  (0  Kan.  300)      555,  550, 

1122,  1124 
v.  Sandown  (52  N.  U.  244)  1265,  1285 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxlv 


Page 
Slessman  v.  Crozier  (80  Ind.  487)  411,  41G 
Sloan  v.  Beebe  (24  Kan.  343)  992 

Sloane  v.  MeConahy  |  I  Ohio,  157)  668 
v.  State  (8  Blackford,  301)  94,140 
Slusser  v.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  378)  992 
Small  v.  Danville  (51  Me.  359)  108,  1195 
Suialley  v.  Appleton  (70  Wis.  340)    1272, 

1305 
v.  Blackburn  Ry.  Co.  (2  II.  &  N. 

158)  718 

v.  Yates  (30  Kan.  519)         1000,  1007 
Smead  v.  Indianapolis  1*.  &C.  R-  Co. 

(11  Ind.  104)  529,548 

Smelson  v.  State  ( 10  Ind.  29)  940 

Smeltzer  r.  White  (92  U.  S.  390)  271 

Smith,  Re  (52  N.  Y.  526)  388,  959 

lie  (Hemp.  201)  437 

v.  Aberdeen  (25  Miss.  458)     722,  898, 

899,  920 

v.  Adrian  (1  Mich.  495)  269 

v.  Albany  (01  N.  Y.  444)         3G0,  51G 

v.  Alexandria  (33  Gratt.  208)        1218 

v.  Appleton  (19  Wis.  408)       120,  251 

v.  Atlanta,  (75  Ga.  110)  1327 

v.  Bangs  (15  111.  399)  1092 

v.  Barrett  (1  Sid.  102)  671 

v,  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co  (120  Mass. 

490) 
v.  Bourbon  County   (127   U.  S. 

105)  1005,  1006,  1012,  1044 

p.  Cheshire  (13  Gray,  318)      151,  562 
v.  Cincinnati  (4  Ohio,  514)  1226 

v.  Clark  County  (54  Mo.  58)  594,031, 
033,  651 
v.   Commonwealth   (41   Pa. 

335) 
v.  Cronkhite  (8  Ind.  134) 
v.  Cumberland  Co.  Com'rs 

Me.  395) 
v.  Dedham  (8  Cush.  522) 
v.  Donelly  (06  111.  464) 
v.  Duncan  (77  Ind.  92) 
v.  Eaton  Co.  Sup.  (56  Mich.  21 


1287 


St 

312,  313 

297 


(42 


374 

1252 
295 

981 
[)  1021 


388 


v.  Emporia  (27  Kan.  528) 

v.  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Tecumseh 

(17  Mich.  479) 
v.  Fletcher  (3  Eng.  305) 
v.  Flora  (04  111.  93) 
v.  Fond  du  Lac  (8  Fed.  R  289) 
v.  Gardner  (12  Or.  221) 
v  Gates  (21  Pick.  55) 
v.  Gould  (61  Wis.  31) 
v.  Heath  (102  111.  130) 
v.  Helmer  (7  Barb.  416) 
v.  Heuston  (0  Ohio,  101)  763,  767,  787 
v.  Huntington  (3  N.  H.  76)  223 

v.  Hutchinson  (8  Rich.  L  260)  1150 
v.  Inge  (80  Ala.  283)  105,  754,  755 
v.  Janesville  (52  Wis.  680) 
v.  Kernochen  (7  How  10S) 
v.  Kinard  (2  Hill  (S.  C.)  642) 
v  Knoxville  (3  Head,  245) 
v.  Law  (21  N.  Y.  296)  194,  363,  364 
v  Leavenworth  (15  Kan.  81)        1310 


940 

1323 

744 

226 

754 

222 

1327 

750 

84 


138 

111 
763 
397 


Page 
Smith  v.  Lock  (18  Mich.  56)  768 

v.  Lowell  (6  Allen,  39)  1300 

v.  Madison  (7  Ind.  Hi)  119,  425,  450 
v.  Magourich  (  II  Ga.  L63)  1112 

v.  Marston  (5  Tex.  \^>)  902 

v.  McCarthy  (50  Pa.  St.  359)     77,  78, 
267,  282,  387,  1077 
r.  Metropolitan  Gas  Co.  ( 12  How. 

l'r.  187)  822 

r.  Milwaukee  (IS  Wis.  03)     550,  945, 
I21t8,  1323 
v.  Moore  (1  C.  B.  438)  209 

v.  Morse  (2  Cal.  524)      119,  130,  155, 
157,  L99 
v  Nashville  (4  Lea  69) 
i'.  Natchez  S.  Co.  ( 1  How.  (Miss.) 

479)  303 

r.  Newark  (?,'!  N.  J. Eq.  1)  L093 

v.  Newberu  (7(i  X.  ('.  ID  11"».  156 
v.  Newburgh  (77  N.  Y.  130)  140,  520 
v.  New  Orleans  (23  La.  An.  5)  563 
w.New  York  (21  How.  (X.  V.) 

Pr.  1)  543 

v.  New  York  (ION.  Y.  504)  017 

v.  New  York  (37  N.  Y.  518)  283,  311, 

315 

v.  New  York  [66  N.  Y.  295)    1206, 

1297, 1317,  1318, 1319,  1320,  1332, 

1333 

v.  Oconomowoc  (49  Wis.  094) 

v.  Philadelphia  (81  Pa.  St.  38) 


1092 
829, 
1162 


.  Philadelphia  County  (2  Pars. 

203)  313 

.  Portland  (30  Fed.  R.  734)   757,  759 

.  Readfield  (27  Me.  145)  1150 

.  Rochester  (76  N.  Y  506)  1163, 

1183,  1184,  1186,  1198 

,  Rome  (19  Ga.  89)  816,  819 

Sac  County  (11  Wall.  139)         040 

.  Sacramento  (13  Cal.  531)  553 

San  Antonio  (17  Tex.  643)         506 

Sheely  (12  Wall.  35)  670 

Sherwood  Tp.  (02  Mich.  150)  1203 

Smith  (3  Desaus.    557)       242.  329 

Smith  (1  Bailey,  70)  316 

Smith  (2  Pick.  021)  1264 

St.  Joseph  (45  Mo.  440)  1281.  1283, 

1285 

State  (10  Conn.  493)  305 

State  (23  N.  J.  L.  712)        752,  754, 

700,  782.  784,8 
Stephan  (66  Md.  381)  321,  512 

.  Tallassee,  &c,  PI.  R.  Co.  (30 

Ala.  650)  258 

Tecumseh  Nat.  Bank  (17  Mich. 

179)  1146 

Tripp  (13  R.I.  152)     1222,  13 is, 

1321 

Turner  (7  How.  (U.  S  )  283)      902 

Warden  (19  Pa   St  426)  604 

Washington  Corp.  (20  How. 

135)     814,  816,  1218,  1220,  122-'-. 

1233 


VOL,  I. 


J 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Smith  v.  Waterbury  (54  Conn.  L74)     81 1 

v,  Wendell  (7  Cush    la8)    1256,  1265, 

L286,  1269,  1270,  1278 

v.  Whitney  (116  U.  S.  167)  1132 

v.  Wildes  (143  Mass.  L265 

v.  Wilmington  (98  N.  C.  343)         64  I 

v.  Wingate  (61  Tex.  54)  300 

Smith'.-  Case  (4  Mod.  53;  12  Mod. 

17;  Skin.311;  1  Show.  278)  242, 

2A  t 

Smith's  Case (8  Howell,  St.  Tr.  1342)   2*7 

si  tool  -'    Hart  (33  Ala.  69)  162 

,-.  Wetumpka  (21  Ala.  112)   138,  881, 

882,  1281 

Smyth  v.  Bangor  (72  Me.  249)  1261 

v.  Darlev  (2  II.  I.   C  789)        345,  363 

Snell,  Re   (30  U.  C  Q.   13.   81 


111,  161, 
164 


/;,  (58  Vt.  207)  15" 

v.  Belleville  Ins.  Co.  (98  U.  S. 

85)  1153 

v.  Leonard  (55  Iowa,  553  226 

Snelson  v.  State  (If.  [nd.  20)  1 153 

Snook  v.  Brantford  (14  U.  C.  Q  B. 

255)  1322 

Snow  v.  Adams  (1  Cush.  443)  1209 

v.  Fitchburg  (130   Mass.    170)      987, 

1127 


v.   Iloiisatonic  It.  Co.  (8  Allen, 

111)  1300 

v.  Provincetown  (109  Mass.  123) 

1219 
Snyder  v.  Lawrence  (8  Kan.  82)  428 

<-.  llockport   (6   Ind.  237)      174,850, 
1215,  1221,  1229 
Society  for  Prop.  Gospel,  &c.  v.  Paw- 
let  ( 1  Pet  480)  76,  140 
r.  Young  <;+  N.  II.  310)  258 
Society  for  Savings  v.  New  London 

(2'.i  Conn.    174)        225,  602,  618, 
633,  G45,  649 
Society  for  Visitation,  &c.  r.  Com- 
monwealth (52  Pa.  St.  125)    335, 
336,  339 

Society,  &c.  (46  Cal.  415).    LSee 

Savings  &  Loan,  &C.] 
(3    Mich.    172).       [Sec    Detroit 

Young  Men's,  &C-1 
(44  Miss.  820).     [See  Miss.  Soc. 

of  Arts,  &c] 
(2  Whart.  309).     [See  Black  & 
White  Smiths,  &C.1 

Solberg  v.  Decorah  (  II  Iowa,  501)  798 
Solomon  City   >■.  Hughes  (21    Kan. 

211)  188,367 

Somerset  To.  v.  Parson  ( 105  Pa.  St. 

360)  361 

Somerville  v.  Dickerman  (127  Mass. 

272)  146,728 

v.  O'Neil  (114  Mass.  353)  781 

Somerville  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Doughty 

(22  N.J.  L.  196]  731,  731 

Sonoma  Co.  Bank  r.  Fairbanks  (52 

Cal.  196)  122 


Page 
Sonova  Highway  Com'rs  v.  Carthage 

Sup.   (27  111.  1»<I)  112''. 

Soon   1 1 1 1 1  ur  '■■   Crowley   (113   U.   S. 

7ii3)  211,897 

Soper   v.    Henry   County    (26   [owa, 

264)  '  43,  1109,  1215,  1281,  1282 
Sorensen  v.  Greeley  (10  Col.  369)  856 
Sorocco  v.  Geary  (3  Cal  69)  1164 

Soulard  o.  St.  Louis  (36  Mo  546)       11*7, 

1188 
Soule  v.  Grand   Trunk   Rv.  Co.  (21 

U.  C.  C  1'.  30S)  "  127(1 

r.  New    York   K.  Co.   (24  Conn. 

675)  ^    1288 

Southampton  v.  Graves  (8  D.  &  E. 

T.  R.  502)  379 

South  Bay  Mill  Dam  Co.  v.  Gray  (30 

Me  547)  303 

South    Bend  v.  Notre   Dame  Univ. 

(69  Ind.  344)  052 

v.  Paxon  (65  Ind.  228)  '  1331 

South    Boston    Iron   Co.    v.   United 

States  (118  U.  S.  37)  551 

South  Brooklyn  R.  &  T.  Co.,  Re  (50 

Hun,  405)  872 

South  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Steiner  (44 

Ga.  546)  ,-:;),  sll 

Southern  Bank,  Rel.,  &c.  (105  U  S. 
278).  [See  Louisiana  r.  Pils- 
bury,  &c] 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Mobile  (49 

Ala.  404)  905 

Southern   Minn.  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman 

I'M  U.  S.  181)  92 

Southern    Pac.    R.   Co.   v.  Peed  (41 

Cal.  256)    841,842,  814,  Mil,  853, 

864,  K64 

v.  Wilson  (49  Cal.  256)  396,  707 

Southern  PI.  R.  Co.,  Re  (5  Ind.  165)    338 

Southern    Steamship    Co.   u.    Port 

Wardens  (6  Wall.  31)  166 

Southgate  v.  Covington  (15  B.  Mon. 

491)  972 

Southhampton,   &c.     Br.    Co.   ?•.   S. 

Local  Bd.  (8  El   &  151.  812)    1156 
[See  also  South  Hampton, &c] 
i  Hampton  v.  Fowler  (52  N.  H. 

225)  272 

Southington    First  Cong.  Soc.  r.  At- 

w  ater  (2-".  Conn.  31 )  068 

South  New  Market  Methodist  Semi- 
nary v.  Peaslce  (15  N.  H. 
317')  258,669 

Southold    Prop.   v.  Ilorton   (6  Hill, 

601)  77,139 

South  Ottawa  v.  Foster  (20  111.  296)     1216 
r.  Perkins  (04   U.  S.  360)  631 

South  Park  Com'rs  v.  Dunlevy  (91 

111.49)  569 

v.  Williams  (51  III   57)  698 

South  School  Dist.  v.  Blakeslee  (13 

Conn.  227)  260,348,380 

Southwark  Com'rs  v.  Neil  (3  Yeates, 

54)  177 


South 


TAI1LE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxlvii 


Page 
Southwark   R.   Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

(47  Pa.  St.  314)  776 

Southworth  v.  Palmyra  &  J.  R.  Co. 

(2  Midi.  287)  84 

South  Yorkshire  Ry.  Co.  v.  Great 
Northern  Ry.  Co.  (9  Exch. 
55)  274 

Soutter  v.  Madison  (15  Wis.  30)  lis.  260, 
1028,  1029,  1032,  1051.',  Km;;,  1069, 
1073,  1074 
Sower  v.  Philadelphia  (35  Pa.  St. 

231)  384,  710,  716,  718 

Spangler  v.  Jacoby  (14  III.  297)  368 

Spann  v.  Webster  County   (64  Ga. 

498)  203 

Sparhawk  v.  Salem   (1  Allen,  30)      1256, 

L258,  1265,  1267 

Sparr  v.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App.  572)    120'.) 

Spaulding  v.  Andover  (54  N.  II.  38)     104, 

108 

v.  Lowell  (23  Pick.  71)      48,  53,  54, 

147,  150,  151,  153,  456,  529 

Speaker  v.  Glass  (3  P.  C.  App.  560)       332 

Spear  v.  Robinson  (29  Me.  531)     279,  349 

Specht  v.  Commonwealth  (8  Pa.  St. 

312)  468 

v.  Detroit  (20  Mich.  168)  707,  709 
Speed  v.  Crawford  (3  Met.  (Ky.)  207)  100 
Speer  v.  Blairaville  Bor.   Sch.  Dir. 

(50  Pa.  St.  150)  229,  972 

Spelman  v.  Portage  (41  Wis.  144)       1204 

Spencer  v.  Merchant  (100  N.  Y.  585)    983 

v.  Merchant  (125  U.  S.  345)   923,  983 

v.  Nemaha  Sen.  Dist.  (15  Kan. 

259)  1116 

v.  People  (68  111.  510)  906 

v.  Pt.    Pleasant   &  O.  R.  Co.  (23 

W.  Va.  406)  1235,  1245 

Spengler  v.  Trowbridge  (62  Miss.  46)  146, 

149 
Sperry  v.  Ilorr  (32  Iowa,  184)  224 

Spiceland  r.  Aller  (98  Ind.  467)  1296 

Spiegel  v.  Gansberg   (44  Ind.  418)      794, 

796 
Spiritual  Atheneum   Soc.  of  W.  R. 

v.  Randolph  (58  Vt.  192)      1005, 

1032 

Spitler  v.  Young  (63  Mo.  42)  419,  422 

Spokes  v.  Banbury  (L.  R.  1  Eq.  42)      452 

Spooner  v.  Holmes  (102  Mass.  503)       650 

Sprague  v.  Coenen  (30  Wis   309)         1000 

r.  Xorwav  (31  Cal.  173)  281 

v.  Tripp  (13  R.  I.  38)  1189 

v.  Worcester  (13  Gray,  193)      1215, 

1317,  1334 

Spray  v.  Thompson  (9  Iowa,  40)  715,  716 

Springer  v.  Bowdoinham  (7  Me.  112)  1269, 

1302 
».  Clay  County  (35  Iowa,  243)        274 
Springfield  v.  Conn.  River  B.  Co.  (4 

Cush.  63)  696,  833,  850,  869 

v.  Doyle  (76  111.  202)  1297 

v.Edwards  (84   111.   620)      197,  204, 

1112,  1113 


Springfield  v.  Green  (120  111.  209) 


Page 

91  1, 
915 


r  Hampden   County  (10  Pick. 

59)  1063 

v.  Harris  (107  Mass.  532)         523,  532 
v.  Le  Claire  (49  111.  476)      1297,  1302, 
1303,  L306,  L307 
v.  Schmook  (68  Mo.  394)  7:::; 

r.  Spence  (40  O.  St.  I  1320 

Springfield   Ry.   Co.    v.    Springfield 

(85  Mo.  674)  1096 

Spring   Val.    W.  W.  v.  Bartlett   (16 

led.  B.  615)  1098 

v.  San   Mateo  W.  W.  (64  Cal. 

123)  697 

v.  Sdiottler  (110  U.  S.  317)  1098 

Spring  Wells  v.  Wayne  County  (58 

Mich.  240) "  272 

Sprowl  v.  Laurence  (33  Ala.  674)  297 

Squires  v.  Chillicothe  (89  Mo.  226)     1297 
Staats   v.   Washington   (44  N.  J.  L. 

605)  470 

v.  Washington  (45  N.  J.  L.  318)    470. 

487 

Stack  w.  East  St.  Louis  (85  III.  377)    777, 

1221,  1241,  1316,  1317,  1321 

v.  Portsmouth  (52  N.  H.  221)      1257, 

1272,  1297 

Stackpole  v.  Healy  (16  Mass.  33)  817 

Stadler  »;.  Detroit  (13  Mich.  346)  291,  317, 

334,  337 

Stafford,  Re  (1  O'M.  &  H.  234)  281 

v.  Albany  (7  Johns.  541)  714 

v.  Hamston  (2  B.  &  B.  691)  920 

v.  Oskaloosa   (57  Iowa,  748;  64 

lb.  251)  1266,  1279 

v.  Providence  (10  R.  I.  567)    730,  731 
Staffordshire  &  W.  C.  Nav.  Prop.  v. 
Birmingham  Co.  Nav.  Prop. 
L.  R.  (1  E.  &  I.  App.  254)       800 
Stainton    v.    Metrop.    B.    of  W.  (23 

Beav.  225;  3  Jur.  n.  s.  257)  1328 
Staley  v.  Columbus  (30  Midi.  38)  995 
Stanchfield    v.    Newton    (142  Mass. 

110)  1317,  1319 

Standiford,  Re  (5  Mackey,  549)  408 

Standley  v.  Perry  (23  (.rant,  507)         518 
Stange  v.  Hill  &  W.  D.  St.  By.  Co. 

(54  Iowa,  069)  852,  1185,  1271 
Stanil3Dd  v.   Hopkins  (9  M.  &  W. 

178)  307, 309 

Stanley  v.  Colt  (5  Wall.  119)  637 

v.  Davenport  (54  Iowa,  403)  860,  868, 

1162,  1185,  1209,  1271 

Stanton  v.  Camp  (4  Barb.  274)  524 

V.  Salem  (115  Mass.   17<;>  1297 

v.  Springfield  (12  Allen,  566)       1251, 

L260,  1201,  1302 

Staple  v.  Spring  (10  Mass.  72)  73-"> 

Staples  v.  Canton  (69  Mo   592)  1259,  1281 

Starin  r.  Edson  (112  N.  V.  206)  1111 

v.  Genoa  (23  N.  Y.  439)  225,  220.  235, 

238,  584,  615,  0  b:.  644 

Stark  v.  Lancaster  (57  N.  H.  88)  1267 


cxlviii 


l  \i;u:   OF   CASES  CITED. 


Page 

Starke;   v.   Minneapolis  (19  Minn. 

203)  561 

Starr  v.  Burlington  (45  Iowa,  87)         386, 

946,  984 
mden   &   Atl.   R.   Co.   (24 
N.  J.  L.  I  811,  869 

v.  Rochester  (6  Wend.  564)  509,  1186 
State   17.   Adams   Co.    Road   Cmnrs 

(Walk.  (Miss  )  368)         322,  323 
v.  Addington  (77  Mo.  L10)  21] 

r.  Addison  (2  s.  c.  199)  954 

,-.  Allen  (21  In. I.  516)  308 

/■.  Ambs  (20  .Mo.  214)  468 

v.  Ames  (ill  Minn.  140)  mi  I 

v.  Ancker  (2  Rich.  L.  245)  307,  310 
u.  Anderson  (is  Atl.  R.  584)  1016 
v.  Anderson  (45  <>.  St.  1961  1070 

/-.  Armstrong  (3  Sneed,  634)  72 

v.  Atkinson  (24  Vt.  448)       602,  765, 

782 

v.  Atlantic  C.  Council  (34  N.  J. 

L.  99)  155,409,  709,847,921 

v.  Auditor  (34  Mo.  &c.     [See  v. 

State  Auditor,  &c] 
v.  Axtell  (  II  N.  J.  L.  117)  953 

v.  Babcock  (19  Neb.  230)  572,  57'.) 
17.  Babcock  (22  Neb.  614)  183,  186 
17.  Bacon  (6  Neb.  286)  1027 

V.  Bailey,  Chickasaw  Co.  Judge 

(7  Iowa,  390)      1005,  1021,  1056, 
1058,  1063 
v.  Baltimore  &   O.   R.   Co.    (12 

Gill&J.  399J  98 

v.  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  (3  How. 

(U.S.)  534)  420,677 

p.  Bank  of   Smyrna  (2   Iloust. 

(Del.)  99)    '  952 

v.  Barbour  (53  Conn.  70)  291 

v.  Barksdale  (5  Humph.  151)  1134 
».  Barlow  |  is  Mo.  17)  548,  1015 

v.  Bartlett  (35  Wis   387)  1304 

w.  Bayonne  (35  N.  J.  L.  385)         38 1, 
385,  985 
i7.  Bean  (91  X.  C.  551)  124 

17.  Bechell  (22  Neb.  158)  240 

17.  Hell  (34  <>.  st    194)  151,  155 

'■.  Beloit  Sup.  (20  Wis.  79)  071,  H>2'.», 

1032 
p.  Bennett  (19  Neb.  191)  910 

v.  Bergen  (29  X.  J.  L  266)  914 

v.  Bergen  (■'>■;  X.  .1.  L.  39)  385,  388 
-    Bergen  (34  X.  .1.  I..  139)  138 

v.  Bill  (18  [red.  L.  878)  176,  1125, 

1126,  1180,  1131 
v.  Binder  (38  Mo.  450)      7'.),  11 1,  356, 

395 
277 
162 

'.HID 


>•.  Blanchard  (0  La.  An.  515) 
u.  Blaeer  (36  La.  An.  863) 
v   Blundell  12  I  N.  J.  L.  402) 
i'.  Board  A.  Council  ( is  Atl.  R. 

571) 
v.  Board  of  Cotn'r-  of  A.  County. 

[Sec  17.  A.  County  Com'rs, 

&C.] 


1024 


State  i7.  Board  of  Education,  &c.  (24 
Wis.  &C.).     [See  v.  Fond  du 
Lac,  &c.  I 
v.  Board   of   Equalization,  &c. 
(10    Iowa,    &c).       [S 
JoIiiimhi  ( !o.,  o.  C.] 

t7.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  A. 

County.       [See   17.    A.    Co. 

Sup.  &c] 
v.  Bollinger  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  (48  .Mo. 

17.  Bonnell  (21  X.  E.  R.  1101) 
/■.  Bonner   (Busbee  (X.  C.)  L. 

257) 
Boone  Co.  Ct.  (50  Mo.  317) 


■Page 


1030 

117 

1016 

84 


B.scawen  (82  X.  II    331)  882,  1134 


Botkin  (71  Iowa,  S7) 
Bradbury  (40  .Me.  154) 

Bradford  (32  Vt.  50) 
Branin  (23  X.  J.  L.  485) 


152 

751,  7I1D, 

762 

10S8 

94,  113, 

947 

636,  (150 

'.'12 
411 
397,  435 
057 
1082 


•.  P.rassficld  (07  Mo.  331) 
1.  Brewer  (01  Ala.  287) 
•.  Bright  (8s  La.  An.  1) 
■  Brittain  (89  X.  C  674) 
-.  Brown  (27  X.  J.  L.  18) 
7.  Brown  (81  X.  J.  I..  3 
7.  Brvce  (7  Ohio,  414)  329,  330,  337, 
338,  839,  1078 
-.  Bryson  (14  0.  St.  457)  334 

•.  Buffalo  (2  11111,481)  21)2,  475,  530, 

532 
7.  Buffalo  Co.  Com'rs  (6  Neb. 

151)  1028 

7.  Burbank  (22  La.  An.  318)       1028, 

1037,  1061 

7.  Burlington  (45  Iowa.  87)  980 

;.  Burlington  (30  Vt.  521)  322,  1185, 

1252 
7.  Burnett  (2  Ala.  140)  1090 

;.  Butler  (11  Lea,  418)  1154 

•.  Butt/  (1)  S.  C.  151',)  308 

-.  Cadwalader  (36  X.  J.  L.  283)     449 
-.  Cahaba  T.  Council  (80  Ala. 

Oi: )  1084 

7.  Cainan  (94  N.  C.  803)        412,  476, 

182 
j.  Camden  (35  N.  J.  L.  217)  1<>70 

•.  Campton  (2  X.  11.  513)  882 

>.  Canterbury  (28  N.  H.  195)  77,263, 

SS2 
;.  Canticny  (84  Minn  1)  414,  487 
,\  Carbondale  Indep.  Sch.  Dist. 

(29  Iowa,  20  1)  lnsi 

•  Carroll  (12  Am.  L.  Reg.  165)  1080 
>.  (  arroll  (38  Conn.  449)        319,  856, 

li  ISO 
>.  Carver  (5  Strob.  217)  760,  762 

>.  Cassidv  (22  Minn.  312)      425,  908, 

',12 
!7.  Catlin  (3  Vt.  530)       743,  7  11,  752, 

70,8, 
j.  Cavanac  (80  La.  An.  287)         1014 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED 


cxlix 


Page 
State  v.  Central  Pac.  "R.  Co.  (9  Neb. 

79;  li>  Neb.  47)  902,962 

v.  Chamberlain  (37  N.  J.  L.  -".1)     987 

v.  Chamberlain  (37  N.  J.  L.  388)  488, 

990 
v.  Chamber   of  Commerce  (20 
Wis.  &e.).     [See  i\  Milwau- 
kee, &c] 
v.  Charles  (16  Minn.  471)  440 

v.  Charleston  (1  Mill  S.  C.  Const 

36)  949,  1075,  1084 

v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (4  Rich. 

L.  286)  166 

v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (5  Rich. 

L.  561)  '.U0,968 

v.  Charleston    C.    Council     (10 

Rich.  L.  240)  904,  949 

v.  Charleston     C.    Council     (12 

Rich.  L.  702)  722 

v.  Charleston    C.    Council     (14 

Rich.  L.  480)  492 

v.  Charleston     C.     Council      (2 

Speers  L.  623;  719)  949,  969,  970 
v.  Charleston     C.     Council     (4 

Strob.  L.  217)  949 

v.  Chase,  Gov.  (5  0.  St.  528)        1016 
v.  Chillicothe  C.  Clerk  (7  O.  St. 

355)  391 

v.  Choate  (11  Ohio,  511)  1078 

v.  Christ  Ch.  Par.  Com'rs  (1  Mill 

S.  C.  Const.  55)  1075,  1132 

v.  Cincinnati  (19  Ohio,  178)  1009 

v.  Cincinnati  (20  O  St.  18)        82,  83 
v.  Cincinnati  Gas  &  C.  Co.  (18 

O.  St.  262)  95,  157,  391,  782,  797, 

822,  823, 826,1075, 1083, 1088,1089 

v.  Clark  (28  N.  H.  176)  385,  393,433, 

470 
v.  Clarke  (54  Mo.  17)      144,  145,  405, 

452 
v.  Clarke  (25  N.  J.  L.  54)       143,  144, 

437 
v.  Clay  County  (46  Mo.  231)     1030, 

1031 
v.  Clay  Co.  Sch.  Dist.  (8  Neb. 

98)  1059 

v.  Cleaveland  (3  R.  I.  117)  412 

v.  Clegg  (27  Conn.  593)  507 

v.  Clinton  Co.  Com'rs  (6  O.  St. 

280)  225,  1037,  1038 

v.  Clunet  (19  Md.  351)  714 

v.Cockrell  (2  Rich.  L.6)  288,714,716, 
1 130,  1132 
v.  Coffee  (59  Mo.  59)  1082 

v.  Collins  (34  Kan.  434)  905 

V.Columbia  (6  S.  C.  1)  424 

v.  Columbia  (12  S.  C.  370)  651 

v.  Columbia  (10  S.  C.  412)  11:::! 

v.  Columbia  (27  S.  C.  137)      254,  964 
v.  Commissioners  of  Printing  (18 

O.  St.  386)  1015 

t>.  Commissioners  of  A.  County, 
&c.  [See  v.  A.  Co.  Com'rs, 
&c.J 


Page 
State  v.  Common   Council,  City,  &c. 
[See  v.  CharlstOD   v.  Water- 
town,  &c.l 
v.  Conlin  (27  Vt.  318)  500 

v.  Cooke  (24  Minn.  247)  78,  117 

v.  Copeland  (3  R.  1.  33) 
v  Comville  I  13  .Mr.  427)  L258 

v.  County  Ct.  Jus.,  &c.  [See  v. 
Boone,  &c,  v.  Davis,  &c,  '-'. 
Floyd,  &c,  v.  Johnson,  &c, 
Marshall,  &c,  v.  Nodaway, 
&c] 
v.  Cowen  (29  Mo.  330)    437,  439,  468, 

170 
v.  Crawford  (36  N.  J.  L.  394)  944,945 
v.  Crenshaw  (94  X.  C.  877)  412 

v.  Crowell,  (4  Halst.  390)  1075 

v.  Crumme.v  (17  Minn.  i2)  139 

v.  Curran  (12  Ark.  321)  77 

v.  Custer  (11  Ind.  210)  1005,  1006,1008 
v.  Cymis  (26  O.  St.  400)  426 

v.  Davenport  (12  Iowa,  335)        1029, 
1031,  L037,  I     ! 
v.  Davey  (39  La.  An.  992)  1126 

v.  Davis    Co.   Judge    (2    Iowa, 

280)  88,  1058 

v.Dawson  (3  Hill  (S.  C.)  100)       692 
v.  Dean  (23  N.  J.  L.  335)  lis 

v.  De  Bar  (58  Mo.  395)  144,  4."j2 

v.  Debnam  (98  N.  C.  712)  476 

v.  De  Casinova's  Adm.  (1  Tex. 

401)  279 

v.  De  Gress  (53  Tex.  387)  1076 

v.  Delesdenier  (7  Tex.  76)  55 

v.  Deliesseline  (1  McCord,  52)       288, 
343,  359,  1023,  1076 
v.  Denny  [Holt,  Rel.]   (118  Ind. 

449)  899 

v.  Denny   [Jameson,  Rel.]    (118 

Ind.  382)  899 

v.  Denny,  Mayor  (21  N.  E.  R. 

252,  274),       73,  81,  100,  101,  103 
v.  Dews  (R.  M.  Charlt.  397)  102 

v.  Digby  (5  Blackf.  543)  7:;:'. 

r.  Dike  (20  Minn.  303)  1016 

v.  Dir.  &  W.  of  Penit.  (5  O.  St. 

234)  547 

v.  Dodsce   Co.    Com'rs    (8   Neb. 

129)  906,  920 

v.  Doherty  (25  La.  An.  119)  334 

v.  Donahay  (30  N.  J.  L.  404)         347, 

1129 
v.  Douglass  (50  Mo.  593)  1080 

v.  Douglass  (33  N.  J.  L.  363)  1  1 1 

v.  Douglass  (26  Wis  428)  310 

v.  Dousman  (28  Wis.  541)  80 

v.  Dowling  (50  Mo.  134)       968,  1112, 

1120 
v.  Dubuclet  (24  La.  An.  16)         1010, 

1061 
v.  Dunn  (1  Minor  (Ala.)  46)  102:! 

v.  Dunnington  (12  Md.  340)    324,  325 
v.  Duval   Co.   Com'rs    (23  Fla. 

483)  88 


cl 


TA1JLE    OK    «  ASKS    CITED. 


P  ige 
State  v.  East  Orange  (11  N.J.  L.  127)  U  0 
v.  Bberly  (12  Neb.  616)  161 

v.  Bdens  [85  N.  C.  452J  450 

r.  Elizabeth  (30  X.  J.  L.  17''.)  979 
i>.  Elizabeth  (30  N.  J.  L.  866)  928, 
976,  977,  985 
v.  Elizabeth  (81  N.J.  L.  617)  985 
v.  Elizabeth  (32  X.  J.  L.  857)  709,  784 
r.  Elizabeth  (37  N.  J.  L.  142)  924 
v.  Elizabeth  (37  X.  J.  L.  432) 

758,  795 
v.  Elizabeth  (40  X.  J.  L.  274)        928, 
929,  988 
v.  Elizabeth  Treas.  ( 12  X.  J.  L. 

79)  1032 

v.  Elkinton  (30  N.  J.  L.  335)        10G7, 
10G8,  1070,  1074 
v.  Elvins  (32  N.  J.  L   362)  88 

v.  Elwood  (11  Wis.  17)  1063 

v.  Essex  Co.  Freeh.  (23  N.  J.  L. 

214)  1017 

,-.  Estabrook  (6  Ala.  653)  431,  891 
p.  Fagan  (42  Conn.  82)  303 

v.  Fairchild  (22  Wis.  lilt)  1061 

17.  Falconer  |  H  Ala.  GOG)  1022 

v.  Fayetteville  Com'rs  (2  N.  C. 

L.  Kepos.  617)  322 

v.  Fenley  (18  Mo.  445)  5G2 

v.  Eerguson  (33  N.  II.  424)  393,  433 
B.  Eerguson  (31  N.  J.  L.  107)  307,  309 
17.  Findley  ( 10  Ohio,  5 1 )  297,  298 

17.  Fishblate  (83  N.  C.  G54)  322 

».  Fisher  (52  Mo.  174)  404 

v.  Fitzgerald  (44  .Mo.  425)      283,  285, 
28G,  509,  1078 
v.  Flanders  (24  La.  An.  57)  105 

v.  Floyd    Co.    Judge    (5    Iowa, 

380)  1029,1030,1031 

t7.  Foley  (31  Iowa,  527)  865 

v.  Fond  du  Lac  (42  Wis.  298)  709 
17.  Fond  du  Lac   Bd.  of  Ed.  (24 

Wis.  683)  1015 

17.  Fort  (24  S.  C.  510)  1126 

r.  Foster  (2  Halst.  101)  3GG 

v.  Freeman  (38  N.  II.  426)      393,  396, 
433,  451,   I7D 
r.  Freeman  (86  N.  C.  683)  296 

v.  Frost  (4  Barring.  558)  279 

v.  Fuller  (34  X.  J.  L.  227)  94,  918,  928 
v   Fuller  (39  X.  J.  L.  57G)  918 

17.  Fullerton  (7  Rob.  (La.)  210)       902 
\  v.  Funck  (17  Iowa,  365)  285,  287,  509 
17.  Gaffney  (34  N.J.  L.  131)    949,  950 
v.  Garlock  (1  1  Iowa,  444)  131 

p.Garroute  (67  Mo.  445)  629 

17.  Gastinel  (20  La.  An.  114)  279 

17.  Gates  (35  Minn.  385)  237 

v.  Gates  (67  Mo.  L39)  323 

i;.  Gates  (22  Wis.  210)  1067,  1074 
17.  Gazlay  (5  Ohio,  1 1)  995 

».  George  (23  Fla.  585)  99,  278 

p.  Georgia    Med.   Soc.   (38  Ga. 

608  ;  8   Am.  L.  Keg.  K.  - 

633)  327,  329 


Page 
State  17.  Gibson  Co.  Com'rs  (SO  Ind. 

478)  1249 

v.  Giles  (1  Chand.  112)  279,  280 

v.  Gilmanton  (14  N.  II.  467)  263 

17.  Glasgow  (N,  C.  Conf.  18G)         322 
v.  Gleason  (12  Fla.  190)  1080 

v.  Glennon  (3  li.  I.  276)  47 

17.  Goodwin  (69  Tex.  65)  1079 

v.  Gordon  (60  Mo  ■  439 

t7.  Gorham  (37  Me.  451)       881,  1135, 

1314 
v.  Governor,  &c.     [See  v.  Chase, 

v.  Kirk  wood,    v.    Price,    v. 

Towns,  17.  Warmouth,  &c.] 
17.  Graham  (13  Kan.  136)  1078 

17.  Graham  (24  La.  An.  429)  1016 

17.  Graham  (16  Nth.  74)  72 

17.  Graves  (19  Md.  851)  157,  392,  711, 
713,  71  1,  726,  1006,  1056 
v.  Great  Works  Mill.  &  M.  Co. 

(2D  Me.  41)  1135 

17.  Green  (37  O.  St.  227)  357 

17.  Greene  County  (54  Mo.  540)      631 

17.  Gregg  (2  Hill  (S  ('.)  388)  703 

17.  Griffey  (6  Neb.  161)  282 

v.  Griscom  (3  Ilalst.  13G)  1069 

17.  Gummersall  (24  N.  J.  L.  529)  1089 

17.  Guttenherg  (38  N.  J.  L.  419)     237, 

914,  924,  986 

17.  Guttenherg  (39  N.  J.  L.  660)    940, 

KM  is,  1028,  1034 

17.  Guttierrez  (15  La.  An.  190)       492, 

499,  504,  507 

v.  Haben  (22  Wis.  660)  1056 

y.  Hackensack  Impr.  Co.  (45  N. 

J.  L.  113)  918 

v.  Halifax    Com'rs   (4  Hev.  L. 

345)  322,939,1134 

17.  Hall  (97  N.  C.  474)  328 

17.  Hall  (32  X.  J.  L.  158)  450 

17.  Hamilton  (6  Ind.  310)  1120 

y.  Hamilton  Co.  Aud.  (19  Ohio, 

116)  1030 

v.  Hammer  (42  N.  J.  L.  435)  835 

v.  Hammonton  (38  X.  J.  E.  430)    220 
17.  Hand  (81  X.  -J.  L.  647)  979 

v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.  (75 

Mo.  208)  953,961 

17.  Hannon  (38  Kan.  593)  1009 

17.  Hardie  (1  lied.  12)  1078 

p.  Hardy  (7  Neb.  377)  488 

17.  Harper  (68  Mo.  531)  439 

v.  Harper  (6  O.  St.  707)  323 

17.  Harris  (23  Eng.  &  Am.  Corp. 

C.  43)  589 

17.  Harris  (10  Iowa,  441)  431 

17.  Hartford  &  N.  II.  R.  Co.  (29 

Conn.  538)  1057 

v.  Hartshorn  (17  Ohio.  135)  272  . 

v.  Haskell  (20  Iowa,  27G)  518 

17.  Hastings  (10  Wis.  518)  1063 

17.  Hauser  (63  Ind.  165)  154,  300 

17.  Hauss  (  13  Ind.  105)  309 

17.  Hay  (29  Me.  457)  451 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Cli 


Page 

386 

424 

144 
192 

138 
407 


State  v.  Hayes  (61  N.  II.  264) 
v.  I  lav  no  (4  S.  C.  403) 
v.  Hedlund  (16  Neb.  666) 
v.  Helfrid  (2  N.  &  McC.  233) 
v.  Ilehncs  (Penn.  (N.J.)  1050) 
v.  Henderson  (38  0.  St.  644) 
v.  Hennepin  Co.  1).  Ct.  ('^l  Minn. 

235)  912 

v.  Henshaw  (76  Cal.  430)  492 

v.  Herod  (29  Iowa,  123)  427,  863,  864, 

mo 

v.  Hewett  (31  Me.  396) 
v.  Hibbard  (3  Ohio,  63) 
v.  Highland  (25  Minn.  355) 
v.  Hiibert  (72  Wis.  184) 
v.  Hill  (10  Ind.  219) 
v.  Hill  (32  Minn.  275) 
v.  Hoblitzelle  (85  Mo.  620) 
r.  Hoboken  (30  N.  J.  L.  22 


995 
647 
474 
738 
1006 
1027 
808, 
863 

v.  Hoboken  (33  N.  J.  L.  280)  425,  943, 

944 
v.  Hoboken  (35  N.  J.  L.  205)  833,  847, 
848,  850,  801 
v.  Hoboken  (36  N.  J.  L.  291)  918 

v.  Hoboken  (38  N.  J.  L.  110)  388,  407 
v.  Hodgdon  (41  Vt.  1311)  905 

v.  Holeomb  (OS  Iowa,  107)  404 

v.  Hulladay  (72  Mo.  499)  584 

v.  Hoyt  (2  Or.  246)  310,  366 

».  Hudson  (27  N.  J.  L.  214)  707 

v.  Hudson  (29  N.  J.  L.  104)    146,  520, 
914,  981,988 
v.  Hudson  (29  N.  J.  L.  115)  914 

v.  Hudson  (29  N.  J.  L.  475)   368,  407, 
709,  984 
v.  Hudson  (32  N.  J.  L.  365)  1126,  1129 
v.  Hudson  (34  N.  J.  L.  531)  980 

v.  Hudson  (44  O.  St.  137)  334 

v.  Hudson  County  (30  N.  J.  L. 

137)  1133,  1136,  1173 

v.  Hudson  Co.  Freeh.  (35  N.  J. 

L.  269)  1070 

v.  Husrg  (44  Mo.  116)     711,  719,  1032 
v.  Huggins  (Harper,  L.  94)    288,  343, 

359 
v.  Huggins  (47  Ind.  586)  794 

v.  Hundehausen  (26  Wis.  432)  95 

v.  Hunter  (38  Kan.  578)  99 

v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (33  Fed.  R. 

730)     88,  170,  171,  175,  177,  697, 

757 

v.  Irvington  (50N.  J.  L.  361)         488 

i'.  Jackson  (8  Mich.  110)  496 

v.  Jackson  Co.  Com'rs  (19  Fla. 

17)  1032 

v.  Jacobs  (17  Ohio,  143)         272,  305, 
355,  1088,  1090 
v.  Jefferson  Par.  Pol.  Jury  (22 

La.  An.  611)  1017 

v.  Jenkins  (46  Wis.  616)  1090 

i'.  Jennings  (27  Ark.  419)  74.  94 

v.  Jersey  City  (24  N.  J.  L.  662)     709, 

710,  914,  944,  985 


State  v.  Jersey  City  (25  N.  J.  L.  809)  154, 

155,  360,  863,  365,  707,  71",  944, 

984 

v.  Jersey  City  (25  N.  J.  L.  525) 


Jersey  City  (25  N.  J.  L   536) 
328,  329,  330,  331,  332,  333, 


170, 
264 
264, 
839, 
L025 
1 55, 


Jersey  City  (26  N.  J.  L.  444) 

291,  3ns.  405,  707,  726,  s»>,  oio, 

984,  985,  986 

Jersey  City  (27  N.  J.  L.  493)     369, 

384,  386,  395,  986 

Jersey  City  (27  N.  J.  L.  536)    366, 

984 

Jersey  City  (29  N.J.  L.  441)    986, 

988,  L092 

Jersey  City  (29  N.  J.  L.  170)     143. 

145,  445,  858,  863 

Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  93)      351, 

373,  407 

Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  148)     385, 


Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  521) 


986 
928, 
1092 
145, 


Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  33) 

174,  387,  809,  985 
Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  277)     814, 


Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  390) 
Jersey  City  (35  N.  J.  L.  404) 

Jersey  City  (37  N.  J.  L.  348) 
Jersey  City  (38  N.  J.  L.  259) 
Jersey  City  (40  N.  J.  L.  483) 


960 

108 
351, 
984 
809 
1059 
753, 
014 
988 


Jersey  City  (41  N.  J.  L.  489) 
Jersey  City  Treas.  (42  N.  J. 

L.  79)  1032 

Jersey   City  W.   Com'rs  (30 

N.  J.  L.  247)  1129 

John  (81  Mo.  13)  1022 

Johnson  (17  Ark.  407)         284,509 
Johnson  (11  Ired.  L.  647)  760 

Johnson  (1  Kan.  178)  84 

Johnson  Co.  Bd.  of  Equal.  (10 

Iowa,  157)  1056 

Johnson  Co.  Judge  (12  Iowa, 

237)  1063,  1072 

Johnson's  Adm.  (52  Ind.  197)    633 
Jones  (19  Ind.  356)  2M 

Jones  (10  Iowa,  65)  1070 

Jones  (1  Ired.  L.  129)      1010,  1062, 


•.  Jones  (18  Tex.  874) 

>.  Judge,  Ninth  C.  C.  (13  Ala. 

805) 
>.  Justices,  &c.  [See  v.  Lenoir,  v. 

Orleans,  &C  ] 
J.Kansas  City  (89  Mo.  34) 
•.  Kansas  Citv,  St.  J.  &  C.  B.  R. 

Co.  (45  Iowa,  L39) 
i.  Kantler  (88  Minn.  69) 
;.  Kaufman  (51  Iowa,  578) 


1063,  1070 

800 


1021 


1131 


755 

363,  487 
495 


clii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS   CITED. 


Page 

State  r.  Keith  ".'I  X.  C.  933)  135 

v.  Kelly  (34  N.  J.  L.  75)  142 

v.  Kempl    6  I  Wis.  r  609 

,-.  Keokuk  (9 Iowa,  138)  Tin,  712,  719, 

lull 
17.  Keokuk  (is  Iowa,  388)  1063 

v.  Kirk  (44  Ind.  401)  291 

v.  Kirkley,  Mayor  (29  Md.  85) 

518.    519,    L006,    1007,    1  I!  3, 
1187 
v.    Kirkwood,    Gov.    (14    Iowa, 

L62)  1016 

v.  Kispert  (21  Wis.  387)  1073 

,-.  Kline  (23  Ark.  587)  281 

r.  Knoxville  (12  Lea,  1  16)  1 19 

v.  Krollman  (38  N.  J.  L.  323)  953 
v.  Lafferty  (5  Marring.  401)  294,483 
v.  Lamberton  (37  Minn.  362)  L128 
v.  Lancaster  Co.  Bank  (8  Neb. 

218)  1142 

v.  Langston  (88  N.  C.  692)  435,  136 
v.  Laverack  (34  N.  J.  L.  201)      458, 

784 
1062 
74,76 
137 
435,  500 
39,  13, 


322 
102 
323 
284 
456 
300 
435 


Lean  (9  Wis  279) 
Li  atherman  (38  Ark.  81) 
I     Iford  (3  Mo.  102) 
Lee  (20  Minn.  445) 
Leffingwell  (54  Mo.  458) 

45,  85.  (loo,  011,  017,  960 

Lehre  (7  Rich.  234)         1050, 1060, 

1081 

Lenoir  Co.  Jus.   (4   Hawks, 

L94) 
Leovy  (21  La.  An.  538) 
Lewenthall  (55  Miss.  589) 
Lewis  (61  Conn.  1 13) 
Lieber  (11  Iowa,  407) 
Lincoln  (4  Neb.  260) 
Lindsay  (34  Ark.  372) 
Lingo  (26  Mo.  406)       329,  330,  332 
Linn  Co.  Ct.  (44  Mo.  504)  628 

Lockwood  (  13  Wis.  403)  495 

Louisville,  X.  A.  &  C.  Ry.  Co. 

(80  Ind. 114)  885 

Ludwig  (21  Minn.  202)  440 

Lyle  (100  N.  C.  497)  720 

I/von  (32  N.  J.  L.  300)  953 

Lyons  (31  Iowa,  432)  1084 

Maberry  (3  Strob.  1  11)  321 

Mi nCo.  Ct.  (  11  Mo.  453)      631 

Macon  Co.  Ct.  (68  Mo.  29)       1030, 
L034 
Madison  C.  Council  (7   Wis. 

688)  is:;,  ls5,  560,  057,  659 

Madison  C.  Council  (15  Wis. 

30)        118,  250,  1028,  1029,  1032, 

1052,  1067,  lnco,  1073,  1074 

Maloy  (20  Kan.  619)  83 

Id  |  II  Mo.  470)  495 

Mansfield  Com'rs  (23  N.  J.  L. 

510)  657 

Marble  (4  Ired.  L.  318)  744 

Marion  Co.  Com'rs  (21  Kan. 

410]  146,  520,  1113 


Page 
State  v.  Marlow  (15  0.  St.  114)    285,  288, 

1077 
v.  Marshall  Co.  Judge  (7  Iowa, 

186)  KH'ii,  1057,  l(i58,  1074 

v.  Marston  (6  Kan.  624)  1021,  1079 
v.  Maynard  (11  111.  4  Km  292,492,493, 

194 
v.  Mavor,  &c.  of  A.     [See   v.  A. 

&c] 
v.  Maysville  (12  S.  C.  70)       900,  939 
v.  McArthur  (13  Wis.  383)  507 

v.  McCrillus  (4  Kan.  250)  1009 

v.  McDowell  (Dud.  L.  (S.  C.)  346) 

152 
r.  McDowell  (19  Neb.  442)  312 

v.  McGarry  (21  Wis.  196)  3::o 

17.  McLaughlin  (15  Kan.  228)  1  124 
v.  McReynolds  (61  Mo.  203)  72,  267, 
075,  1082,  1086 
v.  Merrill  (37  Me.  229)  468,  470 

r.  Merry  (3  Mo.  278)  142 

r.  Miller  (67  Mo.  604)  121 

v.  Miller  (30  N.  J.  L.  360)  143 

v.  Mills  (34  N.  J.  L.  177)  144 

v.  Milwaukee  Ch.  of  Commerce 

(20  Wis.  63)  ::-'.'   330,  33,2 

v.  Milwaukee    C.    Council    (20 

Wis.  87)  674,  1028,  1029,  1032, 
1038 
v.  Milwaukee    C.    Council    (22 

Wis.  397)  1062,  1063,  1068 

17.  Milwaukee    C.    Council    (25 

Wis.  122)  118,  1028 

17.  Milwaukee  Gas,  &c.  Co.  (29 

Wis.  454)  95,  824,  826 

r.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.  (45  Wis.  579 j  1075 

u.  Mineral    PL   Sup.    (22   Wis. 

390)  1068,  1072 

v.  Minneapolis  (32  Minn.  501)  589 
v.  Missouri    Pac.   Ry.   Co.    (33 

Kan.  176)  858 

17.  Mitchell  (2  Tr.  Const.  (S.  C.) 

703)  1010,  1011 

v.  Mobile  (24  Ala.  701)      95,  140,  141 

v.  Mobile  (5  Porter,  270)        147,  457, 

765,  783,  784 

v.  Moffit  (5  Ohio,  356)         1016,  1021, 

1028 
v.  Montclair  Ry.  Co.  (35  N.  J.  L. 

32-)  825 

17.  Montgomery  (74  Ala.  226)  690 
17.  Morris  &   K.  R.  Co.  (23  N.  J. 

L.  360)  782,784,1133 

17.  Morris  Common  Pleas  (30  N. 

J.  L.  72)  78 

i;.  Morristown  (33  N.  J.  L.  57)  143, 
394,  800,  809 
v.  Moss  (2  Jones  (L.)  66)  504 

v.  Mott  (61  Mil.  297)  403,  449 

17.  Moultrieville  (Rice  L.  158)  415 
17.  Mount  (20  La.  An.  352)  1030 

v.  Mount  Pleasant  C.  Council  (8 

Rich.  L.  214)  948 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cliii 


Page 
State  v.  Mount  Pleasant  Sup.   (16 

Wis.  613)  1017 

v.  Municipal    Court    (32   Minn. 
«£e.)     [See  '■■  St.  l'anl,  &c] 
r.  Murfreesboro    (11      Humph. 

217)  L38,  322,  L184,  1281 

v.  Nashville  (15  Lea,  697)       314,  317, 

394 
v.  Nashville   Univ.    (4   Humph. 

157)  G59 

v.  Natal  (39  La.  439)  455 

v.  Nelson    [Hymer,    Rel.]      (21 

Neb.  572)  1000 

v.  Nelson   [Iola  Sup.  Rel.]     (57 

Wis.  147)  979 

v.  Newark  (25  N.  J.  L.  399)  351,  407, 
408,985,  1092,  1126,  1127 
v.  Newark  (26  N.J.  L.  515)  890,  953 
v.  Newark  (27  N.  J.  L.  185)  134,  290, 
407,  918,  923,  928,  955,  950 
v.  Newark  (28  N.  J.  L.  491)  158 

v.  Newark  (30  N.  J.  L.  303)      407,  808 
v.  Newark  (34  N.  J.  L.  236) 


ss,  186, 

993,  994 

984 

928 


1129 


953 
761 


Newark  (35  N.  J.  L.  171) 
Newark  (36  N.  J.  L.  168) 
Newark  (36  N.  J.  L.  478)   923,  955, 

956 
Newark  (37  N.  J.  L.  415)    531,  914, 
918,  929,  937,  979,  989,  990 
Newark  (38  N.  J.  L.  264)  454 

Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  297)  1070 

Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  550)  82 

Newark  (44  N.  J.  L.  344)  828 

Newark  Pol.  Com'rs  (49  N.  J. 

L.  170) 
Newberry  Council  (12  Rich. 

339) 
New  Boston  (11  N.  H.  413) 
New  Brunswick  (30  N.  J.  L. 

395)  154,  156,  921,  928,  959 

New  Brunswick  (32  N.  J.  L. 

548)  975 

New  Brunswick  (44  N.  J.  L. 

11(3)  959 

,  Newman  (91  Mo.  445)      279,  1006, 

1021 

New  Orleans  (20  La.  An.  172)  554 

New  <  hrleans  (23  La.  An.  358)    199 

New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  82)    1030 

New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  129)  1031, 

1042 

New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  705)  1032 

New  Orleans  (35  La.  An.  68)  1032, 

1067 

New  Orleans  (35  La.  An.  221 )  1032 

.  New  Orleans  (36  La.  An.  687)   119 

New  Orleans  (37  La.  An.  13, 

436,  528) 
.  Nodaw  Co.  Ct.  Jus.  (47  Mo. 

349) 
.  North  (42  Conn.  79) 
.  North  (27  Mo.  464) 
.Norwood  (12  Md.  177) 


119 

631 

1083 

903,  904 

300 


Page 

State  v.  Noyes  (30  N.  II.  292)    24, 

w.Ocean  (39  N.  J.  L.  75)  L075 

v.  Omaha  (11  Neb.  265)        884,  L006 

v.  Orange  (31  N.  J.  L.  L31)  1017 
r.  Orange  (82  N.  J.  L.  19)  709,  '.'7'.) 
v.  Orleans    Par.   Dist.  Judge  (21 

La.  An.  711)  1074 
v.  Orleans  Par.   Dist.  Judge  (35 

La.  An.  1075)  827 

v.  Osawkee  Tp.  (14  Kan.  418)  233 

v.  Pacific  T.  Trs.  (61  Mo.  155)  569, 
1030,  L031,  1062 

v.  Palmer  (10  Neb.  203)  L022 

v.  Palmer  [4  N.  W.  Rep.  966)  1  10 

v.  Paris  By.  Co.  (55  Tex.  70)  486 

v.  Parker  (25  Minn.  215)  L082 
v.  Parker  (32  N.  J.  L.  420) 

v.  Parker  (20  Vt.  362)  958 
v.  Parsons  (40  N.  J.  L.  1)  84,  1089 
v.  Passaic  (37  N.  J.  L.  65) 
v.  Passaic  (41  N.  J.  L.  90) 


oi  1,  928 
146,  520. 

980 
L. 

285 


Passaic  Clerk    (25  N.  J. 

354) 
Passaic  Tump.  Co.  (27  N.  J. 

L.217)  -os 

Patamia  (34  La.  An.  750)  413 

Paterson  (34  N.  J.  L.  103)  155,  387 
Paterson  (35  N.  J.  L.  190)  291 

Paterson  (36  N.  J.  L.  159)         709, 
985,  986 
Paterson  (37  N.  J.  L.  380)  747 

Paterson  (38  N.  J.  L.  190)  1025 

Paterson  (40  N.  J.  L.  186)  553 

Paterson  (40  N.  J.  L  244)  986 

Paterson  &  H.  Turnp.  Co.  (21 

N.  J.  L.  9)  1075 

Paterson  Av.  R.  Com'rs  (41 

N.  J.  L.  83)  985 

Pawtuxet  Turnp.  Co.  (8  R.  I. 

521)  1088 

Pender  (66  N.  C.  313)  494 

Perkins  (24  N.  J.  L.  409)    298,  494 
Perry  Co.  Com'rs  (5  0.  St. 

497)  1058,1110 

Perth  Amboy  (29  N.  J.  L  250)  700, 

984,  085,986 

Perth  Amboy  (38  N.  J.  L.  425  (944, 

945 
Pettis  (7  Rich.  L.  390)        798,  801, 

so;; 

Philbrick  ( 19  N.  J.  L.  374)       1079 
Pillsburv  (30  La.  An.  705)  566 

Pinckney  (10  Rich.  L.  474)        904 
Pitot  (21  La.  An.  336)  1026 

Plainfield  (38  N.  J.  L.  95)  485,  709, 
710,  \\\\,  985,993 
Plunkett  (3  Harr.  (N.  J  )  5)  431, 437 
Police  Jury,  &c.     [See  v.  Jef- 
ferson  Par.,  &c  ;  V.  St.  Mar- 
tin's Par.,  &c. ;  r.   <  trleans 
Par.,    SsC.j    v.    Terrebonne 
Par.,  &c] 


cliv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


State  v.  Pollard  (6  R.  I.  200)  437 

r.  Portage  (12  Wis.  502)  722,910,921, 
007,  978 
v.  Porter  (7  Ind.  204) 
v.  Porter  (113  Ind.  70) 
r.  Powell  (07  Mo.  395) 
r.  Powell  107  N.  C.  417) 
«;.  Price,  Gov.  (25  N.  J.  L.  331) 


101) 


297 

358 
323 
502 

285, 

ion; 

107.") 
82 


804 
014 

1021, 


Pritchard  (36  N.  J.  L 

Pugh  (48  <).  St.  08) 
Putnam  Co.  Com'rs  (23  Fla 

682) 
Rahway  (30  N.J.  L.  646) 
Rah  way  ( louncil  (33  X.  .1.  L 

110)      287,  310,  loin,  L020, 

1022,  1057,  1658,  1059,  1061 
Rainey  (74  Mo.  220)  1045 

Ramos  (10  La.  An.  420)    330,  1022 
Ramsey  (8  Neb.  286)  1059 

Ramsey  Co.  D.  Ct.  (33  Minn. 

295)  919,  938 

Raymond  (27  N.  H.  388)  1133 

Reckards  (21  Minn.  47)  482 

Rice  (2  S.  E.  R.  L80)  478 

Richland  T'p  (20  O.  St.  362)  224 
Richmond  (1  R.  I.  40)  641,  702 
Kicker  (32  N.  H.  179) 
Riordan  (24  Wis.  484) 
Roberts  (08  Mo.  234) 
Roberts  (11  G.  &  J.  506) 
Robinson  ( 1  Kan.  188) 
Roggen  (22  Neb.  118) 
Rolle  (30  La.  An.  00) 
Ruff  (30  La.  An.  407) 
Rush  (7  Ind.  221) 
St.  Joseph  (37  Mo.  270) 
St.  Louis  (00  Mo.  10) 


507 
80 
301 
041 
1014 
240 
071 
421 
200 
70 
334,  338 


St.  Louis  Co.  Court  (34  Mo 

540)  94,  101,  103,  213,  1175 

St.  Louis  Co.  Court  (02  Mo. 


Pol. 


723,  1112 
Jury 

1032 
250)  1129 

52ii)  952 


l'H 
St.   Martin's    Par. 

(32  La  An.  ssl) 
St.  Paul  (34  Minn 
St.  Paul  (36  Minn. 
St.  Paul  M.  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  (35 

Minn.  131)  851,852,854 

Saline  County  (45  Mo.  242)  626, 
013,  045,  1000 
Saline  Countv  (48  Mo.  300)  644 
Saline  County  (51  Mo.  350)  1104. 
1112,  1224 
Savannah  (R.  M.  Charlt.  250)    04. 

102 
Sayre  (M  N.J.  L.  158) 
Schlier  (3  Heisk.  281) 
Schnierle  (5  Rich.  L.  299) 


1222 

070 

280, 

1086 


School  District.   [See  v. Clay, 

&c  ;  o.  York,  &c.l 
Scotl  117  Mo.  521)  77 

Sellers  (7  Rich.  L.  368)  321 

Severance  (49  Mo.  401)  486 


Page 
State  v.  Severance  (55  Mo.  378)  143,  063, 

000,  998 
v.  Seymour  (35  N.  J.  L.  47)  102 

v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax.  Dist.  (16  Lea, 

240)  251 

Shelby ville  (4Sneed,176)322,1135 

431 
319 
322 
74 
294,  409 
070 


100 
279 
334 
907 
130 
694 
000 


1010 
286,  1063 


631 


■.  Sherman  (20  Mo.  265) 
i.  Sherwood  f  12  Mo.  170) 
■.  Shields  (8  Blackf.  151) 
i.  Simons  (32  Minn.  540) 
■.  Sims  (16  S.  C.  486) 
-.  Smith  (31  Iowa,  493) 
;.  Smith  (22  Minn.  218)  363,365,388, 

1020 
i.  Smith  (44  O.  St.  348) 
•.  Smith  (14  Wis.  497) 
•.  Sohn  (07  Ind.  101) 
;.  So.  Stp.  Co.  (13  La.  An.  497) 
•.  Springfield  (6  Ind.  83) 
'.  Stanley  (1  1  Ind.  409) 
•.  Stark  (18  Fla.  255) 
;.  State  Auditor  (34  Mo.  375; 

36  Mo.  70) 
■.  State  Board  (13  Fla.  55) 
9.  State  Canvassers  (3  Kan.  88)  1000 
9.  Stearns  (31  N.  H.  106)  480,  496 
•.  Stephens  (4  Tex.  137)  896 

9.  Stevens  (23  Kan.  456)  434 

>;.  Stewart  (5  Strobh.  L.  20)  715, 

1120,  1130 
>.  Stout  (7  Neb.  89)  1142 

>.  Sullivan  County  Ct.  (51  Mo 

531) 

\  Supervisors,  &c.   [See  v.  Min- 
eral Pt ,  &c.,  v.  Mount  Pleas- 
ant, &e  ] 
;.  Swearingen  (12  Ga.  23)     154,  278, 
270,  280 
;.  Swift  (1  Hill  (S.C.L3C0)         715, 
1120,  1130 
:  Swisher  (17  Tex.  441)  958 

-.  Tappan  (20  Wis.  604)        122,  120, 
224,  806 
i.  Taylor  (59  Md.  338)  1000 

:.  Terrebonne  Par.  Pol  Jury  (30 

La.  An.  2S7)  581 

>.  Thomaston  (74  Me.  198)  266 

i.  Thompson  (36  Mo  70)  1023 

■.  Thompson  (34  O.  St.  300)  1086 
>.  Tiedeman  (00  Mo.  306) 
•.  Tipton  (100  Ind.  73) 
K  Tolan  (33  N.  J.  L.  105)  1020,  1075, 
1070,  1080,  1087 
>.  Toomer  (7  Rich   L.  210)  298 

>.    Topeka    (30   Kan.   653;    31 

Kan.  452)  432 

>.  Tosnev  (20  Minn.  262)  138 

•.  Towns  Gov.  (8  Ga.  360)  1016 

•.  Trask  (0  Vt.  355)  763 

I.  Trenton  (12  Atl.  R.  902)  543 

>.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  198)  143 

r.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  400)  385,  985 
-.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  79)  854,  860 
>.  Trenton  (42  N.  J.  L.  74)  155 


674 
72 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


civ 


State 


Page 
v.  Trenton  Street  Com'rs  (36 

N.  J.  L.  283)  H-,  183, 

Troth  (34  N.J.  L.  379)  140 

Trumpf.  (60  Wis.  103)  279 

Trustees,    to'.      LSt-'L'    '■•     1>aci" 

fic,  &c,  t>.  Union,  &c.  v.  Vin- 
cennes  Univ.,  &c  ] 
Trvon  (39  Conn.  183)  380,441 

L. 

857 
88,  486 
L. 

1031 
631, 
047 


Tiipper  (Dudley   (S.  C.) 

135) 
Union  (33  N.J.  L.  350) 
Union  Tp.  Com.  (37  N.J. 

si) 
Union  Tp.  Trs.  (8  Ohio,  394) 


University,  &c.    [See  v.  Nash- 
ville, &c,  f.Vincennes,  &c.J 
Valle  (41  Mo.  29)  101 

Van  Buskirk  (40  N.  J.L.  463)  640, 
647 
Van  Every  (75  Mo.  530) 
Van  Home  (7  O.  St.  331) 


939 

640, 
647 
380 


Van  Winkle  (26  N.  J.  L.  73) 
Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.  (27  Vt. 

103)  1133 

Vincennes  Univ.  Trs.  (5  Ind. 

77 )        55,  241,  240,  250,  329,  330, 

337 

Volkman  (20  La.  An.  585)  909 

Wakely  (2  N.  &  McCord,  410)  714, 

716,1131,  1132 

Wapello   County    (13  Iowa, 

388)  208,  226,  895 

Ware  (13  Or.  380)  1058 

Warmouth  Gov.  (22  La.  An. 

1)  1010 

Warren,  F.  &  Maeh.  Co.  (32 

N.  J.  L.  439)  1008 

Washington  (1  Kan.  188)  1014 

WatertownC.  Council  (9  Wis. 

254)  330,337,1025 

Weatherlv  (45  xMo.  17)  1082 

Welch  (36  Conn.  215)         397,  406, 


409,  470 
650 

499 


•.Wells  (15Ca1.  636) 

;.  Wells  (46  Iowa,  602) 

;.  West  Hoboken  (37  N.  J.  L. 

177)  705 

i.  West  Orange   (40  N.   J.   L. 

122)  918 

:  White  (20  Neb.  37)  141 

k  Whittingham  (7  Vt.  390)  1135 

>.  Wilcox  (42  Conn.  364)  78 

•.  Wilcox  (45  Mo.  458)  78 

•.  Wilkcsville  (20  O.  St.  288)  369 
;.  Wilkinson  (2  Vt.  480)  752,  755, 
763,  782 
).  Williams  (25  Me.  564)  347,  371 
•.  Williams  (11  S.  C.  288)  452,  468 
;.    Wilmington    C.    Council    (3 

Harring.  294)    286,  291,  294,  357, 

494,  lou 

9.  Wilson  (12  Lea,  246)  143,  303 


State  v.  Wilson  (42  Me.  9) 


1032 

7!) 
439 

1007 
963 


Page 
754,760,  762, 

768 
v.  Wilson  Sup.  (17  Wis. « 
r.  Winkelmeier  (36  Mo,  103) 
v.  Wister  (62  Mo.  592) 
v.  Wood  Co.   Treas.  (17  Ohio, 

184) 
v.  Woodruff  (37  N.  J.  L.  139) 
v.  Woodward  (2:;  Vt.  92)       659,  662, 
D72,  751,  702,  765,  7.-2 
V.  Woody  (17  Ga.  012)  1098 

w.  Worth  (95  N.  C.  615)  412 

v.  Wright  (14  Or.  865)  87 

v.  Wrotnowski  (17    La.  An.  156)  1010 
v.  York  Co.  Sch.  Dist.  (8  Neb. 

92)  1059 

v.  Young  (3  Kan.  445)       08,  4'.'::.  V 17 
v.  Young  (17  Kan.  414)  144,  1:1 

v.  Zanesville  &  M.  Turn.  Co.  (10 

O.  St.  308)  10.58 

v.  Zeigler  (32  N.  L.  J.  202)    412,  414, 
477,  494,  1126 
State  Bank,  &c.  (16  How.  369).  [See 
Piqua  Branch,  &c  ] 
(3  La.  An.  294).    [See  Louisiana 

v.  State,  &c] 
(39  Iowa,  490).     [See  National 
State,  &c.  ] 
State  Bank  of  Ind.  v.  Brackenridge 

(7  Blackf.  395)  658,  967 

v.  Madison  (3  Ind.  43)     948,  967,  968 
State  Bank  of  S.  C.  v.  Charleston  C. 

Council  (3  Rich.  L.  342)  000 

State  Board  of  Agr.  v.   Citizens   S. 

R.  Co.  (47  Ind.  407)         531,  536 
State  Board  of  Ed.  v.  Aberdeen  (56 

Miss.  518)  533,  537 

State  Center  v.  Barenstein  (66  Iowa, 

249)  396 

State  Freight  Tax,  Re  (15  Wall,  232)  902 
State  Hist.  Assoc,  v.  Lincoln  (14  Neb. 

336)  759 

State  Railroad   Tax  Cases  (92  U.  S. 

575)  1108,  1120,  1121,  1124 

State  Tax  on   Foreign    held  Bonds, 

Re  (15  Wall.  300) 
State  Tax  on  Hv.   Gross   Receipts, 

ft  (15  Wall.  284) 
State  Treasurer  v.  Somerville  &  E. 

11.  Co.  (28  N.  J.  L.  21) 
State  University,  &c.  (5  Neb.  423). 

[See  University  of  Neb.,  &C.] 
Steamboat  Rock  Indep.  Sch.  Dist. 
Stone  (106  U.  S.  183) 

Steam  Nav.  Co.,  &c.  (8  G.  &  J. 

248).     [See  Penn.   Del.   & 
Md  ,  &c] 

Steamship   Co.,    &c.    (2    Wall. 

450).    [See  Pacific  Mail,  &c  ] 
(6   Wall.   31).     [See   Southern 
Steamship.  &G  | 
Stebbins  v.  Jennings  ( 10  Pick.  172)  75,  76 
v.  Keene  Tp.  (60  Mich.  214)  882 

v.  Mayer  (38  Kau.  573)  388,  503 


901 
902 
969 


600 


clvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

Stebbins  o.  Merritt  (10  Cush.  27)278,  370 
Steekert  v   Kast  Saginaw  (22  Mich. 

L04)  373,390,945,977, 

1123 
Stedman       San  Francisco  (63  Cal. 

L93)  1197 

Steel  v.    Davis   County    (2   Greene 

(Iowa).  169)   '  566,  668 

v.  Boston  i  L28  Mass.  583)  1205 

Steele  v.  Burkhardt  (104  Mass.  69)     1287 

v.  .Martin  (6  Kan.   130)  284,  1077 

v.  Sullivan  (70  Ala.  589)        74  4,  754, 

757 
Steers  v.  Brooklyn  (101  N.  Y.  51)        170, 

748,  749 
v.  Stienville  W.  S.  Co.  (34  Fed. 

R.  145)  822,826 

Stein  v.  Ashbv  (.'JO  Ala.  363)  828 

v.  Burden  (21  Ala.  l:;<>)    219,  828,  899 
v.  .Mobile  (17  Ala.  234)  967 

v.  Mobile  (21  Ala.  591)    225,  22G,  967 
v.  Mobile  (49  Ala.  362)  967,  '.'71 

Steines  v.  Franklin  County  (48  Mo. 

167)    158,  584,  593,  635,  640,  G49, 
1112,  1158 
Steinmeyer  v.  St.  Louis  (3  Mo.  App. 

256)  1328 

Stephan  v.  Daniels  (27  O.  St.  527)  1148 
Stephani  o.  Brown  (40  III.  42^)  1311,  1312 
Stephens  v.  Macon  (S3  Mo.  345)  sss, 

1295,  1298 
v.  People  (89  111.  337)  276,  277 

Stephenson  v.  Chattanooga  (20  Fed. 

R.  586)  746,  757 

v.  Gait  (117  111.  11)  957,  982 

Stephenson  Co.   Sup.  v.  Manny  (56 

III.  160)  1145,  1146,  1151 

Sterling,  ft  (1  Sid.  340)  1062 

v.  Merrill  (124  111.  522)  1297 

v.  Thomas  (60  111.  264)  1311 

v.  Wesl   Felic.  Par.  (26  La.  An. 

59)  565 

Sterling's  Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  35)  822 
Stern  v.  People  (76  111.  475)  301 

Sterrett  v.  Houston  (  1  1  Tex.  153)  1204 
Stetson  v.  Chicago  &  Ev.  R.  Co  (75 

111.  74)  7:'.2,  1240,  1211 

v.  Faxon  (19  Pick.  147)  176,  783, 

785,  786,  1317 

v.  Kempton  (13  Mass.  272)        52,  53, 

51,  147,  210,  2i' 1,  627,  629,  1117 

Steubenville  >:  Culp  [38  <>.  St.  IS)       318 

r.  McGill  (41  0.  St.  235)  1314 

Stevens  v.  Boxford  (10  Allen,  93)        1257 

v.  Buffalo  &  N  Y.  C.  li.  Co.  (31 

Barb.;  691)  969 

v.  Chicago  (48  111.  498)  Iss 

v.  Eden  M.  II.  Soc.  (12  Vt.  G88)  348, 

377 

v.   Paterson   &  N.   R.   Co.  (34 

N.  J.  L.   532).     [See   also 

Stephens,  &c]  749 

t\  Rutland  &  R.  Co.  (29  Vt.  546)  1109 

Stevens'  Case  (T.  Raym.  432)  1070 


Page 
Stevens'  &  C.  Transp.  Cc  v.  Central 

R.  Co.  (33  N.J.  L.  229)  138 

Stevens'  Point  Boom  Co.  v.  Reilly 

(11  Wis.  296)  80 

Steward  v.  Jefferson  (3  Harr.  (Del.) 

335)  899 

Stewart  v.  Baltimore  (7  Md.  500)         507, 

710,  716,  719,  72-; 

v.  Clinton  (79  Mo.  60S)        1320,  1324 

v.   Commonwealth    (10    Watts, 

307)  475 

r.  C.Mincil  Bluffs  (58  Iowa,  642)  713 
o.  Davis  (3  Murph.  (N  C.)  244)  962 
v.  Frink  (94  N.  C.  487)  754 

v.  Hinds  Co.  Pol.  Bd.  (25  Miss. 

479)  709 

v.  Jefferson  Par.  Pol.  Jury  (116 

U.  S.  135)  311,  1032 

v.  Kalamazoo  (30  Mich.  G5)  1110 

v.  New  Orleans  (9  La.  An.  461)  1195, 
1197,  1200 
v.  Otoe  Co.  (2  Neb.  177)  146,  728 

r.  Folk  County  (30  Iowa,  1)  226,  898 
v.  Rutland  (58  Vt.  12)  735 

v.  Southard  (17  Ohio,  402)  324,  326 
v  State  (4  End.  396)  303,  304 

v.  Stewart  (6  CI.  &  F.  911  ;    2 

Smith's  L.  C.  403)        1148,1153 
v.  Woodstock  &   H.  PI.  R.  Co. 

(15  U.  C.  Q.  B.  427)  1260 

Stickford  v.  St.  Louis  (7  Mo.  App. 

217)  1224 

Stickney  v.  Maidstone  (30  Vt.  738)    1263 

v.  Salem  (3  Allen,  374)        1175,  1253 

Stier  v.  Oskaloosa  (41  Iowa,  353)         138 

Stiles  v.  Curtis  (4  Day  (Conn.)  328)    747, 

790 
Stilk  v.  Myrick  (2  Camp.  317)  209 

Still  v.  Lausingburg  (16  Barb.  107)     671, 

678 
Stilling  v.  Thorp  (54  Wis.  538)  1260,  1273 
Stillnian  v.  Isham  (11  Conn.  123)  161 

Stillwater  v.  Green  (4  Ilalst.  59)  217 

Stilson  v.  Lawrence  Co.  Com'rs  (52 

Ind.  213)  533 

Stiltz  v.  Indianapolis  (55  Ind.  515)       103, 

265 

v.  Indianapolis  (81  Ind.  582)         1107 

Stinson  v.  Gardiner  (42  Me.  248)        1253, 

1257 
Stock  v.  Boston  (149  Mass.  410)  11G3 

Stockbridire  r.  West  Stockbridge  (12 

Mass.  400)  139 

Stocking  r.  State  (7  Ind.  326)  305 

Stockton    /-.   Newark  (42  N.  J.  Eq. 

531)  767 

Stockton  &  V.  It.  Co.  v.  Stockton  C. 

Council  (41  Cal.  147)       227,  895 
Stockwell   v.  Fitchburg  (110  Mass. 

305)  1257,  1267 

Stoddard  v.  Oilman  (22  Vt.  568)  307,392 
v.  Kimball  (6  Cush.  469)  683 

Stokes  v.  New  York  (14  Wend.  (N. 

Y.)  87)  87,  415,  464,  481 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clvii 


Stone  v.  Attleboro  (140  Mass.  328)      1267 
r.  Boston  (2  Met.  220)  Tit,  1129 

v.  Brooks  (35  Cal.  I  745,  757 

,-.  Cambridge  (6  Cush.  270)  710 

v.   Cheshire    K.    Co.   (19  N.  II. 

427)  1308 

v.  Commercial  Ry.  Co.  (4  M,  & 

C.  122)  711 

v.  Elliott  (11  0.  St.  252)  683 

,-.  Fairbury,  P.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

(08  111.  394)  777,856,  1223,  1228, 
1241 
v.  Godfrey  (5  DeG.,  M.  &  G.  76)  1153 
r.  Hamilton  Seh.  Dist.  (8  Cush. 

692)  347 

v.  Hubbardston  (100  Mass.  49)    1261, 

1278 
v.  Huggins  (28  Vt  617)  323 

v.  Mobile  (57  Ala.  61)  940,  1122 

v.  New  York  (25  Wend.  157)       1127, 
1131,  1165,  1166 
v.  Oeonomowoc  (71  Wis.  155)        671 
v.  Wisconsin  (94  U.  S.  181)  92 

Stoneburgh  v.  Brighton  (5  U.  C.  L.  J. 

38)  519,  525 

Stoneham  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Richardson 

(23  Tick.  62)  271 

Storehouse  v.  Elliott  (6  D.  &E.  T.  R. 

315)  295 

v.  Enniskillen  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

562)  1139 

Stonington  Saw  Bank  v.  Davis  (14 

N.  J.  Eq.  286)  143 

Storm  v.  Odell  (2  Wend  287)  1131 

Stormfeltz  r.  Manor  Tump.  Co.  (13 

Pa.  St.  552)  776,  781 

Storrs  ».  Utica  (17  N.  Y.  104)     556,  L280, 
1298,  1303,  1305,  1300,  1307,  1308 
Story  v.  N.  Y.  Elev.  R.  Co.  (90  N.  Y. 

122)    743,  750,  777,  778,  780,  788, 

790,  793,  819,  832,  837,  847,  850, 

852,  855,  856,  862,  807,  870,  871, 

87.°.,  874,  875,  886,  889,  1230 

Stotesbury  v.  Smith  i2  Burr.  921)         209 

Stoudinger  v.  Newark  City  (28  N.J. 

Eq.  187)  819 

Stoughton  Sch.  Dist  v.  Atherton  (12 

Met.  105)   303,346,  349,  371,  375 
Stover  v.  Blue  Hill  (51  Me.  439)  1288 

Stow  v.  Wyse  (7  Conn  214)  363 

Stowell  v.  "Milwaukee  (31  Wis.  523)  1227 
Strahl,  Re  (10  Iowa,  309)  285,  287,  289, 
292,  352,  355,  509 
Strange  v.  Dubuque  (62  Iowa,  303)  397 
Stratman,  Re  (39  Cal.  517)  493 

Stratton  v.  Allen  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  229)     182, 

181,  .-,71 

v.  Oulton  (28  Cal.  It)  318,319 

Straus  v.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  (5  O.  St.  59)    512, 

5t0,  503,  571 

Strauss  r.  Pontiac  (40  111.  301)     380,  422. 

434 

Street  v.  Francis  (3  Ohio,  277)  1125 

v.  Gallatin  Co.  Com'rs  (1  111.  25)   1020 


Street  v.  Bolyoke  (105  Mass.  82) 


Page 
1261, 

Uk>6 


Street  Case  (1    La.   An.  412).     [See 
Robin  Street,  &c.J 
(10  La.  An.  313).     [See  Philip 

Street,  &cl 
(14  La.  An.  152).     [See  Melpo- 
mene Street,  &C.J 
(16  La.  An.  893).     [See  Royal 

Street,  &c  | 
(20  La.  An.  497).    [SeeCasealvo 
Street,  &C.1 

Street  R.  Co.  &c.  (32  Cal.  499). 

|  See    North    Beach    &   M. 

Street,  &c] 

(2I)uvall(Ky.),  175,556).   [See 

Louisville  &  P.  Street,  &C.1 

(14  O.  St.  523).    [See  Cincinnati 

&  S.  G.  Av.  Street,  &c.  | 

Strickland    v.    Railroad    Co.    (Miss. 

[MSS.]  )  225 

Striker  v.  Kelly  (3  Denio,  323)  307 

v.  Kelly  (7  Hill,  9)    272,  307,  407.  709 
Strohm  v.  Iowa  City  (47  Iowa,  42) 

1110 
Strong,  Re  (20  Pick.  484)       1021,  1024, 

1057 
Re  (Kirby  (Conn.),  345)  1007,  1012 
v.  Darling  (9  Ohio,  201)  209,  739 

v.  Dist.   Columbia   (1    Mackey, 

205)  539 

v.  Stevens  Pt.  (62  Wis.  255)  1285 

Strosser  v.  Fort  Wayne  (100Ind.443)  266, 

268,  804 
Stroud  v.  Philadelphia   (61  Pa.  St. 

255)  721,911,914,980,988 

Strusburgh   v.  New  York   (87  N.  Y. 

452)  1092 

Struthers   v.  Dunkirk,  W.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (87  Pa.  St.  282)  841,  844,  855 
Stryker  v.  New  York  (19  Johns.  17 
Stuart  v.  Cambridge  (125  Mass.  102)  513, 

559 
v.  Machiasport  (48  Me.  477)  1264 
v.  Palmer  (74  N.  Y.  18  983,984 

Stubenrauch  v.  Neyenesch  (54  Iowa, 

567)  1091,  1126 

Stuber's  Road  (28  Pa.  St.  199)       770.  794 
Studley  v.  Oshkosh  (45  Wis.  380)      1272, 

1301 
Stuhr  v.  Hoboken  (47  N.  J.  L.  147)  407 
Sturgeon  v.  Daviess  Co.  Com'rs   (65 

Ind.  302)  677 

Sturtevant  v.  Alton  (3  McLean,  393)  275, 

513,  518 
v.  Liberty  (46  Me.  457)  562 

Stuyvesant    v.   New    York    (7    Cow. 

588)  157,  387,  395 

v.  Woodruff  (21  N.  J.  L.  133)         752 
Sublett  v.  Bedwell  (47  Miss.  266)  279 

Submarine  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dickson  (15 

('.  B.  v  s.  750)  1298 

Succession  of  A.,  &c.    [See  A.'s  Suc- 
cession, &c.j 


clviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


1 ':i_'t' 

Sudbury   First  Par.  o.  Stearns  (21 

Pick.  1  18)  283,  856,  357,  862,  378 
Suffell  v.  Hank  of  Eng.  (9  Q.  B.  1>. 

650 
Suffield  v.  Hathaway  (  II  Conn.  521)  1093 
3       ilk  v.  Parker  1 7'.'  Va.  660)  1211 

Sugar  Co.,  &c.   (26   N.  J.  Eq.  247). 

[See  Matthiessen,  &c  | 
Sullivan  v.  Boston  (126  .Mass.  540) 


v.  Bolyoke  (135  Ma-s  273) 

v.  Leadvillc  (1  Col.  183) 

v.  McCanimon  (51    1ml.  264) 


1176, 
1267 

11.  93 

188 

1117, 

1151 

89,  290 

1093 

551 


v.  New  York  (53  N.  Y.  652) 
v.  Phillips  (Hit  Ind.  320) 
v.  Walton  (20  Fla.  552) 
Summers    v.    Daviess    County   (103 

Ind.  262)  1200 

Sumner  v.  Dor.  First  Par.   (4  Pick. 

361)  1147 

Sunbury  &  Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper  (33 

Pa.  St.  278)  391 

Sun  Mut.   Ins.  Co.  v.  New   York  (8 

N.  V.  241)  896,  913 

Supervisors  of  A.  County,  &c.    [See 

A.  Co.  Sup.,  &c  1 
Supervisors  v.  &c.  [See  the  fol- 
lowing counties,  wherein  the 
plaintiff,  not  being  specified 
in  the  reporter's  caption, 
may,  in  citing,  not  always 
have  been  fully  named : 
Calhoun,  &c.  (99  U.  S.  214), 
Carroll,  &c.  (18  Wall.  71), 
Lee,  &c.  (7  Wall.  175), 
Powshiek,  &c.  (9  Wall.  736), 
Rock  Island,  &C.  (4  Wall. 
4:*..")),  Washington,  &c.  (9 
Wall.  415)  ] 
Surgi  r.  Snetchman  (11  La.  An.  367)  956 
Susquehanna  Bank  v.  Broome  Co. 

Sup   (25  N.  Y.  312)       10!t2,1120 
Susquehanna  Depot  Bor.  v.  Simmons 

(112  Pa.  St.  384)  1304,  1306 

Sussex   Co.    Freeh,   v.  Strader   (18 

N.J.  L.  108)881,882,  1133,  L169, 
117:'..  1174.  1245,  1282 
Sutherland  v.  Carr  (85  N.  Y.  105)         300 
Sutton  r.  Carroll  Co.  Pol.  Hoard  (41 

Miss.  236    1159,  1173  1187,1198, 

1245 

v.  Clark  (6  Taunt.  28)        1225,  1233, 

1234 
r.  Wauwatosa  (29  Wis.  21)  1287 

Sutton  First   Par.  v.  Cole   (3  Pick. 

232)     261,  353,  -".DO,  666,  661,  670 
Sutton's  Heirs  v.  Louisville  (5  Dana, 

28)  733 

Sutton's  Hospital  Case  (10  Rep.  31)      396 
Suydam  u   Key.  (13  Johns.  144)  324 

Swackhamer    <•.    Hackettstown   (37 

X.  .1.  L.  191 )  182,  188, 193,  194, 195 
Swails  v.  State  (4  Ind.  516)  138 


Page 
Swain  r.  Comstock  (18  Miss.  463)  140 
Swamp  Land    Diet.   v.   Haggin   (64 

Cal.  204)  939 

Swan  v.  Williams  (2  Mich.  127)     705,  709 
Swan  Pt.  Cemetery  v.  Tripp  (14  R. 

1    199)      '  P52 

Swann  >•.  Buck  (40  Miss.  268)  311 

v.  Cumberland  (8  Gill,  150)    715,978, 

1126,  1127 

Swanzea  v.  Somerset  (132  Mass.  312)  881 

Swartz  v.  Flatboats  (  1  1  La.  An.  243)    169 

<■   Page  (13  Mo.  603)  ^  679,  771 

Sweeney  '•■  Port   Burwell  (17  V.  C 

C.  P.  574:  19U.C.C.P.376)    179 
v.  Spooner  (3B.  &  S.  329)  503 

Sweet  v.  Carver  County  (16  Minn. 

106)  565 

r.  Wabash  (41  Ind.  7)  425 

Sweetzer  v.  I  lav  (2  Gray,  49)  300 

v.  Mead  (5  Mich.  107)  524 

Swenson  v.  Lexington  (69  Mo.  157)     842 

Swift  v.  Berry  (1  Boot,  448)  882 

v   Newport  (7  Bush,  37)  972 

r.  New  York  (17  Hun,  518)  557 

i,.  New  York  (83N   Y528)  1140,-1194 

v.  Poughkeepsie  (37  N.  Y.  514)    1151 

v.  Williamsburgh  (21  Barb.  427)  519, 

556,  1186 

Switzer  v.  Wellington  (28  Am.  L.  R. 

281)  163 

Swords  v.  Fdgar  (59  N.  Y.  28)  1205 

Sykes  v.  Columbus  (55  Miss.  115)       635, 

639,647,1034 

v.  Lafferty  (27  Ark.  407)  520 

v.  Pawlet  (43  Vt.  446)  L266 

Symmers  v.  Begem  (Cowp.  502)    334,340 

Symonds   t>.  Clay  Co.  Sup.  (71  111. 

355)  1172,  1174 

Syracuse  Nat.  Bank  v.  Seneca  Falls 

(15  Fed.  B.  783)  594 

Syracuse  Water  Co.  v.  Svracuse  (26 

N.  Y.  State  R.  304)  827 


Taber  v.  Grafmiller  (112  Ind.  451 )  059,  075 
r.  New  Bedford  (135  Mass.  162)  1127 
Tackaberry  v.  Keokuk  (32  Iowa,  155)949 
Tat't  v.  Montague  (14  Mass.285)  541 

v.  Pittsford  (28  N't   286)  518,559,502 
Taeeart   v.  Newport  St.  Ry.  Co.  (16 

B.  I.     )  893 

Tainter  v.  Morristown  (19  N.J.  Eq. 

46)  791,  1097 

r.  Worcester  (123  Mass.  311)  217,829, 

1199 

Talbot  v.  Dent  (9  B.  Mon.  520)       79,  225 

,-.  Hudson  (16  Gray,  417)        700,704 

v.  Taunton  (1  10  Mass.  552)  1255 

v.  Whipple  (7  Gray,  122)  1317 

Talbot   Co.  Com'rs  v.  Queen  Anne 

Co.  Com'rs  (50  Md.  245)  42 

Talbott  v.  Grace  (30  Ind.  389)        172,  754 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clix 


Page 

Talbott  v.  Richmond  &  D.   R.  Co. 

(31  Gratt.  686)  1 17,752 

Talcott  i>.   Pine  Grove  Tp.  (1  B.  & 

B.N.  s.  60)  579 

Tallahassee  v.  Fortune  (8  Fla.  19)      1281 

1295 
Tallapoosa  Co.  Coni'rs  Ct.  r.  Tarver 

(21  Ala.  661)  861,  1069,  1070 

Tallant  v.  Burlington  (39  Iowa,  643)    981, 

1140 
Tallman  v.  Janesville  (17  Wis.  71)  911 
Tahnaii  o.  Butler  County  (12  Iowa, 

531)  896 

Tanner  v.  Albion  (5  Hill,  121 )  450 

Tarlton,  Re  (2  Ala.  35)       715,  1125,  1126 
Tarner  v.  Walker  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  C. 

(ill)  209 

v.  Walker  (L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  301)         209 
Tarn-  v.  Ashton  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  D. 

314)  1270 

Tarver  v.  Tallapoosa  Co.  Com'rs  (17 

Ala.  627)  1069 

Tash  v.  Anams  (10  Cush.  252)       53,  222, 

1110 
Tate  v.  Mo.,  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  (64  Mo. 

149)  819,  1220 

v.  Ohio  &   Miss.  R.  Co.  (7   Intl. 

470)  795,  834,846 

Tatem  v.  Wright  (23  N.  J.  L.  429)        905 
Tavener's  Case  (T.  Raym.  446)  1063 

Tawney  v.  Lynn  &  Ely  Ry.  Co.  (16 

L.  J.  n.  s.  Eq.  282)  711 

Tax  Collector  v.  Dendinger  (38  La. 

An.  261)  146 

Tax  Court,  &e.  (50  Md.  417).      [See 

Appeal  Tax.  Ct.,  &c] 
Taylor,  Ex  p.  (58  Miss.  478)  903 

v.  Americus  (39  Ga.  59)         509,  1126 
v.  Austin  (32  Minn.  247)  1329 

v.  Boulware  (17  Tex.  74)  268 

v.  Boyd  (6:1  Tex.  533)  923,  956,  957 
v.  Csesar  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  461)  279 
v.  Carondelet  (22  Mo.  105)  386,  116, 
420,  677 
v.  Cedar  Rap.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(25  Iowa,  371)  672 

t;.  Chandler  (9  Heisk.  349)  926, 

927 
v.  Cumberland  (64  Md.  68)  1160,  1205 
v.  Douner  (31  Cal.  480)  940 

v.  Fort  Wayne  (47  I nd.  281)  265,  266, 
268,  740 
v.  Gloucester  (1  Roll.  409)  337 

v.  Gloucester  (3  Bulst.  190)    337,  339 
v.  Greenhalgh    (L.    R.    9   Q.  B. 

487)  1295 

v.  Griswold  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  222)       394. 

397,  403 

v.  Henry  (2  Pick.  397)    350.  371,  37  1. 

377,  378,  381 

v.  Lake  Shore  &.  M.  S.  R.  Co. 

(45  Mich.  74)  1312 

v.  Lainbertville   (43   N.   J.   Eq. 

107)  384,  523,  533 


PllgO 

Taylor  v.  Metrop   Elev.  Ry.  Co.  (21 

J.  &  s    112)  878 

v.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  (23  J.  &  S. 

:,:,:,)  878 

v.  Newherne    Com'rs    (2    Jones 

Eq.  ill  77,  226,287,  898 

v.  New  Y..rl,  (82  N.  V.  I'm  1142 

v.  Northampton  ('•>.  Sch.  Com'rs 

(5  Jones  1  1010 

v.  Palmer  (31  Cal.  240)  351,  407.  928, 

v.  Parish,    &c.    (L.    R.   0   C.    P. 

309)  279 

v  Peck  ham  (8  R.  I.  349)     1256,  1276 
v.  People  (66  III.  322)  1146 

v.  I'hila.  Ed.  of  II.  (31  Pa.  St. 

73)  1149,1151,1154 

r.  Fine  Bluff  (34  Ark.  603) 
v.  Plymouth  (8  Met.  462)    1163,  1164, 

1166 
v.  Porter  (4  Hill,  140)  694,  7ol 

v.  St  Louis  (14  Mo.  20)        814,  1223, 


1228 

204 

281 

1261 


t'.  Strong  (3  Wend.  384) 

v.  Taylor  (10  Minn.  112) 

v.  Yonkers  (105  N.  Y.  202) 
Taylor's  Case  (3  Bulst. ;  1  Rol. ;  3 
Salk.,  &c).     [See  King  v. 
Taylor,  &c] 

Taylors   of    Ipswich    (11   Rep. 

54  a)  486 

Taymouth  v.  Koehler  (35  Mich.  22)  540 
Tear  v.  Freebody  (4  C.  B.  x.  s.  228)  889 
Tearney  v.  Smith  (86  111.  391)  1223 

Tecumseh  v.  Phillips  (5  Neb.  305)  88,  321 
Teegarden  u.  Davis  (360.  St.  601)     1119 

v.  Racine  (56  Wis.  545) 
Teft  v.  Size  (10  111.  432) 
Tegarden  v.  McBean  (33  Miss.  283) 


152 
488 
760, 

to.; 


Telegraph  Co.,&c.  (76  111.  172). 

[See  Western  Union,  &c] 
Temperance  Hall  Assoc,  v.  Giles  (33 

N.  J.  L  260)  1309 

Templin  v.  Iowa  City  (14  Iowa.  50)    1323 
Ten   Eyck   r    Del.  &    R.  Canal  Co. 

(18  N.  J.  L.  20u)  97 

Tennessee  &  Ala.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams 

(3  Head.  696)  833,  853,  863 

Tenney  v.  East  NVarren  Lumber  Co. 

(43  X.  II.  343)  273 

v.  Lenz  (16  Wis.  566)  426,  128 

Tensas  Par.  Fol.  Jurv  v.  Britton  (15 

Wall.  506)  190,  193,  194,  199,238, 

531 

Terre  Haute  v.  Beach  (96  Ind.  143)      268 

v.  Iludnut  (112  [nd.  542)  1327 

v.  Lake  (43  Ind.  480)        391,  521,  524 

v.  T.  II.  Water  Works  (94  [nd. 

305)  672 

v.  Turner  (36  Ind.  522)  808,  819,  945, 
1220,  1221 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott  (74 

Ind.  20)  750 


jl* 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Terre  Haute  S   L   R.  Co. 

ind.  113) 
Terrett  u.  Sharon  (84  Conn.  105) 


Page 

Bissell 

856 
1109, 
1110 

v.  Taylor  [9Cranch,  43)  112,  115,  I  55 
Terry  v   New  York  (8  Bosw.  694)       1210 
v.  Wis.   M.  &  F.    Ins.  Co.  Bank 

(18  Wis.  87)  119 

Tesli   v.  Commonwealth     (4    Dana, 

522)  492 

Texas  «£  Pac.   By.  Co.   v.   Rosedale 

Street  Ry.  Co.   (64  Tex.  80)     868 
Texas  Transp.  Co.  v.  Boyd  (07  Tex. 

153)  ! 23,  956 

Textor  o.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (59  Md 

63)  212,465 

Thacher  v.  Jefferson  Co.  Com'rs  (13 

Kan.  182)  553 

Thatcher  v.  Adams  County  (19  Neb. 

185)  1007 

v.  England  (3  C.  B.  254)  209 

Thayer  v.  Boston  (I!)  Pick   511)  176,  754, 

854,  1183,  1187,    1188,  1189,  1195, 

1203,  1211,  1317 

v.  Montgomery    Co.     (3    Dillon 

C.  C.  389)  575,576 

v.  Tyler  (5  Allen,  95)  161 

Theobold  v.  Louisville,  &c.  Ry.  Co. 

(40  Alb.  L.  J.  835)  846 

Theological     Sem.     of     Auburn     v. 

Cliilds  (4  Paige,   418)  661 

Thetford's  Case  (12  Vin.  Abr.  90)       488 
Thibodeaux  v.  Maggioli   (4  La.  An. 

73)  801 

Thicknesse  v.  Lancaster   Canal  Co. 

(4  M.  &  W.  472)  242 

Third  Av.  R.  v.  New  York  (54  N.  Y. 

159)  1097,1098 

Third  Municipality,  &c.     [See  Muni- 
cipality No.  3.] 
Third    Nat.    Bank    of     Syracuse    v. 
Seneca    Falls     (15   Fed     R. 
783)  594 

Thirty-Second  Street,  Re  (19  Wend. 

128)  758 

Thomas,  Ex  p.  (71  Cal.  204)  904 

v.  Ashland  (12  O.  St.  124)  71,  80,  213, 

21  4,  507 

v.  Brooklyn  (58  Iowa,  438)  1272 

v.  Burlington  (69  Iowa,  140)         1149 

v.  Clav  Co.  Com'rs  (5  Ind.  4)  84 

r.  Dakin  (22  Wend.   9)  75 

v.  Gaines  (35  Mich.  156)  920,035,937, 

I  38   976,  hS9,  990 

v.  Hot  Springs  (34   Ark.  553)  452 

v.  Leland  (24  Wend.  65)  125,  130 

v.  Mt.  Vernon  (9  Ohio,  290)  43:;,  487, 

497 

v.  Port  Hudson  (27  Mich.  320)      190, 

194,  538 

v.  Richmond  (12  Wall.  349)    149,  195, 

394,  400,  518,  519,  629,   537,  663, 

567 

v.  Ringwood  Bd.  (L.  R.  9  Eq.  418)  745 


Page 
Thomas  v.  Scotland  County  (3  Dillon 

C.  C.7)  630,  631 

v.  West  Jersey  R.  Co.  (101  U.  S. 

70)  616,678,1191 

v.  White  ( 12  Mass.  869)  299,  300 

Thomason  v.  Ashworth  (73  Cal.  73)      144 
v.  Ruggles  (69  Cal.  466)  1007 

Thompson,  !:•  (52  Ala.  98)  1009 

v.  Abbott  (61  Mo.  176]  254 

v.  Allen  County  (116  U.  S.550)  1040 
v.  Bridgewater  (7  Pick.  188)  1265 
v.  Carroll  (22  How.  122)  394,961 
v.  Floyd  (2  .Jones,  L.  313)  898 

v.  Gibson  (7  M,  &  W.  546)  447 

v.  Keokuk  (61  Iowa.  187)  813 

v.  .Moran  (  II  Mich   602)  124,  660 

V.  Mt.  Vernon  (11  ( >.  St.  088)  406 

v.  New  York  (11  X.  Y.  115)  172,  177 
17.  Nicholson  (12  Rob.  (La.)  326)  298 
v.  Northeastern  liv.  Co.  (3  L.  T. 

n.s.  618)  1298 

v.  People  (23  Wend.  537)  1089 

17.  Perrine  (103  V.  S.  806)  572,635,650 
17.  Perrine  (106  I  .  S.589)  561,572,682 
v.  Pittston  (59  Me.  545)  224,  234 

v.  Schermerhom  (0  N.  Y.  92)  154,  155, 
707,  958 
v.  Stickney  (6  Ala.  579)  323,  326 

v.  Sunderland  Gas  Co.  (L.  R.  2 

Ex.  I).  429)  821 

17.  Waters  (25  Mich.  214)  656 

17.  Wiley  (46  X.J.  L.  170)  931 

Thompson,  Mayor,  v.  Park  Com'rs 

(44  Mich.  602)  124 

Thomson  v.  Boonville  (62  Mo.  282)     957, 

1224,  1229 

v.  Lee  County  (3  Wall.  327)  149,226, 

235,  250,  561,  583,  586,  635 

17.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (9  Wall.  579)  67, 

902 

Thorndike  v.  Boston  (1  Met.  245)         278 

Thornton  v.  Grant  (10  R.  I.  477)  170 

17.  Smith  (1  Wash.  (Va.)  106)        507 

Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt  (L.  K.  8  Ch.  Ap. 

650)  885,  886 

Threadgill  u  Anson  Co.  Com'rs  (99 

N.  C.  352)  1175 

Thurlow  v.  Bogart  (15  U.  C  C.  P.  1)    789, 

790 

Thurston  v.  Hancock  (12  Mass.  220)  1230 

17.  St.  Joseph  (61  Mo.  510)    70s,  1223, 

1230,  1319,  1327,  1329,  1332 

Tidderley's  Case  (1  Sid.  14)  328 

Tidewater  Co  t7.  Coster  (18  X.J.  Eq. 

518 )     703,  917, 1 120,  933, 937,  983, 

989 

Tie  Loy,  Re  (26  Fed.  R.  611)  397 

Tierney  v.  Dodge  (9  Minn.  160)     79,  1  13, 

492,  499  604,  609,  1 126 

Tiffin  17.  McCormick  (34  O.  St.  638)   1308 

t7.  Shawhan  (48  0.  St.  178)  678 

Tifft  v.  Buffalo  (82  N   Y.  201)  I'M 

Tileson  i7.  Newman  (23  Vt.  421)  272 

Tillman  v.  People  (12  Mich.  401)  745,  701 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxi 


Page 
Tillmes  b.  Marsh  (67  Pa.  St.  512)  790 

Tillson  v.  Putnam   Co.  Com'rs  (19 

Ohio,  415)  1030 

Tilton  v.  N.  O.  City  R.  Co.  (35  La. 

An.  1062)  833 

v.  Sanbornton  (55  X.  H.  010)         272 
Times  i>.  State  (26  Ala.  165)  606 

Timothy  v.  Simpson  ( 1  C.  M.  &  R. 

757)  295 

Timson,  Re  (L.  R.  5  Exch.  257)  295 

Tindley  v.  Salem  (137  Mass  171)  1177, 
1178,  1182,  1215,  1246,  1251 
Tinges  v.  Baltimore  (61  Md.  600)  751,  757 
Tinkham  v.  Tapscott  (17  N.  Y.  144)  463 
Tinsley  v.  Kirby  (17  S.  C.  1)  298,  356 
Tinsman  r.  Belvidere  Del.  R.  Co.  (26 

X.  J.  L.  148)  94,  95 

Tintagel  Bor.,  ft  (2  Str.  1003)  102:; 

Tipling  v.  Texall  (2  Bulst.  233)  37 

Tippecanoe  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Cox    (6 

Iml.  403)     241,  240,  250,  529,  568 
v.  Lucas  (93  U.  S.  108)  104 

v.  Reynolds  (44  Ind.  509)  514 

Tipping  v.  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co. 

(4  B.  &  S  608)  485 

Tipton  o.  Jones  (77  Ind.  307)  558 

r.  Norman  (72  Mo.  380)  410,  488,  939 
v.   Rogers   Locomotive    Works 

(103  U.  S.  523)  672 

Tisdale  v.  Minnonk  (40  111.  9)  485 

v.  Norton  (8  Mete.  388)  1265,  1267 
Titler  v.  Iowa  County  (48  Iowa,  90)  1173 
Titus  v.  Northbridge  (97  Mass.  258)  1278 
Tobacco  Pipe  Makers'  Co.  v.  Wood- 

roffe  (7  B.  &  C  838)  486 

Tobey  v.  Hudson  (2  N.  Y.  Sup.  180)  1286 

v.  Wareham  (2  Allen,  594)  347 

Todd  v.  Birdsall  (1  Cow.  260)  321 

v.  Perry  (20  U.  C.  Q.  B.  649)         301 

v.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(19  0.  St.  514)  750,767 

v.  Troy  (61  N.  Y.  506)        1261,  1267, 

1284,  1296 

Tolan  v.  Lansing  (38  Mich.  315)         1181 

Toledo  &  W.  K.  Co.  v.  Lafayette  (22 

Ind.  262)  968 

Toledo  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Chenoa  (43 

111.  209)  140,  808,  858 

Toledo,  W.  &  W.  It.  Co.  v.  Jackson- 
ville (67  111.  37)  858 
Tolland  v.  Wellington  (20  Conn.  578)  881, 

882,  1258 
Toll  Bridge  Co.,  &c.  (17  Conn.  40). 
[See  Enfield  Toll  Br.  Co., 
&c] 
(30     Conn.    380).      [See    New 
Haven  &  E.  II.  Toll  Bridge 
Co.,  &c] 
Tolman  v.  Marlborough  (3  N.  H.  57)  1191 
Tomlin  v.  Dubuque,  B.  &  M.  R.  Co. 

(32  Iowa,  106)  171 

Tomlinson  v.  Branch  (15  Wall.  400)     953 

Tompert  v.  Lithgow  (1  Bush,  170)       287, 

330,  337,  339 

VOL.  I.  —  k 


Page 

Toms  v.  Whitby  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  1 

37  U.  C   'i  B.  LOO)       L268,  12<,I 

Tonawanda    R.   <  !o.   v.   Blunger   |  i 

Denio,  266)  1284 

Tone  r.  Columbus  (39  O.  St.  281)         980 
v.  New  York  (70  N.  Y.  157)    557,  558, 

inn 

Tone  River  Cons.  v.   Ash  (10  B.  & 

74,  75 


1262 

1281 
352 


C.  349) 
Toomey  *•.   London,  B.  ,v  ('.  I;.  Co 

{■.',  c.  B.  v  a   i  16) 
Topeka  v.  Gillett  (32  Kan.  131) 

v.  Tuttle  (5  Kan.  125) 
Topping  v.  Gray  (7  Hill,  259) 
Topsham  v.  Rogers  I  (2  N't.  199) 
Torbush  v.  Norwich  (38  Conn.  225)  119,3, 

L199 
Toronto  v.  Bowes  (4  Grant,  489)  514,  516 
v.  Bowes  (6  Grant,  1)  1105 

Torpedo  Co.  v.  Clerendon  (19  Fed. 

R.  231)  1098 

Torrent  v.  Muskegon  (47  Mich.  115)    140, 

152,  211 
Torrey  v.  Milbury  (21  Pick.  64)  53,  349 
Totten  v.  Halligan  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  567)  789 
Totterdell  u.  Glazbv  (2  Wils.  266)  484 
Touchard  v.  Touchard  (5  Cal.  300)  108 
Tounier  v.  Municipality  (5  La.  An. 

298) 
Tower  r.  Rutland  (56  Vt.  28) 
Towle  v.  State  (3  Fla.  202) 
Towles  v.  Chatham  Co.  Inf.  Ct.  Just. 

(14  Ga.  391) 
Town  v.  Blackberry  (29  111.  137) 
Town  Com'rs  of  A.,  &c.      [See  A. 

T.  Com'rs,  &c.] 
Town  Council  of  A.,  &c.      [See  A. 

T.  Council,  &c.J 
Towns  v.  Tallahassee  (11  Fla.  130) 
Townsend,  /,'-  (34  X    V.  174) 
v.  Des  Moines  (42  Iowa,  657) 
17.  Everett  (4  Ala.  607) 
v.  Hoyle  (20  Conn.  1)      531,  705,  807 
Township  of  A.,  &c.      [See  A.  Tp., 

&c] 
Tracy  v.  Swart wout  (10  Pet.  80)  326 

Trafton  v.  Alfred  (15  Me.  258)  320 

Trammed   v.  Russellville   (34    Ark. 

105)  1157,  1187 

Transportation  Co.,  &e.  (20  N. 

Y.  381).  [See  American 
Transp.  Co.,  &c.]  ;  (99 
O.  s  273;  107  U.  8.  091;  9 
W.  Va.  170.)  |  See  Wheel- 
ing, P.  &  C.  Transp.  Co., 
&c]  (99  U.  S.  635).  [See 
Northern  Transp.  Co.,  &c.  ] 
Tranter  v.  Sacramento  (01  Cal.  271 )  1169, 

L294 
Traphagen  v.  Jersey  City  (29  X.  J. 

Eq.206)  819,1123 

Trask  o.  Maguire  (18  Wall.  206)  952 

Treadway  >■  Schnauber  (1  Dak.  Ter. 

236)  518 


655 

701 
1010 

882 
694 


429 

704 

1301 

301 


clxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Treadwell   v.   Hancock   Co.   Com'rs 

(11  0.  St.  l'JO)    43,  615,  018,  647, 

1178 

v.  New  York  (1  Daly,  123)  1210,  121 1 

Treat  v.  Micklletown  (8  Conn.  243)    1007, 

11(17 
Treise  v.  St.  Paul  (36  Minn.  526)  1270 
Trent   &    F.    Road   Co.   v.    Marshall 

(10  U.  C  C.  P.  336)  260 

Trenton  v.  Shaw  (10   Atl.   R.  273; 

19  \   J.  L.  339)  543 

Trenton  &  N.  B.  Tump.  Co.  v.  Am.  & 

E.  N.  Co.  (43  N.J.  L.  381)      831 
Trenton    Railroad   Case   (6   Whart. 
25).     [See  Phila.  &  T.    K. 
Co.,  &c] 
Trenton   Water  1'.  Co.  v.   Raff  (36 

N.  J.  L.  335)  1222 

Trescott   v.   Waterloo  (26   Fed.    R. 

592)  1157,  1190 

Trigally  v.  Memphis  (6  Coldw.  382)    385, 

412,  507 
Trigg  v.  Glasgow  (2  Bush,  594)  963 

Trimble  v.  Bueyrus  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  76) 

438 
Tripp  v.  Lyman  (37  Me.  250)  1261,  1302 
Tripp,  Treas.  v.  Merch.  Mut.  F.  Ins. 

Co.  (12  R.  1.435)  969 

Trippe  v.  Frazier  (4  II.  &  J.  446)  666 

Tritz  v.  Kansas  City  (84  Mo  632)      1157, 

1173,  1279,  1283 

Trombley  v.   Humphrey   (23  Mich. 

471)  697 

Trott  v.  Warren  (11  Me.  227)  539 

Trowbridge  v.  Albany  (7  Hill,  429)      177 

v.  Brookline  (144  Mass.  139)  820 

v.  Newark  (46  N.  J.  L.  140)    290,  296 

Troy  v.  Atchison  &  N.  R.  Co.  (13 

Kan.  70)  376,  389 

v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.  (23  N.  H.  83)    810, 

883 
v.  Mut.  Bank  (20  N.  Y.  387)  948 

v.  Troy  &  L.  R.  Co.  (49  N.Y.  657)  1304, 

1313 
Truax  v.  Pool  (40  Iowa,  256)  268 

Truchelut  v.  Charleston  C.  Council 

(1  N.  &  McC  227)    134,  409,  485, 
507 
True  v.  Melvin  (43  N.  H.  503)  1056 

Truesdale  v  Peoria  Grape  Sugar  Co. 

(115111.155)  855 

Truheart  v.  Addicks  (2  Tex.  217)        281 
Trumbull  v.  White  (5  Hill,  46)  958 

Trumpler  v.  Bemerly  (39  Cal.  490)       707 
Trustees  of  A.,  &c.   [See  A.  Trs.,  &c.] 
Trustees  of  Schools  of  A.,  &c.    [See 

School  Trustees,  &c] 
Tubbesing  v.  Burlington  (68  Iowa, 

691 )  973 

Tuckahoe  Canal  Co.  v.  T.  &  J.  River 

R.  Co.  (11  Leigh,  42)  430 

Tucker  v.  Aikin  (7  N.  II.  113)       321,  349 

v.  Eldred  (6  R.  I.  404)  816 

w.  Hennecker  (41  N.  II.  317)         1264 


Page 
Tucker  v.  Iredell  Co.  Jus.  (13  Ired. 

L.  434)  323,  367 

v.  Randolph  (75  N.  C.  267)  193 

v.  Rochester  (7  Wind.  254)  1191 

r.  Shorter  (17  Ga.  620)  323 

v.  Tower  (9  Pick.  109)  816 

v.  Virginia  City  (4  Nev.  20)    217,442 
Tuff  v.  Wurman  (2  C.  B.  n.  s.  740; 

5  C.  B.  n.  s.  573)  1264 

Tufts  v.  Charlestown  (98  Mass.  583)     984 
Tugman  v.  Chicago  (78  111.  405)  396,  400, 

401,  443 
Tuleyr.  State  (1  Ind.  500)  303,304 

Tullos  v.  Sedan  (31  Kan.  105)  424 

Tupelo  v.  Beard  (56  Miss.  532)  1154 

Turnbull  v.  Alpena   Sch.  Dist.   (45 

Mich.  496)  271 

Tnrner,  Be  (5  Ohio,  542)  1004,  1014 

v.  Althaus  (6  Neb.  54)  696,  974, 1151 
v.  Brantford  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  109) 

1248 
v.  Buchanan  (82  Ind.  147)  1269,  1270 
v.  Clark  County  (67  Mo.  243)  300 
v.  Cruzen  (70  Iowa,  202)  539 

v.  Dartmouth  (13  Allen,  291)  1320 
v.  Forsyth  (3  S.  O.  E.  R.  649)  1032 
v.  Indianopolis  (96  Ind.  51)  1195, 1199, 

1296 

v.  Newburgh  (109  N.  Y.  301)       1278, 

1297   1303 

v.  Omaha  (6  Neb.  54)  '    899 

v.  People's  Ferry  Co.  (21  Fed.  R. 

90)  165.  748,  752 

Turney  v.  Bridgeport  (55  Conn.  412)     524 

v.  Chamberlain  (15  111.  271)    659,  801 

Turnpike  Co.,  &c.  (5  Ind.  286). 

[See  Wayne  Bo.,  &c-l  (72 
Ind.  226).  [See  Driftwood, 
feci  (11  Johns.  154).  [See 
Highland,  &c]  (17  N.  J. 
L.  314).  [See  Bordentown, 
&c.]  (96  U.  S.  63).  [See 
St.  Clair  Co.,  &c  ] 
Turpen  v.  Tipton  Co.  Com'rs  (7  Ind. 

172)  311 

Turrill  v.  Grattan  (52  Cal.  97)  979 

Tuskaloosa  v.  Wright  (2  Porter,  230)  382 
Tutill  v.  West  Ham  L.  Bd.  of  H.  (L. 

R.  8C.  P.  447)  1265 

Tuttle  v.  Everett  (51  Miss.  27)  1146,  1150 

v.  Holyoke  (6  Gray,  447)  1263 

v.  State  (4  Conn  68)  475 

Twenty-Ninth    Street,   Re   (1    Hill 

(N.  Y.),  189)  758 

Twiss  v.  Port  Huron  (63  Mich.  528)     544 
Twogood  w.  New  York  (102  N.Y. 

216)  1297 

Tyler  v.  Hudson  (147  Mass.  609)   690,697 

v.  People  (GC>  111.  322)  950 

v.  Sturdy  (108  Mass.  196)  740 

Tyler's  Ex.  v.  Eliz.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (9 

Bush,  510)  633 

Tyrone   Tp.    Sch.  Dir.  v.  Dunkle- 

berger  (6  Pa.  St.  31)  668 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxiii 


Page 
Tyson  v  Halifax  Sen.  Dir.  (51   Pa. 

St.  '.»)  234 

i>.  Milwaukee  (50  Wis.  78)    1225,  1227 


U. 


Udall  v.  Brooklyn  Trs.  (19  Johns.  175)  2C3 
Uhl  v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax.  Dist.  (6  Lea, 

010)  251 

Uhrig  v.  St.  Louis  (44  Mo.  458)  933 

Ulam  v.  Boyd  (87  Pa.  St.  477)  526 

Uline  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

(101  N.  Y.  98)  855,856,876 

Underhill  v.  Calhoun  (63  Ala.  216)       160, 

L62 
v.  Manchester  (45  N.  H  214)  1167 
v.  Smith  (Chip.  (  Vt.)  81)  1000 

v.  Sonora  Trs  (17  Cal.  172)  561 

Underwood  v.  Bailey  (59  N.  H.  480)    696 
».  Brockman  (4  Dana,  309)  1153 

v.  Carney  (1  Cush.  (Mass.)  285)    888 
v.  Green  (42  N.  Y.  140)  449,  450 

v.  Newport  Lyceum  (5  B.  Mon. 

130)  538 

v.  Stuyvesant  (19  Johns.  186)         758 

Union  v.  Crawford  (19  Conn.  331)       1172 

Union  Bank  v.  State  (9  Yerg.  490)       900 

Union   Build.  Assoc,  v.  Chicago  (til 

111.  439)  994 

Union  Co.  v.  Peckham  (12  Atl.  R. 

130)  757 

Union  Co.  Com'rs  v.  Mason  (9  Ind. 

97)  569 

Union  Depot  Co.  v.  Brunswick  (31 

Minn.  297)  169 

v.  St.  Louis  (76  Mo.  393)  1140 

Union  Ferry  Co.  Re  (98  N.  Y.  139)       826 
Union  Nat.   Bank   v.  Matthews   (98 

U.  S.  628)  671 

v.  New  York  (51  N.  Y.  638)         1146, 

1147 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  County 

(9  Neb.  449)  206 

v.  Cheyenne  (113  U.S.  516)    143,148, 
152,  1121 
v.  folfax    Co.  Com'rs  (4   Neb. 

450)  575 

v.  Davis   Co.   Com'rs    (6    Kan. 

256)  121,  626,  1060 

v.  Dodge  Com'rs  (98  U.  S.  541)   1147, 

1149,  1150,  1154,  1155 

v.  Hall  (91  U.  S.  343)  1057,  1058 

v.  Lincoln  County  (1  Dillon,  C. 

C.  314)  67,  902 

v.  Lincoln  County  (2  Dillon,  C. 

C.  297)  1107 

v.  Lincoln  County  (3  Dillon,  C. 

O.  300)  590 

v.  McSuane  (22  Wall.  444)  1156 

v.  Merrick  County  (3  Dillon,  C. 

C.  359)  590 

v.  Penniston  (18  Wall.  5)  902 

v.  Ryan  (2  Wy.  408)  148,  152 


re- 
union Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  (23  Kan. 

745)  233 

v.  United  State-  (99  U.  S.  700)      115, 
117.       [See     also     Central 
Branch,  ('.  P.,  &C.1 
Union  Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 
(47  Pa.  St.  814) 
v.  Philadelphia  (101   U.  S.  528)       967 
Union  R.  Co.  v.  Cambridge  (11  Allen, 

287)  467 

Uniontown  Bor.  v.  Commonwealth 

(34  Pa.  St.  293)  1017 

Union  Tp.  v.  Gibboney  (94  Pa.  St. 

534)  45 

United  Brethren  Church  v.  Van  Du- 

sen  (37  Wis.  54)  369 

United  States,  Re  (96  N.  Y.  227)  720 

v.  Addison  (6  Wall.  291)        317,  319 

r.  Addison  (22  How.  174)    1024,  1074 

v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (17  Wall. 

322)       93,  94,  108,  125,  129,  160, 

951,  952,  1290 

v.  Barker  (2  Paine,  152)  321 

v.  Boice  (2  McLean,  352)  321 

v.  Boutelle  (17  Wall.  604)  1047,  1048, 

1051,  1061 

v.  Boyd  (5  How.  29)  301 

v.  Bradley  ( 10  Pet.  343)  297,  299 

v.  Brooklyn  (8  Fed.  R.  473)  1032 

v.  Brown  (9  How.  487)  312 

v.  Chicago  (7  How.  185)  697,  739,  750, 

756,  759 

v.  City  Bank  of  Columbus  (21 

How.  356)  615 

v.  Clark  County  (96  U.  S.  211)  1034 
v.  County  Court  (3  Fed.  R.  1)  118 
v.  Dulutli  (1  Dill.  469)  lti5 

v.  Edmunds  (3  Mackey,  142)  1010 
v.  Fanning  Morris  (Iowa),  348)  182 
v.  Fillebrown  (7  Pet.  28)  376 

v.  Fort  Scott  (99  U.  S.  152)  196,  200, 

1033 
v.  Guthrie  (17  How.  284)  1015 

v.  Hart  (Pet.  (C.  C.)  390)  785 

t;.  Hodsen  ( 10  Wall.  395)  299 

v.  Hoar  (2  Mason  C.  C.  134)  797 

v.  Holly  (3  Cranch,  656)  437 

v.  Hudson  (7  Cranch,  32)  332 

v.  Johnson  County  (5  Dillon  C.  C. 

207  n.)  1040 

v.  Keokuk  (6  Wall.  514)  1032,  1045 
v.  Kirkpatrick  (9  Wheat.  U.  S. 

735)  797 

i'.  Land  Commissioners  (5  Wall. 

663)  1015 

v.  Lawrence  (3  Dallas,  42)  lOi'ifi 

v.  Le  Baron  (19  How    7:!)  297 

v.  Lincoln  County  (5  Dillon  C  C. 

184)  1036.  1040 

v.  Linn  (15  Pet.  290)  297,299 

t'.  Macon  Co.  Ct.  (99  U.  S.  582)     946, 

1028,  1033,  1034,  1035 

v.  McKelden  (McAr.  &  M.  162)     348 

350 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Page 

United  States  i>.  Memphis  ('.'7  D.  S. 

284)     99,  105,  L06,  267,  281,  932, 

:.  1042 
v.  Miller  County  Ct.  (4  Dillon, 

233)  567 

I)  Mobile  Port  (12  Fed.  K.  768)  118 
v.  New  Orleans  I  17  Fed.  R.483)  1028 
r.  New  Orleans  31  Fed.  R.  637)  152 
r.  New  Orleans  (98  I'.  S.  381)  674, 
901,  939,  '.'l".  946,  L028,  L030, 
L038 
v.  New  Orleans  (2  Woods,  230)  226 
v.  Oswego  Tp.  (28  Fed.  R.  55)  1033 
v.  Ottawa  Ami.  (28  Fed.  R.407)  1030, 

1032 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.  (120  U.  S.  227)  1164 
v.  Prescott  (3  How.  578)  323 

v.  Railroad  Br.  Co.  (6  McLean, 

517)  696 

v.  Seaman  (17  How.  225)  1015 

/.    Silverman    (4   Dillon   C.  C. 

224)  1045 

v.  Thompson  (98  U.  S.  487)  797 

v.  Tingey  (5  Pet.  115)  297 

v.  Union  Pac.   R.  Co.  (4  Dillon 

C.  C.  479)  1063,  1071 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (91  U.  S. 

343)  862,870 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  (91  U.  S. 

72)  582 

v.  Vernon  Co.  Ct.  (2  Cent.  L. 

J.  771  ;  3  Dillon  C.  C.  281)    1055 
v.  Wright  (1  McLean,  509)     307,  309 
United  States  Bank,  &e.  (12  Wheat. 
64).     [See  Bank  of    U.  S., 
&c] 
United   States   Distilling  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago (112  111.  19)  424 
United    States   Exp.  Co.    v.  Ellyson 

(28  Iowa,  370)  910 

University  of  Ala.   v.  Walden    (15 

Ala.  655)  313 

v.  Winston  (6  S.  &  P.  17)         103,  123 
University  of  Md.  v.  Williams  (9  G. 

&  J.  365)      97,  123,  241,  307,  308, 
357 
University  of  Mich.   v.  Detroit   (12 

Mich.  138)  524 

University  of   Neb.  v.  McConnell   (5 

Neb.  423)  97,  103,  321 

University  of  N.  Car.  v.  Maultsby  (8 

Ired.  Eq.  257)  103 

University,    &c.    (80  III.  333). 

[See    Northwestern  Univer- 
sity, &c] 
Updegraff  v.  Crans  (47  Pa.  St.  103)     852, 

1095 
Updike  v  Campbell  (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

570)  450 

Upham  v.  Worcester  (113  Mass.  97)      7:11 
Upper  Alloways  Creek  Tp.  v.  String 

15  Halst.  323)  260 

Upton  v.  So.  Heading  R.  Co.  (8  Cush. 

600)  731 


Pag* 
Upton  v.  Starr  (.')  Ind    I  :'.L'l 

L'rmey's    Ex.    v.  Wooden     (1   O.   St. 

160)  068 

Urquhart  v.  Ogdensburgh  (97  N.  Y. 

238)  1273,  1323 

Utica  v.  -Miller  (02  Ind.  230)  557 

Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott  (8  Cow.  708)    1089 


Vail  v.  Beach  (10  Kan.  214)  952 

Vale  Mills  v.  Nassau  (63  N.  II.  136)  1325 
Valentine  v.  St.  Paul  (34  Minn.  446)  1 1 17 
Valley  Dist.  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Alpena  Tp. 

Bd.  of  Ed.  (30  W.  \  a.  421)  272 

Valparaiso  v.  Gardner  (97  Ind.  1)    203, 

205,  206,  550,  1109,  1113,  1116, 

1117 

Valpey  v.  Manley  (1  C.  B.  592)  1149 

Van  Antwerp,  fie   (66  N.  Y.  201)   90,  895, 

912  993 
Vanarsdall  v.  State  (65  Ind.  176)  '  677 
Vanblaricum  v.  State  (7  Blackf.  209)  733 
Vance  v.  F.  &  N.  Bank  (1  Blackf.  80)   68, 

138 

v.  Little  Rock  (30  Ark.  435)  105,  147, 

939,  1028 

Vanderbilt  v.  Adams  (7  Cowen,  349)    212, 

216,  405,  472 

Vanderslice  v.  Philadelphia  (103  Pa. 

St.  102)  1297,  1331 

Vandersmith's  Case    (10  Pa.  Law  J. 

52:i )  788 

Vanderwiele   v.    Taylor   (65   N.   Y. 

341)  1316,1323 

Vandeveer  v.  Mattocks  (3  Ind.  479)  295 
Vandine,  Re  (6  Pick.  187)  404,  441 

Vandyke  v.  Cincinnati    (1   Disnev, 

532)  4-15.  1262,  1297 

Van  Epps  v.  Mobile  Com'rs'  Ct.  (25 

Ala.  460)  1173 

Van  Hook  v.  Selma   (70  Ala.  361)    424, 

944 
Van  Horn  v.  Des  Moines  (63  Iowa, 

447)  1200 

Van    Hostrup    v.    Madison    City   (1 

Wall.  291)  151,  585,  593,618,620 
Van  Keuren  v.  Johnson    (3  Denio, 

182)  321 

Van  Ness  v.  Washington  (4  Pet.  232)  770 
Van  Orsdall  v.  Hazard  (3  Hill,  243)     278, 

307,  308 
Vanover  v.  Davis,  Jus.  Terrell  Co. 

Inf.  Ct.  (27  Ga.  354)      210,  1119 
Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport  (42  Iowa,  308)  807, 
1195,  1298,  1310,  1328 
Van  Riper  v.  Essex  Put.  R.  Bd.  (38 

N.  J.  L.  23)  1222 

Vansant  ;•.  Harlem  Stage  Co.  (59  Md. 

330)  425,  940 

v.  Roberts  (3  Md.  119)  262 

Van  Sicklen  v.  Burlington  (27  Vt.  70)    53 

217 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Cl.W 


Page 
Van  Swartow  v.  Commonweal tli  (2  1 

Pa.  St.  131)  192,  601,  606 

Vantilburgh  v.  Shann  (24  N.  J.  L. 

740)  985 

Van  Valkenburu'li  V.  Milwaukee  (30 

Wis.  338)  769 

Van   Wert   Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Edson  (is 

0.  St.  221)  769,  773 

Van  Wickle  v.  Camden  &  A.  K.  Co. 

(14  N.  J.  L.  L62)  707 

Van  Wormer  v.  Albany  (18  Wend. 

169)  II- 

Varden  v.  Mount  (78  Ky.  86)        416,  418 
Varick  v.  New  York  (4  Johns.  Ch 

53)  803,  1094,  1097 

o.  Smith  (6  Paige,  137)    694,  700,  To:; 

Varner  v.  Martin  (21  W.  Va.  534)         696 

r.  Nobleborough  (2  Me.  121)  500 

,-.  St.    Louis  &   C  R.   Co.    (55 

Iowa,  677)  672 

Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs  (52  Iowa, 

608)  1297 

Vars  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  (23  U. 

C.  C.  P.  143)  885,  1270 

Vason  v.  Augusta  (38  Ga.  542)      158,  291, 

438,400,  500 

v.  So.  Car.  11.  Co.  (43  Ga.  631)       834 

Vassault  v.  Austin  (36  Cal.  691)  403 

Vawter  v.  Franklin  College  (53  Ind. 

88)  368,  373 

Veale  v.  Boston  (135  Mass.  187)  1208 

Veazie  v.  China  (50  Me.  518)  158,  224 

v.  Mayo  (45  Me.  560;   49  Me. 

L56)  859 

v.  Penobseott    R.    Co.    (49    Me. 

119)  1011,  1313 

v.  Rockland  (68  Me.  511)  1140 

Veazie  Bank  v.  Fenno  (8  Wall.  533)     896 

Vceder  v.  Lima  (10  Wis.  280)        237,  644, 

015,  017 

v.  Little  Falls  (100  N.  Y.  343)      1247, 

1258,  1268 

Venice  v.  Breed  (65  Barb.  597)  584 

v.  Murdock  (92  U.  S.  404)     581,  593, 

601,  602,  644 

Ventura  County  v.  Thompson    (51 

Cal.  577)  707,  733 

Vermilye  v.  Adams  Express  Co.  (21 

Wall.  138)  651 

Vernon   Soc.   Trs.   v.  Hills  (6  Cow. 

23)  304,305,355 

Verrill  v.  Minot  (31  Me.  209)  1288 

Verriorr.  Sandwich  (1  Sid.  305)  308 

Vespra  v.  Cook  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  182)     700 
Vick  o.  Vicksburg  (1  Miss.  379)  743 

Vicksburg  v.  Hennessey  (54   Miss. 

000)  1205,  1280 

v.  Lombard  (51  Miss,  p26)      L93,  584 

v.  Marshall  (59  Miss  573)       TOT,  804 

v.  Tobin  (100  U.S.  130)  L65 

Victory  v.  Baker  (67  N.  Y.  366)  1012 

Vidal  r.  Phila.,  Girard's  Ex.,  Sua.  (2 

How.  127)        002,  663,  664,  669, 
1115 


Page 
Village  of  A.,  &c.     [See  A.  Village, 

&c  | 
Villavoso  v.  Barthet  (39  La.  An.  247)  149, 

Vinal  v.  Dorchester  (7  Gray,  121)       1252, 

L315 
Vincennes  v.  Richards  (23  Ind.  381)  122  1 
Vincennes  University  v.  Indiana  (14 

How.  268)  "        68,  248,  244,  210 
Vincent  v.  Lincoln  County  (80  Fed. 

R.  710)  1140 

v.  Nantucket  (12  Cush.  100)    50,  147, 
221 
Vintners'  Co.  v.  Passey  (1  Burr  237 

306,  401,  1st,  1-0 
Vionet  v.  Municipality  (4  La.  An.  12)  1 12 
Virginia  v   Hall  (or,  iu.  278)  991 

Virginia  &  Tenn.  B.  Co.  v.  Washing- 
ton County  (30  Gratt.  471)    900, 
Oil) 
Virginia  Com'rs,  Ex  p.   (112  U.  S. 

177)  1010 

Virginia  Coupon  Case  (114  U  S.  Oil). 

[See  Allen  v.  Bait.  &0.,&c.] 
Virginia  Citv  v.  Chollar-Potosi  Co. 

(2  \ev.  86)  TO,  110 

Visalia  v.  Jacobs  (65  Cal.  434)  754 

Visitors  of  St.  John's  Col.  v.  State 

(15  Md.  330)  loo 

Vogel  v.  New  York  (02  N.  Y.  10)        1303 
Volk  v.  Newark  (47  N.  J.  L.  117)  3  »7 

Volkenning,  ft  (52  N.  Y.  050)  89 

Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy  (4  Wall.  535)  118, 

121,  25u,  585,042.  042,  1027,  1028, 
1032,  1037,  1000 
Von    Phul    v.    Hammer    (20    Iowa, 

222)  79,  84 

Vorrath  v.    Hoboken   (49  N.   J.    L. 

285)  1253 

Vosper  v.  New  York  (49  N.  Y.  Supr. 

Ct.  200,  12T6 

Vosse  v.  Memphis  (9  Lea,  294)  971 


\V. 


Wabash  v.  Alber  (88  Ind.  428)  1222 

Wabaunsee   Co.  Com'rs  v.  Muhlen- 

backer(18  Kan   129)  134 

V.  Walker  (8  Kan.  431)  1148 

Wichita.  &C.      [See  Ouachita,  &&] 

Waco  o.  1'owell  (32  Tex.  2  4T1 

Waddell  v.  New  York  (8  Barb.  95)      557, 

220 
Waddington  'v.   St.  Louis   (11   Mo. 
190)  166 

Wade  v.  Brantford  (19  V  C.  Q    B 

207)  11 12.  1183 

v.  Richmond  (18  Gratt.  583)  267, 

1109,  1111 

Wadleigh  v.  Gilman  (12  Me.  403)       212, 

216,393,  172,  174 

v.  Sutton  (6  N.  H.  15|  541 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


r.i.-i 
Wad-worth  v.  Ean  Claire  Co.  Sup. 

(102  I     -  '''11 

Waffle  ».  Y  Y.  Cunt.  K.  Co.  (58  Barb. 

413)  1333 

v.  Y  V.  Cent.   R.  Co.  (63  N.  Y. 

11)  1380 

Wagerw.Troy  Onion, &c.R.  Co.  (25 

N.  Y.  526)  747,791,  841,  842,  870 
Wahle  r.  Reinbach  (76  111.  322)  149 

Wain  v.  Philadelphia  (99  Pa.  St.  330) 

107 
Waite  v.  No.  E.  R.  Co.  (E.  B.  &  E. 

719)  1264 

Wakefield  i:  Newport  (f,()  X.  II.  374)  1182 

v.  Pawtucket  (12  R.  I.  75)  1222,  1318 

«;.  People  (17  Mich.  68)  971 

v.  Swampscott  (1  Allen,  101)      1193, 

1202 

v.  Walcott  (19  Vt.  37)  361 

Walden  v.  Dudley  ( 19  Mo.  419)  95:; 

Waldo  v.  Wallace     12  Ind.  669)  292,  140, 

493 
Waldraven  v.  Memphis   (4   Coldw. 

431)  296,  314 

Waldron  v.  Berry  (51  N.  II.  136)        324, 

1202 
v.  Haverhill  (143  Mass.  582)        1187, 

1211 
v.  Lee  (5  Pick.  323)  272 

Wales  >:  Muscatine  (4  Iowa,  302)         102 
Walker  v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (1 

Bailey  Eq.  143)  1090 

v.  Chicago  (62  III  286)  958 

v.  Cincinnati  (21  ().  St.  14)  229 

v.  Cook  (129  Mass.  577)  161 

v.  Decatur   County    (67    Iowa, 

307)  t  1286 

v.  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  (6 

Hare,  544)  711 

v.  Hallock  (32  Ind.  239)  325 

v.  Mad   River  &  L.  E.  R.  Co.  (8 

Ohio,  38)  710 

v.  New  Orleans  (31  La.  An.  828)  428 
v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  563)  1148,  1150 
v.  St.  Paul  (33  Minn.  87)  1297 

v.  Springfield  (94  III.  364)  905.  910 
v.  State  Harbor  Coni'rs  (17  Wall. 

648)  170 

v.  Swartwont  (12  Johns.  444)  328 
v.  West    Boylston    (128    .Mass. 

550)  281 

Walkley  V.  Muscatine  (6  Wall.  481)  1005, 

1028,  1083,  1037,  1040 

Wall,  Re  (48Cal.  279)  7s,  386 

Wallace  v.  Fee  (60  N.  Y.  694)  774 

v.  Lawyer  (54  Ind.  501)  161,  162 

v.  Menasha  |  18  Wis.  79)      1190,  1205 

r.  Muscatine     (49    G.     Greene. 

373)  1324 

v.  San  Jose  (29  Cal.  180)        149,  201, 

206,  208,  518 

v.  Sharon  Trs.  (84  N.  C  164)  140,674 

v.  Shelton  (14  La.  An.  498)    72^,  909, 

924 


Page 
Waller  v.  Dubuque  (69  Iowa,  541)     1202, 

1220 
Wallich  r.  Manitowoc  (57  Wis.  9)  1218 
Walling  '••  Shreveport   (6  La.  An. 

660)     718,  1186,  1187,  1189,  1204 
Walnut  Tp.  v.  Jordan  (38  Kan.  662)    255, 

v.  Rankin  (70  Iowa,  05)  552 

Walsh  r.  Augusta  (67  Ga.  293)  203 

v.  Matthews  cs.<  Cal.  128)  923 

v.  New  York  |  II  Eun, 299;  107 

N.  V.  220)  1196 

r.  New  Vork  &   B.  Br.  Trs.  (96 

N.  V    129)  1196 

v.  People  (65  111.  58)  1134 

Walston  v.  Nevin  (128  U.  S.  578)         932 

Walter  r.  Columbia  (61  Ind.  24)  433 

Waltham  v.  Kemper  (55  111.  346)        1173, 

124G,  1253 
Waltman  v.  Rund  (109  Ind.  366)  740 

Walton  v.  Develing  (61  111.  201)  286, 

1077 
Walworth  Co.  Bank  r.  Farmer's  L. 

&  T.  Co.  (16  Wis.  629)  369 

Wamesit  P.  Co.  v.  Allen  (108  Mass. 

352)  Co 

Wammack  v.  Holloway  (2  Ala.  31)     283, 
285,  509,  1078 
Wanstead  L.  Bd.  of  II.  v.  Hill   (13 

C.  B.  n.  s.  479)  449,  450 

Wapello  County  Case  (13  Iowa,  405) 
[See  state  r  Wapello,  &c] 
Ward,  R(  (62  N.  V  395)  915 

v.  Bartholomew  (6  Rick.  409)  679 

p.  Hartford    County    (12    Conn. 

404)  162,1174 

v.  Jefferson  (24  Wis.  342)  1257,  1260, 
1261,  1296 
v.  Little  Rock  (41  Ark.  526)  445 

v.  Louisville  (16  B.  Mon.  184)      1167 
i7.  Maryland  (12  Wall.  418)   902,  904, 

943 
v   Morris   (4  H.  &  McH.   (Md.) 

340)  904 

».  Newark  &  P.  Tump.  Co.  (20 

N.  J.  L.  323)  1170 

u.  North  Haven  (43  Conn.  148)     1258 

17.  State  (48  Ala.  161)  426 

17.  State  (31  Md.  279)  002,904 

Warden   v.  Fond  du  Lac  Sup.   (14 

Wis.  618)  1107 

Wardin  17.  Chandler,  Sec.  Navy  (122 

r.  s.  643)  KM* 

Waring  v.  Mobile  (24  Ala.  701)  269 

Warner  v.  Knox  (50  Wis.  429)  959 

17.  Mower  (11  Vt.  385)  364 

i7.  Myers  (3  Or.  218)  1078 

17.  People  (2  Denio,  272)  311,  313 

v.  People  (7  Hill,  si)  311 

Warnock  v.   Lafayette    (4   La.  An. 

419)  358 

Warren  v.  Charlestown  (2  Gray,  84)      48, 

50,  77,  268,  487 

v.  Chicago  (118  111.  329)  927 


TAin.K  of  (  \si;>  (  m:i>. 


clxvii 


Page 
Warren  v.  Grand  Haven  (30  Mich. 

2-1)  938,  990 

v.  Ilenly  (31  Iowa,  31)    805,  896,  913, 
'.a:.,  919,921,  976,  1224 
v.  Ilolyoke  (112  Mass.  302)  1258 

v.  Lyons  City  (22  Iowa,  351)  769,770, 
771,  773,  776,795 
v.  Portsmouth    Sav.   Bank    (97 

U.S.  110)  583 

v.  Post  (97  U.  S.  110)  583 

v.  St.  Paul  &  Pac.   R.  Co.   (18 

Minn.  384)  727 

v.  Wis.,  &c,  R.  Co.  (6  Biss.  C.  C. 

425)  683 

v.  Wright  (3  111.  App.  602)  1272, 

1273,  1301 
Warren  Bor.  v.   Geer   (117  Pa.  St. 

-iiT)  904 

Warren  County  v.  Marcy  (97  U.  S. 

96)  583,  593 

Warren  Co.  Coni'rs  v.  State  (15  Ind. 

250)  1012 

Warren  Co.  Sup.  v  Patterson  (50  111. 

Ill)  671,672 

Warrensburg  v.  Miller  (77  Mo.  56)       945 
Warsaw  v.  Dunlap  (112  Ind.  570)       1283, 

1297 
Warsop  v.  Hastings  (22  Minn.  437)  280 
Wartman  ,-.  Philadelphia  (33  Pa.  St. 

202)  450,457,458,402 

Warwick   r.  Butterworth   (17   Ind. 

129)  534 

v.  Mayo  (15  Gratt.  528)  510,  710,  790, 
793,  809,  1132 
Washburn  v.  Cass  County  (3  Dillon, 

C.  C.  251)  575,630 

v.  Franklin  (35  Barb.  597)  520 

v.  Oshkosh  (60  Wis.  453)        267,  974 
Washburn  College  v.   Shawnee  Co. 

Com'rs  (8  Kan.  344)        952,  953 
Washburn  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Worcester 

(116  Mass.  458)  1331 

Washer  v.  Bullitt  County  (110  U.  S. 

558)  881 

Washington  v.  Cooly  (4  Cranch,  C. 

C.  103)  483 

v.  Frank  ( 1  Jones,  L.  436)  476 

v.  Finley  (10  Ark.  423)     '  138 

v.  Harvard  (8  Cush.  66)  1110 

v.  Meigs  (1  Mc Arthur,  53)  426 

v.  Nashville  (1  Swan,  177)     466,  921, 
927  984 
v.  Small  (86  Ind.  402)  1283 

v  State  (13  Ark.  752)      898,  907,  908 
Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Gladmon 

(15  Wall.  401)        865,  1286,  1299 
Washington  Avenue,  Re  (69  Pa.  St. 

352)    721,  723,  897,  916,  917,  931, 
935,  936,  937,  975,  983,  989,  990 
Washington  Benef.   Soc.  i>.  Bacher 

(20  Pa.  St.  425)  337 

Washington  Cemetery    v.  Prospect 
>ark  &  C.  I.  R.  Co.  (68  X 
Y.  591)  690,  961 


Page 

Washington  Co.  Sup.  v.  Durant  ('.» 

Wall.  416)  1037,  1046,  1078 

Washington  Park  Com'rs,  />'•   (66  N. 

Y.  144)  711,  71  "J 

Washington  University  V.  Rowse  (  12 

Mo  308)  952 

Waterburyr.  Laredo  (68  Tex.  ■>>■■>)      L80, 

1098 
(14  Cal.  544).   [See  Xatoma.  &c] 

Water  Co.,  &c.  (41   Ind.   864) 

[See  Indianapolie 
(31  N.  J.   P.  7-').     [See  Jersey 

City,  &c  ] 
(10  Wall.  566.)   [See  St   Paul,&c.] 
Waterloo  v.  Union  Mill  Co.  (69  Iowa, 

437)  759,71 

Waterman    <■.    New    York  (7    Daly, 

489) 
Waters  v.  Bay  View  (61  Wis.  642)     L322, 

1331 
v.  Leech  (3  Ark.  110)  396, 

r.  State  (1  Gill,  302) 
v.  Waterman  (2  Root,  214)  324 

Watertown  v.  Cady  (20  Wis.  501)       1032 
Watertown  Tr.  v.  Cowen  (4  Paige, 

510)  763,  783 

r.  Fairbanks  (65  N.  Y.  588)       8s,  986 

v.  Mayo  (109  Mass.  315)  212,  473 

v.  Robinson  (69  Wis.  230)  1053 

Waterville  v.  Kennebec  Co.  Com'rs 

(59  Me.  80)  897 

Watkins  v.  Milwaukee  (52  Wis.  98; 

55  Wis.  335)  914 

v.  Zwietusch  (47  Wis.  513)  914 

Watson  t\  Aquackanomck  Water  Co. 

(36  N.  J.  L.  195)  707 

v.  Kingston  (114  N.  Y.  88)  1318,  P'.iy,. 

1328 
/-.  Mercer  (8  Pet.  88)  637 

v.  Pittsburgh  &  C  R  Co.  (37  Pa. 

St.  469)  7:::: 

v.  South  Kingston  (5  R.  I.  562)      705 

v.  Tripp  (11  R.  I.  98)  1304.  131.". 

v.  Turnbull  (32  La.  An.  856)  169,  174 

Wattles  v.  Lapeer  (40  Mich.  62 1 )         947, 

llic 
v.  People  (13  Mich.  446) 
Watts  v.  Carroll  Par.  Pol.  Jury   (11 

La.  An.  141)  1057,1058 

v.  Scott  (1  Dev.  291)  484 

Waugh  v.  Leech  (28  111.  4SS)         7  in.  7  \:\_ 

m  (7 

Waupun  v.  Moore  (34  Wis.  450) 
Waverlv  v.  Auditor  (100  111.  354)        1107 
WaverlyW.W.  Co., /?e(16  Hun   -".7)    712 
Waxahatchie  v.  Brown  (67  Tex.  51'  )    198, 

203 
Wayland  v.  Middlesex  Co.    Com'rs 

(4  Gray,  500)  697,828 

Wayne  County  o.  Benoit  (20  Mich. 

176)  '  318,  819,  383 

v.  Detroit  (17  Mich.  390)        440,  170, 

480,  638 

v.  Miller  (31  Mich.  447)  760 


clxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS    CITED. 


r.i/. 
Wayne  Co.  Tump.  Co.  v.  Berry  (5 

Ii,l  2  **1,  ss- 

Weaver  u.  Devendorf  (3  Denio,  117)    826, 

391,  L127 
ite  (39  Ala.  635)  1107 

Weaver,  &c.  Tre.  &c.  (8  0.  St.  564) 

Paris  Tp.,  &c] 
\V,l»h  r.    lh-nie  I  lav  Com'rs   (I..    I! 

j    B  842)  694,  1061 

v.  Lafayette    County    (67    Mo. 

650 

Moler  is  Ohio,  652)  773 

,1  (5  Allen,  675)  662 

v.  New  York  (64  Bow.  Pr.  10)       114 

Port  Bruce  (19  D.  C.  Q.  B.  626)  179 

Webberu.  Eastern  R.  Co.  (2 Met.  149)  817 

.  Gray  (24  Wend.  185)  324 

v.  Virginia  (103  U.  S.  344)  904 

Weber  v.  Cal.  Barbor  Com'rs    (18 

Wall.  57)  165,  166,  169,  170, 

171,  17-'.  178 

v.  Lee  County  (6  Wall.  210)        L032, 

1045 
v.  Reinhard  (73  Pa.  St.  370)  917,972 
r.  Traubel  (95  111.  427)  946 

r.  San  Francisco  (1  Cal.  455)       1 123, 

1  1 52 
v.  Zimmerman  (23  Md.  45)  L070, 

1072 

Webster  v.  Chicago  (62  111.  302)  927 

v.  Ilarwinton  (32  Conn.  131)     25,  47, 

1109,  1110 

,..  People  (98  IU.  343)  940 

Webster  <  lounty  v.  Taylor  (19  Iowa, 

117)  567,  568 

Weckleru.  Chicago  (61  HL  142)    707,722 

I  v.  Balston  (76  N.  Y.  329)  1204, 

1265,  1282,  L285 

v.  Greenwich  (45  Conn.  170)        117:;, 

1188 
Weeks  v.  Forman  (16  N.  J.  L.  237) 

177,  196,  '',07 

t,.  Gilmanton  (60  N.  B.  500)  138 

v.  Milwaukee  (10  Wis.242)   910,913, 

919  925,  953,  954,  956,  957,  961, 

962,  1227,  1323 

v.  Shirley  (33  Me.  271)  1288 

Weeping  Water  v.   Reed  (21    Neb. 

261)  764,789 

Wcel  v.  Brockporl  (16  N.  Y.  161) 

11-1,  1211,  1267,  1280,  1293 
Wegman  v.  Jefferson  (61  Mo.  55)  1221 
Wehn  v.  Gage  Com'rs  (5  Neb.  494)         13, 

1175 
Weightman  v.  Clark  (103  D.  S.  256)     899 
v.  Washington  Corp.  (1    Black, 

89)       lus,  1172,  117::,  II '.•'.•.  12*0. 

1296,  1301 

Weil  r.  Uicord  (24  N.  -I    Eq.  L69)         441, 

143 
Weirv.Sl   Paul,S.&T  F.  R.Co.  Ms 

Minn.  155)  726,  12' 

Wei.-  v.  Madison  (75Ind.241)   1221,  1319, 

1827,  1829,  1334,  1535 


Page 

Weisbrod  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

i  L8  Wis,  85)     711.  746,  766,  771, 
792 
Weisenberg  v.  Appleton  (26  Wis.  66) 

1267,  1284,  1288,  1297,  1301 
v.  Truman  (68  Cal.  63)  767 

v.  Winneconne  (66  Wis.  667)       1175, 

1252 

Weismer  v.  Douglas  V  (64  N.  Y  91)  130, 

233,  238,  704,  895,  897,  1011,  1139 

Welch  i7,  Boston  (126  Mass.  142)  212 

17.  Bowen  (103  Ind.  262)  391 

v.  Cook  C'7  (J.  s.  641)  902 

r.  Botchkiss  (39  Conn.  140)  425,427, 

474 
V.  Mahaska  Co.   Sup.  (23  Iowa, 

L99)  1015 

v.  Marion  (48  Ala.  291)  1150 

17.  Milw.  &St.  P.  R.  Co.  (27  Wis. 

ins,  732 

v.  People  (2  Doug.  382)  505 

17.  Portland  (77  Me.  384)  1301 

v.  Post  (99  IU.  471)  235 

v.  Ste.  Genevieve  (1  Dillon,  130)  242, 

244,  245,  250,  254,  361,  354,  356, 

1046,  1049 

v.  Stowell  (2  Doug.  332)  450,  452,  453 

Wild  17.  Androscoggin  Boom  l'rop. 

(6  Me.  93)  1170 

Welker  17.   Potter  (18  O.  St.  85)     72,  80, 
708,  709,  94  .,  984 
Welland  County  v.  Buffalo  &  L.  H. 
Ry.Co.  (30U.C.Q.B.  147; 
31/fc.  539)  718 

Wellcome  v.  Leeds  (51  Me.  313)  851, 1314 
Weller  v.  McCormick  (47  N.  J.  L. 

397)  1273 

Welles  r.  Battelle  (11  Mass.  477)  371 

Wellington  v.  (ire-son  (31  Elan.  99)  L279, 

1283 
Wellington  Count v  v.  Waterloo  (8  U. 

C.  C.  P.  258)  269 

v.  Wilmol  (17  F.  C  Q    15.  82)       269 
v    Wilson  (11  C.  C.  C.  P.  299; 

16  lb.  124)      789,  790,  1240,  1248 
Wells,  Exp.  (21  Fla.  280)  72 

17.  Atlanta  (  18  Ga.  67)  152,512 

r.  lJurbank  (17  N.  II.  393)  76 

v.  Burnham  (20  Wis.  112)      544,979 
v.  McLaughlin  (17  Ohio,  99)  807 

v.  Mason  (28  W.  Va.  156)  1032 

v.  Pontotoc  Co.  Sup.  (102  U.  S. 

en;,)  L95,  236,  236,  573,  630 

r.  Wi-ston  (22  Mo.  :;S4)  897 

Wells  Co.  Road,  R.  (7  0.  St.  16)  724 

Welsford  v.  Weidlein  (23  Kan.  601)    434, 

979 

Welsh  p.  Rutland  (56  Vt.  228)  1 1  *.*«.» 

17.  St.  Louis  (73  Mo.  71)  1303 

v.  Wilson  (101  N.  Y.  254)  785 

Welton  17.  Missouri  (91  U.  S.  275)  902,  004 

Wendell  v.  Brooklyn  (29  Barb.  204)     316 

v.  Troy  (39  Barb  320;  4  Abb. 

Ct.  App.  663)  1293,  1295,  1305 


taiilk  or  c  \si-:s  citkd. 


clxix 


Page 

Wentworth  v.  Hamilton  (34  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  585)  537,  538 

v.  Jefferson  (60  N.  H.  168)  12*7 

VVerth  v.  Springfield  (78  Mo.  107)      1224, 

1242,  124:5 

Wertheimer  v.  Boonville  (2(J  Mo  25  I )  510 

West  r.  Bancroft  (32  Vt.  307)        818,  820 

v.  Blake  (4  Blackf  234)  138,705 

v.  Greenville  (39  Ala.  69)  431 

r.  Lynn  (110  Mass.  51  1)  1276 

v.  New  York  (10  Paige,  539)         1097 

West   Bath    v.  Lincoln    Co.    Com'rs 

(36  Me.  74)  374 

West    Baton    Rouge    Pol.    Jury    v. 

Michel  (4  La.  An.  84)  160 

Westberg   v.    Kansas   City  (64  Mo. 

493)  333 

West  Carroll  Par.  v.  Gaddis  (34  La. 

An.  928)  270,  769 

Westchester    v.  Apple    (35  Pa.  St. 

284)  1303,1313 

West    Chester   Gas  Co.  v.  Chester 

County  (30  Pa.  St.  232)  966,  967 
West  Chicago  Park  Com'rs  v.  West. 

Union  Tel.  Co.  (103  111.  33)    122, 
705 
West  Covington  v.  Freking  (8  Bush, 

121)  757,791 

Westerhaven  v.  Clive  (5  Ohio,  136)      377 
Western  Col.  of  Horn.  Med.  v  Cleve- 
land (12  O.  St.  375)  108,  529, 1258, 
1164,  1167 
Western  Md.  R.  Co.  v.  Owings   (15 

Aid.  199)  716 

Western  Pa.  R.  Company's  Appeal 

(99  Pa.  St.  155)  851 

Western  R.  Co.  v.  Nolan  (48  N.  Y. 

513)  1127 

Western  Sav.  Fund  Soc.  v.  Philadel- 
phia (31  Pa.  St.  175,185)  95,108, 
112,  118,  123,  124,  157,  522,  550, 
627,  1162,  1180,  1206,  1211 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Lieb  (76 

111.  172)  905 

v.  Mass.  Att'y-Gen.  (125  U.  S.  530)  904, 

905 

v.  New  York  (38  Fed.  R.  552)        830 

v.  Philadelphia  (22  W.  N.  C.  39)    830 

v.  Texas  (105  U.  S.  460)  904 

Westfall  v.  Hunt  (8  Ind.  174)     752,  735. 

765 
Westfield  v.  Mayo  (122  Mass.  100)  1313 
West  G-willimbury  v.  Hamilton  &  N. 

W.  R.  Co.  (23  Grant,  383)     1109 
West  Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Cape  Mav  & 
S.   L.  R.  Co.    (34  N.  J.  'Eq. 
164)  868 

Westlake  v.  St.  Louis  (77  Mo.  47)       1150 
West  Mahanoy  Tp.  v.  Watson  (116 

Pa.  St.  344)  1262 

Weston  r.  Arnold  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  App. 

1084)  224 

v.  Charleston  C.  Council  (2  Pet. 

449)  896,  897,  902 


Page 

Weston  v.  Syracuse  (17  N.  Y.  110)        199 
\Ve>t  Oran  Id  (37  N.  J.  Eq. 

600)  1322 

West   River   Bridge  Co.  i>.  Dix   (6 

How.507)  683,689,  696,  701,705, 

707 

Wetherell  v.  Devine  (116  III.  631)         906 

v.  Newington  (54  Conn.  67)  717 

Wetmore   v.  Brooklyn   Gaa  Co.  (42 

N.  Y.  384)  170,  171 

v.  Story  (22  Barb.  11  1)  365 

v.  Tracy  (11  Wend.  250)  1212 

Wetumpka  u.  Wetumpka  Wharf  Co. 
(63  Ala.  011)  i;- 

v.  Winter  (29  Ala.  651)  532,  575 

Wewell  v.  Cincinnati  (45  <  >.  St.  407)    989 
Weyauwega  w.  Ayling  ('.»•.•  L'.  S.  112)  577, 

693 
Weyl  v.  Sonoma  Val.  R.  Co.  (OOCal. 

202)  841 

Weymouth,  &c.  Fire  Dist.  v.  Nor- 
folk Co.  Com'rs  (108  Mass. 
142)  103 

Whalen  v.  La  Crosse  (16  Wis.  270)      556, 

Whalin  v.  McComb  (76  111.  49)      212,  180 
Wharf  Case,  &c.  (3  Bland.  Ch.  383) 

[See    Dugan    v.   Baltimore, 

&c] 
Wharton   v.    Birmingham    Bor.    (37 

Pa.  St.  371)  11"»1 

Wheelen's  Appeal  (108  Pa.  St.  162)      146, 

Wheeler  v.  Bedford  (54  Conn.  244)       763 
v.  Chicago  (24  111.  105)  535 

v.  Cuieage  (57  111.415)  945 

v.  Cincinnati  (19  O.  St.  19)  217,  1 164, 
1166,1198,  1199,  L207 
v.  Kirtland  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  53 1 )         695 
v.  Philadelphia  (77  Pa.  St.  338)     229, 

613 
v.  Rochester   &   S.   R.   Co.    (12 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  227)  968 

v.  Westport    (30    Wis.    392)      1256, 

1281,  1285 

v.  Worcester  (10  Allen,  591)        121 1, 

1317,  1331 

Wheeling  v.  Black  (25  W.  Va.  266)     304, 

481,  498 
v.  Campbell  (12  W.  Va.  36)  808 

Wheeling,  P.  &  C.   Transp.  Co.  v. 

Parkersburg  (107  U.  S.  691 )    165, 

1121 

v.  Wheeling  (99  U.  S.  273) 

v.  Wheeling  (9  W.  Va.  170) 

Wneelock  v.  McDowell  (20  Neb.  412)   312 

v.  Noonan  (108  N.  Y.  179)     855,  856, 

877 
Whicker  >■.  Hume  (14  Beav.  509)  656 

Whhlden  v.  Drake  (5  N.  H.  13)  162 

Whitaker  v.  Eighth  Av.  R,  Co.  (51 

N.  Y.  2! '5)  865 

[See  also  Whittaker,  &cj 
Whitby  v.  Flint  (9  U.  C.  C  P.  449)      301 


i-l  XX 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


Page 
Whitby  ■    Harrison  (18  U.  C  Q.  B. 

•    60S)  260,  801 

White  v.  Bayonne  (49  N.J.  L.  311)      397 

,-.  Bond  County  (68  111.  297)        L173, 

1246,  L282 

V.  Charleston  C.  Council  (2  Hill 

(S.  C.)671)  1166,1174 

v.  Chowan  Co.Com'ra  (90  N.  C. 

437)  41,1173 

v.  Cower  (4  Paige,  510) 
v.  Flannigain  (1  Md.  525)       768,  786, 

7s7 
v.  Fuller  (39  Vt.  198)  123,135 

v.  Godfrey  (97  Mass.  472)      746,  791, 

817 
r.  Hindley  L.  Bd.  of  II.  (L.  R. 

10  Q.  B.  219)  L206,  L214 

v  Kent  (11  Ohio  St.  550)       213,  294, 
466,  809 
v.  Levant  (78  Me.  668)  312 

v.  Lincoln  (5  Neb.  .".it."))  88,  1112 

v.  McKeesport  (101  Pa.  St.  394)    812, 

815 

v.  Nashville  (2  Swan,  304)      15.".,  896, 

400,  401,  722,  920,  978,  984 

v.  New  Orleans  (15  La.  An.  607)  521, 

643 
t;  New  York  (4  E.  1).  Smith,  563)  318 
ii    People  (94  111.  004)  912,  924 

v.  Phillipston  (10  Met.  108)  320,  1193 
v.  Polk  Countv  (17  Iowa,  413)  316 
,-.  Quincy  (97  Mass.  430)  1315 

v.  Smith  (37  Mich.  291)  760 

v.  Stamford  (37  Conn.  587)  86 

v.  Tallman  (26  N.  J.  L.  07)    222,  290, 
416.  419,  42(1,  421 
v.  Vt.  &Mass.  R.  Co.  (21  How. 

575)  500,  582 

v.  Washington  (2  Cranch   C  C. 

337)  483 

v.  Yazoo  City  (27  Miss.  357)        1157, 

1161,  1225 

Whitehead  v.  Lowell  (124  Mass.  281)  1302 

Whitehouse  v.   Fellowes   (10  C.   B. 

N.B.765)      1211,1215,1220 

Whitely  v.  Lansing  (27  Mich.  131)        993 

Whiteside  v.  People  (26  Wend.  634)     362 

Whitfield  v.  Longest  (6  lred.  268)        418 

419,  421,  422,  904 

Whithorn  v.  Thomas  (7  M.  &  G.  1)       879 

Whiting  v.  Boston  (106  Mass.  89)713,  71.., 

L093,  L124,  1125 

r.  New  Haven  (45  Conn.  303)         986 

v.  Potter  (2  Fed.  R.  517)  591 

r.  Quackenbush  (54  Cal.  300)        912 

v.  Sheboygan  &  F.  R.  Co.  (25 

Wi8.167)  225,229,573 

Whitlock  o.  weal  (26  Conn.  106)  480 

Whitney  v.  Clifford  (46  Wis.  138)       1306 

i    Milwaukee(57  Wis.  689)  1273 

Whiteon  o.  Franklin  (84  Ind.  392)        482, 

857,  858 
Whiteett  v    Union  1).  &  R.  Co.  (10 

Col.  243)  "94 


Page 
Whittaker    v.    West    Bovlston    (97 

Mass.  273)  1285,  1300 

Whittier  v.  Yariuv  (10  N    II.  291)         371 
Wichita  &  W.   K.  Co.  V.  Fechheimer 

I  ...  Kan.  45)  847 

Wickliffe  '    Lexington  (11  B.  Mon. 

155)  767 

Wicks  v.  DeWitt  (54  Iowa,  130)         1327 
Wider  v.  Easl  St.  Louis  (66  111.  133)   906, 

927 
Wier  v.  Bush  (4  Litfc  433)  308,  304 

v.  St.  P.,  S.  &  T.  F.  R.  Co.  (18 

Minn.  109)  732 

Wiggin  r.  New  York  (9  Paige,  16)       L63 

Wiggins  v.  Chicago,  (68  111.  372)  904 

'  v.  McClearv  (49  N.  Y.  346)  757 

v.  Philadelphia  (2  Brews.  444)        547 

Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  E.  St.  Louis 

(11)2  111.500)  424 

v.  East  St.  Louis  (107  U.  S.  305)  966 
Wigon  v.  Pilkington  (1  Keble,  597)  327 
Wilbrand   v.  Eighth  Av.  R.  Co.  (8 

Bosw.  314)  864 

Wilbur  v.  Taunton  (123  Mass.  522)     1219 
Wilcox  v.  Chicago  (107  III.  834)  1198 

v.  Deer  Lodge  County  (2  Mont. 

574)  575 

v.  Hemming  (58  Wis.  144)      416,  418 

v.  Smith  (5  Wend.  233)  321 

Wild  v.  Deig  (43  Ind.  455)  374,  701 

v.  Patcison  (47  N.  J.  L.  406)        1198, 

11 '.t9,  1253 

Wilde  v.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

15)  1189,  1190 

Wilder  v.  Chicago  (26  111.  182)  206 

v.  Savannah  (70  Ga.  700)  971 

Wildy  v.  Washburn  (10  Johns.  49)      1125 

Wiles  v.  Hoss  (114  Ind.  371)  522,  959 

Wiley  v.  Bluff  ton  (111  Ind.  152)  1  lo 

r.  Brimfield  (69  III.  306)  239 

v.  Minneapolis  Bd.   of   Ed.    (11 

Minn.  371)  561 

,:  Owens  (39  Ind.  429)  070 

v.  Parmer  (14  Ala.  027)  902,  904 

v.  Silliman  (02  111.  170)    280,  564,  636 

Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  County  (50  Iowa, 

264)  540,642,554 

Wilkes  v.  Dinman  (7  How.  89)  324 

v.  New  York  (79  N.  Y.  021)  1151 

Wilkesbarre's   Appeal  (109  Pa.  St. 

554)  203 

Wilkesbarre    Hospital    v.    Luzerne 

County  (84  Pa.  St.  55)  229 

Wilkey  v.  Pekin  (19  III.  160)  965 

Wilkin  v.  St.  Paul  (88  Minn.  181)         816 
v.  St.  Paul  &   Pac.   R.  Co.   (16 

Minn   271)  709 

Wilkins  v.  Detroit  (40  Mich.  120)  959 

Wilkinson  v.  Albany  (28  N.  H.  9)         443 

v.  Cheatham  (43  Ga.  258)  896 

r.  Leland  (2  Pet.  027)  637 

v.  Peru  (01  Ind.  1)  594 

v.  Providence  Bank  (3  R.  I.  22)   1005 

Will  Co.  Sup.  v.  People  (110  111.  512)  906 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


clxxi 


Page 

Willard  v.  Comstock  (58  Wis.  5G5)     11U7 

v.  Killingworth  (8  Conn.  247)        140, 

340,  403 

v.  Newbury  (22  Vt.  458)     1270,  1314, 

1315 

v.  Newburyport  (12  Pick.  227)  48,  63, 

64,  147,  150,  360,  624 

v.  Presbury  (14  Wall.  676)  919 

v.  Sberborne  (8  Atl.  R.  735)  1251 

Willard'8  Appeal  (4  R.  I.  597)       329.  333 

Willcoeks,  Re  (7  Cow.  402)    343,  357,  360 

Willett  v.  Bellville  (11  Lea,  1)  72 

Willey  v.  Allegbeny  (118  Pa.  St.  490)    169, 

179,  264,  1205,  1206 

v.  Ellsworth  (64  Me.  57)  1257 

v.  Greenfield  (30  Me.  452)  566 

William  &  Anthony  Streets,  Re  (19 

Wend.  678)  730,  920 

Williams,  Re  (4  Ark.  537)  717,  1132 

v.  Augusta   C.   Council    (4   Ga. 

509)    393,  397,  472,  479,  496,  499, 
500,  507 
v.  Boardman  (9  Allen,  570)  162 

v.  Cammack  (27  Miss.  209)    722,  896, 
919,  933 
v.  Carwadine  (4  B.  &  A.  621)  209 

v.  Clinton  (28  Conn.  264)    1258,  1283, 

1300 
v.  Cooper  Co.  Com.  PI.  J.  (27  Mo. 

225)  1010 

v.  Davidson  (43  Tex.  33)  145 

v.  Detroit  (2  Mich.  560)  722,  898, 

917,  921,  942,  959,  971,  976,  977, 
984,  985,  1 1 16 
v.  Dunkirk  (3  Bans.  44)  1191 

v.  First  Pres.  Church  in  Cine.  (1 

O.  St.  478)  738,  739,  773 

v.  Grand  Rapids  (59  Mich.  51)  1157 
v.  Grant  Co.  Ct.  (26  W.  Va.488)  1117 
v.  Kenney  (98  Mass.  142)  162 

v.  Larkin  (3  Denio,  114)  348 

v.  Lincoln  Co.  Com'rs  (35  Me. 

345)  1056 

v.  Lunenburg    Sch.   Dist.    (21 

Pick.  75)   347,  355,  356,  371,  953, 
1147 
v.  Natural   Br.  PI.  R.   Co.   (21 

Mo.  580)  342 

v.  New    Orleans    (23    La.   An. 

507)  1167 

v.  New  Orl.,  M.  &  F.  R.  Co.  (60 

Miss.  680)  721 

v.  New  York  (105  N.  Y.  419)  165, 172 
v.   N.   Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.   (39 

Conn.  509)  750 

w.N.  YCent.  R.  Co.   (16  N.  Y. 

97)  792,841,842,844,870 

v.  Pevton's  Lessee   (4   Wheat. 

77)  517 

v.  Pinney  (25  Iowa,  436)  1107 

v.  Richards  (3  C.  &  K.  81)  865 

v.  Roberts  (88  111.  13)  239,  240,  638 
v.  Sacramento  Co.  Sup.  (65  Cal. 

160)  1131 


Williams  v.  Shelby  Co.  Tax  Dist.  (16 

Lea,  531)  1280 

v.  Smith  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  301)  683 
v.  Stein  (88  1ml.  89)  277 

Williamson  v.  Cass  County  (84  III. 

361)  725 

v.  Commonwealth    (4   B.    Mon. 

146)  477,  478,  484,  497,  500,  505 
v.  Keokuk  (44  Iowa,  88)  88,689,  1034 
v.  Love  (52  Tex.  ■)■',■> |  u- 1 

v.  N.  J.  So.  R.  Co.  (29  N.  J.  Eq. 

311)  969 

Williamsport  v.  Commonwealth  (84 

Pa.  St.  487)      184,  186,  192,  193, 
664,  812,818,  988,  1007 
v.  Kent  (14  lhd.  806)  946 

Willimantic   Sch.  Soc.  v.  Windham 

Sch.  Soc.  (14  Conn.  457)  270 

Willis  v.  Booneville  (28  Mo.  543)  507 

v.  Legris  (45  111.  289)  222,419 

Willoughby  v.  Jenks  (20  Wend.  96)     747, 

758 
Wilmington  v.  Horn  (2  Harring.  190)  300 
v.  Yopp  (71  N.  C.  76)  933 

Wilmington  Com'rs  v.  Roby  (8  Ired. 

L.  250)  898,  904 

Wilson,  Re  (32  Minn.  145)432,  1128,  1129 

v.  \tlanta  (60  Ga.  473)        1259,  1284 

v.  Berkstresser  (45  Mo.  283)         1011 

v.  Blackbird  Cr.  Marsh  Co.  (2 

Pet.  251)  705 

v.  Burks  (71  Ga.  862)  1131 

v.  Charlestown  (8  Allen,  137)      1260, 

1263,  1286,  1300 

v.  Chester  Sch.  Dist.  (32  N.  H. 

118)  44,  539,  540,  541 

v.  Goodman  (4  Hare,  54)  324 

v.  Granby  (47  Conn.  59)  882,  1253 
v.  Halifax  (L.  R.  3  Ex.  114)  1258 
v.  Hardesty  (1  Md.  Ch.  66)  637 

v.  Huntingdon    Co.    Com'rs    (7 

W.  &S.  197)  675,1030 

v.  Inloes  (11  G.  &  J.  351)       166,  172, 

177 
v.  Jefferson   County    (13   Iowa, 

181)  882,  1172,  1174 

v.  Neal  (23  Fed.  R.  129)  570 

v.  New  Bedford  (108  Mass.  261)  1163, 
1206,  1211 
v.  New  York  (1  Denio,  595)  158,  320, 
1157, 1158,  1220,  1319, 1320, 1323, 
1324,  1325,1329,  1331,  1382,  133.3 
v.  Poole  (33  Ind.  448)  991 

v.  Salamanca  (99  U.  S.  499)  593,  630 
v.  Sexon  (27  Iowa,  15)  7-VJ,  765 

v.  Wheeling  (19  W   Va.  323)      1279, 
1283,  1287,  1303,  1305,  1306 
Wilson    County   v.   Third    National 
BankofNashville(103U.S. 
770)  >2 

Wilton  v.  Falmouth  (15  Me.  476)  279 

Wimbledon  Local  Bd   o.  Crovdon  R. 
S.  A.  (L.  R.  32  Ch.  "D.  421) 

1326 


;lxxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Pago 

Winants   o.   Bayonne  (41  N.  J.  L. 

114)  L65 

Winbigler  v.  Los  Angeles  (46  Cal. 

36J  L262,  1268,  1294 

i    /;.  Thames  Cons.  (L.  R    7 
C.  P.  171)  179 

v.  Thames  Conservators  (L.  II. 

9C    P.  <  1156 

Winckler  v  Great   Western  It.  Co. 

(18  l     i.e.  P.  260)  1300 

Windham  r.  Portland  (  1  Mass.  3S4)     20  '. 

271,  273 

Windsor  v.  Hallett  ('.'7  [11.204)  672 

ate  u.  Enniskillen  Oil  Kef.  Co. 

(14  U.  C.  C.  P.  379)  538 

Winn  v.  Lowell  (1  Alien,  177)   1266,  1270, 

1273,  1284 

v.  Macon  (21  Ga.  276)  133,  542 

v.  Rutland  (62  Vt.  481)  1331 

Winnetka  v.  Prouty  (107  111.  218)         744 

Winnsboro   v.   Smart  (11    Rich.  L. 

651)  459 

Winona  v.  Huff  (11  Minn.  119)     738,  743, 
757,  763,  783,  789 
Winona  &  St.  Peter  R.  Co.  v.  Blake 

(04  U.  S.  181)  92 

Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia  (65  Pa.  St. 

135)  170 

Winship  v.  Enfield  (42  Nil.  107)       1255, 
1263,  1264,  1270,  1278,  1314 
Winslow  v.  Perquimans  Co.  Com'rs 

(64  N.  C.  218)         673,  675,  1139 

Winston  v.  Mosely  (36 Mo.  140)  1010, 1023 

v.  Taylor  (99  N.  C.  210)  944 

v.  Westfeldt  (22  Ala  760)  583 

Winter  v.   Montgomery  C  Council 

f65  Ala.  403;  79  Ala.  481)  673, 
964,  962,  008,  1145 
Winthrop  v.  Farrar  (11  Allen,  398)  473 
Winzer  v.  Burlington  (68  Iowa,  270)  1140 
Wirt  r.  McEmery  121  Fed.  R.  233)  795 
Wisby  v   Boute  1 19  O.  St.  238)     738,  739, 

740,  701 
Wisconsin  v.  Duluth  (2  Dillon  C.  C. 

406)  455 

Wisconsin  River  Impr.  Co.  v.  Lvons 

(30  Wis.  61)  170 

Wistar  v.  Philadelphia  (80  Pa.  605)     917, 

936 

v.  Philadelphia  (80  Pa.  112)  960 

v.  Philadelphia  (111  Pa.  St.  604)    936 

Wiswall  v.  Hall  (3  Paige,  313)  172 

William  r.  Portland  172  Me.  539)       1257 

Witherley  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.  (12 

C.  B.  n.  9.  2)  1264 

Withers  w.  Buckley  (20  How.  84)  683 
Withom  v.  Thomas  (7  M.  &  G.  1)  279 
Wixon  v.  Newport  (13  R.  I.  154)  1174 
Woelpper  v.  Philadelphia  (3S  l'a.  St. 

203)  462 

Wolcott    '      Lawrence    County    (26 

Mo.  272)  1148 

Wolf,  Re  (11  Neb.  24)  350,  391 

Keokuk  (48  Iowa,  129)  915 


i'  i  •. 

Wolf  v.  Lansing  (53  Mich.  367)     431,  I   l 

v   Philadelphia  (105  Pa.  St.  25)     914 

Wolff  v.  New  Orleans  |  L08  I     -  358)    118, 

261,  942 
Wolfe  r.  Covington  &  L.  R.  Co.  (15 B. 

Mon.  104)  '•'■.  848,  863 

Wood  r.  Bartling  (16  Kan.  109)  279 

r.  Brooklyn  i  1  I  Barb.  125)    106,  1098 

v.  Draper  (24  Barb    I  1112 

r.  Election  Com'rs  (68  CaL  661 1     111, 

143 
v  Jefferson  Co.  Rank   (9  Cow. 

194)  77,  139,  380,381 

r.  Louisiana  (  itv  (5   I  i lion  C. 

C.  122J  685,  1140,  1144 

[See    also    Louisiana    City  v. 
Wood  (102  D.  s.  294).] 
v.  Lynn  (1  Allen,  108)  529 

r.  Macon  &   B.   R.  Co.  (08  Ga. 

639)  767 

v.  Mears  (12  Ind.  515)    785,  884,  888, 

1309 
/    .Mitchell  Indep.  Sch.  Dist.  (44 

Iowa,  27)  1307 

v.  Nat.  Water  W.  Co.  (33  Kan. 

500)  742,  743,  828 

v.  Oxford  (97  N.  C.  227)  574 

V.  Peake  (8  Johns.  54)  112.") 

v.  Searl  (Bridg.  139)  534 

v.  Stourbridge  Ry.  Co.  (16  C.  B. 

N.  8.  222)  688 

v.  Veal  (5  B.  &  A.  454)  745 

r.  Ward  (3  Exch.  (W.  H.  &  G.) 

748)  1316 

v.  Waterville  (5  Mass   294  !  534 

Woodbridge  v.  Detroit  (8  Mich.  27  1 1  919, 

921,  071 
v.  Hall  (47  N.  J.  L.  388)  323 

Woodbury    v.    Dist.    Columbia    (5 

Mai-key,  127)  1207 

v.  Hamilton  (0  Pick  101)  53 

Woodfolk  v.  Nashville  &  C.  R.  Co. 

(2  Swan.    122)  733 

Woodruff  v.  Neal  (28  Conn.  168)  747,  771, 

776,  7'. "i 
j;.  No.  Bloomfield  Gravel  Co.  (16 

Fed   R.  25)  1216 

v.  Parham  (8  Wall.  139)  002,  903 

v.  Stewart  (63  Ala.  206)  824,  ins 

,-.  Trapnall  (10  How.  206)  118 

Woods    r.    Colfax    Co.    Com'rs    (10 

Neb.  652)  117;; 

v.  Henry  (55  Mo.  560)  72,267 

v.  Lawrence   County   (1    Black, 

386)    238,  581,  593,  614,  617,  CIO, 

647 

Woodson  v.  Skinner  (22  Mo.  13)  677,  771, 

776 
Woodstock   r   Gallup  (28  Vt.  587; 

29  Vt.  347)  701,  715 

Woodward  v.  Calhoun  County  Sup- 
ervisors (2  Cent.  L.  J.  396)    631, 
I  32,  633 
v.  Sarsons  (L.  R.  10  C.  P.  74.1)       281 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxiii 


Page 
Woodyer  v.  Hadden  (5  Taunt.  125)     71 1 , 

756 
Woolf  v.  Beard  (8  C  &  P.  373)  126 1 

Woolrich  v.  Forrest  (1  Pa.  St.  115)       260 
Woolsey,  lie  (95  N.  Y.  136)  99,  100 

Worcester  v.  Eaton  (13  Mass.  371)      661, 

671 
v.  Walker  (9  Gray,  78)  294 

Worcester  County  v.  Worcester  (116 

Mass   193)  '• ,950,966 

Worden  v.  New  Bedford  (131  Mass. 

23)  1211,  1212 

Work  v.  State  (2  O.  St.  296)  507 

Workingliam  r.  Johnson  (Cas.  temp. 

Ilardw  285)  404 

Worley  v.  Columbia   88  Mo.  106)       1182, 

1196 
v.  Harris  (82  Ind     39)  139 

Worrell  c  Mmin  [o  N.  Y.  229)  526 

Worsley   v.    Municipality    (9    Rob. 

(La.)  324)  165,  166,  1152 

Worster  v.  Canal  Br.  Prop.  (16  Pick. 

541)  1296 

Worth   v.   Fayetteville    Com'rs    (1 

Winst.  (N.  C.)  Pt.  2,  70)        969, 
1119 
Worthington  v.  Covington  (82  Ky. 

265)  521 

i;.  Jeffries    L  R.  10  C  P.  379)      1057 

Worthley  v.  Steen  (43  N.  J.  L.  542)      140, 

1022,  1076 
Wortley  v.   Nottingham   (21  L.  T. 

n.  s.  582)  457 

Wragg  v.  Penn.  Tp.  (94  111.  11)  752 

Wray  v.  Ellis  (1  E.  &  E.  276)  478 

v.  Pittsburgh  (46  Pa.  St.  365)        914 

v.  Toke  (12  Q.  B.  492)  411 

Wreford  v.  People  (14  Mich.  41)   441,  445 

Wren  v.  Indianapolis  (96  Ind.  206)      1065 

Wright  v.  Bishop  (88  111.  302)      240,  1111 

v.  Boston  (9  Cush.  233)  933,  987,  988, 

989,  1147 

v.  Chicago  (20  111.  252)  941 

v.  Chicago  (46  111.  44)  933 

v.  Defrees  (8  Ind.  298)  391 

».  Fawcett  (4  Burr.  2044)  1069 

v.  Holbrook  (52  N.  H.  120)  324,  1210, 

1306 
v.  Hughes  (13  Ind.  113)  520 

v.  Linn  (9  Pa.  St.  433)  659,  668 

r.  M.    E.    Church  (1    Hoff.   Ch. 

225)  661 

v.  Stockman  (59  Ind.  65)  43 

v.  Templeton  (132  Mass.  49)         1284 
v.  Victoria  (4  Tex.  375)  672,  751 

v.  Wilmington  (92  N.  C.  156)       1229, 

1328 
Wrought  Iron  Bridge   Co.  v.  Utica 

(17  Fed.  R.  316)  719 

Wulflange  v.  McCollom  (83  Ky.  361 )  1012 

Wurts  v.  Hoagland  (114  U.  S.  606)       932 

Wyandotte  v.  Corrigan  (35  Kan.  21)    847 

o.  Gibson  (25  Kan.  236)  1 25^ 

v.  Wood  (5  Kan.  603)  80,  82 


Page 
Wyandotte  v.  Zeitz  (21  Kan.  649)  195, 
613,  518,  121.". 
Wyandotte  &  K.  C.  Br.  Co.  v.  Wyan- 
dotte Co.  Com'rs  (10  Kan. 

326)  1058 

Wyandotte    City    Cem.    Assoc,    v. 

MLeineger  (I  l  Kan.  312)  704,  756 
Wyandotte    Co.    Com'rs     v.     First 

Presb.    Church    (30     Kan. 

620)  752 

Wvatt  o.  Harrison  (3  B.  &  Ad.  871)  1228 
Wyley  v.  Wilson  (44  Vt.  404)  347 

Wylie  r.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  ( MSS. )  660 

v.  Wausau  (48  Wis.  506)  1287 

Wytnan  -;.  New  York  (11  Wend.  487)  757 
Wyncoop  v.  Cong.  Soc.  of  Belle vue 

(10  Iowa,  185)  208 

Wynehamer  v.   People   (13  N.   Y. 

429)  86,  1164 

Wynne  v.  Wright  (1  Dev.   &  B.  L. 

19)  423,  904 

X. 

Xiques  v.  Bujac  (5  La.  An.  499)  75 

767,  793 


Yahn  v.  Ottumwa  (60  Iowa,  429)         1284 
Yale  v.  Hampden  &  B.  Turnp.  Co. 

(18  Pick.  357)  1301 

Yarish  v.  Cedar  Rap.,  I.  F.  &  N.  R. 

Co.  (72  Iowa,  556)  240 

Yarmouth  v.  North   Yarmouth  1 34 

Me.  411)  93,136 

Yarmouth  Bor.,  Re  (2  Br.  &  G.  292)       75 
Yarnold  v.  Lawrence  (15  Kan.  126)      543, 

545 

Yates  v.  Judd  (18  Wis.  118)  748,  759 

v.  Milwaukee  (10  Wall.  497)  169,  170, 

171,  172,  177,  44!>,  456,  748 

v.  Milwaukee  (12  Wis.  752)    463,  464 

Yeager,  Re  (U  Gratt.  665)  1006 

Yeakel  v.  Lafayette  (48  Ind.  116)         814 

Yeatman  v.  Crandell   (11  La.    An. 

229)  924,  933,  956 

Yeaw  v.  Williams  (15  R.  I.  20)  1266 

Yick  Wo,  Re  (68  Cal.  294)      397,  172,  186 
v.  Hopkins  (118  U.S.  356)  397 

York  v.  Spellman  (19  Neb.  357)  1296 

York  Bor.  v.  Forscht  (23  Pa.  St.  391 )  208, 

187 
w.Welsh  (117  Pa.  St.  174)  695 

York  Buildings  Co.  v.  Mackenzie  (8 

B.  P.  C.  42)  514 

Yost's  Report  (17  Pa.  St.  524) 
Young  v.  Bank  of  Alex.  (4  Cranch, 

384)  138 

r.  Boston  (104  Mass.  95)  1116 

v.  Buckingham  (5  Ohio.  485)  343,360 
v.  Camden  County  .(19  Mo.  309)  563 
v.  Charleston  (20  S.  C.  116)         12  18, 

1252 


clxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Puge 

Young  o.  Clarendon  Tp.  (20  Fed.  R. 

623,  626 
,-.  Clarendon  Tp.  (132  U.S.840)  L028 
u.  Edgefield  Road  Com'ra  (2  N. 

&  McC.  537)        323,  1100,  1172, 
1174 
v.  Harrison  (17  Ga.  30)  729 

Harvey  1 16  [nd.  31  1)  1312 

v.  Leedoni  (07  Pa.  St.  351)  1321 

r.  New  Haven  (30  Conn.   105)       1200 
r.  St.  Louia  (17  Mo.  492)  396 

/•.  Yarmouth  (it  Gray,  380)  830,  1130, 

1315 
Youngblood  v.  Sexton  (32  Mich.  400)  425, 
432,  '.'70,  '.171,  1121 
Young  Men's  Soc.  v.  Detroit  (3  Mich. 

172)  963 

Youngs  v.  Hall  (0  Nev.  212)         105,  120, 

896 
Youngstown  v.  Moore  (30  O.  St.  133) 

1226 


Z. 

Page 

Zabriskie  '•.  Cleveland,  C.  &  C.  R. 

Co.  (2;;  How.  381)  77,220 

v.  Jersey  City  ,<:  B.  R.  Co.  (18 

N.  j.  Eq.  314)  454,  850,  855 

Zanesville  v.  Rieharda  (5  <  >hio  St. 

58'.i)  908,  '.•.';: i,  940,  962 

Zanone  v.  Mound  City  (103  111.  552)    400, 

434,  1006 
Zeigler  v.  Hopkins  (117  U.  S.  683)       707, 

979,  1128 
Zettler  v.  Atlanta  (06  Ga.  105)  1267 

Zimmerman  v.  Snouden  (88  Mo.  218)  970 
Zinc  Co.,  &c.  (117  111.  411).      [See 

Matthiesen,  &c] 
Zoeller  r.  Kellogg  (4  Mo.  App.  168)      732 
Zottman  v.  San  Francisco  (20  Cal. 

90)  521,541,545,945 

Zwietusch   v.   Milwaukee    (55   Wis. 

369)  914 

Zylstra  v.  Charleston  (1  Bay,  382)  412, 413, 

415,  437,  441,   497,  506,  507, 1132 


COMMENTARIES 


ON   THE  LAW  OF 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


A  TREATISE 


ON    TUB 


LAW  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


CHAPTER   I. 


MUNICIPAL   INSTITUTIONS.  —  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL   VIEW.  — 
MUNICIPAL   ABUSES.  —  REMEDIES    SUGGESTED. 

§  1.  As  this  treatise  is  designed  strictly  for  the  practising  lawyer, 
it  does  not  fall  within  its  scope  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  the 
origin  and  rise  of  cities  and  towns,  or  to  trace  minutely  the  history 
of  the  rights,  powers,  and  jurisdiction  with  which  they  are  now  gen- 
erally invested.  Such  inquiries  more  appropriately  helong  to  the 
legal  antiquary,  to  the  historian,  or  to  the  general  scholar ;  and  yet 
a  brief  historical  survey  of  municipalities  will  conduce  to  a  more 
intelligent  understanding,  even  in  its  practical  bearings,  of  the  sub- 
ject of  which  it  is  proposed  to  treat.1  The  existence  of  towns  and 
cities,  and  probably  the  exercise  by  them,  to  a  greater  or  less  ex- 
tent, of  local  jurisdiction,  may  be  ascribed  to  a  very  remote  period 

Phcenicia  and  Egypt  were  noted   for  their  large  and  splendid 

1  Mr.  Dicey  has  some  just  observations  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitution  (2d  ed.), 
on  the  different  purposes  of  the  historical  Lect.  I.     The  present  work   is  intended 
and  of  the  legal  inquirer.     "An  historian  for  the  use  of  courts  and  lawyers,  and  th- 
is primarily  occupied  with  ascertaining  the  historical  view  of  the  development  of  nm- 
steps  by  which  a  constitution  has  grown  nicipal    institutions    in    this    country    is 
to  he  what  it  is.     He  is  deeply,  sometimes  entirely  subordinated   to   the    legal    and 
excessively,    concerned  with  questions  of  strictly   technical    view.      In   the   course 
'origins.'      He    is    only   indirectly    con-  of  the  presenl  chapter  and  elsewl 
cerned  in  ascertaining  what  are  the  rules  sources  of  historical  information  an 
of  the  Constitution  in  the  year  1886.    To  or  less  indicated,  and  the  author  specially 
a  lawyer  on  the  other  hand,  the  primary  refers  with  pleasure  to  the  valuable  series 
object  of  study  is  the  law  as  it  now  stands ;  of  publications  on   Local  Grovernmenl    in 
he  is  only  secondarily  occupied  with  as-  the  United  States,  in  The  Johns  Hopkins 
curtaining  how  it  came   into   existence."  University  Studies. 
VOL.   I.  —  1 


2  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  2 

cities.  In  the  latter  country  we  find  Memphis,  one  of  the  Old 
World's  proudest  capitals,  even  whose  site  was,  until  recently,  a  mat- 
ter of  Learned  conjecture.  It  was,  centuries  ago,  buried  beneath  the 
ds  of  the  encroaching  desert,  and  in  our  own  day  it  has  been  ex- 
humed in  the  midsl  of  Bedouins  too  wild  to  be  interested  in  the 
wondrous  revelations  of  its  entombed  mysteries.  Temples  and 
buildings,  vast  and  magnificent,  dating  probabl)  fifteen  centuries 
before  the  Christian  era,  and  preserved  by  burial  from  decay  and 
spoliation,  may  to-da)  be  seen  almost  in  their  original  perfection. 
" The  pyramids  themselves,"  as  Fuller  quaintly  says,  "doting  with 
age,  have  forgotten  the  names  of  their  founders."  There,  too,  in 
"  old,  hushed  Egypt  and  its  sands,"  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile,  are 
the  massive  ruins  of  Thebes  (Diospolis),  the  city  of  "  the  hundred 
gates,"  antedating  secular  history,  and  claimed  by  the  Egyptians  to 
have  been  the  first  capital,  as  undoubtedly  it  was  one  of  the  oldest 
cities  of  the  historic  world.  As  the  eye  runs  along  the  colonnades 
of  ruined  temples,  the  mind  runs  back  through  the  Egypt  of  the 
Ptolemies  to  the  Egypt  of  the  Pharaohs,  four  thousand  years  ago, 
when  Thebes  was  in  its  glory  and  its  pride.  But  in  the  midst  of 
these  stupendous  remains  of  an  early  civilization,  we  find  but  little 
evidence  of  their  municipal  history  and  organization.  The  chief 
lesson  they  teach  is  that  they  were  the  centres  of  great  wealth  and 
1  lower  in  the  ruling  classes,  and  that  the  people,  who  constitute 
the  true  wealth  of  modern  cities,  were  at  the  absolute  disposal 
of  their  masters,  bound  down  and  degraded  by  servitude  and  op- 
pression. 

§  2.    Notwithstanding  the  people  of  Greece  were  of  a  common 

bl 1,  language,  and  religion,  Greece  was  never  politically  united. 

Political  power  resided  not  in  a  number  of  independent  states,  but 
in  a  large  number  of  free,  independent,  and  <>uto?wmous  cities,  with 
districts  of  country  adjoining  or  attached  to  them.  Each  city,  except 
in  Attica,  was  sovereign  ;  was  the  sole  source  of  supreme  authority, 
and  possessed  the  exclusive  management  of  its  own  affairs.1  The 
citizen  of  one  was  a  foreigner  in  the  others,  and  could  not,  without 
permission  or  grant,  acquire  property,  make  contracts,  or  marry  out 
of  his  own  city.  The  Grecian  heart  always  glowed  with  patriotic 
fervor  for  the  city,  but  it  rarely,  except  in  times  of  great  common 
danger,  kindled  with  a  love  for  the  whole  country.  Although,  ac- 
cording to  Chancellor   Kent,2  the  "civil  and  political  institutions  of 

1   Ream,  Governmenl  of  England,  chap.  xvii.  p.  4G7;  Grote,  Hist.  Greece,  ii.  302; 
ib.  348. 

a  1  K.nt,  Com.  268,  note. 


§  3  INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL   VIEW.  3 

some  of  tlic  states  of  Greece  bear  some  analogy  to  the:  eouiil 
cities,  and  towns  in  our  American  States,"  the  analogy,  it  must  be 
confessed,  is  remote,  uncertain,  and  without   practical  value  in   the 
inquiries  we  are  to  prosecute. 

§3.  Municipal  Corporations,  as  well  as  Private  Corporations, 
were  familiar  to  the  Roman  haw.  The  learned  Savigny,  under 
the  style  of  Juristical  Persons,  has  traced  the  origin  and  stated  the 
nature;  of  Corporations  in  the  Roman  law  with  greal  clearness.  It 
corresponds  in  essentials  almost  exactly  with  our  own  conceptions 
of  corporations.  Thus,  he  says,  "  The  essential  quality  of  all  Cor- 
porations consists  in  this,  that  the  Subject  of  the  right  does  not 
exist  in  the  individual  members  thereof  (not  even  in  all  the  Mem- 
bers taken  collectively  ; )  but  in  the  ideal  Whole;  hence,  by  a  change 
of  an  individual  member,  indeed  even  of  all  the  members,  the  Es- 
sence and  Unity  of  a  Corporation  is  not  affected."  l  Communities, 
towns,  and  villages  are,  he  says,  mostly  older  than  the  State,  and 
have  therefore  a  natural  existence.  Their  Unity  is  of  a  geographical 
character,  since  it  is  based  upon  the  local  condition  of  dwelling  and 
ownership  of  land.  The  governing  body  represents  the  collective 
Whole.  Such  corporations  are  to  be  distinguished  from  the  State, 
since  the  State  is  not  the  subject  of  private  law  relations.2  The 
communities  (i.  e.,  municipal  corporations  as  we  style  them)  "  had 
on  the  one  hand  need  of  property,  and  the  opportunity  for  its  acqui- 
sition, but,  on  the  other  hand,  such  a  dependent  character  that  they 
could  be  arraigned  (unlike  the  State)  before  a  court  of  justice."  8  In 
the  required  sanction  of  the  State  to  their  existence,  in  the  power  of 
the  majority,4  in  responsibility  for  the  obligations  and  frauds  of  their 
representatives,5  in  their  property  rights,6  it  is  interesting  to  observe 
the  close  analogy  between  the  concept  of  the  Roman  Corporations 
and  our  own. 

Other  aspects  of  the  subject  may  be  briefly  noticed.  "  To  con- 
ceive," says  a  modern  author,  "  of  ancient  Rome  as  the  capital 
of  Italy  in  the  same  sense  that  London  is  the  capital  of  Eng- 
land, or  Paris  of  France,  would  be  a  great  mistake.  London  and 
Paris  are  the  chief  cities  of  their  respective  countries,  because  they 
are  the  seat  of  government.  The  people  of  these  cities  and  their 
surrounding  districts  have  no  privileges  superior  to  those  of  other 
English  or  French  citizens.  But  the  city  of  ancient  Rome,  with  her 
surrounding  territory,  was  a  great  corporate  body  or  community, 

1  Jural  Relations,  by  Rattigan,  sec.  86.  4  lb.  sec.  97. 

2  lb.  sec.  86.  5  lb.  sees.  92,  95. 
8  lb.  sec.  87;  post,  sec.  556.  6  lb.  sees.  90,  91. 


4  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  3 

holding  sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  Italy  and  the  provinces. 
None  but  persons  enrolled  on  the  lists  of  the  tribes  had  a  vote  in 
the  popular  assemblies  or  an)  share  in  the  government  or  legislation 
of  the  city."1  The  common  division  of  civic  communities  estab- 
lished  by  the  Roman  government  was  three,  —  prefectures,  municipal 
tenons,  and  colonies.  The  jirr/ectures  did  not  enjoy  the  right  of  self- 
government,  but  were  under  the  rule  of  prefects,  and  the  inhabitants 
were  subjected  to  the  burdens  without  enjoying  the  privileges  of  Ro- 
man citizens.  But  with  the  municipal  tovjns  it  was  different.  They 
at  length  received  the  full  Roman  franchise;  "and  hence,"  says  the 
writer  just  named,  "  arose  the  common  conception  of  a  municipal 
town;  that  is,  a  community  of  which  the  citizens  are  members  of 
the  whole  nation,  all  possessing  the  same  rights,  and  subject  to  the 
same  burdens,  but  retaining  the  administration  of  law  and  govern- 
ment in  all  local  matters  which  concern  not  the  nation  at  large,"  — 
a  description  which  answers  almost  perfectly  to  municipal  organiza- 
tions in  England  and  America.  The  colonics,  composed  of  Roman 
citizens,  were  established  by  the  parent  city,  sometimes  to  reward 
public  services,  but  generally  as  a  means  of  securing  and  holding  the 
country  which  had  been  subdued  by  Roman  arms.  The  consti- 
tution of  these  colonies,  and  the  rights  of  the  citizens  and  com- 
munities composing  them,  varied;  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  our 
] anpose  to  trace  these  differences.  The  colonies  were  obliged  to 
provide  for  the  erection  of  a  city,  and  cities  thus  erected  were  called 
municipia.  We  thus  perceive  the  justness  of  the  observations  of  a 
distinguished  modern  historian  and  statesman,  who  says  that  "  the 
history  of  the  conquest  of  the  world  by  Rome  is  the  history  of  the 
conquest  and  foundation  of  a  vast  number  of  cities.  In  the  Roman 
world  in  Europe  there  was  an  almost  exclusive  preponderance  of 
cities  and  an  absence  of  country  populations  and  dwellings." 2     The 

1  Dr.  Liddell,  Rome,  chap,  xxvii.  sec.  8.  Rome  we  End  great  roads  extending  from 

-  M.    Guizot,    History    Civilization    in  city  to  city;  but  the  thousands  of  little 

Europe,  Lect.  II.     "Rome,  in  its  origin,  by-paths    now  intersecting  every  part  of 

was  a  mere  municipality,   a  corporation,  the  country  were  unknown.     Neither  do 

In  Italy,  around   Borne,  we  find  nothing  we  find   traces  of  the   immense    number 

but  cities,  —  no  country   places,   no  vil-  of   churches,   castles,    country  seats,   and 

lages.     The  country   was   cultivated,   but  villages  which    were  spread   all  over  the 

ii.ii    peopled.     Tim   proprietors    dwelt   in  country  during  the   Middle  Ages.     The 

cities.     If  we  follow  the  history  of  Rome,  only   bequests  of   Rome  consist,  of  vast 

we  find  that  she  founded  <>r  conquered  a  monuments    impressed  with  a   municipal 

host  of  cities.     It  was  with  cities  that  she  character,  destined  for  a  numerous  popu- 

fought,  it  was  with  cities  Bhe  treated,  into  lation,  crowded  into  a   single  spot.      A 

cities  she  sent  colonies,     [n  the  Gauls  and  municipal  corporation  like   Rome  might 

Spain  we  inert   with  nothing  but  cities;  be  able  to  conquer  the  world,  but  it  was 

the  country  around   is  marsh  and  forest,  a  much  more  difficult  task  to  mould  it 

In    the   monuments   left    us    of   ancient  into  one  compact  body."     lb.     See  also  2 


§  3  a  INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL   VIEW.  5 

nation  was  a  vast  congeries  of  municipalities  bound  together  by  the 
central  power  of  Koine.  When  the  Romans  colonized  and  settled 
the  countries  they  had  conquered  they  established  fixed  govern- 
ments, and  carried  with  them,  and  to  some  extent  necessarily  im- 
parted their  arts,  sciences,  language,  and  civilization  to  their  new 
subjects.  Although  the  political  condition  of  the  vanquished  i 
pie  was  far  from  being  desirable,  still  the  immediate  residence 
among  them  of  the  civilized  Roman  did  not  fail  to  produce  eflfi 
more  or  less  beneficial ;  and  thus  the  municipia,  securing  what  the 
Roman  arms  had  achieved,  became  the  efficient  means  of  spreading 
civilization  throughout  the  Roman  world. 

§  3  a.  The  City  of  Ancient  Rome  had,  in  what  we  would  call  its 
municipal  aspects,  many  features  which  correspond  with  those  of 
the  large  cities  of  our  own  day,  and  whose  study  will  afford  us  les- 
sons of  interest  and  value,  since  it  shows  that  large  and  compact  ag- 
gregations of  people  necessarily  give  rise  to  conditions  and  create 
wants  peculiar  to  such  circumstances,  and  which,  as  pointed  out  in 
the  preceding  section,  are  not  common  to  rural  populations  and  to 
the  state  at  large.  Special  provisions  are  therefore  necessary  for  the 
health,  safety,  convenience,  and  good  government  of  populous  com- 
munities crowded  within  a  narrow  space,  and  these  must  be  sup- 
plied. In  its  essential  municipal  wants  and  in  the  means  of 
meeting  them  Ancient  Rome  bears  a  close  analogy  to  London,  Paris, 
or  New  York.  To  secure  the  comfort  and  health  of  the  city,  and  to 
prevent  and  extinguish  fires,  Rome  in  the  course  of  time  provided 
itself  with  a  magnificent  water  supply.  Its  system  consisted  of 
fourteen  aqueducts  whose  aggregate  length  was  359 \  miles,  of 
which  304  miles  were  underground,  often  through  mountains  and 
along  valleys,  and  55  miles  were  above  ground,  the  channel  being 
carried  on  what  is  really  triumphal  arcades,  sometimes  rising  to 
the  height  of  more  than  100  feet.  As  a  sanitary  necessity,  the 
city  constructed  drains  to  carry  off  the  sewage.  The  Cloaca  Max- 
ima is  not  only  a  large  but  it  is  a  wonderful  work  —  "  an  immense 
sewer,  built  twenty-five  centuries  ago,  on  unstable  ground,  under 
enormous  practical  difficulties,  which  still  answers  its  purpose  well, 
ami  which  ranks  among  the  greatest  triumphs  of  engineering  skill." 
For  the  health  and  pleasure  of  the  people  Rome  also  supplied  itself 
with  puhlir  phi xes  of  resort  more  adequately,  perhaps,  than  have  any 
of  the  great  modem  cities.  Lanciani,  as  the  result  oi  explorations 
and  of  his  own  examinations  and  researches,  says  that  "  towards  the 

Kent's  Com.  270,  note  ;  Dr.  A.dam  Smith's     Rook  III.  chap.  ii.  ;   Hearn,  Government 
interesting  chapter,   Wealth   oi'  Nations,     of  England,  chap.  .wii.  p.  -ivS  el  seq. 


6  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  3  a 

end  of  the  third  century  after  Christ,  there  were  in  Rome  eight 
cKinjii  or  commons,  green  spaces  set  apart  mostly  for  foot-races  and 
gymnastic  exercises;  eighteen  fora  or  public  squares,  and  about 
thirty  parks  or  gardens,  which,  first  laid  out  by  wealthy  citizens 
for  their  private  comfort  or  that  of  their  friends,  had  been  absorbed 
into  the  imperial  domain  by  purchase,  by  bequest,  or  by  confisca- 
tion. The  city  was  not  only  surrounded  and  enclosed  by  them,  but 
intersected  by  them  in  every  direction."  Modern  cities  have  noth- 
ing fully  answering  to  these  forums  or  public  squares,  either  in  cost, 
area,  or  magnificence.  They  gave  to  the  people  of  Home  more 
than  twenty-live  acres  in  extent  for  various  public  uses.  In  the 
public  baths  G2,800  citizens  could  bathe  at  the  same  moment.  Rome 
had  also  its  Police  and  Fire  Departments.  The  public  safety  was 
entrusted  to  a  select  body  of  7,500  men,  whose  function  corresponds 
to  that  of  the  9,000  policemen  of  London.  The  Roman  policeman, 
however,  performed  the  double  duty  of  fireman  and  policeman. 

In  a  most  important  particular,  however,  Rome  suffers  by  compari- 
son with  modern  cities.  Its  public  places  were  not  lighted.  All 
business  closed  with  the  daylight.  The  streets  at  night  were  dan- 
gerous. Property  was  insecure.  No  attempt  at  public  illumination 
was  made.  The  idea  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  them. 
Persons  who  ventured  abroad  on  dark  nights  were  dimly  lighted  by 
lanterns  and  torches.1  Its  condition  was  similar  to  that  of  London 
two  hundred  years  ago,  so  graphically  described  by  Macaulay,  and 
whose  description  is  partly  given  in  the  note.2     No  more  forcible 

1  The  data  for  this  section  so  far  as  re-  house,  or  of  a  rope  or  small  chain  drawn 
lates  to  Ancient  Rome,  are  derived  from  across  the  street  to  support  lamps  or  Ian- 
Professor  Lanciani's  late  work  (1889),  terns,  has  as  ye1  been  found,  and  probably 
Ancient  Rome  in  the  light  of  Recent  Dis-  none  ever  will  be."  lb.,  chap.  viii. 
ooveries.  Indeed  the  text  is  simply  an  -  Macaulay's  History  of  England,  vol.  I, 
abridgment  or  transcript  of  those  portions  chap,  iii.,  entitled  "  The  State  of  England 
of  his  work  which  treat  of  the  Sanitary  in  1685."  "  When  the  evening  closed  in, 
Condition  of  Ancient  Rome  (chap,  iii.),  of  the  difficulty  and  danger  in  walking  about 
Public  Tlaces  of  Resort  (chap.  iv. ),  and  London  became  serious  indeed.  Tbe  gar- 
of  the  Police  and  Fire  Department  (chap,  rel  windows  were  opened,  and  pails  were 
viii).  Modern  excavations  and  archseo-  emptied,  with  little  regard  to  those  pass- 
logical  researches  have  enabled  us  to  see  ing  below.  Falls,  bruises  and  broken 
for  the  first  time  Ancient  Rome  as  it  was,  bones  were  of  constant  occurrence.  For 
and  have  invested  it  with  an  interest  more  till  the  last  year  of  the  reign  of  Charles  II. 
intense  and  absorbing  than  ever.  "The  most  of  the  streets  were  left  in  profound 
principal  cause  of  disorder  was  thai  the  darkness.  Thieves  and  robbers  plied  their 
metropolis  was  kepi  in  perfeel  darkness  at  trade  with  impunity  ;  yet  theywere  hardly 
night.  Why  the  idea  of  a  system  of  pub-  so  terrible  as  another  class  of  ruffians.  It 
lie  illumination  was  not  conceived  and  was  a  favorite  amusement  of  dissolute  young 
adopted,  is  a  mystery  hard  to  solve.  Ex-  gentlemen  to  swagger  by  nighl  about  the 
cavations  fully  confirm  the  fact.  No1  a  town,  breaking  windows,  upsetting  sedans, 
trace  of  a  bracket  fixed  to  the  front  of  a  heating  quiet  men,  and  offering  rude  ca- 


§3a 


INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL    7IEW. 


illustration  of  the  necessity  and  advantages  'it'  lighting  a  city  can  be 
given  than  the  pictures  drawn  by  Lanciani  and  Macaulayof  the 
of  a  great  city  buried  in  the  darkness  of  night  ;  and  they  show  how 
clearly  the  power  to  provide  for  this  is  essentially  and  peculiarly 
one  pertaining  to  municipal  rule  and  regulation.  Nor  are  these 
studies,  and  the  facts  that  they  reveal,  withoul  practical  value  to 
the  jurist.  They  demonstrate  that  a  large  and  dense  collection  of 
human  beings  occupying  a  limited  area  have  needs  peculiar  to 
themselves,  which  create  the  necessity  for  municipal  or  local 
ernment  and  regulation,  and  this  in  its  turn  the  necessity  for  cor- 
porate organization.  The  body  thus  organized,  as  it  has  duties 
acquires  rights  peculiar  to  itself  as  distinguished  from  the  Nation 
or  State  at  large,  which  rights,  especially  those  that  pertain 
to  property  acquired  under  legislative  sanction,  it  is  a  mistake  to 
suppose  have  nothing  individual  in  their  nature,  and  that  they 
are  subject  to  the  absolute  and  unlimited  power  of  the  legislature. 
Subject  they  are  indeed  to  the  largest  measure  of  legislative  regu- 
lation for  the  general  good,  but  not  subject  to  absolute  destruction. 
Modes  of  life,  modes  of  thought,  conceptions  of  rights  and  of  duties, 
and  the  essential  conditions  of  existence,  precede  constitutions,  whose 

London.  He  undertook,  for  a  moderate 
consideration,  to  place  a  light  before  every 
tenth  door,  on  moonless  nights  from 
Michaelmas  to  Lady  Day,  and  from  six 
to  twelve  of  the  clock.  Those  who  now 
see  the  capital  all  the  year  round,  from 
dusk  to  dawn,  blazing  with  a  .splendor  In- 
side which  the  illuminations  for  La  Hogue 
and  Blenheim  would  have  looked  pale, 
may  smile  perhaps  to  think  of  Heming's 
of  the  Common  Council,  which  provided'    lanterns,    which  glimmered   feebly  before 


resses  to  pretty  women.  I  am  confident 
that  Milton  was  thinking  of  these  pests 
when  he  dictated  the  noble  lines  :  — 

'  And  in  luxurious  cities,  when  the  noise 
Of  riot  ascends  above  their  loftiest  towers, 
And  injury  and  outrage,  and  when  night 
Darkens  the  streets,  then  wander  forth  the  sons 
Of  Belial,  flown  with  insolence  and  wine.' 

The  machinery  for  keeping  the  peace  was 
utterly  contemptible.     There  was  an  Act 


that  more  than  a  thousand  watchmen 
should  be  constantly  on  the  alert  in  the 
city  from  sunset  to  sunrise,  and  that  every 
inhabitant  should  take  his  turn  of  duty. 
But  this  act  was  negligently  executed. 
Few  of  those  who  were  summoned  left 
their  homes  ;  and  those  few  generally 
found  it  more  agreeable  to  tipple  in  the 
ale-houses  than  to  pace  the  streets. 

"In  the  last  year  of  the  reign  of 
Charles  II.  began  a  great  change  in  the 
police  of  London,  a  change  which  has, 
perhaps,  added  as  much  to  the  happiness 
of  the  body  of  the  people  as  revolutions  of 
much  greater  fame.  An  ingenious  pro- 
jector, named  Ivlward  Ileming,  obtained 
letters-patent  conveying  to  him,  for  a  term 
of  years,  the  exclusive  right  of  lighting  up 


one  house  in  ten,  during  a  small  part   of 
one  night  in  three.     But  such  was  not  tie- 
feeling  of  his  contemporaries.     There  were 
quarters  of   Loudon  peopled  by  the  out- 
casts of  society  where  even  the  warrant  of 
the  Chief  Justice  of  England  could   not 
be  executed  without  the  help  of  a  com- 
pany of  musketeers.     Such   relies  of  the 
barbarism  of  the  darkesl  ages  [sanctuaries 
for  criminals]  were  to  be  found  within  a 
short  walk  of  the  chambers  where  S 
was    studying   history   and    law,    of    the 
chapel  where  Tillotson  was  preaching,  of 
the  coffee-house  where  Dryden  « 
ing  judgment  on  poems  and  plays,  and  of 
the  hall  where  the  Royal  Society  i 
amining  the  astronomical  system  ol 
Newton." 


8  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  4 

chief  value  is  to  give  organic  security  to  such  autecedent  and  exist- 
ing conditions  and  rights  as  are  deemed  to  be  vital  and  fundamental. 
Accordingly  the  Constitutions  of  the  American  States  recognize  the 
existence  and  contemplate  the  continuance  of  incorporated  com- 
munities, and  that  they  shall  enjoy,  in  accordance  with  immemorial 
usage  the  right  of  local  government ;  and  it  is  a  fair  inference,  even 
in  the  absence  of  special  provision,  that  their  property  rights  and 
rights  of  a  pecuniary  character  are  within  the  protection  of  im- 
portant provisions  of  the  State  and  Federal  Constitutions.  Consti- 
tutions are  not  to  be  interpreted  alone  by  their  words  abstractly 
considered,  but  by  their  words  read  in  the  light  of  the  conditions 
and  necessities  in  which  the  provisions  originated,  and  in  view  of 
the  purposes  sought  to  be  attained  and  secured.  Constitutions  are 
devised  not  so  much  to  create  rights,  as  to  guarantee  and  secure 
the  enjoyment  of  those  which  are  considered  primordial  and  inde- 
structible. The  subject  of  the  extent  of  legislative  authority  -over 
municipalities  and  its  limitations  is  considered  in  subsequent 
chapters.1 

§  4.  After  the  subversion  of  the  Eoman  Empire  the  towns  of 
EUROPE  from,  the  fifth  to  the  tenth  century  were  in  a  state  neither  of 
servitude  nor  liberty,  though  their  condition  differed  greatly  in  dif- 
ferent countries.  During  this  period  the  power  and  influence  of 
the  towns  were,  in  general,  on  the  decline.  The  power  of  the 
church  was  great,  and  the  inhabitants  found  their  chief  protection 
in  the  clergy. 

The  establishment  of  the  feudal  system  worked  a  great  change  in 
the  condition  of  the  towns.  Before  that,  towns,  as  we  have  seen, 
were  the  centres  of  wealth  and  population.  The  ruling  class  lived 
within  them.  The  land  was  cultivated  by  persons  who  were  not 
recognized  as  having  political  rights.  After  feudalism  was  estab- 
lished this  changed.  The  proprietor  then  lived  upon  his  estates, 
instead  of  living  within  a  town  ;  the  town  became  part  of  the  lands 
of  the  lord,  or  enclosed  within  his  fief.  It,  with  its  population, 
thus  became  subject  to  his  arbitrary  exactions,  oppression,  and  pil- 
lage. Still  the  towns  gradually  prospered;  with  prosperity  came 
wealth;  and  with  wealth  came  power.  Such,  in  general,  was  the 
condition  of  the  towns  of  continental  Europe  down  to  the  eleventh 
century.  About  this  time,  without  any  union  or  concert,  many  of 
them  in  most  of  the  countries  of  Europe  rose  against  the  lords,  and 
demanded  for  the  burgesses,  commonalty,  or  inhabitants  a  greater  or 

1  PosL  chaps.  iv„  vii.,  viii. 


§  5  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL   VIEW.  9 

less  measure  of  enfranchisement.  Sometimes  a  town  failed  in  its 
stru^de,  and  its  oppression  whs  redoubled  by  the  victorious  lord. 
Sometimes  the  towns  were  aided  by  the  king,  who  was  frequently 
not  unwilling  to  humble  the  arrogant  and  haughty  nobility,  and 
thereby  acquire  the  influence  and  affection  of  those  whom  he  had 
assisted.  Not  unfrequently,  however,  the  struggle  had  to  be  main- 
tained by  their  own  unaided  resources,  and  when  successful, 
result  was  the  granting  by  the  lords  to  the  burghers  of  CHARTERS, 
conferring  more  or  less  extensive  municipal  immunities  and  rights. 
These  charters,  as  Guizot  justly  observes,  were  in  the  nature 
"  treaties  of  peace  between  the  commons  and  their  lords;"  were  in 
fact,  "  bills  of  rights  "  for  the  people.1  During  the  twelfth  century 
"  all  Europe,  and  especially  France,  which  for  a  century  had  been 
covered  with  insurrections  by  burghers  against  their  lords,  was 
covered  by  charters  more  or  less  favorable ;  the  corporators  enjoyed 
them  with  more  or  less  security,  but  still  they  enjoyed  them."  2 

§  5.  After  the  overthrow  of  the  Soman  Empire  and  the  decay  of 
the  civilization  which  accompanied  the  Koman  power,  Europe  be- 
came largely  indebted  to  cities  and  to  the  authority  and  jurisdiction 
which  they  acquired  and  exercised  for  the  creation  of  the  third 
estate,  —  popular  power,  and  for  the  development  of  the  principles 
of  constitutional  or  free  government.3 

The  Italian  cities,  especially  Venice,  Genoa,  and  Pisa,  grew 
rich  out  of  the  commerce  resulting  from  the  vast  armies  that  the 
Crusaders  for  two  hundred  years  had  successively  pushed  forward 
into  the  Holy  Land.  The  oppressive  feudal  system  was  at  this 
time  in  full  force  throughout  Europe.  These  Italian  cities  used 
their  power  and  wealth  to  secure  their  independence.  Cities  and 
towns,  as  well  as  people  who  dwelt  in  the  country,  were  alike  sub- 

1  People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  cipal  jurisdiction,  contributed  more,  per- 
325,  334,  per  Nelson,  J.  haps,  than  any  other  cause,   to  introduce 

2  Guizot,  History  Civilization  in  Eu-  regular  government,  police  and  arts,  nil 
rope,  Lect.  VII.  This  philosophic  and  to  diffuse  them  over  Europe."  Robert- 
valuable  work  is  the  source  from  whence  son's  Charles  V.  ;  see  Hallam's  Middle 
are  drawn  most  of  the  statements  of  the  Ages,  chap.  ii.  Tart  II.  M.  Guizot  conaid- 
text  as  to  the  condition  of  the  towns  of  ers  the  three  great  elements  of  modern 
Europe  from  the  fifth  to  the  tenth  century,  civilization  to  be  the  Feudal  System,  the 
See  similar  account,  Wealth  of  Nations,  Christian  Church,  the  Commons,  or  free 
Book  III.  chap.  iii.  ;  Hallam's  Middle  corporate  cities.  Civilization  in  Europe, 
Ages,  chap.  ii.  Part  II.,  and  notes  to  later  Lect.  VII.  j  sec  also  Wealth  of  Nations, 
editions.  Book  III.  chap,  iii.,  on  "The  Rise  and 

8  "The  institution  of  cities  into  com-     Progress  of  Cities  and   Towns,  utter  the 
munities,  corporations,  or   bodies  politic,      Fall  of  the  Koman  Empire." 
and  granting  them  the  privilege  of  muni- 


10 


MrNIfllWL   CORPORATIONS. 


§6 


ject  to  the  arbitrary  domination  of  their  feudal  masters.  Some  of 
the  cities,  in  the  eleventh  century,  obtained  their  freedom  by  pur- 
chase, some  by  force,  and  some  by  gift.  They,  in  effect,  constituted 
so  many  little  republics,  with  the  right  to  manage  their  own  con- 
cerns. In  this  way,  before  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  nearly 
every  considerable  city  of  Italy  was  enfranchised  or  had  received 
extensive  corporate  immunities  from  the  sovereign  or  lord.  The 
happy  effects  were  soon  perceived  in  the  increased  population  and 
improved  condition.     Liberty  and  prosperity  ever  go  hand  in  hand. 

§  6.  Whether  from  example,  as  asserted  by  Dr.  Robertson,  or 
from  other  causes,  the  same  course  was  pursued  by  the  cities  of  other 
states  in  Europe.  The  King  of  FRANCE,  Louis  le  Gros,  and  his  great 
barons  granted  many  charters  of  community,  by  which  the  inhabi- 
tants were  freed  from  feudal  servitude  and  erected  into  municipal 
corporations,  with  the  power  of  local  government.  These  charters 
contained  grants  of  new  privileges,  and  prescribed  salutary  methods 
for  the  enforcement  of  rights  and  the  redress  of  grievances.  They 
are  interesting  and  instructive,  and  a  brief  view  of  their  general 
character  is  given  in  the  note.1 

1  Abstract  of  municipal  charter  in  the  authorized  to  issue  the  necessary  process 

Middle  Ages. —  In  those  turbulent  times  for  the    seizure    and    sale    of   property, 

personal  safety  was  an  object  of  the  first  humane  and  necessary  exemptions  being 

importance,  and  this  was  usually  afforded  allowed.     (2)  Every  member  was  obliged 

to  the  vassal  by  the  baron  or  lord.     The  to  bring  some   of  his   property   into   the 

communities   or   free   towns   which   were  town,  or  build  a  house,  or  buy  land;  and 

instituted  undertook   to   provide   for  the  in  some   places  the  members  were  bound 

safety   of  their  members,   independent  of  for  each  other.     (3)  Judgments  by  magis- 

the  nobles.     For,     (1)  All  the   members  trates,  duly  selected,  took  the  place  of  the 

were  bound  by  oath  to  assist  and  defend  arbitrary  and  capricious  decisions  of  the 

each  other  against  all  aggressors.     (2)  All  baron  or  feudal  lord.      (4)   Arbitrary  tax- 


residents  in  a  town  made  free  were 
obliged  to  take  part  in  the  mutual  de- 
fence of  its  members.  (3)  The  communi- 
ties could  execute  the  judgments  of  their 
magistrates  by  coercion,  if  necessary. 
(1)  The  practice  of  making  private  satis- 
faction   for    crimes  was    abolished,     and 


ation  was  prohibited,  and  regulations  for 
an  equal  tax  were  sometimes  especially 
prescribed.  Digested  from  Robertson's 
Charles  V.,  Vol.  I.  note  xvi.,  Proofs  and 
Illustrations.  "  The  communities  of 
France  never  aspired,"  says  this  accurate 
and    elegant  historian,  "to  the  same    in- 


provision    made    for   the  regular   punish-  dependence    with    those   in    Italy.     They 

ment  of  offenders.     (5)   A  person  reason-  acquired   in   France  new   privileges    and 

ably    suspected    to    be   about    to    injure  immunities ;  but  the  right  of  sovereignty 

another  might,  as  with  us  at  the  present  remained    entire    to    the    king   or    baron 

day,  be  compelled  to  give  security  to  keep  within    whose    territories    the    respective 

the  peace.     These  communities  also  under-  cities  were  situated,  and  from  whom  they 

took  to  provide  for  the  security  of  prop-  received  the  charter  of  their  freedom."  lb. 

trty  by  the  following:     (1)  Abolishing  the  Charters  defined,  post,  sees.  32,82.  Munici- 

right  of  the  creditor  to  seize  the  effects  of  pal  charters,  treated  of,  post,  chaps,  v.,  vi. 

bis  debtor  with  his  own  hand  and  by  his  Outline  of  modern  municipal   charters  in 

private  authority,  and  compelling  him  to  the  United  States,  post,  sec.  39. 
|)roceed    before    a    magistrate,    who    was 


§   6  INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL    VIEW.  11 

We  meet  in  France  with  great  diversity  in  the  origin  and  gov- 
ernment of  towns  and  cities.  In  some  of  them,  especially  in  south- 
ern France,  the  Roman  municipal  system,  more  or  less  modified  from 
time  to  time,  was  perpetuated.  The  Roman  system  was  formed 
upon  an  aristocratic  model.  In  each  municipium  there  w 
senate,  called  an  ordo  or  curia.  This  was,  politically  considered, 
the  city  ;  it  was  the  governing  body.  The  mass  of  the  population, 
except  in  a  few  cases,  had  no  voice  in  municipal  affairs.  This  senate 
was  composed  of  a  comparatively  small  number  of  families,  and  the 
office  was  hereditary.  When  the  body  became  reduced  in  numbers 
by  death  or  otherwise,  it  was  not  filled  by  the  people,  but  by  the 
survivors.  Other  towns  or  communities  originated,  in  the  mosl 
natural  manner,  upon  the  fiefs  or  estates  of  the  feudal  proprietors. 
Many  of  these  estates  became  centres  or  agglomerations  of  popula- 
tion, composed  of  the  working  and  industrial  classes.  Trade  sprang 
up,  and  towns  and  cities  originated.  The  lord,  or  proprietor,  was  in- 
terested in  and  derived  profit  from  their  prosperity.  To  induce  others 
to  settle  there,  he  frequently  conceded  certain  privileges.  He  did  not 
emancipate  them  from  all  feudal  restraints  and  burdens,  but  these 
he  mitigated.  Often  he  granted  lands  and  privileges  to  all  who 
settled  in  towns  on  his  domains,  on  receiving  a  moderate  fixed  rent 
and  specified  military  services.  These  concessions  had  no  higher 
origin  than  the  personal  interest  of  the  proprietor,  and  were  often 
violated.  They  did  not  constitute  the  towns  locally  independent, 
or  make  them  true  corporations.  But,  limited  and  uncertain  as 
these  concessions  were,  the  towns  which  received  them  prospered 
and  became  more  or  less  important. 

Other  places  in  France  were  chartered  towns  and  true  corpora- 
tions. In  the  twelfth  century  there  was  the  general  movement, 
before  noticed,  on  the  part  of  the  towns  of  France  for  their  enfran- 
chisement, or  delivery  from  feudal  bondage.  The  extent  of  this 
movement  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  the  royal  charters  of 
this  period  are  numbered  by  hundreds,  and  those  granted  by  the 
lords,  by  thousands.  These  were,  in  general,  wrested  from  the 
feudal  proprietors  by  force,  or  the  fear  of  it,  and  conferred  an  almost 
independent  political  existence  upon  the  commune,  or  town.  These 
charters  gave  the  community  the  power  of  having  its  people  judged 
for  offences  by  magistrates  of  their  own  choosing;  crimes  and  pun- 
ishments were  defined;  arbitrary  rents  and  taxes  were  abolished,  and 
iixed  rents  and  regular  taxes  substituted  ;  main-morte  and  other  re- 
straints upon  the  alienation  and  enjoyment  of  property  were  removed. 
The  n;overnment  of  towns  thus  created,  unlike  those  which  were 
mere  perpetuations  of  the  Roman  system,  was  formed  upon  a  demo- 


12  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  7 

orotic  model  A  voice  was  given  to  all  burghers,  or  persons  of  a 
certain  fortune,  or  who  exercised  a  trade  or  calling.  In  a  word, 
with  considerable  diversity,  this  class  of  towns  was  independent, 
and  possessed,  in  local  matters,  the  power  of  self-government.  From 
and  after  the  fourteenth  century,  the  political  power  and  influence 
of  the  towns  of  France  decayed.  The  causes  of  this  decline  have 
been  traced  with  a  masterly  hand  by  M.  Guizot,  but  they  do  not 
relate  to  our  purpose.1  In  the  course  of  change,  we  may  remark 
that  the  royal  power  over  them  became  predominant,  and  instead 
of  being  self-governed,  they  were  administered  by  the  intendants,  or 
officers  of  the  king  or  emperor,  or  the  central  authority  at  Paris. 

Towns,  or  communes  in  modern  France  are  governed  by  a  mayor 
and  council.  By  the  law  of  1855,  in  all  communes  of  3,000  inhabi- 
tants and  upwards,  these  officers  are  appointed  by  the  emperor;  while 
in  small  communes  the  appointment  is  made  by  the  prefect  of  the 
department,  himself  appointed  by  the  emperor.  The  prefect  may 
suspend  municipal  councillors,  but  the  emperor  alone  can  dismiss 
them.2  Under  the  present  republic  the  prefect  is  appointed  by  the 
president ;  and  in  the  larger  towns  the  mayor  is  nominated  by  the 
government  at  Paris,  but  he  must  be  selected  from  the  municipal 
council,  which  is  chosen  by  universal  suffrage.3 

§  7.  It  seems  to  be  well  established  that  the  towns  and  cities  of 
Spain  acquired  charters  of  freedom  at  an  earlier  period  than  those 
in  France,  England,  or  Germany.4  The  cities  of  Italy,  as  we  have 
seen,  owed  their  freedom,  to  a  large  extent,  to  their  commercial 
importance  and  wealth ;  but  those  of  Spain  owed  their  privileges 

i  History  Civilization  in  France,  Lect.  Charles    V.,    Introductory    View),     who 

XIX;    sec  also   Hallam's    Middle   Ages,  wrote  when  the  constitutional  antiquities 

chap.  ii.  Part  II.,  and  notes.  of  Castile  had  been  but  slightly  investi- 

2  American  Encyclopaedia,  Commune.  gated,  would  seem  to  have  no  authority, 

a  Encyclopaedia   Brit.    (9th    ed.),  509,  therefore,    for  deriving  the  establishment 

511    title  France.  of  communities  from  Italy,   and  still  less 

*The   must   ancient  of    these   regular  for  tracing  their  progress  through  France 

charters  of  incorporation  now  extant  was  and    Germany  to    Spain.     Prescott,    Fer- 

granted  by  Alfonso  V.,  in  1020,   to   the  dinand  and  Isabella,  Introduction,  Vol.  I. 

city   of  Leon  and  its  territory.     It   pre-  note  24. 

ceded  by  a  long  interval  those  granted        Hallam,  who,  as  well  as  Prescott,  founds 

to  the  burges  es  in  other  parts  of  Europe,  his  judgment  upon  the  historical    works 

with    the' exception,    perhaps,    of  Italy,  of  Marina  and  Sempere,.  expresses  a  simi- 

Acts  of  enfranchisemenl  became  frequent  lar  opinion  as  to  the  early  period  at  which 

in   Spain   during  the    eleventh    century,  the   towns  of  Spain   were  invested  with 

several  of  which   are   preserved,   and   ex-  chartered  rights  and  privileges.     Middle 

hibit  with  sufficient  precision  the  nature  Ages,  chap,  iv.;  lb.  chap.  ii.  Part  II.  and 

of  the  privileges  accorded  to  the  inhabi-  notes, 
tants.       Robertson    (in    his    History    of 


§  7  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL   VIEW.  13 

and  jurisdiction  to  an  entirely  different  cause.  For  nearly  eight 
hundred  years  the  Gothic  inhabitants  of  Spain  had  been  engaged 
in  an  almost  uninterrupted  struggle  against  the  Moors,  who  occu- 
pied the  southern  part   of  the   peninsula.1     It  was  obviously  the 

dictate  of  policy,  as  the  Spaniards  gradually  narrowed  the  boun- 
daries of  their  enemies'  territory,  to  make  provision  for  securing  and 
holding  the  ground  thus  gained.  With  this  view,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protecting  themselves  from  the  frequent  raids  of  their  Arab 
neighbors,  liberal  charters  were  granted  to  towns,  with  extensive 
districts  of  country  subject  to  their  municipal  jurisdiction 

By  these  grants  or  charters  the  citizens  selected  their  own  officers, 
including  judges  and  a  common  council,  and  enjoyed  many  of  the 
essential  rights  of  freemen.  In  return,  the  community  or  city  paid 
a  certain  (no  longer  an  arbitrary)  tax  or  rent,  and  owed  military 
service.  For  more  effectual  protection,  the  charters  frequently  pro- 
hibited the  nobles  from  acquiring  real  property  or  erecting  for- 
tresses or  palaces  within  the  limits  of  the  community,  and  subjected 
them  to  its  jurisdiction  when  within  its  territory.  Large  sections 
of  the  adjacent  country,  as  we  have  said,  often  embracing  towns  and 
villages,  were  annexed  to  the  city  or  community  and  placed  under 
its  laws  and  jurisdiction.  "  Thus,"  says  Mr.  Prescott,2  to  whom  we 
are  indebted  for  this  sketch  of  the  early  municipalities  of  Spain, 
"  while  the  inhabitants  of  the  great  towns  in  other  parts  of  Europe 
were  languishing  in  feudal  servitude,  the  members  of  the  Castilian 
corporations,  living  under  the  protection  of  their  own  laws  and 
magistrates  in  time  of  peace,  and  commanded  by  their  own  officers 

1  Mr.  Irving's  fine  reflections,  in  his  manent  root  in  the  soil  it  embellished. 
Alhamhra,  upon  this  protracted  and  fa-  Severed  from  all  their  neighbors  in  the 
nious  contest  between  the  Crescent  and  west  by  impassable  barriers  of  faith  and 
the  Cross,  are  not  inappropriate :  "  The  manners,  and  separated  by  seas  and  des- 
singular  fortunes  of  the  Arabian  or  erts  from  their  kindred  of  the  east,  the 
Murisco-Spaniards  form  one  of  the  most  Moriseo-Spaniards  were  an  isolated  peo- 
anomalous  yet  splendid  episodes  in  his-  pie.  Their  whole  existence  was  a  pro- 
tory.  A  remote  wave  of  the  great  Ara-  longed,  though  gallant  and  chivalric, 
bian  inundation  cast  upon  the  shores  of  struggle  for  a  foothold  in  a  usurped  land. 
Europe,  they  seem  to  have  all  the  impe-  They  were  the  outposts  and  frontiers  of 
tus  of  the  first  rush  of  the  torrent.  But  Islaniism.  The  peninsula  was  the  great 
repelled  (by  unsuccessful  battle)  within  battle-ground  where  the  Gothic  conquer* 
the  limits  of  the  Pyrenees,  they  gave  up  ors  of  the  north  and  the  Moslem  conquer- 
the  Moslem  principle  of  conquest,  and  ors  of  the  east  met  and  strove  for  mastery j 
sought  to  establish  in  Spain  a  peaceful  and  the  fiery  courage  of  the  Arab  was  at 
and  permanent  dominion.  Generation  length  (after  eight  hundred  years)  sub- 
after  generation,  century  after  century  dued  by  the  obstinate  and  persevering 
passed  away,    and   still   they  maintained  valor  of  the  Goth. " 

possession    of  the   land.     With   all   this,  2  History  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  Vol. 

however,  the  Moslem  empire  in  Spain  was  I.,  Introduction,  sec.  1. 
but  a  brilliant  exotic  that   took  no  per- 


14  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  7  a 

in  war,  were  in  full  enjoyment  of  all  the  essential  rights  and  privi- 
leges of  freemen." 

§  7  a.  The  modern  municipal  institutions  of  Prussia  and  their 
workings  arc  full  of  interest  and  instruction.  The  aim  has  there 
been  to  embody  the  principle  of  local  self-government,  with  central 
limitations  upon  the  exercise  of  certain  of  the  more  important 
powers.  They  are  so  constructed  as  to  attempt  to  give  to  the  citizen 
such  a  method  of  government  as  will  enlist  the  best  character  and 
talent  in  the  service  of  the  municipality,  and  yet  prevent  it  from 
inconsiderately  engaging  in  enterprises  which  might  unduly  burden 
it  with  obligations  too  great  to  be  borne.  The  scheme  of  organiza- 
tion gives  to  the  municipality  very  general  powers,  with  the  limita- 
tion on  the  exercise  of  many  of  them,  that  they  shall  be  approved 
by  some  superior  administrative  officer  of  the  central  government. 
This  administrative  control  over  the  acts  of  the  municipality  does  not 
in  practice  seem  to  be  carried  to  so  great  an  extent  as  the  control 
actually  although  irregularly  exercised  by  the  State  legislatures  over 
our  American  municipalities ;  so  that  although  the  municipal  ad- 
ministration is  apparently  more  centralized  than  here,  the  Prussian 
cities  in  fact  enjoy,  it  is  said,  a  greater  degree  of  freedom  from 
central  interposition  than  with  us.  In  order  to  ensure  the  services 
of  the  best  citizens,  penalties  are  imposed  on  those  who  refuse  to 
serve  for  at  least  half  of  the  time  for  which  they  have  been  elected 
or  appointed,  that  they  shall  lose  their  municipal  suffrage  and  have 
their  taxes  increased.  Suffrage,  though  very  general,  is  not  univer- 
sal. A  small  property  qualification  is  required,  which  may  consist 
in  the  payment  of  taxes.  P>ut  in  order  to  give  property  a  certain 
degree  of  influence  or  control,  the  voting  population  is  divided  into 
three  classes :  the  first  consisting  of  the  largest  taxpayers,  who  pay 
a  third  of  all  the  direct  taxes ;  the  second  class  consisting  of  the  next 
largest  taxpayers,  who  pay  the  next  third  of  the  taxes  ;  the  third 
class  consisting  of  the  remaining  taxpayers.  Each  of  these  classes 
elects  a  third  of  the  members  of  the  municipal  council.  This 
system  is  similar  to  that  adopted  in  elections  to  the  Prussian  diet ; 
and  it  is  represented  to  work  satisfactorily,  and  to  account  in  a 
large  measure  for  the  great  success  of  the  municipal  government  of 
the  Prussian  cities.1 

1  See  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  has  recently  given  it  as  his  opinion  that 

III.,  December,  1888,  p.  714,  where  Mr.  Berlin  is  the  best  governed  large  munici- 

Goodnow  reviews  Stefrenhagen's  Handbuch  pality  in  the  world.       Opinions  may  differ 

der  si. in ': Hschen  Ver/assung  und  Verwaltung  whether   this  high    culogium    is  merited; 

in  Prcusscn.  hut  undoubtedly  it  is  a  well  governed  city. 

An  enlightened  observer  (Professor  Ely)  The    essential    features   of  its   municipal 


§8 


INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL    VIEW. 


15 


§  8.  Britain  was  one  of  the  last  conquests  of  the  Caesars,  and  whs 
one  of  the  first  of  the  western  provinces  upon  which  they  released 
their  hold.  The  Latin  language  did  not  heroine  the  language  of 
the  people;  nor  did  the  Romans,  as  in  many  of  the  continental 
provinces,  fill  the  country  with  memorials  of  their  skill  and  aits. 
The  impressions  made  by  the  mastery  of  the  Roman  were  Dot  d 
tined  to  be  permanent.  According  to  an  accurate  explorer  and 
philosophic  modern  historian,1  Britain,  when  subject  to  Koine,  was 
divided  into  thirty-three  townships.,  with  a  certain  share  of  local 
self-government;  and  quasi  municipal  institutions,  for  a  long  time 
after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Eoman  power,  constituted  whatever  of 
government  the  people  possessed.  At  the  time  of  the  conquest  of 
England   by  William  of   Normandy    (a.   D.    106G)   the    towns   and 


organization  are  in  substance  stated  by 
Mr.  Baxter  (lecture  on  Berlin)  as  follows: 
All  male  persons  of  the  age  of  twenty- 
four,  who  pay  a  tax  on  an  income  of  $150, 
obtain  the  electoral  franchise  upon  a 
year's  residence.  Over  ten  thousand  cit- 
izens take  part  in  the  administration  of 
municipal  affairs.  The  most  distinguished 
and  substantial  citizens  consider  it  an 
honor  to  do  so.  Penalties  are  imposed 
for  a  refusal  to  serve  in  any  position  to 
which  a  citizen  may  be  elected.  The 
municipal  assembly  is  composed  of  126 
members,  representing  326  wards.  One- 
half  at  least  must  be  house-owners.  The 
members  are  chosen  for  six  years,  one- 
third  retiring  every  two  years,  thus  giv- 
ing permanency  to  the  governing  body 
by  making  the  changes  gradual.  This 
boily  controls  the  affairs  of  the  city.  It 
chooses,  also,  the  upper  branch  of  the  city 
government,  known  as  the  magistracy, 
composed  of  the  mayor  and  the  board  of 
aldermen,  32  in  number,  15  of  whom  are 
salaried,  and  17  are  honorary  members. 
The  term  of  the  mayor  is  twelve  years  ; 
the  salary  about  $7,500.  It  is  regarded  as 
a  position  of  high  honor.  The  salaried 
aldermen  are  elected  for  twelve  years  by 
the  municipal  assembly,  with  special  re- 
gard to  their  qualifications.  Their  sal- 
aries are  higher  than  those  of  the  local 
judges.  The  custom  is  to  re-elect  good 
men.  The  term  of  the  unpaid  aldermen 
is  six  years,  and  they  are  usually  chosen 
from  men  who  have  distinguished  them- 
selves for  efficient  public  service.  Voters 
who   elect   the    municipal    assembly    are 


divided  into  three  classes,  as  stated  in  the 
text.  The  result  is  that  a  majority  of 
the  assembly  is  chosen  by  a  minority  of 
the  voters.  The  next  feature,  so  far  as  our 
observation  goes,  is  almost  wholly  un- 
known in  this  country.  These  two 
chambers  are  supplemented  in  Berlin  by 
a  body  of  70  citizen  deputies,  selected  by 
the  municipal  assembly  from  leading 
citizens,  to  serve  in  joint  committees  for 
the  administration  of  special  affairs,  such 
as  the  relief  of  the  poor,  schools,  &c.  At 
the  meetings  of  these  committees  an  alder- 
man acts  as  chairman.  Under  this  execu- 
tive staff  of  230  members,  all  honorary  offi- 
cials and  men  of  independent  means,  there 
is  a  large  staff  of  paid  officials,  appointed 
for  life,  as  is  the  rule  in  the  German  civil 
service.  The  police  is  administered  by  the 
State  instead  of  the  city,  the  force  consist- 
ing of  about  3,000  men.  The  expense 
(about  $400,000  a  year)  is  borne  by  the 
city.  The  streets  of  Berlin  are  now  taken 
care  of  by  the  city  instead  of  the  State, 
which  up  to  1874  had  the  maintenance. 
The  revenue  of  the  city,  so  far  as 
by  taxation,  comprises  an  annual  income 
tax  of  three  per  cent  on  all  incomes  above 
a  certain  amount  ;  house  rent  and  tax, 
divided  between  landlord  and  tenant  ;  and 
various  minor  special  taxes.  The  net 
debt  of  the  city  is  about  four  millions,  a 
decrease  of  nearly  two  millions  since  1S7'I. 
This  is  a  striking  contrast  to  New  York, 
whose  debt  is  over  one  hundred  millions. 

1  Sir    James     Mackintosh,    History  of 
England,  Vol.  I.  p.  30. 


16  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  8 

boroughs  were  dependent  upon  the  uncertain  protection  of  the  king 
or  lord,  to  whom  they  owed  rents  or  service,  and  were  liable  to  dis- 
cretionary, that  is,  arbitrary  rates  or  talliages.     They  were  not  in- 
corporated, and  did  not  constitute  bodies  politic  ;  and  being  composed 
mainly  of  tradesmen  and  the  lower  classes,  were  regarded  by  their 
feudal  masters  as  possessed  of  no  political  and  of  but  few  civil  rights. 
None  of  them  enjoyed  the  right  of  representation  in  the  council  of 
the  nation,  and,  with  the  exception  perhaps  of  Loudon  and  a  few 
of  the  greater  towns,  did  not  have  the  right  of  internal  or  self- 
government.     Sometime  between  1100  and  1125  Henry  I.  granted 
to  London  the  original  charter,  in  which  were  conferred  many  valu- 
able municipal  privileges,  with  the  right,  among  others,  to  choose 
certain  of  their  own  officers,  such  as  sheriff,  justice,  and  the  like.1 
But  the  rigid  of  local  self-government  was  not,  in  general,  conferred 
upon  towns  and  boroughs  until  the  time  of  John,  who  reigned  from 
1199  to  1216.2     Meantime  the  towns  and  cities  continued  to  grow  in 
population  and  wealth,  and  as  these  increased,  their  disposition  to 
submit  to  arbitrary  exactions  proportionately  diminished,  and  their 
independent  spirit  and  desire  for  freedom  from  oppressive  restraints 
became  more   manifest;   but  still  they   did  not  acquire  sufficient 
influence  or  importance  to  be  allowed  a  representation  in  the  states 
of  the  kingdom  for  more  than  two  centuries  after  the  Conquest.3 
It  was  not  until  the  time  of  Edward  I.  that  cities  and  boroughs, 
then  mostly  incorporated,  obtained  the  right  of  returning  members 
to  parliament.    The  legislative  power  of  the  kingdom  was  at  this  time 
vested  in  the  king  and  the  council,  afterwards  called  the  parliament. 
This  council  was  constituted  of  the  spiritual  and  lay  peerage.     The 
commonalty  of  England  had  no  voice  or  part  in  the  legislature. 
This  wise  and  politic  prince  was  greatly  distressed  for  money,  and 
instead  of  attempting  to  raise  it  by  the  levy  of  arbitrary  taxes, 

1  This  famous  charter  has  no  date.  Its  2  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  III.  chap, 
substance  is  given  in  Norton's  Comment-  viii.  Stephen  thus  describes  the  muni- 
aries  on  the  History,  Constitution,  and  cipal  institutions  of  England  in  the  time 
Chartered  Franchises  of  the  City  of  Lon-  of  John:  "  The  principal  liberties  granted 
don  ;  and  its  various  provisions  explained  in  the  early  charters  are  exclusive  juristic* 
and  commented  on.  Book  II.  chap.  ii.  tion,  a  merchant  guild,  the  appointment 
p.  337.  In  the  latter  clause  of  this  charter  of  the  various  officers  for  the  administra- 
is  an  allusion  to  the  very  ancient  custom  tion  of  justice,  fairs  and  markets,  with 
of  foreign  attachment,  in  which  is  to  be  freedom  from  all  tolls  ;  in  fact  all  of  the 
found  th-  gi  i  in  of  nil  our  foreign  attach-  privileges  granted  by  the  borough  charters 
ment  laws.  Pulling,  Laws,  etc.,  of  Lou-  were  of  a  local  character  in  every  respect." 
don,  188;  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  1  English  Constitution,  chap.  iii.  p.  62. 
III.  ch.  viii.  Part  III.  Mr.  Norton  gives  8  "  It  is  dear  that  at  Runimede  no  rep- 
the  substance  of  all  the  charters  of  London  resentatives  of  cities  or  boroughs  were 
from  the  time  of  William  the  Conqueror  present."  1  Stephen,  English  Constitu- 
te the  present.  tion,  chap.  iii.  p.  71. 


§  8  INTBODUCTOBY    BI8TOBICAL    7IEW.  IT 

which  were  submitted  to  with  murmurs  and  yielded  sparing 
ferred  to  obtain  it  by  the  prior  voluntary  consent  of  the  cities,  towns, 
and  boroughs.1     Accordingly  he  caused  writs  to  be  issued  to  about 
one  hundred  and  twenty  cities  and  boroughs,  enjoining  them  to 
to  parliament,  along  with  the  two  knights  of  the  -hue,  two  deputies 
from  each  borough   within   their  county,   with  authority  from  their 
respective  communities  to  consent  to  what  the  king  and  his  con. 
should  require  of  them.     As  the  experiment  proved  successful,  more 
money  being  obtained,  and  with  less   trouble,  than    in  the    for] 
way,  the  practice  was  continued.     And  this,  according  to  the  best 
opinions  of  learned  and  careful  inquirers,2  is  the  definite  commence- 
ment of  popular  representation,  and  of  the    House   of  Commons 
itself,    the   latter   constituting,    as    Macaulay    wed    observes,   "the 
archetype   of  all    the   representative    assemblies    which   now    m 
either  in  the  old  or  new  world."  3 

The  political  powers  thus  acquired  by  boroughs  and  cities  gave 
them  political  importance.  This  power  was  courted  and  controlled 
by  the  crown.  The  king's  judges  decided  that  no  corporation  was 
valid  without  the  sanction  of  the  king,  and  most  of  the  corporations 
from  time  to  time  applied  to  the  crown  for  a  grant  or  confirmation 
of  privileges.  Their  dependence  upon  the  crown  was  thus  estab- 
lished, and  the  crown,  as  a  check  upon  the  nobles,  encouraged  j'X'j'"- 
lar  elections  by  the  whole  corporate  assembli/.*     In  the  course  of  time 

1  "In  words  that  well  became  the  noble  village  or  town,  hut  not  a  city.  Ameri- 
King  of  a  free   people   he    acknowledged     can  Cyclopedia,  title,  Borov<jh. 

that    '  what  touched    all   should    be  ap-  3  History    England,  Vol.   I.  chap.   i.  ; 

proved   by  all."'     Prof.    Hearn,  Govern-  "The  Crown!  it  is  the  House  of  Commons!" 

ment  of  England,   chap.   xv.    sec.    iii.    p.  said  an   English  statesman  in  1858  ;  and 

423.  the    recent    history   of  Great  Britain,    in 

2  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  III.  chap,  several  memorable  instances,  shows  that 
viii.;  1  Stephen,  Eng.  Const,  chap.  iii.  against  the  declared  and  positive  determi- 
p.  95  ct  scq.  ;  Hearn,  Government  of  Eng-  nation  of  the  commons  neither  the  crown 
land,  pp.  428,  480,  539  ;  Hume,  England,  nor  the  lords,  in  any  struggle  I 

Vol.    I.    App.    II.  ;     Dr.    Adam     Smith,  popular   rights,  ran  make  effectual  i 

Wealth  of  Nations,  Hook  3,  eh.  iii.,  whose  ance.     In    the   United  States  all  .!  | 

account   of    the  condition  of    the    towns  ments  of  the  government    ultimatel; 

and  boroughs  at  this  period,  and  the  decay  spond,  of  emus,',  to  the  public  will,  which 

of  the  power  of  the  lords  and  the  growth  is  here  the  real  sovereign  power,  and  - 

of  the  power   of  the    inhabitants   of   the  at  short  periods  the   executive  and    I 

cities   is,    though  brief,   perspicuous    and  lative  branches. 

satisfactory.      Norton,    Com.   Lond.    lo:>.  4  An  English  municipal  corporation,  as 

A  distinctive  feature  of  boroughs,  in   Eng-  will    be    explained     hereafter, 

land,  is  the  right  of  the  borough  to  elect  usually  of  one  or  m   i  or  definite 

members  of  parliament.     There  the  term  bodies,  and  an  indefinite  body,  the  I 

"  borough"  includes  cities  as  well  as  vil-  being  generally  composed  of  the  burgi 

lages,  but  in  the  United   States  the   term  or  citizens,  thai   is,  the  inhabitant): 

"  borough"  is  not  in  very  general  use,  and,  holders;  and  a  corporate  assembly  was  a 

when    used,    designates   an     incorporated  meeting  of  all  the  bodies,  and  not    of  the 
VOL.  I.  — 2 


18  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  8 

it  was  found  that  these  representatives  were  more  formidable  to  the 
power  of  the  crown  than  the  nubility  had  been.  In  Elizabeth's 
reign  compliant  judges  decided  that,  although  the  right  of  election 
was,  by  the  original  constitution  or  charter,  in  the  whole  assembly, 
still  from  usage,  even  when  within  the  time  of  memory,  a  by-law 
may  be  presumed  giving  the  right  of  election  to  a  select  class  (more 
readily  controlled  by  the  crown)  instead  of  the  whole  body.1 

Afterwards,  to  increase  the  power  of  the  crown,  James  incor- 
porated towns  or  boroughs,  endowing  them  with  the  parliamentary 
franchise,  but  confining  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  vote  to  select 
classes.  The  immense  power  of  popular  representation  was  a  most 
active  agency  in  the  overthrow  of  Charles  I.  This  power  proving 
inimical  to  the  arbitrary  schemes  of  the  Protector,  he  expelled  the 
members  by  violence,  and  subdued  their  authority  in  parliament  by 
force.  He  then  secured  this  power  in  his  own  favor  by  expelling 
all  hostile  magistrates  and  officers  and  supplanting  them  with  others 
of  his  own  creation. 

On  the  Restoration,  Charles  II.  found  the  principal  opposition  to 
the  court  to  come  from  the  cities  and  boroughs.  He  commenced 
his  reign  by  reconstructing  the  corporations  and  filling  them  with 
his  own  creatures.  Judges,  also  creatures  of  the  king,  holding  com- 
missions during  his  pleasure,  aided  him  in  his  scheme  to  acquire 
absolute  control  over  the  corporations  of  the  realm.  London,  as  the 
largest  and  most  influential,  was  selected  as  an  example,  and  in  1G83 
the  famous  quo  warranto  was  issued  against  the  city  to  deprive  it  of 
its  charter,  for  two  alleged  violations,  one  of  which  was  stale  and 
both  were  frivolous.  Judgment  passed,  of  course,  against  the  city, 
and  its  ancient  charter  was  abrogated.2  As  a  condition  of  its  restor- 
ation, it  was,  among  other  things,  provided  that  thereafter  the  mayor, 
sheriff,  clerk,  &c,  should  not  exercise  their  office  without  the  king's 
consent;  and  that  if  the  king  twice  disapproved  of  the  officers 
elected  by  the  corporation,  he  might  himself  appoint  others.  In 
short,  the  city  was  deprived  of  the  right  of  choosing  its  own  officers, 
and  was  made  dependent  upon  the  crown.  Such  also  was  the  fate 
of  most  of  , the  considerable  corporations  in  England.  The  whole 
power  was  in  the  hands  of  the  king.3 

t  or  definite  bodies  alone.     Post,  see.     seizure  of  the  city  franchises,   by  virtue 

of  the  writ  of  quo  warranto,  is  given   at 


<jj. 


i  Willcock   on  Municipal   Corp.  8  ;    3  some  length  by  Norton,  Com.  on  the  llis- 

Hallam,  Const.  History,  52;    1  Stephen,  tory,  &c.  of  London,  Book  I.  chap.  xx.  ; 

English  Const,  chap.  vi.  p.  277  ctseq.  see  also   The  Case  of  the  City  of  London, 

-  i;,  x  c.  City    of    London,    Mich.    33  8  How.  State  Trials,  1340  et  seq. 

''ar.    11.  ;     lJ  Show.  262,   Pulling,  Laws,  3  There  were  eighty-one  quo  warranto 

&c.  of  London,    14.     The    history  of  the  informations    brought    against    municipal 


§  8  INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL    VIEW.  19 

Nor  were  these  arbitrary  proceedings  confined  to  England.  In 
1683  writs  of  quo  warranto  and  srirefacias  wei  •  issued  for  the  pur- 
pose of  abrogating  the  charter  of  Massachusetts.  Patriotism  and 
religion  mingled  their  fervors  and  combined  in  its  defence,  but  in 
vain.  Servile  judges,  in  June,  1684,  one  year  and  i\  days  after 
judgment  against  the  city  of  London,  adjudged  the  charter  to  be  con- 
ditionally forfeited.  The  charter  government  was  displaced,  and 
popular  representation  superseded  by  an  arbitrary  commission.  In 
1687  similar  writs  were  issued  against  the  charters  of  Rhode  [sland 
and  Connecticut;  when,  as  is  well  known,  the  people  of  the  latter 
colony  unsuccessfully  endeavored  to  preserve  this  cherished  muni- 
ment of  their  liberties  by  concealing  it  in  the  charter  oak.  The 
colonies,  as  a  result  of  the  English  devolution  of  1G8X,  had  their 
charters  restored.  Very  shortly  after  the  accession  of  William  and 
Mary  a  hill  to  restore  the  rights  of  those  English  corporations  which 
had  surrendered  their  charters  to  the  crown  during  the  reigns  of 
James  II.  and  Charles  II.  was  introduced  into  parliament,  and 
became  a  law,  with  the  general  applause  of  men  of  all  parties.1 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  fact  that  in  the  time  of 
Elizabeth,  the  controlling  power  of  corporations  was  virtually  vested 
in  "select  bodies."  The  abuses  in  the  corporations  arising  out  of 
select  bodies  continued  after  the  revolution  of  1088,  and  until  act 
of  parliament  in  1835,  next  to  be  mentioned.2  To  remedy  these  and 
many  other  abuses,  the  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act 
(5  and  6  Will.  IV.  eh.  76,  A.  D.  1835)  (referred  to  more  fully  in  a 
subsequent  chapter3)  was  passed.  This  statute  sought  to  restore 
corporations  to  their  original  design,  as  institutions  for  the  lo  1 
government  of  the  place,  to  be  controlled  by  those  interested  in  it, 
and  not  by  a  favored  few.  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  «is  remarket]  by 
Mr.  Hallam,  that  "no  political  institution  can  endure  which  does 
not  rivet  itself  to  the  hearts  of  men  by  ancient  prejudice  or  acknowl- 
edged interest."  That  is,  it  cannot  permanently  endure,  although  it 
may  exist  long  after  it  ought  to  cease.  If  ever  an  institution  out- 
lived its  usefulness  —  lived  long  after  it  be  nee  a  positive  evil  —  it 
was  the  municipal  corporations  of  England,  prior  to  the  reform  ad  of 
1835.  In  many  important  places  in  England  the  number  of  corpo- 
rators ranged  as  low  as  from  ten  to  thirty.  In  a  large  majority  of 
the  municipalities,  the  corporations  were  close;  that  is,  the  govern- 

corporations  by  Charles  II.  and  James  II.  -  I   Stephen,    Eng.    Const,   chap.   vii. 

2  Chandl.    Com.    Debs.  316;  1  Stephen,  p.  479. 

English  Ccinst.  chap.  vii.  p.  455.  8  Chap.  III.    infra,  sees.  35,  36,  and 

1  Macaulay,    History  of  England,  Vol.  note. 
III.  chap,  xv.,  where  a  graphic  account  of 
the  history  of  its  passage  is  given. 


20  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  8 

bag  body  had  the  power  to  determine  who  should  be  admitted  to 
lorn  or  membership;  and  often  the  privilege  was  conferred  upon 
non-residents  and  the  residents  excluded.  The  most  important 
franchise  they  possessed  was  that  of  electing  members  of  parliament, 
and  this,  in  many  places,  was  the  principal  function  of  the  corpora- 
tion. Not  only  were  the  councils  self-elective,  but  their  tenure  was 
lor  life.  They  were  frequently  controlled  by  a  single  party,  and  all 
persons  entertaining  other  opinions  were  excluded.  The  corpora- 
tions wore  nut  in  sympathy  with,  nor  did  the}-  refleel  the  wishes  of, 
the  people  over  whom  they  exercised  local  jurisdiction.  There  was 
no  check  upon  mal-administration.  The  property  was  wasted; 
extravagance  characterized  the  expenditures  of  money  ;  officers  were 
elected  by  the  irresponsible  councils  from  favoritism  or  devotion  to 
party.1  One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Reformed  House  of  Commons 
was  the  overthrow,  in  1835,  of  this  intolerable  system,  by  the  pas- 
sage of  the  above-mentioned  Municipal  Corporations  Statute,2  to 
which  we  shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  refer  in  the  subsequent 
pages   of  this   work. 

Lord  Brougham  has  many  claims  to  the  regard  of  posterity.  Few 
of  these  are  stronger,  however,  than  those  which  arise  from  his  faith- 
ful and  effective  services  in  promoting  the  reform  of  the  Municipal 
Corporations  of  Great  Britain,  by  abolishing  these  self-elected  and 
perpetual  councils,  by  organizing  the  corporations  upon  a  uniform 
model,  and  by  establishing  in  the  act  the  principle  that  the  councils 
should  be  selected  for  short  and  fixed  periods  by  the  votes  of  the 
burgesses,  thus  recognizing  and  ado]. ting  the  representative  system 
based  upon  the  vote  of  persons  actually  interested  in  the  municipal- 
ity.    Mr.  Willco;  k,  in  concluding  his  treatise,3  had  recommended  a 

1  Glover    <>n    ('<»•]>.    xxxviii.    et   seq.  ;  known  as  the  London  Corporation  Reform 

Report  of  Commissioners  of  Corporate  In-  Acl  of  1849.     See  Supplement  to  falling's 

quiry,  32  et  seq.      On   January   1,    1883,  Laws,  &c,  of  London. 

//,.  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882  (  15  <  In  the  15th  day  of  August,  1867,  after 

and"46  Vic.  chap.  50)  wenl  into  force,  re-  amemorahle  struggle    between   the  lords 

pealing,  re-enacting,  and  consolidating  the  and  the  commons,  what  is  known  as  the 

previous  Acts.    Post,  sec.  35.  Disraeli  Reform   Bill  became  a    law,    by 

-  Post,  sec  :!"),  note,  where  the  leading  which  the  righl  to  vote  for  members  of 
provisions  of  this  important  enactmenl  are  parliament  for  boroughs  was  greatly  ex- 
given,  tended.     This  right  was,  in  boroughs,  ex- 

:3  Willcock,  Municipal  Cor]'.  513,  ".1  1.  tended  to  all  occupiers  of  dwelling-houses 

London,     with    its     "greal   and  notable  which  were  rated  to  the  poor  rates,  and 

franchises,  liberties,  and  customs,"  to  treat  to    lodgers   occupying   lodging-houses   of 

of  which,  says   Lord   Coke  (4  Inst.   250),  the  annual   value   of    £10,     unfurnished. 

"  would  require  a  whole  volume  of  itself,"  It   practically    enfranchised   the  working 

was  no!  embraced  in  the  general  ad  of  5  class. 

and  6  Will.    1,   chap.   7<'.,   hut    there  was  Referring  to  the  English  system  of  cor- 

subse^uently  passed  an  important  statute  porate  local  government  and  administra- 


§8  6  INTRODUCTORY    HISTORICAL    VTEW.  21 

similar  reform,  but  disclaimed  being  so  visionary  as  to  suppose  it 
would  soon  be  effected,  since  parliament  won!  1  not  willingly  relin- 
quish its  influence  over  venal  boroughs,  and  members  elected  by 
corporations  would  not  be  allowed  by  their  con  •  to  abandon 

their  ancient  though  unjust  privileges;  but  within  ten  years  from 
the  time  his  language  was  written,  the  reform  of  which  he  almost 

despaired  was  accomplished.  Fifty  years'  experience  has  vindicated 
its  wisdom. 

§  8  a.  Coming  now,  in  this  general  survey,  to  the  municipal 
tutions  of  the  United  States,  the  great  fact  which  first  meet,  (>ur 
view  is  that  the  common  law  is  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  every  State 
and  Territory  of  the  Union,  with  comparatively  unimportant  excep- 
tions. It  is  indeed  a  most  fortunate  circumstance,  that,  divided  as  our 
territory  is  into  so  many  States,  each  supreme  within  the  limits  of 
its  power,  a  common  and  uniform  general  system  of  polity  underlies 
and  pervades  them  all.  The  common  law,  as  well  as  the  institu- 
tions which  it  developed  or  along  side  of  which  it  grew  up,  is  PER- 
VADED by  a  spirit  of  freedom,  which  distinguishes  it  from  all  other 
systems  and  peculiarly  adapts  it  to  the  institutions  of  a  self-govcr 
people.  It  is  established  by  the  learned  researches  which  have  been 
more  recently  made  that  the  germs  and  elements  of  this  law  and  of 
English  polity  are  of  Germanic  origin.1  The  Saxon  conquerors  of 
Great  Britain  were  not  mere  bodies  of  armed  invaders.  They  went 
to  England,  during  two  or  more  centuries,  in  families  and  commu- 
nities. What  manner  of  men  were  they  ?  Guizot  dwells  upon  the 
fact  that  the  distinguishing  character  of  the  Germans  was  "  their 
powerful  sentiment  of  personal  liberty,  personal  independence  and 
individuality."  He  affirms  and  repeatedly  reiterates,  that  it  was 
they  who  "  introduced  this  sentiment  of  personal  independence,  this 
love  of  individual  liberty,  into  European  civilization:  that  this  was 
unknown  among  the  Romans;  unknown  in  the  Christian  Church; 
and  unknown  in  nearly  all  the  civilizations  of  antiquity.  The  lib- 
erty which  we  meet  with  in  ancient  civilizations  is  political  liberty, 
—  the  liberty  of  the  citizen,  not  the  personal  liberty  of  the  man 
himself."2 

§  8  h.    Thus  conquering  and  colonizing  England,  the  Saxons  car- 
ried with  them  "  from  lands  where  the  Roman  eagle  had  never  I 
seen,  or  seen  only  during  the  momentary  incursions  of  Drusus  and 

tion,  Mr.   Gladstone   declared  that  "Our  l  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist  chap.  i. 

municipalities  produce  qualities  which  are  Prof.    Adams,  Germanic   Origin   of    New 

the  best  safeguards  of  England's  greatness."  England  Towns,  in  Johns  Hopkins  I'ni- 

Williams  &  Vine,  English  Munic.  Code,  versity  Stndies. 
p.  12.  '2  Hist.  Civ.  Europe,  Lect  II. 


22  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  8  C 

manicus,"  '  their  language,  their  religion,  their  customs,  their  laws, 
and  their  organizations.  These  were  indigenous,  —  homebred,  with- 
out trace  or  tincture  of  the  Roman  law  and  institutions.2  They 
borrowed  nothing  from  antiquity  or  from  surrounding  peonies. 
They  founded,  and  in  the  course  of  centuries  their  successors  and 
descendants,  the  people  of  England,  built  up  their  institutions  on 
their  own  model.  Macaulay  speaks  of  this  with  his  accustomed 
vividness:  "The  foundations  of  our  Constitution,"  he  says,  "were 
laid  by  men  who  knew  nothing  of  the  Greeks,  but  that  they  had 
denied  the  orthodox  procession  and  cheated  the  Crusaders;  and 
nothing  of  Rome  but  that  the  Pope  lived  there.  Those  who  followed 
contented  themselves  with  improving  on  the  original  plan.  They 
found  models  at  home  ;  and  therefore  they  did  not  look  for  them 
abroad."3  This  love  of  personal  freedom  and  independence  was  im- 
pressed upon  the  institutions  they  founded,  or  adopted,  or  modified. 

§  8  c.    Learned  investigators  differ  concerning  the  extent  to  which 
Roman  law  existed  and  prevailed  at  the  time  of  the  Saxon  conquest, 
and  the  extent  to  which  it  was  adopted  or  incorporated  into  the 
English  laws,  usages,  and  institutions.     But  there  is  a  general  assent 
to  these  propositions,  viz. :  that  the  Saxon  spirit  of  freedom  was  em- 
bodied in  the  various  local  courts;  that  it  was  in  these  popular  tribu- 
nals that  the  principles  of  law  and  local  government  were  cultivated 
and  disseminated ;  that  the  Saxons  breathed  into  the  English  gov- 
ernment and  institutions  "a  spirit  of  equity  and  freedom  which  has 
never  entirely  departed  from  them,"4  and  that  in  the  course  of  time 
the  common  law  intertwined  its  roots  and  fibres  inseparably  into 
the  constitution,  polity,  local  and  municipal  institutions,  the  civil 
and  criminal  jurisprudence,  the  family  relation,  and   the  rights  of 
person  and  of  property.     So,  as  we  have  above  seen,  from  an  immemo- 
rial or  early  period  the    local    territorial  subdivisions  of   England, 
such  as  shires,  towns,  and  parishes,  enjoyed  a  degree  of  freedom,  and 
were  permitted  to  assess  upon  themselves  their  local  burdens  and  to 
manage  their  local  affairs.     The  ratepayers  were  thus  dignified  by 
being°au  integral  part  of  the  communal  life  ;  the  foundations  of  mu- 
nicipal liberty  were  laid;  administrative  power  was  decentralized; 
knowledge  of  the  laws  and  reverence  for  and    obedience  to  them 
were  constantly  taught  by  a  participation  in   their  administration 
and  enforcement.     This   was  exactly  the  opposite  of  the  systems 
which  concurrently  prevailed  on  the  Continent,  where  the  central 

i  Digby,  Real  Prop.  11,  12.  4  Mackintosh,     Hist.    Eug.    Vol.     V. 

2  Freeman,  Norman  Conquest,  chap.  i.     chap.  i. ;  Beeves,    Hist.    Com.   Law,    In- 

3  Essay  on  Bistory.  traduction  by  Finlason. 


§  8  d  AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL    INSTITUTIONS.  23 

power  absorbed,  governed,  regulated  everything,  thereby  destroying 

municipal  freedom  and  i lit-  c.;ip;icity  to  enjoy  and  exercise  it,  as  well 
as  the  power  to  defend  and  preserve  it. 

§  8  d.   Our  ancestors  in  the  settlement  of  thin  country  brought  with 

them  these  notions  of  English  liberty  and  polity,  and  they  found 
here  a  field  of  unexampled  extent  for  their  free  development.  Ac- 
cordingly the  system  of  intrusting  the  direction  of  local  affair 
the  local  constituencies,  has  from  the  earliest  colonial  periods  been 
carried  by  us  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  in  England.1  A 
pass  from  one  end  of  this  country  to  the  other,  alike  in  the  older 
regions  and  in  the  newest  organized  settlement,  you  find  the  affairs 
of  each  road-district,  school-district,  township,  county,  town  and  < 
locally  self-managed,  including  the  administration  of  local  justice 
Every  township  in  the  United  States  has  a  local  court  with  power 
to  summon  a  jury  of  the  vicinage,  thereby  bringing  justice  home  to 
the  business  and  bosoms  of  the  people,  and  making  it  their  own 
affair.  It  is  in  no  slight  degree  instructive,  and  certainly  in  the 
highest  degree  interesting,  to  trace  the  institutions  of  this  new 
country  back  to  their  germs  in  the  Saxon  or  Anglo-Saxon  polity  ;  for 
when  we  touch  to-day,  even  in  our  frontier  settlements,  the  electric 
chain  wherewith  Providence  hath  bound  the  ages  and  the  genera- 
tions  of  men  together,  we  discover  that  we  are  in  historic  com- 
munion with  rude  and  remote  ancestors  although  separated  from  us 
by  seas,  mountains,  and  centuries. 

Each  State  binds  together  the  local  institutions  which  it  creates 
and  regulates  independent  of  Federal  control ;  thus  happily  prevent- 
ing a  concentration  at  the  national  centre  of  the  power  and  duty  oi 
legislating  for  and  regulating  the  affairs  of  local  communities  through- 
out a  country  of  such  extent,  that  with  its  exact  situation,  wan;-. 
and  interests,  it  would  be  impossible  for  Congress  to  become  ade- 
quately acquainted.  So,  in  the  ascending  scale,  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution constitutes  the  States  and  the  people  thereof  into  a 
National  Government.  It  defines  the  relations  of  the  States  to  each 
other  and  to  the  national  government,  and  limits  the  power  of  the 
States  to  deprive  any  citizen,  however  humble,  of  the  great  essential 
rights  of  freedom  and  equality  before  the  law. 

Magna  Cuarta  remains  to-day  one  of  the  main  foundations  oi 
English  liberty.2    Its  chief  glory  is  the  provision  "  that  no  freeman 

1  Post,  sec.  45,  note.  Const.  Hist.  Vol.  I.   chap,    xii.)      Magna 

2  "The  whole  of  the  constitutional  Cbarta  "is  the  keystone  of  English 
history  of  England  is  little  more  than  a  liberty."  (Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  Vol. 
commentary  on  Magna  Charta."    (Stubbs,  II.    chap,  viii.j 


24  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  9 

shall  be  imprisoDed  or  disseized  of  his  freehold,  but  by  the  lawful 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  land."  This  memorable 
provision,  which  was  from  the  first  embo  lied  in  all  of  the  Statu  Con- 
stitutions, has  been  carried  into  the  Federal  Constitution,1  thereby 
placing  the  rights  of  life,  liberty  and  property,as  against  invasion  by 
the  States,  under  the  protection  of  the  national  authority. 

sj  9.  In  general,  all  of  our  American  cities,  tarns,  and  counties 
public  corporations,  full  or  quasi.  They  arc  created  l>y  the 
jlature,  and  are  invested  with  power  to  decide  and  control  local 
and  subordinate  matters  pertaining  to  their  respective  localities. 
The  number  and  freedom  of  these  local  organizations,  whereby 
political  power  is  exercised  by  the  citizens  of  the  various  local 
subdivisions  of  a  State  who  have  a  right  to  vote  and  to  regulate 
their  own  domestic  concerns,  constitute  a  marked  feature  in  our 
system  of  government.2  They  are  simply  the  administrative  form 
of  the  fundamental  American  idea  of  government,  viz.,  that  the 
people  an  tfa  source  of  all  political  power  and  have  the  right  to  ex- 
ercise  it.  This  is  with  us  no  mere  rhetorical  declamation,  but  a 
foundation  principle  upon  which  our  political  institutions  rest.  As 
local  matters  can  better  be  regulated  by  the  people  of  the  locality 
than  by  the  central  power,  we  provide  that  each  road-district,  each 
school-district,  each  city  and  each  county  shall,  as  to  its  local  con- 
cerns,  be  self-governed.  These  organizations  are,  of  course,  subject 
to  the  legislature  of  the  State,  and  their  acts,  if  in  violation  of  law 
or  where  they  affect  private  rights,  are  also  subject  to  judicial  cog- 
nizance and  judgment.  They  are  under  the  law  and  are  bound  to 
obey  it.  The  policy  of  creating  local  public  and  municipal  corpo- 
ms  for  the  management  of  matters  of  local  concern,  runs  back 
to  the  earliest  period  of  our  colonial  history,  is  exhibited  in  all  our 
legislation,  and  expressly  or  impliedly  guaranteed  in  our  State  con- 
stitutions.3    "  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  this  State,  recognized 

1  Amendmenl  XIV.  the  requisite  length  of  time)  whatever  may 

-  "In   all  quasi  corporations,  as  cities,  be  the  desire  of  himself  or  the  town."   See 

towns,  parishes,  school-districts,  member-  post,  chaps,  ii.  and  iii.;  People  v.  Cana- 

ship  is  constituted  by  livingwithin  cer-  day,  7:'.  N.  C.   198  ;   s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep. 

; 'in  limits."     Per  Shaw,  C.  J.,  Overseers  465.     Post,  sec.  195. 

nf  Poor,  &c,  r.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  130;  3  Kent,  Com.  275;  Cooley, Const.  Limit. 

Ifillr.  Boston,  1&2  Mass.  344,  356(1877)  ;  chap.  viii.     See  also  this  learned  author's 

B.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  332.     Post,  sec,  10.  opinion  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan, 

"When  a  roan,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Mor-  in  the    People  v.  Hurlbut,   24  Mich.  44, 

Oal    -  v.    Hill,    10    Pick.   383,  346,  (1871)  ;  States.  Noyes,  10  Fost.  SON. H. 

"  moves  into  a  town,  he  becomes  a  citizen  292;  Bow*.  Allenstown,  34  N.   11.351; 

jsed  of  the  requisite  qual-  s.  <■.   9   Am.   Rep.   103,  and  in  People?;. 

i-  to  age,  &c,  and  if  he  remains  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep. 


§9 


AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   INSTITUTIONS. 


25 


and  perpetuated  by  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  that 
the  people  of  every  hamlet,  town,  and  city  of  the  State  are  entitled 
to  the  benefits  of  local  self-government."  i 

The  elective  franchise  is  not,  as  was  the  case  until  the  compara- 
tively recent  reform  legislation  in  England,  a  privilege  dependent 
upon  custom  or  usage,  or  confined  to  certain  classes,  but  is  uniform 
and  universal,  extending  to  all  of  the  adult  male  citizens.  Old 
Sarums  and  rotten  boroughs,  as  well  as  property  qualifications,  are 
unknown.  The  effect  of  this  policy  of  establishing  cities,  towns, 
and  districts  of  country  into  bodies  politic,  and  investing  the  citi- 
zens thereof  with  the  power  of  self-government  in  respect  of  their 
local  affairs,  has,  upon  the  whole,  been  most  happy.  One  of  the 
most  philosophical  and  fair  of  foreign  observers2  was  much  struck 


202.  Post,  sees.  58,  73.  Text  approved. 
Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.,  2  Lea  (Tenn.), 
425.  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  &e.,  4  Jones 
(N.  C.)  Eq.  323;  Comw.  v.  Roxbury,  9 
Gray,  503,  510,  511,  note  written  by  Mr. 
Gray,  afterwards  the  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts, 
and  now  one  of  the  Justices  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  ;  Web- 
ster v.  Harwinton,  32  Conn.  131  ;  People 
v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50  (1873).  Post, 
sec.  58.  In  Mr.  Quincy's  Municipal  His- 
tory of  Boston,  chap,  i.,  will  be  found 
an  interesting  historical  account  of  the 
constitution  of  towns  in  Massachusetts,  and 
of  their  mode  of  organization  and  opera- 
tion, particularly  of  the  town  of  Boston. 
Post,  sec.  28. 

1  Per  Cooley,  J.,  in  People,  ex  rel.  Park 
Comm'rs  (Detroit  Park  Case),  28  Mich. 
228  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202,  re- 
ferred to  post,  sees.  72,  73. 

2  M.  De  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in 
America:  "Local  assemblies  of  citizens 
constitute  the  strength  of  free  nations. 
Municipal  institutions  are  to  liberty  what 
primary  schools  are  to  science  ;  they  bring 
it  within  the  people's  reach  ;  they  teach 
men  how  to  use  and  how  to  enjoy  it.  A 
nation  may  establish  a  system  of  free  gov- 
ernment, but  without  the  spirit  of  munici- 
pal institutions  it  cannot  have  the  spirit  of 
liberty."  M.  De  Tocqueville's  Democracy 
in  America,  chap.  v.  Post,  sec.  28,  note. 

"  From  time  immemorial,"  says  one  of 
the  .ablest  of  American  common-law  judges, 
"  the  counties,  parishes,  towns,  and  terri- 
torial subdivisions    of   the   country  have 


been  allowed  in  England,  and,  indeed,  re- 
quired, to  lay  rates  on  themselves  for  local 
purposes.  It  is  most  convenient  that  the 
local  establishments  and  police  should 
be  sustained  in  that  manner  ;  and,  indeed, 
to  the  interest  taken  in  them  by  the  in- 
habitants of  the  particular  districts,  and 
the  information  upon  law  and  pirolic  mat- 
ters generally  thereby  diffused  through 
the  body  of  the  people,  has  been  attrib- 
uted by  profound  thinkers  much  of  that 
spirit  of  liberty  and  capacity  for  self-gov- 
ernment, through  representatives,  which 
has  been  so  conspicuous  in  the  mother 
country,  and  which  so  eminently  distin- 
guishes the  people  of  America.  From  the 
foundation  of  our  government,  colonial 
and  republican,  the  necessary  sums  for 
local  purposes  have  been  raised  by  the 
people  or  authorities  at  home.  Court- 
houses, prisons,  bridges,  poor-houses,  and 
the  like  are  thus  built  and  kept  up  ;  and 
the  expenses  of  maintaining  the  poor,  and 
of  prosecutions  and  jurors,  are  thus  de- 
frayed, and  of  late  (in  North  Carolina)  a 
portion  of  the  common-school  fund,  and  a 
provision  for  the  indigent  insane,  are  thus 
raised,  while  the  highways  are  altogether 
constructed  and  repaired  by  local  labor, 
distributed  under  the  orders  of  the  county 
magistrates.  When,  therefore,  the  Consti- 
tution vests  the  legislative  power  in  the 
General  Assembly,  it  must  be  understood 
to  mean  that  power  as  it  had  been  exer- 
cised by  our  forefathers,  before  and  after 
their  migration  to  this  continent.**  Per 
Rutfin,  J.,  in  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  ic.,  4 
Jones  (N.  C.)  Eq.  323  (is:,*;. 


26  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §  10 

with  the  institutions  of  New  England  towns;  and  considered  them 
mall  independent  republics  in  all  matters  of  Local  concern,  and 
as  forming  the  principle  of  the  life  of  American  liberty  existing 
at  this  day.1  Nol  only  the  Ne\*  England  towns,  but  the  underlying 
and  universal  prevalence  of  local  government  and  administration, 
rural  and  urban,  throughout  the  United  States,  and  its  effect  upon 
the  general  life  and  well-being  of  the  American  people,  have  been 
not  only  noticed  but  intelligently  described  and  enforced  in  a  late 
work  of  great  interest  and  value,  by  a  distinguished  English  writer, 
who  criticises  freely  indeed,  but  with  no  conscious  bias  and  with  no 
unfriendly  spirit.2 

§  10.  The  value  of  our  system  of  municipal  institutions,  to  which 
we  have  thus  alluded,  may  be  seen  on  comparing  the  political  con- 
dition of  the  people  of  the  United  States  with  that  of  the  people 
of  modern  France,  —  selected  as  a  fair  example  of  a  government 
without  municipal  freedom.  France  is  a  highly  centralized  govern- 
ment. The  state  there  is  everything,  Municipal  institutions,  with 
the  power  of  independent  local  self-government,  belong  there  to 
the  past.  The  central  power  governs  and  regulates  everything.  It 
provides  amusements;  constructs  roads,  bridges,  internal  improve- 
ments; controls  trade;  inspects  manufactures.  The  effects  of  this 
system  are  thus  described  :  "  Develop  in  the  slightest  degree  a 
Frenchman's  mental  faculties,  and  he  flies  to  a  town  as  surely  as 
steel  filings  fly  to  a  loadstone.  From  all  parts  of  France  men  of 
great  energy  and  resource  struggle  up,  and  fling  themselves  on  the 
world  of  Paris.  There  they  try  to  become  great  functionaries. 
Through  every  department  of  the  eighty-four,  men  of  less  energy 
and  resource  struggle  up  to  the  provincial  capital.  All  who  have, 
or  think  they  have,  heads  on  their  shoulders,  struggle  into  town  to 
fieht  for  office  which  the  government  alone  can  confer.  The  whole 
energy  and  knowledge  and  resource  of  the  kind  are  barrelled  up 
in  the  towns:  all  between  towns  is  utter  intellectual  barrenness." 
Such  are  the  withering  effects  of  a  centralized  despotism.3     How 

1  Post,  sees.  23,  29,  and  notes.  result  of  a  popular  uprising  against  central- 

2  Prof.  Bryce's  American  Common-  ized  power.  But  it  went  to  the  other  ex- 
wealth,  13SS,  "vol.  I.  chaps.  48-51.  See  treme,  and  contemplated,  without  a  nation- 
also  the  useful  and  valuable  monographs  al  compact,  a  league  of  86,000  independent 
on  Local  Government  in  the  several  communes.  Their  declared  scheme  was  this: 
States,  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  "France  shall  no  Longer  be  one  and  indi- 
Studies.  visible,  empire  or  republic;  she  shall  form 

3  But  under  the  laws  of  1866,  1871,  a  federation,  not  of  small  states  or  prov- 
and  L884,  the  French  municipalities  have  inces,  but  of  free  cities,  linked  together 
a  la,  0|  independence.  The  com-  only  so  far  as  shall  be  consistent  with  the 
vm,                   at  of  1871  was  the  natural  most  absolute   decentralization  and  local 


§11 


AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   INSTITUTIONS. 


27 


different  with  the  decentralized  system  of  government  in  the  United 
States,  where  each  local  constituency  chooses  its  own  officers;  each 
road-district,  school-district,  village,  town,  city,  and  county  admin- 
isters its  own  local  affairs  by  the  people  and  for  the  people.1 

§  11.  To  civil  territorial  divisions,  erected  into  corporations  full 
or  quasi,  with  defined  powers  of  local  administration,  and  the  exten- 
sion of  the  right  to  vote  for  officers  to  all  who  are  to  be  affected  by 
their  action,  are  due  that  familiarity  with  public  affairs,  that  love 
of  liberty,  that  regard  for  private  rights  and  property,  and  that  uni- 
versal reverence  for  and  obedience  to  law,  which  are  characteristic 
of  the  best  government  in  Europe, —  Great  Britain,  and  the  best 
in  America,  —  the  United  States.2 

government."  (Journal  Officiel  dc  la  Com-  this  power  had  been  vested  in  the  legisla- 
mune,  April,  1871.)  But  a  scheme  which  tive  department,  and  not  with  subordi- 
made  cities,  and  not  the  nation,  practically  nate  officers,  Agncw,  J.,  observed: 
the  sovereign,  is  radically  defective,  and 
open  to  all  the  objections  which  M.  Maz- 
zini  has  so  forcibly  pointed  out  against  it. 
(Contemporary  Review,  1871  ;  reprinted 
Littell's  Living  Age,  July,  1871,  p.  112.) 
1  Barrett  i\  Brooks,  21  Iowa,  144,  151. 
By  constitutional  provision  in  New  York, 
'  *  it  belongs  exclusively  to  the  local  power 
to  fill  the  offices,  either  by  election  or  ap- 


is  manifest  that  the  city  government  is 
founded,  in  its  leading  thought,  upon  the. 
American  idea  of  a  popular  representative 
government,  its  immediate  prototype  being 
the  form  of  the  State  government.     The 
right  of  supervision  and  control  is  there- 
fore vested  in  the  councils  as  the  imme- 
diate representatives  of  the  popular  will, 
which  exerts  and  enforces  its  determining 
pointment,  as  the  legislature  may  direct."     power  by  means  of  constantly  recurring 
Met.  Bd.  Health  v.  Heister,  37  N.  Y.  661 , 
667  ;  People  v.  McDonald,  69  N.  Y.    362 
(1877)  ;  People  v.  Supervisors,  112  N.  Y. 
585  (18S9)  ;  People  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15 
(1875)  ;    s.  c.   21  Am.  Rep.  677.     Opin- 
ion of  McKinstry,  J.     See  also  Constitu- 
tion of  Illinois,  art.  ix.  sec.  5  ;  construed 
People  v.  Chicago,  51  111.  17  (1869)  ;  s.  c. 
2  Am.   Rep.   278  ;   Constitution  of  Cali- 
fornia,  art.   xi.,   entitled  "Cities,  Coun- 
ties, and  Towns,"  sees.  13,  15.    Provisions 
exist  in  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  State  con- 
stitutions, which  place  the  right  of  local 
government,  and  to  some  extent  the  au- 
tonomy   of    municipalities,     beyond    the 
power  of  legislative  destruction.     Consti- 
tutional provisions  as  to  qualification  of 
electors  and  the  right  of  equal  representa- 
tion held  to  apply  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions.    People  v.   Canaday,  73  N.  C.  198 
(1S75)  ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  465. 

Speaking  of  the  power  of  creating  debts 
and  expending  money  by  the  city  of  Phil 


elections.  Subject  to  this  primary  power 
the  affairs  of  this  people,  great  in  num- 
bers, wealth,  intelligence,  and  influence, 
are  conducted  by  departments  and  offi- 
cers." Philadelphia  v.  Flanigen,  47  Pa. 
St.  21  (1864). 

"What,"  inquired  the  Abbe  Sieves,  in 
a  book  which  gave  a  powerful  impulse  to 
the  publie  mind  at  the  beginning  of 
the  French  Revolution  of  1789,  —  ' '  What 
is  the  tiers  etat  ?  "  And  he  answered, 
"Nothing."  What  ought  it  to  be? 
"  Everything."  Thiers,  French  Rev.,  vol. 
I.  p.  27;  Guizot,  Hist.  Civ.  Leet.  VII. 
On  this  popular  foundation  rests  not 
only  our  national  government,  but  as  well 
all  of  our  State  governments  and  mu- 
nicipal institutions.  People  v.  Detroit, 
28  Mich.  228  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202 
(1873).     Post,  sees.  58,  72,  73. 

2  After  alluding  to  the  antiquity  of  this 
system  in  England,  Mr.  Justice  Brown,  in 
the  important   ease  of  the  People  v.  Dra- 
adelphia,  under  the  Consolidation  Act  of     per  (15  N.  Y.    532,  562),  says:    "Wher- 
1S54,  in  a  case  where  it  was  held  that     ever   the   Anglo-Saxon    race   have    gone, 


26 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§11 


B  the  picture  ia  not  without  its  shadows.  The  usefulness  of 
our  municipal  corporations  has  been  impaired  by  evils  that  are 
cither  inherent  in  them  or  that  have  generally  accompanied  their 
workings.  Some  of  these  may  be  briefly  indicated:  1.  Men  the 
best  fitted  by  their  intelligence,  business  experience,  capacity,  and 
moral  character,  for  local  governors  or  counsellors  are  not  always, 
it  is  feared,  — it  might  he  added,  are  not  generally,  —  chosen.  This 
is  especially  true  of  populous  cities.  2.  Those  chosen  are  too  apt 
to  merge  their  individual  conscience  in  their  corporate  capacity. 
Under  the  shield  of  their  corporate  character,  men  hut  too  often  do 
acts  which  they  would   never  do  as  individuals.     The  public,  as  if 


wherever  they  have  carried  their  language 
and  laws,  these  communities,  each  with  a 
administration  el'  its  own  selection, 
have  gone  with  them.  It  is  here  that 
fchey  have  acquired  the  habits  of  subor- 
dination and  obedience  to  the  laws,  of 
patienl  endurance,  resolute  purpose,  and 
knowledge  of  civil  government,  which  dis- 
tinguish them  from  every  other  people. 
Here  have  been  the  seats  of  modern  civ- 
ilization, the  nurseries  of  public  spirit, 
and  the  centres  of  constitutional  liberty. 
They  are  the  opposites  of  those  systems 
which  collect  all  power  at  a  common  cen- 
tre, to  he  wielded  by  a  common  will  and 
to  effect  a  given  purpose,  which  absorb 
all  political  authority,  exercise  all  its  func- 
tions, distribute  all  its  patronage,  repress 
tie-  public  activity,  stifle  the  public  voice, 
and  crush  "ut  the  public  liberty." 

"  Whoever,"  says  DeTocquevil!c,CEuvres 
vlites,  VIII.,  "travels  in  the  United 
States  is  involuntarily  and  instinctively 
so  impressed  with  the  fact  that  the  spirit 
of  libertj  and  the  taste  tor  it  have  per- 
vaded all  the  habits  of  the  American  peo- 
ple, that  he  cannot  conceive  of  them  under 
any  hut  a  Republican  government.  In 
the  same  way  it  is  impossible  to  think  of 
the  English  as  living  under  any  hut  a  tee 
government."  After  quoting  these  words, 
Prof.  Dicey,  in  his  work  on  the  Law  of  the 
Constitution,  Bays  (2d  ed.,  1886,  p.  173) 
that  "  tiny  point  in  the  clearest  manner 
to  the  rule,  predominance,  or  supremacy  <;/" 
/mi-  as  the  distinguishing  characteristic 
of  English  institutions";  institutions 
which  we  have  fully  inherited  or  adopted. 
What  i-  meant  by  absolute  supremacy  of 
the  rule  of  law  in  England  and  America, 


how  it  permeates  the  whole  political  sys- 
tem, and  how  it  protects  and  secures  the 
individual  man  in  all  of  his  fundamental 
legal  rights,  viz.,  that  no  man  shall  be 
punished  except  for  a  breach  of  law,  and 
that  all  classes  are  subject  to  the  ordinary 
law  of  the  land  administered  in  the  ordi- 
nary law  courts,  with  no  immunity  from 
liability  of  any  officer  or  official  however 
high  (the  King  only  excepted)  who  vio- 
lates the  legal  rights  of  any  other  man, 
however  humble,  are  so  clearly  set  forth 
in  the  instructive  work  just  cited,  that  it 
gives  us  pleasure  to  commend  it  to  our 
readers. 

"The  city  corporations,"  remarks  a 
modern  jurist,  "which  have  grown  up  in 
modern  times,  are  of  infinite  advantage  to 
society  ;  they  hind  men  more  closely  to- 
gether than  does  any  other  form  of  political 
association.  Hut  that  which  most  re- 
markably  distinguishes  them  from  the 
close  corporations  which  formerly  existed, 
is  the  general  spirit  of  freedom  which  has 
been  breathed  into  them.  More  especially 
is  this  the  case  with  town  corporations  in 
America,  which  are  as  different  from  those 
of  England  as  the  latter  are  from  similar 
corporations  in  Scotland  and  Holland." 
Pel  Orimke,  J.,  Rosebaugh  v.  Saffin,  10 
Ohio,  31,  37  ;  see  also  States.  Noyes,  10 
Fost.  (X.  H.)  292;  and  the  opinion  of 
Allen,  .1.,  in  People  p.  Albertson,  55  N.Y. 
50,  57  (187:3),  where  he  says  :  "  The  right 
of  (local)  self-government  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  our  institutions."  People  v.  Su- 
pervisors,  112  N.  Y.  585.  Post,  sees.  45, 
imte,  58,  72,  7:5,183;  People  >•.  Detroit,  28 
Mich.  228  (1873);  a.  c.  15  Am.  Rep. 
202. 


§  12  AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL    INSTITUTIONS.  29 

to  retaliate,  acts  towards  corporations  in  the  same  spirit.  The  no- 
tion, though  not  avowed,  is  quite  too  much  acted  upon,  that  all 
that  can  be  obtained  from  a  public,  or,  indeed,  from  any  corpora- 
tion, is  legitimate  spoil.  Against  these,  men,  usually  honest  and 
fair  in  their  dealings,  do  not  scruple  to  make  demands  which  they 
would  never  make  against  an  individual.1  .'!.  As  a  result,  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  affairs  of  our  municipal  corporations  is  too  often 
unwise  and  extravagant. 

§  12.  Municipal  corporations  are  institution*  designed  for  the  local 
government  of  towns  and  cities;  or,  more  accurately,  towns  and 
cities,  with  their  inhabitants,  are,  for  purposes  of  subordinate  local 
administration,  invested  with  a  corporate  character.  To  clothe 
them  with  powers  to  accomplish  purposes  which  can  better  be  left 
to  private  enterprise,  is  unwise.  Their  chief  function  should  be  to 
regulate  and  govern  in  respect  of  local  affairs,  which  can  be  dealt 
with  better  by  the  people  concerned  than  by  the  distant  central 
power.  To  invest  them  with  the  powers  of  individuals  or  of  private 
corporations,  for  objects  not  pertaining  to  municipal  rule,  is  to  per- 
vert the  institution  from  its  legitimate  ends,  and  to  require  of  it 
duties  which  it  is  not  adapted  satisfactorily  to  execute.  Some  of 
the  evil  effects  of  municipal  rule  have  arisen  from  legislation  un- 
wisely conferring  upon  municipalities,  at  the  suggestion  often  of 
interested  individuals  or  corporations,  powers  foreign  to  the  nature 
of  these  institutions,  and  not  necessary  to  enable  them  to  dis- 
charge the  appropriate  functions  and  duties  of  local  administra- 
tion. Among  the  most  conspicuous  instances  of  such  legislation 
may  be  mentioned  the  power  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways,  to 
incur  debts,  often  without  any  limit  or  any  which  is  effectual,  and 
to  issue  negotiable  securities.2  The  result  has  too  often  been  that 
debts  are  incurred  so  large  that  they  press  with  disastrous  weight 
on  the  municipality  and  its  citizens.  Extraordinary  and  extra- 
municipal  powers  have  been  too  often  incautiously  or  unwisely 
granted,  and  the  charters  or  constituent  acts  carelessly  worded  and 
loosely  construed.  The  remedy  suggested  by  experience  consists, 
in  part,  in  constitutional  provisions  prohibiting  the  granting  of 
special   charters,  and    requiring   all  municipal   corporations  to  be 

1  These  effects  are  not  confined  to  this  shrink  from,  did  lie  feel  personally  re- 
side of  the  Atlantic.  "It  is  a  familiar  sponsible."  Essays,  No.  "VII.  p.  261,  Am. 
fact,"  says  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  "that  ed.  1865;  and  see  lb.,  Essays  No.  5,  for  a 
the  corporate  conscience  is  ever  inferior  to  description — perhaps  too  highly  colored 
the  individual  conscience — that  a  body  of  —of  the  unsatisfactory  working  of  the 
men  will  commit,  as  a  joint  act,  that  English  reformed  municipal  corporations, 
which  every  individual    of    them    would  2  Sec  post,  sees.  117,  153. 


30 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§12a 


organized  under  general  laws.  The  legislature  ought  also  to  be  pro- 
hibited from  allowing  municipal  corporations  to  engage  in  extra- 
municipal  projects,  or  to  incur  debts  or  levy  taxes  for  such  purposes. 
I  powers  granted  to  such  corporations,  and  especially  the  power 
to  levy  taxes,  ought  to  be  more  carefully  defined  and  limited,  and 
should  embrace  such  objects  only  as  are  necessary  for  the  health, 
welfare,  safety,  and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants.1  The  amount 
of  indebtedness  that  may  be  incurred,  even  for  municipal  purposes, 
ought  also  to  be  limited  beyond  the  power  to  be  evaded.3 


§  12  a.  Unrestrained  power  in  the  central  legislative  authority  to 
bestow  valuabh  franchises  affecting  cities  and  property  therein,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  municipal  authorities  and  of  the  property 

owners  who  are  injuriously  affected,  necessarily  makes  the  city  and 
such  owners  the  sufferers  from  inconsiderate  grants.  Administered 
on  business  principles,  a  city  ought  to  derive  large  revenues  from 
the  use  of  wharves,  from  railways  occupying  streets  with  their 
tracks,  from  gas,  water,  and  other  companies  to  which  are  given 
the  right  to  lay  mains  in  the  streets  and  public  places.     Effective 


i  "The  great  increase  of  corruptions  in 
municipal  bodies,  growing  out  of  the  abil- 
ity to   create   by  taxation   a  fund  which 
may  !"■  squandered,  has  made  many  tliink- 
:ng  men  doubt  the  wisdom  of  endowing 
them  with  the  power."     Mr.  Justice  Mil- 
ler,  in    Rusch    v.    Des    Moines  County,  1 
Woolw.  C.  C.  313,  322  (1868).     And  note 
the  striking   observations  of  Mr.  Justice 
,/■  on   the  abuses  which   attend  the 
administration   of   finances  by  municipal 
bodies  and  officers,  and   the  too  prevalent 
frauds  in  tie-  procurement  and  execution 
of  public  contracts.     Philadelphia  v.  Flani- 
gen,    17    Pa.   St.   21  ;  Hague  v.   Philadel- 
phia,   48  Tb.  527.     In   the  Pennsylvania 
first  cited,  the  suggestion  of  the  text 
:is  to  the  wisdom  of  strictly  guarding  and 
limiting  the  power  to  create  debts  is  well 
enforced  by  this  learned  judge,     lie  truly 
says  :  "  A  valid  contract  is  uncontrollable, 
demanding  its  performance  at  the  hands 
of  the  judiciary,  and  calling  to  their  aid 
the  whole  power  of  tic  government.     If 
an  "'ii   foT   its  payment   i-  no1 

.  it  musl  he  in  the  nexl  or 
some  following."  Agnew,  J.,  47  Pa.  St. 
21.  Tie'  gigantic  and  astounding  frauds 
and  corruption  perpetrated  by  whal  is 
known   a>  the  "Tweed   ring,"  which  were 


revealed  in  1871,  in  the  local  administra- 
tion of  the  affairs  of  the  great  city  "l  New 
York,  have  awakened  public  attention  to 
the  necessity  of  more  efficient  cheeks  upon 
the  misuse  of  municipal  powers.  The  legis- 
lation which  was  thereupon  enacted  to  pre- 
vent frauds  in  the  future,  cannot  be  said,  in 
view  of  disclosures  in  1886  in  reference  to 
the  Broadway  railway  franchises,  to  have 
been  adequate  to  the  end  proposed.  It 
was  judicially  established  that  a  large  ma- 
jority of  the  board  of  aldermen  had  been 
guilty  of  accepting  bribes.  People  v. 
Jaehne,  103  X.  V.  182  ;  People  v.  O'Piien, 
111  X.  Y.  1  (1888).  Legislation  based 
upon  the  principles  suggested  in  the  text 
(sees.  13-15)  would,  it  is  believed,  have 
prevented  these  shocking  and  scandalous 
corruptions.  The  mayor  was  without  real 
power  in  the  matter  of  the  granting  of 
these  franchises  by  the  common  council. 
His  veto  was  overridden. 

2  As  we  shall  hereafter  see,  nearly  all  :>f 

the  States  which  have  revised  "!■  adopted 
Constitutions  since  the  above  was  written, 
have    ordained    provisions    limiting    the 

power    Of    the    State     legislatures     and    of 

municipalities  in  respect  of  each  of  the 
four  important  eferred  to  in  the 

text. 


§  13  REMEDIES   SUGGESTED.  31 

organic  limitations  on  the  power  both  of  the  legislature  and  of  the 
local  authorities  to  make  grants  of  this  character  ought  to  be  de- 
vised, and  the  proprietary  rights  of  adjoining' property  owners  pro- 
tected. Accordingly  in  late  years  several  Stales  have  ordained 
constitutional  provisions  of  this  character.1  And  generally  it  may 
be  said  that  experience  has  shown  the  necessity  of  organic  provis- 
ions more  exactly  defining  and  limiting  the  power  of  the  legi  slature 
to  enact  laws  which  affect  the  local  and  private  or  distinctly  cor- 
porate rights  of  chartered  cities,  and  which  involve  expenditures  of 
money,  the  creation  of  debts  and  consequent  pecuniary  burdens, 
without  the  consent,  or  against  the  will  of  the  local  authorities  of 
the  municipality  or  the  people  thereof.2 

§  13.  Experience  with  us  has  also  demonstrated  the  necessity  of 
more  power  and  more  responsibility  in  the  executive  head  of  our  muni- 
cipal institutions.  Too  often  the  duties  of  the  mayor  or  executive 
officer  are  only  nominal,  and  to  these  he  gives  but  little  attention, 
—  a  natural  result  of  his  want  of  importance,  and  of  his  inability 
to  control  the  administration  of  municipal  affairs.  If  the  office 
were  clothed  with  dignity  and  real  authority ;  if  the  mayor  were 
invested  with  the  veto  power,  if  he  had  the  sole  right  to  appoint 
and  the  unrestricted  power  to  suspend  or  remove  subordinate 
officials  or  heads  of  departments,  then  the  citizens  could  justly 
demand  of  him  that  he  should  be  individually  responsible  for  the 
proper  conduct  of  the  concerns  of  the  municipality,  and  if  griev- 

1  By  the  amended  Constitution  of  New  larly  amended  their  constitutions.     Post, 

York,  which  took  effect  January  1,  1875,  chap,  xviii.,  on  Streets. 
it  is  provided  (art.  3,  sec.   18)  that  "the         The  legitimate  sources  of  revenue  that*'* 

legislature   shall   not  pass  any  private  or  may  be  thus  opened  to  cities  is  well  illus- 

local  bill  granting  to  any  corporation,  as-  trated   by  the  case  of  the  city  of  Berlin, 

sociation,  or  individual  a  right  to  lay  down  In  that  city,  it  is  stated  on  good  authority 

railroad  tracks,  or  any  exclusive  privilege,  that  the  street  railway  company  not  only 

immunity,    or   franchise    whatever.      The  paves  a  portion  of  all  the  streets  it  occu- 

Iegislature  shall  pass  general  laws  provid-  pies,  but  pays  a  percentage  of  its  receipts 

ing  for  the  cases  enumerated  in  this  sec-  to  the  city,  whose  revenue  from  this  source 

tion,  and  for  all  other  cases  which,  in  its  is  about  $250,000  a  year;  and  in  1911  the 

judgment,  may  he  provided  for  by  general  street  railway,  with  all  of  its  equipment, 

laws  ;  but  no  law  shall  authorize  the  con-  will  become  the  property  of  the  city.    Mn- 

struction  or  operation  of  a  street  railroad  nicipal  gas-works  yield  about  18  per  cent 

except  upon  the  condition  that  the  con-  of  the   entire   annual    expenditure  of  the 

sent  of  the  owners  of  one-half  in  value  of  city  as  profil  :  the  water-works  also  yield 

the  property  bounded  on,  and  the  consent  an   annual  profit  of  about  $220,000,  and 

also  of  the  local  authorities  having  control  even  the  gnat  sewerage  system  produces 

of  that  portion  of  the  street  or  highway  something  Idee  a  net  revenue  of  the  same 

upon  which    it  is   proposed   to  construct  figure  through   the  annual  rates  imposed        J 

and   operate   such   railroad,    be    first  ob-  upon  householders  for  the  use  of  sewers.^ ^^^ 
tained."    Several  other  States  have  simi-         2  Mr.  Low,  describing  his  experience  as 


32 


MUNICIPAL    COKPOUATIONS. 


§14 


ancea  exist,  they  would  knew  to  whom  to  apply  For  remedy,  or 
upon  whom  to  fix  the  blame.1 

£  II.    Municipal  corporations,  as  they  exist  in  tl  mtry,  it 

may    be    further    observed,    are    of    exceedingly   complex    character. 
hereto  allude  to  the  Legal  complexity  which  inheres  in  their 
rate   nature,   we   may    mention   that   which   arises    from   the 
edingly  diverse  character  of  the  multiform  duties  which  are 
confided  to   their  agency  and  management,  requiring  the  delega- 
tion of  corresponding  powers  and   provisions    for  their  execution. 

mayor  of  Brooklyn  (1  Bryce,  Amer.  Com-  nicipal  charters  with  a  masterly  hand, 
monW(  "The!  itof  and  shows  great  familiarity  with  the  sub- 
interference  in  the  details  of  city  action  has  ject  of  which  he  treats,  Mauj  of  his  sug- 
become  to  the  legislature  almosl  a  second  gestions  may  be  profitably  studied  by  the 
nature.  In  every  year  of  his  term  [as  mayor]  legislator.  It  may  be  observed  that  in 
the  writer  was  compelled  to  oppose  a1  Al-  England,  under  the  reformed  municipal 
bany  unwise  and  adverse  legislation  on  Bystem,  the  right  to  a  voice  in  municipal 
the  part  of  the  State.  No  law  objected  management  is  not  universal,  but  is  re- 
to  by  the  mayor  during  this  interval  was  stricted  to  occupiers  of  houses  and  tax- 
placed  u] the  statute  book.     It  is  not  payers,  and  yet  we  have,  as  we  have  seen, 

too  much  to  say,  however,  that  the  great-  complaints    of    municipal    extravagance, 

est  anxieties  of  his  term  sprang  from  the  corruption,  and  abuse.     In   the  existing 

;  difliculties  of  this  annual  system  of  municipal  government  in  Greal 

;,  ,,,,   the  one  hand  to  advance  the  Britain,  the  function  of  the  mayor,  as  we 

interesl   of  the  city,  and  on  the  other  to  shall  point  oul  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  is 

save  it  from  harm  in  its  relations  to  the  in  many  respects  essentially  differenl  from 

law-making  power  of  the  State."  the  function  of  the  corresponding  officer 

i  Extended   observation    of  the  work-  in  our  American  municipalities.    Therethe 

ings  of  our  municipal  institutions  has  sat-  actual  work  of  municipal  administration  is 

isfied  the  author  that  the  views  expressed  in  effeel  carried  on  by  the  councils  and 

1Iltil                  sound,  and  he  is  glad   to  committees,  upon  whom,  rather  than  upon 

find  them  confirmed  by  the  Hon.  Josiah  the  mayor,  rests  the  responsibility  of  the 

Quincy,  in  his  Municipal   History  of  Bos-  success  of  municipal  rule.    Political  Science 

published  in  1852.  Mr.  Qnincy  was  Quarterly,  vol.  iv.,  215  etseq. 
mayor  of  the  city  of  Boston  from  1823  to  The  charter  of  the  city  of  Hrooklyn 
1828,  inclusive,  and  his  opinions  are  en-  which  went  into  effect  January  1,  1882, 
titled  to  n  i1  respect,  no1  only  Iron,  his  and  which  has  been  declared  by  the  high- 
known  ability  but  large  experience  in  est  authority  to  be  such  a  "  vast  improve- 
municipal  affairs.  It  is  interesting  to  ob-  ment"  on  any  system  of  government 
serve  the  striking  coincidence  of  his  views  which  the  city  had  tried  before,  "that  do 

with  the  r mmendations  of  the  "Com-  voice  is   raised  against   it,"  is  based  in  its 

mittee  ol  Seventy,"  of  New  York,  respect-  reform  feature.,  essentially  upon  the  pinn- 
ing municipal  administration  and  the  im-  ciples  suggested  in  the  text.     See  on  this 
inCe   of  efficient    executive    superin-  subject   chap.   lii.   vol.  I.  Bryces   Amen- 

tendence,  control,  and  responsibility.   Ma-     can  Comi Health,  written  by  the  Hon. 

nicipa]  History  ol    B                  p.  v.     And  Seth    Low    (the    Brat    mayor  ot   Brooklyn 
tothe  same  effect  is  Mr.  Charles  NordhofTs  under  this  charter),  entitled  "An  Amen- 
restinc  article  in  the  North  American  can  View  of  Municipal  Government  in  the 
lew  for  October,   1871,  entitled  "The  United   States."     It   is  replete   with  thai 
overnmenl   of    New  York. -A  Rem-  wisdom  and  instruction  that   come,    and 
edy   Suggested."      This    vigorous    writer     can  only  ■.  from  careful  study  corn- 
ordinary  mu-  bined  with  practical  experience. 


§15 


REMEDIES    SUGGESTED. 


33 


Some  of  these  powers  are  civil  or  political,  and  not  peculiar  to  the 
people  of  the  municipality  ;  others  are  purely  local,  of  which  some 
concern  all  the  inhabitants,  and  some  affect  only,  or  mainly,  the 
property  owners,  on  whom  exclusively  or  largely  the  burden  of 
their  exercise  or  administration  falls.  In  the  ordinary  municipal 
charters,  the  essential  differences  between  these  powers  have  not 
been  sufficiently  regarded,  and  in  consequence  adequate  checks 
upon  their  abuse  have  not  been  provided. 

§  15.  The  general  right  of  suffrage  will  remain,  and  in  the  au- 
thor's judgment,  ought,  at  least,  as  respects  the  popular  branch  of 
the  municipal  council,  to  remain  as  extensive  in  the  municipality 
as  in  the  state;  and  all  schemes  of  municipal  reform,  whatever 
their  merit,  based  upon  restricting  it  within  narrower  limits  than 
those  here  suggested,  are  simply  impracticable.1  But  if  special  or 
extra-municipal  powers  be  granted,  not  affecting  civil,  political,  or 
other  rights  which  concern  all,  but  which  involve  directly  the  ex- 
penditure and  payment  of  money,  it  is  but  just  that  the  project 
should  be  required  to  have  the  support  of  a  majority  in  value  of 


1  The  observations  upon  this  subject 
of  Mr.  Seth  Low  in  his  chapter  in  Bryce's 
work,  before  referred  to,  are  sound  and 
weighty.  We  extract  one  or  two  sentences  : 
"Every  one  understands  that  universal 
suffrage  has  its  drawbacks,  and  in  cities 
these  defects  become  especially  evident.  .  . 
As  it  exists  in  the  United  States,  it  is 
not  only  a  great  element  of  safety,  but  is 
perhaps  the  mightiest  educational  force  to 
which  the  masses  of  men  have  ever  been 
exposed.  In  a  couutry  where  wealth  has 
no  hereditary  sense  of  obligation  to  its 
neighbors,  it  is  hard  to  conceive  what 
would  be  the  condition  of  society  if  uni- 
versal suffrage  did  not  compel  every  one 
having  property  to  consider,  to  some  ex- 
tent at  least,  the  well-being  of  the  whole 
community."  1  Bryce,  Am.  Com.,  634, 
635. 

Mr.  Bright  gave  eloquent  expression  to 
similar  sentiments  in  the  peroration  of  his 
speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  March 
24,  1859,  on  Lord  Derby's  Reform  Bill :  "  I 
have  endeavored  to  stand  on  the  rules  of 
political  economy,  and  to  be  guided  by  the 
higher  rules  of  true  morality  ;  and  when 
advocating  a  measure  of  reform  larger 
than  some  are  prepared  to  grant,  I  appear 
in  that  character,  for  I  believe  that  a  sub- 
VOL.  I.  —  3 


stantial  measure  of  reform  would  elevate 
and  strengthen  the  character  of  our  pop- 
ulation ;  that,  in  the  language  of  the 
beautiful  prayer  read  here  every  day,  it 
would  tend  '  to  knit  together  the  hearts 
of  all  persons  and  estates  within  this 
realm.'  I  believe  it  would  add  to  the 
authority  of  the  decisions  of  Parliament, 
and  I  feel  satisfied  it  would  confer  a  lus- 
tre, which  time  could  never  dim,  on  that 
benignant  reign  under  which  we  have  the 
happiness  to  live."  And  later,  in  1865, 
he  exclaimed  to  a  Birmingham  audience  : 
"  Who  is  there  that  will  meet  me  on  this 
platform,  or  will  stand  upon  any  platform, 
and  will  dare  to  say,  in  the  hearing  of  an 
open  meeting  of  his  countrymen,  that 
these  millions  for  whom  I  am  now  plead- 
ing are  too  degraded,  too  vicious,  and  too 
destructive  to  be  entrusted  with  the  elec- 
tive franchise  ?  I,  at  least,  will  never , 
thus  slander  my  countrymen.  I  claim 
for  them  the  right  of  admission,  through 
their  representatives,  into  the  most 
ancient  and  the  most  venerable  Parlia- 
ment which  at  this  hour  exists  among 
men  ;  and  when  they  are  thus  admitted, 
and  not  till  then,  it  may  be  truly  said 
that  England,  the  august  mother  of  free 
nations,  herself  is  free." 


34  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  17 

those  who  must  pay  t lit*  expense.  No  small  proportion  of  cor- 
ruption and  abuse  in  municipalities  has  had  its  source  in  their 
authority  to  make  public  and  Local  improvements.  The  power  is 
usually  conferred  without  sufficient  care,  and  the  rights  of  the  prop- 
erly owners  (often  made  liable  for  the  whole  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment or  amount  of  the  expenditure  are  not  sufficiently  respected 
and  guarded.  In  many  of  its  more  important  aspects  a  modern 
American  city  is  not  so  much  a  miniature  State  as  it  is  a  busini 
corporation,  —  its  business  being  wisely  to  administer  the  local 
affairs  and  economically  to  expend  the  revenues  of  the  incorporated 
community.  As  we  learn  this  lesson  and  apply  business  methods 
to  the  scheme  of  municipal  government  and  to  the  conduct  of  muni- 
cipal affairs,  we  arc  on  the  right  road  to  better  and  more  satisfactory 
results.1 

§  16.  As  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  organize  municipal  corpo- 
rations under  general  laws  so  that  defects  and  abuses,  being  gen- 
erally seen  and  felt,  will  be  the  more  speedily  and  better  remedied 
by  the  legislature,  so  municipal  corporations  should  be  shorn  of 
the  power  to  grant  special  privileges,  except  under  ordinances 
general  in  their  character,  and  which,  on  equal  or  fair  terms,  will 
make  them  available  to  all.  The -courts,  too,  have  duties,  the  most 
important  of  which  is  to  require  these  corporations,  in  all  cases,  to 
show  a  plain  and  clear  legislative  grant  for  the  authority  they  assume 
to  exercise;  to  lean  against  constructive  powers,  and,  with  firm  hands, 
to  hold  them  and  their  officers  within  chartered  limits.  As  a  rule 
this  duty  has,  in  our  judgment,  been  faithfully  performed. 

§  1 7.  If  we  analyze  the  complex  powers  usually  conferred  upon  a 
municipality  in  this  country  we  shall  discover  that  these  are  of  two 
general  classes,  viz.,  1.  Those  which  relate  to  health,  good  govern- 
ment, efficient  police,  &c,  in  which  all  the  inhabitants  have  an 
equal  interest  and  ought  to  have  an  equal  voice.  2.  Those  which 
directly  involve  the  expenditure  of  money,  and  especially  those 
relating  to  local  improvements  the  expense  of  which  ultimately 
falls  upon  the  property  owners.  As  respects  these,  the  controlling 
voice  ought  to  be  with  those  who  have  to  bear  the  burden.  No 
municipal  management,  will,  in  the  long  run,  be  other  than  oxtrav- 
aganl  and  unwise  where  the  members  of  the  governing  body  have 
no  substantial  interests  in  the  municipality,  and  where  they  have 
more  to  gain  by  plundering  than  by  protecting  it.  To  insure  good 
government  there  must  be  a  real  identity  of  interest  between  the 

1  1  Bryce,  Am.  Com.,  chap,  lii.  p.  625.     Ante,  see.  12  a  and  note. 


§  17  REMEDIES   SUGGESTED.  35 

members  of  the  governing  body  and  the  municipality.  The  prob- 
lem of  satisfactory  municipal  rule  in  populous  cities  is  one  which 
is  urgently  demanding  solution,  but  it  is  also  one  which,  it  is  feai 
must  be  slowly  wrought  out  by  experience.  It  is  estimated  that 
the  indebtedness  of  the  public  and  municipal  corporations  in  this 
country  already  exceeds  $1,000,000,000;  much  of  it  was  created 
without  the  sanction  of  those  who  will  have  to  pay  it,  and  it  is  in 
many  places,  especially  in  the  newer  States,  pressing  with  heavy 
weight  upon  the  burdened  taxpayer.  A  remedy  is  imperatively  de- 
manded, and  suggestions  herein  made  have  been  offered  in  the  hope 
that  some  of  them  may  not  be  wholly  undeserving  of  attention. 

But  with  all  the  drawbacks  we  have  mentioned  (many  of  which 
are  remediable)  our  system  of  popular  municipal  organization  and 
local  administration  is,  beyond  controversy,  the  fairest  to  the  indi- 
vidual citizen,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  most  satisfactory  in  its  opera- 
tions and  results,  of  any  that  have  yet  been  devised.  Any  other 
conclusion  would  be  equivalent  to  admitting  that  the  people  are 
incapable  of  enlightened  self-government ;  that  holders  of  property 
ought  alone  to  be  respected,  and  alone  to  be  invested  with  political 
and  municipal  rights;  that  the  few  ought  to  govern  the  many  ;  and 
that  our  representative  system,  the  flower  of  modern  civilization, 
based  upon  the  equal  right  of  every  man  to  a  voice  in  the  local  and 
general  government,  is  a  failure.  That  it  is  a  failure  we  cannot  admit. 
That  it  is  not  a  failure  is  demonstrated  by  the  experience  of  more 
than  two  centuries.  It  is  not  improbable  that  we  sometimes  over- 
estimate the  shortcomings,  chiefly  felt  in  the  larger  cities,  in  the 
practical  workings  of  our  municipal  system,  for  the  system  is  an  open 
one,  in  which  all  are  interested  to  bring  its  abuses  into  the  light  of 
day.  The  fine  observation  of  Lord  Bacon  fitly  applies  :  "  The  best 
governments  are  always  subject  to  be  like  the  fairest  crystals,  wher 
every  icicle  or  grain  is  seen,  which  in  a  fouler  stone  is  never  perceived} 

1  It  is  frequently  said  that  New  York  of  the  city  of  New  York  for  1888  and  18S9 
is  among  the  worst  governed  of  cities.  The  will  appear  from  the  following  table: — 
complexity  and  magnitude  of  its  munici- 
pal functions  necessarily  present  great 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  thorough  and 
efficient  administration.  Abuses  are 
difficult  entirely  to  suppress.  The  city 
has  charge  of  charities  and  corrections,  a 
law  department,  a  department  of  public 
parks,  of  public  works,  of  health,  of  po- 
lice, of  street  cleaning,  of  fire,  of  educa- 
tion. Appropriations  for  these  purposes 
for  the  year  1889  amounted  to  nearly 
twenty  millions  of  dollars.  The  aggregate 
appropriations  for  the  several  departments 


Finance       Depart- 

1888. 

^-:, 

ment     .... 

$276,000  00 

.?2«7,000  00 

Law  Department  . 

260,544  00 

216,6 

Public  Works  .     . 

8,180,809  00 

3,124,221  00 

Public  Parks     .     . 

l,ou,t;.-)0  no 

1,212.200  I'n 

Charities  and  Cor- 

rections    .     .     . 

2.343.372  00 

2,197,06 

Health  Department 

394.277  00 

418,8 

Police       .... 

4,416.256  66 

-I  109,650  '•'! 

Street  cleaning 

1,269,469  00 

1,272,04  I  64 

Fire 

1,976,492  00 

2,136,043  M) 

Taxes  and    assess- 

ments  .... 

112,0ini  00 

117  2 

Education    .     .     . 

4,808,167  no 

1.079,008  B6 

819,525,625  66 

»19,464,158  34 

36 


MI'NIOIl'Al,    CORPORATIONS. 


§# 


ible  it  to  pay  interest  on  its  pub- 
ind  for  other  pui  poses  twelve  or 
thirteen  millions  more  i>  required  ;  bo 
that  at  this  time  the  annua]  operations  of 
the  city  government  require  to  be  raised 
by  taxation  between  thirty-tbree  and 
thirty-four  millions  of  dollars,  necessitat- 
ing a  tax  rate  of  somewhat  over  two  per 
cent  "ii  the  assessed  values  of  taxable 
property.  The  official  statement  of  the 
retiring  mayor,  Honorable  Abram  S. 
Hewitt,  made  the  81st  of  December,  1888, 
.it  tin-  end  of  his  term  of  two  years,  .shows 
the  condition  of  the  city  government  to  be 
much  better  than  is  commonly  supposed. 
i:  i:  "Every  department  of  the  city 
government  is  in  admirable  working  or- 
der.  No  private  business  is  better  organ- 
ized or  more  closely  attended  to  than  the 
public  service  in  this  city.  Every  outstand- 
ing claim  that  could  be  collected  has  been  ; 
all  disputes  have  been  adjusted  ;  the  pub. 
lie  property  has  been  carefully  conserved 


and  mole  productive,  and  there  are  no 
claims  against  the  city  of  any  considerable 
magnitude.  The  credit  of  the  city,  as  in- 
dicated by  the  prices  bid  for  its  bonds,  has 
never  been  so  high  as  at  the  present  time. 
Its  securities  command  a  higher  price 
than  those  of  any  other  city  in  the  world. 
At  the  outset  of  my  term  of  office  I 
adopted  the  principle  of  calling  together 
the  heads  of  departments  to  consult  as  to 
legislation  which  might  be  required  for 
the  advantage  of  the  city  and  the  better 
conduct  of  its  business.  Every  act  pro- 
posed was  carefully  considered  by  this 
conference.  One  hundred  and  ninety-one 
bills  directly  affecting  the  city  of  New 
York  were  passed  by  the  legislature  during 
the  last  year.  The  passage  of  many  ob- 
jectionable bills  was  thus  defeated,  but  in 
some  important  cases  the  legislature  acted 
directly  against  the  recommendations  of 
the  city  authorities." 


§  18  CORPORATION   DEFINED.  37 


CHAPTER   II. 

CORPORATIONS  DEFINED  AND  CLASSIFIED.  —  PRIVATE,  PUBLIC,  AM 
MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  DISTINGUISHED.  —  THE  NEW  ENGLAND 
TOWN. 

§  18  (9  a).  Corporation  defined.  —  A  corporation  is  a  legal  institu- 
tion, devised  to  confer  upon  the  individuals  of  which  it  is  composed 
powers,  privileges,  and  immunities  which  they  would  not  other- 
wise possess,  the  most  important  of  which  are  continuous  legal 
identity  or  unity,  and  perpetual  or  indefinite  succession  under  the 
corporate  name,  notwithstanding  successive  changes,  by  death  or 
otherwise,  in  the  corporators  or  members.  It  conveys,  perhaps, 
as  intelligible  an  idea  as  can  be  given  by  a  brief  definition  to  say 
that  a  corporation  is  a  legal  person,  perfectly  distinct  from  the  mem- 
bers which  compose  it,  having  a  special  name,  and  having  such 
powers,  and  such  only,  as  the  law  prescribes.  The  most  accurate 
notions  of  complex  subjects  come  not  from  definition,  but  descrip- 
tion;  and  in  the  course  of  the  present  work  we  shall  describe  the 
class  of  corporations  with  which  it  deals,  by  their  creation,  consti- 
tution, faculties,  powers,  objects,  duties,  and  liabilities.  Some  of 
the  definitions  and  deductions  in  the  earlier  reports  amuse  by  their 
quaintness,  but  are  without  much  practical  value.  "As  touching 
corporations,"  says  Lord  Coke,  "the  opinion  of  Manwood,  chief 
baron,  was  this :  that  they  were  invisible,  immortal,  having  no 
conscience  or  soul ;  and  therefore,  no  subpoena  lieth  against  them ; 
they  cannot  speak,  nor  appear  in  person,  but  by  attorney."  * 

Chief- Justice.  Marshall's  description  of  a  corporation  is  remarkable 
for  its  general  accuracy  and  felicitous  expression:  "A  corporation 
is  an  artificial  being,  invisible,  intangible,  and  existing  only  in  con- 
templation of  law.  Being  the  mere  creature  of  the  law,  it  possesses 
only  those  properties  which  the  charter  of  its  creation  confers  upoD 
it,  either  expressly  or  as  incidental  to  its  very  existence.  These 
are  such  as  are  supposed  to  be  best  calculated  to  effect  the  objecl 
for  which  it  is  created.  Among  the  most  important  are  immortality 
[in  the  legal  sense  that  it  may  be  made  capahle  of  indefinite  duration], 
and,  if  the  expression  may  be  allowed,  individuality,  —  properties 
by  which  a  perpetual  succession  of  many  persons  are  considi 

i  2  Bulst.  233;  Willc.  Corp.  15.     Ante,  sec  3. 


38  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  19 

as  tlu-  same,  and  may  act  as  a  single,  individual  They  enable 
a  corporation  to  manage  its  own  affairs,  and  to  h<»M  property  with- 
out the  perplexing  intricacy,  the  hazardous  and  endless  necessity,  of 
perpetual  conveyances  for  the  purpose  of  transmitting  it  from  hand 

to  hand.  It  is  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  clothing  bodies  of  men, 
in  succession,  with  these  qualities  and  capacities  that  corporations 
were  invented  and  are  in  use.  By  these  means  a  perpetual  suc- 
cession  of  individuals  are  capable  of  acting  for  the  promotion  of 
the  particular  object  like  one  immortal  being."1  Thus,  though  the 
members  change,  the  corporation  itself  remains  in  its  legal  person- 
ality and  unity  the  same,  all  of  its  members,  past  and  present, 
constituting  in  law  but  one  person,  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
Thames  or  the  Mississippi  is  still  the  same  river,  though  the  parts 
^imposing  it  are  constantly  changing.2  The  above  observations 
are,  in  general,  applicable  to  all  corporations,  private  as  well  as 
public  and  municipal. 

§  19(95).  Municipal  Corporations  defined. —  A  municipal  corpo- 
ration, in  its  strict  and  proper  sense,  is  the  body  politic  and  corpo- 
rate constituted  by  the  incorporation  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  city  or 
town  for  the  purposes  of  local  government  thereof.  Municipal 
corporations  as  they  exist  in  this  country  are  bodies  politic  and 
corporate  of  the  general  character  above  described,  established  by 
law  partly  as  an  agency  of  the  State  to  assist  in  the  civil  gov- 
ernment of  the  country,  but  chieHy  to  regulate  and  administer 
the  local  or  internal  affairs  of  the  city,  town,  or  district  which  is 
incorporated.3 

1  Dartmouth    College   v.  Woodward,  4  tive  language,  but  the  simile  of  the  ele- 

Wneat.    636,  1819.     Other  definitions  :  4  gant    English    commentator   is    not    only 

Black.  Com.  37  ;  1  Kyd,  Corp.  13  ;  Grant,  striking,  but  accurate.     "  All  of  the  indi- 

Corp.  3,  4  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  Corp.  sec.  1;  vidual  members,"  present  and  future,  "are 

Glover,  Corp.    3,  6.     Willcock  declines  to  but   one   person  in  law,  -  a    person  that 

define,  but  describes  corporations.    Munic.  never  dies,  in    like  manner   as  the  river 

Corp.    15.      The   last-named   author    ob-  Thames  is  still  the  same  river,  though  the 

serves  that  " rporatiori  continues  the  parts  which  compose  it  are  changing  every 

body  politic  from  its  creation  to  its  instant."     1  Black.  Com.  468. 

ilution,   unaltered    by  the    revolution  8  "A  body  politic,"  says  Lord   Coke, 

iges  or  the   successive  changes  of  its  "is  a  body  to  take  in  succession,  framed 

members,    so   that    it    is   unnecessary   to  as  to  its  capacity  l>y  policy,  and  therefore 

in  ike   grants  to   them  and    their   succes-  is   called    by  Littleton  (sec.  413)  a  body 

sors.  or  to  declare  their  obligations  hind-  politic;  it  is  called  a  corporation,  or  body 

ing  on  their  successors."     lb.  16:  Clover,  corporate,   because  the    persons    are  made 

8  ;  Grant,  5  ;  7  Vin.  Abr.  358,  363.   Ante,  into  a   body,  and  are  of  capacity  to  take, 

grant,  &c,  by  a  particular  name."  Viner, 

a  Glover,  8  ;  1  Black.  Pom.    168.     It  is  Abr.  Corp.  (a  2).    A  municipal  corporation 

scarcely  ever  (pi i               u  :pres9  or  even  is  alio  defined   to  be   "An  investing  the 

to  illustrate  a  legal  proposition  in   figura-  people   of  a  place  with  the  local  govern- 


§20 


CORPORATION    DEFINED. 


39 


§20.  Same  subject.  —  We  may ,  therefore,  define  a  municipal  "</•- 
poration  in  its  historical  and  strict  sense  to  be  the  incorporation, 
by  the  authority  of  the  government,  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  par- 
ticular place  or  district,  and  authorizing  them  in  their  corporate 
capacity  to  exercise  subordinate  specified  powers  of  1  igislation  and 
regulation  with  respect  to  their  local  and  internal  concerns.  This 
power  of  local  government  is  the  distinctive  purpose  and  the  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  a  municipal  corporation  proper.1  The  phrase 
"  municipal  corporation"  is  used  with  us  in  general  in  the  strict  and 
proper  sense  just  mentioned  ;  but  sometimes  it  is  used  in  a  broader 
sense  that  includes  also  public  or  quasi  corporations,  the  prim  sipal 
purpose  of  whose  creation  is  as  an  instrumentality  of  the  State,  and 
not  for  the  regulation  of  the  local  and  special  affairs  of  a  compact 
community.2 


ment  thereof."  Salk.  183.  "  This  latter 
description,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  in 
the  People  i>.  Munis,  13  Wend.  325,  334 
(1835)  "  is  the  most  appropriate,  and  is  jus- 
tified by  the  history  of  these  institutions, 
and  the  nature  of  the  powers  with  which 
they  were,  and  are,  invested."  It  is  also 
quoted  by  Campbell,  C.  J.,  in  the  People 
v.  Horlhart,  24  Mich.  44  (1871).  Post, 
sec.  183.  The  English  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  1882  applies  to  certain  described 
incorporated  towns,  cities,  and  places;  and 
it  clearly  defines  the  words  "municipal 
corporations "  as  used  in  the  Act,  thus  : 
"  Municipal  corporation  means  the  body 
corporate  constituted  by  the  incorporation 
of  the  inhabitants  of  a  borough"  (sec.  7). 
"  The  municipal  corporation  acts  by  its 
council,  which  shall  exercise  all  the  pow- 
ers  vested  in  the  corporation.  The  coun- 
cil consists  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and 
councillors."  (sec.  10.) 

1  2  Bouv.  Law  Diet.  21 ;  2  Kent,  275  ; 
People  v.  Morris,  supra.  Ante,  sees.  9,  12, 
14,  17,  19  ;  post,  sees.  21,  22,  23,  46,  58. 

2  Heller  v.  Stremniel,  52  Mo.  309  (1873) ; 
State  v.  Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458,  471, 
( 1  s7:"S ).  This  last  case  discusses  the  mean- 
ing of  the  terms  "municipal  corpora- 
tions "  and  "  corporations  for  municipal 
purposes,"  as  used  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  State.  Post,  sec.  49.  "The  defini- 
tion of  a  municipal  corporation,"  says  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Missouri,  "would  only 
include  organized  cities  and  town.,  and 
other  like  organizations  with  political  and 


legislative  powers  for  the  local  civil  gov- 
ernment and  police  regulation  of  the  in- 
habitants of  particular  districts  included 
in  the  boundaries  of  the  corporation  ; " 
and  it  was  accordingly  held  that  an  in- 
corporated board  of  public  schools  was  not 
a  municipal  corporation  within  the  mean- 
ing of  an  Act  declaring  that  no  person 
shall  be  eligible  to  a  certain  office  who 
shall  hold  any  office  under  a  municipal 
corporation.  Heller  v.  Stremniel,  supra. 
In  Wisconsin  the  term  "municipal  cor- 
poration," as  used  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  State,  does  not  include  towns  (Norton 
v.  Peck,  3  Wis.  714);  and  when  used  in 
Statutes  it  is  presumed  to  be  used  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  term  is  used  in  the 
Constitution,  unless  a  different  legislative 
intention  appears  ;  and  under  the 
tion  of  that  State  municipal  corporations, 
properly  and  strictly  so  called,  do  not  in- 
clude towns  not  chartered,  school  dis- 
tricts, or  other  quasi  corporations.  Ea- 
ton v.  Manitowoc  Co.  (power  to  purchase 
and  hold  tax  certificates),  41  Wis.  189 
(1878).  Post,  sec.  48,  note.  "The  word 
'municipal,'  as  originally  used  in  its 
strictness,  applied  to  cities  only.  The 
word  now  has  (in  the  legislation  oi 
a  much  more  extended  meaning,  and  when 
applied  to  corpoi  i  words  '  polit- 

ical,' '  municipal,'  and   '  public  '  at 
interchangeably."     Rothrock,  J.,  in  Curry 
b.    Distrid   Township   of  Sioux    ( 
Iowa,  102,  construing  a  special  act. 
set  .  22,  a.     In  the  legislation  of  Illinois 


40  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  21 

§  21.  Creation  and  Powers.  —  Like  other  corporations,  municipal 
corporations  must  with  us  h,  created  by  statute.  They  possess  no 
powers  or  faculties  not  conferred  upon  them,  either  expressly  or  hy 
fair  implication,  by  the  law  winch  creates  them  or  by  other  statutes 
applicable  to  them.  Persons  residing  in  or  inhabiting  a  place  to 
be  incorporated,  as  well  as  the  place  itself,  are  —  both  tht  per 
and  the  place  —  indispensable  to  the  constitution  of  a  municipal 
corporation.1  Artificial  succession  also  is  of  the  essence  of  such  a 
corporation.  Municipal  corporations  are  created  and  exist  for  the 
public  advantage,  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  their  officers  or  of  par- 
ticular individuals  or  classes.  The  corporation  is  the  artificial  body 
created  by  the  law,  and  not  the  olhcers,  since  these  are,  from  the 
lowest  up  to  the  councilmen  or  mayor,  the  mere  ministers  of  the 
corj  toration.  Even  the  council,  or  other  legislative  or  governing 
body,  constitutes,  as  it  has  been  well  remarked,  neither  the  corpora- 
tion, nor  in  themselves  a  corporation.2  It  is  quite  impossible  in 
any  brief  space  to  convey  an  adequate  idea  of  the  exact  nature  and 
properties  of  an  American  municipal  corporation.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  law  more  complex  and  abstruse.  Although  the  inhabitants 
of  a  place  be  incorporated,  they  do  not  constitute  the  corporation ; 
neither,  as  we  have  just  observed,  is  it  constituted  by  the  governing 
body.  Notwithstanding  Mr.  lvyd's  criticism,  the  corporation  is  in- 
visible, for,  although  we  may  see  all  the  inhabitants,  or  all  of  the  offi- 
cers, we  do  not  see  the  legal  body  —  ideal  person,  —  which  makes 
the  corporation,  as  we  see  an  army  ;  but  this  is  a  property  common 
to  all  corporations.3  An  additional  complexity  in  municipal  cor- 
porations arises  out  of  the  various  and  diverse  powers  usually 
conferred,  giving  them,  as  they  exist  among  us,  an  extremely  compos- 
ite character.  The  primary  and  fundamental  idea  of  a  municipal 
corporation  is  an  institution  to  regulate  and  administer  the  internal 
concerns  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  defined  locality  in  matters  peculiar 
to  the  place  incorporated,  or  at  all  events  not  common  to  the  state 
or  people  at  large;  but  it  is  the  constant  practice  of  the  States  in 
this  country  to  make  use  of  the  incorporated  instrumentality,  or  of 
its  oflicers,  to  exercise  powers,  perform  duties,  and  execute  functions 

an  incorporated  "town  "  and  an  incorpor-  *  Galesburg  v.   Hawkinson,  75  111.   156 

ated    "village"   are   one   and    the    same  (1874).     Post,  sec.  183. 

thin-      Enfield  v.  .Ionian,  119  U.  S.  680;  2  Reg.  v.  Paramore,  10  Ad.  &  El.  2S6  ; 

Martin  v.  People,  87   111.  524.     Mr.  .Ins-  Reg.   v.   York,  -1  Q.  B.  850;  Grant,  3.">7; 

tice  Bradley,  in    Enfield  v.  Martin,  supra,  Glover,  1  :  Samson  v.  Williams,  3  Darn. 

at  page  685,  considers  the  meaning  <>!'  the  •.<.  Cress.  162  ;  Brown  v.  Gates,  L5  W.  Va. 

words   " town  "  and  "  village  "  as  used  in  (citing  text)  131.     Post,  sec.  40. 

New  England,  New  York,  the  Southern,  8  Ante,  sec.  3. 
the  Middle,  and  the  Western  States. 


§  22      PUBLIC    AND    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS    DISTINGUISHED.  11 

that  are  not  strictly  or  properly  local  or  municipal  in  their  nature, 
but  which  are,  in  fact,  state  powers,   exercised    by  local  officers, 

within  defined  territorial  limits;  and  it  is  important,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  to  keep  this  distinction  in  mind.  In  theory,  the  two 
classes  of  powers  are  distinct;  but  the  line  which  separates  the  one 
from  the  other  is  often  difficult  to  trace.  The  point  may  be  illus- 
trated from  the  English  law  :  If  the  king  incorporate  a  town,  its 
officers  will  have  no  implied  power  as  conservators  or  justices  of 
the  peace,  —  express  words  are  necessary  to  confer  this  power;  and 
when  they  net  in  the  latter  capacity,  it  is  not  because  they  are  cor- 
porate officers,  but  because  of  powers  expressly  annexed  to  their 
corporate  offices  ;  and  the  two  capacities  remain  distinct,  although 
united  in  the  same  person.1  The  subject  itself  will  be  elsewhere 
discussed.  The  name  of  the  municipal  corporation,  its  boundaries, 
its  officers,  its  powers,  its  duties,  and  the  like,  are  subjects  regulated 
by  legislative  enactment,  and  will  be  hereafter  noticed. 

§  22  (10).  Public  and  Municipal  Corporations  distinguished.  —  Cor- 
porations intended  to  assist  in  the  conduct  of  local  civil  government 
are  sometimes  styled  political,  sometimes  public,  sometimes  civil, 
and  sometimes  municipal,  and  certain  kinds  of  them  with  very  re- 
stricted powers,  quasi  corporations,  —  all  these  by  way  of  distinction 
from  private  corporations.  All  corporations  intended  as  agencies  in 
the  administration  of  civil  government  are  public,  as  distinguished 
from  private  corporations.  Thus  an  incorporated  school-district,  or 
county,  as  well  as  city,  is  a  public  corporation  ;  but  the  school-dis- 
trict or  county,  properly  speaking,  is  not,  while  the  city  is  a  muni- 
cipal corporation.2  All  municipal  corporations  are  public  bodies, 
created  for  civil  or  political  purposes ;    but  all  civil,  political,  or 

1  1  Kyd,  327  ;  People  v.  Hurlburt,  24  be  sued,  but  not  liable  for  trespass  9  com- 
Mich.  44  (1871),  per  Campbell,  C.  J.;  s.  c.  mitted  by  their  officers.  School  Districl 
6  Am.  Law  Rev.  376;  8.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103;  v.  Williams,  38  Ark.  454.  In  Iowa  a 
s.  p.  People  v.  Detroit,  28  .Midi.  228  school  district  is  a  municipal  corporation 
(1873)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202  [post,  sees,  within  the  meaning  of  the  act  authorizing 
72,  73),  in  which  the  nature  of  municipal  the  issue  of  bonds  by  such  corporations, 
corporations  and  the  purposes  of  their  ere-  Curry  v.  District  Township  of  Sioux  I  itv, 
ation  are  fully  discussed  by  Conic;/,  J.  63  Iowa,  102.  In  Louisiana  the  police 
The  text  quoted  and  the  distinction  ap-  juries  of  the  several  parishes  are  munici- 
proved,  and  made  the  basis  of  the  decision,  pal  corporations.  Police  Jury  of  Ouachita 
in  Beach  v.  Leahy,  11  Kansas,  23,  30  v.  Monroe,  38  La.  An.  630.  "  Municipal 
(1873).  corporations,"  as  used  in  the  amendment 

2  Ante,  sees.  9,  12,  14,  17,  19,  20,  and  to  the  Constitution  of  Minnesota  relating 
note.  White  v.  Commissioners,  90  N.  C.  to  the  assessment  of  property  for  Local 
437  ;  Schultes  v.  Eberly,  82  Ala.  242.  In  improvements,  held  to  include  counties. 
Arkansas,  school-districts  are  by  statute  Dowlan  v.  County  ^(  Sibley,  36  Minn. 
quasi  corporations,  with  power  to  sue  and  430.     Supra,  sec.  20,  and  note. 


IS  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  23 

public  corporations  are  not,  in  the  proper  use  of  language,  muni- 
cipal corporations.  The  phrase  "municipal  corporations,"  in  the 
temptation  of  this  treatise,  has  reference  to  incorporated  villages, 
tovms,  and  cities,  with  power  of  local  administration!  as  distin- 
guished from  other  public  corporations,  such  as  counties  and  quasi 
corporations.1 

§  '23.  Same  subject.  —  The  distinction  between  municipal  corpora- 
proper,  such  as  chartered  towns  and  cities,  or  towns  and  cities 
voluntarily  organized  under  general  incorporating  acts,  such  as 
exist  in  a  number  of  the  States,  and  involuntary  quasi  corporations, 
such  as  canities,  has  been  very  clearly  drawn  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Ohio  :  "Municipal  corporations  proper  are  called  into  existence 
either  at  the  direct  solicitation  or  by  the  free  consent  of  the  persons 
composing  them,  for  the  promotion  of  their  own  local  and  private 
advantage  and  convenience."  On  the  other  hand,  "  Counties  are  at 
most  but  local  organizations,  which,  for  the  purposes  of  civil  admin- 
istration, are  invested  with  a  few  functions  characteristic  of  a  cor- 
porate existence.  They  are  local  subdivisions  of  the  State,  created 
by  the  sovereign  power  of  the  State,  of  its  own  sovereign  will,  with- 
out the  particular  solicitation,  consent,  or  concurrent  action  of  the 
people  who  inhabit  them.  The  former  (municipal)  organization  is 
asked  for,  or  at  least  assented  to,  by  the  people  it  embraces;  the 
latter  organization  (counties)  is  superimposed  by  a  sovereign  and 
paramount  authority."  2  "A  municipal  corporation  proper  is  created 
mainly  for  the  interest,  advantage,  and  convenience  of  the  locality 
and  its  people  ;3  a  county  organization  is  created  almost  exclusively 
with  a  view  to  the  policy  of  the  State  at  large,  for  purposes  of  polit- 
ical organization  and  civil  administration,  in  matters  of  finance, 
of  education,  of  provision  for  the  poor,  of  military  organization,  of 
the  means  of  travel  and  transport,  and  especially  for  the  general  ad- 

i  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio'  St  local  affairs  of  the  community;  and,  being 

109  (1857)  :  Fini  I     •  B  ard,  &c,  30  Ohio  in  its  nature  and  objects  a  municipal  or- 

St.  37  :  Askew  9.  Hale,  54  Ala.  639,  —  ap-  ganization,  the  legislature  may,  unless  re- 

provingtexl  ;  GreeneCounty  v.  Eubanks,  strained  by  the  Constitution,  or  some  one 

80  Ala.  204  ;  Lawrence  County   o.   Chat-  of  those  fundamental  maxims  of  right  and 

ij    1,\   R.  Co.,  81    Ky.  225  ;  Manuel  v.  justice  with  respeel   to  which  all  govern- 

missionere,  98  N.  C.  9;  Cathcart    v.  incuts  and  society  are  supposed  to  be  or- 

Comstock,  56  Wi  .  590.  ganized,  i  ntrol  over  I 

-  Hamilton  Co.  v,  Mighels,    rwpra.     A  agencies,  and  require  such  public  duties 

/  rritorial  divis-  and  functions  to  be  performed  by  them  as 

.  created  and  organized  f<>r  fall  within  the  general  scope  and  ol 

public  political   purposes  L  with  of  the  municipal  organization.     Talbot* 

the  administration  of  the  State   govern-  Queen   \    ne's  County,  50  Md.  245.     Post, 

incut,  and  specially  charged  with  the  bu-  chaps,  iv.,  xxiii. 
perinl                  id  administration   of  the        8  Pus/,  sec.  183.     Ante,  sees.  19-22. 


24      PUBLIC    AND    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS   DISTINGUISHED. 


43 


ministration  of  justice.  With  scarcely  an  exception,  all  the  powers 
and  functions  of  the  county  organization  have  a  direct  and  exclusive 
reference  to  the  general  policy  of  the  Stale,  and  are,  in  fact,  but  a 
branch  of  the  general  administration  of  that  policy."1 

§  24.  Same  subject.  —  An  incorporated  city  or  town  sometimes 
embraces  by  legislative  provision  two  distinct  corporations,  as  foi 
example,  the  municipal  and  the  school  corporation  existing  within 
the  same  territory.  It  is  in  such  cases  a  distinct  corporation  for 
school  purposes,  and  under  the  statute  or  charter  may  be  bound  as 
such  for  the  contract  price  of  materials  furnished  and  labor  per- 
formed by  another  in  the  erection  of  a  school  building  for  such  cor- 
poration.2 More  generally,  however,  school-districts  are  organized 
under  the  general  laws  of  the  State,  and  fall  within  the  class  of  cor- 
porations known  as  quasi  corporations.3 

we  think  such  liability  cannot  be  derived 
from  the  relations  of  the  parties,  either 
on  the  principles  or  the  precedents  of  the 
common  law."  Followed,  Jacobs  v.  Ham- 
ilton Co.,  4  Fisher  Pat.  Cases,  81  (1862). 


1  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St. 
109.  In  this  case,  from  which  we  have 
quoted,  the  learned  judge,  adverting  to 
the  case  in  hand,  in  which  it  was  sought 
to  make  the  county  liable  in  damages  to 
one  who  suffered  a  personal  injury  from  Also  cited  and  followed  in  Wehn  v.  Gage 
the  neglect  of  the  commissioners  of  the  Co.,  5  Neb.  494  (1877),  where  it  was  held 
county  in  the  discharge  of   their   official     that,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  creating 


duties,  says  :  "  But,  it  is  said,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  board  of  county  commissioners 
are  chosen  by  tho  electors  of  the  county, 
and  hence  the  board  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  agents  of  tJie  county,  for  whose  torts 
in  the  performance  of  official  duties  the 
county  ought  to  be  responsible.  True, 
the  people  of  the  county  elect  the  board 
of  county  commissioners  ;  but  they  also 
elect  the  sheriff  and  treasurer  of  the 
county.  Are  the  people  of  the  county, 
therefore,  responsible  for  the  malfea- 
sances in  office  of  the  sheriff  or  for  tho 
official  defalcations  of  the  county  treas- 
urer I  This  will  not  be  pretended.  .  .  . 
We  cannot  but  think  that  county  com- 
missioners are  not  agents  or  representa- 
tives of  the  county  in  any  such  sense  or 
manner  as  to  render  the  people  of  the 
county  justly  answerable  for  their  neg- 
lect;  even  if  the  neglect  he  such  as  would 
create  a  civil  liability  against  a  natural 
person  or  a  municipal  or  private  corpora- 
tion. It  is,"  he  adds,  "  undoubtedly  com- 
petent for  the  legislature  to  make  the 
people  of  a  county  liable  for  the  official 
delinquencies  of  the  county  commission- 
ers ;  but  this  has  not  yet  been  done,  and 


the  liability,  the  county  was  not  liable  to 
an  action  by  reason  of  its  jail  being  so 
erected  and  kept  as  to  become  an  actual 
nuisance  to  persons  residing  near  it.     Sec. 

22,  cited  and  approved.  Pula.ski  County 
v.  Reeve,  42  Ark.  55  ;  State  v.  Leffingwell, 
54  Mo.  458  (1873);  Askew  v.  Hale  Co.,  54 
Ala.  639(1875);  s.  c.  25  Am.  Hep.  730. 
See  also  Soper  v.  Henry  Co.,  26  Iowa, 
264  (1868);  Treadwell  v.  Commissioners, 
11  Ohio  St.  190  ;  Angel!  &  Ames,  sees.  14, 

23,  21,  25.  Post,  sees.  57,  66,  also  chapter 
on  Actions,  sees.  963,  965,  966,  1014. 

2  Princeton  v.  Gehhart,  61  Ind.  1S7; 
IiirHs  v.  Hughes,  61  Ind.  212  :  Wright  v. 
Stockman,  59  Ind.  65  ;  Sheffield  v.  An- 
dress,  56  Ind.  157. 

3  Harris  v.  School  District,  8  Foster, 
28  (N.  H.)  58,  61  (1853).  Speaking  of 
the  powers  of  separate  school-districts  not 
included  in  a  municipality,  and  of  their 
officers,  Bell,  J.,  in  the  case  just  cited, 
observes:  "These  little  corporations  have 
sprung  into  existence  within  a  few  years, 
and  their  corporate  powers  and  those  of 
their  officers  are  to  be  settle.!  by  the  con- 
structions of  the  courts  upon  a  sine 

of  crude,  unconnected,  and  often  experi- 


<  9' 


14  Ml'MCIl'AL    COKI'OKATIONS.  g  -■> 

8    25      10  a  .     Same    subject.        Distinction    between    Public    and 
quasi  and   Municipal  Corporations.  —  Civil   corporations   are    oJ    dif- 
ferent grades  or  classes,  but  in  essence  and  nature  they   must   all  be 
trded  as  public.     The  school-district  or  the  road-district  is  usually 
invested   by   general   enactments   operating   throughout    the   State 
with  a  corporate  character,  the  better  to  perform  within  and  for  the 
lity  its  special  function,  which  is  indicated  by  its  oame.      It  is 
but  an  instrumentality  of  the  State,  and  the  State  incorporates  it 
that  it  may  the  more  effectually  discharge  its  appointed  duty.     So 
with  counties.     They  are  involuntary  political  or  civil  divisions  of 
the  State,  created  by  general  laws  to  aid  in  the  administration  of 
government.     Their  powers  are  not  uniform  in  all  the  States,  but 
these  generally  relate  to  the  administration  of  justice,  the  support  of 
the  poor,  the  establishment  and  repair  of  highways,  —  all  of  which 
are   matters   of   State,   as    distinguished   from    municipal    concern. 
They  are  purely  auxiliaries  of  the  State  ;  and  to  the  general  statutes 
of  the  State  they  owe  their  creation,  and  the  statutes  confer  upon 
them  all  the  powers  they  possess,  prescribe  all  the  duties  they  owe, 
and  impose  all  liabilities  to  which  they  are  subject.1      Considered 
with   respect   to    the    limited  number   of   their   corporate   powers, 
the  bodies  above  named  rank  low  down  in  the  scale  or  grade  of 
corporate  existence ;  and  lance  have  been  frequently  termed  quasi 
corporations.2     This  designation  distinguishes  them  on  the  one  hand 

mental  enactments.    School-districts  an-  in  powers.     The  liability  of  such  powers  to 

New  Hampshire  quasi  corporations  of  the  abuse   furnishes  the  strongest  arguments 

most  limited  powers  known  to  the  laws,  against  their  existence,"  as  a  committee 

They  have  no  powers  derived  from  usage,  mighl  Load  the  district  with  debts,  though 

They  have  the  powers  expressly  granted  the   district  had  expressly   limited  their 

to  them,  and  mch  implied  powers  as  are  authority.      See    also   Wilson   v.    School 

necessary  to  enable  them  to  perform  their  Dist.,   32  (N.  H.)  118(1855)  ;  Foster  v. 

duties,  and  no  more.     Among  them  is  the  Lane,  10  Foster,  30  (N.   H.)  305,^315; 

power  to  vote  money  for  specified  purposes,  Giles  v.  School  Dist.,  11  Fost.  31  (N.  H.) 

and  the  power  to  appoint  committees  'to  304  ;  Scales  v.  Chattahoochee  County,  ±1 

tea'   relative  to  those  pur-  Ga,    225(1870);  Rogers  v.  People,  68  111. 

'int.,    effect.'      'ni-    district    may  154  (1873),  citing  text     So  also  Beach  v. 

!v,   by  their   votes   for  building  and  Leahy,  11  Kansas,  23, 30 (1 873).    A.school- 

repairing  school-houses,  limit  the  expense  district  is  bound  by   the  contract  of  its 

to  a  definite  sum  ;  and  they  may  limit  the  board  lor  repairs  of  its  school-house,  not- 

pren                   ir  the  exact  description  of  withstanding  that  a  given  sum  had  been 

the    school-house    to  be    built,   and    when  voted    lor   such   repairs   and   expended  for 

ti.js  [a  done   th<                     (appointed  to  such  object.     Conklin  a.  School  Dist.  22 

•,  ,,,v  the  vote,  into  effed  ')  cannot  bind  Kansas,  521.    And  under  a  parol  contract. 

11,,.                   -.-   exceeding    those   limits.  Cases  in  note  2,  supra. 

These  committees  an-  special  agents,  with-  l  Ante,  sees.  '.),  12,  14,  17, 19-23.     Post, 

out  any  genera]  powers  over  the  affairs  of  sees.  I''..  '.'<;  ;-'.tf;6,  1014. 

the  district,  and  their  powers  are  confined  -  Hamilton  County  v.  Garrett,  62  Tex. 

to  .a  special  pur]".--  ;  and  no  Inference  can  602. 
be  drawn  from  the  general  nature  of  their 


§  27      PUBLIC   AND    MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS   DISTINGUISHED.  45 

from  private  corporations  aggregate,  and  on  the  other  from  muni- 
cipal corporations  proper,  such  as  cities  or  towns  acting  under 
charters,  or  incorporating  statutes,  and  which  are  invested  with 
more  powers  and  endowed  with  special  functions  relating  to  tho 
particular  or  local  interests  of  the  municipality,  and  to  this  end  are 
granted  a  larger  measure  of  corporate  life. 

§26.  Same  subject. — It  will  appear  hereafter  that  nearly  all 
of  the  courts  have  drawn  a  marked  line  of  distinction  between  muni- 
cipal corporations  and  quasi  corporations,  in  respect  to  their  liability 
to  persons  injured  by  their  neglect  of  duty ;  holding  the  former  liable, 
without  an  express  statute  giving  the  action,  in  cases  in  which  the 
latter  are  not  considered  liable  unless  made  so  by  express  legislative 
enactment.  One  reason  given  for  the  distinction  is,  that  with  re- 
spect to  local  or  municipal  powers  proper  (as  distinguished  from 
those  conferred  upon  the  municipality  as  a  mere  agent  of  the  State) 
the  inhabitants  are  to  be  regarded  as  having  been  clothed  with  them 
at  their  request  and  for  their  peculiar  and  special  advantage,  and 
that  as  to  such  powers  and  the  duties  springing  out  of  them,  the 
corporation  has  a  private  character,  and  is  liable,  on  the  like  prin- 
ciples and  generally  to  the  same  extent  as  a  private  corporation. 
This  subject  will  be  fully  examined  in  its  appropriate  place,  and  is 
alluded  to  here  only  for  the  purpose  of  noting  the  distinction  which 
has  been  made  between  municipal  and  public  corporations.1  But 
that  a  municipal  corporation  is  in  any  just  view  a  private  corpora- 
tion, or  possesses  a  double  character,  the  one  private  and  the  other 
public,  although  often  asserted,  is  only  true  in  a  modified  sense.  In 
their  nature  and  purposes,  municipal  corporations,  however  numer- 
ous and  complex  their  powers  and  functions,  are  essentially  public.2 

§  27.  Same  subject.  Concerning  the  distinction  mentioned  in  tJie 
preceding  section,  the  following  views  may,  perhaps,  on  principle  be 

1  Post,  ch.  xxiii.  Text  approved.  Han-  the  last  two  sentences  of  the  text,  as  they 
non  v.  St.  Louis  County,  62  Mo.  313,  316  appeared  in  the  third  edition,  to  stand. 
(1876);  Heller  v.  Stremmel,  52  Mo.  309  But  to  prevent  misconception  he  now  adds 
(1873)  ;  State  v.  Leffingwell,  54  Mo.  458,  that  while,  in  his  judgment,  a  municipal 
471  (1873)  ;  Union  Township  v.  Gibboney,  corporation  is  essentially  a  public  and  not 
94  Pa.  St.  534.  in  any  true  sense  a  private  corporation,  still 

2  The  doctrine  of  the  private  character  it  does  not  follow  that  it  may  not  have, 
of  municipal  corporations,  as  respects  under  the  Constitutions  of  the  States,  cer- 
their  property  rights,  is  argued  with  great  tain  primordial  and  fundamental  rights, 
force  by  Cooley,  J.,  in  People  v.  Detroit,  which,  although  they  are  not  beyond  legis- 
28  Mich.  228  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  See  lative  regulation,  are  nevertheless  beyond 
post,  ch.  iv,  sees.  58,  72,  73.  In  the  Roman  legislative  destruction.  See  post,  ch.  iv. 
law,  see  ante,  sec.  3.     The  author  allows 


If,  MUNICIPAL  COBPOBATIONS.  §  28 

jidered  as  sound.1  As  respects  the  usual  and  ordinary  legisla- 
tive and  governmental  powers  conferred  upon  a  municipality,  the 
better  to  enable  it-  to  aid  the  State  in  properly  governing  that  por- 
tion of  its  people  residing  within  the  municipality,  such  powers  are 
in  their  very  nature  public,  although  embodied  in  a  charter  and  not 
conferred  by  laws  general  in  their  nature  and  applicable  to  the  en- 
tire State.  But  powers  or  franchises  of  an  exceptional,  or  extraordi- 
nary or  non-municipal  nature  may  be,  and  sometimes  are,  conferred 
upon  municipalities,  such  as  are  frequently  conferred  upon  individ- 
uals or  private  corporations.  Thus,  for  example,  a  city  may  be  ex- 
pressly authorized  in  its  discretion  to  erect  a  public  wharf  and  charge 
tolls  for  its  use,2  or  to  supply  its  inhabitants  with  water  or  gas,  charg- 
ing them  therefor  and  making  a  profit  thereby.8  In  one  sense  such 
powers  are  public  in  their  nature  because  conferred  for  the  public  ad- 
vantage. In  another  sense  they  may  be  considered  private,  because 
they  are  such  as  may  be,  and  often  are,  conferred  upon  individuals 
and  private  corporations,  and  result  in  a  special  advantage  or  benefit 
to  the  municipality  as  distinct  from  the  public  at  large.  In  this 
limited  sense,  and  as  forming  a  basis  for  the  implied  eivii  liability 
for  damages  caused  by  the  negligent  execution  of  such  powers,  it 
may  be  said  that  a  municipality  has  a  private  as  well  as  a  pitblic 
character.  And  so,  as  hereafter  shown,  a  municipality  may  have 
property  rights  which  are  so  far  private  in  their  nature  that  they 
are  not  held  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature.4 

§28  (11).  The  New  England  Town.  —  Til  the  New  England 
States,  public  corporations  have,  in  many  respects,  a  peculiar  char- 
acter. In  some  instances,  there  are  acts  incorporating  cities,  giving 
them  defined  powers  and  providing  a  special  mode  of  government  ; 
but  even  then  the  general  laws  in  relation  to  towns,  when  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  provisions  of  the  local  act,  ordinarily  apply  to  the 
places  specially  incorporated.  In  the  New  England  town  proper, 
the  citizens  administer  the  general  affairs  in  person,  at  the  stated 
corporate  or  town  meetings,  and  through  officers  elected  by  them- 
selves.5    The  towns  are  charged  with  the  support  of  schools,  the 

i  s :asea  cited  /»«/,  sec.  66;  and  for  2  Pittsburg*.  Grier,  22 Pa, 'St. 68  (1868) ; 

illustrations  and    application  of  the  doc-  post,  nee.  113,  note,  ami  the  chapter  xxiii. 

trine,   post,    Bees    ."'7.  58,   775;  also  chap,  on  Actions,  sees.  966,  967,  980. 

xxiii.,  Actions,  sees.  968-967,  L014,  1018.  8  lb.,  post,  chap,  xxiii.  on  Actions. 

See  observations  of  Hunt,  J.,  in  Barnes  4  Chap,  iv.,  post. 

v.   Districl    of   Columbia,  91    U.    S.  540  B  In  toums,  according  to  the  use  of  the 

(1875)  :  and  oiOray,  C.  •'.,  in  Hill  v.  Bos-  word  in  the  New  England  States  and  some 

ton,  L22   Mass.  344  (1877),  noted    infra,  of  the  others,  the  citizens  administer  the 

genera]  affairs  in  person,  in  town  meet- 


§28 


THE   NEW   ENGLAND   TOWN. 


47 


relief  of  the  poor,  the  laying  out  and  repair  of  highways,  and  are 
empowered  to  preserve  peace  and  good  order,  maintain  internal  po- 
lice, and  direct  and  manage  generally,  in  a  manner  not  repugnant 
to  the  laws  of  the  State,  their  prudential  affairs ;  and  for  defraying 
these  and  all  necessary  and  lawful  charges,  they  may  levy  and  col- 
lect taxes.  Speaking  generally,  the  New  England  towns  are  organ- 
ized after  the  same  model;  and  an  exact  notion  of  their  character 
will  be  best  obtained  by  reference  to  the  leading  statutory  provisions 
in  Massachusetts  respecting  them,  given  in  the  note.1     The  town  in 


ings.  In  cities,  this  is  done  by  means  of  a 
mayor,  aldermen,  and  council,  to  whom 
the  citizens  entrust  most  of  the  legislative 
and  executive  powers  of  the  place.  State 
v.  Glennon,  3  R.  I.  276,  278,  per  Staples, 
C.  J.  In  New  England,  "  town  "  is  a 
generic  term,  and  it  will  embrace  cities, 
unless  the  contrary  appears  in  other  parts 
of  the  statute  to  have  been  the  intent  of 
the  legislature.  lb.  The  reader  will  find 
the  opinion  of  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Hill  v.  Bos- 
ton, 122  Mass.  344  ;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 
332,  1877,  highly  instructive  as  to  the 
character  of  New  England  towns  and 
cities.  As  to  general  liabilities,  there  is 
no  substantial  distinction  between  cities 
and  towns  under  the  legislation  of  Massa- 
chusetts,    lb.  p.  354. 

1  Every  town  has  the  corporate  right  to 
send  representatives  to  the  General  Court 
(the  legislature).  If  by  a  majority  vote  a 
town  declines  to  send  a  representative,  the 
dissenting  minority  cannot  legally  choose 
one.  Opinion  Justices  Sup.  Court,  7  Mass. 
526  ;  15  Mass.  537.  "  Towns  in  Connecti- 
cut, as  in  the  other  New  England  States, 
differ  from  trading  companies,  and  even 
from  municipal  corporations  elsewhere. 
They  are  territorial  corporations,  into 
which  the  State  is  divided  by  the  legis- 
lature, from  time  to  time,  at  its  discre- 
tion, for  political  purposes  and  the  con- 
venient administration  of  government ; 
they  have  those  powers  only  which  have 
been  expressly  conferred  upon  them  by 
statute,  or  which  are  necessary  for  con- 
ducting municipal  affairs ;  and  all  the  in- 
habitants of  the  town  are  members  of  the 
quasi  corporation."  Per  Gray,  J.,  Bloom- 
field  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  121  U.  S.  121, 
citing  1  Swift's  System,  116,  117  ;  Gran  by 
v.  Thurston,   23  Conn.  416  ;  Webster  v. 


Harwinton,  32  Conn.  131  ;  Dillon,  Mun. 
Corp.,  sees.  23-30. 

Summary  of  the  leading  statutory 
provisions  in  Massachusetts  respecting 
towns :  — 

1.  As  to  powers  and  duties.  —  They  are 
' '  bodies  corporate,  with  all  the  powers  here- 
tofore exercised  by  them,  and  subject  to 
all  the  duties  to  which  they  have  hereto- 
fore been  subject."  Gen.  St.  1860,  chap, 
xviii.  sec.  1.  "  Towns  may,  in  their  cor- 
porate capacity,  sue  and  be  sued  in  the 
name  of  the  town."  lb.  sec.  8.  They 
may  hold  real  estate  and  personal  prop- 
erty "  for  the  public  use  of  the  inhabit- 
ants," and  also  "in  trust  for  the  support 
of  schools  and  the  promotion  of  education 
within  the  limits  of  the  town."  lb.  sec. 
9.  They  may  make  contracts  necessary 
and  convenient  "  for  the  exercise  of  their 
corporate  powers,"  and  may  dispose  of 
their  corporate  property,  lb.  sees.  8,  9. 
"They  may,  at  legal  meetings,  grant  and 
vote  such  sums  as  they  judge  necessary 
for  the  following  purposes  :  For  the  sup- 
port of  town  schools;  for  the  relief,  &c.t 
and  employment  of  the  poor;  for  the  lay- 
ing out  and  discontinuing  and  repair  of 
highways ;  for  procuring  the  writing  and 
publishing  of  town  histories;  for  burial- 
grounds  ;  for  encouraging  the  destruction 
of  noxious  animals ;  for  all  other  ncccs- 
sary  charges  arising  therein."  lb.  sec.  10. 
"  May  make  necessary  by-laws,  not  repug- 
nant to  the  laws  of  the  State,  for  directing 
and  managing  the  prudential  affairs,  pre- 
serving the  peace  and  good  order,  and 
maintaining  the  internal  police  thereof." 
lb.  sec.  11.  But  such  bydaws  must,  be- 
fore taking  effect,  be  approved  by  the 
Superior  Court,  or,  in  vacation,  a  judge 
thereof.     lb.  sec.   14.     They  are   binding 


48 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


28 


New   England,  while  somewhat  anomalous,  has  some  of  the  usual 
powers  of  a  regular  municipal  corporation,  and  some  of  the  charac- 


upon  all  within  tin-  limits  of  the  town, 
strangers  as  well  as  inhabitants.  lb.  sec. 
15. 

■j.  Corporate  or  Toum  Meetings.  "Ev- 
ery male  citizen  of  twenty-one  years  of 
age  ami  upwards  (except  paupers,  &c), 
who  has  resided  within  the  State  one  year, 
and  within   the   town   in  which   he  claims 

the  right  to  vote,  sis  months,  and  who  has 

paid  a  State  or  county  tax,  &C.,  shall  have 
a  right  to  vote  upon  all  questions  at  all 
meetings  for  the  transaction  of  town  af- 
fairs, and  no  other  person  shall  be  entitled 
tovote."  lb.  sec.  19.  "  The  annual  meet- 
big  of  each  town  shall  be  held  in  Febru- 
ary, March,  or  April  ;  and  other  meetings 
u  such  time  as  the  selectmen  may  order." 
lb.  Bee,  20.  Warrants  issue  for  all  meet- 
ings, under  the  hands  of  the  selectmen, 
directed  to  constables  or  others,  who  no- 
tify such  meeting  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  the  by-laws  or  vote  of  the 
town.  lb.  sec.  21.  "The  warrant  shall 
express  the  time  and  place  of  the  meeting 
and  the  subjects  to  be  there  acted  upon  ; 
.  .  .  and  nothing  acted  upon  shall  have 
a  legal  operation  unless  the  subject  matter 
thereof  is  contained  in  the  warrant."  lb. 
sec.  22.  [See  infra,  sees.  266-268,  as  to 
necessity  and  requisites  of  the  notice  or 
warning.]  If  selectmen  unreasonably  re- 
fuse to  call  a  meeting,  any  justice  of  the 
peace  may  do  so  upon  the  application  of 
ten  or  more  legal  voters  of  the  town.  lb. 
sec.  23.  Provision  is  made  for  moderat- 
ing and  conducting  the  meeting.  lb.  sees. 
25-30.  Town  officers  are  elected  at  the 
annual  meeting,  who  serve  for  one  year, 
and  until  others  are  chosen  and  qualified. 
These  consist  of  selectmen,  assessors,  treas- 
urer, constables,  who  are  er-officio  collec- 
tors unless  others  be  specially  chosen  ; 
field-drivers,  fence-viewers,  surveyors  of 
lumber,  measurers  of  wood,  unless  select- 
men appoint,  "and  all  Other  usual  town 
officers."  lb.  sec.  31.  Then  follows  a 
variety  of  provisions  respecting  the  duties 
of  these  several  officers,  and  the  manner  of 
their  performance.  In  addition,  there  are 
Incorporating  and  establishing  cities. 
"  The-  laws  in  relation  to  towns,  where  not 
inconsistent  with   the  general  or  special 


provisions  of  the  acts  establishing  cities, 
apply  to  them  ;  and  cities  are  Bubject  to 

tic   liabilities,  and  city  councils  have  the 
powers  of  towns.    The  mayor  and  aldermen 

shall  have  the  powers  and  !»■  subject  to  the 
liabilities  of  selectmen,   &c,   if  no  other 
provisions  are   made   in   relation  thereto." 
Gen.  St.    1860,  chap.    xix.    166.      "The 
marked  and   characteristic  distinction   be- 
tween a  town  organizatim  (in  Massachu- 
setts) and  that  of  a  CITY  is,   that  in  the 
former   all   of   the   qualified   inhabitants 
meet,    deliberate,  act,   and  vote   in    their 
natural  and  personal  capacities  ;  whereas, 
under  a  city  government,  this  is  all  done 
by  their  representatives."    Per  Shaw,  C.  J., 
in    Warren  v.   Charlestown,    2  Gray,   84, 
101.    As  to  the  origin  and  power  of  towns 
in  Massachusetts,  consult  Commonwealth 
v.  Roxbury,  9  Gray,   451  (1857)  ;  opinion 
of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  476,  and  the  valuable  note 
of  Mr.  (since  Chief  Justice)  Gray,  pp.  503, 
528;  and  the  opinion  of  the  same  eminent 
judge  in  Hill  v.  Boston,  122   Mass.  344 
(1877)  ;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Kep.  332  ;  Quincy's 
Municipal   History  of   Boston,   chap.   i.  ; 
a nt,.  chap.  i.      Towns  were  not  expressly 
authorized  to  sue  and  be  sued  until  1694, 
nor  formally  incorporated  until  1785.     lb. 
9   Gray,  511,   note  "  G  "  ;    2  Dana's   Ah. 
698  ;  WUlard  v.  Newhuryport,   12  Pick. 
227,  231  ;  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick. 
77,  78.     Post,  sec.   187,  note.     The  neces- 
sity of  the  representative  system  in  a  popU' 
lous  place  is  strikingly  illustrated  in  The 
People  v.   Detroit,  28  Mich.   228  (1873); 
8.  c.   15  Am.    Rep.  202,  where  the  legis- 
lature  had    provided    that   an   important 
question  should  be  decided  by  a  vote  of 
a  citizens'  meeting.     Two  meetings  were 
held,  but  the    noise,    confusion,  and  vio- 
lence prevented  discussion  and  determina- 
tion, and  this  provision  was  subsequently 
repealed.     Speaking  of  the  represent 
si/s/rm   in  general,  the  learned  Dr.  Lieber 
calls  it  "a  flower  of  civilization,  such   as 
neither  antiquity  nor  the    Middle    Ages 
either  enjoyed   or  suspected ;    something 
direct  and  positive  in  it  self;  .   .    .   one   of 
the     very    greatest    political    institutions 
which  adorn  the    pages    of   the    history  of 
civilization,  for  through  it  alone   can    be 


§  28  THE  NEW  ENGLAND  TOWN.  49 

teristics  of  the  county  organizations  in  many  of  the  States.  The 
New  England  town  is  especially  interesting  as  affording,  perhaps, 
an  example  of  as  pure  a  democracy  as  anywhere  exists.  All  of  the 
qualified  inhabitants  meet  and  directly  act  upon  and  manage,  or  di- 
rect the  management  of,  their  own  local  concerns.  Each  citizen  has 
a  vote  and  an  equal  voice.  This  form  of  government  was  adopted 
at  a  very  early  period,  and  is  firmly  adhered  to  and  deeply  cherished 
by  the  people  of  the  New  England  States.  The  result  has  demon- 
strated how  well  adapted  it  is  to  promote  the  well-being  of  the 
communities  that  for  so  long  a  space  of  time  have  thus  governed 
themselves.  The  remarkable  growth  and  prosperity  of  the  New 
England  States,  not  the  most  favored  by  nature,  and  the  intelli- 
gence and  character  of  the  people,  are  known  to  all  ;  and  it  is  not 
strange  that  these  results  should  be  attributed,  in  a  large  measure, 
to  this  system  of  local  popular  government.1  But,  in  the  course  of 
time,  many  of  the  towns,  or  portions  thereof,  grew  to  be  large  and 
populous,  and  the  system  of  meetings  of  the  electors,  in  their  origi- 
nal capacity,  became  inconvenient  and  almost  impracticable.  When 
the  population  of  a  town  or  place  exceeds  10,000  or  12,000  persons, 
the  need  for  the  representative  system  is  urgently  felt.  Accord- 
ingly, in  the  New  England  States,  there  are  now,  in  addition  to 
towns,  a  large  number  of  incorporated  cities,  with  charters  or  consti- 
tuent statutes,  organized  upon  the  usual  representative  model,  with  a 
legislative  or  governing  body,  and  an  executive  head  and  subordi- 
nate officers.     The  people  of  the  large  city  of  Boston,  in  particular, 

obtained  real  civil  liberty,  broad,  extensive,  of  New  England.     At  the  town  meeting 

and  natural  freedom."    2  Pol.  Ethics,   489.  one    is    impressed   with    the    accumulat- 

History  of  Political  Representation  in  Eng-  ed   virility  of  the  four  or  five  men  who 

land,  —  why  it  was  unknown  in  antiquity,  speak  so  well  to  the  point,  and  so  easily 

and  why  it  was  used  and   developed   in  handle  the  affairs  of  the  town, — only  four 

England, —see    Hearn,     Government    of  last    night,    and    all    so   good   that   they 

England,  chaps,  xvii. ,  xviii.     The  general  would    have  satisfied   me   had   I  been   in 

justice  of  Dr.  Lieber's  eulogium  cannot  be  Boston    or   Washington.     The   speech    of 

denied  ;  but  this  system  has  worked  every-  was  perfect,  and  to  that  handful  of 

where  better  than  it  has  in  our  large  cities,  people,  who  heartily  applauded  it."  And 
where  the  representative  is  often  elected  again,  "  The  most  hardfisted,  disagreeably 
by  those  who  do  not  pay  the  taxes,  the  restless,  thought  -  paralyzing  companion 
expenditure  of  which  it  is  his  principal  sometimes  turns  out  in  the  town  meet- 
function  to  direct  and  control.  See  chap.  i.  ings  to  be  a  fluent,  various,  and  effective 
ante,  for  a  discussion  of  the  defects  in  the  orator.  Now  I  find  what  all  that  excess 
practical  working  of  our  municipal  corpor-  of  power  which  chafed  and  fretted  me  so 

ations,  and  for  some  suggestions  as  to  the  much  in was  for."     This   illustrates 

best  method  of  remedying  them.  what  De  Tocqueville  means  in  the  passages 

1  Mr.     Ralph    Waldo    Emerson     took  quoted  ante,  sec.  9,  "  that  local  assemblies 

great  interest   in    the    practical  workings  of  citizens  constitute  the  strength  of  free 

of  the  town  meeting  system.     He  writes,  nations,"  &c. 
"I    see  in  them  the  safety  and  strength 

VOL.   I.  —  4 


50 


Ml'Nini'AL    COUrOKATIONS. 


§  28 


were  wedded  to  the  town  system,  and  struggled  long  against  the  in- 
evitable change  to  the  representative  plan  ;  and  five  successive  times 
between  L784  and  L82]  they  rejected  well-considered  schemes  for  a 
city  government.  The  town  continued  to  be  governed  by  meetings 
of  the  electors  en  masse,  acting  through  boards  and  officers,  until  the 
place  had  40,000  inhabitants,  of  whom  seven  thousand  wore  qualified 
In  1822,  however,  the  legislature,  at  the  desire  of  a  major- 
ity of  the  voters,  granted  the  place  a  city  charter,  by  which  it  was 
provided  that  the  control  of  its  affairs  should  be  in  a  mayor  ami 
city  council.  Alter  this,  other  towns,  from  time  to  time,  made  the 
change  from  the  town  to  the  city  plan  ;  so  that,  as  before  observed, 
we  have  in  the  New  England  States  both  modes  of  local  administra- 
tion. The  town  system  is  the  general  one  ;  the  city,  or  representative 
system,  is  the  exceptional  one,  and  is  confined  to  places  of  compact 
population  and  considerable  size.1 


1  No  city  was  incorporated  in   Massa- 
ehusetl  3  until  after  the  amendmenl  of  t  he 
C      titration  of  that  State  in  1820.    Per 
,  C.  J.,  in  Warren  v.  < lharlestown, 
i.     The  purpose  and  effectof  the 
je  iii  the  form  of  municipal  govern- 
ments  in   Massachusetts  under   the    cou- 
■]  provision  authorizing  the  estab- 
lishmi  m    "I  cities,  is  discussed  by  Gray, 
('.   J.,  in   Hill  v.  Boston,   122  Mass.   Z4  \ 
7);  B.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  332.    After  re- 
ferring to  the  previous  attempts  in  1784, 
1785,  1791,  1804,  and  1815,  to  change  the 
town  government  of  Boston,   Mr.  Josiah 
Quincy,  in  his  Municipal  History  of  Bos- 
ton, p.  28,  continues:  "In   L82]   the  im- 
practicability of  condui  ting  the  municipal 
interests  of  the  place,  under  the  form  of 
town  government,  became  apparenl  to  the 
inhal  itanl        With  a  population  upwards 
rod,  and  with   seven   thou- 
sand   qualified   voters,    it    was    evidently 
impossible  calmly  to  deliberate  and   act. 
When  a  town-meeting  was  held   on   any 
ii -  subject,  in    Fanenil    Hall,  those 
only  who  obtained  places  near  the  mod- 
i  mid  even  hear  the  discussion.     A 
fi'w  '  <1   individuals  easily 

L   tin     i  it  of    the   ■ 

,    affaii  .  in  in  assi  mbly  in  which 
the  n  imber   could    have   neil  hi  r 

nor  hearing.      Winn   the    subject 
■  \    rally   e:    it ing,    tov. n-meet- 
ings  were  u  ually  composed  of  the  select- 
men, the  town  officers,  and  thirty  or  forty 


inhabitants.  Those  who  thus  came  were, 
for  the  most  part,  drawn  to  it  from  some 
official  duty  or  private  interest,  which, 
when  performed  or  obtai 1,  they  gen- 
erally troubled  themselves  hut  little,  or 
not  at  all,  about  the  other  business  of  the 

ti ting.     In  assemblies  thus   composed, 

by-laws  were  passed,  taxes,  to  the  amount 
of  one  hundred  or  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars,  voted,  on  statements 
often  general  in  their  nature,  and  on  re- 
ports, as  it  respects  the  majority  of  voters 
present,  taken  upon  trust,  and  which  no 
one  had  carefully  considered,  except  per- 
haps the  chairman.  In  the  constitution 
of  the  town  government  there  had  resulted, 
in  the  course  of  time,  from  exigency  or 
necessity,  a  complexity  little  adapted  to 
produce  harmony  in  action,  and  an  irre- 
sponsibility irreconcilable  with  a  wise  and 
efficient  conduct  of  its  affairs.  On  the 
agents  of  the  town  there  was  no  direct 
check  or  control  ;  no  pledge  for  fidelity 
but  their  own  honor  and  sense  of  character. 
The  prosperity  of  the  town  of  Boston, 
under  such  a  form  of  government  ;  the  few 
defalcations  which  had  occurred  ;  the  fre- 
quent, and  often,  for  years,  uninterrupted 
re-election  of  the  same  members  to  the 
officiating  boards,  arc  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  prevailing  high  state  of  morals  and 
intelligence  among  the  inhabitants." 
After  mentioning  the  different  boards 
among    which    the    executive    |iower     was 

divided,  and   which   acted   independently 


29 


THE    NEW    ENGLAND    TOWN. 


51 


§  29  (12).  Same  subject.  —  The  character  of  towns  in  New  Eng- 
land, and  in  what  respects  they  differ  from  English  municipal  cor- 
porations, existing  by  prescription  or  special  charter,  prior  to  the 
legislation  by  parliament  in  1835,  before  mentioned,1  and  the  care 
to  be  observed  in  applying  the  English  cases  relating  to  such  cor- 
porations to  the  town  and  city  organizations  of  New  England,  are 
instructively  set  forth  by  the  learned  Chief-Justice  Perley,  in  deliv- 
ering the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Hampshire,  in  an 
important  case  to  which  we  shall  again  have  occasion  to  allude.2 


of  each  other,  and  which  were  invested 
with  the  expending  power,  and,  in  effect, 
with  exercise  of  the  whole  power  of  tax- 
ation, Mr.  Qnincy  proceeds:  "A  con- 
viction of  the  want  of  safety  and  of  re- 
sponsibility in  a  machine  thus  complicated 
and  loosely  combined  became  at  length 
so  general  that  the  inherited  and  invet- 
erate antipathy  to  a  city  organization  be- 
gan perceptibly  to  diminish.  About  this 
time,  also,  one  of  the  most  common  and 
formal  objections  to  a  city  organization 
was  removed.  The  constitution  of  Massa- 
chusetts, which  was  passed  in  1780,  con- 
tained no  express  authority  to  establish  a 
city  organization  ;  and  in  every  attempt 
to  change  that  of  the  town,  it  never  failed 
to  be  zealously  contended  that  the  legis- 
lature of  the  commonwealth  possessed  no 
such  power.  But  by  the  amendments  to 
the  constitution  made  by  the  convention 
of  1820,  and  adopted  by  the  people,  this 
power  was  expressly  recognized.  The 
question,  therefore,  now  stood  on  its  own 
merits,  and  independent  of  constitutional 
objections.  The  debates,  also,  which  oc- 
curred in  this  convention  had  a  tendency 
to  open  the  eyes  of  the  inhabitants  to  their 
own  interests,  and  to  allay  some  of  the 
long-cherished  prejudices  against  a  city 
organization."  In  1821  the  people  voted 
to  make  the  change,  and  measures  were 
immediately  taken  to  obtain  the  sanction 
of  the  legislature.  The  legislature,  on 
the  23d  day  of  February,  1822,  passed 
"  An  Act  establishing  the  City  of  Boston" 
commonly  called  "  the  city  charter."  Tlie 
following  is  a  brief  outline  of  the  prin- 
cipal  features  of  this  charter,  taken  from 
Quincy's  Municipal  History  of  Boston, 
p.  41;  (1)  The  title  of  the  corporation  to 
be,  "The  City  of  Boston."  (2)  The  control 
of  all  its  concerns  is  vested  in  a  mayor,  a 


board  of  aldermen,  consisting  of  eight, 
and  common  council,  of  forty-eight  inhabi- 
tants, to  be  called,  when  conjoined  "The 
City  Council."  (3)  The  city  to  be  divided 
into  twelve  wards.  The  mayor  and  alder- 
men and  common  council  to  be  chosen  an- 
nually, by  ballot,  by  and  from  inhabitants; 
four  of  the  common  council  from  and  by 
those  of  each  of  the  wards.  (4)  The  city 
clerk  to  be  chosen  by  the  city  council. 
(5)  The  mayor  to  receive  a  salary.  His 
duty,  to  be  vigilant  and  active  in  causing 
the  laws  to  be  executed  ;  to  inspect  the 
conduct  of  all  subordinate  officers  ;  to 
cause  carelessness,  negligence,  and  posi- 
tive violation  of  the  laws  to  be  prosecuted 
and  punished  ;  to  summon  meetings  of 
either  or  both  boards ;  to  communicate 
and  recommend  measures  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  finances,  the  police,  health, 
security,  cleanliness,  comfort,  and  orna- 
ment of  the  city.  (6)  The  mayor  and 
aldermen  are  vested  with  the  administra- 
tion of  the  police  and  executive  power  of 
the  corporation  generally,  and  with  spe- 
cific enumerated  powers.  (7)  All  other 
powers  belonging  to  the  corporation  are 
vested  in  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  com- 
mon council,  to  be  exercised  by  concurrent 
vote.  Post,  sec.  187,  note.  Boston  has 
an  amended  or  reformed  charter  dating 
from  1854,  but  the  changes  are  not  struc- 
tural. They  give  the  mayor  increased 
power.  The  City  Council  still  consists  of 
two  branches.  Certain  executive  officers 
are  elected  by  the  people,  and  others  are 
appointed  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen. 
See  Bugbee,  "City  Government  of  P»is- 
ton,"  in  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies, 
1887,  fifth  series. 

1  Ante,  chap.  i. ;  post,  chap.  iii. 

2  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.   2S4, 


MUNICIPAL   C0RPQBATI0N8.  §  30 

Hi  \  :  It  is  to  be  observed  that  municipal  corporations  in  Eng- 
land are  broadly  distinguished  in  many  important  respects  from 
towns  in  this  and  the  other  New  England  £  There  is  qo  uni- 

formity in  the  powers  and  duties  of  English  municipal  corporations. 
They  were  uot  created  and  established  under  any  general  public 
law,  but  the  powers  and  duties  of  each  municipality  depended  upon 
its  own  individual  -rant  or  presi  ription.  Their  corporate  franchises 
were  held  of  the  crown  by  the  tenure  of  performing  the  conditions 
upon  which  they  had  hern  granted,  and  were  liable  to  forfeiture 
for  breach  of  the  conditions.  They  indeed  answered  certain  public 
purposes,  as  private  corporations  do  which  have  public  duties  to  per- 
form, and  some  of  them  exercised  political  rights.  But  they  are  not 
like  towns  (with  us)  general  political  and  territorial  divisions  of  the 
country,  with  uniform  powers  and  duties,  defined  and  varied,  from 
time  to  time,  by  general  legislation.  Towns  (in  New  England)  do 
not  hold  their  powers  ordinarily  under  any  grant  from  the  govern- 
ment to  the  individual  corporation  ;  or  by  virtue  of  any  contract 
with  the  government,  or  upon  any  condition,  express  ot  implied. 
They  give  qo  assent  in  their  corporate  capacity  to  the  laws  which 
impose  their  public  duties  or  fix  their  territorial  limits."  And  re- 
fi  rring  to  the  case  then  before  the  court,  he  added  :  "  In  all  that  is 
material  to  the  present  inquiry,  municipal  corporations  in  England 
hear  much  less  resemblance  to  towns  in  this  country  than  to  pri- 
vate corporations  which  are  charged  with  the  performance  of  public 
duties;  and  for  these  reasons  the  English  authorities  on  the  suhject 
are  but  remotely  applicable  to  the  present  case."  l 

§  30  (12  a).  Legal  powers  of  New  England  towns. —  The  distinc- 
tive character  of  the  New  Engla  nil  towns,  and  particularly  the  limited 
nature  of  their  powers,  will  lie  further  seen  by  ;t  brief  -lance  at  the 
course  of  judicial  decisions  with  respect  to  their  authority  to  make 
contracts  and  to  obtain  revenue.  Money  can  only  he  raised  by 
them  for  the  purposes  expressed  in  the  statute,  and  fur  expenses 
incident  to  such  purposes  The  power  of  the  majority  is  wisely 
limited  by  law  to  the  object  and  cases  which  are  clearly  provided 
for  and  defined  by  statute.2 

290(1858).     And  see  also  Hill'-.  Boston,  B.  Adams  has  an  essay  on  the  "  Germanic 
,.,.  37,  i-:;.  in  of  New  England  Towns,"  in  Johns 

1  Mr.  Bryce,   in  hi-  "  American  Com-  Hopkins  University  Studies,  last  scries. 
mon  wealth,"  has  two  interesting  chapters         'Stetson    v.    Kempton,    13   Mass.  272 

on  tin-  subject  of  rural  local  government  (1816);    Pai  on      .  Gi    ben,  11    Pick.  396 

in  the  United  States.     He  traces  the  origin  (1831).     "This  limitation,"  says  Mr.  Jus- 

and  influence  "f  the  New  England  town  tin-  Wilde,  with  great  truth,  in  the 

(.haps,   xlviii.  andxlix.).     Prof.  Herbert  last  cited,  "  upon  the  power  and  authority 


§  30 


LEGAL   POWERS   OF   NEW   ENGLAND    TOWNS. 


53 


Thus  a  town,  under  a  statute  which  restricts  it  to  raising  money 
to  provide  for  "  the  poor,  for  schools,  for  the  support  of  public  wor- 


of  towns  to  enter  into  contracts  and  stip- 
ulations, is  a  wise  and  salutary  provision 
of  law,  not  only  as  it  protects  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  minority  of  the  legal 
voters,  but  as  it  may  not  unfrequently 
prove  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  the 
majority,  who  may  be  hurried  into  rash 
and  unj>rofi  table  speculations  by  some 
popular  or  delusive  excitement,  to  the  in- 
fluence of  which  even  wise  and  consider- 
ate men  are  sometimes  liable.  A  town  in 
its  corporate  capacity  will  not  be  bound, 
even  by  the  express  vote  of  the  majority, 
to  the  performance  of  contracts  or  other 
legal  duties,  not  coming  within  the  scope 
of  the  objects  and  purposes  for  which  they 
are  incorporated."  The  power  of  towns 
to  raise  money  is  discussed  at  large  by 
Endicott,  J.,  in  Minot  v.  West  Roxhury, 
112  Mass.  1  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  17  Am.  Rep.  52  ; 
cited  post,  ch.  xxii.  Anthony  v.  Adams, 
1  Met.  (Mass.)  284,  286  (1840),  per  Shaw, 
C.  J.  ;  quoted  and  followed  in  Vincent  v. 
Nantucket,  12  Cush.  105  (1853).  See  also 
Norton  v.  Mansfield,  16  Mass.  48  ;  Dill  v. 
Wareham,  7  Met.  (Mass.  1844)  438  (con- 
tract by  the  town,  undertaking  to  transfer 
the  right  of  taking  oysters  within  its 
limits). 

Whether  towns  in  Massachusetts  are 
authorized  by  statute  to  make  any  con- 
tracts wdiich  involve  the  payment  of 
money,  unless  the  contracts  are  such  that 
a  tax  on  the  inhabitants  may  be  laid  to 
raise  the  money,  does  not  seem  to  be  set- 
tled by  express  adjudication.  Bancroft 
v.  Lviinfield,  18  Pick.  566  (1836),  per 
Shaw,  C.  J.;  Tash  v.  Adams,  10  Cush. 
252(1852). 

' '  The  inhabitants  of  every  town  in  this 
state"  — Maine  —  says  Shcplcy,  C.  J.,  in 
Hooper  v.  Emery,  14  Maine  (2  Shep. ),  375 
(1S37),  "  are  declared  to  be  a  body  politic 
and  corporate  by  the  statute  ;  but  these 
corporations  derive  none  of  their  powers 
from,  nor  are  any  duties  imposed  upon 
them  by  the  common  law.  They  have 
been  denominated  quasi  corporations,  and 
their  whole  capacities,  powers,  and  duties 
are  derived  from  legislative  enactments." 
See  also  Pittson  v.  Clark.  15  Maine,  460, 
463;  Augusta  v.  Leadbetter,  16  Maine,  45 


(1839)  ;  Estes  v.  School  Dist.,  33  Maine, 
170  (1871)  ;  Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  45 
Maine,  496,  504  (185S)  ;  Salem  Mill  Dam 
v.  Ropes,  6  Pick.  23,  32  ;  School  Dist., 
&c.  v.  Wood,  13  Mass.  193  (1816),  per 
Parker,  C.  J.  ;  Mower  v.  Leicester,  9  Mass. 
247,  250  (1812).  The  legislature  may  au- 
thorize and  require  a  town  in  Massachu- 
setts to  raise  and  expend  money  for  public 
use  within  its  limits,  or  for  reimbursing 
money  paid  for  such  public  use.  Agawam 
v.  Hampden,  130  Mass.  528,  and  cases 
cited.  Non-residents  of  municipalities. 
Post,  sec.   195. 

Where  the  legislature  has  prescribed 
the  purposes  for  which  money  may  be 
raised  by  taxation,  it  cannot  be  raised  for 
other  and  distinct  purposes  ;  nor  when  it 
is  raised  and  collected  for  authorized  and 
proper  purposes  can  it  be  appropriated  to 
or  expended  upon  other  and  different  ob- 
jects. This  would  be  to  break  down  and 
defeat  the  limitation.  Hence  towns  can- 
not give  away  or  distribute,  per  capita  or 
otherwise,  money  collected  by  taxation. 
Hooper  v.  Emery,  14  Maine  (2  Shep.), 
375,  explaining  Ford  v.  Clough,  8  Greenl. 
(Maine)  334;  Davis  v.  Bath,  17  Maine, 
141  (1840)  ;  Pease  v.  Cornish,  19  Maine, 
(1  Appl.),  191  (1841)  ;  Stetson  v.  Kemp- 
ton,  13  Mass.  272  ;    Dillingham  v.  Snow, 

5  Mass.  547  ;  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23 
Pick.  71  (1830)  ;  Woodbury*,-.  Hamilton, 

6  Pick.  101  ;  Cooley  v.  Granville,  10 
Cush.   56. 

The  Vermont  statute  respecting  the 
powers  of  towns  is  nearly  a  transcript  of 
that  of  Massachusetts.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Vermont  approves  of  the  expo- 
sition of  the  statute  given  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts  in  Willard  v. 
Newbury  port,  12  Pick.  230 ;  Allen  v. 
Taunton,  19  Pick.  485  ;  Tony  v.  Milbury, 
21  Pick.  64  ;  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick. 
71  ;  Hardy  v.  Waltham,  3  Met.  163,  per 
Isham,  J.,  in  Van  Sicklen  v.  Burlington, 
27  Vt.  (1  Wins.)  70.  For  discussion  of 
powers  and  duties  of  selectmen,  and  digest 
of  previous  decisions  in  New  Hampshire, 
see  Carleton  v.  Bath,  2  Fost.  (22  N.  H.) 
559.  Have  no  general  authority  to  bind 
the  town  by  contract.     Andover  v.  Graf- 


54 


MUNICIPAL    cnKI'oKATIONS. 


.  and  other  necessary  charges,1  cannot  raise  money,  even  in  the 
time  of  war,  and  when  the  town  is  in  immediate  danger  from  the 
enemy,  tor  the  payment  of  additional  wages  to  the  drafted  and  en- 

d  militia,  and  for  other  purposes  of  defence.  This  is  not  a  cor- 
luty,  but  the  duty  of  the  general  government.1  Nor  can  it 
appropriate  money,  contract  for,  oi  levy  a  tax  to  aid  in  the  construc- 
tion of  a  road,  which,  by  law,  is  to  be  made  at  the  i  xpense  of  the 

',/.  and  qoI   the  town.2     A  town  may,  it  is  said,  raise  money  to 

I  ordinary  expenditures,  such  as  the  payment  of  officers,  the 
support  and  defence  of  actions,  the  expenses  incident  to  discharging 
duties  imposed  by  law,  looking  to  the  safety  and  convenience  of  the 
citizens.  Thus  ii  can  erect  a  town  or  city  hall,  or  market-house,  but 
not  a  theatre,  a  circus,  or  any  place  of  mere  amusement,  nor  even  a 
statue  or  monument,  unless  in  populous  and  wealthy  towns  as 
suitable  ornaments  to  public  buildings  or  squares.3  So  towns  may 
provide  for  the  support  of  a  public  clock,  hay -scales,  burying-ground, 
wells,  reservoirs,  and  many  other  like  objects,  which  relate  to  the 

immodation  and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants,  and  which  have 
been  placed  under  the  municipal  jurisdiction  of  towns  by  statute  or 
by  usage.4 


ton,  7  N.  H.   300.     But  are  confined  to 
Biich  acts  as  are  necessary  to  the  discharge 
of  their  duties.     Sanborn  v.  Deerfield,  2 
X.  II.  253.     Cannot,  ex-officio,  adjusl  con- 
troversies of  suits,  or  release  a  cause  of 
action.      Carleton    v.  Bath,  2   Fost.   (22 
N.    II.    559.     May  indemnify    town   offi- 
cers in  proper  cases.     Pike  v.  Middleton, 
12  N.  II.  278.     Post,  sec.  147.    But  there 
is  no   promise   implied  in   law  against  a 
town  to  indemnify  selectmen  in  any  case 
for  damages  which  they  have  been  com- 
pelled  to  pay,  arising  out  of  the  discharge 
of  official  duty.     Eaves  v.   Shattuck,  3f> 
N.  II.  189.     Are  supposed  to  be  liable  to 
poration  for  gross  negled  of  official 
duty.     Sanborn  v.  Deerfield,  2  N.  H.  253, 
!  .    W  wdbury,  J.     Notes  made  by  a  treas- 
a  New  England  town  to  a  bank, 
in  payment  for  money  borrowed  without 
nowledge  of  the  town,  are  no1  bind- 
ing upon  the  town,  unless  authorized  by 
of  the   town   at  a  meeting  duly 
warned  for  thai  purpose,  or  ratified  by  the 
•   such  a  meeting  duly  warned  for 
of  Buch  ratification.     Bl  - 
field  p.  I  la*   Bank,  121  U.  S.  121 

268-268. 
1  Stetson  v.    Kempton,    13   Mass.   272 


(1816),  where  the  phrase,  necessary  town 
ies,  is  construed  by  Parker,  C.  J.; 
and  see  comment  of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  12  Pick. 
227,  230  ;  S.  c.  23  Pick.  74  ;  and  of  Dewey, 
J., in  Allen  v.  Taunton,  19  Pick.  485,  487; 
18  Pick.  566  ;  10  Cush.  57  ;  of  Clifford, 
J.,  in  Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford,  C.  C. 
590  (1867). 

2  Parsons  v.  Goshen,  11  Pick.  896 
(1831)  ;     Anthony    v.    Adams,    1     Met. 

.)  284   (1840). 

3  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272 
(1816),  /-  r  Parh  r,  C.  J.  ;  All.  n  v.  Taun- 
ton, 19  Tick.  485,  487,  opinion  by  Dewey, 
J.,  .1-  to  power  of  towns  in  Massachusetts  ; 
Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71  ;  opin- 
ion of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  on  Bame  subject. 

4  Willard  v.  Newburyport,  12  Pick. 
227,    230    (1831).       General    municipal 

beld  to  include  power  to  erect  a 
town-halL  Greeley  v.  People,  60  111.  19 
(1871)  ;  Bell  v.  Platteville,  71  Wis.  139. 
But  does  not  include  power  to  defray  ex- 
I  n  es  of  a  committee  to  petition  the  le- 
gislature to  destroy  the  existence  of  the 
town  by  annexing  it  to  another  town. 
Minol  v.  West  Roxbury,  112  Mass.  1 
(1873)  ;  B.  c.  17  Am.  Rep.  52;  Coolidge 
v.  Brookline,  114  Mass.  592  (1874).    Lia- 


§  31  THE    STATE   AND    ITS   CORPORATIONS    DISTINGUISHED.  55 

§  31  (14).  Each  one  of  the  United  States,  in  its  organized  politi- 
cal capacity,  although  it  is  not  in  the  proper  use  of  the  term  a  corpo- 
ration, yet  it  has  many  of  the  essential  i'aculties  of  a  corporation, 
a  distinct  name,  indefinite  succession,  private  rights,  power  to  sue, 
and  the  like.  Corporations,  however,  as  the  term  is  used  in  our 
jurisprudence,  do  not  include  States,  but  only  derivative  creations, 
owing  their  existence  and  powers  to  the  State  acting  through  its 
legislative  department.  Like  corporations,  however,  a  State,  as  it 
can  make  contracts  and  suffer  wrongs,  so  it  may,  for  this  reason 
and  without  express  provision,  maintain  in  its  corporate  name 
actions  to  enforce  its  rights  and  redress  its  injuries.1  But  a  State 
is  not  liable  to  be  sued  without  its  consent ; 2  although  it  is  not 
unusual  for  States,  by  special  provision,  to  authorize  suits  to  be 
brought  against  them,  but,  as  the  permission  is  voluntary,  they  may 
prescribe  the  terms,  and,  unless  it  impairs  the  obligation  of  existing 
contracts,  may  withdraw  the  consent  at  pleasure.3  The  like  dis- 
tinction between  the  State  and  its  corporate  creations  existed  in  the 
Roman  law.  The  State  like  the  corporation  was  a  Juristical  Per- 
son, but  unlike  corporations  it  was  not  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
any  judge.  Corporations  were  the  subject  of  Private-law  relations, 
but  not  so  the  State  or  Fiscus.  The  jural  relations  of  the  State  and 
of  corporations  are,  in  many  respects,  essentially  dissimilar.4  A  de- 
vise to  a  State  for  any  object  which  it  may  properly  aid  or  provide 
for  is  valid.6  Extended  consideration  of  the  powers  of  the  States, 
and  of  their  relation  to  the  United  States  and  to  each  other,  is  not 
within  the  scope  of  the  present  work,  which  is  limited  strictly  to 
municipal  corporations. 

bility  of  toivns  in  actions  of  tort.     See  post,  2  Briscoe  v.  Bank,  11  Pet.  257,  321. 

chap,  xxiii.    Private  property  of  the  inhab-  3  Beers    v.    Arkansas,    20    How.     527 

itants  may  be  taken  to  satisfy  a  judgment  (1857);    Dodil   v.    Miller,    14    Ind.    433; 

against  the  town.     Post,   sec.    962,    note  Auditor  v.   Davies,   2   Pike   (Ark.),  494; 

and  cases,  chap.  xxii.  Ellis  v.  State,  4  Ind.  1  ;  State  v.  Trustees, 

i  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  5   Ind.    77.     The  Supreme   Court  of  the 

159,  162  ;  26  Wend.  192  (1841),  affirming  United  States  has  original  jurisdiction  in 

s.  c.  8  Paige,  531  ;    Indiana  v.  Woram,  6  cases  in  which  a  State  shall  he  a  party,  as 

Hill   (N.    Y.),    33    (1843).      These   cases  also  in  suit  between  States.     Kentucky  v. 

hold  that  States  may  sue  as  plaintiff  in  the  Dennison,    24    How.    66  ;    Wisconsin    v. 

State  courts.     State  v.  Delesdenier,  7  Tex.  Duluth,    2    Dillon,    C.    C,    406    (1872). 

76  ;    People  v.  Assessors,  1  Hill  (N.  Y. ),  The  United  States  Circuit  Court  has  not. 

620.     The  governor  of  a  State,  as  the  head  lb. 

of  the  executive  department,  is  a  corpora-  4  Savigny,  Jural  Relations  (Rattigan's 

tion  sole,  and  bonds  made  payable  to  him  Translation,  sees.  86,  87).     Ante,  sec.  3. 

may  be  enforced  for  the  benefit  of  those  Post,  sec.  45,  note. 

interested.     Governor  v.  Allen,  8  Humph.  6  McDonough  Will  Case,  15  How.  367, 

(Tenn.)  176  (1847)  ;    Polk,  Governor,  v.  382  (1853)  ;  post,  sec.  569. 
Plummer,  2  Humph.  500. 


56  MUNICIPAL  C0BP0RATI0N8.  §32 


CHAPTEK   III. 

.TION,     AND     SEVERAL     KINDS     OF     MUNICIPAL     CORPORATIONS     IN 
ENGLAND    AND    IN   THE    DNITED   STATES. 

///  England.  —  Diffi  r<  run  h  !  Regal  and  Parliamentary  Corpora- 

tions. —  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835. 

§  32    (15).     Creation    and    kinds   in   England;    Charter    defined. — 

In  England,  corporations  can  be  created  only  in  one  of  two  ways: 
1,  by  the  king's  charter  :  2,  by  act  of  parliament.  They  exist  there, 
however,—  1,  by  the  common  law;  2,  by  prescription  ;  3,  by  royal 
charter;  4,  by  authority  of  parliament.     Corporations  at   common 

law  are  those  which  derive  their  existence  and  powers  from  imme- 
morial usage,  although  they  may  have  had  their  origin  in  an  act 
of  parliament  or  royal  grant,  no  longer  discoverable.  Those  by 
prescription  presuppose  a  grant  by  charter  or  act  of  parliament, 
which  has  been  lost.  Into  corporations  created  by  regal  or  legisla- 
tive u'rant  may  be  resolved  what  have  been  styled  corporations  by 
implication,  which  is,  where  a  body,  lawfully  constituted,  cannot 
(any  into  effect  its  purposes  without  attributing  to  it  a  corporate 
character.  The  franchise  of  being  a  corporation,  and  the  right  to 
exercise  corporate  powers  and  to  enjoy  corporate  privileges,  can  be 
claimed  in  no  other  way  than  as  above  stated.  A  legal  sanction 
to  the  corporate  character  is,  therefore,  absolutely  necessary,  and  is 
always  implied.1 

The  distinction  between  corporations  deriving  their  existence 
from  the  king's  charter  and  those  which  derive  their  existence 
from  parliament  is  important,  A  royal  charter  is  a  written  instru- 
ment, in  tin-  form  of  letters-patent,  under  the  great  seal,  addressed 
to  all  the  subjects  of  the  realm,  containing  a  grant  by  the  crown  to 
persons  named,  of  the  franchises,  powers,  and  privileges  therein 
mentioned.  A  charter  of  incorporation,  therefore,  is  the  written  in- 
strument by  which  the  king  creates  the  corporate  body,  names  it, 
defines  its  objects,  and  confers  its  powers.  Unless  restricted  in  the 
charter,  all  of  the  common-law  incidents  of  a  corporation  attach  to 

1  Willc.  21  ;  Glover,  23  ;  Grant,  6,  7  ;  Louis   v.   Allen,  13  Mo.  400;  St.  Louis  v. 

1   Kyd,  39  ;  Angel]  ><c  Am.  Bee.  <>'.>  ;  Bro.  Russell,  9  Mo.  503.     Post,  sees.  42,  84, 

Corp.  ''.:.  :  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  '■'•<>  X.  II.  note. 
290  (1858),  per  Per  ey,  C.  .1.  ;   St. 


§  34        ASSENT    AND    ACCEPTANCE    OF   GRANTEE  :    REVOCATION.  57 

it,  but  no  corporation  can  pursue  objects  not  warranted  by  its  char- 
ter. The  charter  is  the  organic  act  which  gives  to  the  corporation 
both  its  existence  and  its  peculiar  character.1 

§  33.  Royal  and  Parliamentary  Charters.  —  The  king's  charter 
may  confer  upon  the  corporation  it  institutes  all  the  usual  and 
ordinary  powers  of  a  corporate  body,  but  it  cannot  invest  such  a 
body  with  extraordinary  powers,  such  as  proceeding  in  a  manner 
different  from  the  common  law,  or  punishing  by  forfeiture  or  im- 
prisonment, or  conferring  an  exclusive  right  of  trading.  When  the 
king  grants  clauses  which  are  illegal  they  are  void ;  and  if  illegal 
and  not  confirmed  by  parliament,  no  length  of  time  or  of  usage 
will  make  such  clauses  valid.  But  'parliament,  in  the  fulness  of 
its  power,  may  grant  to  corporations  which  it  erects  such  powers, 
ordinary  and  extraordinary,  as  it  deems  proper ;  and  it  may,  as  it 
has  often  done,  confirm  clauses  in  royal  charters  which  were  void, 
because  beyond  the  king's  power  to  grant. 

§  34.  Assent  and  Acceptance  of  Grantee  ;  Revocation.  —  The 
king  cannot  incorporate  a  body  of  men  without  their  assent.  Until 
his  charter  has  been  accepted,  it  is  therefore  inoperative.2  When 
once  accepted,  the  acceptance  is  irrevocable.  The  acceptance  must 
be  by  the  grantees  ;  and  it  is  held  that  a  valid  acceptance  may 
be  made  by  a  majority  of  the  grantees.  The  charter  must  be 
accepted  in  toto,  or  not  at  all,  for  there  can  be  no  partial 
acceptance  without  the  assent  of  the  crown,  which  must  be  shown 
by  matter  of  record.  If  the  corporation  be  a  new  one,  acceptance 
of  part  of  the  charter  is  taken  as  acceptance  of  all.  Acceptance 
may  be  shown  by  user,  —  by  acting  under  it,  as  well  as  by  the 
formal  action  of  the  corporate  body.  After  acceptance  the  crown 
cannot  resume  the  grant,  or  dissolve  or  destroy  the  corporation,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  grantees  or  their  successors.  The  crown,  at 
common  law,  can  create  a  corporation  for  municipal  government  in 
any  place  where  there  is  not  at  the  time  an  existing  corporation 

1  Outline  of  municipal  charter  of  the  offices.  Per  Campbell,  J.,  in  People  v. 
Middle  Ages.  Ante,  sec.  6.  Charters  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451  (1874)  ;  s.  c.  18 
denned.     Post,  sec.  82.  Am.  Rep.  107.     Towns  and  cities,  that  is, 

2  Acceptance  of  charter.  Post,  sees.  44,  compact  bodies  of  people,  have  a  natural 
54,  65  ;  chap.  xxi.  As  acceptance  was  existence,  and  what  may  be  called  a  nat- 
necessary  to  make  the  king's  charter  ural  quasi  corporate  character.  It  was  so 
operative,  the  municipal  charters  which  he  in  Rome.  Ante,  sec.  3.  And  so  in  Eng- 
gave  were  all  given  to  existing  communi-  land.  "  Each  town  was  regarded  as  a 
ties  having  a  recognized  and  organized  corporate  community,"  prior  to  any  actual 
existence,  and  in  the  habit  of  acting  as  grant  of  a  charter.  Heam,  Government 
one  body,  through  elections  or  agencies  or  of  England,  475,  501.     Post,  sees.  58, 183. 


58  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  35 

of  the  same  kind,  bul  there  cannol  be  concurrently  two  corpora- 
tions for  the  same  place,  having  the  same  or  similar  powers  or  juris- 
diction. But  the  limitations  upon  the  power  of  the  crown  do  not 
apply  with  respect  to  municipal  corporations  created  by  parliament. 
power  is,  legally  speaking,  illimitable.  It  may  create  or 
abolish  and  change  al  its  pleasure,  with  or  without  the  assent  of  the 
people  or  corporation  to  be  thereby  affected.  It  may  change  royal 
charters;  but  parliamentary  corporations  cannol  be  affected,  without 
the  consenl  of  parliament,  by  charters  granted  by  the  crown.  Except 
to  the  extent  iif  powers  which  may  be  conferred,  a  parliamentary 
corporation  is,  at  common  law,  similar  to  that  which  is  created  by 
the  crown.1 

§  35  (16).     Constitution    of   an   old   English  Municipality.  —  Trior 

to  1835  many  of  the  towns,  boroughs,  and  cities  of  England  were  incor- 
porated in  one  of  the  ways  mentioned;  that  is  to  say,  there  were 
in  them  bodies  corp< irate,  established  for  the  local  government 
thereof.  There  was  no  uniformity  in  the  constitution  or  powers 
of  these  corporate  bodies.  The  corporation  proper  was  not  the 
town  or  place,  but  a  corporate  body  constituted  'within  it,  with  powers 
or  jurisdiction,  more  or  less  extensive,  to  govern  the  inhabitants. 
These  bodies  were  established  at  different  times,  and  from  different 
motives.  The  first  distinct  recognition  of  a  municipal  corporation 
was  in  the  18th  of  Henry  VI.  (a  D.  1439),  with  reference  to  King- 
ston-upon-Hull,  which  had  an  express  charter  of  incorporation 
granted  to  it,  for  the  first  time,  in  that  year.  Charters  had  pre- 
viously been  granted  to  it  by  different  sovereigns,  at  various  times, 
giving  it  various  privileges,  but  they  did  not  incorporate  the  place, 
nor  was  it  incorporated  until  the  charter  of  18th  Henry  VI., 
which  is  the  first  that  uses  terms  of  incorporation.2  Subsequently 
such  corporations  were  erected  from  time  to  time,  each  with  its 
peculiar  constitution,  depending  on  the  provisions  of  the  charter  or 
prescriptive  usage.  The  constitution  of  the  corporations  was  so  va- 
rious, and  is  so  different  from  the  American  model,  that  it  requires 
r;IM.  to  gel  an  accurate  idea  of  it.  For  illustration,  we  will  take; 
a  simple  form,  viz.:  where  by  charter  or  by  prescription  the  cor- 
poration consists  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  commonalty  of  a 
town.  Here  there  are  three  ranks,  classes,  or  parts :  1,  the  mayor, 
or  head  officer ;    2,  the  aldermen,  the  number  of  whom  is  definite, 

i  Authorities   lasl    cited.      Respecting  see  Rntter  v.  Chapman,  s  M.   &  W.  1  ; 

the  authority  of  the  crown  to  granl  char-  Reg.  v.  Boucher,  3  Q.  B.  654  ;  s.  c.  2  G. 

ters  to  incorporate  towns,  Bince  the  Gen-  .v  D.  1Z1. 

eral  Municipal   Corporations  Ad  of  1835,  2  Glover  on  Mimic.  Corp.  16. 


§  36  ENGLISH    MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS    ACT,    1835.  59 

being  fixed  by  the  charter,  or  by  prescriptive  usage ;  3,  the  com- 
monalty, that  is,  the  common  freemen,  whose  number  is  indefinite, 
and  whose  rights  in  the  course  of  time  were  largely  usurped  or 
destroyed.1  These  three  classes  were  denominated  the  integral 
parts  of  the  corporation,  and  no  corporation  was  complete  (except 
it  be  otherwise  provided  by  the  charter)  unless  the  mayor,  or  head 
officer,  a  majority  of  the  definite  class  (that  is,  a  majority  of  the 
aldermen),  and  some  members  of  the  indefinite  class,  or  commonalty, 
be  in  existence.  Hence,  during  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor,  no 
valid  corporate  act  can  be  done  except  to  elect  another,  since  with- 
out a  mayor  the  corporate  body  is  incomplete.  Hence,  also,  at 
every  corporate  meeting  it  was  essential,  at  common  law,  that  there 
should  be  present  the  mayor,  or  head  officer,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
preside,  also  a  majority  of  each  definite  integral  class,  and  some 
members  of  each  indefinite  class,  if  there  be  more  than  one  such 
class. 

§  36.  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act  of  1835,  and  Re- 
vised Act  of  1882.  —  In  the  course  of  time,  as  we  have  already 
pointed  out,  great  abuses  had  crept  into  these  bodies,  which  parlia- 
ment had  frequently  been  obliged  to  redress.2  Complaints  of  griev- 
ances were  universal,  and  misrule,  confusion,  and  internal  disputes 
were  so  general  that  the  municipal  system  of  government  fell  into 
great  and  deserved  disrepute.  As  a  measure  of  reform,  the  Muni- 
cipal Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Win.  IV.  ch.  lxxvi.,  was  devised 
and  enacted.3     "  I  cordially  concur,"  said  the  king,  "  in  this    im- 

1  Ante,  sec.  8.  municipal  functions.      The  population  of 

2  Introductory  chapter,  ante,  sec.  8.  these  corporate  places  exceeded  two  mil- 
Luehrman!7.  Taxing  Dist.,  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  lions  of  people.  Some  of  these  corpora- 
425.  tions   claimed   to   act   under   prescriptive 

3  The  reformed  House  of  Commons  custom,  but  most  of  them  under  several 
presented  an  address  to  William  IV.,  re-  charters,  forming  a  continued  series  from 
questing  the  appointment  of  a  commission  a  very  early  date,  but  generally  under 
to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  municipal  charters  granted  from  the  reign  of  Ed- 
corporations  in  England  and  Wales.  The  ward  I.  down  to  the  reign  of  George  IV. 
commission  which  was  appointed  made  a  inclusive.  The  number  of  corporators 
thorough  examination  of  the  condition  of  stated  to  be  definite,  in  fifty  boroughs, 
the  various  boroughs,  and  their  report  dis-  varied  in  most  cases  from  under  ten  to 
closed  abuses  and  defects  which  it  seems  thirty,  and  those  indefinite,  in  one  hun- 
marvellous  that  any  spirited  people  so  long  dred  and  sixty-two  boroughs,  varied  from 
endured.     See  chap,  i.,  ante,  sec.  8.  twelve  to  five  thousand,  but  usually  aver- 

Official    Report   as    to  the  abuses  aged  from  fifty  to  two  hundred  corpora- 

AND  defects  found  to  exist  in  the  muni-  tors.     The  titles  to  freedom,  or  citizenship, 

cipal  corporations  of  England  and  Wales,  generally  comprehended  those  arising  from 

—  The  commission  ascertained  the  exist-  birth,  servitude,  marriage,  purchase,  gift, 

ence  of  two  hundred  and  forty-six  corpo-  or   election.      The   governing   bodies  were 

rations  in  England  and  Wales,  exercising  formed  by  the  close  and  corrupt  system 


60 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


36 


portanl  measure,  which  is  calculated  to  allay  discontent,  to  promote 
peace  and   union,  and  to  procure  for  those  communities  the  ad- 


■■'■><i  in  a  great  majority  of  the 
municipalities.  The  corporate  officers, 
such  as  the  mayor,  or  other  head  of  the 
corporation,  the  recorder  -  frequently  un- 
professional —  and  the  town-clerk,  were 
appointed    by    the   self-el  scted   governing 

body  from  its  own  immaculate  c slave. 

ol  the  municipalities  possessed  ex- 
clusive criminal  jurisdiction,  extending  to 
the  trial  of  felonies  and  all  other  offences, 
whereas  many  appear  never  to  have  had 
any  criminal  jurisdiction.      Several   bor- 
had  civil  jurisdiction  extending  to 
the  decision  of  all  actions,  —  some  extend- 
ing tu  the  decision  of  personal  and  mixed 
actions  ;  others  to  the  decision  of  personal 
actions;    while  in  a  considerable  number 
no  civil  jurisdiction  appeared  ever  to  have 
ted.     The  property  in  some  few  bor- 
oughs was  trivial,  but  the  revenue  gener- 
ally  averaged    from   £500   to   £1,000   in 
each,  while  in  some  the  property  exceeded 
£50,000  per  annum.     In  a  few  towns  cor- 
porate  I  he  accounts  were  printed  for  dis- 
tribution  and   audited    public!;  ;    but   in 
mosl  cases  the  accounts  were  neither  duly 
kept,  nor  audited,  nor  published,  besides 
being  inaccurate  and  in  a  generally  unsat- 
isfai  toi  v   state.     The   annual    income  of 
these  municipal  corporations  amounted  to 
abonl    £366,000,  ami  the  expenditure  to 
£377,000,  while  the  debt  in  one  hundred 
ami  thirty-three  exceeded  the  sum  of  two 
millions  sterling.     Throughout  the  course 
of  the  investigation  (if  the  commissioners 
there    were    perceptible    the    same    com- 
plaints,     of  magistrates   ill-qualified  by 
education  and  habits  for  their  situations, 
generally  partial,  ami  sometimes  corrupt  ; 
of  courts,  which  mighl  be  made  the  instru- 
ments of  much   local  advantage,   falling 
into  disuse  through  defects  of  their  origi- 
nal constitution  ami   their  recent  malad- 
ministration ;  of  juries  improperly  selected 
by  reason  of  notorious  party  bias  ;   of  rev- 
enue misapplied.;  of  debl  contracted  and 
of  property  alienated;   of  the  absence  of 
all  accounts  ami  the  denial  of  all   BCCOUn- 
lity   by  certain   corporations;    of  the 
insufficiency  of  the  police,  the  neglecl  of 
paving  and  lighting,  and  the  want  of  those 
municipal  accommodations  lor  which  the 


public  property  committed  in  trust  to  the 

Corporation   would,    if  duly    administered, 
I"-    amply  sullicicnt    to   provide.       Having 
given  a  general  view  of  the  ordinary  con- 
stitution of  the  various  municipalities,  the 
commissioners  nexl   proceeded  to  specify 
some  of  their  defects.     'The  most  common 
and  most  striking  defect  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  municipal  corporations   was, 
that   the  corjxtrntf  bodies  existed  indepen- 
dently of  the  communities  among  which 
tin  it  ioere  found.     The  corporators  looked 
upon  themselves,  and  were  considered  l>y 
the  inhabitants,  as  separate  and  exclusive 
bodies;    they   had    powers   and    privileges 
within  the  towns  and   cities  from  which 
they  were  named,  hut  in  most  places  all 
identiti/  of  interest  hetwecn  the  corporation 
ami  the  inhabitants  disappeared.      That 
was  the  case  even  where  the  corporation 
included  a  large  body  of  inhabitant  free- 
men.    It  appeared  in  a  more  striking  de- 
gree as  the  powers  of  the  corporation  had 
been  restricted  to  smaller  numbers  of  the 
resident  population,  and  still  more  glar- 
ingly when  the  local  privileges  had  been 
conferred  on  non-resident  freemen,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  inhabitants  to  whom  they 
rightfully  ought  to  belong.     The  privilege 
of  electing  members  of  parliament  being 
that  which,  before  the  passing  of  the  Re- 
form Act,  conferred  upon  the  self-elected 
governing  bodies  of  close  corporate  towns 
their  principal    importance,   and   the    re- 
wards   for    political     services     which     the 
patron  was  accustomed  to  distribute  among 
them,  caused   this  function  to  be  consid- 
ered in  many  places  as  the  sole  object  of 
their  institution.     The  power  so  monopo- 
lized, and  employed  in  a  mode  unsuitable 
to  the  altered  circumstances  of  the  times, 
led  to  various  abuses  of  the  system.     The 
custom  of  keeping  the  number  of  corpo- 
rators as  low  as  possible  may  be  referred 
to  the  wish  for  preserving  the  parliamen- 
tary franchise  rather  than    to   the  desire 
of  monopolizing  the  municipal  authority, 
which  had  been  coveted  only  as  a  means 
of  securing   the   other  and   more  highly 
prized  privilege.     A  great  number  of  cor- 
porations were  preserved  solely  as  political 
engines,  and  the  towns  to  which  they  be- 


§3G 


ENGLISH    MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS   ACT,    1835. 


61 


vantages  of  responsible  government."  This  act  organizes  all  of 
the  municipal  corporations  of  England  and  Wales  upon  a  uniform 
model.  It  does  not  altogether  destroy  their  previously  existing  law- 
ful corporate  powers,  but  it  does  sweep  away  all  laws,  statutes, 
charters,  and  usages  inconsistent  with  or  contrary  to  its  provisions. 
It  defines  who  shall  be  burgesses  or  citizens,  making  the  right 
essentially  to  depend  upon  occupancy  of  houses  or  shcis  within  the 

longed  derived  no  benefit,  but  often  much 
injury,  from  their  existence.  To  maintain 
the  political  ascendency  of  a  party,  or  the 
political  influence  of  a  family,  was  the  one 
end  and  object  for  which  the  powers  en- 
trusted to  a  numerous  class  of  these  bodies 
have  been  exercised.  This  object  was  sys- 
tematically pursued  in  the  admission  of 
freemen,  resident  or  non-resident ;  in 
their  election  of  municipal  functionaries 
for  the  council  or  the  magistracy;  in  the 
appointment  of  subordinate  officers  and 
the  local  police  ;  in  the  administration  of 
charities  entrusted  to  the  municipal  au- 
thorities ;  in  the  expenditure  of  the  cor- 
porate revenue,  and  in  the  management  of 
the  corporate  property.  The  most  flagrant 
abuses  arose  from  this  perversion  of  muni- 
cipal privileges  to  political  objects.  Thus 
the  inhabitants  had  to  complain,  not  only 
that  the  election  of  their  magistrates  and 
other  municipal  functionaries  was  made 
by  an  inferior  class  of  themselves,  or  by 
persons  unconnected  with  the  town,  but 
also  of  the  disgraceful  practices  by  which 
the  magisterial  office  was  frequently  ob- 
tained ;  while  those  who,  by  character, 
residence,  and  property,  were  best  quali- 
fied to  direct  and  control  its  municipal 
affairs  were  excluded  from  any  share  in 
the  elections  or  management.  The  exclu- 
sive and  party  spirit  belonging  to  the 
whole  corporate  body  appeared  in  a  still 
more  marked  manner  in  the  councils  by 
which  in  most  cases  it  was  governed. 
These  councils  were  usually  self -elected, 
and  held  their  offices  for  life.  They  were 
commonly  of  one  political  party,  and  their 
proceedings  were  mainly  directed  to  se- 
cure and  perpetuate  the  ascendency  of  the 
party  to  which  they  belonged.  Individu- 
als of  adverse  political  opinions  were,  in 
most  cases,  systematically  excluded  from 
the  governing  body.  These  councils,  which 
embodied  the  opinions  of  a  single  party, 
were    entrusted    with    the   nomination   of 


magistrates,  of  the  civil  and  criminal 
judges,  often  of  the  superintendents  of 
police,  and  were,  or  ought  to  have  been, 
the  leaders  in  every  measure  that  con- 
cerned the  interests  and  prosperity  of  the 
town.  So  far  from  being  the  representa- 
tives either  of  the  population  or  of  the 
property  of  the  town,  they  did  not  repre- 
sent  even  the  privileged  class  of  freemen  ; 
and  being  elected  for  life,  their  proceed- 
ings were  unchecked  by  any  feeling  of 
responsibility.  The  commissioners  re- 
ported that  there  prevailed  amongst  the 
inhabitants  of  a  great  majority  of  the  in- 
corporated towns  a  general  and  a  just  dis- 
satisfaction with  their  municipal  councils, 
whose  powers  were  subject  to  no  proper 
control,  whose  acts  and  whose  proceedings, 
being  secret,  were  unchecked  by  the  influ- 
ence of  public  opinion  ;  a  distrust  of  the 
municipal  magistracy,  tainting  with  sus- 
picion the  local  administration  of  justice, 
and  often  accompanied  with  contempt  of 
the  persons  by  whom  the  law  was  admin- 
istered ;  a  discontent  under  the  burdens  of 
local  taxation,  while  revenues  that  ought 
to  be  applied  for  the  public  advantage 
were  diverted  from  their  legitimate  use, 
and  sometimes  wastefully  bestowed  for  the 
benefit  of  individuals,  sometimes  squan- 
dered for  purposes  injurious  to  the  char- 
acter and  morals  of  the  people.  The  com- 
missioners therefore  felt  it  their  duty  to 
represent  to  his  Majesty  that  the  muni- 
cipal corporations  of  England  and  Wales 
neither  possess  nor  deserve  the  confidence 
or  respect  of  his  Majesty's  subjects,  and 
that  a  thorough  reform  must  be  effected 
before  they  can  become  what  they  ought 
to  be, — useful  and  efficient  instruments 
of  local  government.  Glover's  Historical 
Summary  of  the  Corporate  System  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  pp.  38  to  45. 
The  result  was  the  municipal  Corporations 
Act  of  5  &  6  Win.  IV.  chap,  lxxvi.  See 
chap.  1,  ante,  sec.  8. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  36 

paymenl  of  taxes  for  the  relief  of  the  poor.     Tli- 
burgesses  or  citizens  elect,   from   time  to  time,  a  fixed  number  of 
propel    persoi  councillors,  and  the  council  (compose!  of  the 

mayor,  aldermen,  and  councillors)  elect,  from  qualified  persons,  the 
rmen,  and  also  the  mayor  and  the  ministerial  and  inferior  cor- 
te  officers.  The  council  is  tin-  governing  body  of  the  corpo- 
ration, and  its  most  important  powers  are  defined  by  various  acts  of 
parliament.  It  will  thus  be  perceived  that  tin-  original  power  is  in 
the  burgesses  or  citizens;  that  the  act  adopts  the  representative 
9ystem,  and  proceeds  upon  the  idea  that  a  substantial  interest  in 
the  incorporated  place,  which  is  made  necessary  in  order  to  be  a 
burgess  or  citizen,  will  induce  care  in  the  selection  of  councillors: 
and  that  frequent  elections  will  prove  the  most  effectual  check  <>n 
those  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  municipal  authority, 
which  is  carefully  limited  and  detined. 

The  art  of  1835,  with  its  amendments,  re-enacted  and  consolidated 
by  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882,  4.".  and  46  Vict.  ch.  50; 
L  h.  Is  Stats.  205,  which  went  into  force  January  1,  1883,  consti- 
tutes the  body  of  the  existing  English  municipal  corporations  system. 
The  leading  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1835  are  so  important  to  be 
understood  in  the  study  and  application  of  the  English  cases  decided 
thereunder  to  questions  arising  in  this  country,  and  contain  so  much 
of  interest  to  the  lawyer,  the  legislator,  and  the  municipal  inquirer, 
that  they  are  given  or  referred  to  in  the  note  to  this  section.1     Be- 

1  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  5  franchises    to    the    freemen    or    eitizeiis. 

\m>  >\  W\i.  IV.  chap,  i.xxvi.,  enacted  (Sues.  2-5.)     These  schedules  contain  an 

Sept.   9,    1835,    and  codified   by  the  alphabetical   list  of  all  the  in© 

Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882,  boroughs,   with    the    number  of   wards, 

15   wn   16  Vict.  chap.  l.  —  Name,  etc.  number  of  aldermen,  and  number  of  coun- 

This    act    commences    by    reciting,    that  cillors,  and  style  of  tl orporate    body 

'*  whereas  divers  bodies  corporate  at  sun-  in   each;  thus:  "Bath,  —  Seven    w 

dry  times  have  been   constituted  within  fourteen  aldermen,   forty-two  councillors, 

towns,   and  boroughs  of  Eng-  Corporate  name,       Mayor,  Aldermen,  and 

land  and  Wales,  to  the  int.  nt  thai    the  Citizens  of  the  City  of  Bath."     Ifi1 

!„    .,,,,!   remain  well  borough  instead  of  a  eity,  the  word  "  Bur- 

aud  quietl  I ;  and  it  is  expedient  gesses"   is  used   instead   of   "  Citizei 

,lMt  .  cor-  The  act  provides  that  the  body  corporate 

porate  were  constituted  should  be  altered  in  each  of    said  places  ".shall    tak< 

in  the  manner  hereinafter  mentioned;  be  hear  the  name  of  the  Mayor.  Aldermen, 

i,  therefore  enacted,  thai  so  much  of  all  and   Bui  i    ?es    [oi   Citizens,  in  case  of  a 

laW8j  |  .andsomuchof  city]  of  such  borough,  and  by  that  name 

all  royal  indUher  charters,  now  in  force,  Bhall  have  perpetual   succession,  and 

I  boroughs  named  in  be  capable  in  law,  by  the  council  hereii 

schedules  (A  and  B)  annexed,  as  are  incon-  mentioned  of  such    borough,   ' 

ntwith,  or  i,  this  act,  shall  (Sec   6.)     Nam.-    undei    Ad    o\    1882    is 

by,        al  '•  and  same.     (Sec.   8.)     "Municipal    Cobpo 

'  (sec  1 ),  with  the  reservation  of  ration,"  as   used    in    the    Acl    of  1882, 

in   rights,  beneficial  exemptions,  and  means  the  body  corporate  constituted  by 


§36 


ENGLISH    MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS    ACT,    1835. 


G3 


tween  1835  and  1882,  not  less  than  fifty-five  acts  were  passed  more 
less  relating  to  municipal  corporations,  and  in  general  amenda- 


01 


the  incorporation  of  the  inhabitants  of  a 
borough.  Act  1882,  sec.  7.  "  The  muni- 
cipal corporation  of  a  borough  shall  be 
capable  of  acting  by  the  council  of  the 
borough,  and  the  council  shall  exercise  all 
the  powers  vested  in  the  corporation  by 
this  act  or  otherwise.  The  Council  shall 
consist  of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen,  and  Coun- 
cillors."    Act  1882,  sec.  10. 

Membership.  —  Before  the  passage  of 
the  act  under  consideration,  the  qualifica- 
tions for  members  or  officers  of  municipal 
corporations  depended  upon  the  charter, 
usage,  or  by-laws  of  the  particular  cor- 
poration, the  usual  qualifications  being 
that  the  person  claiming  to  be  admitted 
to  the  freedom  of  the  corporate  town 
should  be  the  son  of  a  freeman,  or  should 
have  served  an  apprenticeship  to  a  free- 
man, or  (in  some  instances)  married  his 
daughter,  or  acquired  the  privilege  by 
gift  or  purchase  ;  but  this  act  provides 
that  hereafter  "  no  person  shall  be  elected, 
made,  or  admitted  a  burgess  or  freeman 
of  any  borough  by  gift  or  purchase." 
(Sec.  3.)  It  fixes  the  qualification  of  bur- 
gesses or  citizens,  thus  :  "  Every  male  per- 
son, of  full  age,  who  shall  have  occupied 
any  house,  warehouse,  counting-house,  or 
shop,  within  any  borough  "  for  three  years, 
"  and  during  the  time  of  such  occupation 
been  an  inhabitant  householder  within  the 
borough,  or  within  seven  miles  of  the  bor- 
ough, shall,  if  duly  enrolled,  be  a  burgess 
of  such  borough  and  a  member  of  the  body 
corporate  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  bur- 
gesses of  such  borough,  provided  he  shall 
have  been  rated  in  respect  to  the  premises 
so  occupied  by  him  to  all  rates  made  for 
the  relief  of  the  poor  within  the  parish." 
(Sec.  9.)  Such  resident  occupiers  and  tax- 
payers, only,  are  members  of  the  corporate 
body  of  the  place  ;  all  the  other  inhabi- 
tants are  no  part  of  the  municipal  corpo- 
ration, though  subject  to  its  government. 

The  Act  1882  changes  the  qualifications 
of  a  burgess  from  three  years  to  one  year, 
and  in  some  other  minor  respects.  (Sec.  9. ) 
Women  may  vote  at  municipal  elections 
if  otherwise  qualified,  but  not  married 
women.  Act  1882,  sec.  63,  based  on  the 
Act  of  1872  (32  &  33  Vict.  chap.  lv.  sec. 


9),  which  first  admitted  women  to  the  mu- 
nicipal franchise.  The  Married  Woman's 
Property  Act  (33  &  34  Vict.  chap,  xciii.), 
does  not  remove  or  all'cct  the  political  dis- 
abilities of  married  women.  See  Regina 
v.  Harrald,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  361. 

Councillors,  how  chosen,  &c.  — 
Upon  the  first  day  of  November,  in  every 
year,  the  burgesses  so  enrolled  in  every 
borough  shall  openly  assemble,  and  elect 
from  the  persons  qualified  to  be  councillors 
[who  must  have  the  qualifications  of  a  bur- 
gess, and  also  increased  pecuniary  and  rat- 
ing qualifications]  the  councillors  of  the 
borough"  (sec.  40),  of  whom  one-third 
part  go  out  of  office  annually.  The  elec- 
tions are  held  before  the  mayor  and  asses- 
sors, and  the  mode  of  voting  (which  is 
exactly  the  opposite  of  the  ballot  in  Amer- 
ica), is  by  delivering  to  the  officers  of  elec- 
tion a  voting-paper  containing  the  name 
and  abode  of  the  person  voted  for,  and 
signed  with  the  name  and  abode  of  the 
voter.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  burgesses 
elect  the  councillors,  whose  qualifications 
are  fixed  by  the  statute,  and  whose  num- 
ber in  each  incorporated  place  is  definite. 
Under  Act  1882,  the  term  of  councillor  is 
three  years,  and  his  qualifications  are 
somewhat  changed  from  those  in  the  Act 
of  1835. 

Aldermen,  how  chosen.  —  On  the 
ninth  day  of  November,  in  every  third 
succeeding  year,  the  council  for  the  time 
being  are  directed  to  elect,  "from  the  coun- 
cillors, or  front  jicrsons  qualified  to  be  coun- 
cillors, the  aldermen  of  the  borough, "  who 
are  one-third  in  number  of  the  councillors. 
(Sec.  25. )  The  manner  of  election  is  pre- 
scribed, namely,  by  every  member  of  the 
council  delivering  to  the  mayor  or  chair- 
man a  voting-paper  signed  by  the  mem- 
ber voting,  which  the  mayor  or  chairman 
is  directed  openly  to  read.  (Act.  7  Win. 
IV.  and  1  Vict.  chap.  Ixxviii.  sec.  14  ;  16 
and  17  Vict.  chap,  lxxix.  sec.  13.)  Term 
of  aldermen  under  Act  of  1882,  is  six 
years.      (Sec.  14. ) 

Mayor,  how  chosen.  —  At  the  meet- 
ing of  the  council,  to  be  held  on  the  ninth 
day  of  November,  each  year,  the  council 
are  directed  to  elect,  out  of  the  aldermen  or 


r»4 


MUNICIPAL   C0RP0BATIGN8. 


§37 


tory  of  the  Act  of  1835.     The  Act  of  1882  revises  or  codifies  all  the 
legislation,  including  the  Act  of  L835  upon  the  Bubject  of  the  Muni- 
tl  Corporations  of  England     The  substance  of  the  Acl   of   1 
I  remains  as  re-enacted  in  the  Act  of  1882.      Its  provisions  cx- 
tend  to  W  ales,  but  not  to  Scotland  or  Ireland. 

In  the  United  St"i<  <. 
^  37  (IT).    Legislative  Sanction  essential  to  Corporate  Existence; 

Prescription.  —  The  proposition  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the 


councillors,  a  lit  person  to  be  the  mayor, 
who  shall  continue  in  office  for  one  year 
,  until  his  successor  shall 
accepted  and  qualified.  (6  and  7 
Win.  IV.  chap.  cv.  sec.  4.)  So  by  the 
Acl  of  1882,  sec  15,  except  that  the 
mayor  may  be  elected  from  any  persons 
win.  are  qualified  to  be  aldermen  or  coun- 
cillors. 

Who  compose  the  council,  &c.  — 
The  mayor,  the  aldermen,  and  the  coun- 
cillors, for  the  time  being,  constitute  the 
council  of  the  borough.  (Sec.  25.)  So 
by  the  Acl  of  18-2,  sec.  10.  Thecouncil, 
as  we  have  seen,  elect  the  mayor  and  the 
aldermen,  and  it  also  appoints  the  clerk, 
treasurer,  and  other  corporate  officers. 
The  corporate  body  acts  by  and  through 
the  council,  who  have  the  authority  of  the 
0hl  corpor  iti  >i  i,  i  ■■■  ep1  as  modified.  Pro- 
vision is  ma  le  foi  I  he  tated  and  special 
meetings  of  the  council;  the  notice  pre- 
scribed, the  quorum  fixed,  the  presiding 
officer  defined,  &c.  Power  is  given  to 
make  by-laws,  and  the  powers  of  the  coun- 
cil defined,  and  provision  is  made  for 
powers  vested  in  trustees,  under  sundry 
h.eal  acts  o  parliament,  foT  paving,  light- 
ing, supplying  with  water  or  gas,  cleans- 
ing, watching,  regulating,  or  improving, 
or  for  providing  or  maintaining  a  ceme- 
tery or  market  in  the  boroughs  being 
transferred  to  the  body  corporate  of  the 
borough.  (Sec.  75,  20  and  21  Vict  chap. 
i.)  By  other  acts  of  parliament  the 
bom  boroughs  arc   fixed  (6  and 

7  Win.  IV.  chap.  ciii.  1836)  ;  the  "ad- 
ministration of  the  borough  fund  "  regu- 
lati  d  1 Tb.  chap,  civ.)  ;  "  the  administra- 
tion of  justic  "  provided  for  [U>.  chap. 
cv.  ;  18  and  11  Vict,  i  hap.  tci.)  !  bon 

dated     (7  Wm.    IV.    and    1    Vict. 
chap,    lxxxi.    1  D  I   8    Vict.   chap. 


xxviii.;  3  and  1  Vict.  chap,  .\xviii. ;  1  and 
[>  Vict.  chap,  xlviii.  ;  ,ri  and  0  Vict.  chap. 
xcviii.)  ;  power  to  sell  and  mortgage  prop- 
erty and  to  charge  rates  given  (5  and  6 
Vict,  tdiap.  xcviii.  ;  23 and  21  Vict. chap. 
xvi. )  ;  provision  made  as  to  maintaining 
bridges  (13and  14  Vict  chap.  lxiv.  1850); 
to  promote  public  libraries  (18  and  19  Vict, 
chap.  lxx.  1855;  29  and  SO  Vict.  chap, 
xciv. )  ;  in  relation  to  the  police,  19  and 
20  Vict.  chap.  lxix.  (27  and  28  Vict, 
chap,  lxiv.;  28  and  2'.'  Viet.  chap,  xxxv.); 
the  management  of  highways,  by  enabling 
councils  to  adopt  parish  roads  and  apply 
their  funds  to  their  repair  (25  and  26  Vict. 
idiap.  lxi.);  for  safe  keeping  of  petroleum 
(25  and  26  Vict.  chap.  Ixvi.);  for  the  pro- 
tection of  gardens  and  ornamental  grounds 
(26  and  27  Vict.  chap,  xiii.);  in  relation 
to  prisons  (28  and  29  Vict.  chap.  cxxvL 
known  as  "The  Prisons  Act,  1865"  ;  29 
and  30  Vict.  chap.  e. )  ;  the  Ballot  Act 
and  Corrupt  Practices  Act  of  1872;  the 
Municipal  Elections  Act  of  1875  ;  the 
Registration  Act  of  1878;  the  Town 
Council  and  Local  Hoards  Act  1880. 
A  variety  of  other  statute-,  of  Less  im- 
portance, in  relation  to  municipal  corpo- 
rations, have  been  passed  since  the  general 
Acl  of  1835,  some  amendatory  of  it  and 
some  making  new  and  additional  provis- 
ions, and  all  have  been  consolidated,  as 
before  stated,  in  the  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  of  1882,  45  and  46  Vict.  chap. 
1.  ;  L.  K.  18  Stats.  205.  By  the  famous 
Disraeli  reform  bill  of  1867,  the  right  to 
vote  foT  a  member,  or  members,  to  serve 
in  parliament  for  boroughs  was  extended 
to  large  numbers  or  classes  of  persons  who 
did  not  before  possess  the  franchise.  New 
American  Cyclopaedia,  1868,  p.  327.  Ante, 
chap.  i.  sec.  8. 


§  37  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS   IN   THE   UNITED    STATES.  65 

law  of  corporations  of  this  country  is,  that  here  all  corporations, 
public  and  private,  exist  and  can  exist  only  by  virtue  of  express  legis- 
lative, enactment,  creating,  or  authorizing  the  creation  or  existence  of 
the  corporate  body.  Legislative  sanction  is  with  us  absolutely  es- 
sential to  lawful  corporate  existence.  The  public  welfare  is  the 
ground  of  this  doctrine.  It  would  be  unwise  to  allow  corporate 
powers  to  be  assumed  and  exercised  except  for  purposes  and  on 
terms  previously  defined  by  the  legislature.  That  a  corporation 
may  here  exist  by  prescription,  and  its  existence  be  established  1  >y 
long  and  undisputed  user  of  corporate  powers,  may  (as  the  cases 
hereafter  referred  to  will  show)  be  true,  but  such  prescription  and 
user  suppose  a  legislative  grant.  Instances  of  prescriptive  corpora- 
tions, with  us,  are  rare  and  exceptional.  But  corporations,  public 
and  private,  by  virtue  of  direct  legislative  authorization  under 
special  or  general  laws,  are  being  created  in  such  vast  numbers  as 
to  constitute  one  of  the  most  marked  and  important  features  of  the 
polity  of  the  present  time.  Speaking  of  "  corporations  by  statute," 
in  England,  Mr.  Willcock  says  that  "  the  legislature  has  not  often 
exercised  the  power  of  creating  municipal  corporations,  because  it 
has  been  esteemed  a  flower  of  the  prerogative."  1  This  has  reference 
to  a  period  anterior  to  the  famous  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
September  9,  1835  (5  and  6  Wm.  IV.  ch.  lxxvi.),  by  which  parlia- 
ment undertook  the  regulation  of  this  important  subject;2  and 
to  the  Companies  Acts  of  a  later  date  which  liberally  authorize  the 
formation  of  companies  for  private  enterprises  with  the  powers  and 
privileges  of  corporations.3 

1  Willc.  on  Mimic.  Corp.  25.  towns,  are  of  still  more  recent  incorpora- 

2  Ante,  sees.  8,  35.  tion.     And  not  a  few  of  those  whose  char- 
8  Existing   Municipal    Government    in     ters  are  of  earlier  date,  as  Liverpool,  Leeds, 

Great  Britain  — "In  the  recent  progress  and  Nottingham,  are  just  as  essentially 
of  Great  Britain,"  says  Mr.  Shaw  (Politi-  modern,  their  earlier  municipal  history 
cal  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  iv.  p.  197,  June  having  little  or  no  importance.  There 
1889),  "few  things  are  more  remarkable  are  now  284  incorporated  towns  and  cities 
than  the  development  of  urban  life  and  in  England  and  Wales,  and  106  of  these 
municipal  institutions.  It  is  true  that  have  received  their  charters  since  the  Mu- 
the  towns  and  their  constitutions  must  nicipal  Reform  Act  of  1835.  The  new 
be  studied  historically  in  order  to  be  manufacturing  towns  are  decidedly  more 
thoroughly  understood  ;  but  it  happens  populous  than  the  old  seaports  and  county 
that  as  a  rule  the  historic  towns  are  no  capitals.  Thus  I  find  that  of  towns  hav- 
longer  the  important  ones,  and  that  the  ing  a  population  of  25,000  or  more  there 
greater  municipalities  of  England  are  quite  are  nearly  sixty  which  have  been  incor- 
as  distinctively  nineteenth  century  de-  porated  since  1825,  while  there  are  only 
velopments  as  are  those  of  America.  As  about  forty-five  whose  charters  are  of  ear- 
corporations,  Manchester  and  Birming-  lier  date.  One-half  of  the  more  recent 
ham  are  only  fifty  years  old,  having  pro-  corporations  have  the  above-named  mini- 
cured  their  charters  in  1838.  Sheffield,  mum  of  population,  while  only  one-fourth 
Bradford,  Salford,  and  many  other  large  of  the  older  places  have  it. 
vol.  r.  —  5 


MrNirilWL    CORPORATION-. 


i;  37  "•    Number    and    frequency    of    Corporate    Creations.  —  The 

•  '■         i-  es  entially  of  modern  growth,  and  is 
yet  in  a  Btate  of  development      Having  occasion  to  refer  to  this 

unprofitable,  and 


ii  then  is  the  great  modern  towns 
owe  their  forms  of  government  to  the  past, 
it  is  to  the  genera]  past  of  municipal  insti- 
tutions in  England   rather  than  to  any- 

I  a  determining  kind  in  their  own 
individual  histories.     The  Munici] 

-  Reform  Act  ol  l  335  preserved  the 
old  government  of  towns  by  a  mayor,  al- 
dermen,  and  councillors,  while  throwing 
open  the  franchise  to  the  new  classes  of 
electors  who  had  received  the  ! 
parliamentary  franchise  in  the  reform  of 
L832,  and  making  dors  directly 

representative   ol    the   burgesses.      Since 

ie  framework  of  English  municipal 

government  has  been  simple,  definite,  reg- 

..■[  easily  understood  ;  and  the  new 

been   elaborated   upon   that 

framework." 

workings  of  the  English  sys- 

'rusted  with  those  of  the  American 

si/st,  iii.  — The    writer    last    quoted     (/'/. 

pp.   216,  217),  thus  contrasts  the  theory 

of  the  English  system  with 

of  our  American  municipalities: 
'•  Many  earnest  and  intelligent  muni- 
cipal reformers,  especially  in  New  York 
ami  the  Eastern  States,  have  advocated 
the  plan  of  greatly  increasing  the  author- 
ity of  the  mayor,  so  thai  he  may  he  held 
more  definitely  responsible  for  the  admin- 
istration of  the  various  executive  depart- 
ments. It  is  the  plan  of  a  periodically 
elective  dictatorship.  As  a  remedy  for 
the  evils  that  grow  out  of  interferences 
by  the  State  ami  the  farming  out  of  cer- 
tain departments  such  as  park's  or  water- 
supply  to   special  boards  or  commissions 

ponsible  to  the  mayor  or  the  coun- 
cil or  the  people,  and  further  as  a  tem- 
porary   measure   of   defence    against    un- 

irthy   ami  ounsels,    this 

somewhat    heroic    plan    of    making    the 
mayor  I  he   <  Irom- 

□  euphemism,  '  a  protx  'tor,'  seems 
to  have  a  great  'leal  in  its  favor.  Bui  it 
is  unrepublican,  ami  it  does  not  at  :i!l 
solve  the  difficult  problem  of  harmonizing 
the  authority  of  the  mayor  ami  the  au- 
thority of  the  council.  The  relation  be- 
tween tin-  two  cannot   at   lust    be  other 


than  that  of  a  shifting 
J  compromi 

"  It  would  seem  a  little  strange  that  the 
one  school  of  reformers  should  not  have 
been  opposed  by  another  which  would  ad- 
vocate the  concentration  of  authority  and 
responsibility  in  the  council.  Logically, 
tie-  mayor  must  eventually  swallow  the 
council  or  the  council  must  swallow  the 
mayor,  if  political  forces  are  to  \»-  ac- 
corded some  degree  of  natural  play  ;  and 
the  one-man  power  is  on  the  decline  every- 
where in  this  age.  Municipal  govern- 
ments, elsewhere  than  in  the  United 
States,  after  having  constituted  a  ruling 
body  do  not  erect  a  separate  one-man 
power  and  give  it  the  means  to  obstruct 
the  ruling,  administrative  body  and  to 
diminish  its  scope  and  responsibility. 
The  mayor  elsewhere  is  an  integral  part 
•uiicil.  English,  Scotch  and  Irish 
municipal  government  is  simply  govern- 
ment by  a  group  of  men  who  are  to  be 
regarded  as  a  grand  committee  of  the  cor- 
poration,—  the  corporation  consisting  of 
the  whole  body  of  burgesses  or  qualified 
citizens.  In  Glasgow  it  is  a  committee  of 
fifty  ;  in  Edinburgh,  of  forty-one  ;  in  Man- 
chester,  of  seventy-six  ;  in   Birmingham, 

Liver] 1  and   most   of  the  large   English 

towns,  of  sixty-four  ;  in  Dublin,  of  sixty  ; 
in  Belfast,  of  forty  ;  and  in  tie'  other  in- 
corporated towns  of  the  United  Kingdom 
i;  varies  from  twelve  to  sixty-four,  accord- 
ing to  their  size.  So  far  as  these  bod- 
ies have  authority  to  pass  by-laws  at  all, 
their  authority  is  complete,  ami  nobody 
obtrudes  a  veto.  Tiny  appoint  and  re- 
move all  officials.  They  have  entire  charge 
of  municipal  administration,  distributing 
the  work  of  departmental  management 
ami  supervision  to  Btanding  committees 
of  their  own  number,  which  they  organ- 
ize ami  constitute  as  they  please.  If  such 
n  local  government  cannot  I"'  trusted,  the 
fault  is  with  popular  institutions.  It  is 
quite   certain    to  he  as  g 1  a  government 

as  the  people  concerned  deserve  to  have. 
The  location  of  responsibility  is  perfectly 
definite.  When  the  Glasgow  city  improve- 
ment  schi  me  became  unpopular  with  the 


§  38  POWER   OF   CONGRESS   TO   CREATE   CORPORATIONS.  67 

subject,  a  distinguished  judge  said  :  "  Formerly  but  few  private  cor- 
porations were  created,  and  these  cut  so  small  a  comparative  figure 
in  the  destinies  of  states,  that  they  attracted  but  little  attention 
on  the  part  of  law-makers,  and  were  but  little  studied  by  the  courts. 
Even  in  England,  until  a  very  recent  period,  both  public  and  pri- 
vate corporations  were  created  by  royal  prerogative,  without  the 
intervention  of  parliament,  and  were  invested  with  such  powers  and 
privileges  as  favorites  might  ask,  or  the  public  good  be  supposed  to 
require.  But  even  then  such  corporations  were  rare.  Now  they 
have  become  among  the  greatest  means  of  state  and  national  pros- 
perity. It  is  probably  true  that  more  corporations  were  created  by 
the  legislature  of  Illinois,  at  its  last  session,  than  existed  in  the 
whole  civilized  world  at  the  commencement  of  the  present  cen- 
tury." 1  This  state  of  things  has  necessarily  led  to  a  more  careful 
study  of  the  whole  subject,  both  by  legislators  and  the  courts.  Not 
only  are  commercial  or  business  corporations  being  thus  multiplied, 
but  public  and  municipal  corporations,  in  all  of  the  States  and  Ter- 
ritories of  the  United  States,  are  constantly  created  and  universally 
adopted  as  part  of  the  ordinary  machinery  of  government,  so  that  it 
is  perhaps  impossible  to  find  a  town  or  city  of  any  considerable  size 
not  incorporated  and  invested  with  the  power  of  local  government. 
There  are  in  this  country  many  hundreds  of  incorporated  places 
acting  under  special  charters  granted  by  the  States  or  general  incor- 
poration acts  passed  by  them. 

§  38  (18).  Congress  may  create.  —  The  power  of  Congress  to  cre- 
ate or  authorize  the  creation  of  corporations,  public  or  private,  when- 
ever these  become  an  appropriate  means  of  exercising  any  of  the 
constitutional  powers  of  the  general  government,  or  of  facilitating 
its  lawful  operations  in  the  States  or  Territories,  must  be  taken  to 
be  conclusively  settled  by  the  Supreme  Court.2      This  power  has 

voters  because  it  was  proving  more  expen-  system,  by  which  the  people  give  the  en- 
sive  than  its  projectors  had  promised,  the  tire  management  of  their  affairs  to  a  big 
chairman  of  the  committee  was  retired  by  committee  of  their  own  number,  which 
his  constituents  at  the  end  of  his  term,  they  renew  from  time  to  time." 
The  taxpayers  hold  every  member  of  coun-  1  Per  Caton,  J.,  Railroad  Co.  v.  Dalby, 
cil  responsible  for  his  votes.  The  system  19  111.  353  (1857).  See  also  similar  obser- 
is  as  simple,  logical,  and  effective  as  the  vations  of  Rogers,  J.,  in  Bushel!  v.  In- 
American  system  is  complicated  and  in-  surance  Co.,  15  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  176, 
compatible  with  harmonious  and   respon-  177. 

sible  administration.     City  government  in  2  McCulloch   v.    Maryland,    4  Wheat. 

America    defeats    its    own    ends    by    its  316;   Osborn  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  9  Wheat. 

'  checks   and  balances,'    its   partitions   of  738  ;  Thompson  v.  Pacific  Railroad  Co.,  9 

duty   and   responsibility,    and    its   grand  Wall.    579 ;    Pacific    Railroad  v.  Lincoln 

opportunities  for   the  game  of  hide-and-  Co.,  1  Dillon,  C.  C.  314  (1871)  ;  Morawet? 

seek.     Infinitely  superior  is  the   English  on  Corp.  (2d  ed.)  sec.  9. 


68  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  39 

been  exercised  on  important  occasions,  such  as  incorporating  the 
bunks  of  the  United  states,  the  national  banks,  and  the  various 
fie  railroad  companies;  and,  within  the  above  limitations,  it  is 
no  longer  disputed.  Congress  habitually  passes  acts  for  the  organ- 
ization of  Territorial  governments,  the  local  legislatures  of  which 
may,  under  congressional  authority,  create  corporations,  public  and 
private,  in  the  Territories  ;  but  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  Con- 
gress to  establish  municipal  corporations  within  the  limits  of  the 
States,  and  it  has  never  attempted  to  exercise  it. 

A  provision  in  a  Territorial  Organic  Act,  that  the  power  of  the 
territorial  legislature  "  shall  extend  to  all  rightful  subjects  of  legisla- 
tion" authorizes  the  legislature  to  create  municipal  corporations, 
and  to  invest  them  with  the  power  to  make  ordinances,  and  to  pro- 
vide corporation  courts  in  which  to  enforce  them.  And  such  courts 
may  be  provided,  although  by  the  organic  act  it  is  declared  that  the 
judicial  power  of  the  Territory  shall  be  vested  in  a  supreme  court, 
district  courts,  probate  courts,  and  justices  of  the  peace.1 

§  39  (19).  Outline  of  ordinary  Municipal  Charter.  —  In  this  coun- 
try, until  comparatively  a  recent  period,  municipal  corporations 
In i  re  been  created  singly,  each  with  its  special  or  separate  charter 
passed  by  the  legislature  of  the  State.  These  charters,  in  all  of  the 
States,  were  framed  after  the  same  general  model ;  but  in  the  extent 

1  State  v.  Young,  3  Kan.  445  (1866)  ;  legislative  assembly  had  no  power  to  con- 
People,  ex  rel.  v.  City  of  Butte,  4  Mont,  fer  upon  a  justice  of  the  peace  a  denomina- 
174;  Burnes  v.  Atchison,  2  Kan.  454;  s.  tion  not  warranted  by  the  organic  act; 
r.  Reddick  v.  Amelia,  1  Mo.  5  (1821).  and,  in  so  far  as  a  municipal  charter 
In  this  case  the  objection  made  was,  that  undertook  to  confer  upon  a  justice  of  the 
such  a  legislature  was  not  sovereign,  and  peace  exercising  jurisdiction  under  the  or- 
tli.it  nothing  short  of  sovereign  power  dinances  of  t lie  city  the  name  of  "police 
could  create  a  corporation.  The  answer  magistrate,"  it  is  void.  lb. 
given  was,  that  Congress  could  give,  and  It  is  no^  provided  by  act  of  Congress, 
had  given,  the  power  to  Legislate  on  such  "That  the  legi  lative  assemblies  of  the 
subjects.  That  a  Territorial  legislature,  several  Territories  of  the  United  States 
vested  with  general  legislative  powers,  shall  not,  after  the  passage  of  this  act, 
may  create  a  corporation  which  is  not  grant  private  charters  or  especial  privi- 
affected  by  the  subsequent  adoption  of  a  leges,  but  they  may,  by  general  incorpo- 
State  constitution,  was  held  in  Vincennes  ration  acts,  permit  persons  to  associate 
University  v.  Indiana,  14  How.  268  (1852).  themselves  together  as  bodies  corporate 
See  also  Vance  v.  Bank,  1  Blackf,  (hid.)  for  mining,  manufacturing,  and  other  in- 
80;  Myers  i\  Bank,  20  Ohio,  283.     Under  dustrial  pursuits."    Act  of  March  2,  1867, 

the  Territorial  <>l  of  ( 'olorado,  the        11   Stat    .      !    l/n^e,    1'JtI,  see.   1  ;    1,'ev.  Stats. 

inl.lv  has  power  to  establish  of  U.  S.  sec.  18S9.     In  Seattle  v.  Tyler, 

a  municipal  corporation,  bu1  the  question  Wash.  Territory,    1877,  this  section  was 

of  such  establishment  by  special  or  general  held  by  Ch.  J.  Lewis  of  Washington  Terri- 

law  is  not  discussed.      Deitz  v.  City  of  tory  to  extend  to  and  embrace  municipal 

Central,   1   Col.   323  (1872).      Under   the  corporations  within  its  prohibition, 
name  organic  act  it  was  decided  that  the 


§  39  OUTLINE   OF   ORDINARY   MUNICIPAL   CHARTER.  69 

of  the  special  powers  conferred,  and  in  the  peculiar  constitution  of 
the  governing  body,  and  the  like,  there  was  great  variety.  It  will 
be  useful  to  notice  the  outline  features  of  one  of  these  charters,  since 
it  constitutes  the  organic  act  of  the  corporation,  and  bestows  upon 
it  its  legal  character.  Such  a  charter  usually  sets  out  with  an  in- 
corporating clause  declaring  "that  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  of 
(naming  it),  or  city  of  (naming  it),  are  hereby  constituted  a  body 

politic  and  corporate  by  the   name  of  the  'town  of ,' or 'city 

of ,'  and  by  that  name  shall  have  perpetual  succession,  may 

use  a  common  seal,  sue  and  be  sued,  purchase,  hold,  and  sell  prop- 
erty," &C.1     The  charter  then  defines  the  territorial  boundaries  of 
the  town  or  city  thus  incorporated.2     After  that  follow  provisions 
relating  to  the  governing  body  of  the  corporation,  usually  styled  the 
town  or   city   council?     This  is  generally  composed  of  one  body, 
though  in  some  instances  of  two ;  the  members   being  called  alder- 
men, councilmen,  or  trustees.      The  corporate  territory  is  divided 
into  wards,  and  each  ward  elects  one  or  more  aldermen  the  number 
being  specified  and  definite.4     The  charter  fixes  the  qualifications  of 
the  voters,  which  are  usually  that  the  voter  shall  be  a  male  citizen 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State,  be  of  age,  and  a  resident,  for 
a  specified  time,  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation.     The  mode  of 
holding  elections  is  prescribed ;  and  the  power  is  often  given  to  the 
council  to  canvass  returns,  and  to  settle  disputed  elections  to  cor- 
porate offices.5      Provision  is  made  for  the  election  of  a  mayor,  or 
other  chief  executive  officer  of  the  corporation,  and  his  duties  de- 
fined.    The  charter  contains  a  minute  and  detailed  enumeration  of 
the  powers  of  the  city  council,  which  are  usually   numerous ; 6  the 
most  important  of  which  are,  the  authority  to  create  debts  (some- 
times restricted) ;  to  levy  and  collect  taxes  within  the  corporation, 
for  corporate  purposes ; 7  to  make  local  improvements,  and  assess- 
ments to  pay  therefor  ;  to  appoint  corporate  officers  ; 8  to  enact  ordi- 
nances to  preserve  the  health  of  the  inhabitants,  to  prevent  and 
abate  nuisances,  to  prevent  fires,  to  establish  and  regulate  markets, 
to'  regulate  and  license  given  occupations,  to  establish  a  police  force  ; 
to  punish  offenders   against    ordinances  ;    to   open  and  grade   and 
improve  streets  ; 9  to  hold  corporation  courts,10  &c. 

1  Post,  chap.  viii.  several  times  as  much  power  as  a  voter  in 

2  Post,  chap.  viii.  another.    People  v.  Canaday,  73  N.  C.  198 
8  Post,  chap.  x.  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  465. 

4  Constitutional   provisions    to    secure  5  Post,  chap.  ix. 

equality  of  representation  held  applicable  6  Post,  chaps,  v.  and  vi. 

to  municipal  corporations  and  to  disable  7  Post,  chap.  xix. 

the  legislature  to  divide  a  city  into  wards,  8  Post,  chap.  ix. 

in   some   of  which  a  voter  should   have  9  Post,  chap.  xii.        ™  Post,  chap,  xiii 


JO  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  41 

When  it  is  remembered  that  tfo   charter  of  such  <>  corporation  is 

,:„1  gives  i"  it  all  the  powers  it   pi  (unless 

other  statutes  are  applicable  to  it),  its  careful  study,  in  any  given 

,  is  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of  the  nature  ami  extent 

powers  it  confers,  tin-  duties  it  enjoins,  and   liabilities  it 

creates.     The  construction  of  its  various  provisions,  and  the  deter- 

mination  of  the  relation  which  these  bear  to  the  general  statutes  of 

tllt.  State, how  far  the  charter  controls,  or  how  far  it  is  controlled 

by  otheT  legislation,  are  often  among  the  most  difficult  problems 
which  perplex  the  lawyer  and  the  judge.  The  study  of  a  question 
of  corporation  law  begins  with  the  charter ;  bu1  it  must  oftentimes 
be  pursued  into  the  constitution,  the  genera]  statutes  and  legislative 
policy  of  the  State,  and  after  this  into  the  broad  field  of  general 
jurisprudence. 

§40.  Corporators  and  Members.  —  In  municipal  and  public  cor- 
porations, ascities,  towns,  parishes,  school-districts,  and  the  like, 
membership,  so  to  speak,  is,  under  the  legislation  and  polity  of  this 
country,  usually  constituted  by  living  within  certain  limits,  whatever 
may  be 'the  desire  of  the  individual  thus  residing  or  that  of  the  mu- 
nicipal or  other  incorporated  body.  In  private  corporations,  on  the 
other  hand,  especially  those  organized  for  pecuniary  profit,  member- 
ship is  constituted  by  subscribing  to  or  receiving,  with  the  assent  of 
the  corporation  when  that  is  necessary,  transfers  of  its  stock.1  It  is 
the  citizens  or  inhabitants  of  a  city,  not  the  common  council  or  local 
legislature,  who  constitute  the  "corporation"  of  the  city.  The 
members  of  the  council  and  other  charter  officers  are  the  agents  or 
ministers  of  the  corporation.2 

§  41  (20).  General  municipal  Incorporating  Acts  in  the  United 
States.  —  Within  a  period  comparatively  recent,  the  legislatures  of 
a  number  of  the  States,  following  in  this  respect  the  example  of  the 
English  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Win.  IV.  ch.  lxxvi., 
heretofore  mentioned,  have  passed  general  acts  respecting  municipal 
corporations.  These  acts  abolish  all  special  charters,  or  all  with 
enumerated  exceptions,  and  enact  general  provisions  for  the  incor- 
poration, regulation,  and  government  of  municipal  corporations. 
The  usual  scheme  i>  to  grade  corporations  into  classes,  according  to 
their  size, as  into  Cities  of  the  First  class,  Cities  of  the  Second  Class, 

i  OvrrsoiTs  of  Poor,  &c.  v.  Sears,   22         2  Ante,  Bee.  'Jt ;  Lowber  v.  Mayor,  &c. 

Pick.  122,  130,  per  Shaw,  C.  J. ;  Oak*  v.  of  N.Y.,  6  Abbott's  Pr.  !:.  325;  Clarke 

Hill,   10  Pick.  333,  346,  ,..  ,•  Morton,  J.  ;  v.  KoHi.'stcr.  -2\  B;ub.  44f»  (is:,7);  Baum- 

l,  atnd  notes.  gartner  '•.  Hasty,  100  Ind.  575. 


§41 


GENERAL   INCORPORATING    ACTS. 


71 


and  Towns  or  Villages,  and  to  bestow  upon  each  class  such  powers 
as  the  legislature  deems  expedient ;  but  the  powers  and  mode  of 
organization  of  corporations  of  each  class  are  uniform. l 


1  Ohio.  —  By  the  Towns,  Cities,  and 
Villages'  Act  of  May  3,  1852  (Swan's  Stat. 
954),  all  corporations  existing  for  the  pur- 
poses of  municipal  government  are  thereby 
organized  into  cities  and  incorporated  vil- 
lages. (Sec.  1.)  In  respect  to  the  exer- 
cise of  certain  corporate  powers,  municipal 
corporations  are  divided  into  classes,  thus : 
1.  Cities  of  the  first  class,  which  comprise 
all  cities  having  a  population  exceeding 
twenty  thousand  inhabitants  ;  2.  Cities  of 
the  second  class,  which  comprise  all  cities 
not  embraced  in  the  first  class  ;  3.  Incor- 
porated villages  ;  and  4.  Incorporated  vil- 
lages for  special  purposes.  lb.  sec.  39  et  sea. 
These  are  "declared  to  be  bodies  politic 
and  corporate,  under  the  name  and  style 

of  the  city  of ,   or  the  incorporated 

village  of ,  as  the  case  may  be,  —  ca- 
pable to  sue  and  be  sued  ;  to  contract  and 
be  contracted  with  ;  to  acquire,  hold,  and 
possess  property,  real  and  personal ;  to 
have  a  common  seal  ;  and  to  exercise  such 
other  powers,  and  to  have  such  other  priv- 
ileges, as  are  incident  to  municipal  cor- 
porations of  like  character  or  degree,  not 
inconsistent  with  this  act  or  the  general 
laws  of  the  State."  lb.  sec.  18.  These 
powers  and  privileges  are  then  specified 
with  great  minuteness,  twenty  sections  of 
the  act  being  devoted  to  this  purpose.  In- 
corporated villages  are  governed  by  one 
mayor,  one  recorder,  and  five  trustees, 
elected  annually ;  the  mayor,  recorder, 
and  trustees  constituting  the  village  coun- 
cil, any  five  of  whom  make  a  quorum. 
lb.  sec.  43.  The  corporate  authority  of 
cities  is  vested  in  the  mayor,  one  board 
of  trustees  (two  from  each  ward),  who 
compose  the  city  council,  together  with 
such  officers  as  are  mentioned  in  the  act, 
or  as  may  be  created  under  its  authority. 
lb.  sec.  52  et  seq. 

"The  governing  all  cities  and  villages 
under  one  general  law  was  a  new  experi- 
ment, supposed  to  be  required  by  the 
present  Constitution.  It  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that,  in  the  working  of  the  experi- 
ment, omissions,  if  not  mistakes,  would 
be  discovered,   to   be   corrected  by  addi- 


tional legislation.  It  will  be  a  work  of 
care  and  time  to  perfect  an  orderly  and 
harmonious  system."  Per  Gholson,  J.,  in 
Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12  Ohio  St.  124,  130 
(IStil).     Infra,  sec.  46. 

California.  — Constitution,  Art.  XL,  on 
Cities,  Counties,  and  Towns,  contains  pro- 
visions as  to  their  incorporation,  organiza- 
tion, and  government.  The  entire  subject 
of  the  creation  and  government  of  cities  is 
provided  for  in  Part  IV.  title  iii.  of  the 
Political  Code.  It  does  not  apply  to  cities 
existing  at  the  time  of  its  adoption.  Ex 
parte  Simpson,  47  Cal.  127;  People  v. 
Clunie,  70  Cal.  504.  If  the  course  pur- 
sued in  establishing  a  municipality  is 
substantially  such  as  is  pointed  out  in  the 
act,  courts  will  not  disturb  it,  the  pro- 
priety of  establishing  a  municipality,  and 
of  including  particular  territory  within  its 
boundaries,  being  a  political  question  for 
the  legislature  to  determine.  People  v. 
City  of  Riverside,  70  Cal.  461. 

Illinois.  —  The  General  Assembly  has 
the  power  to  delegate  legislative  authority 
incident  to  municipal  government  to  cities  ; 
but  this  can  only  be  done  by  general  law, 
under  the  Constitution  of  1870.  When, 
however,  it  is  done  by  such  law,  the  con- 
stitutional mandate  is  fully  complied  with, 
and  the  ordinances  to  be  adopted  by  dif- 
ferent municipalities,  under  the  power  so 
conferred,  may  be  as  variant  in  their  terms 
as  the  varying  municipal  necessities  or 
sense  of  public  policy  in  those  who  exer- 
cise the  legislative  authority  may  require. 
Covington  v.  East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548 
(1875). 

Iowa.  —  The  Ohio  act  is,  in  substance, 
adopted  in  Iowa.  Revision  1860,  chap.  li. 
But  it  does  not  apply  to  cities  having  spe- 
cial charters,  unless  adopted  by  them. 
Burke  v.  Jeffries,  20  Iowa,  145. 

Kansas. — The  act  of  Kansas  (Comp. 
Laws  1885,  chaps.  18,  19,  20)  provides 
for  three  classes  of  cities,  and  is  in  other 
respects  similar  to  that  of  Ohio.  It  has 
been  decided  in  that  State  that  a  supple- 
mental act  by  which  it  was  intended  to 
extend  corporate  powers,  but  which  was  so 


MUNICIPAL   C0BP0BATI0N8. 


These  acts  are  generally  held  not  to  violate  constitutional  pro- 
visions  against  Local  ur  special  legislation.1     General  incorporation 


Bpecia]  in  its  provisions  that  it  could  by 
ie>  possibility  apply  to   more   than   tl 

:   i  ities,  was  void,  as  being  in  viola- 
tion of  the  State  Constitution   forbidding 

.  gislature  from  conferring  corporate 
powers  by  special  act.  Topeka  v.  Gillett, 
32  K  in.  131. 

In  Tennesset  (Acts  1849,  chap,  xvii.) 
is  made  by  genera]  acl  for  the 
incorporation  of  towns,  cities,  and  \  ilia 
The  constitution  of  Tennessee  declares 
that  "the  Legislature  shall  have  power  to 
grant  charters  of  incorporation  as  they 
may  deem  expedient  for  the  public  good." 
Art.   XI.  sec.   7.      In   the  State  v.  Arm- 

og,  3  Sliced  (Tenn.),  634,  it  was  hi  Id 
that  the  act  of  1856,  by  which  full  power 
to  create  corporations,  and  determine  the 
•  stent  of  their  powers,  was  given  to  the 
Circuit  Courts,  was  unconstitutional,  on 
the  ground  that  the  legislature  could  not 
delegate  its  authority  to  the  courts.  But 
in  the  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Shelton,  1   Head,  24 

58),  it  was  held  that  the  act  of  1849  — 

which  was  a  general  statute  for  the  incor- 

:  ion  of  towns  and  cities,  and  by  which 

a  petition  was  to  he  presented  by  the  in- 
habitants of  a  place  proposing  to  organize 
under  the  ait  to  the  County  Court,  which 
had  power  simply  to  record  the   petition 
and  designate  tic  boundaries  of  the  cor- 
iion  —  was  not   in   conflict  with    the 
■  itution,  as  tie-  Btatute,  and  not  the 
court,  determined   the  extent  and  nature 
of  the  powers  of  the  corporation.     In  Ex 
part  Cliadwell,  3  Bax.  98,  s.  o.  1  Tenn. 
nd    /-.''■  part i-  I'.ui  us,  1  Tenn.  ( 'h. 
be  act  of  1871,  under  the  Constitution 
of   1870,  was  declared    void    in   so   far  as  it 
undertook  to  confer   upon    the   Court  of 
Chancery   the   power   to  grant   corporate 

!.        See    also    Willed     1\     llellville, 

11  Lea  (Tenn.),  1.     For  abstract  of  legis- 


1  State  v.  Graham,  16  Neb.  74  ;  Pritch- 
ett  v.  Stanislaus  Co.,  73  Cal.  310.  An 
.net  known  as  the  "  McClure  ch 
held  not  to  be  a  "general  law"  for  the 
■I  of  cities  under  the  Con6titu- 
I '  difornia.  Desmond  v.  Dunn,  55 
CaL  242;    Ex  parte  Wells,  21  Fla.  280. 


lation  in  this  State  establishing   Taxing 
Disti       ,  see  post,  ch.  vii. 

.1/  -      A  general  act  for  the  incor- 

poration of  town,  was  passed  in  Missouri 
in  L845,  and  it  was  held  not  unconstitu- 
tional by  reason  of  certain  duties  which  it 
on  the  County  Court  with  refer- 
ence to  organization  of  towns  under  the 
act,  as  these  duties  arc  not  legislative  but 
judicial,  and  the  law  itself,  and  not  the 
court,  declares  the  powers  of  which  the 
corporation  shall  he  possessed.  Kayser  v. 
Trustees,  &c.  16  Mo.  88  (1852).  Con- 
struction of  statute.  Woods  v.  Henry,  55 
Mo.  560;  State  v.  McReynolds,  61  Mo. 
203  (1876).  The  case  of  Kayser  v.  Trus- 
tees, &c.  supra,  is  thought  by  Campbell, 
J.,  to  conflict  with  the  general  course  of 
decision,  since  such  duties  are  in  their 
nature  administrative  or  political  rather 
than  judicial.  People  v.  Beunett,  29 
Mich.  451  ;  s.  0.  18  Am.  Rep.  107.  See 
Damodhar  Gordhani  v.  Deorau  Kanji, 
L.  R.  1  App.  Div.  332. 

Indiana. — The  general  law  of  1857, 
for  the  incorporation  of  cities,  is  not  un- 
constitutional for  want  of  uniform  it \y  in 
the  mode  of  their  organization.  Lafayette 
v.  Jennets,  10  [nd.  70,  80  (1857).  See 
also  YVelker  v.  Potter,  18  Ohio  St.  85.  In 
the  Revised  Statutes  of  1881,  sees.  3031- 
3406  are  collected  the  statutory  law  of  the 
State  relating  to  cities  and  towns,  their 
organization,  powers,  methods  of  taxa- 
tion, opening  of  streets,  kc.  In  an  election 
held  under  its  provisions  to  determine 
whether  a  town  shall  become  a  city,  a 
majority  of  the  votes  rust  is  sufficient  to 
decide  ;  it  is  not  essential  that  there  be  a 
majority  of  the  legal  voters,  State  v.  Tip- 
ton, 109  Ind.  73. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  in  the 
recent  cases  (April,  1889)  of  the  State  v. 


A  constitutional  provision  authorizing 
cities  having  over  100,000  inhabitants  to 
frame  charters  for  their  own  government 
held  to  be  self-acting  and  not  to  require 
legislation  to  give  it  effect.  People  v. 
Hoge,  55  Cal.  612. 


41 


GENERAL   INCORPORATING    ACTS. 


73 


acts,  rather  than  special  charters,  would  seem  clearly  to  be  the  best 
method  of  creating  and  organizing  municipal  corporations.     1.  Such 


Denny,  21  Northeast.  Rep.  252,  and 
Evansville  v.  State,  21  Northeast.  Rep. 
267,  has  asserted  and  maintained  the  con- 
stitutional right  of  local  self-government  in 
that  State  in  opinions  of  marked  ability 
and  learning.     Post,  sec.  58. 

Pennsylvania.  —  A  general  act  was 
passed  in  1851,  designed  to  form  a  system 
for  the  regulation  of  boroughs  incorporated 
thereafter.  Commonwealth  v.  Montrose, 
52  Pa.  St.  391.  Course  of  legislation  and 
decision  in  Pennsylvania  as  to  the  incor- 
poration of  boroughs  discussed  in  People 
v.  Bennett,  supra.  A  general  act  for  the 
incorporation  and  regulation  of  municipal 
corporations,  dividing  them  into  three 
classes,  and  having  other  features  similar 
to  the  Ohio  act,  was  adopted  in  this  State 
May  3,  1874.  It  has  since  been  amended. 
Beading  v.  Savage,  120  Pa.  St.  198  (1888). 

North  Carolina.  —  By  general  act,  every 
incorporated  town  may  elect,  each  year, 
not  less  than  three  nor  more  than  seven 
commissioners,  who  are  a  body  corporate 
and  the  governing  body  of  the  town. 
These  commissioners  are  elected  by  the 
vote  of  the  citizens  of  the  place.  At  the 
same  time  they  are  also  to  elect  a  mayor, 
who  presides  at  the  meetings  of  the  com- 
missioners, but  who  has  no  vote  except  in 
case  of  a  tie.  The  mayor  is  both  a  peace 
officer  and  a  judicial  officer,  with  the  same 
jurisdiction  as  a  justice  of  the  peace,  with 
power  also  to  "  hear  and  determine  all 
cases  that  may  arise  upon  the  ordinances 
of  the  commissioners,"  &c.  The  commis- 
sioners may  levy  certain  specified  taxes, 
and  make  ordinances  in  relation  to  their 
officers,  records,  markets,  nuisances,  the 
repair  of  streets  and  bridges  in  the  town, 
&o.  These  general  provisions  apply  to 
all  incorporated  towns  when  not  incon- 
sistent with  special  charters  or  acts  in 
reference  thereto.  Rev.  Code  1854,  chap. 
iii.  p.  586. 

Michigan.  —  The  general  act  of  1873 
for  the  incorporation  of  villages  within 
any  two  square  miles  of  territory  was  held 
unconstitutional  because  the  rights  of  the 
people  concerned  were  not  respected,  and 
the  legislature  had  attempted  to  delegate 
legislative  powers  to  private  citizens  in- 


stead of  to  corporate  authorities  or  local 
boards  of  officers.  People  v.  Bennett, 
29  Mich.  451  (1874)  ;  s.  c.  18  Am.  Rep. 
107. 

New  York.  —  In  this  State  there  are 
cities  with  local  and  special  charters,  and 
also  towns  whose  powers,  duties,  and  privi- 
leges are  particularly  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute. Each  town  is  a  body  corporate  for 
specified  purposes  ;  but  it  is  declared  that 
"no  town  shall  possess  or  exercise  any 
corporate  powers  except  such  as  are  enu- 
merated in  this  chapter,  or  shall  be  spe- 
cially given  by  law,  or  shall  be  necessary 
to  the  exercise  of  the  powers  so  enumerated 
or  given."  Rev.  Stats.  Part  I.  chap.  xi. 
p.  337,  sees.  1,  2.  "The  several  towns  in 
this  State,"  says  Denio,  J.,  in  Lorillard  v. 
The  Town  of  Monroe,  11  N.  Y.  (1  Kern.) 
392  (1854),  "are  corporations  for  certain 
special  and  very  limited  purposes,  or,  to 
speak  more  accurately,  they  have  a  certain 
limited  corporate  capacity.  They  may 
purchase  and  hold  lands  within  their  own 
limits  for  the  use  of  their  inhabitants. 
They  may,  as  a  corporation,  make  such 
contracts  and  hold  such  personal  property 
as  may  be  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  their 
corporate  or  administrative  powers,  and, 
as  a  necessary  incident,  may  sue  and  be 
sued,  where  the  assertion  of  their  corporate 
rights,  or  the  enforcement  against  them  of 
their  corporate  liabilities,  shall  require  such 
proceedings.  (1  Rev.  Stats.  337,  sec.  1  et 
scq.)  In  all  other  respects — for  instance, 
in  everything  which  concerns  the  admin- 
istration of  civil  or  criminal  justice,  the 
preservation  of  the  public  health  and  mor- 
als, the  conservation  of  highways,  roads, 
and  bridges,  the  relief  of  the  poor,  and 
the  assessment  and  collection  of  taxes  — 
the  several  towns  are  political  divisions, 
organized  for  the  convenient  exercise  of 
portions  of  the  political  power  of  the 
State,  and  are  no  more  corporations  than 
the  judicial,  or  the  senate  and  assembly 
districts.  lb.  sec.  2.  The  functions  and 
duties  of  the  several  town  officers  respect- 
ing these  subjects  are  judicial  and  admin- 
istrative, and  not  in  any  sense  corporate 
functions  or  duties,"  and  hence,  as  to  such 
subjects,  the  towns  as  corporations  are  not 


71  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §42 

■    tend  to  prevent  favoritism  and  abuse  in  procuring  extraordinary 

gpanl  ciaJ  powers.     2.  The]   lecure  uniformity  of  rule  and  of 

Al!  being  created  and  endowed  alike,  real  wants  are 

the  30oner   felt  and  provided    for,  and  real  grievances  the   sooner 

redressed.1 

Creation  by  Implication. 

$    12  (21).    No   Precise  Form  of  Words  essential.  —  It  is  well  set- 
tled in  England  that,  while  a  corporation  must  commence  or  be  in- 
stituted  by  the  proper  authority,  yet  no  fixed,  prescribed,  or  precise 
form   of  words  is  necessary  in  order  to  create  a  corporation.     While 
the  words  "to  found"  "to  erect  or  establish,"  or  "to  incorporate," 
:u,.  commonly  used  to  evince  the  intention  to  erect  or  create  a  body 
politic,  they  are  not  necessary.2     The  king  grants  a  charter  to  the 
men  of  I  >ale,  that  they  may  annually  elect  a  mayor,  and  plead  and 
be  impleaded  by  the  name  of  the  mayor  and  commonalty.     This  is 
considered  to  be  sufficient  to  incorporate  them.8     So  a  grant  by  a 
charter  containing    no  direct  clause  of  incorporation  to  the  inhabi-  . 
tants  of  a  town,  "  that  their  town  shall  be  a  free  borough,"  incorpor- 
ates it.4     So,  also,  a  grant  by  the  king  to  the  men  of  Dale  that  they 
be  discharged  of  tolls  incorporates  them  for  this  particular  purpose, 
but  does  not  enable  them  to  purchase.6     The  settled  doctrine  is  that 
a  corporation  may  be  created  by  implication,  as  well  as  by  the  use  of 
words.      But  this  implication,  to  be  sufficient,  must  clearly  manifest 
or  express  the  intention  to  establish  or  constitute  a  body  politic  or 
corporate,  that  is,  to  invest  it  with  corporate  powers  and  privileges. 
But  the  absence  of  express  provision  respecting  the  incidents  which  the 
law  tacitly  annexes  to  corporations  is  considered  immaterial.     Thus 
the  omission  in  the  charter  or  act  of  the  words  "to  plead  and  be  im- 
pleaded," or  "to  have  a  seal,"  or  "to  make  by-laws,"   would  not 
make  it    essentially  defective.6     So  it  would  not  be  essentially  de- 

liable  for  any  default  or  malfeasance  of  2  10  Co.  27a,  28a,  296,  80  ;  1  Kyd,  62  ; 

See,    i     bo    the  corporate  2  Kent,  Com.  27. 

icity  of  towns  in  New  York,   Denton  8  21  Edw.  IV.  56.     The  doctrine  of  a 

.  h ,  •_-  Johns.  Ch.   i:.  320;  North  corporation  by  implication  originated   in 

Hempstead  v.   Hempstead,  2  Wend.  109;  the  tunc  of  Edward  IV.     lb.  8  Edw.  IV. 

affirming  b.   c.    Hopk.    288;    Cornell   v.  28.     Post,  sec.  660. 

Guilford,  1  Denio,  510.  4  Kyd,  62,  cites  Firm.  Burg.  ch.  ii.  ; 

,,.„.(-.  _ st;if e  v.  Jennings,27  Ark.  Slado:  ,  Hist.  Exch.  402. 

419  (1872).     The  legislature  cannol  dele-  5  Vin.  Abr.  Corp.  F.  pi.  6;  lb.  pi.  4; 

gate  the   power   to  create  municipal  cor-  Bagot'a  Case,  7   Edw.  IV.  29;  Grant  on 

poration  .      as,  in  this  case,  to  a  district  Corp.  4.°.,  note  <•,  and  cases  cited. 

.  sin,,, us,  32   Minn.  540;  8  Rol.  Abr.  518  ;  1  Kyd,  68.    TheCon- 

thermaii,  88  Ark.  81.  servatora,  &c.  v.  Ash,  10   Barn.  &  Cress. 

i  Cairo  v.    Bross,    101    111.    175  (1882),  34'J  (21    Eng.   C.    L  97),  1829.     "It  is 

quoting  ti  ±     Pout,  Bee.  16,  and  note.  not  necessary,"  says  Mr.  Kyd,  "that  the 


§  43  NO   PRECISE    FORM    OF   WORDS   ESSENTIAL.  75 

fective  were  the  name  omitted,  if  the  name  could  be  ascertained  from 
the  terms  of  the  charter  or  act,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  thing 
or  matters  granted.1  Certain  attributes  or  powers  are  absolutely 
essential  to  constitute  a  body  corporate,  such  as  perpetual  succession, 
the  right  to  contract,  to  sue  and  be  sued  as  a  corporation,  &c.  Now 
if  the  charter  or  act  which  is  relied  upon  as  creating  a  body  cor- 
porate by  implication,  instead  of  simply  omitting  to  express  these 
essential  properties,  negatives  and  excludes  them,  it  is  plain  that 
the  body  would  not  be  deemed  to  be  incorporated.2 

§  43  (22).  Same  subject.  —  Although  corporations  in  this  country 
are  created  by  statute,  still  the  rule  is  here  also  settled  that  not  only 
private  corporations  aggregate,  but  municipal  or  public  corporations, 
may  be  established  without  any  particular  form  of  words  or  technical 
mode  of  expression,  though  such  words  are  commonly  employed.3 
If  powers  and  privileges  are  conferred  upon  a  body  of  men,  or  upon 
the  residents  or  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  district,  and  if  these  can- 
not be  exercised  and  enjoyed,  and  if  the  purposes  intended  cannot 
be  carried  into  effect,  without  acting  in  a  corporate  capacity,  a  cor- 
poration is,  to  this  extent,  created  by  implication.  The  question 
turns  upon  the  intent  of  the  legislature,  and  this  can  be  shown 
constructively  as  well  as  expressly.4  This  is  well  illustrated  in  a 
case  in  Massachusetts,5  where  the  question  was  whether  the  plain- 
charter  should  expressly  confer  those  Barn.  &  Cress.  349  (21  Eng.  C.  L.  97). 
powers  without  which  a  collective  hody  Ante,  sec.  32  ;  post,  sec.  84. 
of  men  cannot  be  a  corporation,  such  as  l  Trustees  v.  Parks,  10  Me.  (1  Fairf.) 

the  power  of  suing  and  being  sued,  and     441  ;    School   Com.  v.   Dean,    2   Stew.  & 
to  take  and  grant  property,  though  such     Port.  (Ala.)  190  (1832). 
powers   are  in  general   expressly  given."  2  Grant  on  Corp.  30. 

1  Kyd,  Corp.  63.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  3  Thomas  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  9,  84, 
Borough  of  Yarmouth,  1609,  2  Brownlow  per  Cowen,  J.,  and  authorities  cited  ;  Bow 
&  Goldsb.  292,  Part  II.,  it  was  decided  by  v.  Allentown,  34  N.  H.  351,  372  ;  Steb- 
the  common  bench,  per  Lord  Coke,  that  a  bins  v.  Jennings,  10  Pick.  172  ;  Benton  v. 
grant  of  incorporation  to  the  burgesses  or  Jackson,  2  Johns.  Ch.  325,  326  (1817)  ; 
citizens  of  a  borough  or  city,  which,  being  Mahoney  v.  The  Bank  of  the  State,  4 
an  old  grant,  shoidd  be  favorably  con-  Ark.  620  (1842)  ;  s.  c.  well  digested  in 
strued,  was  good  without  the  words  "their  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.,  sec.  77;  North 
successors."  And  see,  on  this  subject,  the  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2  Wend.  109, 
learned  opinion  of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Over-  133,  opinion  by  Savage,  C.  J.  ;  Conserva- 
seers  of  Poor,  &c.  v.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  tors  of  River  Tone  v.  Ash,  10  Barn.  & 
130  (1839).  He  says  :  "The  mode  of  per-  Cress.  349  ;  Jefferysv.  Gurr,  2  B.  &  Adol. 
petuating  the  existence  of  a  corporate  body  841  ;  Newport  Trustees,  In  re,  16  Sim. 
is  not  essential ;  all  that  is  essential  is  346 ;  2  Kent,  Com.  27. 
that  some  mode  be  provided  by  the  charter  4  Same  cases  last  cited, 

or  act  by  which  it  is  constituted,  or  by  the  5  Inhabitants,  &c.  v.  Wood,  13  Mass. 

general  laws  of  the  government,  by  means  193  (1816).  Mr.  Fessenden  for  the  plain- 
of  which  it  shall  be  so  perpetuated."  22  tiff,  and  Mr.  Greenleaf  for  the  defendant. 
Pick.  130  ;   The  Conservators  v.  Ash,  10     In  Bow  v.  Allentown,  34  N.  H.  351,  it  was 


76 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§43  a 


tills  were  a  corporate  body  with  power  to  sue.  They  were  not 
incorporated  expressly.  But,  by  statute,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
several  school-districts  were  empowered,  at  any  meeting  properly 
called,  to  raise  money  to  erect,  repair,  or  purchase  a  school-house, 
to  determine  its  site,  &c,  the  majority  binding  the  minority. 
The  canst-  w;i>  urgm-d  by  able  counsel,  and,  after  several  consulta- 
tions, the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  finally  agreed  in 
the  opinion  that  the  plaintiffs  possessed  sufficient  corporate  powers 
tt)  maintain  an  action  on  a  contract  to  build  a  school-house,  and  to 
make  to  them  a  lease  of  land.  But  the  intention  of  the  legislature, 
where  it  is  sought  to  show  that  a  corporation  has  been  created  by 
implication,  must  satisfactorily  appear.1 

§  43  v.  Corporate  Existence  not  open  to  Collateral  Attack.  — - 
Where  a  municipal  corporation  is  acting  under  color  of  law,  and 
its  existence  is  not  questioned  by  the  State,  it  cannot  he  col- 
laterally drawn  in  question  by  private  parties ;  and  the  rule  is  not 
different  although  the  Constitution  may  prescribe  the  manner  of 
incorporation.2 


held  that  the  annexation  by  the  legisla- 
ture of  other  territory  to  the  town  of  Allen- 
town  made  that  a  corporate  town  by 
implication,  if  it  was  not  so  before  ;  and 
such  also  was  the  effect,  under  the  Consti- 
tution of  New  Hampshire,  of  a  grant  to  a 
place  having  less  than  one  hundred  and 
fifty  polls  to  send  a  representative.  A 
legislative  grant  gives  capacity  to  hold 
the  thing  granted.  Lord  v.  Bigelow,  6 
Vt.  465. 

1  Medical  Institute  v.  Patterson,  1 
Denio,  61  ;  8.  c.  affirmed  in  Court  of  Er- 
rors, 5  Denio,  618  (1846)  ;  Myers  v.  Irwin, 
2  Serg.  &  Rawle,  368  (1816)  ;  Angell  & 
Anns,  sec.  79,  and  cases  cited  ;  Wells  V. 
Burbank,  17  N.  II.  393;  Society,  &c.  v. 
Town  of  Pawlet,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  480,  502. 
To  establish  a  corporation  by  implication, 
says  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Stebbins  v.  Jennings, 
10  Pick.  172,  it  must  appear  that  the 
rights  and  powers  conferred  can  only  be 
enjoyed  by  the  exercise  of  corporate 
powers,  and,  therefore,  if  such  powers 
arc  not  necessary,  they  are  not  impliedly 
given. 

2  St.  Lonis  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247 
(1876)  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  180,  254. 
Hence  in  an  action  by  such  a  corporation 


to  recover  penalties  imposed  by  its  ordi- 
nances, mil  ticl  corporation  is  not  a  good 
plea.  Mendota  v.  Thompson,  20  111.  197; 
Hamilton  v.  Carthage,  24  111.  22  ;  Ket- 
tering v.  Jacksonville,  50  111.  39  ;  Geneva 
v.  Cole  (action  to  recover  a  tax),  61  111. 
397  (1871)  ;  Burt  v.  Winona  &  St.  Peter 
l!y.  Co.,  31  Minn.  472;  Frederick  town  v. 
Fox,  84  Mo.  59  ;  Austrian  v.  Guy,  21 
Fed.  Rep.  500. 

In  State  v.  Leatherman,  38  Ark.  81, 
Eakin,  J.,  said  :  "  We  are  emboldened  to 
declare  in  behalf  of  tho  public  good,  that 
the  State  herself  may,  by  long  acquies- 
cence, and  by  the  continued  recognition 
tli rough  her  officers,  State  and  county,  of 
a  municipal  corporation,  be  precluded  from 
an  information  to  deprive  it  of  franchises 
long  exercised  in  accordance  with  the  gen- 
eral law."  In  this  case  the  proceedings  to 
incorporate  the  city  were  had  in  a  court 
not  empowered  to  entertain  them.  People 
v.  Maynard,  15  Mich.  463,  470.  See  post, 
chap,  xxi.,  Quo  Warranto.  Entering  into 
an  obligation  with  a  corporation  admits 
the  corporate  rapacity,  and  precludes  a 
plea  of  mil  ticl  corporation.  St.  Louis  v. 
Shields,  62  Mo.  247,  251,  and  cases  cited. 
Post,  sec.  449. 


§  44  ACCEPTANCE    OF    CHARTER    MAY    BE    REQUIRED.  77 

Acceptance  of  Charter. 

§  44  (23).  Incorporating  Act  may  be  made  binding  without  Con- 
sent, or  only  upon  Consent.  —  The  rule  which  applies  to  private 
corporations,  that  the  incorporating  act  is  ineffectual  to  constitute 
a  corporate  body  until  it  is  assented  to  or  accepted  by  the  corpo- 
rators, has  no  application  to  statutes  creating  municipal  corpora- 
tions.1 These  are  laws,  and  as  such  are  imperative  and  binding 
according  to  their  terms  without  any  consent,  unless  the  act  is 
expressly  made  conditional.2  All  who  live  within  the  limits  of 
the  incorporated  district  are  bound  by  them,  and  can  withdraw 
from  their  operation  only  by  removal.  Over  such  corporations  the 
legislature,  except  as  restrained  by  the  Constitution,  has  entire  cod- 
trol ;  and  unless  otherwise  provided  by  the  act  itself,  or  a  different 
intention  be  manifested,  the  public  corporation  is  legally  constituted 
as  soon  as  the  incorporating  act  declaring  it  to  exist  goes  into 
effect.3  But  while  the  legislature  is  net  bound  to  obtain  the  accep- 
tance or  assent  of  the  municipal  corporation,  it  is  well  established 
that  a  provision  in  a  municipal  charter  that  it  shall  not  take  effect 
unless  assented  to  or  accepted  by  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  is 
not  unconstitutional,  it  being  in  no  just  sense  a  delegation  of  legis- 
lative power,  but  merely  a  question  as  to  the  acceptance  or  rejection 
of  a  charter.4     So  a  provision  in  a  charter,  or  the  constituent  act 

1  Post,  sees.  54,  84,  note,  183.  524,  532  (1826)  ;   State  v.  Canterbury,   8 

2  It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  218  ;  People  v.  City  of 
make  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  char-  Butte,  4  Mont.  174.  Acceptance,  when 
ter  dependent  upon  the  result  of  an  elec-  requisite,  may  doubtless  be  implied  in 
tion  by  the  qualified  voters  of  the  territory  proper  cases,  as  where  no  particular  mode 
to  be  affected  by  it.  Clarke  v.  Rogers,  81  of  expressing  acceptance  is  prescribed, 
Ky.  43.  from  corporate   acts   and   conduct,   as   in 

3  Berlin  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266  cases  of  private  corporations.  Taylor  v. 
(1856),  per  Bell,  J.,  where  it  is  accord-  Newberne,  2  Jones  Eq.  N.  C.  141  (1855). 
ingly  held  that  to  make  an  incorporation  See  Zabriskie  v.  Railroad  Co.,  23  How. 
of°a  town  effectual  it  is  not  necessary  that  (U.  S.)  381,  397  (1859).  Post,  sec.  270, 
there    should    be   a  legal    town   meeting  note. 

holden  in  it.     See  also  People  v.  Wren,  4  4  People  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  53  (1869) 

Scam.   (5  111.)   269;    Warren  v.  Charles-  Alcorn  v.  Horner,   38  Miss.   652  (1860) 

town,  2  Grav,  104  ;  Mills  v.  Williams,  11  Patterson  v.  Society,  &c,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J 

Ire.   558;    State   v.  Curran,   7  Eng.   (12  L.)  385  (1854);  Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56  Pa 

Ark.)  321;   Fire  Department  v.   Kip,   10  St.  359;  Commonwealth  v.  Quarter  Ses 

Wend.  267;    People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend,  sions,  8  Pa.   St.    395;  Commonwealth    v 

325,   337;   Brouwer  v.   Appleby,  1  Sandf.  Painter,  10  Pa.  St.  214  ;  and  see  also  Bull 

158  (1847)  ;  People  v.  President,  9  Wend.  v.  Read,  13  Gratt.  (Va.)  78  (1853);  People 

351;    Wood  v.   Bank,   9  Cow.    194,    205  v.  Reynolds,  5  Gilm.  (10  111.)  1;  State  v. 

(1828) ;  Proprietors,  &c.  v.  Horton,  6  Hill,  Scott,  17  Mo.  521  ;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State, 

501  ;  Gorham  v.  Springfield,  21  Maine,  58  4   Zabr.    (24   N.    J.    L.)    718  ;     Bank   v. 

(1842)  ;    People  v.   Stout,    23  Barb.    349  Brown,    26   N.  Y.    467    (1863) ;    Call  v. 

(1856)  ;  Bristol  v.  New  Chester,  3  N.  H.  Chadbourne,  46  Maine,  206 ;  State  v.  Wil- 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


44 


of  a  municipal  corporation,  by  which  the  right  to  make  certain 
improvements  or  to  create  certain  liabilities  is  made  to  depend  upon 
a  vote  of  the  people  interested,  has  frequently  been  upheld  as  valid.1 
So  an  act  directing  an  election  to  he  held  by  the  qualified  electors 
interested  to  determine,  by  ballot,  whether  a  newly-erected  town- 
ship should  be  continued,  is  constitutional.3     On  the  same  principle 

N.  J.  L.  72  ;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  422.  See 
also  Howe  v.  Plain  field  (intoxicating  li- 
quors), 37  N.  J.  L.  146;  Hudson  County 
v.  State  (power  of  local  body  to  fix  rates 
of  ferriage),  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  718. 
Validity  of  Loral  Option  Laws  denied, 
and  the  subject  fully  examined,  in  Wall, 
In  re,  48  Cal.  271)  (1874);  s.  0.  17  Am. 
Rep.  425;  People  v.  Nally,  49  Gal.  478 
(1875)  ;  Anderson  v.  Commonwealth,  14 
Bush,  171  ;  State  v.  Cook,  24  Minn.  247  ; 
Fell  o.  State  (Liquor  Law),  42  Md.  71 
(1875)  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  83.  See  also 
in  Pennsylvania  the  ease  which  involved 
the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  act  of 
May,  1871,  "to  allow  the  voters  of  the 
22(1  Ward  of  Philadelphia  to  vote  on  the 
question  of  granting  licenses  to  sell  intox- 
icating liquors."  Locke's  Appeal,  72  Pa. 
St.  491 ;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  716  ;  Glovers- 
ville  v.  Howell  (intoxicating  liquors),  70 
N.  Y.  287  (1877)  ;  State  v.  Wilcox,  42 
Conn.  364  (1875)  ;  s.  0.  19  Am.  Rep.  536; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  124,  125.  Post,  sec. 
308. 

i  Clarke  v.  Rochester,  28  N.  Y.  605  ; 
Patterson  v.  Society,  fee,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  ,1. 
L.)  385  ;  BankofRomeu.  Rome,  18  N.Y. 
38  ;  Trustees  v.  Cherry,  8  Ohio  St.  564  ; 
Burnes  v.  Atchison,  2  Kan.  454  (1S64); 
Bank  v.  Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467;  Hammond 
o.  Haines,  25  Md.  541  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Commissioners,  1  Ohio  St.  77  ;  Foote  v. 
Cincinnati,  11  Ohio,  408  (1842)  ;  St.  Louis 
,■.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483  ;  Blanding  ». 
Burr,  13  Cal.  343.  These  cases  are  dis- 
tinguishable from  Barto  v.  Himrod,  4 
Seld.  (8  X.  V.)  483. 

-  Commonwealth  v.  Judges,  &c.,  8  Pa. 
St.  391  ;  distinguished  from  Pari. 
Commonwealth,  6  Pa.  St.  507  ;  Coramon- 
!•]:  o.  Painter,  L0  Pa.  St.  214  (1849)  ; 
Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  859.  So 
the  question  may  be  submitted  whether  a 
portion  of  an  adjoining  comity  shall  bi 
annexed.  People  v.  Nally,  49  Cal. 
478  (1875).    Wherethe  authority  toad  de- 


cox,  45  Mo.  458  ;  Hobart  v.  Supervisors,  17 

People  v.  City  of  Butte,  supra; 

.  tie,   &c.    R.  R.  Co.    v.  Geiger,   34 

Ind.  185.  This  case  asserts  a  distinction 
between  a  bill  submitted  to  the  people  of 
the  whole  State  for  adoption  or  rejection, 
and  an  ad  which  leaves  it  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  a  particular  locality  whether  they 
will  avail  themselves  of  its  provisions.  It 
has  been  held  in  New  Hampshire  that  it 
was  competent  for  the  legislature,  under 
the  Constitution  of  the  State,  to  enact  a 
penal  law  which  shall  have  effect  c*ly  in 
towns  which  adopt  it  by  vote.  State 
v.  Noyes,  10  Fost.  (30  N.  H.)  279  (1855). 
An  amendment  to  a  city  charter  was  to 
take  effed  only  when  adopted  "  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  of  the  city."  This  was 
considered  to  manifest  the  intention  to 
present  the  question  of  acceptance  to  the 
voters  at  a  regular  city  election.  The 
council  ordered  the  vote  to  he  taken  at 
the  toumship  polls;  the  voters  of  the  two 
organizations  possessing  different  qualifi- 
ions,  hut  the  township  and  city  occu- 
pied precisely  the  same  territory.  Held, 
that  the  election  was  of  no  validity,  and 
thai  the  amendment  had  never  been  duly 
accepted.  Foote  v.  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio, 
408  (1842). 

/  oi  il  '  ption  Laws.  A  useful  article 
upon  the  Constitutionality  of  Local  Option 
Laws  will  be  found  in  12  Am.  Law  Reg. 
(v  s.)  March,  1873,  p.  129.  Affii 
the  principle  that  municipal  ot  public  cor- 
poral >n£  nf  the  people  thereof  may  by  the 
I,  lature  be  invested  with  the  power  to 
date  or  prohibit  the  retail  of  intoxi- 
cating drinks,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
jerS(  >  i  ■!  i  \.  ' "  tiham  Local  Option 
Law,  which  declared  the  r  tail  of  ardenl 
spirits  without  license  to  he  unlawful,  and 
which  provided  that  no  license  should  be 
granted  if  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  a 
1  i  be  eon- 

12  Am.    Law    Re  ;.    (n.  s.)   32  ;    s.  c     36 


§45 


CREATION   BY   SPECIAL   ACT   AND   BY   GENERAL    LAWS. 


79 


the  legislature  may  provide  that  a  statute  shall  cease  to  exist  unless 
the  municipal  corporation  to  be  affected  by  it  shall,  within  a  pre- 
scribed period,  assent  to  it.1  Permitting  the  voters  of  a  munici- 
pality to  decide  upon  questions  of  local  interest  or  expediency,  such 
as  those  mentioned  in  this  section  and  in  the  notes,  seems  to  the 
author  to  be  conformable  to  those  ideas  of  self-government  and  self- 
regulation  by  the  people  concerned,  which  lie  at  the  basis  not  only 
of  our  municipalities  but  of  our  institutions.  The  only  limit  is 
that  the  legislature  must  not  delegate  its  function  as  the  law- 
making branch  of  the  government. 


Special  Constitutional  Provisions  relating  to  Municipal  Corporations. 

§  45  (24).  Creation  by  special  Act  and  by  general  Laws.  —  The 
Constitutions  of  many  of  the  States  contain  provisions  respecting 
the  creation  and  powers  of  municipal  corporations.  In  some  of  the 
Constitutions  the  legislature  is  in  terms  allowed  to  create  corpora- 
tions for  municipal  purposes  by  special  act*  and  in  others  it  is  in 


pends  upon  the  prior  sanction  of  "  a  major- 
ity of  the  qualified  voters  "  residing  in  the 
corporation,  the  presumption  is  that  all 
who  vote  are  legal  voters  ;  and  the  better 
view  probably  is,  that  those  who  do  not 
vote  acquiesce  in  the  result,  and  that  a 
majority  of  those  actually  voting  is  suffi- 
cient, though  in  point  of  fact  it  may  not 
be  a  majority  of  all  who  would  be  entitled 
to  vote.  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450 
(1866)  ;  State  v.  Mayor,  &c.  37  Mo.  270. 
And  of  this  opinion  is  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  which,  in  an  ac- 
tion on  municipal  bonds,  the  phrase,  "  a 
majority  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  town- 
ship," was  held  to  mean  a  majority  of  the 
legal  voters  of  the  township  voting  at  the 
election.  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers, 
16  Wall.  644  (1872)  ;  People  v.  Warfield, 
20  111.  163  ;  People  v.  Wiant,  48  111.  263  ; 
Kailroad  v.  Davidson  County,  1  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  692  ;  Talbot  v.  Dent,  9  B.  Mon. 
526  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  Corp.,  9  ed.  sees. 
499,  500.  But  compare  State  v.  Winkel- 
meier,  35  Mo.  103,  which  construes  such 
language  to  require  a  "  majority  of  all  the 
legal  voters  of  the  city,  and  not  merely  of 
all  who  might,  at  a  particular  time,  choose 
to  vote  upon  it."  See  Damon  v.  Granby, 
2  Pick.  345,  355  (1824),  and  chapter  on 
Corporate  Meetings,  post.  Infra,  sees.  47, 
note  277. 


1  Corning  v.  Greene,  23  Barb.  33  (1856). 

2  Post,  chap.  iv.  New  York  Constitu- 
tion, 1846,  art.  viii.  sec.  1  ;  Illinois  Con- 
stitution, 1847,  art.  x.  sec.  1  ;  see,  also, 
new  Constitution,  1870  ;  Michigan  Con- 
stitution, 1850,  art.  xv.  sec.  1  ;  California 
Constitution,  1849,  art.  iv.  sec.  31  :  con- 
strued, Railroad  Co.  v.  Plumas  Co.,  37 
Cal.  354.  The  Constitution  of  California 
of  1879  ordains  that  "  Corporations  for 
municipal  purposes  shall  not  be  created 
by  special  laws,  but  by  general  laws." 
Art.  xi.  sec.  6.  Minnesota  Constitution, 
1857,  art.  x.  sec.  2  ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9 
Minn.  171;  12  Minn.  41  ;  Oregon  Constitu- 
tion, 1857,  art.  xi.  sec.  2  ;  Louisiana 
Constitution,  1864,  title  vii.  art.  exxi.  ; 
Nevada  Constitution,  1864,  art.  viii.  sec. 

1  ;  construed, Virginia  City  v.  Mining  Co., 

2  Nev.  86.  In  Missouri  it  is  provided 
that  no  municipal  corporation  shall  be 
created  by  special  act,  except  cities  of  at 
least  5,000  inhabitants,  the  special  act  to 
be  approved  by  a  vote  of  the  inhabitants. 
Constitution  1865,  art.  viii.  sec.  5.  Un- 
der a  constitutional  provision  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, that  "  the  General  Assembly  shall 
not  pass  any  local  or  special  law  regu- 
lating the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  town- 
ships," &c,  it  was  held  that  an  act 
providing  that  in  counties  the  popula- 
tion of  which  exceeds  100,000  and  is  less 


H) 


Ml'NK'II'AL    cnlil'oi;  Cl'loNS. 


§45 


terms  forbidden  to  do  this,  and  required  to  provide  a  general  law 
for  all  ationa,  public  and  private.1     So  far  as  municipal  cor- 

porations  and  their  rights  arc  protected  by  constitutional  provisions, 
express  or  implied,  they  are  removed  from  legislative  control,  but  no 
further,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  subsequent  chapter.  But  the  provis- 
ions of  the  several  Constitutions  in  reference  to  municipal  institu- 
tions and  local  government  are  sufficient,  it  is  believed,  to  establish 
that  the  legislative  power  over  them  and  their  existence  is  not 
transcendental  and  unlimited.2    Although  the  Constitution  of  a  State 


than  lfi'i, ,  tin'  fees  that  belong  to  cer- 

i.iii,  county  officers  shall  be  turned  over 
to  another,  Is  unconstitutional,  being  an 
attempt  to  legislate  directly  for  certain 
counties  (there  being  only  four  tailing 
within  the  limits  mentioned  in  the  act) 
Belected  from  all  others.  This  is  local  or 
Bpecial  legislation  within  the  meaning  of 
the  constitutional  prohibition.  McCarthy 
v.  Commonwealth,  110  Pa.  St.  243,  fol- 
lowing previous  eases  in  the  same  State  to 
t  hi  -  im  s  effect.  "  Wherever  the  provis- 
hi  ,  '  i  are  romjiulsorily  binding 
upon  every  city  of  the  particular  classifica- 
tion, the  legislation  is  general  and  consti- 
tutional. Wherever  the  provisions  are 
binding  a1  the  option  of  the  local  author- 
ities, the  legislation  is  special,  local,  and 
unconstitutional."  Beading  v.  Savage,  120 
Pa.  St.  198  (1888). 

1  Iowa  Constitution,  1857,  art.  iii.  sec. 
30  :  Von  I'lml  r.  Hammer,  29  Iowa,  222  ; 
Florida  Constitution,  1865,  art.  iv.  sec.  20; 
ka  Constitution,  art.  viii.  sees.  1 
and  2.  By  the  new  Constitution  of  Ulir 
lit  ion  is  forbidden  "  in- 
corporating cities,  towns,  or  villages,  or 
ag  or  amending  the  charter  of  any 
town,  city,  or  village."  Wisconsin  con- 
stitution amendment,  1871.  Atty.-Genl. 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  35  Wis.  425;  Kimball  v. 
Ro  i  adale,  12  Wis.  407  ;  Stevens  Poinl  & 
Co.  v.  Reilly,  11  Wis.  2'.'.r.  ;  Kansas  Con- 
stitution, art.  rii.  sees.  1  and  5  ;  con 
Wyandotte  City  v.  Wood,  5  Kan.  603; 
Atchison  v.  Bartholow,  4  Kan.  124. 
Tic  Constitution  of  Ohio  is  as  follows  : 
"The  General  Assembly  shall  provide 
for  the  ion  of  cities  and  incor- 

by  general  laws,  and  re- 
strict   their    power    of    taxation, 
ment,  I  noney,  contracting  debts, 

and  loaning  their  credit,  so  as  to  prevent 


the  abuse  of  such  power."  Constitution 
a.  i).  1S51,  art.  xiii.  sec.  6.  Under  this 
section  the  legislature,  by  the  Towns' 
and  Cities'  Act  of  May  3,  1852  (Swan  & 
Critchf.  Stats.  14:»7),  undertook  to  pro- 
vide for  the  government  of  all  such  places 
by  a  general  statute.  Thomas  v.  Ashland, 
12  Ohio  St.  124.  An  act  applying  to  all 
cities  of  the  first  class  containing  less  than 
100,000  inhabitants  is  not  in  conflict 
with  the  provision  of  the  Constitution 
which  requires  all  laws  of  a  general  nature 
to  have  a  uniform  operation  throughout 
the  State  Welkerv.  Potter,  18  Ohio  St. 
85  (1868)  ;  see  also  Lafayette  v.  Jenners, 
10  Ind.  70,  80,  (1857).  Construction  of 
constitutional  provision  that  there  shall  be 
"  but  one  system  of  town  and  county  gov- 
ernment," which  "  shall  be  as  nearly  uni- 
form as  practicable."  State  v.  Dousman, 
28  Wis.  541  (1871)  ;  State  v.  Riordan,  24 
Wis.  484  (1869). 

In  Morawetz  on  Corp.  (2d  ed.)  sees. 
9-13,  the  cases  relating  to  constitutional 
limitations  on  the  powers  of  the  States 
in  respect  of  the  mode  of  creating  cor- 
porations are  referred  to,  and  the  judi- 
cial construction  of  special  constitutional 
pm\  [sions  on  this  subject  stated. 

-  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  561, 
Brown,  J.,  says  :  "  When  the  present  Con- 
stitution was  formed,  the  entire  territory  of 
the  State  was  separated,  and  appropriated 
by  its  civil  divisions,  its  counties,  cities, 
and  towns.  These  civil  divisions  are  coeval 
with  the  government.  The  State  has 
never  existed  a  moment  without  them. 
All  our  tlioiiij/ils  mill  notions  of  civil  gov- 
ernment are  iiise/iupi/i/;/  iissocifi/nl  with 
counties,  cities,  "ml  towns.  They  are  per- 
manent elements  in  the  frame  of  govern- 
ment ;  they  are  institutions  of  the  State, 
durable   aud  indestructible  by  any  power 


§46 


PROHIBITION    OF   SPECIAL    ACTS. 


81 


may  recognize  the  municipal  corporation  of  an  important  city  by 
fixing  the  number  of  certain  officers,  and  providing  for  their  election, 
&c,  yet  this  does  not  make  the  charter  of  the  city  a  constitutional 
charter  conferring  powers  beyond  the  control  of  the  legislature.1 

§  46  (24  a).  Prohibition  of  special  Acts  conferring  Corporate  Pow- 
ers.—  The  Constitution  of  Kansas  as  well  as  of  Ohio,  in  the  article 
entitled  "  Corporations,"  contains  a  provision  that  "  the  legislature 
shall  pass  no  special  act  conferring  corporate  powers,"2  and  the  Su- 


less  than  that  which  gave  being  to  the 
organic  law.  They  are  however,  subject 
to  control  and  regulation  by  the  legisla- 
ture. It  may  enlarge  or  circumscribe  their 
territorial  limits,  increase  or  diminish 
their  numbers,  separate  them  into  parts, 
and  annex  some  of  the  parts  to  parts  of 
others  ;  but  they  must  still  assume  the 
form  and  be  known  and  governed  only  as 
counties,  cities,  or  towns.  The  State  at 
large  is,  and  ever  has  been,  an  aggregate 
of  these  local  bodies."  To  same  effect  in 
same  case,  15  N.  Y.  541,  per  Denio,  C.  J.; 
and  see  also  opinion  of  Allen,  J.,  in  Peo- 
ple v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50  (1873).  See 
also  People  v.  Morrell,  21  Wend.  563 
(division  of  counties)  ;  ante,  sec.  9  et  sea. 
In  People  v.  Hurlbut,  decided  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Michigan,  in  1871,  24 
Mich.  44  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103,  this  sub- 
ject is  largely  and  learnedly  examined  by 
Mr.  Justice  Cooley,  who,  conceding  to  the 
State  full  authority  to  shape  and  control 
municipal  organizations  at  its  will,  never- 
theless maintained  that  there  were,  in  the 
Constitution  of  that  State,  both  express 
and  implied  restrictions  upon  the  legisla- 
tive dominion  over  municipal  institutions, 
and  that  local  governments  and  the  right 
of  the  people  to  them  were  secured  by  the 
Constitution,  and  did  not  exist  by  the  favor 
and  at  the  mere  pleasure  of  the  legislature. 
And  in  the  same  case  the  court  decided, 
under  a  special  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  elsewhere  noticed,  that 
the  legislature  could  not  appoint,  for  a 
city  corporation,  officers  whose  duties  were 
purely  local  and  strictly  municipal.  The 
discussions  by  all  of  the  judges  are  un- 
usually interesting.  Ante,  sees.  8  «-8  d, 
11  ;  post,  chap.  iv.  In  The  State  v.  Denny 
and  Evansville  v.  State  (April,  1889),  21 
North  East.  Rep.  252,  267,  274,  noted 
VOL.    I.  — 6 


post,  sec.  58,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indi- 
ana holds  that  the  Constitution  of  that 
State  secures  to  the  people  of  its  incorpo- 
rated municipalities  the  right  to  local  self- 
government,  and  that  this  right  is  there- 
fore incapable  of  legislative  destruction. 
The  opinions  of  Elliott,  C.  J.,  and  of 
Coffey,  Berkshire,  and  Olds,  JJ.,  are  re- 
plete with  learning,  and  are  of  unusual 
interest.  Mitchell,  J.,  dissented  on  the 
ground  that  the  legislative  acts  in  question 
were  not  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution 
of  the  State  as  it  now  stands.  See  Consti- 
tution of  California  of  1879,  art.  xi.,  en- 
titled "Cities,  Counties,  and  Towns,"  for 
provisions  which  declare  or  presuppose  the 
continued  existence  of  these  organizations. 

1  Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police,  15  Md. 
376.  See  also  Patterson  v.  Society,  &c. 
4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  385  (1854). 

2  Constitution  of  Kansas,  art.  xii. 
Sees.  1  and  2  of  art.  xiii.  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Ohio  are  the  same  as  sec.  1,  art.  xii. 
of  the  Constitution  of  Kansas.  Sec.  6, 
art.  xiii.  of  the  Ohio  Constitution  is  the 
same  as  sec.  5,  art.  xii.  of  the  Kansas 
Constitution.  There  is  a  similar  constitu- 
tional provision  in  Nebraska,  and  perhaps 
in  other  States.  This  provision  construed 
(Clegg  v.  Richardson  Co.,  8  Neb.  178  ; 
Dundy  v.  Richardson  Co.,  8  Neb.  508), 
and  held  to  invalidate  certain  bonds  issued 
under  a  special  law.  s.  p.  School  District 
v.  Insurance  Co.,  103  U.  S.  707.  The 
Constitution  of  California  declares  that 
"all  laws  of  a  general  nature  shall  have 
a  uniform  operation."  Under  this  clause 
it  is  held  that  an  act  exempting  particular 
cases  from  the  operation  of  a  general  law 
is  unconstitutional.  Omnibus  It.  R.  Co. 
v.  Baldwin,  57  Cal.  160,  where  a  special 
act  authorizing  the  construction  of  a  street 
railway  was  held  void  for  attempting  to 


82 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§46 


preme  Courts  of  those  States  have  decided  thai  the  provision  ap- 
plied to  municipal  as  well  as   private  corporations;1  and  that  the 

t  was  to  compel  the  legislatures  of  those  States  to  regulate  the 
grant  of  powers  to  municipal  corporations  by  general  laws.  Hence 
an  dly  amending  the  charter  of  a  city  in  respect  to  mak- 

local  improvements  or  assessments,2  or  specially  extending  the 
limits  of  a  particular  city,3  is  unconstitutional;  and  so  it  seems  is 
an  act  which  authorizes  a  city  by  name  to  issue  its  scrip  for  a  par- 
ticular purpose,  and  to  levy  taxes  to  pay  it  in  aid  of  a  single  enter- 
prise,— the  court  inclining  to  hold  such  an  enactment  to  be  a 
special  act,  and  one  which  undertook  to  confer  corporate  powers* 


exempt    the  railway    company  from    the 
operation  of  the  general  law  relating  to 
railways.       Ante,     sec.    45  ;   post, 
see.  49. 

bison   v.   Bartholow,  4    Kan.  124 
(1866)  .  Wyandotte  City  v.  Wood,  5  Kan. 
1870)  ;   The  State   v.   Cincinnati,  20 
Ohio  St.  18  (1S70)  ;  following  Atkinson  v. 
Rail  5  Ohio  St.  21  (1864).     In 

New  Jersey  a  similar  provision  is  held  to 
apply  exclusively  to  private  corporations. 
State    v.    Newark,   40   N.   J.    L.  550,   558 

-   Atchison  v.  Bartholow,   siqrra ;    Gil- 

r.  Norton,  10  Kan.  491  (1872);  State 

Pugh,  4:j  Ohio  St.  98  (an  act  to  reorgan- 

■  4'  the  first  grade  of  the   second 

,  and  to  reduce  their  tax   levy,    held 

to  be  unconstitutional  because  it  granted 

authority  to  such  cities  to  appoiul  a  I 

of  control,  thus  conferring  corporate  powers 

by  special  act). 

:i  Wyandotte  v.  Wood,  supra  ;  State  v. 
Cincinnati,  supra.  In  tie'  easel  I  cited, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio,  under  the 
titutional  provision  quoted  in  the 
text,  held  that  the  legislature  cannot  by 
special  act  create  a  corporation,  nor  by 
special  act  confer  additional  powers  on  a 
corporation  already  existing ;  and  that  in 
there  was  no  difference 
between  prii 
tions,  since  the  Constitution  equally  em- 

|    qjual]     applies  to  both  cl 
and.  ih.  refore,  the  act  of  April   16, 

rib  thi  i  orporate  limits  of  <  'in- 

cinnati,"  being  considered   a  special  act, 

v  i-  adjudged  void.     See  also  Atkinson  v. 

Railroad    '  !o.,  supra.     In  this  case,   Ran- 

.  J.,  thus  'he  Constitution  ; 


"  These  provisions  of  the  Constitution  are 
too  explicit  to  admit  of  the  least  doubt  that 
they  were  intended  to  disable  the  General 
Assembly  from  either  creating  corpora- 
tions, or  conferring  upon  them  corporate 
powers,  by  special  acts  of  legislation.  It 
was  intended  to  correct  an  existing  evil, 
and  to  inaugurate  the  policy  of  placing  all 
corporations  of  the  same  kind  upon  a  per- 
fect equality  as  to  all  future  grants  of 
power;  of  making  such  law  applicable  to 
all  parts  of  the  State,  and  thereby  secur- 
ing tic  vigilance  and  attention  of  its 
whole  representation  ;  and  finally,  of 
making  all  judicial  construction  of  their 
powers,  or  the  restrictions  imposed  upon 
them,  equally  applicable  to  all  corpora- 
tions of  the  same  class.  We  must  give 
such  a  construction  to  the  Constitution  as 
will  preserve  its  leading  objects  intact." 
Supra,  sees.  41,  45. 

4  Commercial  National  Bank  v.  City 
of  Iola,  2  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  353  (1873).  Iu 
this  case  the  Circuit  Judge,  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  and  referring  to  the 
opinion  of  Ranney,  .1.,  quoted  in  the  last 
note,  ohserved  :  "One  of  the  objects  of 
the  constitutional  provision  in  Kansas,  as 
well  as  in  Ohio,  was  to  cut  up  by  the 
roots  the  mischi  f  of  special  legislation, 
particularly  in  respect  to  corporations, 
both    public    and    private.      This    object 

would  he  defeated  if  the    special    act    relat- 
ing   to    the    city    of    Iola  could    stand.      If 

undei  the  doctrine  of  Butz  v.  Muscatine, 
8  Wall.  575,  'hi-  court  is  not  absolutely 
bound,  in  this  class  of  cases,  to  follow  the 
interpretation  of  the  Stat-  Com  titution 
given  by  its  highest  court,  yet  it  seems 
that  it   night  to  follow  it  where  it  appears 


46 


PROHIBITION    OF   SPECIAL    ACTS. 


83 


It  was  decided  that  while  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  of 
Kansas  that  forbids  the  legislature  to  pass  "any  special  act  con- 
ferring corporate  powers"  includes  municipal  corporations  proper, 
it  does  not  embrace  quasi  corporations,  such  as  school-districts,  al- 
though the  latter  are  declared  by  statute  to  be  bodies  corporate.1 
In  California  an  act  of  the  legislature  which  grants  to  individuals 
and  their  assigns  certain  powers  and  privileges,  and  then  provides 
that  the  act  shall  not  take  effect  unless  such  persons  within  a  given 
time  shall  organize  themselves  under  existing  laws  into  a  corpora- 
tion, is  a  grant,  not  to  the  individuals  as  persons,  but  to  the  corpo- 
ration when  formed.2 


to  rest  upon  solid  grounds,  and  was  made 
in  cases  and  in  respect  to  questions  where 
there  was  nothing  to  warp  the  judgment 
of  its  judges,  and  where  the  interpretation 
was  settled  or  had  been  declared  at  the 
time  the  act  in  controversy  was  passed. 
In  the  latest  case  on  this  subject,  decided 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  it  is  not  denied  that  the  Supreme 
Court  of  a  State  is  the  appointed  expositor 
of  its  Constitution  and  laws,  and  that  the 
Federal  courts  will  adopt  as  rules  for  their 
own  judgments  the  decisions  of  the  highest 
courts  of  the  State  'respecting  local  ques- 
tions  peculiar  to  itself,  or  respecting  the 
construction  of  its  own  Constitution  and 
laws.'  It  only  denies  the  binding  force 
of  State  adjudications  which  rest  upon  the 
general  principles  of  law,  and  not  upon 
the  meaning  of  special  constitutional  or 
legislative  provisions.  Olcott  v.  Super- 
visors, 16  Wall.  678  (1872).  I  think  the 
present  case  is  one  in  which  it  is  the  duty 
of  this  court  to  follow  the  decisions  of  the 
State  Supreme  Court ;  and  so  far  as  my 
judgment  rests  upon  the  special  provisions 
of  the  Constitution  above  referred  to,  I 
place  it  upon  the  State  adjudications  with- 
out an  inquiry  into  their  soundness."  The 
bonds  in  this  case  were  held  invalid 
mainly  on  the  ground  that  they  were  not 
issued  for  a  public  purpose.  The  judg- 
ment of  the  Circuit  Court  was  affirmed. 
20  Wall.  655(1874).  See  also  Savings 
Assoc,  v.  Topeka,  3  Dillon,  376  (1874)  ; 
post,  sec.  159;  also  chap.  xiv.  on  Contracts. 
Further  as  to  the  construction  of  the 
provision  that  "corporate  powers"  shall 
not  be  conferred  by  special  act.  School 
Dist.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  103  U.  S.  707  ;  State  v. 


Cincinnati,  20  Ohio  St.  18.  Morawetz  on 
Corp.  (2d  ed.)  sees.  10-13,  and  cases  cited. 

Construction  of  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion against  granting  right  "  to  lay  chum, 
railroad  tracks  in  streets  by  local  or  private 
act,"  see  post,  chap,  xviii.  on  Streets. 

i  Beach  v.  Leahy,  11  Kan.  23  (1873). 
Under  the  constitutional  provision  in 
question  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  in 
the  State  v.  Maloy,  20  Kan.  619  (1878), 
ruled  the  following  points  as  stated  by  the 
judges  :  The  act  of  the  legislature  en- 
titled ' '  An  act  authorizing  cities  therein 
named  to  become  cities  of  the  second 
class,"  approved  February  29,  1872,  is  a 
special  act,  conferring  corporate  powers 
upon  four  particular  municipal  corpora- 
tions, and  is  therefore  unconstitutional 
and  void,  being  in  contravention  of  sec.  1 
of  art.  xii.  of  the  Constitution,  which 
provides  that  "  the  legislature  shall  pass 
no  special  act  conferring  corporate  pow- 
ers." 2.  The  city  of  Council  Grove  was 
organized  as  a  city  of  the  second  class, 
under  said  special  act,  and  was  never 
organized  as  a  city  of  the  second  class 
under  any  other  act,  and  has  never  had 
a  population  of  two  thousand  inhabitants. 
And  it  was  therefore  held  that  said  city  is 
not  legally  a  city  of  the  second  class. 

2  San  'Francisco  v.  S.  V.  W.  W.,  43 
Cal.  493  (1874).  Such  an  act  is  an  at- 
tempt by  the  legislature  in  violation  of 
the  Constitution  to  confer  powers  and 
privileges  upon  a  corporation  by  special 
act.  lb.;  post.  sec.  49.  The  Constitution 
of  Florida  provides  that  "the  legislature 
shall  establish  a  uniform  system  of  county, 
township,  and  municipal  government." 
An  act  authorizing  the  dissolution  of  ?nu- 


84 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


48 


§  47  (2,">).  "  Any  Body  Politic  or  Corporate  "  construed.  — A  Con- 
stitutional provision  that  two  thurds  of  the  General  Assembly  "shall 
be  requisite  to  every  bill  creating,  continuing,  altering,  or  renewing 
body  politic  or  corporate,"  was  held  by  a  majority  of  the  court 
Of  errors,  reversing  the  majority  view  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the 
same  case,  to  extend  to  jatblic  and  municipal,  as  well  as  private  cor- 
porations.1 The  constitutional  provision,  however,  that  "  no  bill 
shall  contain  more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  its  title,"  is  limited  to  State  legislation  and  has  no  appli- 
cation to  municipal  ordinances.2 

§  48  (2G).  "Where  General  Law  can  be  made  applicable."  —  Under 
a  Constitution  which  provides  that  "in  all  cases  where  a  general  law 
can  be  made  applicable,  no  special  law  shall  be  enacted,"  the  better 
view,  and  the  one  supported  by  the  decided  weight  of  authority,  is 
that  it  is  for  the  legislature  to  determine  whether  its  purpose  can 
or  cannot  be  expediently  effected  by  a  general  law  ;  and  a  special 
act,  as,  for  example,  one  providing  for  the  location  of  the  county 
seat  of  a  specified  county,  will  not  be  held  invalid  by  the  courts.3 

nicipal  corporations  having  a   bonded  in- 
debtedness, the  bonds  being  due,  unpaid  and 

unprovided  for,  upon  the  written  applica- 
tion of  one-half  of  the  owners  or  holders  of 

the  bonds,  and  providing  for  their  rein- 
corporation, was  held  to  be  in  violation  of 

this  provision  and  void.     State  v.  Stark, 

18  Fla.  255.    See  on  this  subject,  however, 

chap.  vii. ,  post. '  But  an  act  creating  a  new 

class  of  municipal  corporations,  imposing 

upon  all  the   cities  of  the   new  class  the 

same  powers   and  duties,  is  lawful   under 

the  provision.     Lake  v.   Florida,   18   Fla. 

501.     See  post,  chaps,  vii.  and  viii. 

>  Pnrdy  v.  People,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  384 

(1842)  ;  reversing  2  Hill,  81.     What  is  an 

alt,  mi  inn  within  this  provision.     Corning 

v.  Green,  23  Barb.  33  ;  Smith  v.  Helmer, 

7  Barb.  416  ;  Morris   v.  People,    3  Denio, 

381.     Where  a  Constitution  requires  that 

acts    of   incorporation    shall    have   "  the 

assent    of     at    least    two-thirds    of    each 

house,"    the    word   "house"  means    the 

members    present  doing  business,     tl 

being  a  qnorum, —  and  not  a  majority  of 

all   the  members  elected.     Southwortli  v. 
lad  Co.,  2  Mich.  287. 
—    2  Humboldt  v.   McCoy,   23  Kan.   249; 

Green  v.  Indianapolis,  25  Ind.  490. 
,      8  State  v.  Johnson,  1  Kan.  178  (1862)  ; 

contra,  l'ritz,  in  n,  9  Iowa,  30  (1859),  where 


a  special  act  amending  the  charter  of  a 
city  was  held  invalid  because  all  such  laws 
were,  by  the  Constitution  of  the  State,  re- 
quired to  be,  and  could  be,  made  general. 
Von  Phul  v.  Hammer,  29  Iowa,  222.  It 
is  for  the  legislature,  and  not  the  courts, 
to  determine  when  a  general  law  can  be 
made  applicable.  Gentile  v.  State,  29 
Ind.  409,  overruling  Thomas  v.  Board  of 
Commissioners,  5  Ind.  4  ;  Longworth's 
Executors  v.  Evansville,  32  Ind.  322  ; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  129,  note;  State  r. 
County  Court,  50  Mo.  317  (1872)  ;  s.  c.  11 
Am.  hep.  415  ;  Murdock  v.  Woodson,  2 
Dillon,  C.  C.  188  (1873)  ;  Board  of  Com- 
missioners  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247  (1876)  ; 
Evans  v.  Job,  8  Nev.  322  (1878),  where  the 
decisions  in  that  State  and  elsewhere  are 
reviewed  by  Hawley,  J.  The  word 
"town"  —  as  used  in  constitutional  in- 
hibition of  special  laws  regulating  the 
internal  atl'airs  of  towns  and  counties  — 
is  a  generic  term,  including  cities.  State 
v.  Parsons,  40  N.  J.  L.  1.  But  in  the 
absence  of  any  clear  expression  of  a  con- 
trary intent,  the  term  "  municipal  cor- 
poration" in  any  statute  must  be  taken 
in  the  rtric.1  constitutional  sense  as  not  in- 
cluding towns.  Eaton  v.  Manitowoc,  44 
Wis.  489.     Ante,  sec.  20,  and  note. 


§  50  LEGISLATIVE   DUTY   DISCRETIONARY.  85 

§  49.  "  Municipal  Purpose,"  what  ?  —  The  Constitutions  of  some 
of  the  States  contain  a  provision  that  corporations  shall  not  be  created 
by  special  acts  except  for  municipal  purposes.  What  is  a  municipal 
purpose  within  this  provision  has  been  several  times  considered.1 
An  act  incorporating  a  board  of  commissioners  for  filling  up  certain 
slough  ponds  in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  was  held  to  create  a  corpora- 
tion for  municipal  purposes  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution.2 
An  act  creating  a  board  of  park  commissioners  was  considered  to 
constitute  them  a  corporate  authority,  the  object  of  their  creation 
being  municipal  in  its  character.3  So  a  corporation  to  carry  on  a 
public  school  and  raise  funds  for  its  support.4 

§  50  (27).  Legislative  Duty  held  to  be  discretionary.  —  The  Con- 
stitutions of  several  of  the  States  contain,  substantially,  this  provis- 
ion, derived  from  the  Constitution  of  New  York :  "  It  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  legislature  to  provide  for  the  organization  of  cities  and 
incorporated  villages,  and  to  restrict  their  power  of  taxation,  assess- 
ment, borroiving  money,  contracting  debts,  and  loaning  their  credit,  so 
as  to  prevent  abuses  in  assessments,  and  in  contracting  debts  by 
such  municipal  corporations."5  This  obviously  enjoins  upon  the 
legislature  the  duty  of  providing  suitable  and  proper  restrictions 
upon  the  enumerated  powers ;  but  in  what  these  restrictions  shall 
consist  and  how  they  shall  be  imposed  are  subjects  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion or  sense  of  duty  of  the  legislative  department,  with  the 
exercise  of  which  the  courts  cannot  interfere.6     The  Supreme  Court 

1  State,  ex  rcl.  Choteau  v.  Leffingwell,  corporation  by  special  act.      lb.  ante,  sec. 

54  Mo.  458  (1873),  where  the  subject  is  46. 

elaborately  discussed,  and  the  conclusion  2  St.    Louis   v.    Shields,    62   Mo.    247 

reached  was  that  corporations  for  "muni-  (1876). 

cipal  purposes"  under  the  Constitution  of         3  People  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  37. 
Missouri  must  be  connected  with  the  mu-  4  Horton  v.  Mobile  School  Comm'rs,  43 

nicipal  corporation  itself,  and  be  instituted  Ala.   598.     See  comment  of  Wagner,  J., 

for   the  purpose  of  carrying  out  some  of  on  this  decision  in  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  62 

the  objects  of  the  municipality.      Under  Mo.  251  (1876). 

the  Coustitution  of  California,  which  pro-  5  NeioYork  Constitution  1846,  art.  viii. 
vides  that  "corporations  maybe  formed  sec.  9;  Wisconsin  Constitution  1848,  art. 
under  general  laws,  but  shall  not  be  ere-  xi.  sec.  3  ;  Michigan  Constitution  1859,  art. 
ated  by  special  act,  except  for  municipal  xii.  sec.  13  ;  Oregon  Constitution  1857, 
purposes,"  a  corporation  cannot  exercise  art.  xi.  sec.  5;  Kansas  Constitution  1859, 
any  powers  except  those  conferred  by  gen-  art.  xii.  sec.  5  ;  see  Paine  v.  Spratley,  5 
eral  laws.  The  legislature  cannot  confer  Kan.  525  ;  Nevada  Constitution  1864,  art. 
on  such  corporations  any  powers  or  grant  viii.  sec.  8  ;  Nebraska  Constitution,  art. 
them  any  privileges  by  special  act.  San  viii.  sec.  4  ;  California  Constitution  1849, 
Francisco  v.  S.  V.  W.  W.,  48  Cal.  493  sec.  37;  Ohio  Constitution  1851,  art.  xiii. 
(1874).  A  grant  of  an  easement  in  a  sec.  6.  Post,  sec.  750,  note.  See  also 
street  made  by  the  legislature  to  a  corpo-  chapters  relating  to  Contracts  and  Tax- 
ration,  is  purely  a  grant  of  corporate  power,  ation,  post. 
and  therefore  cannot  be  made  to  a  private  6  The  failure  of  the  legislature  to  per- 


86 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§51 


of  Wisconsin,  in  the  case  cited  in  the  note,  holds  to  some  extent  a 
contrary  view,  but  its  judgmenl  was  in  effect*  although  not  in  terms, 
overruled  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  it  is  not, 
m  its  lull  extent,  in  harmony  with  the  view  elsewhere  taken  in  the 
Stair  courts.1 


§  5]    (28).      "Only    One   Object,  which   shall   be  expressed   in   the 

title."  —  Many  of  the  State  Constitutions  contain  in  substance  a  pro- 
vision that  no  legislative  act  shall  embrace  more  than  one  object  or,  as 
some  of  them  phrase  if,  one  subject,  which  shall  be  expressed  in  its  title. 

In  some  of  the  Constitutions  this  prohibition  is  limited  to  local  and 
private  acts.  The  purpose  of  such  prohibitions  is  obvious.  The 
unity  of  object  or  subject  is  to  prevent  "log-rolling  legislation,"  by 
prohibiting  the  joining  of  distinct  measures  with  a  view  to  combine 
votes  for  all.  Requiring  such  subject  or  object  to  be  expressed  in 
the  title  is  to  prevent  deceptive  titles,  and  to  enable  members  of  the 
legislature,  and  the  people,  through  the  usual  publication  of  legisla- 
tive proceedings,  to  form  from  tiie  title  an  opinion  of  the  nature  and 


form  the  duty  relative  to  restricting  the 
power  of  taxation,  &c,  enjoined  by  the 
constitutional  provision  above  cited, 
"may,"  says  Ranney,  .1.,  in  Hill  v.  Hig- 
don,  5  Ohio  St.  248,  "be  of  very  serious 
import,  but  lays  no  foundation  for  judicial 
correction."  See  Maloy  v.  Marietta,  11 
Ohio  St.  636,  638,  where  this  view  is  left 
open,  but  holding  that  the  legislature 
alone  has  the  power  to  determine  the 
mode  and  mnisi/rr  of  the  restrict  ion  to  he 
imposed.  It  was  also  left  open  in  the 
r.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481,  hut 
this  case  illustrates  what  is  a  sufficient  re- 
striction  on  th.  power  of  taxation  to  meet 

th Dstitutional  requirement.     See  also 

Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  518  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Connelly,  10  Ohio  St.  165.  To  the  effect 
that  the  constitutional  provision  quoted  in 
the  text  does  not  take  away,  but  recog- 
nize,, the  discretion  of  the  legislature  in 
conf  rring  powers  of  the  enumerated  char- 
acter upon  municipal  corporations,  and 
that  Buch  discretion  is  not  reviewable  by 
the  courts,  see  Bank  of  Komi'  v.  Rome,  18 
X.  V.  38  (1858);  Benson  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
of  Albany,  2t  Barb.  2  IS  (1857);  Clarke  v. 
Rochester,  24  Barb.  446;  Grant  v.  Courter, 
j!  B  :  i.  232  ;  Wynehamer  <■.  People,  13 
N.  V.  129  ;  Baltimore  v.  State,  15  Md. 
376;    l'coplu    v.   Draper,   15    N.  Y.    532; 


White  v.  Stamford,  37  Conn.  587  ;  New- 
ton v.  Atchison,  31  Kan.  151  (quoting 
the  text). 

1  Foster  v.  Kenosha,  12  Wis.  616 
(1860).  The  legislature  cannot,  consist- 
ently with  this  restriction,  confer  upon  a 
municipal  corporation  an  unlimited  power 
to  levy  taxes  and  raise  money  lor  extra 
municipal  purposes,  such  as  aiding  rail- 
road companies ;  and  an  amendment  to 
the  charter  of  a  city,  authorizing  its  coun- 
cil "to  levy  and  collect  special  taxes  for 
any  purpose  (aside  from  what  may  he 
specially  provided  for  in  the  city  charter) 
which  may  he  considered  essential  to  pro- 
mote or  secure  the  common  interests  of 
the  city,  or  borrow,  on  the  corporate 
credit  of  the  city,  any  sum  of  money  at 
a  rate  of  interest  not  exceeding  ten  per 
cent,"  on  obtaining  the  previous  sanction 
of  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city,  18 
void,  and  the  requirement  of  the  sanction 
of  the  voters  is  not  a  restriction  on  the 
power  to  le\y  taxes  or  contract  debts, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution, 
the  court  being  of  opinion  that  the  duty 
of  Imposing  the  limitation  rests  on  the 
legislature.  !<•.  But  see  Campbell  v. 
Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194  (1866)  ;  City  o. 
Lampson,  '.»  Wall.  (77  (1809);  and  the 
authorities    cited    in   the    last    note.     See 


§51 


REQUIREMENTS   AS   TO    TITLE   OF    ACT. 


87 


objects  of  the  bill.1  Subject  to  the  foregoing  fundamental  require- 
ments the  provision  has  been  frequently  and  properly  construed  to 
require  only  the  general  or  ultimate  object  to  be  stated  in  the  title, 
and  not  the  details  by  which  the  object  is  to  be  attained.  Any  pro- 
vision fairly  and  reasonably  connected  with  and  calculated  to  carry 
the  declared  object  into  effect  is  unobjectionable,  although  not 
specially  indicated  in  the  title.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  title  fairly 
expresses  or  plainly  gives  notice  or  warning  of  the  subject  dealt 
with  in  the  body  of  the  act.  Thus,  where  a  Constitution  provides 
that  no  bill  or  act  shall  pass  containing  any  matter  different  from 
what  is  expressed  in  the  title  thereof,  an  act.  the  title  of  which 
declares  it  to  be  for  the  better  regulation  of  a  certain  town  (naming  it), 
or  to  amend  or  enlarge  the  powers  of  the  corporation  thereof,  is  suffi- 
cient, without  enumerating  the  particulars  in  which  the  powers  are 
enlarged  or  extended.2  So  a  provision  in  an  act  entitled  merely,  "  An 
act  to  amend  the  act  incorporating  the  city  of  M.,"  extending  the 
city  limits,  does  not  conflict  with  the  constitutional  requirement 
that  "  every  law  shall  embrace  but  one  object,  which  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  its  title."  3     Many  illustrations  of  the  judicial  construction 


Rogau  v.  Water-town,  30  Wis.  259  (1872), 
as  to  loaning  credit. 

For  other  restrictions  upon  the  power  to 
contract  debts  and  limitations  upon  such 
power,  see  chapters  on  Charters  and  Con- 
tracts, post. 

1  Carter  County  t\  Sin  ton  (Const.  Ky. ), 
120  U.  S.  517  ;  Montclair  v.  Ramsdell 
(Const.  New  Jersey),  107  17.  S.  147  ;  Jones- 
boro  v.  Cairo,  &c.  R.  R.  (Const.  111.),  110 
TJ.  S.  192  ;  Mahomet  v.  Quackenbush 
(Const.  111.),  117  U.  S.  509  ;  Otoe  County 
v.  Baldwin  (Const.  Neb. ),  111  U.  S.  1;  Ack- 
ley  School  Dist.  v.  Hall  (Const.  Iowa),  113 
TJ.  S.  135  ;  Re  Phcenixville,  109  Pa.  St. 
44  ;  Re  Airy  Street,  113  Pa.  St.  281  ; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  141-151,  and  au- 
thorities. 

2  Green  v.  Mayor,  R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.) 
368  (1832),  per  Law,  J.  ;  Mayor  v.  State, 
4  Ga.  26  ;  Hill  v.  Decatur,  22  Ga.  203. 
Text  affirmed.  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist., 
2  Lea  (Teun.),  425  ;  Murphy  v.  State,  9 
Lea  (Tenn.),  373.  An  act  which,  in  effect, 
amended  the  charters  of  cities  of  a  certain 
class  held  void  because  this  purpose  did 
not  appear  in  its  title.  State  v.  Wright, 
14  Ore.  365. 

3  Morford  v.  Unger,  8  Iowa,  82  (1S59); 
Davis  v.  Woolnough  (act  establishing  city 


court),  9  Iowa,  104  ;  s.  p.  St.  Paul  v.  Coul- 
ter, 12  Minn.  41,  50  (1866). 

The  subject  of  a  law  to  incorporate  a 
city  or  town  is  the  charter  of  incorporation, 
and  the  title  need  not  enumerate  all  the 
powers  intended  to  be  conferred.  Lock- 
hart  v.  Troy,  48  Ala.  581  (1872).  Where 
the  title  to  an  act  is  "to  consolidate  and 
amend  the  several  acts  incorporating  the  city 
of  Brunswick,  and  for  other  purposes  therein 
mentioned,"  and  the  act  contains  a  provi- 
sion to  make  valid  and  confirm  "  all  tic 
ordinances  of  the  mayor  and  city  council  of 
the  city  of  Brunswick  heretofore  passed, 
and  not  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution 
of  the  State  of  Georgia  or  of  the  United 
States,"  it  was  held  that  it  was  in  viola- 
tion of  the  Constitution  of  1868,  which 
declares  :  ' '  Nor  shall  any  law  or  ordi- 
nance pass  which  refers  to  more  than  one 
subject-matter,  or  contains  matter  differ- 
ent from  what  is  expressed  in  the  title 
thereof."  Brieswick  v.  Brunswick,  51 
Ga.  639  (1874).  And  in  a  later  case  it 
was  held  that  the  Act  of  1872,  entitled 
"  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  incorpo- 
rating towns  and  villages,"  not  hav- 
ing indicated  by  its  title  the  provision 
making  the  act  an  amendment  of  ex- 
isting   municipal    charters,    is    unconsti- 


^ 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§51 


of  this  constitutional  provision  as  applicable  to  municipalities  are 


given  in  the  note 

tut  tonal.     Ayeridge  v.   Comm'rs,  60  G;i. 
4  14. 
A  statuti  '-:l  in  Ss  title  as  an 

.''/n.  nt  ("  a  city  charter,  but  which 
embraces  objects  foreign  to  the  charter,  is 
in  conflict  with  the  Constitution  and  void. 
Williamson    v.    Keokuk,    44    Iowa,    88 

).  The  judgment  in  the  case  last 
cited  would  seem  to  be  of  doubtful  cor- 
r.  ctnesa  upon  the  facts. 

In  determining  whether  a  law  be  in 
lict  with  the  prevision  of  the  Consti- 
tution, the  a  in');/  of  the  object  is  to  be  looked 
for  in  tin-  ultimate  end  to  be  attained, 
and  not  in  the  details  leading  to  that  end. 
State,  &c.  r.  Co.  Judge;  2  Iowa,  280  ; 
People  r.  Mahaney,  L3  Mich.  4S1  (1865), 
holding  that  the  title  oi  "an  act  to  estab- 
lish a  police  government  for  the  city  of 
Detroit/'  was  sufficiently  specific;  ap- 
proved,  White  r.  Lincoln,  5  Neb.  505, 
(1877);  Atty.  Gen.  v.  Bradley,  36  Mich. 
117  (1877)  ;  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich. 
44  (1871 ) ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103.  Construe- 
tion  of  similar  constitutional  provision. 
Arnoult  v.  New  Orleans,  11  La.  An.  54  ; 
K.tthman  v.  New  Orleans,  11  La.  An. 
145  ;  Peoples  Mellen,  32  111.  181  ;  Rail- 
road  Co.  v.  Gregory,  15  111.  21  ;  Davis  v. 

(inspection  act  for  Baltimore),  7  Md. 
151;  Annapolis  v.  State,  30  Md.  212; 
Lafon  v.  Dufrocq,  6  La.  An.  350;  Re 
Airy  Street,  113  Pa.  St.  281  (1886)  ;  Re 
I'honixville,  109  Pa.  St.  44  ;  Ottawa  v. 
People,  48  111.  233  (1868)  ;  Miles  v. 
Charleton,  29  Wis.  400  (1872);  Murdoch 
r.  Woodson,  2  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  188  (1873); 
Hubert  b.   People,   19  N.  V.  132  (1872); 

v.  Union,  33  N.  J.  L.  350  (4  Vroom), 
where  the  subjeet  is  fully  discussed.  Mont- 
clair  o.  Ramsdell,  107  U.  S.  147,  in  which 
Mr.  Justice  Harlan  quoted  the  opinion  in 
State  v.  Union,  supra,   and   added,  "The 

lions  should  be  grave,  and  the  con- 
flict between  the  statute  and  the  Constitn- 
tion  palpable,  before  the  judiciary  should 
disregard  a  legislative  enactment  upon  the 
sole  ground  that  it  embraced  more  than 
one  object,  or  if  but  one  object,  that  it 
was  not  sufficiently  expressed  by  the 
title."  Montclair  v.  Ramsdell,  supra,  fol- 
lowed in  State  v.  Conun'rs  of  Duval  Co., 


23  Fla.  483  (1887).     Bee,   also,  State  v. 
Klvii   ,  32  N.  .1.  L  (3  Vroom),  362  ;  State 
r.  Newark,  34  N.  }.  L.  (8  Vroom)  236  ;  In 
'■■  <  ouiin'is  of  Elizabeth,  49  N.  J.  L.  (20 
Vroom),  188;  Sedgwick  C*  v.  Bailey,  13 
Kan.  600  ( 1 S74)  ;  Comm'rs  of  Marion  Co. 
v.  Comm'rs  of  Harvey  Co.,  26  Kan.  181  ; 
Devlin  r.  New  York," 63  N.  Y.  8  (1875)  ; 
People  r.  WiDseai  80  H.  Y.  60?  (1875); 
Tecnmseh  v.  Phillips,  5  Neb.  305  (1877)  ; 
Dows  r.  Town  of  Elmwood,  34  Fed.  Rep. 
114  ;    Baltimore    &    Ohio    R.    K.    Co.    v. 
County  of  Jefferson,   29  Fed.    Bep.  305. 
An  act  public  in  its  nature,  in  which  the 
people  of  the  whole  State  have  an  interest, 
but  which  specially  concerns  the  property 
and  rights  of  a  portion  of  Hie  people  of  the 
State,  is  a  lucal  act  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Constitution  of  Illinois,  1848  (art. 
3,  sec.  23),  requiring  the  subject  thereof 
to  be  expressed  in  the  title  (citing  and  re- 
viewing various  cases  in  Illinois  and  else- 
where on   this  subjeet).     Applying  these 
principles  to  an  act  of  the   Illinois  legis- 
lature of  April   16,   1869,   known  as  the 
Lake  Front  Act,  entitled  "An  act  in  re- 
lation to  a  portion  of  the  submerged  lands 
and  Lake  Park  grounds  lying  on  and  ad- 
jacent   to    the    shore  of  Lake    Michigan 
on   the   eastern    frontage   of  the   City  of 
Chicago,"  it  was  held  that  since  the  gene- 
ral subject  of  that  act  was  the  disposal  of 
lands  on    and    adjacent  to  the  shore  of 
Lake  Michigan    on    the   eastern    frontage 
of  Chieago,   the   subject   was   sufficiently 
expressed  in  the  title  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that 
all  local  laws  must  contain  but  one  sub- 
ject, which  must  be  expressed  in  the  title. 
Illinois  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (Lake  Front 
Case),    S3    Fed.    Kep.    730   (Harlan  and 
Blodyctt,  JJ.).     Where  the  act  has  but 
one   general   object  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
object   or    subject   is   fairly  expressed   in 
the  title.     White  v.  Lincoln,  5  Neb.  505 
(1877)  ;    Black    v.    Cohen,    52    Ga.    621 
fl874)  ;    Lock-port    v.    Gaylord,    61    111. 
27*1    (1871),    where  a    curative   act   legal- 
izing warrants   was  held    invalid    because 
it  did   not  set  forth  the  subject-matter  in 
the  title.     In  Watertown  v.  Fairbanks,  65 
N.  Y.  588  (1875),  a  legislative  act  vali- 


§51 


REQUIREMENTS    AS   TO   TITLE   OF    ACT. 


89 


dating  previous  illegal  assessments  was 
held  to  conflict  with  the  constitutional 
requirement  (art.  3,  sec.  16),  that  "  no 
private  or  local  hill  shall  embrace  more 
than  one  subject,  and  that  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  title."  An  act  entitled 
"An  act  to  legalize  and  authorize  the  as- 
sessment of  street  improvements  and  as- 
sessments," not  specifying  any  city  or 
locality,  held  not  sufficiently  to  express 
the  subject  of  the  act,  which  was  solely 
to  legalize  certain  proceedings  of  the  com- 
mon council  of  a  single  city.  Durkee  v. 
City  of  Janesville,  26  Wis.  697.  Under 
an  act  to  revise  the  charter  of  a  specified 
city,  there  may  be  conferred  upon  the 
municipality  the  usual  legislative,  taxing, 
judicial  and  police  powers,  including  the 
creation  of  a  city  court.  This  is  but  one 
subject,  and  a  charter  with  such  a  title 
does  not  infringe  the  provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution that  no  local  bill  shall  embrace 
more  than  one  subject  which  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  its  title.  Harris  v.  People,  59 
N.  Y.  599  (1875),  where  Folger,  J.,  ex- 
plains the  object  of  this  constitutional 
provision  to  be  "to  prevent  the  joining 
of  one  local  subject  to  another  or  others 
of  the  same  kind,  or  to  one  or  more  gene- 
ral subjects,  so  that  each  should  gather 
votes  for  all  ;  and  to  advise  the  public 
and  the  locality,  and  the  representatives 
of  the  locality  and  of  other  parts,  of  the 
general  purpose  of  the  bill,  so  that  those 
interested  might  be  on  their  guard  as  to 
the  whole  or  as  to  the  details."  People  v. 
Supervisors,  43  N.  Y.  10.  See  also  Sul- 
livan v.  New  York,  53  N.  Y.  652  (1873)  ; 
Volkening,  In  re,  52  N.  Y.  650  (1873)  ; 
Astor,  In  re,  50  N.  Y.  363  (1872);  Mayer, 
In  re,  50  N.  Y.  504  (1872)  ;  and  People 
v.  Briggs,  50  N.  Y.  553,  where  the  pur- 
pose of  the  constitutional  provision  is  well 
expounded  by  Church,  C.  J.  People  v. 
Rochester,  50  N.  Y.  525  (1872).  The 
word  "  private "  (art.  3,  sec.  16,  supra) 
refers  to  "persons,"  the  word  "local"  to 
"  territory."  People  v.  O'Brien,  38  N.  Y. 
193  ;  People  v.  Supervisors,  43  N.  Y.  10  ; 
People  v.  Hills,  35  N.  Y.  449,  451. 

The  constitutional  provision  in  New 
York  as  to  the  title  of  local  and  private 
bills  (art.  3,  sec.  16,  supra),  underwent 
careful  consideration  in  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals in  the  great  cases  of  Astor  and  Bailey 
v.  New  York  Arcade  Railway  Co.  (1889) 


(not  yet  reported,  but  will  probably  ap- 
pear in  113  or  114  N.  Y.  Rep.),  relating 
to  the  right  of  the  defendant  company  to 
construct  an  underground  railway  in 
Broadway  and  Madison  Avenue  in  New 
York  City.  It  was  incorporated  in  1868, 
by  a  local  and  private  act  to  transmit 
packages  and  merchandise  by  means  of 
pneumatic  tubes.  In  1873,  by  local  and 
private  act  its  charter  was  amended,  and 
the  title  thereof  expressed  that  it  was  an  act 
' '  to  provide  for  the  transportation  of  pas- 
sengers in  said  [pneumatic]  tubes."  In 
the  body  of  this  amended  act,  however,  the 
corporation  was  given  authority  to  con- 
struct and  operate  an  ordinary  railway 
under  the  said  streets.  The  amended 
act  of  1873  was  held  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional because  the  title  was  deceptive. 
Giving  the  judgment  of  the  court  on  this 
point,  Earl,  J.,  said  :  "  The  construction 
of  such  a  railway  [an  ordinary  railroad] 
by  such  a  corporation  is  certainly  a  subject 
not  expressed  in  the  title  of  the  act.  The 
only  subject  there  indicated  is  the  transpor- 
tation of  passengers  and  property  through 
pneumatic  tubes  by  atmospheric  pressure. 
A  title  purporting  that  an  act  provides 
for  pneumatic  transportation,  would  not 
be  sufficient  for  an  act  authorizing  the  con- 
struction and  operation  of  a  horse  railway 
or  a  steam  railway,  as  a  title  purporting 
that  an  act  authorizes  a  line  of  omnibuses 
for  the  transportation  of  passengers  would 
not  be  sufficient  for  an  act  authorizing  the 
construction  of  a  railway  for  the  same  pur- 
pose. The  constitutional  provision  re- 
ferred to  has  been  deemed  by  statesmen  and 
jurists  —  conditores  legum  —  of  so  much 
importance  that  it  is  found  in  the  funda- 
mental law  of  most  of  the  States.  Its 
purpose  is  to  prevent  fraud  and  deception 
by  concealment  in  the  body  of  acts  sub- 
jects not  by  their  titles  disclosed  to  the 
general  public,  and  to  legislators  who  may 
rely  upon  them  for  information  as  to 
pending  legislation.  When  the  subject  is 
expressed,  all  matters  fairly  and  reason- 
ably connected  with  it,  and  all  measures 
which  will  or  may  facilitate  its  accomplish- 
ment, are  proper  to  be  incorporated  in  the 
act,  and  are  germane  to  the  title.  The 
title  must  be  such  at  least  as  fairly  to  sug- 
gest or  give  a  clue  to  the  subject  dealt  ivith 
in  the  act,  and  unless  it  comes  up  to  this 
standard  it  falls  below  the  constitutional 


90 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§51 


requirement  (The  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Colegate, 
12  N    Y .  1  16  :  People  v.  Hills,  35  N.  Y. 
,  M  it*  rol  New  ¥brk,  &c.  Bridge, 
72   N    ',  .   527  ;  Mattel  of  Application  of 
Department  of   Public    Park  .    36    N.  Y, 
,-.  Whitlock,  92  N.  Y.  191  ; 
Matter  oi  Knaust,  101  N.  Y.  188  ;  Cooley, 
itutional    Limitations,   141).      Here 
ted  bj  the  title  is 
the  transportation  of  passengers  and  prop- 
erty through  pneumatic  tubes,  by  atmos- 
pheric pressure,  and  everything  appropriate 
ami  germane  to  that  subject  could  be  pro- 


vided for  in  tin' act.  Butaperson  read- 
ing the  title  alone  would  have  do  clue 
whatever  to  the  great  railway  Bcheme  ac- 
tually authorized  by  the  act." 

If,  however,  a  local  ad  contains  a  sub- 
jecl  whicb  is  properly  expressed  in  its  title 
it  is  valid  as  to  thai  Bubjed  although  it  is 
invalid  as  to  a  subject  not  expressed.  Van 
Antwerp,  I«  ''<.  56  N.  V.  261,  267  (1874); 
s.  p.  McGee'a  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  17", 
478  (1886);  Dewhurst  o.  Allegheny  City, 
95  Pa.  St.  437 ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  148. 


§52 


PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE   CORPORATIONS. 


91 


CHAPTER  IV. 


PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE    CORPORATIONS     DISTINGUISHED. 
AUTHORITY   AND   ITS   LIMITATIONS. 


■  LEGISLATIVE 


§  52   (29).      Public  and  Private. 
porations,  heretofore  adverted  to, 

1  Ante,  chap.  ii.  sees.  19-27.  In  Mills 
v.  Williams,  11  Ired.  (N.  C.)  Law,  558, 
(1854).  Pearson,  J.,  commenting  on  the 
common  division  of  corporations,  says : 
"The  purpose  in  making  all  corporations 
is  the  accomplishment  of  some  public  good. 
Hence,  the  division  into  public  and  pri- 
vate has  a  tendency  to  confuse  and  lead  to 
error  in  investigation  ;  for,  unless  the 
public  are  to  be  benefited,  it  is  no  more 
lawful  to  confer  '  exclusive  rights  and 
privileges'  upon  an  artificial  body  than 
upon  a  private  citizen.  The  substantial 
distinction  is  this  :  Some  corporations  are 
created  by  the  mere  will  of  the  legislature, 
there  being  no  other  party  interested  or 
concerned.  To  this  body  a  portion  of  the 
power  of  the  legislature  is  delegated  to  be 
exercised  for  the  public  good,  and  it  is 
subject  at  all  times  to  be  modified,  changed, 
or  annulled.  Other  corporations  are  the 
result  of  contract.  The  legislature  is  not 
the  only  party  interested  ;  for,  although 
it  has  a  public  purpose  to  be  accomplished, 
it  chooses  to  do  it  by  the  instrumentality 
of  a  second  party.  These  two  make  a  con- 
tract. The  expectation  of  benefit  to  the 
public  is  the  moving  consideration  on  one 
side  ;  that  of  expected  remuneration  for 
the  outlay  is  the  consideration  on  the 
other.  It  is  a  contract,  and,  therefore, 
cannot  be  modified,  changed,  or  annulled 
without  the  consent  of  both  parties. 
Counties  are  an  instance  of  the  former, 
railroad  and  turnpike  companies  of  the 
latter  class  of  corporations."  This  recog- 
nizes the  substantial  difference  between 
the  two  classes  of  corporations,  and  is,  in 
effect,  a  criticism  upon  the  names  by 
which  they  are  distinguished. 

According  to  the  view  of  the  Supreme 


—  A  fundamental  division  of  cor- 
is  into  public  and  private.1     The 

Court  of  California,  corporations  should 
be  divided  into  three  classes,  to  wit  : 
Public  municipal  corporations,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  promote  the  public  interest ; 
corporations  technically  private,  but  of  a 
quasi  public  character,  having  in  view 
some  public  enterprise  in  which  the  pub- 
lic interests  are  involved,  such  as  railroad, 
turnpike,  and  canal  companies  ;  and  cor- 
porations strictly  private.  Miner's  Ditch 
Co.  v.  Zellerbach,  37  Cal.  543  (1869).  The 
opinion  of  Sawyer,  C.  J.,  in  this  case,  is 
able  and  instructive.  The  author  pre- 
fers the  ordinary  division  of  corpora- 
tions into  public  (which  includes  mu- 
nicipal) and  private.  The  Civil  Code 
of  California  thus  defines  public  and 
private  corporations  (sec.  284):  "Cor- 
porations are  either  public  or  private. 
Public  corporations  are  formed  or  organ- 
ized for  the  government  of  a  portion  of 
the  State  ;  all  other  corporations  are  pri- 
vate." Construing  this  section,  it  was 
held  in  Dean  v.  Davis,  51  Cal.  406,  410, 
that  a  levee  district  formed  under  an  act 
of  the  legislature  for  reclamation  purposes 
was  a  public  corporation.  Crockett,  J., 
says  :  "  It  is  true,  perhaps,  that  it  was 
not  formed  or  organized  for  the  govern- 
ment of  a  portion  of  the  State,  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  term  ;  nevertheless 
it  exercises  certain  governmental  functions 
within  the  district.  To  constitute  a  pub- 
lic corporation,  it  is  not  essential  that 
it  shall  exercise  all  the  functions  of  gov- 
ernment within  the  prescribed  district." 
s.  p.,  see,  also,  People  v.  Reclamation 
District,  53  Cal.  346  ;  Hoke  v.  Perdue, 
62  Cal.  545.  See  Foster  v.  Fowler,  60 
Pa.  St.  27  (1868),  in  which  a  company 
created  to  supply  a  city  with  water  was 


•_;  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  53 

importance  of  this  distinction  cannot  be  too  much  emphasized,  since 
upoD  it  are  based  the  legal  principles  which  so  broadly  distinguish 
the  two  classes  of  corporations.  With  private  corporations  the  pres- 
ent work  has  no  other  conqern  than  to  point  out  by  way  of  illustra- 
tion wherein  they  differ  from  those  which  are  public.  Both  classes 
are  alike  created  by  the  legislature,  and  in  the  same  way,  —  by 
apecia]  charter  or  under  general  incorporation  acts. 

§  .":!.  "Private"  defined;  Dartmouth  College  Case. — Private  cor- 
poration*  are  created  for  private,  as  distinguished  from  purely  public 
purposes,  and  they  are  not,  in  contemplation  of  law,  public,  because 
it  may  have  been  supposed  by  the  legislature  that  their  establish- 
ment would  promote,  either  directly  or  consequentially,  the  public 
interest.  They  cannot  be  compelled  to  accept  a  charter  or  incor- 
porating act.1  The  asgevA  of  the  corporation  is  necessary  to  make  the 
incorporating  statute  operative  ;  but  when  assented  to,  the  legislative 
grant  is  irrevocable,  and  it  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  the  corpo- 
ration, be  impaired  or  destroyed  by  any  subsecpuent  act  of  legisla- 
tion, unless  the  right  to  do  so  was  reserved  at  the  time.  The 
celebrated  Dartmouth  College  Case?  by  its  construction  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  incorporated,  wisely  or  otherwise,  into  American  juris- 
prudence the  principle  which  has  been  attended  with  such  important 
practical  consequences,  namely,  that  privileges  and  franchises  granted 
by  legislative  act  to  a  private  corporation,  when  accepted,  constitute 

held  to  be  a  public,  as  distinguished  from  right  remain  to  be  yet  fully  determined, 

a  private   corporation.     Unless    there    is  An  enactment  exercising  this  right  might 

some  B] ial  constitutional  restriction,  the  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  deprive  the  cor. 

legislature   of  a   State   may  regulate   the  poration    of    its    property    without    due 

compensation  of  grain  elevators  and  pub-  process  of  law. 
lie  warehouses,  and  fix  a  maximum  rate  of  l  Ante,  sec.  44. 

Charges.  Munnu  People,  69  111.  80  (1873).  -Dartmouth    College    v.     Woodward, 

Affirmed  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  U.  S.  4  Wheat.  51S.     All  attempts  tooverthrow 

,  r.  People,  94  U.S.  313  (1876).  The  this  judgment  ban  foiled      In  the  great 

same  principle,  as  respects  the  legislative  case  of  the  People  v.  O'Brien,   Receiver, 

right  to    regulate  the  .harges  for  railway  arising  out  of  the  acts  of  the  legislature  of 

transportation  services,   was  asserted   and  New  York  in  1886,  repealing  the  charter 

applied    by   the   Supreme   Court    of    the  of  the  BvoaAway  Swrftux  Raifoowg  Com- 

I'nited  States  in  what  fa  popularly  known  pany,    and   dissolving  that    corporation, 

•is  the  "  granger"  cases.     Chicago,  B.,  &  decided  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 

Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  94  U.  S.  155  ;  Pike  York    (111  X.  Y.  1,  1888),  Roger,  C.  J., 

B.  Chicago  &   N.   W.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  U.  S.  speaking  of  the  Dartmouth  College  Case, 

164;    Lawrence  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  says:  " Although  it  has  sometimes   been 

Co.,  94  rj.  S.  164  ;    ('hi. -igo,  M.,  &  St.  P.  criticised,  it  has  been  uniformly  acquiesced 

R.  Co.  >•.  Ackley,  94  U.  S.  179  ;  Winona  in  by  the  courts  of   the  several  States  as 

&  St.  P.  ft.  Co.  v.  Blake,  94    V.   S.    181  j  the  law  ofthe  land,  and  may  be  regarded 

Southern  Minn,  ft  ft  Co.  v.  Coleman,  94  as  too  firmly  settled  to  admit  of  question 

U.S.  1-1  ;  Sinner.  Wisconsin.   9  I   D.   8.  or  dispute."     Infra,  sec.  68  a ;   post,  sec 

181.     The  limitations  upon   this   general  11-'. 


§  54  PUBLIC   CORPORATIONS   DEFINED.  93 

a  contract  within  the  meaning  of  the  clause  of  the  Constitution  which 
secures  inviolability  of  contracts  by  ordaining  that  no  State  shall 
pass  any  law  impairing  their  obligation ;  and  hence  a  law  materially 
altering  the  charter  of  such  a  corporation  is  unconstitutional,  unless 
the  power  to  alter  it  was  reserved,  either  generally  or  specially, 
when  the  grant  was  made. 

§  54  (30).  Public  Corporations  defined.  —  Public  including  muni- 
cipal corporations  are  called  into  being  at  the  pleasure  of  the  State, 
and  while  the  State  may,  and  in  the  case  of  municipal  corporations 
usually  does,  it  need  not,  obtain  the  consent  of  the  people  of  the 
locality  to  be  affected.  The  charter  or  incorporating  act  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  is  in  no  sense  a  contract  between  the  State  and  the 
corporation,  although,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  vested  rights  in 
favor  of  third  persons,  if  not  indeed  in  favor  of  the  corporation  or 
rather  the  community  which  is  incorporated,  may  arise  under  it. 
Public  corporations  within  the  meaning  of  this  rule  are  such  as  are 
established  for  public  purposes  exclusively,  —  that  is,  for  purposes 
connected  with  the  administration  of  civil  or  of  local  government,  — 
and  corporations  are  public  only  when,  in  the  language  of  Chief- 
Justice  Marshall,  "  the  whole  interests  and  franchises  are  the  exclusive 
property  and  domain  of  the  government  itself,"  such  as  quasi  corpo- 
rations (so  called),  counties  and  towns  or  cities  upon  which  are 
conferred  the  powers  of  local  administration.  Subject  to  consti- 
tutional limitations  presently  to  be  noticed,  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture over  such  corporations  is  supreme  and  transcendent :  it  may, 
where  there  is  no  constitutional  inhibition,  erect,  change,  divide,  and 
even  abolish  them,  at  pleasure,  as  it  deems  the  public  good  to 
require.1 

1  Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward,    4  could  not  be  impaired  by  subsequent  legis- 

Wheat.   518  (1819)  ;    Allen  v.  McKean,  1  lation.       But,  said  Nelson,  J.,    with    his 

Sumner,  276  (1833)  (the  Bowdoin  College  usual  clearness,    "It  is  an  unsound  and 

Case  elaborately  considered  by  Story,  J. )  ;  even    absurd    proposition     that    political 

see  reference  to   this  case,    2  Story's  Life  power   conferred   by   the   legislature    can 

and   Letters,  150;    Patterson  v.  Society,  become  a  vested  right  as  against  tli>  govern- 

&c,  4  Zabr.   (24  N.  J.  L. )  385  ;  Cheany  ment  in  any  individual  or  body  of  men." 

v.  Hooser,   9    B.    Mon.   330  ;    Berlin    v.  s.    p.      Penobscot   Boom    Corporation   v. 

Gorham,  34   N.    H.    266  ;  Meriwether  v.  Lawson,  16  Me.  224  ;  Yarmouth  v.  North 

Garrett  (repeal  of  charter  of  city  of  Mem-  Yarmouth,    34    Me.  411    (1852)  ;    Story, 

phis),  102  U.   S.  472,  511,  (1880),  citing  Com.    Const.,  sees.    1385,    1388  ;   North 

text  ;  Sinton  v.  Carter  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep.  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133  (1858); 

535  ;     People  v.  Morris,    13  Wend.    325  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1  (1868)  ; 

(1835).  In  this  case  the  defendant  insisted  United  States  r.  Railroad  Co.,  17Wall.322; 

that   the  rights  and  privileges   conferred  Philadelphia    v.    Fox,    64   Pa.    St.    169  ; 

upon  the  village   of  Ogdensburg  by  the  Mobile  v.  Watson,   116  U.  S.  289  (1885); 

act  incorporating  it  were  vested  rights,  and  ante,  sec.  9 ;  Jersey  City  v.  Railroad  Co., 


94 


MCNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§55 


5      "        Form  of  Grant  does  not  affect  Extent  of  Power.  —  The  extent 

of  the  legislative  control  over  public  or  municipal  corporations  is  not 


20   X.  J.    Eq.   860  ;    Handle  r.   Del.   &c. 
Canal   Co.,     1    Wall.    Jr.    275,    s.  o.    14 
How.   80;    Tinsnian   v.    Railroad   Co.,  2 
Dutch.  (N.  .1.)  1  18  ;  State  v.   Brannin,  3 
.   (23  N.  J.  L.)  485  ;  State   v.  Fuller, 
om  (34  N.  J.  L.)  227  ;   Patterson  v. 
ty,&c,  4Zabr.  (24  N.J. L.) 385; ante, 
rennings,27Ark.419(1872); 
Clinton  v.   Railroad   Co.,  24  Iowa,   455  ; 
San  Francisco  v.   Canavan,  42  Cal.  541  ; 
Demaresl   v.    New    York,    74  N.  Y.  161, 
s.  C.  below,  11   Hun,  19  ;  Cornell  v.  Peo- 
ple, 107   HI.  372  -,  Lutz  v.  Crawfordsville, 
109  Ind.  466;  Wood  v.   Town  of  Oxford, 
'.'7  N.  C.  227  ;    David   V.  Portland    Water 
Comm'rs,  1  I  I  »reg.  98  ;   Portland  &  W.  V. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Portland,  14  Oreg.  188  ;  In  re 
Malone's  Estate,  21  S.  C.  435  ;  Morris  v. 
,    62   Tex.    728.  "  A  municipal  cor- 
poration, in  which  is  vested  some  portion 
of  the  administration  of  the  government, 
may  be  changed  at  the  will  of  the  legisla- 
ture.    Such  is  a  public  corporation,  used 
for  public  purposes."     Per  McLean,  J.,  in 
State  Bank  V.  Knoop,  16  How.  U.  S.  369, 
380  (1853).     "  Public  or  municipal   cor- 
porations  are  established  for  the  local  gov- 
ernment  of  towns  or  particular  districts. 
The  special  powers  conferred  upon   them 
are  not  vested  rights  us  against  the  State, 
but,  being  wholly  political,  exist  only  dur- 
ing the  will  of  the  general   legislature  ; 
rwise,    there     would     be    numberless 
petty   governments  existing    within    the 
State  and  forming  part  of  it,  but  indepen- 
dent of  the  control  of  the  sovereign  power. 
v  a1  any  time  be  repealed 
or  abrogated  by  the  legislature,  either  by 
a  general   law  operating  upon  the  whole 
State,  or  by  a  Bpecial  act  altering  the  pow- 
:    the  corporation."     Sloan    v.   state 
(implied  modification  of  charter  as  to  vend- 
ing liquor  by  subsequent  general  law),  8 
kf.   (Ind.)  361  (1847),'  per  Smith,  J. 
Approving    People    v.    Morris,  13   Wend. 
325:  Armstrong  v.  Comm.  (as  to  removal 
of   count;,    seal ).     1    Blackf.  (Ind.)    208 
(1836)  ;  post,  sees.  62,  183. 

In  the  case  of  the  United  States  v.  The 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Company, 
decided  by  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  17    Wall.  322  (1872),  in  which   it 


was  held  that  the  general  government  could 
not  tax  tin  income  or  property  of  tin  city  of 
B  I  timore  under  the  Internal  l{e\  i 
Act  'post,  sec.  775),  the  court  discus 
and  examines  the  nature  of  municipal 
corporations  and  the  relation  they  sustain 
to  the  State,  of  which  they  are  treated  as 
anus  or  agencies.  The  court  says,  "  A 
municipal  corporation  like  the  city  ol 
Baltimore  La  a  representative  not  only  of 
the  State,  but  is  a  portion  of  its  govern- 
mental power.  It  is  one  of  its  creatures, 
made  for  a  specific  purpose,  to  exei 
within  a  limited  sphere  the  powers  of  the 
State.  The  State  may  withdraw  these 
local  powers  of  government  at  pleasure, 
and  may,  through  its  legislature  or  other 
appointed  channels,  govern  the  local 
territory  as  it  governs  the  State  at  large. 
It  may  enlarge  or  contract  its  powers  or 
destroy  its  existence.  Asa  portion  of  the 
State,  in  the  exercise  of  a  limited  portion 
of  the  powers  of  the  State,  its  revenues, 
like  those  of  the  State,  are  not  subject  to 
taxation."     Post,  sees.  100,  773,   775. 

As  to  extent  of  LEGISLATIVE   CONTROL, 

and  the  distinction  between  public  and 
PRIVATE  corporations  in  this  respect,  see 
infra,  sees.  66,  68  a,  72-74  a,  and  cases  ; 
Cooley,  Taxation  (2d  ed.),  688.  See,  also, 
People  v.  Wren  (division  of  a  county),  4 
Scam.  (111.)  273  ;  Martin  v.  Dix,  52  Miss. 
53(1876);  People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich. 
228(1873);  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202;  >-w 
Orleans,  &c.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  26  La. 
An.  517  ;  Coles  v.  Madison  County, 
Breese  (111.),  120;  Laramie  County  v. 
Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  807  (1875)  ;  C.  & 
A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111.  344  ;  State 
v.  Brannin,  3  Zabr.  (23  X.  J.  L.)  4S5  ; 
Rader  v.  Road  Dist.,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J. 
L  i.  273  ;  Bush  o.  Shipman,  4  S 
(5  111.)  190  :  Holliday  v.  People,  5  Cilm. 
(10  111.)  216;  Richland  County  v.  Law- 
rence County,  12  III.  8;  Trustees,  &c.  v. 
Tat  man.  13  111.  SO  ;  Gutzwelier  v.  People, 
14  111.  142;  Sangamon  County  v.  Spring-, 
field,  63  111.   66(1872)  ;  S1  I  tyor, 

E.   M.  Charlt.    (Ga.)   250;  State,   &c."    v. 
St.   Louis   County    Court,    34    Mo.    E 
Purdy  v.    People,  4  Hill  (X.    Y.),    : 
Morey  v.  Newfane,  8  Barb.  645  ;  Lloyd  v. 


§56 


PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE   CORPORATIONS    DISTINGUISHED. 


95 


impaired  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  charter  is  granted  in  the 
same  act  that  creates  a  private  corporation,  whose  rights  cannot  be 
changed  without  its  consent.1  Where,  in  incorporating  a  gas  com- 
pany, the  legislature  reserved  the  power  to  alter,  modify,  or  repeal 
the  charter,  it  is  competent  for  it,  by  subsequent  legislation,  to 
subject  the  company  to  supervision  and  control,  and  to  confer  upon 
the  municipal  corporation  in  which  the  works  of  the  company 
are  erected  the  power  to  regulate  the  price  of  gas,  and  ordinances 
duly  passed  in  pursuance  of  such  power  are  binding  upon  the 
company.2 

§  56   (31).      Differences  between  Public   and  Private   Corporations 
illustrated.  —  Some  of  the  leading  differences  between  public  and  private 


Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  5  N.  Y.  (1  Seld.) 
309  ;  I. owl  .or  v.  Same,  7  Abb.  Pr.  It.  248  ; 
Green  v.  Same,  5  Abb.  Pr.  R.  503  ;  Aurora 
v.  West,  9  Ind.  74  ;  Plymouth  v.  Jackson, 
15  Pa.  St.  44  ;  Louisville  v.  Common- 
wealth, 1  Duvall  (Ky.),  295  ;  Murphy  v. 
Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189(1872); 
O'Hara  v.  Portland,  3  Oreg.  525  ;  Gray 
v.  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  Rep. 
N.  s.  186  ;  State  v.  Hundelhausen,  26 
Wis.  432  (1870)  ;  Tinsman  v.  Railroad 
Company,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  148  ;  Marietta 
v.  Fearing,  4  Ohio,  427  ;  Richmond  v. 
Richmond,  &c.  Railroad  Co.,  21  Gratt. 
(Va.)  604  (1872);  State  v.  Mayor,  &c,  24 
Ala.  701  ;  Governors.  McEwen,  5  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  241  ;  Grogan  v.  San  Francisco, 
18  Cal.  590  ;  Darlington  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  31  N.  Y.  164  ;  Savings  Fund 
Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175, 
185  ;  Philadelphia  v.  Field,  58  Pa.  St. 
320  ;  infra,  sec.  80  ;  Erie  v.  Canal  Com- 
pany, 59  Pa.  St.  174  ;  Dunsmore's  Ap- 
peal, 52  Pa.  St.  374  ;  Blanding  v.  Burr, 
13  Cal.  343  (1859)  ;  People  v.  Hill,  7  Cal. 
97(1857);  Nichol  v.  Mayor,  &c,  9 
Humph.  252  ;  Creighton  v.  San  Francisco, 
42  Cal.  446  (1871)  ;  Lucas  v.  Tippecanoe 
Co.,  44  Ind.  524  (1873)  ;  Burns  v.  Clarion 
County,  62  Pa.  St  (1869)  ;  Durach's  Ap- 
peal, 62  Pa.  St.  491 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Hoylc, 
23  La.  An.  740;Amite  City  v.  Clements,  24 
La.  An.  27  (1872)  ;  21  Am.  Law  Review 
14. 

This  subject  is  discussed  in  an  inter- 
esting manner  by  Sharsioood,  J.,  in  his 
learned  judgment,  in  Philadelphia  v.  Fox, 


64  Pa.  St.  169(1870).  The  doctrine  is 
here  laid  down  that  since  the  legislature 
cannot  alienate  any  part  of  its  legislative 
power,  it  cannot  therefore  by  legislative 
act  or  contract  invest  any  municipal  cor- 
poration with  an  irrevocable  franchise  of 
government  over  any  part  of  its  territory. 
lb.  181 ;  post,  sees.  64,  68,  72-74  a,  80,  567. 
In  Louisiana  the  recall  and  abrogation  by 
the  legislature  of  powers  conferred  upon  a 
municipal  corporation  and  vesting  them 
iu  another,  is  said  to  be  a  proper  exercise 
of  the  police  power  of  the  State.  Pickles  v. 
Dry  Dock  Co.,  38  La.  An.  412.  Police 
power  is,  however,  a  very  indefinite  term, 
and  is  often  used  to  express  the  sum  of  the 
legislative  power  of  the  State  not  within 
the  limitations  of  the  Federal  and  State 
Constitutions.  Dissolution  and  legislative 
extinction  of  municipal  corporation,  by 
repeal  of  its  charter,  see  post,  sees.  170, 
185,  189  ;  also,  21  Am.  Law  Review,  14. 

1  Patterson  v.  Society,  &c,  4  Zabr. 
(24  N.  J.  L.)  385  (1854).  See,  also,  Bal- 
timore v.  Board  of  Police,  15  Md.  376 
(1859).  Text  approved.  Luehrman  v. 
Taxing  District,  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  425. 

2  State  v.  Cincinnati  Gas  Co.,  18  Ohio 
St.  262  (1868).  See,  also,  Norwich  Gas- 
light Co.  v.  Norwich  City  Gas  Co.,  25 
Conn.  19  (1856)  ;  State  v.  Milwaukee  Gas- 
light Co.,  29  Wis.  454  (1872).  It  is,  we 
suppose,  to  be  implied  thai  ordinano 

as  those  mentioned  in  the  text  shall  be 
reasonable,  ami  not  confiscatory,  in  their 
nature  and  operation. 


96  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  56 

mrp       \         are  well  illustrated  and  clearly  stated  in  a  case  decided 
in   New  Jersey.     In  an  action  by  a  riparian  proprietor  against  a 

I  company,  for  obstructing  a  water-course,  the  company  insisted 
that  u  was  oot  liable,  because  the  work  was  authorized  by  its  char- 
ter; that  the  acts  it  did  were  legal;  that  the  injury  complained  of 

consequential ;  that  the  enterprise  was  a  public  work;  designed 
for  public  purposes,  and  that  the  company,  in  executing  it,  acted  as 
the  public  agents  of  the  State  and,  therefore,  possessed  the  State's 
immunity  from  liability.  Bui  the  court  held  that  the  company  was 
not  a  public  corporation.  <  hi  this  point  Nevius,  J.,  the  organ  of  the 
court,  observed:  "Public  corporations  are  political  corporations,  or 
such  as  are  founded  wholly  for  public  purposes,  and  the  whole  inter- 
est in  which  is  in  the  public.  The  fact  of  the  public  having  an 
interest  in  the  works  or  the  property  or  the  object  of  a  corporation 
does  not  make  it  a  public  corporation.  All  corporations,  whether 
public  or  private,  are,  in  contemplation  of  law,  founded  upon  the 
principle  that  they  will  promote  the  interest  or  convenience  of  the 
public.  A  bank  is  a  private  corporation,  yet  it  is,  in  the  eye  of 
the  law,  designed  for  public  benefit.  A  turnpike  or  a  canal  com- 
pany is  a  private  company,  yet  the  public  have  an  interest  in  the  use 
of  their  works,  subject  to  such  tolls  and  restrictions  as  the  charter 
has  imposed.  The  interest,  therefore,  which  the  public  may  have  in 
the  property  or  in  the  objects  of  a  corporation,  whether  direct  or 
incidental  (unless  it  has  the  whole  interest),  does  not  determine  its 
character  as  a  public  or  private  corporation.  In  the  present  case, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  objects  of  the  corporation,  whether  to 
erect  a  public  navigable  highway  or  to  improve  the  navigation  of 
the  Earitan  Paver,  or  whether  the  public  have  a  right  to  the  use  and 
enjoyment  of  these  improvements,  when  made,  or  not,  the  company 
are  essentially  a  private  company,  and  are  not  [in  the  sense  which 
will  confer  the  State's  exemption  from  liability]  the  agents  of  the 
State.  Their  works  are  not  constructed  by  the  requirement  of  the 
State,  or  at  the  expense  of  the  State,  nor  does  the  stock  belong  to 
the  State,  nor  is  the  State  answerable  for  the  lands  or  materials  used 
in  the  construction  of  these  works,  or  responsible  for  the  debts  of 
the  company,  or  for  injuries  committed  by  them  in  the  execution  of 
their  work.  The  State  could  not  compel  the  company  to  construct 
this  canal  or  improve  the  navigation  of  the  river;  it  has  permitted 
them  to  do  so  at  their  own  request.  The  company  might  have 
abandoned  the  work  whenever  they  saw  fit;  they  may  now  aban- 
don it  without  responsibility  to  the  State.  The  corporation  itself, 
the  property  of  the  corporation,  the  object  of  the  corporation,  are 
essentially  private,  subject   only  to  public  use,  under  their  own 


§  5T      CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRAINT   UPON    LEGISLATIVE   POWER. 


97 


restrictions,  and  from  which  use  the  company  are  to  derive  the 
profits."1 

§  57  (32).  Scope  of  Legislative  Authority.  —  The  adjudged  cases 
exhibit  some  contrariety  of  opinion  respecting  the  scope  of  legislative 
authority  over  municipal  corporations,  or  rather  respecting  the  ques- 
tion how  far  such  corporations,  viewed  as  legal  personalities,  and  us 


1  Nevius,  J.,  Ten  Eyck  v.  Canal  Co., 
3  Harrison  (N.  J.),  200,  203  (1841)  ;  ap- 
proved, Hanson  v.  Vernon.  27  Iowa,  28, 
53  (1869). 

In  an  elaborate  and  well-considered 
opinion,  in  which  the  court  of  appeals  of 
Maryland  held  the  regents  of  the  university 
of  that  State  to  be  a  private  corporation, 
though  its  ends  were  public,  Buchanan, 
C.  J.,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  thus  defines  a  public  corporation  : 
"A  public  corporation  is  one  that  is 
created  for  political  purposes,  with  politi- 
cal powers,  to  be  exercised  for  purposes 
connected  with  the  public  good  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  civil  government  ;  an  in- 
strument of  the  government,  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  legislature,  and  its  members 
officers  of  the  government,  for  the  admin- 
istration or  discharge  of  public  duties,  as 
in  the  cases  of  cities,  towns,  &c. ;  so  where 
a  bank  is  created  by  the  government  for 
its  own  uses,  and  the  stock  belongs  ex- 
clusively to  the  government,  it  is  a  public 
corporation  ;  and  so  of  a  hospital  created 
and  endowed  by  a  government  for  general 
purposes  of  charity."  Regents  of  Univer- 
sity v.  Williams,  9  Gill  &  Johns.  (Md.) 
365,  397  (1838).  See,  also,  Norris  v. 
Trustees,  7  Gill  &  Johns.  7.  The  Univer- 
sity of  the  State  of  Nebraska  is  a  public 
corporation.  Regents  v.  McConnell,  5 
Neb.  423  (1877)  ;  post,  sec.  60,  note. 

Speaking  of  public  corporations,  and  the 
relations  they  sustain  to  the  State,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana  uses  this  lan- 
guage :  "The  government  of  cities  and 
towns,  like  that  of  the  police  jury  of  par- 
ishes (counties),  forms  one  of  the  sub- 
divisions of  the  internal  administration  of 
the  State,  and  is  absolutely  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  legislature.  The  laws  which 
establish  and  regulate  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  not  contracts,  but  ordinary  acts  of 
legislation,  and  the  powers  they  confer  are 
VOL.   I.  —  7 


nothing  more  than  mandates  of  the  sov- 
ereign power,  and  those  laws  may  be  re- 
pealed or  altered  at  the  will  of  the  legis- 
lature, except  so  far  as  the  repeal  or  change 
may  affect  the  rights  of  third  persons 
acquired  under  them."  Police  Jury  v. 
Shreveport  (repeal  of  corporation  ferry 
right),  5  La.  An.  661  (1850)  ;  State 
Bank  v.  Navigation  Co.  (construction  of 
charter),  3  La.  An.  294  (1848) ;  Reynolds 
v.  Baldwin,  1  La.  An.  162  ;  Hayues  v. 
Municipality,  5  La.  An.  760  ;  Edgerton  v. 
Municipality,  1  La.  An.  435  ;  Board  v. 
Municipality,  6  La.  An.  21  (1851).  The 
same  doctrine  is  affirmed,  and  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  legislature  over  municipal  cor- 
porations and  their  funds  and  franchises 
is  asserted,  in  Amite  City  v.  Clements,  24 
La.  An.  27  (1872). 

In  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  holding  that  the  legis- 
lature of  a  State  might  lawfully  repeal  or 
discontinue  a  ferry  franchise  granted  to  a, 
municipal  corporation,  it  is  remarked  that 
towns  and  cities,  "  which  are  public  mu- 
nicipal and  political  bodies,  are  incorpo- 
rated for  public,  and  not  private,  objects. 
They  are  allowed  to  hold  privileges  or 
property  only  for  public  purposes.  The 
members  are  not  shareholders,  nor  joint 
partners  in  any  corporate  estate,  which 
they  can  sell  or  devise  to  others,  or  which 
can  be  attached  or  levied  on  for  their  debts. 
Hence,  generally,  the  doings  between  them 
and  the  legislature  are  in  the  nature  of 
legislation  rather  than  compact,  and  sub- 
ject to  all  the  legislative  conditions  named, 
and  therefore  to  be  considered  as  not  vio- 
lated by  subsequent  legislative  changes." 
Per  Woodbury,  J.,  in  East  Hartford  v. 
Hartford  Company,  10  How.  (U.  S.)  511, 
531  (1850)  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman, 
105  U.  S.  166  (1881).  See  also  Trustees 
v.  Tatman,  13  111.  30  ;  New  Orleans  v. 
Hoyle,   23   La.   An.   740. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  57 

such  representing  special  rights  of  the  community  that  is  incorpo- 
l,  are  within  the  operation  or  protection  of  the  usual  constitu- 
tional restraints  upon  legislative  power.  The  present  chapter  will 
be  devoted  to  a  consideration  of  this  subject.  In  dealing  with 
questions  of  this  delicate  and  complex  nature  we  must  beware  of 
broad  propositions,  and  avoid  general  speculations.  The  only  wise 
and  sate  course  is  to  keep  near  the  shore  and  within  the  light  of 
actual  adjudications,  accompanying  these  with  such  observations  as 
.1  to  be  required.  The  extent  of  the  authority  of  the  legislature 
over  public  corporations  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  an  important 
case  decided  by  the  court  of  appeals  in  the  State  of  Maryland.  The 
legislature  in  incorporating  a  railroad  company  made  it  its  duty  to 
locate  its  road  through  three  towns  specially  named,  and  provided 
that  it'  it  failed  to  do  so,  "then  and  in  that  case  said  company  shall 
forfeit  81, 000,000  to  the  State  of  Maryland  for  the  use  of  Washing- 
County"  The  action  was  instituted  for  the  benefit  of  the  county 
to  recover  the  $1,000,000,  it  being  alleged  that  the  defendant  had 
not  constructed  its  road  in  the  manner  required.  The  defendant 
phaded  that  since  the  last  continuance  of  the  cause  the  legislature 
had  passed  an  act  repealing  that  portion  of  the  charter  of  the  com- 
pany requiring  it  to  build  its  road  through  those  towns,  and  specially 
remitting  and  releasing  the  forfeiture  of  81,000,000.  The  leading 
question,  which  was  argued  on  either  side  by  distinguished  counsel, 
was,  whether  the  provision  in  favor  of  the  county  was  one  of  con- 
tract  (the  railroad  company  having  assented  to  the  act),  and  hence 
claimed  to  be  inviolable  by  legislative  interference,  or  whether  it 
was  one  of  penalty  and  therefore  subject  to  unlimited  legislative 
control  The  court  held  the  latter  view  to  be  the  true  one,  and  that 
the  defendant  was  not  liable.  The  court  also  expressed  the  opinion 
that  if  it  should  be  treated  as  a  contract  made  by  the  State,  yet  it  was 
a  contract  for  the  benefit  of  one  of  its  counties,  to  which  the  money, 
if  collected,  would  belong  in  its  political  and  public  capacity  as  part 
of  the  State;  and  that  such  a  contract  did  not  come  within  the 
meaning  of  that  provision  of  the  national  Constitution  which  pro- 
hibits  a  State  from  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  legislature  from  releasing  it  at  pleasure  or  discontinuing 
an  action  brought  for  its  enforcement  in  the  name  of  the  State.1 

1  State    v.    Railroad    Co.,    12    Gill    &  would  have  applied,  if  the  forfeiture  had, 

Johns.    (Md.)   399    (1842).     Affirmed   on  in  such  a  case,  heen  to  a  city  or  municipal 

error.     8  Bow.  (U.  S.)  584  (1844)  ;  C.  &  corporation.     Infra,  sec.  61. 
.\.  I:.  R.  Co.  r.  Adler,  56  111.  844  (1870).  A  public  corporation  has  no  vested  right 

Although  the  forfeiture  in  th<    case  men-  to  fines  directed  to  be  paid  to  it,  and  the 

1  in  the  texl  was  to  the  county  (a  legislature   may  release   them.     No  con- 

public    corporation),    the    same    doctrine  tract  in  such  cases  is  therehy  violated,  for 


§  58  OFFICES   AND    OFFICERS.  99 

§  58  (33).  Offices  and  Officers ;  Municipal  Officers  defined  ; 
Mode  of  Appointment.  —  Questions  have  arisen  under  special  Consti- 
tutional provisions  respecting  the  authority  of  the  legislature  over 
municipal  offices  and  officers.  And  here  it  is  important  to  bear  in 
rnind  the  before  mentioned  distinction  between  State  officers  —  that 
is,  officers  whose  duties  concern  the  State  at  large,  or  the  general 
public  although  exercised  within  defined  territorial  limits  —  and 
municipal  officers,  whose  functions  relate  exclusively  to  local  con- 
cerns of  the  particular  municipality.  The  administration  of  justice, 
the  preservation  of  the  public  peace,  and  the  like,  although  confided 
to  local  agencies,  are  essentially  matters  of  public  concern;  while  the 
enforcement  of  municipal  by-laws  proper,  the  establishment  of  gas- 
works, of  water-works,  the  construction  of  sewers,  and  the  like,  are 
matters  which  pertain  to  the  municipality  as  distinguished  from  the 
State  at  large.1  The  Constitution  of  Michigan  enjoined  upon  the  le- 
gislature to  "  provide  for  the  incorporation  and  organization  of  cities 
and  villages,"  gave  it  authority  to  confer  upon  them  such  powers  of 
a  local  legislative  and  administrative  character  as  it  should  deem 
proper,  and  contained  the  further  provision  that  "judicial  officers  of 
cities  and  villages  shall  be  elected,  and  all  other  [municipal]  officers  shall 
be  elected  or  appointed,  at  such  time  and  in  such  manner  as  the  legisla- 
ture may  direct "  ;  and  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 
in  a  cause  that  underwent  great  consideration,  and  in  which  the 
judges  delivered  separate  opinions,  that  while  the  legislature  was  left 
free  to  appoint  officers  not  municipal,  —  such,  for  example,  as  a  board 
of  police  commissioners  in  and  for  a  city, — yet  that  it  was  restrained 
by  the  above  mentioned  provisions,  especially  by  the  one  last  quoted, 
from  itself  directly  appointing  municipal  officers  whose  duties  and 

none  exists.     Coles  v.    Madison  County,  Mo.  370  (1876).    See  and  compare  People 

Breese  (111.),   115  ;    Holliday  v.  People,  5  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am. 

Gilm.  (10  111.)  216;  Conner  v.  Bent,  1  Mo.  Rep.  677  ;    Schumacher  v.  Toberman,   56 

235;  Rankin  u.  Beaird,  Breese  (111. ),  123  ;  Cal.  508.     Opinion  of  McKinstry,  J.,  and 

post,  sec.  62.     Effect  of  executive  pardon  of  Cooley,   J.,    in    People    v.    Detroit,    28 

on  fines  going   to   county.      Holliday   v.  Mich.  22S  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.     Text 

People,  5  Gilm.  (10  111.)  216.  approved.     Burch  v.  Hardwick,  30  Gratt. 

1  People   v.    Hurlbut,     24    Mich.     44  24  ;    U.  S.   v.   Memphis,   97   U.  S.    284. 

(1871);  s.c.  9  Am.  Rep.  108.     The  distinc-  Post,  sees.  72,  74  a  ;  People  v.  Curley,    5 

tion  mentioned  in  the  text  is  there  accu-  Col.    412  ;     State    v.    Hunter,    38     Kan. 

rately  drawn,  and  clearly  stated  and  illus-  578    (metropolitan  police   act    giving  the 

trated  in  the  admirable  opinion  of  Camp-  city  council    power  to  appoint  <<  board  of 

bell,  C.J.     It  is  approved  and  applied  in  police  commissioners  held  constitutional); 

Chicago  v.    Wright,    69    111.  326  (1873)  ;  infra,  sec.  60  ;    Hathaway  v.  Few  Balti- 

People   v.  Draper,    15    N.  Y.  543,  Denio,  more,  4S  Mich.    251  ;  State  v.  George,   23 

J.  ;  Re  Woolsey,  95   N.  Y.  135  ;    Astor  v.  Fla.    585   (1887);   ante,  sees.    L9,   22,28. 

New  York,  62  N.  Y.   567.     The  text  is  See  chapter  on  Corporate  Officers,  j 
cited  and  applied  in  Britton  v.  Steber,  62 


100 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§58  a 


authority  were  plainly  and  exclusively  local,  such  as  the  board  of 
water  commissioners  and  board  of  sewer  commissioners  i'or  a  partic- 
ular city.1 

§  58a.  Same  subject. — The  Constitution  of  New  York2  pro- 
vides that  municipal  offia  rs shall  be  electa/  bij  the  (lectors  of  the  muni- 
cipality, or  appointed  by  tin  authorities  thereof.  The  purpose  of  this 
provision  is  to  secure  to  the  political  and  municipal  divisions  of  the 
State  the  right  of  local  self-govt  mment,  and  to  prevent  the  legislature 
from  depriving  the  Inhabitants  of  the  several  counties,  cities,  towns, 
and  villages  of  the  right  to  choose  their  officers.8  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Indiana  has  sustained  the  right  of  local  self-government 


1  People  v.  Hurlbut,  supra,  distin- 
guished from  Peoples.  Mahaney,  13  Mich. 
481  ;  ante,  sec.  9,  and  notes.  In  People 
v.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  15 
Am.  Rep.,  The  People  v.  Hurlbut  is  ex- 
plained, and  its  doctrine  adhered  to,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  board  of  Park  Com- 
missioners for  Detroit,  selected  by  the 
legislature  without  its  consent,  were  not 
the  officers  or  representatives  of  the  city. 
Infra,  sees.  72-74  «.  So,  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  Kentucky,  which  contains  a 
provision  that  "  officers  of  towns  and  cities 
shall  be  elected  for  such  terms,  and  in  such 
manner,  and  with  such  qualifications,  as 
may  be  prescribed  bylaw,"  and  "shall 
reside  within  their  respective  districts,"  it 
was  held  that  tJic  legislature  could  not 
authorize  the  governor  to  appoint  municipal 
officers,  since  the  Constitution  requires  that 
they  shall  be  elected  by  the  voters  of  the 
town  or  city  :  Speed  V.  Crawford,  '■'>  Met. 
(Ky.)  207  (1860) ;  but  it  was  also  likewise 
held  that  it  was  within  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  pass  an  act  depriv- 
ing the  mayor  and  council  of  a  desig- 
nated city  of  the  power  to  elect  the  police 
force  thereof,  and  establishing,  instead,  a 
board  of  police  for  the  city  and  the  county 
in  which  the  city  was  situate,  to  be  elected 
by  the  qualified  voters  of  the  city  and 
comity,  and  that  this  hoard,  thus  elected, 
should  select  and  enroll  the  permanent 
police  force  of  the  city,  which,  it  was  pro- 
vided should  be  taxed  to  pay  them. 
Police  Commissioners  i.  Louisville,  3 
Hush  (Ky.),  597  (1868).  See  Richmond 
Mayoralty  Case,  L9  Gratt.  (Va.)  073. 
3.  60,  7--74  a. 


2  Art.  x.  sec.  2. 

8  People  v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50 
(1873),  criticising  People  v.  Draper,  15 
N.  Y.  532  ;  and  People  v.  Shepherd,  36 
N.  Y.  285  ;  People  v.  Bull,  46  N.  Y.  57  ; 
People  v.  McKinney,  52  N.Y.  374  (1873), 
overruling  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  X.  Y. 
128.  And  see  People  v.  Palmer,  52  N.  Y. 
83  (1873)  ;  People  v.  Clute,  50  N.  Y.  451 
(1872)  ;  ante,  sec.  9,  and  note.  The  legisla- 
ture may,  notwithstanding  the  constitu- 
tional provision  mentioned  in  the  text 
and  others,  provide  for  the  improvement 
of  city  streets  through  commissioners  ap- 
pointed by  legislative  act,  instead  of  be- 
ing chosen  by  the  municipal  authorities. 
Re  Woolsey,  95  N.  Y.  135  ;  Astor  v.  New 
York,  62  N.  Y.  567.  Infra,  sec.  74,  note. 
It  is  otherwise  under  the  Constitution  of 
California.  People  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15  ; 
Schumacher  v.  Toberrnan,  56  Cal.  508. 
Concerning  the  general  inquiry  how  far 
right  of  local  government  and  municipal 
self-regulation,  including  the  right  of  the 
local  citizens  to  select  local  officers,is  rooted 
in  our  American  Constitutions,  the  reader 
will  find  the  opinion  of  Cooley,  J.,  in  the 
People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228  (1873)  ; 
s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202,  in  connection  with 
the  opinions  in  The  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24 
Mich.  14  (1871)  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103, 
highly  instructive.  See  ante,  chap.  i. 
where  the  subject  is  viewed  in  its  general 
historical  aspects.  In  Indiana,  see  State  v. 
Denny  (two  cases),  21  Northeastern  Rep. 
252  and  274;  Evansville  v.  State,  21 
Northeastern  Rep.  267.  Post,  sees.  72- 
74  a. 


§59 


OFFICES   AND   OFFICERS. 


101 


in  that  State  in  opinions  of  marked  ability,  vigor,  and  learning, 
which  hold  to  be  unconstitutional  two  acts  of  the  legislature 
which  deprived  certain  classes  of  municipalities  of  the  usual 
rio-hts  of  municipal  control  and  local  regulation.1  It  has  elsewhere 
been  held,  however,  that  administrative  agencies  and  officers,  such 
as  police  boards,  and  even  boards  of  water  commissioners,  park  com- 
missioners, &c,  may,  in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  limita- 
tion, be  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  assist  in  local  or  municipal 
administration.2 


§  59.  Same  subject.  —  Eecognizing  and  applying  the  distinction 
in  the  preceding  section  between  State  officers  and  municipal  officers, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  held  that  the  mayor  of  a  city  was  not 
an  officer  under  the  State,  within  the  meaning  of  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision, giving  the  Supreme  Court  jurisdiction  only  when  title  to  an 
office  under  the  State  is  in  contest.3 


i  In  The  State  v.  Denny  (Ind.  1889), 
21  Northeastern  Rep.  252,  an  act  of  the 
legislature  creating  a  board  of  public  works 
and  affairs  for  cities  having  50,000  inhab- 
itants, to  consist  of  three  members  selected 
from  the  two  leading  political  parties,  and 
to  be  appointed  hj  tlie  legislature,  and  giv- 
ing to  such  board  exclusive  power  and 
jurisdiction  over  streets,  alleys,  sewers, 
water  supply,  and  lights,  was  held  uncon- 
stitutional, as  infringing  the  right  of  local 
self-government  vested  in  the  people  of 
such  cities.  In  Evansville  v.  State  (Ind. 
1889),  21  Northeastern  Rep.  267,  and  The 
State  v.  Denny,  Mayor,  lb.  274,  an  act 
creating  metropolitan  police  and  fire  boards 
for  cities  having  over  29,000  inhabitants, 
provided  that  no  persons  should  be  eligible 
as  commissioners  of  the  police  board  un- 
less they  had  resided  in  the  respective 
cities  for  five  years,  and  that  the  officers 
and  employees  of  the  police  board  should 
be  selected  from  the  two  leading  political 
parties.  It  was  held  that  these  provisions 
as  to  residence  and  politics  were  repugnant 
to  Art.  1,  sec.  23  of  the  Constitution  of 
Indiana,  prohibiting  the  legislature  from 
granting  to  any  citizen  or  class  of  citizens 
privileges  or  immunities  which,  upon  the 
same  terms,  shall  not  belong  equally  to  all 
citizens.  The  act  also  gave  to  the  boards, 
whose  members  were  to  be  selected  by  the 
legislature,  supreme  and  exclusive  control 
over  the  fire  and  police  departments,  and 


of  the  property  of  the  city  used  in  them, 
as  well  as  of  the  purchase  of  supplies  for 
them.  It  was  held  void  as  being  an  at- 
tempt to  deprive  the  people  of  the  cities 
affected  by  the  act  of  the  right  of  local 
self-government.  Ante,  sees.  9,  11,  45, 
and  note  ;  post,  sec.  183. 

2  County  Court  v.  Griswold,  58  Mo.  175, 
198(1874);  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  Y. 
532  ;  Daily  v.  St.  Paul,  7  Minn.  390, 
following  People  v.  Draper.  See  People  v. 
Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50  (1873),  where  Peo- 
ple v.  Draper  is  questioned  and  dis- 
tinguished. State  v.  Valle,  41  Mo.  29  ; 
State  v.  St.  Louis  County  Court,  34  Mo. 
546.  Limitations  on  the  right  suggested. 
People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228  (1873  ); 
s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202. 

8  Britton  v.  Steber,  62  Mo.  370  (1876). 
A  State  officer  may  be  connected  with 
some  of  the  municipal  functions,  but  he 
must  derive  his  powers  from  a  State  stat- 
ute, and  execute  his  powers  in  obedience 
to  a  State  law.  State  v.  Valle,  41  Mo.  29. 
Aldermen  and  common  councilmen  are 
considered  "civil  officers"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Rhode  Island  relating  to  the  quali- 
fications of  voters.  In  re  The  Newport 
Charter,  14  R.  I.  655.  Water  committee 
with  statute  authority  to  construct  and 
manage  the  water-works  of  a  city,  was 
held  to  be  agents,  and  not  "officers," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional 


102 


Ml   NK'II'AI.    CORPORATION'S. 


6  60 


I    (34).      Same   subject.  — Police  Officers;   Mode  of   Appoint- 

meut.  —  And  it  has  been  several  times  determined  that  the  legi 
tmv  may,  unless  specially  restricted  in  the  Constitution,  takefrom  a 
municipal  corporation  its  charter  p  ■  |  ia  andtheir 

appointment,  and  by  statute  itself  directly  provide  for  a  permanent 
police  for  the  corporation,  under  the  control  of  a  board  of  police  not 
appointed  or  elected  by  the  corporate  authorities,  but  consisting  of 
commissioners  named  and  appointed  by  the  legislature.  Police  of- 
ficers are  in  fact  State  or  public  omcers,  and  not  private  or  cor- 
porate officers.  And  a  provision  in  such  a  law,  transferring  to  such 
commissioners,  for  the  purposes  of  the  new  police,  the  use  of  the 
police-telegraph,  station-houses,  watch-boxes,  &c,  provided  by  the 
corporation,  is  valid  sunt-  it  only  takes  city  property  dedicated  to  a 
particular  use  and  applies  it  to  the  same  purpose,  changing  only 
the  agency  by  which  the  use  is  directed;  the  property  is  still  the 
city's.1 


provision  that  the  Legislature  "shall  not 
create  any  office,  the  term  of  which  .shall 
roger  than  four  years."  But  a  provi- 
sion in  the  Constitution  of  Connecticut 
prohibiting  an  increase  of  the  compensa- 
tion of  any  public  officer  during  his  term,  is 
violated  by  a  resolution  of  the  common 
icil  to  pay  compensation  to  a  com- 
mittee of  the  council  who  were  entitled  to 
no  salary,  for  customary  services  rendered 
duiing  the  year.  Garvie  v.  Hartford,  5-1 
Conn.  44(i;  David  v.  Portland  Water 
Committee,  14  Oreg.  98. 

1  Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police  (affirm- 
ing validity  to  the  Baltimore  Police  Bill), 
15  M'l.  376  (1859).  There  is  nothing  in 
the  maxim  that  "Taxation  and  represen- 
tation go  together,"  thai  can  preclude  the 
legislature  from  establishing  in  a  city  a 
metropolitan  polia  board,  with  power  to 
estimate  the  expenses  of  the  police,  and 
compelling  the  city  authorities  to  raise  by 
taxation  the  amount  so  estimated.  Every 
city  is  represented  in  the  State  legislature; 
and  it  is  for  that  body  to  determine  how 
much  power  shall  be  conferred  by  the 
municipal  charters  which  it  grants.  Peo- 
ple  v.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481  ;  see  also 
same  principle,  People  v.  Draper,  15  N. 
Y.  532  (18">7),  where  the  act  to  establish 
the  metropolitan  police  district  was  held 
constitutional.  But  see  People  v.  Albert- 
sou,  55  X.  V.  50  (187S),  where  Peopli  ». 
Draper  is  questioned  and   distinguished, 


ami  People  v.  Shepherd,  36  X.  Y.  2^7,  is 
doubted;  People  v.  McDonald,   69   X.   Y. 

362(1877);  People   v.  Detroit,  28    Mich. 
228,  236;  People  v.  Chicago,  51   111.  17. 
Text  approved.     Burch   r.  Hardwiek,   30 
Gratt.    24  ;     Police     Comm'rs  v.    Louis- 
ville, 3  Bush,  597  ;  Diamond  v.  Cain,    21 
La.  An.  309  (1869) ;  State  v.  Leovy,  21  La. 
An.  538  ;  ante,  sec.  58  n.  The  cases  concur 
in  holding  that  police  officers  are,  in  fact, 
.State  officers  and  not  municipal,  although 
a  particular  city  or  town  be  taxed  to  pay 
them.  Posi,sec.210,and  chap,  xxiii.  Cooley, 
Taxation    (2d  ed.),  681.       An   act   which 
makes  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  a  cor- 
poration commissioners  of  the  court-house 
and  jail  maj   be  repealed   by  the  legisla- 
ture, and  these  buildings  placed  under  the 
control  of  county  or  other  officers.     State 
v.  Mayor,  R.  M.  (  harlt.  (Ga.)  250  ;  see  also 
SI  ite  v.  Dews,  K.  M.  Charlt.  397.  A  grant 
to  a  city  to  aid  in  building  a  court-house,aad 
for  educational  purposes,  is  subject,   until 
executed,   to    legislative    resumption  and 
control.      Bass  v.    Fontleroy,    11    Texas, 
698.     In  the  absence  of  constitutional  re- 
striction   the     legislature      may     directly 
appoint  officers  to  act  within  the  munici- 
pality.      Hudson,    &c.    Co.     v.    Seymour 
(highway  commissioners),  6  Vroom,  35  N. 
.1.  L.  17.       Many  of  the  recent  Constitu- 
tions   contain    prohibitions    against     such 
appointments.     See  for  example  Const .  of 
California      1879,     Art.    xi.    sees.    12-14. 


§  61  OFFICES   AND   OFFICERS.  103 

§  Gl.  Same  subject.  —  Mode  of  Payment.  In  the  absence  of 
special  constitutional  restriction  it  is  competent  likewise  to  the  legis- 
lature of  a  State  to  enact  that  the  county  shall  pay  a  portion  of  the 
expenses  of  a  police  force  in  a  city  situated  wholly  within,  and  forming 
part  of  the  county.  Police  officers  really  execute  public  or  State  us 
distinguished  from  corporate  duties.  It  may  even  direct  a  county 
to  appropriate  part  of  its  revenue  already  collected  in  this  v 
since  such  legislation  is  not  unconstitutional,  as  being  retrospective 
in  its  operation,  or  as  taking  away  vested  rights,  or  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts,  or  violating  the  principles  of  taxation.  A 
moneys  acquired  by  taxation  are  not  strictly  the  private  property 
of  the  county,  such  legislation  is  not  the  application  of  private  prop- 
erty to  public  use  without  compensation,  since  the  police  board,  by 
virtue  of  the  act  creating  it,  was  an  agency  of  the  State  government 
and  performed  public  duties.1  Such  is  the  legislative  power  over 
counties  and  their  property  paid  for  by  taxation  that  the  General 
Assembly  may  constitutionally  enact  a  law  to  take  railroad  stock 
from  the  county  after  it  has  been  subscribed  and  paid  for  out  of 
funds  raised  by  taxation,  and  transfer  it  to  those  from  whom  the 
money  was  collected,  and,  in  the  event  they  do  not  apply  for  it,  to 
vest  it  in  townships  for  school  purposes.2 

Infra,  sec.  74  a.  So  held  in  Indiana.  State  be  committed  to  the  corporate  authorities 

v.  Denny,  21  Northeastern  Rep.  252  ;  Ev-  of    a   municipality,    and   if  there  are   no 

ansville  v.  State,  lb.  267  ;  State  v.  Denny,  special  constitutional  restrictions  on  the 

lb.  274.  power  of  the  legislature,  it  may  authorize 

The  management  and  mode  of  electing  the  assessment  of  a  tax  upon  the  keepers 
trustees  of  an  incorporated  academy,  which  of  saloons  and  restaurants  in  the  munici- 
is  endowed  entirely  by  the  State,  may  be  pality  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  such 
changed  by  the  legislature  at  its  pleasure.  police  force  therein,  to  be  levied  and  col- 
Dart  v.  Houston,  22  Ga.  506  ;  see  also  lected  as  other  taxes.  Durach's  Appeal, 
University  of  North  Carolina  v.  Maultsby,  62  Pa.  St.  491  (1869)  ;  post,  sees.  746,  750, 
8  Ired.  Eq.  257  ;  University  of  Alabama  v.  793  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111.  344 
Winston,  5  Stew.  &  Port.  17  ;  Louisville  (1870). 

v.  University  of  Louisville,  15  B.  Mon.  School  districts  being  public  corpora- 
645  ;  Visitors,  &c.  v.  State,  15  Mxl.  330  ;  tions,  under  legislative  control,  a  law  pro- 
Regents  v.  McConnell,  5  Neb.  423  (1877).  viding  that  school  debts  may  be  paid  in 

1  State,  ex  rel.   St.  Louis   Police  Com-  bills  of  the  State  bank  of  the  State,  is  valid 

m'rs   v.    St.    Louis   County  Court    (man-  as  against  the  objection  that  the  legisla- 

damus),  34  Mo.  546  (1864);  contra,  Mayor,  ture  had  no  power  to  direct  that  an\ 

&c.  v.  Tows,  5  Sneed  (Tenn.),   186.     The  except  gold  and  silver  should  be  received 

view  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  is  in  payment  of  debts.     Bush  v.  Shipman, 

undoubtedly  the  correct  one.     Approved.  4  Scam.  (5  111.)  190. 

St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  52  Mo.  351  (1873)  ;  A  municipal  corporation  may  constitu- 

People  r.  Morris,  13  Wend.  325 ;  Sangamon  tionally    be     exempted    from    prospec 

Co.  v.  Springfield,  63  111.  66  ;  Weymouth,  liability  for  non-feasance  of  its  officers  or 

&c.  Fire   Dist.  v.   County   Comm'rs,    108  liability  for  torts.     Gray  v.  Brooklyn.   10 

Mass.  142;  Stilzv  Indianapolis,  55  Ind.  515.  Abb.  Pr.  R.  N.  S.  186;  post,  chap,  xxiii. 

The  maintenance  of  a  police  force  may  a  Lucas  v.  Tippecanoe  Co.,  44   Ind.  524 


L04 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATION'S. 


§  62  (35).  Legislative  Power  over  Revenues.  —  The  legitimate 
authority  of  the  legislature  over  municipal  eorporations  extends  to 
making  provisions  concerning  their  funds  and  revenues}  and  the  au- 
thority is  not  abridged  because  the  purpose  to  which  the  revenue  is 
to  he  appropriated  is  specified  in  the  charter;  and  tin:  ground  of  the 
doctrine  is  that  such  corporations  have  no  vested  rights  in  powers 
conferred  upon  them  lor  civil,  political,  or  administrative  purposes. 
Thus,  the  legislature  may  repeal  the  power  it  had  given  to  cities  to 
grant  licenses  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  although  the 
money  to  be  derived  from  the  sale  of  such  licenses  was  directed  to 
be  appropriated  to  the  support  of  paupers  within  the  city.2  Such 
an  authority,  it  was  remarked,  "  gives  the  city  no  more  a  vested 
right  to  issue  licenses,  because  the  legislature  specified  the  objects 
to  which  the  money  should  be  applied,  than  if  it  had  been  put  into 
the  general  fund  of  the  city."  3 


(1873);  Downey,  J Vorden,  and  Osborn,  JJ., 
concurring,  Buskirk  and  Pettit,  JJ.,  dis- 
senting. The  opinions  are  elaborate,  and 
refer  to  the  leading  authorities  on  the 
subject.  The  dissenting  judges  consider 
Spaulding  v.  Andover,  then  recently  de- 
cided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
Hampshire,  as  strongly  sustaining  their 
views.  In  the  Board  of  Comm'rs  of  Tip- 
pecanoe County  v.  Lucas,  Treasurer,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  93 
I'  S.  108  (1876),  was  of  the  opinion,  as 
counties  were  mere  agencies  of  government 
whose  powers  may  be  changed  at  pleasure, 
that  revenues  raised  by  taxation,  although 
Levied  for  specific  public  purposes,  are  so 
far  subject  to  the  legislature  that  it  may 
direct  them  to  I"-  applied  to  other  uses  of 
tie'  municipality  ;  and,  therefore,  that  it 
was  competent  for  the  legislature  to  direct 
restitution  to  tie-  taxpayer  of  property  ex- 
1  from  him  by  taxation  in  whatever 
form  the  property  may  have  been  changed, 
-o  long  as  it  remained  in  the  possession  of 
tie-  municipality. 

1  Ante,  sees.  57,  60,  61,  and  notes. 

2  Gutzweller    v.   People,    14     111.    142 
(1852)  ;  ante,  sec.  54,  note. 

8  Gutzweller  v.  People,  14  111.  142, 
(1852),  per  Caton,  J.  See,  also,  Richland 
I  0.  V.  Lawrence  Co.,  12  111.  1  (1850)  ; 
adhered  to,  Sangamon  Co.  v.  Springfield, 
18  111.  71  (1872)  ;  Spaulding  v.  Andover 
full  discussion  by  Foster,  J.),  54  N.  H. 
i&  (1871);  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  Council, 


93  U.  S.  116  (1876)  ;  People  v.  Super- 
visors, 50  Cal.  561  ;  People  v.  Power,  25 
111.  187  ;  Richmond  v.  Richmond,  &c. 
Railroad  Co.,  21  Gratt.  (Va.)  604  (1872), 
holding  that  the  State  may  exempt  property 
from  municipal  taxation.  By  the  charter 
of  a  municipal  corporation  there  was 
granted  to  it  sole  power  to  grant  licenses 
to  sell  spirituous  liquors  within  its  limits, 
and  to  appropriate  the  money  arising 
therefrom  to  city  purposes.  Subsequently 
the  legislature  passed  an  act  directing  the 
money  thus  raised  to  be  paid  by  the  cor- 
poration to  an  academy  located  within  the 
town.  The  municipal  corporation  refused 
to  pay  over  to  the  academy  an  amount  re- 
ceived for  licenses  after  the  passage  of  the 
last-named  act,  and  the  academy  brought 
an  action  to  recover  it.  The  court  held 
the  subsequent  act  to  be  unconstitutional, 
and  that  the  town  was  not  liable.  The 
court  were  of  opinion,  that,  by  its  charter, 
the  town  had  a  vested  right  in  the  profits 
arising  from  licenses.  It  admitted  that 
the  legislature  might  altogether  take  away 
from  the  town  the  power  to  grant  licenses  ; 
but  if  it  allowed  the  power  to  remain,  it 
denied  the  right  of  the  legislature  "to 
make  a  different  disposition  of  the  funds 
arising  from  such  licenses  from  that  con- 
tained in  the  charter,  unless  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  corporation."  Trustees  of 
Aberdeen  Academy  v.  Aberdeen,  13  Sm.  & 
M.  (21  Miss.)  645  (1850).  See,  also,  Aber- 
deen  v.  Saunderson,  8  Sm.  &  M.  663.     The 


§  03  LEGISLATIVE   POWER   OVER   MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  105 

§  63  (36).  Legislative  Power  over  Municipal  Charters.  —  Legisla- 
tive acts  respecting  the  political  and  governmental  powers  of  muni- 
cipal corporations  not  being  in  the  nature  of  contracts,  the  provisions 
thereof  may  be  changed  at  pleasure  where  the  constitutional  rights 
of  creditors  and  others  are  not  invaded.1  By  act  of  the  legislature 
the  separate  city  of  Lafayette  was  added  to  and  incorporated  with 
the  city  of  New  Orleans,  with  a  provision  that  the  added  district, 
which  was  less  in  debt  than  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  should  be 
charged  only  with  its  own  debts;  and  by  a  subsequent  act  of  the 
legislature  it  was  provided  that  taxes  should  be  equal  and  uniform 
throughout  the  entire  limits  of  the  city ;  the  effect  of  which  was  to 
increase  the  amount  of  taxes  to  be  raised  within  that  portion  of  the 
corporation  which  was  formerly  the  city  of  Lafayette.  A  bill  was 
filed  by  residents  and  property  owners  of  the  annexed  district  to 
enjoin  the  collection  of  the  excess  of  taxes  beyond  the  amount  fixed 
by  the  act  incorporating  the  annexed  district  into  the  "  old  city," 
claiming  that  the  act  was  a  contract,  and  the  levy  of  taxes  under  the 
latter  act,  so  far  as  regards  debts  due  antecedently  to  the  annexation, 
violated  the  vested  rights  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed  district. 
The  Supreme  Court,  on  the  ground  that  public  corporations  are 
wholly  under  the  control  of  the  legislature,  which  has  the  power  to 
provide  in  what  manner  taxes  shall  be  levied  for  their  support,  and 
how  their  debts  shall  be  paid  on  their  dissolution,  held  the  act  au- 
thorizing increased  taxation  to  be  valid,  and  dismissed  the  bill.2    So 

doctrine  that  the  town  corporation  had  a  v.  Board,  &c,  44  Ind.  524)  ;  Indianapolis 

vested  right  in  profits  arising  from  licen-  v.  Indianapolis    Home,  &c,  50  Ind.  215 

ses    cannot,  we  think,  be  sustained,  and  (1875). 

is    not    in    harmony  with   the  decisions  1  Smith  v.  Inge,  80  Ala.  283.     Rights 

elsewhere.       Indianapolis   v.   Indianapolis  of    creditors   of    municipal    corporations, 

Home,  &c,  50  Ind.  215  (1875).  see  post,  sec.  68  a,  chaps,  vii.  viii.,  and  xiv. 

City,   county,  and  township  funds  are  As   to   constitutional  rights  of  creditors, 

under  legislative  control.     County  v.  State,  mortgagees,  contractors  with    and    share- 

11  111.  202  ;  County  v.  County,  12  111.  1  ;  holders,  of  private  corporations,  as  against 

Dennis  v.  Maynard,  15  111.  477  ;  Love  v.  the  legislative  power  of  the  State,  see  opin- 

Schenck,  12  Ired.  Law,  304  ;  Love  v.  Ram-  ion  Euger,  C.  J.,  in  People  v.  O'Brien,  1888, 

sour,  lb.  328  ;  Youngs  v.  Hall,  9  Xev.  212  known  as  the  Broadway  Surface  Raihvay 

(1374)  ;  People  v.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y.   1  ;  Case,  111  N.  Y.  1.     Infra,  sec.  68  a. 

People   v.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.   491  (1874)  ;  2  Layton  v.   New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  Council,  93  U.  S.  515  (1857).    See,  also,  Girard  ;•.  Philadel- 

116  (1876)  ;    ante,  sec.  57,  note  ;  Indian-  phia,  7  Wall.  1  (1868);  People  v.  Hill,   7 

apolis  v.  Indianapolis  Home,  &c,  50  Ind.  Cal.  97  (1857)  ;  post,  chap.  viii.  ;  State  v. 

215  (1875).     The  Indianapolis  Home  for  Flanders,  24  La.  An.   57;    V,  S.,  ex  rel. 

Friendless  Women  is  so  far  a  public  cor-  Brown  v.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.,  300  ;  Vance 

poration  or  institution,  that  an  appropria-  v.  Little  Rock,  30  Ark.    435,  439  ;  Haw- 

tion  by  the  legislature  of  fines,  collected  kins  v.  Jonesboro,  63  Ga.  527  ;  Sedgwirk 

for  the  violation  of  certain  city  ordinances,  Co.  v.    Bailey,  11  Kan.   631    (1873);    San 

to   its  support,    is  not  the  appropriation  Francisco  v.  Canavan,  42  Cal.  541  (1872). 

of   money    to    a   private  purpose  (Lucas  A   statute   extinguishing  one   corporation 


106  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  64 

v.  ]».  i ,  a  contract  for  paving  streets  had  been  made,  but  before 

it  was  fully  executed,  certain  wards  were  added  to  the  city  (in  which 
wards,  how*.  ixt  of  the  paving  was  ever  done),  and  do  p 

ii  as  i"  the  debts  of  the  corporation  was  made  in  the  act  of 
annexation,  it  was  held  that  the  legislature  might  afterwards  consti- 
tutionally enact,  as  against  the  contractor,  that  the  people  within 
the  wards  thus  added  should  oot  be  taxed  to  pay  any  part  of  the  debt 
of  the  city  contracted  prior  to  the  pa  sage  of  the  act  by  which  they 
were  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation.1  And  the  same 
principle  wa  1  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 

which  held  to  be  valid  a  Legislative  act  by  which  the  city  of  Carroll- 
ton  was  annexed  to  New  Orleans,  with  a  provision  that  the  latter 
city  should  succeed  to  all  tiie  rights  and  property,  and  assume  and 

dl  of  the  debts  of  the  former.2 

§64     37).     Same  subject.  —  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  alU  r 
and  abolish  municip  U  corporations,  to  erect  new  corporations  in  the 

place  of  the  old,  in  add  to  the  old,  or  to  carve  out  of  the  old  a  new 
corporation,  or  the  power  to  divide  and  dispose  of  the  property  held 
by  such  corporations  for  municipal  purposes,  is  not  defeated  or 
affected  by  the  circumstance  that  the  corporation  is,  by  its  charter, 
made  the  t ntstce  of  a  charity,  or  of  other  private  rights  and  interests. 
Where  the  le.ur:d  existence  of  the  municipal  trustee  is  destroyed  by 
legislative  act,  the  Court  of  Chancery  will  assume  the  execution  of 
the  trust,  and,  if  necessary,  will  appoint  new  trustees  to  take  charge 
of  tin-  property  and  carry  into  effect  the  trust.3 

and    throwing  its  obligations  on  another  sessment  for  public  use,  and  enforceable  aa 

raises  an  implied  promise  on  the  part  of  such,  says:  "But  such  is  not  this  case. 

tin-  su ssor  to  pay  the  same.     Little  v.  ...  There    i-   no   principle   that    1    am 

i  Township  Committee,  40  N.  J.  I.,  aware   of   which    sanctions   the    doctrine 

3;«7.     /■    ■,      es.  170,  186-189.  that  it  is  within  the  taxing  power  of  the 

1  I'll                      t  r  1.  Brown  v.  Mem-  legislature  in  compel  on>  town,  city,  or  lo- 

phis,  97    D     3.  300  (1>77).     Further  as  entity  in  contribuU  i<>  the  payment  of  the 

i   dissolution  ami  of  change  of  debts  of  another.     The  government  has  no 

68   -;  chaps,  vii.  such  authority,  and    this   case    i>  entirely 

m  1  viii.     In  town  of  Flatbush,  In  re,  60  without  a  precedent,     [fsuch  assessments 

N.  V                                         tppeals  ex-  were  authorized  they  might  not  be  limited 

•  ■I  the  opinion  that   it   was  beyond  to  adjoining  towns,  cities,  or  villages,  hut 

tin-  competency  of  the  legislature  to  assess  applied  to  those  located  at  greal  distances 

lands  in  the  town  of  Flatbush  to  pay  debts  from  each  other.     Such  Legislation  would 

previously  incurred  by  the  adjoining  city  !"•  unjust,   mischievous,    ami   oppressive, 

i  under  prior  a                   irk,  and  cannot  be  tolerated. " 

although   the   portion    of    the    park    was  -  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  644 

1   out    of    the    corporate    limits    of  (1877).      Such   legislation    is  not  within 

iting  that  the  prohibition  of  the  State  Constitution 

>  'it    for    benefits  against  ti                                      laws.   lb. 

been  made  it  might  be  said  to  he  an  as-  8  Girard   v.    Philadelphia,    7    Wail.    1 


§  QQ  PUBLIC   AND   PRIVATE   RIGHTS.  107 

§  65  (38).  Legislative  Power  not  wholly  Unlimited. — The  suprem- 
acy of  the  legislative  authority  over  municipal  corporations  is  not, 
however,  in  all  respects,  unlimited ;  but  the  limitations  must  be  sought 
either  in  the  national  or  State  Constitution ;  and  except  as  there 
found,  in  terms  or  by  fair  implication,  they  do  not  exist.  In  Eng- 
land it  is  settled  that  the  Crown  has  no  power,  without  the  consent 
of  those  to  be  affected  thereby,  to  alter  or  abolish  municipal  charters, 
or  to  impose  new  ones  on  the  corporation.  But  Parliament  may 
create  new  corporations,  or  abolish  or  alter  charters,  or  impose  new 
ones,  at  its  will,  and  without  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants.  And 
so  may  the  State  legislatures  in  this  country,  if  there  be  no  consti- 
tutional restriction  upon  the  power.1 

§  66  (39).  Public  and  Private  or  Proprietary  Rights  distinguished. 
—  It  assists  to  an  understanding  of  the  extent  of  legislative  power 
over  municipal  corporations  proper  (incorporated  towns  and  cities)  to 
observe  that  these,  as  ordinarily  constituted,  possess  a  double  charac- 
ter :  the  one  governmental,  legislative,  ov  public ;  the  other,  in  a  sense, 
proprietary  or  private.  The  distinction  between  these,  though  some- 
times difficult  to  trace,  is  highly  important,  and  is  frequently  re- 
ferred to,  particularly  in  the  cases  relating  to  the  implied  or  common- 
law  liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  the  negligence  of  their 
servants,  agents,  or  officers  in  the  execution  of  corporate  duties  and 
powers.  On  this  distinction,  indeed,  rests  the  doctrine  of  such  im- 
plied liability.2     In  its  governmental  or  public  character,  the  corpora- 

(1868)  ;  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  courts,   arose  between  the  prerogative  of 

472,  528  (1880)  ;  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  64  the  crown  and  the  corporation.     The  right 

Pa.  St.  169  (1870)  ;  infra,  sees.  74  a,  80,  or  power  of  parliament  in  England,  or  of 

Montpelier  v.  East  Montpelier  (division  of  the  legislature  here,  would  present  (and 

town,  and  contest  as  to  trust  property  held  was  decided  to  present)  quite  a  different 

for  the  benefit  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  question."     Per  Nelson,  J.,  in  People  v. 

original  township),   29  Vt.   (3  Wms.)  12  Morris,  13  Wend.  325,  334  (1835)  ;  Phila- 

(1856)  ;  same  controversy  at  law,  27  Vt.  delphia  v.  Field,  58   Pa.  St.   320  (1868)  ; 

704.     See  infra,  sec.  80,  and  chapters  on  Hudson   County  v.    Seymour,    6    Vroom 

Corporate  Property  and  Remedies  against  (35  N.  J.  L.),  47  ;  People  v.  Bennett,  29 

Illegal   Corporate   Acts,   post.      Text  ap-  Mich.  451  (1874)  ;  s.  c.  18  Am.  Rep.  107  ; 

proved.     Luehrman  v.  Tax.  Dist.,  2  Lea  Austin  v.  Coggeshall,  12  R.  I.  329,  citing 

(Tenn. ),  425  ;  Ellerman  v.  McMains,   30  and  approving  text. 

La.  An.  190  ;  infra,  sec.  68  ;  Cincinnati  v.  2  Ante,  sees.  22,  25,  28.  "  The  dis- 
Cameron,  33  Ohio  St.  336.  tinctiou  is  well  established  between  the 
1  St.  Louis  v.  Allen  (extension  of  city  responsibilities  of  towns  and  cities  for  acts 
limits),  13  Mo.  400  (1850)  ;  St.  Louis  v.  done  in  their  public  capacity,  in  the  dis- 
Russell,  9  Mo.  503  (1845).  Ante,  sec.  54.  charge  of  duties  imposed  on  them  by  the 
It  is  justly  observed,  that  "  most,  if  not  legislature  for  the  public  benefit,  and  for 
all,  of  the  leading  cases  in  the  books,  in-  acts  done  in  what  may  be  called  their  /in- 
volving the  question  of  the  inviolability  vate  character,  in  the  management  of  prop- 
of    municipal    charters,    in   the    English  erty  and  rights  voluntarily  held  by  them 


108 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


S  66 


t j. in  is  made,  by  the  State,  one  of  its  instruments,  or  the  local 
depositary  of  certain  limited  and  prescribed  political  powers,  to  be 
exercised  for  the  public  good  ou  behalf  of  the  State  rather  than  for 
itself.  In  this  respecl  it  La  assimilated,  in  its  nature  and  functions, 
to  a  county  corporation,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  purely  part  of 
the  governmental  machinery  of  the  sovereignty  which  creates  it. 
Over  all  its  civil,  political,  or  governmental  powers,  the  authority 
of  the  Legislature  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  supreme  and  without 
limitation,  unless  the  limitation  is  found  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
particular  State  But  in  its  proprietary  or  private  character,  the 
theory  is  that  the  powers  are  supposed  not  to  be  conferred,  pri- 
marily or  chiefly,  from  considerations  connected  with  the  govern- 
ii in ,t  bf  the  State  at  large,  but  for  the  private  advantage  of  the 
compact  community  which  is  incorporated  as  a  distinct  hyal  per- 
sonality or  corporate  individual;  and  as  to  such  powers,  and  to 
property  acquired  thereunder,  and  contracts  made  with  reference 
thereto,  the  corporation  is  to  be  regarded  quo  ad  hoc  as  a  private 
corporation,  or  at  least  not  public  in  the  sense  that  the  power  of 
the  legislature  over  it  or  the  rights  represented  by  it,  is  omnipotent.1 


for  th<-ir  own  immediate  profit  or  advan- 
tage, as  a  corporation,  although  inuring, 
of  course,  ultimately  to  the  benefit  of  the 
public."  Per  Gray,  J.,  in  Oliver  v.  Wbr- 
102  Mass.  489,  499  (1869)  ;  B.  P. 
Detroit  v.  Corey,  9  Mich.  165,  184(1861)  ; 
Hill  v.  P,oston,' 122  Mass.  344,  359  ;  s.  c. 
23  Am.  Rep.  332.  In  the  one  case,  no 
private  action  lies  unless  it  be  expressly 
given  ;  in  the  other,  then-  is  an  implied  or 
common-law  liability  for  the  negligence  of 
their  officers  in  the  discharge  of  such  du- 
ties. In  further  illustration  of  this  dual 
character,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
cases  cited  in  the  next  note.  See  reference 
to  this  section  of  the  text  in  Spaulding  v. 
Andover,  54  N.  11.38,  54  (1873);  and  in 
Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  528; 
post,    .sees.   72-74  a,  and  chap,  xxiii.,  and 

"  Wot  Sav.  Fund  Soc.  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 31  Pa.  St,  175  ;  lb.  185  ;  Bailey  v. 
,  &c.  of  New  Ymk,  8  Bill,  ^'A  ; 
People  v.  Fields,  58  N.  V.  191  ;  People  v. 
11,  :,*  N.  Y.  1  (1874)  ;  Maximilian 
v.  Mayor,  kc.  of  New  York,  62  X.  Y. 
160  (is::,)  :  People  v.  Briggs,  50  X.  Y. 
558,  560  (1872)  ;  Xichol  v.  Nashville,  9 
Humph.  252  ;  Small  v.  Danville,  51  Me. 
859  ;  Jonea  ».    New  Haven,  34  Conn.  1  ; 


Western  College  v.  Cleveland,  12  Ohio 
St.  375  (1861)  ;  Howe  v.  New  Orleans,  12 
La.  An.  481  ;  Martin  v.  .Mayor,  &c,  1 
Hill,  545  ;  Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen, 
172;  Oliver  v.  Worcester,  102  Mass.  489 
(1869)  ;  Touchard  v.  Touchard,  5  Cal.  306  ; 
Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453  ; 
Commissioners  v.  Duckett,  20  Md.  463  ; 
Weet  v.  Brockport,  16  N.  Y.  161,  note  ; 
Louisville  v.  University  of  Louisville,  15 
B.  Mon.  642  ;  Louisville  v.  Common- 
wealth, 1  Duvall  (Ky.),  295  ;  Weightman 
v.  Washington,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  39  (1861); 
Reading  v.  Commonwealth,  11  Pa.  St. 
196  (1849)  ;  Richmond  v.  Long's  Admr., 
17  Gratt  (Va.)  375;  Do  Voss  v.  Rich- 
mond, 18  Gratt.  338  ;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Law 
Reg.  (n.  s.)  589;  New  Orleans,  &c.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  26  La.  An.  478  ; 
B.  C.  lb.  517  (1874)  ;  Askew  v.  Hale  Co., 
54  Ala.  689  ;  Detroit*.  Corey,  9  Mich.  165, 
184(1861);  People  v.  Hurlbnt,  24  Mich. 
44  (1871),  opinion  of  Coolcy,  J.  ;  s.  C.  9 
Am.  Rep.  103;  People  v.  Detroit,  28 
Mich.  228  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202. 
Malone's  Estate,  21  S.  C.  435.  As 
to  what  are  municipal  duties,  and  what 
falls  within  the  scope  of  municipal  powers, 
see  United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad  Co.,  17  Wall.  332  (1872)  ;  post, 


§  67  PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE   RIGHTS.  109 

§  67.  Same  subject.  —  This  division  of  the  powers  of  a  municipal 
corporation  into  two  classes,  one  public  and  the  other  private,  has 
been  before  alluded  to,  and  is  well  established,  but  the  private  char- 
acter thus  ascribed  to  such  powers  it  is  difficult  exactly  to  define. 
It  is  easy  to  understand  that  if  under  the  exercise  of  lawful  powers 
by  the  authority  of  the  legislature,  property  has  been  acquired  by  a 
municipality,  such  property  may  not  be  subject  to  legislative  appro- 
priation to  uses  distinctly  foreign  to  the  interests  of  the  munici- 
pality ;  but  in  what  sense  are  powers  conferred  and  to  be  exercised 
for  the  good  of  all  the  people  of  the  place  private  ?  Wherein  do 
such  powers,  in  their  origin  or  nature,  differ  from  those  admitted  to 
be  public?  Are  not  all  powers  conferred  upon  municipalities, 
whether  many  or  few,  given,  and  given  only,  for  their  better  regula- 
tion and  government,  and  to  promote  their  welfare  as  parts  of  the 
Commonwealth  ?  The  small  municipality,  with  few  and  simple 
powers,  is  no  more  completely  under  the  supreme  dominion  of  the 
legislature  than  the  more  populous  one,  requiring  for  its  proper 
government  organs  and  powers  peculiar  to  itself.  Are  the  latter, 
therefore,  private  ?  If  so,  it  must  be  in  a  qualified  and  peculiar 
sense.1  Contracts  in  favor  of  the  creditor  are  protected  by  the 
national  Constitution ;  but  as  against  a  State,  the  difficulty  is  to  find 
a  logical  and  sound  basis  on  which  to  rest  private  rights  in  favor  of 
a  municipality,  if,  under  the  Constitution  of  the  particular  State,  it  is 
within  the  power  of  the  State  which  breathed  into  it  the  breath  of 
life  utterly  to  extinguish  its  existence  at  pleasure.  The  distinction 
originated  with  the  courts,  to  promote  justice,  and  has  been  most 
frequently  applied  to  escape  technical  difficulties  in  order  to  hold 
such  corporations  liable  to  private  actions.2  The  distinction,  how- 
sec.  775  et  seq.  ;  Niles  Water  Works  v.  (1865),  may  be  read  with  profit.  The 
Niles,  59  Mich.  311.  On  the  ground  that  Chief-Justice  there  asserts  the  unlimited 
legislation  concerning  municipal  coipora-  power  of  the  legislature  over  municipal 
tions  is  of  a  peculiar  character  on  account  corporations  and  their  property.  He  main- 
of  their  being  agencies  of  the  government,  tains  that  such  corporations  are  altogether 
the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  held  public,  and  all  their  rights  and  powers 
that  a  charter  provision  limiting  tlie  right  public  in  their  nature,  and  that  their  prop- 
to  bring  actions  to  recover  money  improp-  erty,  though  held  for  income  or  sale,  and 
erly  paid  for  taxes  to  six  months,  when  the  unconnected  with  any  use  for  the  purposes 
general  statute  of  limitations  allowed  five  of  the  municipal  government,  is  under 
years  in  such  cases,  was  not  unconstitu-  the  control  of  the  legislature,  and  not 
tional  for  granting  a  special  privilege,  within  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
Covington  v.  Hoadley,  83  Ky.  444.  protecting  private    property.      He  denies 

1  Ante,  sees.  25,  26.  the  correctness  of  the  distinction  taken  in 

2  Section  approved  in  State,  ex  rel.  v.  Bailey  v.  The  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  3 
Smith,  44  Ohio  St.  348.  On  this  subject  Hill,  531,  and  other  cases,  between  the 
the  opinion  of  Chief- Justice  Denio,  in  public  and  private  functions  of  city  gov- 
Darlington  v.   Mayor,   &c,  31  N.  Y.  164     ernments,  and  maintains  that,  as  respects 


110 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§08 


:   is  generally  recognized,  ami  it  may  be  invoked  as  the  basis  of 
rights  in  favor  of  the  municipality  which  are  nol  wholly 
withdrawn  from  the  protection  that  our  Constitutions  extend  to 
property.1 

t0).     Same  subject.  —  It  is,  perhaps,  at  present,  impossible 
tn  define  with  precision  what  limitations  exist  wpon  the  povxr  of  the 
-,!,<-.  over  municipal  corporations,  as  ordinarily  constituted.     It 
is  practicable  only  to  refer  to  the  leading  cases  upon  the  subject,  and 
:M  to  extract,  the  principles  upon  which  they  rest. 
It  is  decided  thai  a  grant  by  the  legislature  of  the  State  to  a  town 
of  the  right  to  establish  a  ferry  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  contract; 
hence  the  grant  is  repealable,  and  the  corporation  may  constitu- 
tionally be  deprived  of  the  franchise.2     So  the  powers  conferred  by 
the  Legislature  upon  a  municipality  in  respect  of  wharves  and  wharf- 
age may  he  revoked  by  it  at  pleasure  if  it  does  not  touch  property 
acquired  by  the  municipality  under  the  sanction  of  the  legislature.3 
An  act  conferring  upon  a  municipal  corporation  a  public  trust,  and 


the  State,  all  their  powers  and  functions 
are  public.  He  affirms  that  the  legisla- 
ture may  compel  a  municipal  corporation 
to  submit  to  arbitration  claims  as  to  which 
privat  tions  and  natural  persons 

would  be  entitled  by  the  Constitution  to  a 
trial   by  jury.    The  opposite  view  is  no- 
where  more  ably  presented  than  by  Camp- 
C.  J.,  in  The  People  v.   Hurlbut,  24 
.    ll    (1871)  ;  B.  c   9  Am.  Rep.  103, 
!..  in  People  v.  Detroit,  28 
.228  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202; 
i    ■.  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  Pr.  Rep.  n.  b. 
1SG  ;   post.   chap,    xxiii.     See   as  to  jury, 
Appeal,     52    Pa.    St.     374. 
ct  Plimpton  v.  Som- 
V;.  283  (1860).     See  also  chap- 
on  Municipal  Courts,    Property,  and 
.  post. 
i  See  ante,  sec.  3  a  :  post,  sees.  68  and 
note   68  a,   69,   as   to   the   rationale   and 
dsol  the  distinction. 

II   i  ford  w.  Hartford  Brid  ■•■  Co  . 

10  How.  511  (1  o.  L6  Conn.  1  19  . 

17  Conn.  79  ;  Trustees  i>.  Tatman,  13  111. 

Shreveport,  5  La.  An. 

(1850);    Darlington   v.    Mayor,    31 

Y      L64,    202,    203,  per  Denio,   C  J. 

L]  1-116. 

Iroad  Co.   v.   Ellerman,  105   U.  8. 

31).      "Whatever   i 

the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 


by  Matthews,  J.,  in  Railroad  Co.  <\  Eller- 
man, just  cited  (p.  172),  "the  municipal 
body  [of  New  Orleans]  rightfully  enjoys 
over  the  subject  [of  wharves  and  wharf- 
age]  is  derived  from  the  legislature.    They 
are  merely  administrative,  and  may  be  re- 
voked at  any  time,  not  touching,  of  course, 
any  property  of  the  city  actually  acquired 
in  the  course  of  administration.     The  sole 
ground  of  the  right  of  the  city  to  collect 
wharfage  at  all  is  that  it  is  a  reasonable 
compensation,  which  it  is  allowed  by  law 
to  charge  for  the  actual  use  of  structures 
provided  at  its  expense  for  the  conveni- 
ence of  vessels  engaged  in  the  navigation 
of  the  river.      And  while   it   may  be  true, 
as  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Louisiana,  in    Ellerman    v.   McMains  (30 
La.  An.  pt.  1,  190),  that   the  city  cannot 
lawfully  be  required  to  permit  the  use  of 
its  wharves,  without  compensation,  on  the 
ground  that   they  are   private  property,  it 
is  equally  true,  as  decided   by  the  same 
court    in    City  of   New  Orleans  r.   Wolmot 
(31  La.  An.  65),  that  the  city  cannot  for- 
bid any  water-craft  from  using  the  banks 
of  the  navigable  waters  of  the  State  for 
the  purposes  of  navigation  and  commerce, 
and    cannot    compel    them    to   pay   to    it 
wharfage  excepl  for  the  use  of  wharves  of 
which  it   is  the  proprietor."     Post,  chap. 
CB.  103-113. 


S  68  PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE   RIGHTS.  Ill 

the  title  to  land  as  ancillary  to  its  execution,  is  not  a  contract,  bu1 
may  be  repealed  at  the  will  of  the  legislature.1  But  suppose  tin- 
legislature  had  granted  in  fee  to  the  corporation  a  tract  of  land 
within  its  limits,  is  such  a  grant,  or  is  an  ordinary  grant  of  laud  to 
the  corporation  from  others,  a  contract  as  respects  the  State,  and  pro- 
tected by  the  Constitution  from  legislative  invasion,  the  same  as  if 
the  grant  had  been  made  to,  or  the  property  acquired  by,  an  indi- 
vidual or  private  corporation  ?  The  question  thus  stated  has  never 
arisen  directly  for  adjudication  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States ;  but,  in  the  celebrated  Dartmouth  College  Case,  two  of  the 
judges  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  legislative  control  over  public 
and  municipal  corporations  was  not  so  transcendent  and  absolute  as 
to  extend  to  an  arbitrary  divestiture  of  its  private  property  and  the 
destruction  of  rights  of  a  private  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
the  opinion  of  a  distinguished  and  able  judge  in  New  York,  in  a 
case  already  mentioned,  that  the  authority  of  the  legislature  over 
the  powers,  rights,  and  property  of  municipal  and  public  corpora- 
tions, is,  as  respects  the  corporations,  quite  without  limit.2  That 
property  acquired  and  owned  by  a  municipal  corporation  by  legisla- 
tive consent  is  not  subject  to  an  unlimited  power  of  the  legislature 
over  it,  is  consonant  with  natural  justice.  The  need  of  having 
property  and  of  property  rights  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  why 
municipal  corporations  are  created.  This  is  strongly  expressed  by 
Savigny  in  respect  of  municipal  corporations  in  ancient  Rome.3  If 
a  municipal  corporation,  as  representing  a  distinct  community,  be  re- 
garded as  a  legal  person,  the  legislature  in  effect  says  to  it,  "  You 
may  at  your  own  expense  acquire  property  ; "  and  if  it  acts  on  such 

i  People  v.  Vanderhilt,   26  N.  Y.  287  the   counties  the    legislature   had    entire 

(1863)  ;  post,  sec.  114.     Where  an  act  in-  control  over  the  fund,  and  might  resume 

corporating  a  city  donated  lands  included  or  change  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 

therein  for  the  erection  of  certain  public  originally    designed    to   be   expended,    or 

buildings,  and  the  residue  to  be  applied  to  provide  for  the  payment  by  an  old  county, 

education,  and  the  charter  was  afterwards  which  had  received,  but  not  expended,  its 

repealed,  it  was  held  that  until  the  trust  proportion  of  such  fund,  to  a  new  county 

had  been  executed  it  was  competent  for  the  erected  out  of  the  old  county,  of  an  equita- 

legislature   to   change  or  abolish   it,   and  ble  share  of  the  fund.     Richland  County 

that  the  repeal  of  the  charter  extinguished  v.    Lawrence    County,    12    111.   1   (1850), 

the  trusts,  they  being  public,  unexecuted,  distinguished  from  Hampshire  v.  Franklin, 

and   conditional.     Bass  v.   Fontleroy,   11  16  Mass.  76.     Post,  chap.  viii. 
Tex.  698-708    (1854).     Where  an  act  of        2  Dcnio,  C.  J.,  in   Darlington  v.  New 

the  legislature,  instead  of  granting  certain  York,   31   N.  Y.  164  (1865).     See  post, 

moneys  received  by  the  State  for  the  pur-  sec.  68  a. 

poses  of  internal  improvements  to  certain         3  Savigny,   Jural    Relations  (translated 

counties  absolutely,  simply  appropriated  it  by  Rattigan).  sec.  85.  "  Property  Capacity 

to  be  drawn  by  such  counties  and  expended  is    the    essential    quality    of  a  Juristical 

by  them  in  the  improvement  of  roads,  &c,  Person,"   i.   e.,   a  corporation.     lb.  sees, 

it  was  held  that  before  its  expenditure  by  86,  87. 


112 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§68 


permission,  the  courts  may.  perhaps,  fairly  deduce  a  contract  that 
the  legislature,  while  it  may  regulate  or  change  the  uses  of  such 
will  not  deprive  the  corporation  of  it.     Accordingly,  the 
»ht  of  opinion  seems  to  be  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  thai  there  may 
be,  in  such  corporations,  rights  under  contracts  and  grants  which 
ad  destruction  by  the  legislature,  though  not  beyond  legiti- 
mate legislative  authority  and  control;1  hut  in  the  present  state  uf 


i  In  Richland  County  o.  Lawrence  Coun- 
ty, 12  111.  1  (1850),  while  the  plenary 
power  of  the  legislature  over  the  public, 
civil,  or  political  rights  of  public  corpora- 
was  asserted  and  declared,  -till  it 
was  admitted  by  the  very  able  and  cau- 
tious judge  who  delivered  the  opinion,  that 
"the  State  may  make  a  contract  with,  or 
a  grant  to,  a  public  municipal  corporation 
which  it  could  not  subsequently  resume  ; 
but  in  such  case  the  corporation  is  to  be 
led  as  a  private  company."  Per 
nbull,  J.  Sangamon  Co.  v.  Spring- 
field, 68  111.  66  (1872).  See  West  Sav. 
Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St. 
17.-.  .   lb. 

■•  But    while  the   legislative  power  (to 
enlai  ;,  oi  evi  'i   destroy  munici- 

pal  corporations,    as  the   public   interest 
may  require)  maybe  exercised  over  public 
and  municipal  corporations,  it  has  as  uni- 
iv  been   held  thai  towns,   and  other 
.■  rnrporalions,  may  lum  private  right* 
•ests  vested   in  them  under  their 
charters  and  as  to  those  rights,  they  are  to 
>„   regarded  and  protected  the  sami   as  if 
and  interests  of  indi- 
tote   corporations  ;   and 
grants  of  property  in  trust  for  other  than 
■  .rate  and   municipal   use   (that   is,  as 
we    undersl  md,    for    private,   as    distin- 
guished  from    public,    purposes)    are    no 
more  the  Bubject    of    legislative   control 

than  are  the  private  and  vested  right,  of 
individuals.'  Per  Isham,  J.,  argut  ndo,  in 
Montpelii  '    Montpelier,  29  Vt.  (8 

Wms.)  12,  19  (1856)  ;  s.  c.  27  Vt.  7    i 

\  of  property  to  private, 
\„,  to  public  and  municipal 
■  i.  repi  aled 
of  th»  grantees.     Town  of 

;,.    9    1  ranch    (U.  S.),  292, 

-     y,  J.,  obiter;  Terret  v. 

.  52.     In  this  last  case,  Mr. 

remarks,   arguendo,      "  In 


respect,  also,  to  public  corporations,  which 
exist  only  for  public  purposes,  such  as 
counties,  towns,  cities,  &c,  the  legislature 
may,  under  proper  limitations,  have  a 
right  to  change,  modify,  enlarge,  or  re- 
strain them,  securing,  however,  the  prop- 
erty, for  the  uses  of  those  for  whom  and 
at  whose  expense  it  was  originally  pur- 
chased." Followed  by  Chancellor  Kent, 
2  Com.  305  ;  by  Mr.  Justice  Washington, 
Dartmouth  College  Case,  4  Wheat.  518, 
663.  In  the  last  case,  Mr.  Justice  Story 
said  :  "But  it  will  hardly  be  contended, 
that  even  in  respect  to  such  [public]  cor- 
porations, the  legislative  power  is  so  trans- 
cendent that  it  may,  at  its  will,  take  away 
the  private  property  of  the  corporation,  or 
change  the  uses  of  its  private  funds  ac- 
quired under  the  public  faith."  4  Wheat. 
518,  694,  obiter.  And  such  is  Mr.  Justice 
Cooky's  view  in  his  valuable  treatise, 
Constitutional  Limitations,  238.  He  re- 
iterates it  in  his  learned  opinion  in  People 
v.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44  ;  s.  c.  6  Am.  Law 
Rev.  376  (1871);  s.  c.  9  Am.  Hep.  103, 
and  also  in  his  elaborate  judgment  in  the 
important  case  of  The  People  v.  Detroit, 
28  Mich.  228  (1873);  s.  ,-.  15  Am.  Hep. 
202;  Detroit  v.  Detroit  &  Howell  P.  EL 
Co.,  43  Mich.  140.  In  Orogan  v.  San 
1  i  mcisco,  18  Cal.  590,  Mr.  Chief-Justice 
Field,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  California,  takes  the  ground 
that  the  real  estate  or  private  property  oi 

a  municipal  corporation  is  protected  by 
the  clause  iii  the  national  Constitution 
securing  the  inviolability  of  contracts  ; 
that  all  legislative  authority  over  it  must 
be  exercised  in  subordination  to  this  guar- 
anty :  and  that  it  is  subject  to  legislative 
control  to  the  same  extent,  but  no  greater 
extent,  than  all  other  property  in  the 
State.  But  in  Darlington  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
of  New  York,  31  N.  Y.  164,  193,  205, 
Mr.   Chief-Justice  Denio   observes  :   "  Let 


§68 


PUBLIC    AND    PRIVATE   RIGHTS. 


113 


the  decisions  the  point  cannot  fairly  be  said  to  be  settled.     It  has 
however  been  adjudged  that  the  rights  of  the  city  of  New  York  to 


us  suppose  the  city  to  be  the  owner  of  a 
parcel  of  land  not  adapted  to  any  tnuni- 
cijml  use,  but  valuable  only  for  sale  to 
private  persons  for  building  purposes,  or 
the  like,  no  one,  I  think,  can  doubt  but 
what  it  would  be  competent  for  the  legis- 
lature to  direct  it  to  be  sold,  and  the  pro- 
ceeds devoted  to  some  municipal  or  other 
public  purpose,  within  the  city,  as  a  court- 
house, a  hospital,  or  the  like.  ...  It  is 
unnecessary  to  say  whether  the  legislative 
jurisdiction  would  extend  to  diverting  the 
city  property  to  other  public  use  than 
such  as  concerns  the  city  and  its  inhabi- 
tants." And  he  considers  the  expression 
of  Chancellor  Kent  (2  Com.  305)  and  of 
Mr.  Justice  Story,  that  where  a  municipal 
corporation  is  empowered  to  have  and  to 
hold  private  property,  such  property  is 
invested  with  the  security  of  other  private 
rights,  to  mean  only  that  it  possesses  such 
rights  against  wrong-doers,  and  not  that 
it  is  exempt  from  legislative  control.  31 
N.  Y.  164,  196. 

Let  us  consider  this  interesting  subject 
a  moment  longer.  The  city  of  New  York 
is  the  owner  of  valuable  real  property  in 
fee  made  by  ancient  grants,  from  which 
it  derives  large  revenues.  No  one  denies 
that  the  legislature  may  regulate  or  direct 
the  uses  of  this  property,  provided  it  is 
not  diverted  from  the  municipality  or  ap- 
propriated to  earfra-munieipal  purposes. 
But  could  the  legislature  require  it  to  be 
sold  and  the  proceeds  given  to  the  city  of 
Albany,  or  covered  into  the  State  treas- 
ury ?  The  injustice  of  such  an  act  is  so 
striking  that  it  suggests  that  it  must  be 
beyond  the  legislative  power,  even  if  there 
are  no  special  limitations  in  the  Constitu- 
tion. The  text  (sec.  68)  states  a  ground 
on  which  the  denial  of  such  a  power  in 
the  legislature  can  be  rested.  A  chartered 
municipality  is  certainly  a  distinct  legal 
personality  ;  and  it  is  a  familiar  principle 
that  property  acquired  by  a  corporation 
under  its  franchises  is  invested  with  all 
the  attributes  of  property,  although  the 
franchises  of  such  corporation  may  be 
absolutely  subject  to  legislative  control. 
Mr.  Justice  Field,  supra,  and  Ruger, 
C.  J.,  in  People  v.  O'Brien,  111  N.  Y. 
VOL.  I.  —  8 


1  (1888),  express  the  opinion  that  the  pri- 
vate property  of  municipalities  and  of 
corporations  is  protected  by  the  contract 
clause  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  Since 
the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Field  was 
given,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has 
been  adopted.  It  provides  that  no  person 
shall  be  deprived  of  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  and  the  property  rights  of 
private  corporations  are  held  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  to  be 
within  the  Amendment.  A  compact  bodj 
of  people,  such,  for  example,  as  the  city  of 
New  York,  have  needs  not  common  to  the 
body  of  the  State  at  large  ;  hence,  their 
incorporation  with  a  distinct  capacity  to 
acquire  and  hold  property  for  the  use  and 
benefit  of  this  distinct  body  of  people. 
It  is  their  property.  No  reason  sug- 
gests itself  to  us  why  their  ownership,  a3 
against  a  total  diversion  of  use,  is  not 
protected  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 
See  further,  infra,  sees.  68  a,  72,  73. 

In  two  cases  arising  out  of  the  Tweed 
frauds  in  New  York,  the  conclusion  was 
reached  that,  as  between  the  State  and 
the  municipal  corporation,  the  funds  of 
the  corporation  owned  and  held  for  the 
public  uses  of  the  corporation  are  dis- 
tinctively and  exclusively  the  property  of 
the  corporation  ;  and  the  opinion  was  ex- 
pressed arguendo  that  such  funds  were 
invested  with  the  security  of  other  private 
property,  subject  to  the  plenary  power  of 
the  legislature,  as  declared  in  Darlington 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  supra,  to  direct  their  appro- 
priation to  any  use  or  purpose  for  the 
benefit  of  the  municipality  or  its  inhabi- 
tants. People  v.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y.  1 
(1874)  ;  People  v.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491 
(1874).  The  exact  point,  however,  which 
was  adjudged  in  these  cases  is  that,  unless 
expressly  given  by  statute,  an  action  could 
not  be  maintained  in  the  name  of  the  State 
by  the  attorney-general,  to  recover  a  judg- 
ment for  moneys  of  the  county  and  city 
of  New  York,  fraudulently  taken  by  the 
defendants,  as  such  right  of  action  was 
exclusively  in  the  municipality,  which  was 
the  owner  of  moneys  illegally  appropriated. 
Post,  chap.  xxii. 


11  \ 


[CIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§68 


real  estate  which  it  owns  in  fee  simple  absolute,  under  grants  made  to 
it  in  its  ancient  charters,  which  grants  were  confirmed  by  the  Con- 
ution  of  the  State,  are  as  indestructible  by  legislative  act  as  are 
the  like  property  rights  of  citizens;  and,  applying  this  principle,  it 
was  held,  that  the  legislature  had  no  authority  to  pass  an  act  order- 

the  demolition  of  a  reservoir,  part  of  the  water  system  of  New 
York,  built  by  the  city  at  the  expense  of  its  citizens,  upon  property 
which  it  thus  owned  in  fee  simple  and  upon  the  demolition  of  such 

rvoir  further  enacting  that  the  lands  covered  by  it,  together  with 
other  lands  adjoining  the  same  owned  in  like  manner  by  the  city, 
should  be  converted  into,  and  maintained  as  one  of  the  public  parks 
of  the  city,  except  upon  making  compensation  to  the  city  therefor.1 


i  Webb  '■.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  64 
11  >w.  l'r.  Rep.  10  (Supreme  Court,  special 
term,  1882).  I"  giving  the  judgmenl  of 
ourt,  M  tcomlx  r,  J.,  after  observing 
that  the  land  in  question  was  granted  to 
the  city  in  fee  simple  by  the  Dongan 
rter  in  1686,  and  was  also  substantially 
embraced  in  the  Montgomerie  charter  of 

1730,  which  was  coufin 1  by  the  colonial 

iature  in  1732,  and  by  the  Constitu- 

>,(   New    York   of  1777,  1821,  and 

6,    says  :    "  The    lands   in    question, 

.    nv  owned  by  the  city  in   fee 

:     olute.     |<  'iting  Furman  v.  New 

York,  5  Sandf.  (S.  C.)  16;  s.  c.  10  N.  V. 

If,    therefore,   the   legislature  has 

undertaken   by   its    acts  to    destroy   the 

of  this  corporation,  or  to  deprive 

the  city  of  its  use,  without  just  compen- 

m,  it  has  violated  a  fundamental  law 

|     State.    Chancellor  KeiU  (CUy  Char- 

■  K.  nt's  Notes),  in   commenting  upon 

the  provisions  of  the  ancient  charters  on 

ays  :  '  It    may  not   be  amiss  to 

state  bi  re,  once  for  all,  thai   it    is  an  ac- 

i  tig,  ,\  and  settled  principle  that  no 

<     ti  d    righl    of  property,  whether  it  be- 

longs  to  private  individuals  or  be  in  the 

rporal     fi  inchise,  can  ever 

be  lawfully  taken  away  without    some  de- 
fault  or  forfeiture,    to  be  ascertained  by 

.,   fair  trial  and  pronoui d    by  judicial 

.      The  Eugli  of  .1/";/"" 

at   principle  the 
t   H   hi  -  and  privileges  then  ex- 
isting or   thereafter   to   be   lawfully  pro- 
cured ;  and  that  principle  was  intended  to 
neral  and    perpetual  application. 
It  provided  that  the  city  of  London,  and 


all  other  cities,  should  have  all  their  lib- 
erties and  free  customs  ;  and  that  no  free- 
man should  be  disseized  of  his  freehold  or 
liberties,  or  free  customs,  but  by  lawful 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land.  Corporate  franchises  in  this  coun- 
try rest  on  a  basis  which  ought  to  be  at 
least  as  solid  as  Magna  Charta,  for  they 
are.  founded  on  grants  which  are  contracts, 
and  "no  State,"  says  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  Stales,  "  can  pass  any  law 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts."  ' 

"I  perceive,"  continues  Macomber,  J., 
"no  difference  between  the  tenure  of 
property  thus  held  by  the  city  and  the 
proprietary  rights  of  natural  persons  or 
private  corporations.  This  privilege,  how- 
ever, is  peculiar  in  this  State  to  the  city 
of  New  York.  [Not  meaning  by  this  to 
decide  that  property  owned  in  fee  simple 
absolute  by  other  cities  is  not  equally  pro- 
tected by  the  Constitution.] 

"  Nor  is  this  property,  with  other  real 
estate  owned  by  the  city,  held  in  trust  for 
any  person  ;  nor  is  it  stamped  with  any 
mere  political  trust  of  which  the  city  may- 
be deprived,  and  thus  its  claim  to  the 
right  to  the  possession  of  the  property  de- 
stroyed. The  title  to  the  land  rests  some- 
where, and,  as  has  been  shown  above,  so 
far  as  the  records  extend,  no  one  claims  it 
except  the  city  itself. 

"  It  seem,  to  me  that  the  weight  of  au- 
thority is  to  the  effect  that  the  property 
which  New  York  holds  in  its  proprietary 
or  private  character,  though  originally  de- 
rived from  the  power  claiming  the  ulti- 
mate title,  and  which  concerns  the  private 
advantage  of  the  corporation,  as  a  distinct 


68  a 


REPEAL   OR    DISSOLUTION. 


115 


§  68  a.  Same  subject.  Effect  of  Repeal  or  Dissolution.  —  Where 
the  Constitution  or  laws  have  reserved  to  the  legislature  absolute  and 
unrestricted  power  to  repeal  the  charters  of  private  corporations  and 
to  dissolve  them  at  will,  the  legislative  supremacy  over  their  exist- 
ence would  seem  to  be  as  complete  as  it  is  over  that  of  municipal 
corporations;  and  by  analogy  the  limitations  on  the  legislative 
power  over  the  property  and  contract  rights  or  other  vested  rights  of 
private  corporations  throw  light  upon  like  questions  as  respects  mu- 
nicipal corporations.  As  to  private  corporations  it  can,  we  think, 
safely  be  affirmed  that  while  the  legislature  may,  under  and  pursu- 
ant to  such  reserved  power,  annul  and  dissolve  them  at  pleasure,  it 
is  not  within  its  competency,  under  the  Federal  Constitution  as 
amended,  or  under  like  provisions  in  the  Constitutions  of  the  States, 
to  impair  or  affect  the  property  or  property  rights  of  the  dissolved 
corporation,  but  only  its  right  to  exist,  and  such  other  rights  as  are 
directly  and  necessarily  dependent  on  the  continued  existence  of  the 
corporation.  The  rights  of  mortgagees,  of  creditors  generally,  and 
rights  arising  under  valid  contracts  with  the  corporation,  survive  the 
repeal  and  dissolution.1     And  the  same  doctrine,  doubtless,  applies 


legal  personality,  is  stamped  with  so  many 
of  the  rights  and  powers  of  natural  per- 
sons or  private  corporations  as  that  the 
city  cannot  be  deprived  of  this  reservoir 
without'  due  process  of  law  and  without 
just  compensation.  It  admits  of  no  doubt 
that  the  legislature  may  change,  modify, 
enlarge,  or  restrain  the  powers  of  a  cor- 
poration which  it  has  created.  But 
whenever  this  is  done,  and  a  municipal 
corporation  is  relieved  of  the  privilege 
and  duty  of  maintaining  a  jurisdiction 
over  the  property  and  property  rights,  care 
lias  invariably  been  taken  to  restore  to 
the  original  owner  or  proprietor  the  rights 
which  the  municipal  corporation  were  for 
a  time  permitted  to  exercise.  Terret  v. 
Taylor,  9  Cranch,  52  ;  2  Kent,  Commen- 
taries, 257  ;  Dartmouth  College  Case,  4 
Wheat.  694  ;  People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich. 
228  ;  Bailey  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
3  Hill,  531  ;  People  v.  Fields,  58  N.  Y. 
591  ;  People  v.  Ingersoll,  Id.  1  ;  Maxmil- 
lian  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  160." 

1  Peoples.  O'Brien,  Receiver  (Broadway 
Railway  Case),  111  N.  Y.  1  (1888)  ; 
Mamma  v.  Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet.  285  ; 
Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Cranch,  135  ;  Sinking 
Fund  Cases  (arising  under  reserved  power 
to  amend  or  repeal  Pacific  Railway  acts), 


99  U.  S.  700  (1878)  ;  Greenwood  v. 
Freight  Co.,  105  U.  S.  13  (1881)  ;  Detroit 
v.  Howell  Plank  Road  Co.,  43  Mich.  140, 
147. 

Broadway  Surface  Railway  Case  :  While 
the  legislature  of  New  York,  under  the 
power  reserved  in  the  Constitution  ' '  to 
alter  or  repeal,"  from  time  to  time,  laws 
under  which  corporations  are  formed,  and 
under  a  general  reserved  power  by  statute 
that  "  all  corporations  shall  be  subject  to 
alteration,  suspension,  and  repeal  in  the 
discretion  of  the  legislature,"  may  annul 
or  repeal  the  charter  of  a  corporation  or 
dissolve  it  ;  yet  it  cannot,  by  virtue  of 
such  an  act,  or  any  act,  impair  or  affect 
the  property  or  property  rights  of  the  cor- 
poration. The  extent  and  limits  of  legis- 
lative povjer  over  corporations  and  their 
rights  and  the  rights  of  their  mortgagees, 
and  of  persons  having  contracts  with 
the  dissolved  corporations,  underwent  the 
most  thorough  and  deliberate  considera- 
tion of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York 
in  Broadway  Surface  Railway  Case.  Peo- 
ple v.  O'Brien,  Receiver,  et  al.,  Ill  N.  Y. 
1  (188S).  In  that  case  the  Broadway  Sur- 
face Railway  Company  was,  in  18S4,  duly 
incorporated.  It  acquired  from  the  muni- 
cipal   authorities   the   right  to  lay  dowa 


lit; 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  68  a 


to  property  rights  acquired  by  virtue  of  valid  municipal  grants;1  and 
it  has  also  been  declared  in  respect  of  the  property  rights  of  muni- 
cipalities, though  as  to  this,  the  doctrine  remains,  perhaps,  to  be 
fully  settled,  defined,  and  its  limitations  ascertained  by  actual  judi- 
cial judgments.3     It  is  agreed  by  all  the  authorities  that  under  the 


tracks  and  to  run  cars  over  Broadway 
from  the  Battery  to  Fourteenth  street  It 
was  authorized  by  statute  to  mortgage  its 
property  and  franchises,  and  also  to  make 
icts  with  connecting  railroad  com- 
panies for  tin-  use  of  their  tracks.  It 
executed  mortgages  on  its  propi  rty  and 
franchises    to  gotiable    bonds, 

which  wore  sold  in  the  market.  After- 
wards it  appeared  to  the  legislature  prob- 
able, if  not  certain,  that  the  corporation 
acquired  the  right  to  occupy  the  streets  by 
means  of  bribery  ofa  majority  of  the  board 

1.  ri  ii-ii  ;  and  this  was  the  motive, 
doubtless,  that  led  the  legislature,  in  1886, 
peal  the  charter  of  the  Broadway 
Company,  to  dissolve  the  corporation,  and 
to  provide  for  winding  up  its  affairs  and 
disposing  of  and  distributing  its  property. 
The  opinion  of  the  court,  delivered  by 

■Judge  Ruger,  discusses  the  interest- 
ing questions  involved  with  learning  and 

ked  ability.     The  court  held  that  the 
franchise   of   the   corporation,    under    its 

iter,  and  the  grants  from  the  muni- 
cipal authorities  to  lay  down  tracks  and 
operate  its  railroad,  was  a  property  right 
which  survived  the  dissolution  of  the 
corporation;  so  were  the  rights  of  thi 
corporation  under  its  contracts  with  con- 
necting railroads,  and  also  the  rights  of 
the   -  to  the  continued  use  of  the 

street  in  connection  with  the  railroad, 
under  the  municipal  consent  to  the  use 
thereof  for  railway  purposes.  The  sp  i  ial 
provisions  of  the  rep<  aling  act  as  to  wind- 
ing up  the  affairs  of  the  dissolved  corpora- 

nid  disposing  Of  and   distributing   Lts 

property,  were  held  to  be  unconstitutional. 

1   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Delamore,  114  U.  S.  501; 

Langdon   v.   Mayor,   ike,  93  N.  Y.   129  ; 

People?-.  O'Brien,  supra,  and  cases  cited. 

|     i  erning  rights  acquired  under  muni- 

to  others,  Rug>  r,  < '.  J.,  in  The 

People  o.  O'Brien,  supra,  speaking  of  the 

at   by  the  corporation   of  Ni  w   York 

City   to   the    Broadway   Surface    Railway 

Company  to  use  the  streets  of  New  York 


for  its  railway,  says:  "  Grants  similar  in  all 
material  respects  to  the  one  in  question 
have  heretofore  been  before  the  courts  of 
this  State  lor  construction,  audit  has  been 
quite  unifonnh   held  thai   they  are  grants 
in  he  vesting  the  grantee  with  an  interest 
in  the  street  in   perpetuity  to  the  extent 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  a  street  rail- 
road.    People  v.  Sturtevant,  9  N.  Y.  263  ; 
Davis  v.  The   Mayor,  &c,  14   N.  Y.  506  ; 
Milhau  v.  Sharp,  27  X.  Y.  611  ;  .Mayor  v. 
Second  Ave.   R.   R.    Co.,  32  N.  Y."261  ; 
Sixth  Ave.   It.  R.    Co.  v.  Kerr,   72   N.  Y. 
330.     Other  cases  are  also  reported  in  the 
books,  but  it  is  deemed  unnecessary  to  ac- 
cumulate authorities  on   this  point.  .   .   . 
We  are  then  Core  of  the  opinion  that  the 
Broadway  Surface  Railroad  Company  took 
an    estate     in    perpetuity    in    Broadway 
through  its  grant  from  the  city  under  the 
authority  of  the  Constitution  and  the  act 
of  the  legislature.     It  is  also  well   settled 
by  authority  in  this  State  that  such  aright 
constitutes  property  within   the  usual  and 
common  signification  of  that  word.     Sixth 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.    v.    Kerr,  72  N.  Y.    330  ; 
People    v.  Sturtevant,  9   N.  Y.   263.    .    .   . 
It  is,  however,  earnestly  contended  for  the 
State  that  such  a  franchise  is  a  mere  li- 
cense  or   privilege   enjoyable   during  the 
life  of  the  grantei    only,  and   revocable  at 
the  will   of  the    State.     We    believe  this 
proposition  to  be  not  only  repugnant  to 
justice    and    reason,    but   contrary  to  the 
uniform  course  of  authority  in  this  coun- 
try.    The  Laws  of  this  State  have   made 
Buch  interests  taxable,  inheritable,  aliena- 
ble, subject  to  levy  and  sale    under  execu- 
tion, to  condemnation   under  the  exi 
of  the  right   of  eminent  domain,  and  in- 
M   ted  them  with   the  attributes  of  prop- 
erty gem  rally." 

-  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co., 
32    N.    Y.    261.      In    this   ease    llroicii,    J., 

said  :  "The  rights  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions to  property  in  lands  and  its  usual 
incidents,  and  to  create  ferries  and  railroad 
franchises,  are  quite  distinct  and  separate 


§  68  a    LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER  CONTRACTS   OF   MUNICIPALITY.    117 

power  to  repeal  the  charters  of  private  corporations  the  legislature 
cannot  take  away  property  acquired  under  the  operation  of  the 
charter;1  and  as  to  municipal  corporations  the  only  question  is 
whether  the  legislature  can  deprive  them,  or  rather,  perhaps,  their 
inhabitants,  of  their  property.  It  is  believed  by  the  author,  for  the 
reasons  suggested  in  this  chapter,2  that  while  the  legislature  has  full 


from  their  duties  as  legislatures,  having 
authority  to  pass  ordinances  for  the  con- 
trol and  government  of  persons  and  inter- 
ests within  the  city  limits.  The  latter 
are  powers  held  in  trust,  as  all  legislative 
powers  are,  to  be  used  and  exercised  for 
the  benefit  and  welfare  of  the  whole  com- 
munity, while  the  former  are  property,  in 
the  ordinary  sense,  to  be  acquired  and 
conveyed  in  the  same  manner  as  natural 
persons  acquire  and  transfer  property." 
The  same  learned  judge  said,  in  Brooklyn 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  R. 
Co.,  32  Barb.  364:  "The  grant  to  the 
City  Railroad  Company  and  its  acceptance 
of  the  conditions  annexed,  with  the  duties 
and  obligations  and  large  expenditures  re- 
sulting therefrom,  would  seem,  therefore, 
to  invest  the  company  with  the  right  of 
property  in  the  franchise,  of  which  it  can- 
not be  deprived  without  its  consent  or 
against  its  will." 

1  See  cases  cited  in  note  1  to  this  sec- 
tion. In  Detroit  v.  Howell  Plank  Road 
Co.,  43  Mich.  140,  147,  Cooley,  J.,  said  : 
"It  is  immaterial  in  what  way  the  prop- 
erty was  lawfully  acquired,  whether  by 
labor  in  the  ordinary  vocations  of  life,  by 
gift  or  descent,  or  by  making  profitable 
use  of  a  franchise  granted  by  the  State  ;  it 
is  enough  that  it  has  become  private  prop- 
erty, and  it  is  then  protected  by  the  •  law 
of  the  land.'  " 

Speaking  of  the  reserved  power  to 
"amend  or  repeal"  the  charter  of  the 
Union  Pacific  Company,  Waitc,  C.  J.,  in 
the  Sinking  Fund  Cases,  99  II.  S.  700 
(1878),  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  said  :  "  All  agree  that  it  cannot  be 
used  to  take  away  property  already  ac- 
quired under  the  operation  of  the  charter, 
or  to  deprive  the  corporation,  of  the  fruits, 
actually  reduced  to  possession,  of  contracts 
lawfully  made." 

In  same  case  (p.  73),  Strong,  J.,  defines 
property.     In  The  People  v.  O'Brien,  su- 


pra, Euger,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  It  is  also  to  be 
observed  that  in  none  of  the  provisions  for 
repeal  in  this  State  is  there  anything  con- 
tained which  purports  to  coufer  power  to 
take  away  or  destroy  property  or  annul 
contracts,  and  the  contention  that  the 
property  of  a  dissolved  corporation  is  for- 
feited, rests  wholly  upon  what  is  claimed 
to  be  the  necessary  consequence  of  the 
extinction  of  corporate  life.  We  do  not 
think  the  dissolution  of  a  corporation 
works  any  such  effect.  It  would  not 
naturally  seem  to  have  any  other  opera- 
tion upon  its  contracts  or  property  rights 
than  the  death  of  a  natural  person  upon 
his.  Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet.  285. 
The  power  to  repeal  the  charter  of  a  cor- 
poration cannot,  upon  any  legal  princi- 
ple, include  the  power  to  repeal  what  is  in 
its  nature  irrepealable,  or  to  undo  what 
has  been  lawfully  done  under  power  law- 
fully conferred.  Butler  v.  Palmer,  1  Hill, 
335." 

A  legislative  grant  of  an  exclusive  right 
to  supply  gas  to  a  municipality  and  to  its 
inhabitants,  through  pipes  and  mains  laid 
in  the  public  streets,  and  upon  condition 
of  the  performance  of  the  service  by  the 
grantee,  is,  after  acceptance  and  perform- 
ance by  the  grantee,  a  contract  protected 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
against  subsequent  State  legislation  which 
impairs  it.  The  legislature,  however,  retains 
its  police  power,  including  the  duty  to  pro- 
tect the  public  health,  morals,  and  safety. 
New  Orleans  Gas  Company  v.  Louisiana 
Light  Company,  115  U.  S.  650  (1885)  ; 
Louisville  Gas  Company  v.  Citizens'  Gas 
Company,  115  U.  S.  683.  The  same  prin- 
ciple applied  to  a  legislative  grant  of  an 
exclusive  right  to  supply  u-ater  to  a  munici- 
pality and  its  inhabitants.  New  Orleans 
Water- Works  Company  v.  Rivers,  115 
U.  S.  674  (1885). 

2  Ante,  sec.  68;  post,  sec.  69,  and  note. 


118 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§69 


power  of  Legitimate  regulation  and  control,  it  cannot  deprive  them 
(that  is,  in  essence,  the  peopL   of  the  locality  at  whose  expense  it 
[uired  or  for  whose  benefit  it  was  granted    of  such  prop- 
erty.    It  is  in  effect  fastened  with  a  trusl  for  the  incorporated  muni- 
Lity  as  long  as  the  legislature  sailers  it  to  live,  and  for  the  benefit 

of  the  i pie  of  the  locality  if  the  corporate  entity  which  represents 

their  rights  shall  be  dis  solved. 


11  j.    Legislative  power  over  Contracts  of  Municipality.  —  It 

is  an  interesting  question,  which  has  uot  yet  arisen  for  judgment, 
whether  the  Legislature  of  the  State  has  the  right,  in  virtue  of  its 
control  over  municipal  corporations,  to  annul  or  interfere  with  con- 
tracts  between  two  municipalities.  This  would  depend  perhaps  upon 
the  nature  of  the  contracts,  that  is,  whether  they  were  public  or 
corporate.  If,  however,  a  municipal  corporation  becomes  indebted, 
the  rights  of  the  creditor  based  upon  the  obligation  of  the  contract  can- 
not, it  is  clear,  be  impaired  by  any  subsequent  legislative  enact- 
ment.1    Thus,  where  an  act  of  the  legislature  was  passed  to  provide 


1  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  4  Wall. 
535  (1866);  approved  in  Wolff  v.  New 
I  frleana,  103  U.  S.  358  ;  Galena  v.  Amy, 
5  Wall.  705  ;  Amy  v.  Galena,  7  Fed.  Rep. 
163;  and  see  Meriwether  .  Garrett,  102 
U.  S.  472  ;  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall. 
575  ;  Lee  County  v.  Rogers,  7  Wall. 
Furman  v.    Nichol,    8    Wall.    44  ; 

iff  ,:  TrapnalL  10  How.  2".;  ; 
on  v.  Kinsir,  1  How.  316  ;  Lansing 
v.  County  Treasurer,  1  Dillon  Cir.  C.  R. 
522  ;  Muscatine  o.  Railroad  Co.,  lb.  536  ; 
State  v.  Milwaukee,  25  Wis.  122;  Brook- 
lyn Park  Comm'rs  v.  Armstrong,  45  N.  Y. 
234  (1871);  Soutter  v.  Madison  (act  for- 
bidding city  to  levy  taxes  to  pay  judg- 
ments held  void).  15  Wis.  30  ;  Western 
Savings  Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31 
Pa.  St.  175,  185  ;  San  Fram  isco  v.  Cana- 
van,  42  Cal.  Ml  (1872)  ;  Goodale  v.  Fen- 
nell,  27  Ohio  St.  126  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  22 
Am.  Rep.  321.  The  power  of  taxation  by 
a  municipal  corporation,  and  its  limitation 
at  the  date  of  a  contract,  become  a  pari  of 
tract,    and    continue   to   exist   in 

if  a   creditor   under   Buch  tract 

without  regard  to  subsequent  reduction  of 
tbe  limitation  or  restriction  of  the  power. 
M  v.    Si  ite,    62  T.-x.    728  ;    United 

»j  Mobile,  12  Fed.  Rep. 
768  ;  Mobile    v.    Watson,  110  U.  S.   289 


(1885)  ;  United  States  v.  County  Court,  3 
Fed.  Rep.  1.  Where  a  contract  was  made 
by  a  municipal  corporation  while  a  law 
providing  a  remedy  by  compulsory  taxa- 
tion was  in  force,  the  repeal  of  the  law 
and  tlu  adoption  of  a  new  Constitution 
forbidding  the  levy  of  a  tax  in  such  case, 
were  held  invalid  as  impairing  the  ob- 
ligation of  the  contract.  Sawyer  v. 
Concordia,   12  Fed.   Rep.   754. 

Where  there  is  a  mode  prescribed  by 
statute  for  levying  taxes  to  pay  the  princi- 
pal and  interest  of  bonds  which  may  be 
issued  by  municipal  corporations  in  aid  of 
railroads,  it  is  considered  a  part  of  the  ob- 
.  and  any  subsequent  change  of 
it  by  the  legislature  which  substantially 
mollifies  that  mode  so  as  to  affect  rights 
under  the  contract,  is  void  as  impairing 
the  obligation  of  the  contract.  No  rule 
can  be  laid  down  as  to  what  constitutes 
such  impairment,  and  each  case  must  de- 
pend upon  its  own  circumstances.  Sei- 
hert  v.  Lewis,  122  U.  S.  2S4.  A  contract 
made  with  a  municipal  corporation  upon 
the  faith  of  taxes  to  be  levied,  cannot  be 
altered  by  the  repeal  or  modification  of 
the  power  of  tie-  municipality  to  levy  the 
uch  legislation  is  void  for  being 
an  impairment  of  the  obligation  of 
tract.     Nelson  v.  St.  Martin's  Parish,  111 


§  69     LEGISLATIVE   POWER   OVER   CONTRACTS   OF   MUNICIPALITY.     119 


for  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  a  municipal  corporation,  and  author- 
izing the  creation  of  a  sinking  fund,  to  be  deposited  and  applied 
in  a  particular  manner,  and  where  creditors  acting  thereunder 
have  surrendered  the  evidences  of  their  debts  and  received 
new  bonds,  for  the  payment  of  which  the  fund  stands  pledged 
by  the  act,  it  is  not  competent  —  because  it  impairs  the  obliga- 
tion of  contracts  —  for  a  subsequent  legislature,  in  providing  for 
the  liquidation  of  the  corporate  debts,  to  give  a  different  destin- 
ation to  the  sinking  fund  by  changing  the  depository  of  the 
fund.1 

So  where  the  effect  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  authorizing  a  city 
to  fund  its  floating  debt  was,  in  substance,  a  pledge  to  those  who 
surrendered  their  claims  and  received  new  obligations,  of  a  portion 
of  its  revenues  and  property,  to  be  applied  to  the  payment  of  its 
obligations  in  a  specified  mode,  this,  if  acted  on,  constitutes  a  contract 
which  cannot  be  materially  altered,  either  by  the  municipality  or 
the  legislature,  without  the  consent  of  the  creditors;  but  it  was 
held  that  a  subsequent  act,  simply  changing  the  mode  of  levying 


U.   S.  716  ;    Louisiana  v.    Pillsbury,   105 
U.  S.  278.  Post,  see.  854. 

But  where,  by  the  change,  additional 
property  is  made  taxable  to  pay  the 
bonds,  a  levy  of  taxes  upon  both  species 
of  property  may  be  ordered.  Cape  Girar- 
deau County  v.  Hill,  118  U.  S.  68.  Pre- 
vious to  1879  the  city  of  New  Orleans 
had  the  power  to  tax  for  general  pur- 
poses to  the  extent  of  12^  per  cent.  The 
Constitution  adopted  in  that  year  reduced 
the  limit  to  10  per  cent.  On  an  applica- 
tion for  a  mandamus  brought  by  a  judg- 
ment creditor  whose  judgment  was  founded 
upon  a  contract  entered  into  in  1873, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  held, 
that  the  power  of  taxation  as  it  existed  at 
the  date  of  the  contract  was  read  into  it, 
and  that  so  far  as  was  necessary  to  satisfy 
the  contract  the  power  of  taxation  had 
not  been  affected  by  the  new  Constitution; 
and  the  writ  was  issued  directiug  the  levy 
of  a  tax  within  the  12Jj  per  cent  limit  to 
satisfy  the  judgment.  State,  ex  rel.  Mar- 
chand  v.  New  Orleans,  37  La.  An.  13. 
See,  also,  State,  ex  rel.  Thorn  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 37  La.  An.  528  ;  State  ex  rel.  Car- 
riere  v.  New  Orleans,  36  La.  An.  687  ; 
State,  ex  rel.  Stewart  v.  Police  Jury,  34 
La.  An.  673.  In  a  later  case,  upon  a 
similar   application,  where  the  judgment 


was  based  upon  a  contract  entered  into  in 
1874,  after  the  adoption  of  an  amendment 
to  the  Constitution,  providing  that  the 
city  should  not  increase  its  debt  under 
any  pretext,  and  forbidding  the  drawing 
of  warrants  except  against  cash  actually 
in  the  treasury,  it  was  held,  by  the  same 
court,  that  the  contract  was  restricted  as 
to  satisfaction  to  the  revenues  of  the  year, 
and  imposed  no  obligation  upon  the  city 
to  exercise  in  the  future  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion possessed  by  it  at  that  time  ;  and  it 
was  also  held  that  the  provision  in  the 
Constitution  of  1879  limiting  the  rate  "f 
taxation  to  10  per  cent  was  not  a  violation 
of  the  obligation  of  the  contract.  It  re- 
fused to  compel  the  city  to  levy  a  tax  in 
excess  of  that  limit.  State,  ex  rel.  Gas 
Light  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  37  La.  An. 
436. 

Further,  see  chapter  on  Contracts, 
post.  sec.  511  ct  seq.  For  effect  of  judi- 
cial determination  of  the  law  at  the 
time  a  contract  is  entered  into,  see 
post,  sec.  517. 

1  Liquidators  v.  Municipality,  6  La.  An. 
21  (1851).  As  to  sinking  fund,  see  Terry 
v.  Bank,  18  Wis.  S7  ;  post,  chapter  on 
Charters.  Fraudulent  transfers  of  prop- 
erty by  municipal  corporations.  Smith  v. 
Morse,  2  Cal.  524. 


L20 


MUNICIPAL    COUI'ORATIONS. 


§70 


taxes,  and  which  did  not  and  could  not  affect  the  result  or  impair 

r'nx  of  the  creditors,  was  not  invalid.1 
So,  also,  where  the  Legislature  authorized  an  indebted  city  to  issue 
bonds  to  a  specified  amount,  in  paymenl   of  a  like  amount  of  its 
outstanding  bonds,  and  among  other  provisions,  plainly  intended  to 

induce  creditors  to  make  the  exchange,  was  one.  prohibiting  the  city 
from  thereafter  issuing  its  bonds,  "except  in  payment  of  its  bonded 
debt,"  and  this  authority  having  been  acted  on,  the  arrangement 
accepted  by  the  creditors,  and  new  bonds  issued,  it  was  decided  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  that  tin  prohibition  against  the 
issw  of  further  bonds  constituted,  in  favor  of  the  holders  of  the  new 
I miK Is,  a  contract  which  the  legislature  could  not  impair  by  a  subse- 
» [in  nt  enactment  authorizing  the  municipality  to  issue  additional 
bonds  for  other  purposes.2 


§  70  (42).    Same  subject.  —  But  authority  to   a   city   to  borrow 

money,  and  to  tax  all  the  property  therein   to  pay  the  debt  thus 

incurred,  docs  not  necessarily  deprive  the  State  of  the  power  to  modify 

ation  so  as  to  exempt  portions  of  the  property,  if  the  rights  of 

creditors  be  not  thereby  impaired.3     So  authority  given  in  a  railroad 


1   People  v.   Bond,  10  Cal.   563  (1858). 
And    Bee    People  v.    Wood,    7   Cal.   579 
( 1  357)  ;  Brooklyn  Park  Conim'rs  v.  Arm- 
15  X.  Y.  234  (1871). 

-  Smith*.  Apph-ton,  19  Wis.  468(1865). 
Text  cited  and  approved.  Mount  Pleas- 
ant v.  Beckwith,  100  U.  S.  514.  Extent 
of  legislative  power  over  municipal  indebt- 
w  as  against  the  municipality,  see 
<  ity  v.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477  ;  and  read, 
in  connection  therewith,  Campbell  v.  Ke- 
n  -hi.  5  Wall.  194,  in  effect  overruling 
tli"  practical  application  of  Foster  v.  Ke- 
aosha,  12  Wis.  616  (1860).  Further  as 
to  rights  of  creditors,  see  post,  chapters 
"n  Charters,  Contracts,  and  Mandamus. 
Hall,  9  Nev.  212. 
\\'h>  a  the  performance  of  Die  obligation 
of  a  public  or  municipal  corporation  has 
been  rendered  impossible  by  act  of  the  lawt 
as,  for  example,  by  a  subsequent  statute, 
the  obligation  is  discharged,  and  no  action 
against  the  corporation  will  lie  thereon. 
principle  is  well  exemplified  in  Brown 
v.  Mayor  &c.  of  London,  9  Com.  B. 
(•■■  3.)  726  (1861),  respecting  the  liabil- 
ity of  London  on  bonds  payable  out  of 
tolls  and  duties  levied  on  vessels  navigat- 
ing the  Thames.     In  this  country,  how- 


ever, it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
legislative  power,  as  respects  creditors,  is 
restrained  by  the  provision  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  that  no  State  shall  pass  any 
act  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 

8  Oilman  v.  Sheboygan,  2  Black,  510 
(1862)  ;  Muscatine  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  536  ;  Seibert  v.  Lewis,  122  U.  S. 
284  (1S86)  ;  Goodale  v.  Fennell,  27  Ohio 
St.  426  (1875)  ;  S.  c.  22  Am.  Rep.  321  ; 
holding  a  subsequent  act  restricting  power 
of  assessment  inoperative  against  a  con- 
tractor who  had  agreed  to  take  his  pay- 
ment in  assessments. 

As  against  a  municipal  corporation,  the 
legislature  maij,  it  has  been  decided  l>y 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri,  repeal  Us 
powers  to  levy  and  collect  wharfage,  al- 
though the  proceeds  of  the  public  wharf 
had  been  pledged  by  the  corporation, 
timler  legislative  authority,  as  a  fund  in 
connection  with  other  revenues  for  the 
payment  of  bonds  issued  for  money  bor- 
rowed  by  the  corporation  to  maintain  and 
improve  the  wharf.  After  the  issue  of 
sii'h  bonds,  which  were  outstanding,  and 
after  the  passage  of  a  subsequent  act  re- 
pealing  all  acts  which  authorized  the  mu- 
nicipality to  collect  wharfage,  it  sued  the 


§71 


LEGISLATIVE   POWER   OVER   PUBLIC    PROPERTY. 


121 


charter  to  a  county  to  take  stock  and  issue  bonds  therefor,  if  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  so  determine,  is  not  a  contract,  but  a  mere  au- 
thority conferred  upon  the  county  in  its  public  capacity,  and  may 
be  repealed  after  a  vote  at  any  time  before  the  subscription  has  been 
made,1  or  agreed  to  be  made.2 

§  71   (43).    Legislative  power  over  Public  Property  of  Municipality. 

—  The  legislature,  as  the  trustee  for,  and  the  representative  of,  the 
general  public,  has  full  control  over  the  public  property  and  the  public 
rights  of  municipal  corporations.  Accordingly,  it  may  authorize  a 
railroad  company  to  occupy  the  streets  in  a  city  without  its  consent 
and  without  payment  to  it ; 3  but  it  could  not,  probably,  authorize 
the  taking  of  the  private  property  of  a  city  by  a  railroad  company, 
except  for  public  purposes,  and  upon  compensation   being   made.4 


defendant  for  refusing  to  pay  wharfage, 
on  the  ground  that  the  repealing  act  was 
unconstitutional  ;  but  the  Supreme  Court, 
assimilating  the  case  to  that  of  Gilman  v. 
Sheboygan,  2  Black,  510,  and  distinguish- 
ing it  from  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  4 
Wall.  535,  held  that  the  city  could  not 
recover.  The  language  of  the  judge  de- 
livering the  opinion  would  seem  to  imply 
that  the  repealing  act  would  not  be  invalid 
as  to  creditors  unless  other  funds  should 
prove  insufficient ;  but  it  should  be  ob- 
served that  this  was  not  a  point  adjudged 
in  the  case.  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  52  Mo. 
351  (1873). 

1  Aspinwall  v.  County  of  Jo  Daviess, 
22  How.  364  (1859).  When  such  repeal 
is  effectual,  see  People  v.  Coon,  25  Cal. 
635  ;  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  v.  Davis 
County,  6  Kan.  256  (1870);  compare  Town 
of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav.  Bank,  92 
U.  S.  625  ;  infra,  chapter  on  Contracts. 
In  The  State  v.  Meller,  67  Mo.  604,  it  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State 
that  while  municipal  corporations  cannot, 
as  between  the  legislature  and  themselves, 
place  their  privileges  on  the  ground  of 
contract,  yet  where  the  State  creates  a 
municipal  corporation,  and  through  it  con- 
tracts with  a  third  person,  whereby  rights 
become  vested  in  the  latter,  it  is  beyond 
the  power  of  the  State  to  impair  the  obli- 
gations of  the  contract  when  the  contract 
to  subscribe  for  stock  is  completed.  C.  & 
O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barren  Co.,  10  Bush  (Ky.), 


604  (1874)  ;  Shelby  Co.  v.  Cumberland  & 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  299. 

In  California  it  is  held  that  while  the 
legislature  cannot  require  the  creditors  of 
a  county  to  surrender  their  evidences  of 
indebtedness,  and  accept  new  ones  differ- 
ent in  terms  from  the  old,  it  may  refuse  to 
provide  funds  to  pay  any  portion  of  the 
old  indebtedness,  unless  the  creditors  will 
accept  new  evidences  in  place  of  the  old, 
and  for  a  less  sum,  and  that  there  is  no 
constitutional  objection  to  a  law  which 
provides  a  county  fund,  out  of  which  the 
holders  of  county  indebtedness  can  obtain 
50  per  cent  of  the  nominal  value  of  their 
demands,  whenever  they  may  choose  to 
accept  the  same.  People  v.  Morse,  43 
Cal.  534  (1872). 

2  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav. 
Bank,  92  U.  S.  625.  More  fully  on  this 
subject,  see  infra,  chapter  xiv.  on 
Contracts. 

3  Post,  sec.  701  et  seq. 

*  Ante,  sec.  68,  and  note,  sec.  68,  «, 
and  notes  ;  see  post,  sees.  72,  73.  Dar- 
lington v.  Mayor,  &c,  31  N.  Y.  164 
(1865) ;  Reynolds  v.  Stark  County,  5 
Ohio,  204  ;  5  Ohio  St.  113  ;  Clinton  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  24  Iowa,  455  (1868)  ;  Louis- 
ville v.  University  of  Louisville,  15  B. 
Mon.  642  (1855) ;  Portland  &  W.  V.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Portland,  14  0reg.  188.  See  fur- 
ther, chapter  on  Streets  and  on  Dedication, 
post;  People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188  ;  Mer- 
cer v.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Pa.  St.  99  ;  Mayor, 


L22 


MUNICIPAL    COIIPDIJATIONS. 


§71 


It  may  autl  'porations  to  make  contracts,  but  it  is,  perhaps, 

more  doubtful  how  tar  it  can  compulsorily  make,  in  the  Legal  sense 
of  the  word,  contracts  for  them,  since  the  essence  of  a  contract  con- 
in  the  agreement  of  the  parties.1    And  on  this  view  it  has  been 
held,  in  Vermont,  that  the  Legislature  cannot  without  tJu  consent  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  appoint  an  agent  for  it,  and  authorize  him,  as 
i  agent,  to  purchase  property  and  bind  the  corporation  to  pay 
for  it.-     So  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  has  decided  that  the  le- 
|  iture,  under  peculiar  provisions  in  the  Constitution  of  that  State, 
has  no  power  to  compel  a  city  to  incur  a  debt  against  its  will.8 


eti  .  v.  Bopkins,  13  La.  326  ;  NewOrleans, 
\  Railroad  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  26  La. 
An.  517;  lb.  478  (1874);  Reading  v. 
Commonwealth,  11  Pa.  St.  196  ;  post,  sec. 
701  ct  s<  </. 

i  (' \   on  Taxation  (2d  ed.),  688  ct 

seq.,  where  the  subject  is  discussed  and  the 
leading  cases  referred  to. 

.ins  v.  Randolph,  31  Vt.  226 
(1858).  The  case  was  this  :  Plaintiff 
sued  the  town  of  Randolph  in  assumpsit 
for  liquor  sold  to  an  "  agent  "  appointed 
bj  the  county  commissioners  to  purchase 
liquors  (under  the  act  of  1852,  "to  pre- 
venl  the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors"), 
at  the  expense  of  the  town  for  which  he 
was  appointed.  The  town  never  gave  any 
assent,  express  or  implied,  to  this  appoint- 
ment ;  nor  did  it  receive  any  benefit  from 

of  the  liquors,  or  have  any  knowl- 
edgethal  the  agent  was  purchasing  liquors 
on  it-;  credit.  The  court  held  the  acl 
of  1852  unconstitutional,  and  that  the 
plaintiffs  could  nol  recover.  The  decision 
was  put  mainh  upon  the   ground  that  the 

are  could  not   authorize  a  binding 

i  to  be  made  creating  a  debt  against 
a  public  corporation  withoul   it  ■  con  sent. 

-.  .!.,  dissented,  nol  on  the  ground 

I   .ration  was  bound  by  force  of 

any  contract,  but  because  the  acl  of  1852 

!  a  duty  upon  the  towns,  as   mniii- 

dp  tl  a  to  '       I  n   the  liquors, 

and  this  for  public  purposes,  and  to  carry 
out  a  police    regulation.      Chief- Justice 

/  ■  ,  and  considers  it 

ading  upon  no  principle."  Dar- 
lington V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  31 
N.  V.  164,  205  (1865).  On  the  other 
hand  it  is  approved  by  Lyon,  J.,  in  State 
v.   Tappan,  29  Wis.  664  (1872)  ;  s.  o.  9 


Am.  Rep.  662,  referred  to  infra,  -<  .  75, 
and  note.  And  see  Philadelphia  o.  Fii  Id, 
58  Pa.  St.  320  (1868).  Post,  sec.  831, 
note  ;  sec.  72  et  scq.  Hasbrouck  o.  .Mil- 
waukee, 13  Wis.  37  ;  Mills  V.  Charlton, 
29  Wis.  400. 

8  Cairo  &  St.  Louis  It.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Sparta,  77  111.  505  (1875)  ;  People  r. 
Chicago  (Lincoln  Park  Case),  51  111.  17 
(1869)  ;  People  v.  Salomon  (South  Park 
Case),  Ih.  :j7  ;  BLarard  v.  Drainage  Com- 
pany, lb.  130.  Though  the  reasoning  of 
the  court  is  general,  yet  the  point  decided 
—  that  the  city  could  not  be  compelled  to 
contract  a  debt  against  its  consent  —  was 
inilucneed  by,  if  it  does  not  rest  upon,  a 
constitutional  provision  (art.  ix.  sec.  5), 
which  was  construed  to  restrict  the  legis- 
lature from  granting  the  right  of  local  or 
corporate  taxation  to  any  other  than  the 
corporate  authorities  of  the  munic 
or  district  to  be  taxed.  In  Illinois  an  act 
authorizing  police  commissioners  to  issue 
certificates  of  indebtedness  without  its  con- 
sent is  unconstitutional.  People  v.  Can- 
ty, 55  111.  33;  ante,  sec.  60;  People  v. 
Me  Adams,  82  111.  356  ;  Park  t'oinin'rs  v. 
Tel.  Co.,  103  111.  33.  Compare  Darlington 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  31  N.  Y. 
164.  See  Dunnovan  v.  Green,  57  111.  63; 
Sinton  v.  Ash  bury,  41  Cal.  525  (1871). 
In  California  it  is  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture may  empower  the  authorities  of  a  city 

to  purchase  an  agricultural  park,  and  to 
issue  its  bonds  in  payment  therefor,  and  to 
levy  a  tax  for  their  payment.  Sonoma 
County  Bank  v.  Fairbanks,  52  Cal.  196. 
Infra,  sec.  72  et  seq. 

The  general  propositions  in  the  text  as 
in  Hi:  restrictions  on  legislative  power  over 
municipal  corporations  will  be  found  to  be 


§72 


COMPULSORY   CONTRACTS  :    DETROIT   PARK   CASE. 


123 


§  72.  Compulsory  Contracts  ;  Detroit  Park  Case.  —  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Michigan,  in  a  case  arising  under  a  statute  relating  to  a  pub- 
lic park  for  the  city  of  Detroit,  which  created  a  Board  of  Park  Com- 
missioners for  the  city,  the  act  naming  the  commissioners  and 
investing  them  with  power  to  acquire  by  purchase  the  necessary 
lands,  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  $300,000,  and  imperatively  requiring 
the  city  council,  without  its  assent  to  the  appointment  of  the  com- 
missioners or  to  the  purchase  of  the  lands  by  them  selected,  to  pro- 
vide the  money  to  pay  therefor  by  the  issue  and  sale  of  the  bonds 
of  the  city,  held  that  the  city  could  not  be  compelled  against  the  will 
of  the  council,  to  issue  its  bonds ;  and  the  decision  was  placed  on  the 
ground  that  a  park  was  purely  a  matter  of  local,  as  distinguished 
from  State,  concern,  and  that  it  was  beyond  legislative  competency 
to  coerce  a  municipal  corporation  to  contract  a  debt  for  local  pur- 
poses without  its  consent.1 


sustained  by  the  following  cases  :  Atkins 
v.  Randolph,  31  Vt.  226  (1858)  ;  White 
v.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  193  ;  Louisville  v.  The 
University,  15  B.  Mon.  642 ;  Western 
Savings  Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31 
Pa.  St.  175,  185  ;  Montpelier  v.  East 
Montpelier,  29  Vt.  12  ;  Poultney  v.  Wells, 
1  Aik.  (Vt.)  180  ;  Trustees  v.  Winston,  5 
Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.)  17  ;  Norris  v.  Trus- 
tees Abingdon  Academy,  7  Gill  &  Johns. 
(Md.)  7  ;  Regents  of  University  v.  Wil- 
liams, 9  Gill  &  Johns.  365  ;  Trustees  of 
Academy  v.  Aberdeen,  13  Sm.  &  M.  21 
Miss.  645  ;  Brunswick  v.  Litchfield,  2  Me. 
(2  Greenl.)  28,  32. 

1  People,  ex  rel.  Park  Comm'rs  v.  Com- 
mon Council  of  Detroit  (mandamus  to 
compel  the  council  to  raise  money  to  pay 
for  lands  for  the  park),  28  Mich.  228 
(1873)  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  The 
ground  upon  which  the  judgment  in  the 
Detroit  Park  Case,  just  mentioned,  rests, 
as  appears  by  the  opinion  of  the  court  de- 
livered by  Coohy,  J.,  is  that  a  municipal 
corporation  like  that  of  Detroit  will  be 
found  to  be  in  part  a  mere  public  agency 
of  the  State,  and  in  part  possessed  of  pecu- 
liar and  local  franchises  and  rights  which 
appertain  to  it  as  legal  personality  for  its 
private  (as  distinguished  from  the  public) 
advantage.  It  is  admitted  that  "in  all 
matters  of  general  concern  there  is  no 
local  right  to  act  independently  of  the 
State,  .  .  .  and  the  State  may  exercise 
compulsory  authority,    and    enforce   the 


performance  of  local  duties,  either  by  em- 
ploying local  officers  for  the  purpose,  or 
through  agents  or  officers  of  its  own  ap- 
pointment. .  .  .  The  proposition  which 
asserts  the  amplitude  of  legislative  control 
over  municipal  corporations,  when  con- 
fined, as  it  should  be,  to  such  corporations 
as  agencies  of  the  State  in  its  government, 
is  entirely  sound.  They  are  not  created 
exclusively  for  that  purpose,  but  have 
other  objects  and  purposes  peculiarly  local, 
and  in  which  the  State  at  large,  except  in 
conferring  the  power  and  regulating  its 
exercise,  is  legally  no  more  concerned  than 
it  is  in  the  individual  and  private  con- 
cerns of  its  several  citizens.  Indeed  it 
would  be  easy  to  show  that  it  is  not  from 
the  standpoint  of  State  interest,  but  from 
that  of  local  interest,  that  the  necessity  of 
incorporating  cities  and  villages  most  dis- 
tinctly appears.  State  duties  of  a  local 
nature  can  for  the  most  part  be  very  well 
performed  through  the  usual  township  and 
county  organizations.  It  is  because, 
where  an  urban  population  is  collected, 
many  things  are  necessary  for  their  com- 
fort and  protection  which  are  not  needed 
in  the  country,  that  the  State  is  then 
called  upon  to  confer  larger  powers  and  to 
make  the  locality  a  subordinate  common- 
wealth. ...  It  is  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple in  this  State,  recognized  and  perpet- 
uated by  express  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, that  the  people  of  every  hamlet,  toicn, 
and  city  of  the  State  are  entitled  to  the  bene- 


124  Ml  NICIPAIi   CORPOH  LTIONS.  §  73 

5j  73.  Same  subject.  —  The  judgment  of  this  abh  coutt  in  the  De- 
/',  Case,  as  well  as  the  argument  of  the  eminent  judge  in 
the  opinion  by  which  it  is  supported,  is  in  the  author's  judgment 
aot  only  sound,  but  it  is  in  accordance  with  fche  weight  of  judicial 
expression  on  the  subject.1  There  are  difficulties  attending  the 
•iiMii  of  linlimited  legislative  power  over  municipalities,  and 
difficulties,  also,  in  assigning  limits  to  that  power.  The  legislative 
power  of  the  State  otight  to  be  at  all  times  comprehensive  enough 
and  penetrating  enough  to  enforce  all  duties  and  to  redress  all  evils. 
Abuses  will  inevitably  arise  which  nothing  but  legislative  surgery 
can  remedy.  It  seems  to  be  right  and  just  that  the  citizens  of 
Detroit  should  not  he  compelled  to  incur  a  large  debt  for  a  park, 
which  after  all  is  a  matter  of  luxury  and  ornament  rather  than  a 
prime  necessity.  But  change  the  instance.  Suppose  the  city  should 
rduse  to  provide  a  system  of  sewers  or  drainage,  whereby  the  health 
of  its  people  was  injuriously  affected:  may  it  say  that  this  does  not 
concern  the  people  of  the  State  outside  the  city,  that  it  is  peculiarly 
a  local  matter,  and  therefore  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  State  to 
compel  the  city  to  make  such  a  provision,  and  to  raise  the  necessary 
taxes  or  make  the  necessary  assessments  to  that  end  ?  On  the  whole, 
the  question  whether  a  city  may  be  compelled  to  create  a  debt  or  lia- 
bility against  its  will  must  be  answered,  we  think,  with  reference 

fitsof  h>r,,l  s.lf-fjwcrnment.  But  authority  tionable  of  all   has   been  this:  that   the 

in  tie-  legislature  to  determine  what  shall  people  shall   vote  the  taxes  they  are    to 

be  the  exfa  at  of  the  capacity  in  a  city  to  pay,  or  be  permitted  to  choose  representa- 

acquireand  hold  property  is  qoI  equivalent  tives  for  the  purpose." 
to,  and  does    nut    contain    within    itself         Supra,  sec.  71  n.     Oallam  v.  Saginaw, 

•rityfo   deprive  the  city  of  property  50  Mich.  7,  cited    in/rat    sec.  140,   note. 

actually  acquired  by  legislative  permission.  See,  also,  Detroit  v.   Plank  Road  Co.,  43 

As  to  property  it  thus  holds  for  its  own  Mich.   140;   Mayor*.  Park  Comm'rs,  44 

private  purposes,  a  city  is  to  be  regarded  Mich.    602,   cited  infra,  sec.    565,    note. 

aea  constituent  in  State  government,  and  The  city's  ownership  of   gas  works  is  in 

is  entitled    to   the  like  protection  in  its  its  local  or  private,  as  distinguished  from 

propei  ,  natural  person  who  its  public  character.     Western  Sav.  Fund 

is   also  a      ustituent.     The  right  of  the  Soc.    v.    Philadelphia,    31    Pa.    St.    183. 

Slatt    is  •>  right  of  tegUlation,  not  of  ap-  "  Provisions  for  Local  conveniences  for  the 

ptopriallon.      [i  catinot  be  deprived   of  citizens,  like  Water,  light,  public  grounds 

such  propei  v  without  due  process  of  law.  for  recreation,  and  the  like,  are  manifestly 

And  when  a  local  convenience  or  need  is  matters  which   are  nut   provided  for  by 

to  be  mpplied  in  which  the  people  of  the  municipal   corporations  in  their  political 

Stateatlarge,  or  any  portion  thereof  out-  or  governmental   capacity,    but    in    that 

side  the   city  limits,  are  nut  concerned,  quasi  private  capacity  in  which  they  act 

the  State  re  by  process  of  taxa-  for  the   benefit  of   their   corporators   ,-x- 

tion  take  from  the  individual  citizens  the  dlusively."     Cooley  on  Taxation  (2d  ed.), 

money  to  purchase  it,  than  they  could,  if  688. 
it  had  been  procured,  appropriate  it  to  the         »  See  supra,  sec.  68,  and  note  ;  sec.  68  a, 

use.       .   .   From    the  very  dawn  of  and  notes, 
our  liberties  the  principle  most  unques- 


§  74  COMPULSORY   CONTRACTS  ;     DETROIT   PARK    CASE.  125 

not  only  to  the  constitutional  provisions  of  the  State,  but  to  the 
nature  of  the  purposes  for  which  the  debt  or  liability  is  to  be 
incurred. 

§  74.  Same  subject.  —  Thus,  if  there  is  no  special  limitation  in  the 
Constitution,  and  the  debt  or  liability  is  one  to  be  incurred  in  the 
discharge  of  a  public  or  State  duty,  which  it  is  proper  for  the  legis- 
lature to  impose  upon  the  municipality,  it  can  constitute  no  objection 
to  the  validity  of  the  Act  that  the  debt  or  liability  is  to  be  created 
without  its  consent.  Accordingly,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional 
restriction,  it  has  been  decided,  and  the  decision  is  doubtless  correct, 
that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  direct  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  build  a  bridge  over  a  navigable  watercourse  within  its  limits, 
or  the  State  may  appoint  agents  of  its  own  to  build  it,  and  em- 
power them  to  create  a  loan  to  pay  for  the  structure,  payable  by 
the  corporation.1  Thus  also,  since  municipal  corporations  are  instru- 
ments of  government,  created  for  political  purposes,  and  subject  to 
legislative  control,  and  since  it  is  one  of  the  ordinary  duties  of  such 
corporations,  under  legislative  authority,  to  make  and  keep  in  repair 
the  streets  and  highways  and  bridges  connected  therewith,  the  Court 
of  Appeals  in  Maryland  sustained  an  act  mandatory  in  its  terms, 
which  not  only  empowered  but  required  the  city  of  Baltimore  in  its 
corporate  capacity  to  take  charge  of  and  maintain  as  a  public  highway 
a  specified  bridge  within  that  city,  and  enforced  the  duty  created  by 
the  act  of  mandamus.2     But  the  legislature  cannot  by  an  imperative 

1  Philadelphia  v.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320  therein,  the  legislature  may  require  it  to 
1868),  approving  Thomas  v.   Leland,   24     issue   its  bonds  to  pay  such   indebtedness. 

Wend.  65  ;  Guilder  v.  Otsego,  20  Minn.  Jefferson  County  v.  People,  5  Neb.  136 
74  (18/3)  ;  supra,  sec.  54,  note,  and  cases  (1876).  The  power  of  the  legislature  over 
cited.  United  States  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R.  municipal  contracts  and  liabilities  was 
Co.,  17  Wall.  322  (1872)  ;  post,  sec.  775  ;  very  fully  considered  in  The  People  v. 
Carter  v.  Bridge  Proprietors,  104  Mass.  Batchellor,  53  N.  Y.  128  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  13 
236(1870).  But  the  legislature  would  not,  Am.  Rep.  480,  and  the  conclusion  was 
of  course,  possess  such  extensive  powers  reached  that  while  municipalities  may  be 
over  a  private  corporation.  Erie  v.  Canal,  compelled  by  the  legislature,  without  their 
59  Pa.  St.  174.  Public  highways  and  consent,  to  construct  and  maintain  im- 
bridges  are  matter  of  general,  or  State,  provements  of  a  public  character,  and 
rather  than  of  municipal  concern.  Cooley,  even  enter  into  contracts  for  this  purpose, 
Taxation  (2d  ed.),  682.  A  city  street,  they  could  not  be  compelled,  without 
however,  while  its  character  is  chiefly  their  consent  or  that  of  their  taxable  in- 
public,  has  also  a  local  and  peculiar  and  habitants,  to  become  stockholders  in  a 
g-««s/-public  or  corporate  character  ;  which  railway  corporation  ;  and  therefore  a  man- 
is  shown  in  chap,  xviii.  on  Streets  and  datory  statute  requiring  a  municipal  or 
chap,  xxiii.  on  Actions.  public  corporation  to  subscribe  for  stock  in 

2  Pumphrey  v.  Baltimore,  47  Md.  145.  a  railway  corporation,  and  issue  its  bonds 
A  county  being  justly  indebted  under  a  con-  in  payment  therefor,  without  such  consent, 
tract  for  the  erection  of  public  buildings  was    unconstitutional.      The    opinion    of 


L26 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


statute  compel  a  municipality,  without  its  consent  or  that  of  its  in- 
habitants, to  create  a  debt  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railway.1 


^   74  ".     Same  subject.      Compulsory  liability  ;    City    Hall   building 

iu  Philadelphia. —  If  the  legislature  has  unlimited  power  to  deter- 
mine for  what  purposes  and  in  what  amounts  indebtedness  cha 
able  upon  a  municipality  and  payable  by  its  inhabitants  may  be 
ited  without  their  consent  or  that  of  their  local  authorities,  it  is  a 
power  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  certain  to  lead  to  abuse  and  oppres- 
sion. This  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  experience  of  the  city  of 
Philadelphia,  which  it  is  profitable  to  record  for  instruction  and  warn- 
ing. At  an  early  day  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania,  under 
the  lead  of  Chief-Justice  Gibson,  asserted,in  a  great  variety  of  cases, 
a  measure  of  legislative  power  almost  as  unlimited  as  that  of  Parlia- 
ment. It  came  to  be  the  accepted  doctrine  in  that  State,  that 
municipalities  held  nut  only  their  existence  but  all  of  their  rights 


,  J.,  i  ontains  a  valuable  review  of 
many  of  the  leading  decisions  upon  the  ex- 
tent of]  control  over  municipali- 
e  is  distinguished  from 
II'  X.  V.  401,  where  a 
mandator}  acl  of  the  legislature-,  requir- 
ingthe  town  of  Yonkers,  without  its  con- 
sent, to  issue  bonds  to  raise  money  to  be 
expended  in  the  construction  of  highways 
in  the  town,  was  held  to  be  constitutional. 
The  case  of  Batchellor  was  also  dis- 
tinguished,  or  attempted  to  he,  from  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  State  courts,  to 
the  effect  thai  railway  corporations  are 
public,  and  erected  for  public  purposes  in 
such  a  sense  as  that  the  taxingpower  may 
be  employed  to  aid  in  their  construction, 
nnless  there  is  some  special  limitation  in 
inn  of  the   particular  S1  I 

The  ca I'  People  v.  Flagg,   supra,    was 

decided  !"•:" the  constitutional  amend- 
ment of  lsT!.  prohibiting  local  Legislation 
on  the  subject  of  laying  oul  and  working 
highways,  bu1   permitting  such  power  to 
be  delegated  to  the  Local  authorities  by 
general  Laws.     People  >•.  Supervisors,  112 
N".  Y.  585  (1 '--'.').  distinguishing  People w. 
Plagg.      See   Town    of    Flatbush,  Fn   re, 
60  N.  V.  398  (1875),  cited,  ante,  sec.  63, 
3  ipervisors,  17  Wis.  298  ; 
l,  note. 
In  the  Brooklyn  and  New  York  Bridge 
ie  court  of  appeals  have  declared 


that  the  erection  of  a  bridge  to  connect  two 
i,i  i„  ,i  "city  purpose,"  for  which 
indebtedness  may  be  incurred  under  the 
late  constitutional  amendment  upon  that 
subject.  In  deciding  such  a  question  the 
court  said  that  great  weight  should  he 
given  to  the  determination  of  the  legisla- 
ture. A  constitutional  provision  that  no 
county,  city,  or  town  shall  give  money  or 
loan  its  credit  to  any  individual  or  cor- 
poration, or  become  the  owner  of  cor- 
porate stock  or  bonds,  is  not  in  conflict 
with  a  statute  authorizing  two  cities  al- 
ready owning  stock  in  a  company  organ- 
ized to  build  a  bridge  between  such  cities, 
to  become  the  owners  of  the  whole  stock, 
by  purchasing  the  stock  of  the  private 
stockholders,  or,  in  case  of  a  failure  to 
agree,  by  taking  it  by  eminenl  domain. 
A  statute  authorizing  the  erection  of  a 
certain  bridge,  provided  that  the  I 
should  call  on  tlie  cities  who  v,<  n-  to  pay 
for  it  for  the  funds  necessary,  "  provided, 
:.  that  tin'  whole  amount  to  be 
paid  by  both  cities  shall  not  exceed  eight 

million  dollars."      //'/'/that  this   was   not 

an  absolute  limit   against  a  greater  cost, 
but  only  a  direction  that  no  more  should 

he  ealhd    for   without   further  legislative 
authority.      (Church,  C.   J.,    Folger     ;:  I 
Miller,  .1.1.,  dissenting.)     People  r.  Kelly, 
5  Abb.  N.  Y.  New  Cas.  383. 
1  People  v.  Batchellor,  supra. 


§  74  «  COMPULSORY   CONTRACTS.  127 

at  the  absolute  will  of  the  legislature,  which,  if  it  chose,  could 
govern  the  inhabitants  of  municipalities  by  its  own  appointees.1 
Acting  under  this  view,  the  legislature  in  1870  passed  an  act  "  To 
provide  for  the  erection  of  all  public  buildings  required  to  accommo- 
date the  courts  for  all  the  municipal  purposes  within  the  city 
of  Philadelphia."  By  this  act  the  legislature  decided  that  the  city 
should  have  new  public  buildings.  The  act  selected  certain  citizens 
by  name,  whom  it  appointed  commissioners  for  the  erection  of  the 
buildings.  It  made  this  body  perpetual  by  authorizing  it  to  fill 
vacancies.  It  was  not  chosen  by  the  inhabitants  or  taxpayers,  or 
removable  by  them,  or  accountable  to  them.  It  was  authorized 
without  the  consent  of  the  municipal  authorities  to  make  contracts 
to  construct  the  buildings,  which  the  act  declared  should  be  bind- 
ing at  law  upon  the  city  and  the  contractors.  It  was  authorized 
prior  to  December  1  of  each  year  to  make  requisitions  on  the 
common  councils  for  the  amount  of  money  required  for  the  succeed- 
ing year ;  and  the  act  made  it  the  duty  of  the  common  councils  to 
levy  a  special  tax  sufficient  to  meet  the  requisition,  and  to  do  all 
such  acts  as  the  commission  might  from  time  to  time  require.  This 
commission  was  imposed  by  the  legislature  upon  the  city,  and 
given  absolute  control  to  create  debts  for  the  purpose  named,  and 

1  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  64  Pa.  St.  160,  and  jurist,  who  has  given  much  attention 
180,  181,  per  Sharswood,  J.,  who,  giving  to  this  subject.  In  the  course  of  an  in- 
the  judgment  of  the  court,  says:  "Amu-  teresting  chapter  "on  local  taxation  un- 
nicipal  corporation  is  merely  an  agency  of  der  legislative  compulsion,"  Judge  Cooky 
government  fully  subject  to  the  control  of  (Taxation,  2d  ed.  chap.  21.  p.  678)  says  : 
the  legislature,  who  may  enlarge  or  di-  As  "  local  powers  of  taxation  must  come 
minish  its  territorial  extent,  or  its  func-  from  the  State,  it  might  seem  to  follow,  as 
tions,  may  change  or  modify  its  internal  a  corollary,  that  the  State  could,  at  pleas- 
arrangement,  or  destroy  its  very  existence,  lire,  withhold  the  grant  and  exercise  the 
with  the  mere  breath  of  arbitrary  discre-  power  itself.  But  in  the  general  frame- 
tion.  .  .  .  The  sovereign  may  continue  its  work  of  our  republican  governments  noth- 
[the  city's]  corporate  existence,  and  yet  ing  is  more  distinct  and  unquestionable 
assume  or  resume  the  appointments  of  all  than  that  they  recognize  the  existence  of 
of  its  officers  and  agents  into  its  own  local  self-government  and  contemplate  its 
hands  ;  for  the  power  which  can  create  and  permanency.  Some  State  Constitutions 
destroy  can  modify  and  change."  do  this  in  express  terms,  others  by  neces- 

It  may,  we  think,  be  doubted  whether,  sary  implication  ;  and  probably  in  no  one 
upon  full  and  mature  consideration,  the  of  the  States  has  the  legislature  been  en- 
Constitutions  of  the  several  American  trusted  with  the  power  which  would  en- 
States  do  not  contain  express  or  implied  able  it  to  abolish  the  local  government, 
limitations  upon  the  autocratic  power  of  It  has  usually  a  large  authority  in  de- 
the  legislature  asserted  in  the  paragraph  termining  the  extent  of  local  powers  and 
quoted,  which,  however,  is  typical  of  the  framework  of  local  government  ;  but 
many  to  be  found  in  the  judicial  discus-  while  it  may  shape  the  local  institutions, 
sions  on  this  subject.  We  are  inclined  to  it  cannot  abolish  them,  and,  without 
concur  in  the  soundness  of  the  observa-  substituting  others,  take  all  authority  to 
tions  quoted  below,  of  an  eminent  judge  itself." 


L28  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §  74  a 

fco  require  the  levy  of  taxes  for  their  payment.  A  scheme  more 
repugnant  to  all  notions  of  local  self-government  than  that  which 
was  forced  upon  the  city  and  committed  to  this  legislative  oligarchy 
cannot  weU  be  conceived.  "They  projected  (according  to  a  learned 
judge  of  that  State)  structures  at  the  corner  of  Broad  and  Market 
streets  upon  a  scale  of  magnificence  better  suited  for  the  capital 
11  empire  than  the  municipal  buildings  of  a  debt-burdened 
city.'1 

Acts  vesting  the  ordinary  municipal  functions  in  commissions 
appointed  by  the  legislature  would  seem  in  this  State  not  to  have 
been  unfrequent.  Public  discontent  was  exhibited,  and  at  length 
found  its  expression  in  the  amended  Constitution  of  1874,  which 
prevents  for  the  future  the  creation  of  such  commissions,  by  ordain- 
ing "  That  the  General  Assembly  shall  not  delegate  to  any  special 
commission,  private  corporation  or  association,  any  power  to  make, 
supervise,  or  interfere  with  any  municipal  improvement,  money, 
property,  or  effects,  whether  held  in  trust  or  otherwise ;  or  to  levy 
taxes,  or  to  perform  any  municipal  function  whatever."  2  This  Con- 
stitution also  provided  that  "  no  debt  shall  be  contracted  or  liability 
incurred  by  any  municipal  commission  except  in  pursuance  of 
appropriations  previously  made  by  the  municipal  government."3 
These  provisions  failed  however  to  give  relief  in  respect  to  the  build- 
ings in  question,  for  the  construction  of  which  the  commission  had, 
prior  to  1874,  entered  into  contracts.  The  provision  first  quoted 
was  held  to  be  prospective  only,  and  not  to  apply  to  special  com- 
missions  existing  before  the  adoption  of  the  amended  Constitution. 
And  as  to  the  second  provision  above  quoted,  it  was  held  that  while 
it  would  prevent  the  commission  thereafter  from  entering  into  any 
contract  until  an  appropriation  had  been  made  by  the  municipal 
government,  it  did  not  repeal  the  obligation  imposed  by  the  above 
mentioned  Act  of  1870  upon  the  common  councils  to  raise  the 
amount  required  by  the  commissioners  and  to  levy  the  necessary 
taxes.  Accordingly,  the  Supreme  Court,  on  the  relation  of  the 
commission,  decided  that  it  was  entitled  to  a  peremptory  man- 
damus to  compel  the  common  councils  (they  having  refused  to  do 
so)  to  levy  a  special  tax  to  meet  a  requisition  of  the  commission 
for  81,500,000,  this  being  the  amount  found  by   the  commission 

1    I'd    P't.rson,  J.,  in  Perkins  i'.  Sink,  pulsorily  expended  upon  an  enormous  pile 

86   Pa.  St.  283(1878).     Speaking  of  this  which  Burpasaes  the   town   halls  and  ca- 

bnilding,  Judge   Ware  say.- (1  Am.  Const.  tbfidrals  of  the  Mi. Idle  Ages  in  extent,  if 

Law,  630)  ■  "  For  nearly  twenty  years  all  not  in  grandeur." 

the  money  that  could                 I  from  im-  2  Art.  3,  see.  20,  Constitution  of  1874. 

mediate  and  pressing  needs  has  been  com-  8  Art.  15,  see.  2,  Constitution  of  1874. 


§75 


CLAIMS    NOT    ENFORCEABLE   IN    LAW. 


120 


to  be  necessary  for  the  succeeding  years  for  the  city  hall  building 
before  mentioned.1 


§  75  (44).  Mandatory  Statutes  to  pay  Claim3  not  legally  binding 
on  the  Municipality.  —  The  fact  that  a  claim  against  a  municipal  or 
public  corporation  is  not  such  an  one  as  the  law  recognizes  as  of 
legal  obligation  has  often  been  decided,  by  courts  of  the  highest 
respectability  and  learning,  to  form  no  constitutional  objection  to 
the  validity  of  a  law  imposing  a  tax  and  directing  its  payment ; 2 


i  Perkins  v.  Slack,  86  Pa.  St.  270  (1878). 
It  is  confessedly  difficult  in  many  cases  to 
define  the  line  of  demarcation  between 
public  or  State  powers  and  duties  which 
municipalties  may  be  compelled  to  perform 
as  State  agencies,  and  those  of  a  private 
or  quasi,  private  or  corporate  nature  which 
pertain  to  municipalities  as  the  organized 
representatives  of  compact  communities 
for  their  own  special  local  benefit  and 
convenience.  General  usage  and  practice 
must  largely  guide  the  inquiry.  A  county 
may  doubtless  be  compelled  to  build  a 
court-house  if  no  special  constitutional 
restriction  stands  in  the  way.  But  the 
building  of  a  city  hall  of  the  character  of 
the  one  in  Philadelphia  would  seem  rather 
to  belong  to  the  category  of  local  or  mu- 
nicipal, as  distinguished  from  State  or  pub- 
lic objects,  which,  therefore,  cannot,  or,  if 
it  can,  ought  not  to  be  forced  by  central 
legislative  dictation  upon  a  reluctant  com- 
munity, which  alone  must  bear  the  bur- 
den. In  Michigan  the  State  cannot 
compel,  but  it  may  authorize,  an  incor- 
porated city  to  erect  a  court-house  for 
the  county  in  which  the  city  is  situated. 
Callam  v.  Saginaw,  50  Mich.  7. 

2  Guilford  v.  Supervisors,  &c,  13  N.  Y. 
(3  Kern.)  143  (1855).  This  case  holds 
the  following  propositions  :  1.  That  the 
legislature  has  power  to  levy  a  tax  upon 
the  taxable  property  of  a  town,  and  ap- 
propriate the  same  to  the  payment  of  a 
claim  made  by  an  individual  against  the 
town.  2.  That  it  is  not  a  valid  objection 
to  the  exercise  of  such  power  that  the 
claim,  to  satisfy  which  the  tax  is  levied, 
is  not  recoverable  by  action  against  the 
town.  3.  That  it  does  not  alter  the  case 
that  the  claim  has  been  rejected  by  the 
voters  of  the  town,  when  submitted  to 
them  at  a  town  meeting,  under  an  act  of 
VOL.  I.  —  9 


the  legislature  authorizing  such  submis- 
sion, and  declaring  that  their  decision 
should  be  final  and  conclusive. 

This  case  has  been  approved,  arguendo, 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  The  United  States  v.  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  Railroad  Co.,  17  Wall.  322  (1872)  ; 
New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  654 
(1877).     Infra,  sec.  76  a. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  same  case  has  been 
disapproved  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wis- 
consin, in  The  State  v.  Tappan,  29  Wis. 
664  (1872)  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  622,  and  an 
act  of  the  legislature  of  Wisconsin,  similar 
in  its  nature  and  principles  to  that  involved 
in  Guilford  v.  Supervisors,  supra,  was  held 
unconstitutional.  The  opinion  of  Lyon, 
J.,  evinces  great  care  in  its  preparation  ; 
but  it  has  failed  to  satisfy  us  that,  in  the 
absence  of  special  constitutional  restraints, 
the  extent  of  the  legislative  power  of  tax- 
ation depends  upon  the  consent  of  the 
municipality  or  the  people  therein,  or  that 
the  special  act  before  the  court  exceeded 
the  rightful  power  of  the  legislature.  The 
principle  has  been  reaffirmed,  in  Massa- 
chusetts, that  the  discretionary  power  of 
the  legislature  in  the  distribution  of  pub. 
lie  burdens  embraces  the  power  to  author- 
ize an  assessment  on  one  district  for  part 
of  the  expense  of  repairing  a  portion  of  a 
bridge  in  another.  Carter  v.  Bridge  Pro- 
prietors, 104  Mass.  236  (1870)  ;  post,  sec. 
737.  See  Mr.  Sedgwick's  opinion  of  this 
legislation,  Const,  and  St.  Law,  313,  314. 
The  principle  of  Guilford  v.  Supervisors 
was  applied  in  Brewster  v.  Syracuse,  19 
N.  Y.  116  (1859),  where  it  was  decided  by 
all  of  the  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 
that  the  legislature  has  the  power  to  au- 
thorize the  levy  of  a  tax  for  the  purpose 
of  paying  to  one  who  has  constructed  a 
municipal   improvement   (a  street   sewer) 


130 


MUNICIPAL   COBPOB  \  CTONS. 


§75 


bul  the  validity  of  Legislation  of  this  character,  if  it  interferes  with 
what  has  beeo  called  the  private  contracts  of  such  corporations,  must 
sustained  on  the  ground  that  such  contracts,  so  far  as  the  corpo- 
rations are  concerned,  are  under  the  absolute  control  of  the  Legisla- 
ture, and  not  within  the  protection  of  the  contract  clause  of  the 
national  Constitution.     The  cases  on  this  subject,  when  carefully 
mined,  seem  to  the  author  to  go  no  further,  probably,  than  to 
rl  the  doctrine  that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  compel 
municipal  corporations  to  recognize  and   pay  debts  or  claims  not 
binding  in  strict  law,  and  which,  for  technical  reasons,  could  not  be 
enforced  in  equity,  but  which,  nevertheless,  are  just  and  equitable 
in  their  character,  and  involve  a  moral  obligation.1     To  this  extent 


.  lition  to  the  contract  price,  which 
rporation  was  forbidden  to  pay  by 
n  ter.     The  court  did  not  consider 
'iv  contract  in   the  case, 
and  sustained  the  legislation  on  the  ground 
was  warranted  by  the  taxing  power, 
which,  in  that  State,  was  not  restrained, 
thus  leaving  it  in  the  discretion   of  the 
nire   to    recognize    and   direcl    the 
■it  of  claims  founded  in  equity  and 
justice,  or  in  gratitude  or  charity.     People 
v.    Mayor,    &c.    of    Brooklyn,    4    Conist. 
<X.  Y. )  11!'.     And  see  Thomas  v.  Leland, 
24  Wend.  65  (1840)  ;  People  v.   Dayton, 
55  N.  Y.  367  (1874)  ;   infra,  sec.  76  a  ; 
Shelby  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Bush  (Ky.), 
225 ;    Philadelphia    v.  Field,  58  Pa.   St. 
368).     This  seems  to    be   carrying 
the  doctrine  of  the  control  of  the  legisla- 
tor public  corporations  to  its  extreme 
Limit.      See    Mr.    Justice   Cooley's   dews, 
Const.    Lim.    380,   491,    notes.     Taxation 
I.),  685,  698.     The  Supreme  Court 
of  California  has  followed  and  approved 
Guilfordw.  Supervisors.    Blandingv.  Burr, 
59)  ;    North   Mo.   K.    R. 
Co.  v.  M  19   Mo    190,  500,  (1872). 

And  more  recently  in  New  York  theCourl 
of   Appeals,    while    not    questionin 

'    in    Guilford  V.   Supervisors,   &c., 

criticised  and  limit  -I  some  ol   the  dicta  in 
e  as  to  the  extenl  of  the  legislative 
power.     Weismer  v.  Village  of  Douglass, 
64    N.   Y.  91  ;    8.  C.    21   Am.    Rep     586. 
7''.  '.      Under  special  pro- 
visions of  Michigan  Constitution,  see  Peo- 
1  Inandaga,  L6   Mich.  '2.'.  I.      WTu  n 
under  a   moral  obligation  to 
rse   ani.th'  r   cmmiy  fur  a- r tain  ex- 


penses, the  legislature  may  givi  tins  a  legal 
effect  by  a  subsequent  act.  Lycoming  v. 
Union,  L5  Pa.  St.  166  (1850)  ;  O'Hara  v. 
State,  112  N.  Y.  146  (1889)  ;  Cole  v. 
State,  102  X.  V.  54.  Rights  of  trial  by 
jury  may  /«  denied  by  the  legislature  to 
municipal  corporations,  these  being  mere 
creatures  of  its  policy,  with  such  rights 
only  as  it  sees  proper  to  confer.  Borough 
oi  Dunmore's  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  374  ; 
Kelsb  r.  Dyersville,  68  Iowa,  137;  but 
inte,  sec.  66,  note. 
1  Blandingu.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343  (1853); 
Lycoming  v.  Union,  15  Pa.  St.  166  ; 
Guilford  v.  Supervisors,  13  N.  V.  144 
(1855)  ;  Brewster  v.  Syracuse,  19  N.  Y. 
116  (1859)  ;  Thomas  i?.  Leland,  21  Wend. 

65  (1840)  ;  HasbrOUCk  V.  Milwaukee,  21 
Wis.  217  (1866)  ;  Smith  v.  Morse,  2  Cal. 
524  ;  Grogan  v.  San  Francisco,  18  Cal. 
590;  Sinton  v.  Ashbury,  11  Cal.  525 
(1871)  ;  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S. 
644  (1877)  ;  People  ,-.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15 
(1875)  ;  Creighton  r.  San  Francisco,  42 
Cal  446  (1877)  ;  People  v.  Supervisors, 
70  N.  Y.  228  (1877).  Text  approved. 
Nevada  v.  Hampton,  13  Nev.  441  ;  infra, 
sec.  76  ".  sec.  77,  note. 

The  legislature,  in  favor  of  a  county  col- 
lecting officer,  who  has  settled  and  paid 
a  claim  against  him,  may  pass  an  act  au- 
thorizing the  settlement  to  be  opened  and 
equitably  adjusted,  and  such  an  acl  i 
implied  direction  thai  the  rule  of  law  as 
to  voluntary  payments,  shall  not  apply. 
Burns  v.  Clarion  Co.,  62  Pa.  St.  422' 
(1869).  In  California  the  legislature  can? 
not  compel  a  city  to  pay  a  claim  which  it 
is  under    no  obligation    whatever  to   pay  ; 


§  76  a  CLAIMS   NOT    ENFORCEABLE   IN    LAW.  131 

and  with  this  limitation,  the  doctrine  is  unobjectionable  in  princi- 
ple, and  must  be  regarded  as  settled,  although  it  asserts  a  measure 
of  control  over  municipalities,  in  respect  of  their  duties  and  liabili- 
ties, which  probably  does  not  exist  as  to  private  corporations  and 
individuals. 

§  76.  Same  subject.  —  Accordingly,  in  a  case  where  a  munici- 
pality, after  the  passage  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  which  provided 
that  towns  and  cities  should  not  thereafter  "  have  power  to  contract 
any  debt  without  fully  providing  in  the  ordinance  creating  the  debt 
the  means  of  paying  the  principal  and  interest"  issued  bonds  with- 
out such  a  provision  as  the  above  statute  required,  and  used  them  in 
payment  of  an  authorized  indebtedness,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  held  that  inasmuch  as  the  bonds  represented  an  equita- 
ble claim  against  the  city,  it  was  competent  for  the  legislature  to 
interfere  and  require  the  city  to  pay  them.  "  The  power  of  the 
legislature,"  says  Field,  J.,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court, 
"  to  require  the  payment  of  a  claim  for  which  an  equivalent  has 
been  received,  and  from  the  payment  of  which  the  city  can  only 
escape  on  technical  grounds,  would  seem  to  be  clear.  ...  A  very 
different  question,"  the  learned  judge  cautiously  adds,  "  would  be 
presented  if  an  attempt  were  made  to  apply  the  means  raised  [by 
taxation]  to  the  payment  of  claims  for  which  no  consideration  had 
been  received  by  the  city."  1 

§  76  a.  Same  subject.  — A  bank  advanced  money  to  commission- 
ers for  the  construction  of  the  New  York  City  court-house.  In 
making  these  advances  the  bank  was  represented  by  its  president, 

nor  require  a  court  to  render  judgment  on  should  in  no  event  be  liable  for  any  por- 

proof  of  the  amount  thereof.       Hoagland  tion  of   the   expenses   thereof,    was  held 

v.   Sacramento,   52  Cal.   142.     See  infra,  not  to  affect  or  in  any  manner  invalidate 

sec.  76.  an  act  subsequently  passed  by  the  legisla- 

1  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  644,  ture  requiring  the  city  to  pay  him  a  debt 

652(1877).     The  poioer  of  the  legislature  which    in    good    conscience    it    ought    to 

to  appropriate  the  moneys  of  municipal  cor-  pay.     Creighton  v.  San  Francisco,  42  Cal. 

porations  in  payment  of  claims  ascertained  446(1872);    Sinton  v.    Ashbury,  41  Cal. 

by  it  to  be  equitably  due  to  individuals,  525    (1871);    New    Orleans  v.   Clark,   95 

though  such  claims  be  not  enforceable  in  D.  S.  644  (1877)  ;  supra,  sees.  75,  76. 

the  courts,  depends  largely,  in  the  view  of  In  Iowa  it  appears  to  ]»■  regarded  as  not 

the  Supreme  Court  of  California,  upon  the  within    the    power    of  the    legislature    to 

legislative  conscience,  and  will  not  be  inter-  provide  a  means  for  the  collection  of  an 

fered   with    by   the    judicial    department  unconstitutional  obligation  against  a  puh- 

unless  in  exceptional  cases;  and  the  cir-  lie  corporation,  as  where  a  debt  had  he. mi 

cumstance  that  the  contract  under  which  incurred   in   excess   of  the   limit   fixed  by 

the  plaintiff  did  certain  work  in  San  Fran-  the    Constitution.        Mosher      o.     School 

Cisco,    expressly   provided    that    the  city  District,   44  Iowa,  122  (1876). 


132  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  77 

and  it  made  the  advances  in  good  faith  without  notice  of  any  con- 
spiracy or  misappropriation  ;  but  in  fact  the   commissioners   had 

red  intoa  fraudulent  conspiracy  to  raise  bills  for  work  above  the 
true  amount  and  to  divide  thi  among  themselves.     Part  of 

the  money  advanced  went  into  the  court-house,  but  the  Larger  por- 
tion of  it  was  fraudulently  diverted  by  the  commissioners.  Three 
of  the  conspirators  were  directors  of  the  bank,  hut  were  not  present 

!i  any  action  was  taken  in  respecl  of  the  advances  by  the  bank. 

r  this,  the  Legislature  passed  an  act  directing  the  city  to  pay 
hack  i"  the  various  hanks  all  moneys  which  had  been  advanced  by 
thrtn  for  the  use  of  any  of  the  departments  of  the  cit)  or  county, 
which  act  included  the  advance  above  mentioned.  This  act  was 
held  to  be  a  valid  exercise  of  the  legislative  power.1 

^  77  (45).  Ratifying  void  Local  Assessments.  —  It  has,  however, 
been  decided  in  .Maryland,  that,  as  against  tin  abutters,  tin  legisla- 
ture run/,/  imt  ratify  ci  assessment  for  a  lorn/  improvement  in  front 
of  their  property,  which  had  been  adjudged  to  be  void,  and  com- 
pel them  to  pay  for  the.  same.2  In  the  case  just  mentioned,  the 
Legislature,  in  an  act  relating  to  the  grading  and  paving  of  ah  avenue 
in  tin'  city  of  Baltimore,  aiming  other  things  required,  as  prelim- 
inary to  proceedings  thereunder,  that  the  mayor  and  council  of  the 
city  should  determine  the  proposed  work  to  be  consistent  with  the 
public  good.  An  application  by  property  owners  for  the  improve- 
ment was  made  to  the  city  commissioners  instead  of  the  mayor  and 
council,  and  the  commissioners  determined  to  grade  the  aveuue, 
awarded  the  contract,  and  the  contractor  did  the  work  at  the  cost 
of  over  $100,000.  The  abutters  instituted  no  proceedings  to  stop 
the  work;  and  after  it  was  completed  the  city  passed  an  ordinance 
ratifying  the  contract  to  grade,  and  all  the  acts  of  the  officers  of  the 

1  Mayor,  &c.  of  New   York   v.  Tenth  city  was  not  liable  for  the  advances  made 

National    Rank,    111    X.  V.   446   (1888).  to  them  by  the  bank,  this  retroactive  act 

de-  imp<  ratively   requiring  tin-  city,  without 

termine    what    moneys   they    may    raise  its  consent,  to  make  good  to  the  bank  tin' 

expend,  and  what  taxation  tor  muni-  »un1  which  the  conspirators  put 

may  be  Imposed;  and  it  into  their  pockets  and  which  never  wenl 

inly  does  not  exceed  its  constitutional  into  the  work,  so-ms  to  carry  the  legis- 

irity   when   it   compels  a  municipal  lative   power   beyond   the   just  limits   of 

corporation  to  pay  a  debl  which  has  some  equitable  or  moral  obligation,  which  the 

i  laii     think    is    the    true 

Town  of  Guilford  v.  Supervisors;  Brew-  measure  of  legislative  power  of  this  char- 

'  -  Darlington  v. 

:,  ::l    X.  V.   164;  Brown   v.   Mayor,         -  Baltimore*.  Horn,  26  Md.  194  (1866); 

V.  239.  compare  with  cases  cited  in  sees.  7-r>  and 

immissioners  had  7'.'  ;  Lennon   i>.  New  York,  55  N.  Y.  361 

no  power  tu  borrow  money,  and  that  the  (1874). 


§  79  CURATIVE   ACTS.  133 

city  in  relation  to  the  grading  of  the  avenue.  An  assessment  being 
made  upon  their  property,  to  pay  the  expense  of  the  grading,  they 
filed  a  hill  for  an  injunction  and  relief,  and  it  was  judicially  deter- 
mined that  the  proceedings  of  the  city  commissioners  were  coram 
non  juclice  and  void,  and  that  they  could  not  be  ratified  by  ordi- 
nance.1 After  this  judicial  determination,  the  legislature  passed  an 
act  directing  the  city  to  pay  the  contractors  for  the  work  done  by 
them  and  accepted  by  the  city,  to  borrow  the  money  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  levy  a  tax  for  its  payment,  which  the  city  did.  But  at 
the  same  session,  the  legislature,  to  reimburse  the  city  treasury, 
empowered  the  city  to  collect  from  the  abutters  on  the  avenue 
graded  the  amounts  which  had  been  assessed  and  ascertained  by  the 
city  commissioners ;  and  this  last  act  was  held  by  the  court  of 
appeals  to  be  void,  because  it  was  an  assumption  of  judicial  power 
by  the  legislature,  and,  in  effect,  a  legislative  reversal  of  the  former 
judgment  of  the  court. 

§  78.  Same  subject.  —  In  levying  a  local  assessment  upon  the 
abutting  property,  a  lot  within  the  district  declared  to  be  benefited 
was  omitted,  after  which  the  legislature  validated  the  assessment, 
this  omission  and  exemption  being  retained  and  preserved ;  and  it 
was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California  that  the  validating  act 
was  unconstitutional.2  The  ground  for  this  judgment  is  satisfactory; 
since  the  legislature  could  not  prospectively  have  exempted  the 
property  omitted  because  it  would  have  violated  the  constitutional 
requirement  of  uniformity,3  it  could  not  do  this  retrospectively. 

§  79  (46).  Curative  Acts.  —  In  general,  however,  the  legislature 
mag,  by  subsequent  act,  validate  and  confirm  previous  acts  of  the  cor- 
poration otherwise  invalid.  If  the  act  could  have  been  lawfully 
performed  or  done  under  precedent  legislative  authority,  the  legisla- 
ture may  subsequently  ratify  it  and  give  it  effect.4     Merely  because 

1  Baltimore  v.  Porter,  18  Md.  284  an  incorporated  city."  Infra,  sees.  79, 
(1861)  ;  see  infra,  sec.  814.     In  Brown  v.     544. 

Mayor,   &c.  of  New  York,  63  N.  Y.   239  3  Post,  sec.  755,  and  cases  cited  in  note. 

(1876),  a  legislative  ratification  of  an  ultra  For  construction  of  constitutional  provis- 

vircs  contract  for  street  improvements  was  ion  in  California  in  respect  of  equality  and 

sustained.      Duanesburg    v.   Jenkins,    57  uniformity  of  taxation,    the    opinion    of 

N.  Y.  177  (1874).     Infra,  sees.   79,  544.  McKinstry,  J.,  in  The  People  v.  Lynch, 

O'Hara  v.  State,  112  N.  Y.  146  (1889).  supra,  will  repay  reading. 

2  Peoples  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15  (1875)  ;  4  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn. 
s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  676.  Followed  in  475  (1843),  in  which  it  was  held  that  the 
Schumacher  v.  Toberman,  56  Cal.  508,  legislature  might  validate  prior  subscript 
where  McKinstry,  J.,  said  :  "  The  legisla-  tion  of  city  to  stock  of  railroad  company, 
ture  cannot  legalize  a  void  assessment,  nor  s.  p.  Winn  v.  Macon,  21  Ga.  275  (1857)  , 
by  direct  act  make  an  assessment  within  Mattingly   v.    District  of  Col.,   97   U.  S. 


134 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATION'S. 


§  79 


such  legislation,  in  matters  aot  relating  to  crimes,  is  retrospective, 
Qot  make  it  void.  ft  in  addition  to  its  being  retrospective, 
it  unjustly  impairs  or  abrogates  vested  rights,  and,  without  reason- 
able  cause,  imposes  upon  third  persons  new  duties  in  respect  to 
past  transactions,  it  will  be  void  because  in  conflict  with  the 
jtitution.1 


Mi  Millen  v.  Boyles,  6  Iowa,  304  ; 
/  ,  39]  .  \.  n  I  irleana  v.  Poutz,  14  La. 
An.  853  ;  Bissel)  v.  Jeffersonville,  'J  l 
How.  287,  295  (1860)  ;  Atchison  v. 
Batcher,  3  Kan.  L04  (1865)  ;  Frederick  v. 
Augusl  i,  .'•  G  >.  561  ;  Allison  v.  R.  W.  Co., 
ish  (Ky.),  247  (1872)  ;  Truchelut  v. 
Council,  1  Not1  &  McCord  (S.  C), 
227  ;  Citizens'  Water  Ci>.  v.  Bridgeport 
Hydraulic  Co.,  65  Conn.  1  ;  Tifft  v.  Buf- 
X.  V.  2n4  ;  Cooley,  <  lonst.  Lini. 
371,  379  ;  post,  sees.  419,  551,  814  ; 
tra,  under  Constitution  of  Illinois;  Mar- 
shall v.  Silliman,  61  111.  218  ;  but  see 
infra,  sec.  544,  note.  A  healing  statute 
i>  n. ii  unconstitutional  by  reason  of  giving 
validity  to  an  act  irregularly  done  which 
the  legislature  could  have  authorized  to  be 
done  in  the  irregular  way  in  the  first  in- 
stance. Lockhart  v.  Troy,  48  Ala.  579 
(1872). 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature,  by 
:   enactment,  to  cure  defects  or 
omissions  in  the  proceedings  of  the  super- 
intendent  of   streets.      San    Francisco  v. 
in  Real    Estate,  42  Cal.  517  (1872). 
Where  the  original  purpose  for  which  the 
i  of  taxation  is  invoked  is  one  of  the 
ordinary   purposes  of  municipal   govern- 
ment and  within  the  powers  granted,  and 
where  then-  is  do  fraud  or  oppression  in 
the  creation  of  the  debt  or  burden,  and  no 
inequality  or  injustice  in  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  tax,   the  legislature  may  by 
y  defect  in  th 
edings  to  colled,  the  tax  which  it  could 
prior  enactment, 
have  made  immaterial.     Emporia   v,  Nor- 
ton, L8  Km.  560  ;  approved   in  Mason  v. 
Spencer,   85   Kan.   512.     (An  acl   curing 
defed   in  mode  of  collecting  a  sewer  tax 
held  valid.)     Subsequent  legislative  ratifi- 

I  a  municipal  coi  | 
tion,    which    might   lawfully   have    been 
performed  under  precedent   legislative  an- 
tic ■  lid   and  effectual.     Ander- 
■    3  Dta  Anna,  L16  V.  S.  304,  a 


from  Illinois.  Adhered  to  in  Bolles  v. 
Brom field  (a  case  from  Illinois),  L20  U.  S. 
759  (1886),  although  after  the  issue  pf  the 
bonds  in  suit  by  the  municipality  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  State  of  Illinois  had 
decided  against  the  validity  of  such  cura- 
tive legislation.     Otoe  County  r.  Baldwin, 

111  V.  S.    1;    Grenada   Co.  v.   Brogden, 

112  U.  S.  261,  262.  Curative  act  held  in- 
effectual by  reason  of  original  want  of 
powi  r  in  municipality  to  issue  bonds,  and 
of  a  disabling  provision  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Mississippi.  Katzenberger  v.  Aber- 
deen, 121  U.  S.  172.  But  a  retrospective 
act,  to  moJa  valid  a  tax  upon  pi 

within  tht  corporation  when  levied,  was 
he.'d  void.  Atchison,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Maquillon,  12  Kan.  301  (1873). 

1  Bridgeport  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Conn. 
47.".,  497,  and  cases  cited  per  Church,  J. 
Laws  passed  to  remedy  defective  execution 
of  powers  of  public  corporations,  or  their 
officers,  are  valid,  though  retrospective  in 
their  operation,  unless  they  contravene 
some  provision  of  the  State  Constitution. 
State  v.  Newark,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  187 
(1858)  ;  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 
287,  295,  where  such  curative  acts  are  said 
to  be  valid  when  contracts  arc  not  im- 
paired, or  the  rights  of  third  persons 
injuriously  affected.  New  ( Irleans  v.  Clark, 
95  U.  S.  611  (1S77). 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to 
validate  a  city  ordinance  which  had  become 
null  and  void  for  want  of  being  recorded, 
and  to  provide  that  the  omission  to  record 
shall  not  impair  the  lien  of  the  assess- 
ments against  the  lot-owners.  Schenley 
v.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  St.  29  (1859). 
legislature  may  ratify,  and  thereby 
make  binding  an  unauthorised  municipal 
subscription  to  the  stock  of  an  incorpor- 
ated theatre  company.  Municipality  o. 
Theatre  Company,  -J  Rob.  (La.)  209 
(1842)  ;  but,  quaere,  whether,  if  the  legis- 
lature had  the  power,  the  act  in  this  case 
was  properly  held  to  be  a  ratification.  Dan- 


§80 


LEGISLATIVE    POWER   OVER   TRUST   PROPERTY. 


13* 


§  80  (47).  Legislative  Power  over  Property  held  in  trust  for 
Specific  Uses.  —  While  it  is  undeniable  that  the  legislature  has  full 
control  over  public  corporations,  and  over  the  funds  which  belong 
to  them  as  such,  and  held  for  strictly  public  purposes,  yet  where 
by  authority  of  law  such  corporations  hold  property  or  funds  in  trust 
for  specific  uses,  it  is  left  in  doubt  by  the  cases  how  far  the  legisla- 
lature  can,  unless  the  uses  be  public  or  charitable,  interfere  with  or 
control  such  trust  property  or  funds.  In  a  case  of  great  interest, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  decided  that  it  was  within  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  deprive  the  city  of  Philadelphia  of  the 
risht  to  administer  charitable  trusts  under  the  will  of  Mr.  Girard 
and  others,  which  had  been  granted  to  and  accepted  by  it,  and  to 
confer  the  administration  of  these  trusts  upon  a  separate  body  called 
"  Directors  of  City  Trusts,"  appointed  by  the  judges  of  the  Supreme 
Court  and  other  judges  named  in  the  act.  It  is  to  be  remarked, 
however,  that  the  legislature  did  not  attempt  to  change  or  pervert 
the  trusts  themselves.1  Certain  it  is,  that  without  legislative  au- 
thority a  municipal  corporation  holding  the  legal  title  to  property 
in  trust  cannot  use  the  funds  derived  from  such  property  for  corpo- 
rate purposes,  or  indeed  for  any  except  the  trust  purposes.2 

ielly  v.  Cabaniss,  52  Ga.  211  (1874).  See, 
further  on  this  subject,  chapter  on  Con- 
tracts, post,  sec.  544.  Text  cited  and 
approved.  Pompton  v.  Cooper  Union,  101 
U.  S.  196. 

1  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  64  Pa.  St.  169 
(1870).  Such  a  power  has  since  been  taken 
away  from  the  legislature.  Const.  Pa., 
1874,  art.  3,  sec.  20  ;  supra,  sec.  74  a  ; 
post,  sec.  567  et  seq. 

»  White  v.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  193  ;  ante, 
sec.  64  ;  Montpelier  v.  East  Montpelier 
(contest  as  to  trust  property  on  division 
of  town),  27  Vt.  (1  Wms.)  704  (1S54)  ; 
same  controversy  in  chancery,  29  Vt. 
(3  Wms.)  12.  See,  also,  Trustees,  &c.  v. 
Bradbury,  2  Fairf.  (Me.)  118;  Poultney 
v.  Wells,  1  Aik.  (Vt.)  180  ;  Plymouth  v. 
Jackson,  15  Pa.  44  ;  Harrison  v.  Bridge- 
ton,  16  Mass.  16  ;  Daniel  v.  Memphis,  11 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  582;  Trustees  of  Acad- 
emy  v.  Aberdeen,  13  Sm.  &M.  (21  Miss.) 
645,  as  to  which,  quaere.  Aberdeen  v. 
Sanderson,  8  Sm.  &  M.  670  ;  Chambers  v. 
St.  Louis,  29  Mo.  543  ;  Holland  v.  San 
Francisco,  7  Cal.  361  ;  Girard  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 7  Wall.  1.  See,  post,  chapters  on 
Corporate  Property  and  Remedies  against 
Illegal  Corporate  Acts. 


A  conveyance  was  made  in  1873,  by 
the  proprietors  of  the  lands,  to  the  select- 
men of  North  Yarmouth,  of  "  all  the 
flats,  sedge  banks,  and  muscle  beds  in 
said  town,  lying  below  high-water  mark, 
...  for  the  sole  use  and  benefit  of  the 
present  inhabitants,  and  of  all  such  as 
may  or  shall  forever  inhabit  or  dwell  in 
said  town,"  &c.  It  was  decided  that  this 
property  was  held  by  the  town  as  a  public 
corporation,  subject  to  legislative  control, 
in  trust  for  the  use  of  all  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, and  that  upon  a  division  of  the 
town,  it  was  competent  for  the  legislature 
to  provide  that  the  original  town  should 
still  hold  such  property  in  trust  for  the 
inhabitants  of  both  towns.  North  Yar- 
mouth v.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133  (1S5S)  ; 
post,  sec.  187. 

To  another  town  in  Maine,  lands  were 
granted  by  Massachusetts  prior  to  the 
separation  of  Maine  therefrom,  for  the  use 
of  its  schools.  The  legislature,  in  1803, 
on  the  application  of  the  town,  authorized 
the  sale  of  the  lands,  and  gave  to  certain 
designated  trustees  the  right  to  control  the 
funds  raised  by  the  sale  of  the  lands. 
This  was  considered  as  constituting  a 
contract,  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that 


M  TN  1 1 ' 1 1' a  L    CUUl'Oi: ATIONS. 


§80 


•  of  the   legislature,    au- 
town 



.    the   trust  property .   h 
to   the   principles  settled  in    the 
itutional 
and  void.     The  Ti  ,&         B  idbury, 

M  ,    118    (1834)  ;  Yarmouth  <■.  North 
Vanuouth,    34  Me.  411  (1852).     In  this 
trustees  of  the  funds  were   a 
corporation,   and  nol     mbj(  cl    to 
legislative   control.     In  North  Yarmouth 
v.  Skillings,  10  file.  13:;  i  i  858 ),  the  trustees 
of  the  property  or  fund  in  question  were 
orp  ■  it  ion,  and  subject  to  such 
control.     The  rule  as  to  pi  ivate  and  pub- 
ins  is  well  exemplified  In  these 
.  Norris  v.   Abingdon 
.  7  Gill  &  Johns.  (Md. )  7  ;  Bass 
v.    Fontleroy,    11   Tex.  698 ;  Louisville  v. 
University  of  Louisville,  15  B.  Mon.  642. 
In  Tl      S  Springfield  Township, 

6  In.l.  (Porter)  83  (1854),  il  washeldthat 
;i  law  of  the  State  (act  of  1852),  so  far  as  it 
1  the  proceeds  of  the  Bale  of  the 
don  (granted  by  act  of  Con- 
•   April   19,  1816)   from   the  use  of 
schools    in    the  mI    township 

where  the  land  was  situated,  to  the  use  of 
>ol  system   of  the  State    at   large, 
v.  :s  in    contravention  of   that  section  of 
Qstitution   (see.    7,  art.  viii.) 
which   provides,   that     "all    trust    funds 
held  by  the  State,  shall  remain  inviolate, 
and  be  faithfully  and  exclusively  applied 
I  ■  the  purpose   for  which  the  trust  was 
I." 


That  the  legislature  cannot  in  dividing 
a  torn  violate  the  provisions  of  the  donor 
of  a  fund  held  by  a  municipality  in  spe- 
cific trusts  is  affirmed  by  thi  Supreme 
Court    of    New    Hampshire   in   a   recent 

nt.  The  case  was  this  :  I 
the  town  "I'M.  received  from  John  Boyn- 
ton  the  sum  of  $10,000  as  a  fund  for  the 
support  of  its  public  schools,  on  the  ex- 
ondition  that,  unless  the  income 
tl"  reof  should  be  forever  divided  and 
applied,  according  to  the  number  of 
scholars  between  the  ages  of  five  and 
fifteen  in  the  several  schools  or  districts 
of  the  town,  the  fund  should  be  repaid  to 
the  donor,  his  executors,  administrators, 
or  assigns.  In  1872,  the  town  of  6.  was 
created  by  act  of  the  legislature  out  of 
part  of  the  territory  and  inhabitants  of  M., 
and  it  was  provided  that  all  property,  real 
and  personal,  and  all  school  and  other 
funds  belonging  to  the  original  town  of  M. 
should  be  divided  in  the  proportion  of 
seven  to  M.  and  thirteen  to  G.  It  was 
held  that  the  legislature  had  no  constitu- 
tional power  to  direct  a  division  or  dis- 
tribution of  the  fund  different  from  that 
prescribed  by  the  donor  ;  and  that,  there- 
fore, no  legal  provision  for  tie'  division  of 
tie-  fund  in  controversy  having  been  made, 
the  rights  of  the  town  of  M.  therein  were 
unaffected  by  the  act,  and  the  new  town 
ofG.  was  not  entitled  to  any  portion  of 
the  fund  or  income.  Greenville  v.  Mason, 
53  N.  H.  515  (1873)  ;  post,  sec.  187, 
note. 


§  82  CHARTERS   DEFINED.  137 


CHAPTER   V. 

MUNICIPAL    CHARTERS. 

General  Municipal  Powers.  —  Their  Nature  and  Construction. 

§  81  (48).  Subject  outlined.  —  This  chapter  will  treat  of  Muni- 
cipal Charters  and  the  principles  upon  which  they  are  construed, 
and  of  the  general  nature  of  the  powers  which  they  confer  upon  the 
corporation  or  upon  its  legislative  or  governing  body.  The  subject 
will  be  considered  under  the  following  heads  :  — 

1.  Charters  defined.     §  82. 

2.  Judicially  noticed.     §  83. 

3.  Proof  of  Corporate  Existence.     §  84. 

4.  Repeal  and  Amendment  of  Charters.     §§  85,  86. 

5.  Conflict  between  General  Laws  and  Special  Charters.     §§  87, 
88. 

6.  Extent  of  Corporate  Powers,  Limitations  thereon,  and  Canons 
of  Construction.     §§  89,  90,  91. 

7.  Usage  as  affecting  Powers  and  their  Interpretation.    §§  92,  93. 

8.  Discretionary  Powers.     §§  94,  95. 

9.  Public  Powers  incapable  of  Delegation.     §  96. 

10.  Public  Powers  cannot  be  surrendered  or  bargained  away. 
§  97. 

11.  Imperative  and  Discretionary  Powers.     §§  98,  99. 

12.  Exemption  of  Revenues  from  Judicial  Seizure,  and  herein 
of  Garnishment.     §§  100,  101. 

§  82  (49).  Charters  defined.  —  We  have  before  seen  that  in  this 
country  municipal  corporations  are  created  by  legislative  act,  either 
in  the  form  of  a  special  legislative  charter  or  under  general  incor- 
porating statutes.1  A  municipal  charter  granted  by  the  crown  in 
England  is  a  written  instrument  in  the  form  of  letters-patent,  with 
the  Great  Seal  appended  to  it,  addressed  to  all  the  subjects,  and  con- 
stituting the  persons  therein  named  and  their  successors  a  body 
corporate  for  or  within  the  place  therein  specified,  and  prescribing 
the  powers  and  duties  of  the  corporation  thereby  created.  But  such 
charters  are  inoperative  until  accepted.2     But  in  this  country,  as 

1  Ante,  sees.  39,  41. 

2  Ante,  sees.  32,  44.     Outline  of  charter  of  the  Middle  Ages,  ante,  sec.  6. 


138 


MI'N'ICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§83 


we  have  i  lsewhere  shown,  the  legislature  creates,  alters,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  constitutional  restriction,  can  repeal  charters  and  incor- 
ting  statutes  and  abolish  municipal  and  public  corporations  at 
its  will,  and  it  invests  them  with  such  powers,  mandatory  and  dis- 
tionary,  and  requires  of  them  such  duties,  as  it  deems  most 
expedient  for  the  general  good,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  particular 
localitv.1  No  precise  form  of  ivords  is  necessary  to  create  a  corpo- 
ration, and  a  corporation  may  lie  created  by  implication.2 

§83  (50).  Charters  judicially  noticed.  —  Courts  will  judicially 
he  charter  or  incorporating  act  of  a  municipal  corporation 
without  being  specially  pleaded,  not  only  when  it  is  declared  to  be 
a  public  statute,  but  when  it  is  public  or  general  in  its  nature  or  pur- 
j,  though  there  be  no  express  provision  to  that  effect.3  But  the 
acts,  votes,  and  ordinances  of  the  corporation  are  not  public  matters, 
and  must,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,  be  pleaded  and 
proved.4 


i  Weeks  v.  Gilmanton,  60   N.  II.  500. 
8,  9,  22. 

2  J///.,  Bees.  3,   12,  13. 

3  Albrittin  v.  Huntsville,  60  Ala.  486  ; 
Smoot  o.  Wetumpka,  '24  Ala.  121  ;  Case 
v.    Mobile,    30   Ala.    538  ;     Perryman   v. 

aville,  51  Ala.  510  ;  Montgomery  v. 
Wright,  72  Ala.  411  ;  Selma  v.  Perkins, 
68  Ala.  it.'  .  Montgomery  v.  Hughes,  65 
Ala.  201  ;  Wetumpka  v.  Wetumpka 
Wharf  Co.,  63  Ala.  611;  Potwin  v. 
Johnson,  108  111.  70;  Dwyer  v.  Bren- 
ham,  65  Tex.  526  ;  Solomon  v.  Hughes, 
24  Kan.  211  ;  State  v.  Tosney,  26  Minn. 
262;  Durch  v.  Chippewa  Co.,  60  Wis. 
227;  Smith  v.  Janesville,  52  Wis.  680. 
In  Indiana,  if  a  city  is  a  party  to  a  suit 
and  the  pleadings  do  not  Bhow  otherwise, 
the  presumption  is  that  it  is  incorporated 
under  the  general  incorporation  law. 
House  v.  Greensburg,  !»3  Ind.  533. 

'  Beatty  v.  Knowles,  t  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
152,  157  (1830)  ;  Stii  loosa,  cit- 

ing and  approving  text,  11  Iowa,  353  ; 
Ingle  r.  Jones,  13  Iowa,  280  (1876)  ; 
Aldermen  v.  Finley,  5  Eng.  (10  Ark.  423 
(1850)  ;  Fauntleroy  o.  Hannibal,  1  Dillon 
C.  C.  118  n-71)  ;'  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7 
Kan.  126  I  -7!)  ;  s.  C.  7  Am.  Rep.  423  ; 
Wes1  •:  Blake,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  234 
>-.  Whipple,  7  Vt.  15,  18 
(183.")  ;    Case    v.    Mobile,    30    Ala.    538 


(1857)  ;  Clarke  v.  Bank,  5  Eng.  (10  Ark.) 
516;  Stater.  Mayor,  11  Humph.  (Tcnn.) 
217  (1850)  ;  see  Vance  v.  Bank,  1  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  80,  and  note  (2)  ;  G  Bac.  Abr.  374, 
note  ;  Young  v.  Bank,  &c,  4  Cranch, 
384  ;  Swails  v.  State,  4  Ind.  516  (1853)  ; 
Portsmouth,  &c.  Co.  v.  Watson,  10  Mass. 
91  ;  Clap])  v.  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  ; 
People  v.  Potter,  35  Cal.  110,  where  a  city 
is  incorporated  under  a  general  act,  the 
fact  of  its  corporate  character  must  be 
averred  and  proved.  Ingle  v.  Jones,  43 
Iowa,  286  (1876)  ;  post,  sec.  177,  note  , 
Morgan  v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga.  662.  A  city 
charter  being  declared  to  be  a  public  act, 
supplements  and  amendments  to  it  are 
likewise  public.  Newark  Bank  ('.Asses- 
sors, 30  N.  J.  L.  22  ;  State  v.  Bergen,  34 
N.  J.  L.  43(.»  ;  New  Jersey  v.  Yard,  95  TJ. 
S.  112  (1877).  See])ost,  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances, sec.  422.  Where  a  public  law 
creates  the  mayor  and  aldermen  an  incor- 
porated body,  no  averment  or  proof  is 
necessary  to  establish  the  existence  of  the 
corporation.  State  v.  Mayor,  11  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  217  (1850)  ;  State  v.  Helmes 
(prescriptive  corporations),  Pen.  (N.  J.) 
1050 ;  Hawthorne  v.  Hoboken  (supple- 
mental act),  3  Vroom,  32  N.  J.  L.  172  ; 
Stevens  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Vroom,  33 
N..1.1..  229  ;  Bowie  v.  Kansas  City,  51  Mo. 
454  (1873). 


§81 


PROOF   OP    CORPORATE    EXISTENCE. 


139 


§  84  (51).  Proof  of  corporate  Existence  ;  User  ;  Legislative 
Recognition.  —  The  primary  evidence  of  a  special  charter  or  act  of 
incorporation  in  this  country  is  the  original  or  an  authenticated 
copy,  or,  under  statute  regulation,  a  printed  copy  published  by  au- 
thority. But  if  primary  evidence  cannot  be  had,  parol  or  secondary 
evidence  of  its  existence  is  admissible.1  Thus,  where  a  public  corpo- 
ration had  existed  for  a  long  space  of  time  (in  the  instance  before 
the  court,  for  forty  years),  the  court  allowed  evidence  of  its  incorpo- 
ration by  reputation,  the  original  act  not  being  found,  and  it  being 
probable  that  it  had  been  destroyed  by  fire.2  So  evidence  that  a 
town  has  for  many  years  exercised  corporate  privileges,  no  charter 
after  search  being  found,  is  competent  to  go  to  the  jury  to  establish 
that  it  was  duly  incorporated.  And  where  there  is  no  direct  or 
record  evidence  that  a  place  has  been  incorporated,  and  it  is 
sought  to  show  the  fact  of  incorporation  from  circumstantial  evi- 
dence, the  question  is  ordinarily  for  the  jury,  and  not  the  court ; 
that  is,  the  jury,  under  the  circumstances  determine  whether  there 
is  or  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  presume  a  charter  or  act  of  incorpo- 
ration? or  the  due  establishment  and  existence  of  a  corporate  dis- 
trict  under  some   general    act.4     So   corporate   existence   may   be 


1  Stock  bridge  v.  West  Stockbridge,  12 
Mass.  400  (1815)  ;  Braintree  v.  Battles,  6 
Vt.  395  (1834)  ;  Blackstone  v.  White,  41 
Pa.  St.  330. 

2  Dillingham  v.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547 
(1809)  ;  s.  p.  Bassett  v.  Porter,  4  Cush. 
487  (1849).  In  view  of  the  defective  man- 
ner in  which  the  records  of  quasi  corpora- 
tions —  such  as  school  and  road  districts, 
and  the  like  —  are  kept,  the  courts,  in  the 
absence  of  any  statute  requiring  record 
evidence,  will  permit  the  existence  and 
organization  of  the  corporation  to  be 
proved  by  reputation  and  acts,  where  these 
facts  do  not  appear  of  record.  Barnes  v. 
Barnes,  6  Vt.  388  (1834)  ;  Londonderry  v. 
Andover,  28  Vt.  416,  (1856)  ;  Sherwin  v. 
Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439  ;  Ryder  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  13  111.  523  ;  Highland  Turnpike  v. 
McKean,  11  Johns.  154  ;  Owings  v. 
Speed,  5  Wheat.  420.  See  chapter  on 
Corporate  Records  and  Documents,  post. 

Irregularities  in  the  proceedings  to  or- 
ganize a  corporation  are  not  favored  when 
set  up  long  afterwards  to  defeat  the  cor- 
porate existence.  Jameson  v.  People,  16 
111.  257  (1855)  ;  Dunning  v.  Railroad  Co., 
2  Ind.  437  (1850);  Fitch  v.  Pinckard,  4 
Scam.  5  111.  76. 


Where  a  corporation  is  created,  and 
declared  to  exist  as  such,  by  the  legisla- 
ture without  condition,  proof  of  organisa- 
tion or  user  is  not  necessary  to  enable  it 
to  maintain  an  action.  Cahill  v.  Insur- 
ance Company,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  124; 
Fire  Department  v.  Kip,  10  Wend.  266 
(1833).  And  see  Proprietors,  &c.  v.  Hor- 
ton,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  501  ;  People  v.  Presi- 
dent, 9  Wend.  351  ;  Wood  v.  Bank,  9 
Cowen,  194,  205.  When  construed  to  be 
immediately  created,  the  omission  to  do 
certain  acts  prescribed  to  organize  the  in- 
stitution, was  held  immaterial  as  respects 
persons  contracting  with  the  corporation. 
Brouwer  v.  Appleby,  1  Sandf.  158  (1847)  ; 
s.  p.  People  v.  President,  9  Wend.  351. 
See  also  ante,  sec.  44. 

3  New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton,  1;"  X.  II. 
201  (1844)  ;  Mayor  of  Kingston  v.  Horner, 
Coup.  102,  per  Lord  Mansfield  ;  Worley 
v.  Harris,  82  Ind.  493.  Where  the  fact  of 
incorporation  arises  as  a  collateral  question, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  show  that  a  city  is 
de  facto  a  corporation.  Louisville  N.  A. 
&  Chic.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shires,  108  111.  617. 

4  Bassett  v.  Porter,  4  Cush.  487  (1849) ; 
New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton,  12  N.  EL  409, 
412  (1841)  ;  s.  c.  15  N.  H.  201  ;  Robie  v. 


140 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


inferred  and  judicially  noticed,  although  the  incorporating  act   or 
charter  cannot  be  found,  if  the  fact  of  incorporation  is  clearly  rcc- 
bsequent  legislation  not  in  contravention  of  any  consti- 
tutional provision  respecting  the  mode  of  creating  corporations.1 

^  85  (52).  Repeals  and  Amendments,  and  their  Effect.  —  The 
powers  conferred  upon  municipal  corporations  may  at  any  time  be 
altered  or  repealed  by  the  legislature,  either  by  a  general  law  oper- 
ating upon  the  whole  State,  or,  in  absence  of  constitutional  restric- 
1  ion,  by  a  special  act!2    A  charter  may  be  amended,  the  name  of  the 

Sloan  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  361  (1847), 
approving   People   v.    Morris,    13    Wend. 
325  ;  Daniel  v.    Mayor,   &c.  11   Humph. 
(Tenn.)  582  ;  State  v.  Mayor,  24  Ala.  701 
(1854);  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall. 
1  (1868)  ;  State  v.  Troth,   5  Vroom  (34 
N.  J.   L.),   379  ;    Worthley  v.  Steen,  43 
N.  J.   L.   542  ;    Wallace  v.   Trustees,  84 
N.  C.  164  ;  iwst,  sees.  171,  172  ;  State  v. 
Palmer,  4  N.  \Y.  Rep.  966  ;  Indianapolis 
v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396  ;  ante, 
sees.  45,  52  et  seq.     Crook  v.  People,  106 
111.    237  ;    Churchill   v.   Walker,  68   Ga. 
681.     The  adoption  of  a  new  State  Consti' 
tution  does  not  abrogate  a  special  charter 
unless  in  conflict  with  it.     People,  ex  rel. 
Mills  v.  Jones,  7  Col.  475.     The  power  of 
the  legislature  to  amend  a  special  charter 
is  not  impaired  by  the  fact  that  the  char- 
ter has  been  continued  in  force  by  a  new 
Constitution  of  the  State.     Wiley  v.  Bluff- 
ton,  111   Ind.  152.     The  provisions  of  an 
amendatory  act   reducing  the    number  of 
councilmen,  though  the  act  took  effect  at 
once,  were  postponed  until  the  next  year, 
when  they  could  be  called  into  requisition 
at  the  election,  —  no  earlier  election  being 
provided  for  ;   and  meanwhile  the   exist- 
ing  council   remained   unaffected    by  the 
amendment.     Scovill  v.  Cleveland,  1  Ohio 
St.  126  (1853).     Same  principle  applied. 
Beading  v.    Keppleman,  61  Pa.  St.  233 
(1869). 

A  legislative  amendment  to  charter 
abolishing  assistant  aldermen,  and  declar- 
ing board  of  aldermen  to  be  common 
council,  is  a  valid  exercise  of  legislative 
authority  ;  a  public  corporation's  charter 
being  always  subject  to  legislative  amend- 
ment or  alteration.  Demarest  v.  New 
York,  74  N.  Y.  161.  An  act  repealing  a 
charter  and  imposing  upon  the  sheriff  of 


Sedgwick,   35  Barb.    319    (1861).      The 
.,  rate  powers  by  "  place  for 
twenty  years,  without  objection,  and  with 
the  knowledge  and  assent  of  the  legisla- 
ture,   furnishes  conclusive  evidence  of  a 
charter,  which  has  been  lost  ;  or,  in  other 
w.uds,  .if  a   corporation  by    prescription, 
which  supposes  a  grant.     Bow   v.  Allen- 
town,  ::!  N.  11.  351  (1857).     In  this  caseit 
was  also  held  that  an  act  of  incorporation 
gubsequt  ntly  passed  does  not  raise  any  con- 
clusive presumption  that  the    town    was 
not   before   incorporated.     Long  use  and 
acquiescence  are  evidence  in  support  of  the 
legal  existence  of  a  municipal  corporation. 
People  v.  Farnham,  35  111.  562  ;  Jameson 
v.  People,   16  111.    257  (1855);  People  v. 
,:  i,  15  -Mich.  463(1867).     Long  ac- 
quiesci  ace  in  the  proceedings  of  a  school 
district    is  presumptive   evidence  of  the 
regular    organization    of     such     district. 
Sherwin*.  Bugbee,    16   Vt.    439   (1844); 
Londonderry  v.  Andover,  28  Vt.  416.  "  It 
is  now  well  settled  in  this  State,    that  the 
mere  fact  of  a  school  district  maintaining 
its  existence    and  operation  for  a  great 
number   of  years — say  fifteen  —  is   suffi- 
cient evidence  of  its  regular  organization. 
The  same  rule  of  presumption  must  be  ap- 
plied to  the  subdivision  of  the  town  into 
districts."    /'  r  Bedfield,  J.,  in  Sherwin  v. 
Bugbee,  supra. 

'  Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257  (1855)  ; 
Swain  r.  Comstock,  18  Wis.  463  (1864)  ; 
People  v.  Farnham,  35  111.  562  ;  Bow  v. 
Allentown,  34  N.  H.  351  (1857)  ;  Society. 
&c.  v.  l'awht,  4  Pet  480(1830)  ;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Chenoa,  43  111.  209  ;  Virginia  City 
v.  Mining  Co.,  2  Nev.  86  (1866);  Rail- 
:  Co.  v.  Plumas  County,  37  Cal.  354  ; 
ante,  see.  42. 

2  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472  ; 


§86 


REPEAL    AND    AMENDMENT. 


141 


place  and  of  the  governing  body  may  be  changed,  and  its  boundaries 
altered,  while  in  law  the  corporation  remains  the  same.1  The  inser- 
tion in  an  amended  charter  of  the  same  provisions  that  were  con- 
tained in  the  old  is  not,  unless  such  upon  the  whole  act  appears  to 
have  been  the  intention  of  the  legislature,  a  repeal  of  the  latter. 
The  law  on  this  subject  is  thus  stated  :  "  Where  a  statute  does  not, 
in  express  terms,  annul  a  right  or  power  given  to  a  corporation  by  a 
former  act,  but  only  confers  the  same  rights  and  powers  under  a  new 
name,  and  with  additional  powers,  such  subsequent  act  does  not  annul 
the  rights  and  powers  given  under  the  former  act  and  under  its 
former  name,"  there  being  no  express  repeal.2  The  change  of  a  city 
charter  does  not  affect  existing  ordinances  in  harmony  with  new 


provisions.* 

§  86    (53).      Repeating  Clause; 
by  Implication.  —  A  repeating  cla 

the  county  the  duty  of  enforcing  its  ordi- 
nances as  the  town  marshal  might  have 
done,  held  valid.  Rose  v.  Hardee,  98 
N.  C.  44.  Where  a  town  was  incorpor- 
ated under  a  general  act  and  afterwards 
prcepted  and  organized  under  a  special 
charter,  it  was  held  that  the  repeal  of  the 
special  charter  did  not  revive  its  incorpor- 
ation under  the  general  act,  and  that  it 
was  no  longer  a  municipal  corporation. 
Burk  v.  State,  5  Lea  (Tenn.J,349. 

1  Wood  v.  Board  of  Election,  58  Cal. 
561  ;  post,  sees.  171,  182  et  seq. ;  State, 
ex  rel.  v.  White,  20  Neb.  37,  holding  that 
a  mere  change  of  a  city  from  one  grade  to 
another,  under  the  general  law  of  Ne- 
braska, does  not  change  the  corporation 
itself,  and  that,  in  consequence,  a  police 
judge  elected  before  the  change  was  made 
was  entitled  to  hold  his  office  for  the  full 
term  for  which  he  was  elected.  To  same 
effect,  State  v.  Hedlund,  16  Neb.  566.  See 
post,  sec.  172. 

2  State,  &c.  v.  Mobile,  24  Ala.  701 
(1S54)  ;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall. 
1  (1868)  ;  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93 
U.  S.  266  (1876).  Approving  Milner's 
Admx.  v.  Pensacola,  2  Woods,  632  ;  Laird 
v.  De  Soto,  22  Fed.  Rep.  421  ;  Indianapolis 
v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396. 
Approving  text.  Commonwealth  v.  Wor- 
cester, 3  Pick.  (Mass.)  474  (1826)  ;  Grant 
on  Corp.  24,  and  cases  cited  ;  lb.  305. 
See  chapter  on  Dissolution,  post.  "  There 
is  no   doctrine  better   settled,"  says  Mr. 


Substitutionary  Charter ;    Repeals 

use  in  a  revised  and  amendatory 

Justice  Strong,  "  than  that  a  change  in 
the  form  of  government  of  a  community  does 
not  ipso  facto  abrogate  pre-existing  law, 
either  written  or  unwritten.  This  is  true 
in  regard  to  what  is  strictly  municipal  law, 
even  when  the  change  is  by  conquest. 
The  act  of  assembly  converting  a  borough 
into  a  city  did  not,  therefore,  of  itself,  and 
in  the  absence  of  express  provisions  to  that 
effect,  either  repeal  the  former  acts  of  as- 
sembly relative  to  the  borough,  or  annul 
existing  ordinances.  It  was  solely  a 
change  in  the  organic  law  for  the  future, 
and  left  unaffected  the  existing  ordinances, 
precisely  as  a  change  of  a  State  Constitu- 
tion leaves  undisturbed  all  prior  acts  of 
assembly."  Trustees  of  Academy  v.  Erie, 
31  Pa.  St.  515,  517  (1858).  As  to  trans- 
fer to  new  or  reorganized  corporation  of  the 
property  and  rights  of  the  old  or  former 
corporation,  see  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7 
Wall.  1  (1868)  ;  Savannah  v.  Steamboat 
Company,  R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  342  ;  Fowle 
v.  Alexandria,  3  Pet.  398,  408  ;  Munici- 
pality v.  Commissioners,  1  Rob.  (La.)  279. 
Transition  from  town  to  city  organization 
does  not  dissolve  the  corporation  or  extin- 
guish its  indebtedness.  Olney  v.  Harvey, 
50  111.  453  (1869)  ;  Maysville  v.  Shultz, 
Frank  v.  San  Fran- 
post,  chap.  vii.  sees. 


3  Dana,  10  (1865) 
cisco,  21  Cal.  668 
171,  172. 
8  Chamberlain    i 


Evansville,    77    Ind. 


542  ;  Trustees  of  Academy  v.  Erie,  supra. 


1  12  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  86 

charter  whereby  a  former  provision  is  included  in  the  revised  act, 
does  not,  as  to  such  provision,  interrupt  the  continuity  of  the  origi- 
nal act.1     Where  the  original  charter  of  a  city  prescribed  the  quali- 

tions  required  to  make  a  person  eligible  to  the  office  of  mayor, 
and   contained   a   proviso   that   a  certain   fact  disqualified,  and   an 

udatoryact,  in  dealing  in  the  same  subject,  copied  nil  of  the  <>rit/i- 
nal  act  except  f he  proviso,  which  was  omitted,  the  court  held  that  the 
proviso  in  the  original  act  was  not  repealed,  placing  stress,  however, 
upon  the  express  declaration  that  all  parts  of  the  new  act  incon- 
sistent with  or  contrary  to  the  old  one  were  repealed.  There  is, 
however,  much  room  to  contend  that  the  subject-matter  having 
been  revised  in  the  amendatory  act  in  the  manner  it  was,  the  legis- 
lative intention  was  to  repeal,  and  not  to  continue  in  force,  the  pro- 
viso.2 A  general  law  forbidding  the  opening  of  streets  through 
cemeteries  is  not  repealed  by  a  subsequent  act  extending  the  limits 
of  a  town,  and  appointing  commissioners  with  authority  "to  survey, 
lay  out,  &c,  streets  and  alleys,  as  they  shall  deem  necessary  within 
said  limits,'1  since  both  acts  can  stand,  and  repeals  by  implication  are 
not  favored.3  So  a  general  statute,  expressly  prohibiting  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  from  debarring  citizens  from  selling  at  wholesale  in 
the  city  market,  is  not  repealed  by  implication  by  a  subsequent  act, 
by  which  the  city  authorities  are  invested  with  power  to  pass  such 
ordinances  as  appear  to  them  necessary  for  the  security,  welfare,  &c, 
of  the  city.4  So,  also,  where  a  State  statute  required  auctioneers  to 
take  out  a  State  license,  and  a  subsequent  charter  to  a  city  gave  it 
power  "to  provide  for  licensing,  taxing,  and  regulating  auctions," 
&c,  it  was  held  that  a  license,  granted  by  the  city  corporation  to  an 
auctioneer  did  not  relieve  him  of  the  necessity  of  obtaining,  also,' a 
license  from  the  State  authorities,  the  court  being  of  opinion  that 
both  statutes  could  and  ought  to  stand,  as  they  were  not  incon- 
sistent.5 

1  si.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23  Mo.   483  Stats.  12G  ;  Bank  v.  Bridge,  1  Vroom  (30 

(1856).  N.    J.    L.),    112;    Industrial    School    v. 

■■   v.    Merry,   3  Mo.  278  (1833).  Whitehead,  2  Beasley,   N.J.  2<io  ;  State 

Goodenow   v.  Buttrick,  7   Mass.  v.  Kelly,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  75. 

U0,    143;    Kin-    >:    Grant,    1     Barn.  &  8  Egypt  Street,  2  Grant  (Pa.)  Cas.    155 

Adol.  104.     Where  a  later  statute  under-  (1854).     See,  further,  infra,  sec.  87,  as  to 

entire  subject-matter  of  a  repeals  by  implication. 

lute,  it  will  generally  he  taken  as  4  Baywood    o.    Savannah,    12   Ga.  404 

intended  to  he  a  substitute  for  the  former  (185 

statute  unles8a  contrary  purpose  appears.  B  Simpson  '•.  Savage,  1  Mo.  359(1823); 

I-        .  ■  relya  question  of  legislative  in-  infra,  sec.  87.     Text  approved.     Sieben- 

Murdock  v.   Memphis,  20  Wall,  hauer,  /«  re,  It  Nev.  365. 
•  ;i7,  and  cases  cited.     Sedgwick  on 


§87 


REPEAL    AND    AMENDMENT. 


143 


§  87  (54).  General  Law3  and  Special  Charters ;  Repeals  by 
Implication;  Conflict;  Construction.  —  It  is  a  principle  of  very 
extensive  operation  that  affirmative  statutes  of  a  general  nature  do 
not  repeal  by  implication  charters  and  special  acts  passed  for  the 
benefit  of  particular  municipalities ; l  but  they  do  so  when  this 
clearly  appears  to  have  been  the  purpose  of  the  legislature.  If  both 
the  general  and  the  special  acts  can  stand,  they  will  be  construed 
accordingly.  If  one  must  give  way  it  will  depend  upon  the  sup- 
posed intention  of  the  law-maker,  to  be  collected  from  the  entire 
legislation,  whether  the  charter  is  superseded  by  the  general  statute, 
or  whether  the  special  charter  provisions  apply  to  the  municipality, 
in  exclusion  of  the  general  enactments.  So  particular  provisions  of 
charters  should  be  read  and  construed  in  the  light  of  the  whole 
instrument,  of  all  preceding  charters,  of  the  general  legislation  of  the 

1  Bond  v.    Hiestand,  20  La.  An.    139  ;     a  question  of  intention,"  says  Wagner,  J., 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Alexandria,  17  Gratt.  ( Va.) 
176  (1867)  ;  Hammond  v.  Haines,  25  Md. 
541  ;  Louisville  v.  McKean,  18  B.  Mon. 
9  ;  Cumberland  v.  Magruder,  34  Md.  381 
(1871)  ;  Comm'rs  Central  Park,  In  re, 
50  N.  Y.  493  (1872)  ;  Mayor  v.  Inman, 
57  Ga.  370  (1876)  ;  post,  sees.  137,  162  ; 
State,  ex  rel.  v.  Wilson,  12  Lea  (Tenn.), 
246  ;  Wood  v.  Board  of  Election,  58 
Cal.  561  ;  East  St.  Louis  v.  Maxwell,  99 
111.  439.  A  provision  in  a  new  State 
Constitution  held  to  remove  a  limitation 
in  a  municipal  charter  upon  the  power  of 
taxation  for  the  payment  of  bonded  in- 
debtedness. East  St.  Louis  v.  Amy,  120 
U.  S.  600.  In  Donahue  v.  Graham,  61 
Cal.  276,  a  "street  law"  contained  in  a 
city  charter  which  was  inconsistent  with 
the  provisions  of  a  new  Constitution,  was 
held  to  be  repealed  by  it.  Repeals  by  im- 
plication are  not  favored  ;  and  special  laws 
conferring  particular  rights  upon  munici- 
pal corporations  were  held  not  to  be  re- 
pealed by  subsequent  statutes  general  in 
their  character.  Ottawa  v.  County,  12  111. 
339;  Egypt  Street,  2  Grant  (Pa.)  Cas. 
455  (1854)  ;  Harrisburgh  v.  Sheck,  104 
Pa.  St.  53  ;  supra,  sec.  87.  A  general 
statute,  repealing  all  acts  contrary  to  its 
provisions,  held  not  to  repeal  a  clause  in 
the  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation 
upon  the  same  subject.  State  v.  Branin 
(taxation),  3  Zabr.  (23  N.  J.  L.),  484 
(1852).  But  a  general  railroad  tax  law  held 
to  repeal  by  implication  prior  special  char- 
ter powers  of  municipalities.    "  It  is  really 


and  the  intention  was  regarded  as  manifest 
from  the  scope  and  purpose  of  the  whole 
act,  although  negative  words,  or  words  of 
repeal,  were  not  used.  State  v.  Sevarauce, 
55  Mo.  378  (1874)  ;  Union  Pacific  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Cheyenne,  113  U.  S.  516  (1884)  ; 
post,  sec.  770. 

The  principle  that  general  legislation  on 
a  particular  subject  must,  in  the  absence 
of  anything  showing  a  different  intent  on 
the  part  of  the  legislature,  give  way  to 
inconsistent  special  legislation  on  the  same 
subject,  is  recognized  and  applied  in  the 
following  cases.  State  v.  Morristown,  33 
N.  J.  Law,  57(1868) ;  Cross  v.  Morristown, 
3  C.  E.  Green  (18  N  J.  Eq.),  305  ;  State 
v.  Trenton,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),  198, 
201  ;  State  v.  Branin,  3  Zabr.  (23  N.  J.  L. ) 
484  ;  State  v.  Clark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  54  ; 
State  v.  Jersey  City,  5  Dutch.  170  ;  Jersey 
City  v.  Railroad  Co..  20  N.  J.  Eq.  360  ; 
Goddard,  In  re,  16  Pick.  504  ;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Alexandria,  supra.  In  Bank  v. 
Bridges,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  112,  and 
State  w.  Miller,  lb.  368,  special  laws  gave 
way  to  general  laws,  because  the  legisla- 
ture had  annexed  to  the  latter  a  repealing 
clause  abrogating  all  inconsistent  local  or 
special  acts.  Per  Depue,  J.,  33  X.  J.  57, 
60.  See  Bank  v.  Davis,  1  McCarter  Ch. 
(N  J.)  286  ;  Clintonville  v.  Keeting,  4 
Denio,  341  ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn. 
166.  Other  illustrations  will  be  found  in 
the  chapters  on  Ordinances  and  Taxation, 
post,  sec.  773  ;  ante,  sec.  86. 


144 


SICIPAL    COl:roi;.\TI0NS. 


State,  and  oi  t  of  the  legislature  in  the  erection  of  munici- 

palities, as  before  explained.1 

88.      Implied  Repeal  of  General  Laws.  —  The  presumption  IS  not 

■  !y  to  be  indulged  that  the  legislature  has  by  implication  repealed, 
as  :  i  particular  municipality,  or  as  respects  all  municipal- 

ral  nature,  elsewhere  in  force  throughout  the 
State  ;  yet  a  charter  or  special  act  passed  subsequent  to  the  general 
law,  ami  plainly  irreconcilable  with  it,  will  to  the  extent  of  the  con- 
flict operate  a  repeal  of  the  latter  by  implication.  But  by  a  well- 
known  rule  founded  on  solid  reasons,  such  repeals  are  not  favored; 
and  the  principle  of  implied  repeals  ought  to  be  applied  with  ex- 
treme caution.2 


1  Alexander  »•.  Alexandria  (taxing 
power),  5  Cranch,  2  |  L809)  ;  Grant  on 
Corp.   -J7  ;    I  ipany    < .    Railroad 

Company,    1  Gill  &  Johns.   1  ;  Smith  v. 
ben,    i      I  tow.    L98  ;  Janesville   v. 
Markoe,    L8  Wis.  350;  Powell  v.  Parkers- 
28  W.  V;l.  698  :  Thomason  i>.  Ash- 
worth,  73   Cil.    73;   Babcock  v.   Helena, 
34  Ark.  199  :  Eichels  v.  Evansville  Street 
.  7-  [nd.  261  ;  Chicago  Dock  Co. 
rity,    L15    111.    155.     Where   there 
■'     171     reference   to 
I  by  a  municipal  officer, 
and  the  sarin   crime  was  made  punishable 
by  a  greater  penalty  in  a 

i   by  the   legislature,    it   was   held 
crimes   committed   after  the 
code  was  adopted,   the  charter  provision 
was    repealed.      People    v.    Jaehne,    103 
X.  V.  ili    v.  o\,il.  L09  N.  Y. 

22 
•  should  be  construed  together;  and 
on   this  principle,   the  definition   of  the 
word    "owner,"  in   a  subsequenl    paving 
act,  wa  proper  to  be  ad- 

verted to,  and  as  applicable  to  thi 
word  in  ubjpct. 

Holland  o.  Baltimore,  11  Md    I 
tfi     Bedfo     !   !'   StreetR   .1 

R  C  143  Ma  200  Moi  in 
v.  Long  Island  City,  101  X.  V.  139. 
Where  a  city  chart 

to  the  mode  of  assessing  and 
collecting  municipal  taxi  equenl 

repeal  of  the  n  •..  nne  act  and  the  | 

ning  the  creation 
and  government  of  municipalities,  which 
contained  pr  ivision 


lecting  their  taxes,  was  held  not  to  alter 
the  powers  and  practice  of  the  city  under 
its  charter.  People  v.  Clunie,  70  Cal. 
504.  When  general  revenue  laws  are  ap- 
plicable to  incorporated  places,  sei 
sees.  770-774.  Provisions  in  a  city  charter 
inconsistent  with  amendments  to  the  Con- 
stitution  of  the  State  afterwards  adopted 
are  void.  Public  School  Trustees  v.  Taylor, 
30  N.  .1.  Eq.  618. 

2  See  cases  cited  to  last  preceding  sec- 
tion ;  also,  St.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23 
Mo.  483  ;  Baldwin  v.  Green,  10  Mo.  410  ; 
State  v.  Hinder,  38  Mo.  451  ;  State  v. 
Young  (intoxicating  liquors),  17  Kan. 
114  (1877)  (while  the  Kansas  cases  on  the 
ted  by  Horton,  C.  J.)  ; 
State    V.    Clarke,    1    Dutch.    (N.   J.)  54; 

.  Douglass,  4  Vroora  (33  X.  J.  L.), 
363  ;  stater.  .Mills,  5  Vroom  (34  X.J.  L.), 
177,  18o;  Montezuma  r.  Minor,  70  Ga. 
191  ;  St.  Johnsbury  v.  Thompson,  59  Vt. 
300.  The  case  of  The  State  v.  (lark,  54 
Mo.  17(1873),  s.  c.  1  I  Am.  Rep.  471,  and  of 
The  State  v.  De  Bar,  58  Mo.  305  (1874), 
relating  to  the  social  i  oil  powers  of  the  city 
of  St.  Louis,  are  highly  instructive  on  the 
question  on  th<  effect  of  a  special  act  upon 

ral  law.  In  each  case  the  defend- 
indicted  under  the  general  crim- 
inal code  of  the  State,  which  prohibited 
the  keeping  of  bawdy  houses.  In  the  first 
case  the  defi  ndanl  pleaded  a  license  from 
the  city  to  keep  such  a  house.  In  1870  the 
charter  of  thi   city  was  amended,  and  tho 

\  power  to  "  suppress  "  such  houses 
was  changed  to  the  poweT  "to  pass  ordi- 
nances, not  inconsistent  with  any  law  of 


§89 


SUMMARY   OF    CORPORATE   POWERS. 


145 


§  89  (55).  Extent  of  Power ;  Limitations  ;  Canons  of  Construc- 
tion.—  It  is  a  general  and  undisputed  proposition  of  law  that  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  possesses  and  can  exercise  the  follovnng  poivers, 
and  no  others :  First,  those  granted  in  express  words ;  second,  those 
necessarily  or  fairly  implied  in  or  incident  to  the  powers  expressly 
granted ;  third,  those  essential  to  the  declared  objects  and  purposes 
of  the  corporation,  —  not  simply  convenient,  but  indispensable.1  Any 
fair,  reasonable  doubt  concerning  the  existence  of  power  is  resolved 
by  the  courts  against  the  corporation,  and  the  power  is  denied.2     <  )i 


the  State,  to  regulate  or  suppress"  such 
houses.  Under  this  power  to  regulate, 
the  city  regulated  such  houses  by  passing 
an  order  licensing  them  ;  and  such  an 
ordinance  was  held  to  be  valid  notwith- 
standing the  general  law,  and  to  have  the 
effect  to  prevent  the  enforcement  of  the 
general  criminal  law  of  the  State  within 
the  city  of  St.  Louis.  The  question  was 
a  close  one,  but  the  majority  opinion  of 
Napton,  J.,  in  view  of  the  legislation  re- 
cited in  it,  seems  to  be  sound.  State  v. 
Clark,  54  Mo.  17  (1873).  The  next  year, 
1874,  in  consequence  of  the  decision,  the 
charter  of  the  city  was  amended  in  this 
respect,  by  substituting  the  words  ' '  to 
suppress,  but  not  to  license,  bawdy  houses." 
After  this  act  went  into  effect  the  State  v. 
De  Bar,  supra,  arose.  The  defendant  was 
indicted  under  the  general  law  of  the 
State  for  keeping  such  a  house.  There 
was  another  provision  in  the  general  law, 
that  the  repeal  of  a  law  shall  not  by  im- 
plication revive  a  former  law.  And  it 
was  held  by  a  majority  of  the  court  that 
the  amendment  of  1874,  which  repealed 
the  former  amendment  of  1870,  did  not 
thereby  revive  the  general  criminal  statute 
in  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  and,  as  a  conse- 
quence, that  the  defendant  could  not  be 
convicted.  This  last  decision  seems  to  the 
author  to  be  erroneous,  on  the  ground  that 
the  act  of  1870  did  not  ipso  facto  repeal 
the  general  law  in  the  city,  but  such  re- 
peal, or  suspension  rather,  was  only  ef- 
fected when  the  city  passed  the  ordinance. 
If  so,  a  repeal  of  the  ordinance  \>y  the 
council,  without  the  act  of  1S74,  would 
have  left  the  general  law  of  the  State  in 
force  within  the  city,  and  its  repeal  by 
the  act  of  1874  would  have  precisely  the 
same  effect.  These  cases  may  be  usefully 
consulted  on  the  nature  and  scope  of  the 

VOL.  I.  —  10 


power  to  "regulate."  See  also  Given s  v. 
Van  Studdiford,  86  Mo.  149.  G 
power  in  a  municipal  charter  held  not  to 
repeal  by  implication  the  chartered  rights 
of  a  railroad  company.  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  5  Dutch.  170.  Or  to  interfere  with 
vested  rights.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  5 
Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  32. 

A  charter  which  confers  exclusive  juris- 
diction upon  municipal  authorities  oper- 
ates to  repeal  the  general  law  on  the  same 
subject  within  the  municipality  ;  not  so 
ordinarily  when  the  charter  confers  con- 
current authority.  Seebold  v.  People,  86 
111.  33  (1878). 

1  Smith  v.  Newbern,  70  N.  C.  14 
(1874);  s.  c.  16  Am.  Rep.  766.  Referring  to 
the  text,  McAllister,  J.,  in  People  v.  How- 
ard, not  officially  reported,  says,  "  It  is  the 
best  summary  of  all  the  decisions  upon 
that  point  to  be  found  in  all  the  books." 
Text  cited  and  approved  in  the  following 
cases  :  Cook  Co.  v.  McCrea,  93  111.  236  ; 
Ottawa  v.  Carey,  108  U.  S.  110  ;  Kelly  v. 
Town  of  Milan,  21  Fed.  Rep.  842  ;  Scott 
v.  Shreveport,  20  Fed.  Rep.  714  ;  Des- 
mond v.  City  of  Jefferson,  19  Fed.  Rep. 
483  ;  In  re  Lee  Tons,  18  Fed.  Rep.  253  ; 
City  of  Eufaula  v.  McXab,  67  Ala.  588  ; 
Henke  v.  McCord,  55  Iowa,  378  ;  Ravenna 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  45  Ohio  St.  118; 
City  of  Corvallis  v.  Carlile,  10  Oreg.  139  ; 
Danville  v.  Shelton,  76  Va.  325  ;  Bell  v. 
Platteville,  71  Wis.  139  ;  Oilman  v  Mil- 
waukee, 61  Wis.  588  ;  Blake  v.  Walker, 
23  S.  C.  517  ;  Charleston  v.  Reed,  27  W. 
Va.  681;  City  of  Kansas  v.  Swope,  79  Wo. 
446;  City  of  Portland  v.  Schmidt,  13  Oreg. 
17;  Levy  v.  Salt  Lake  City.  3  Utah  63; 
Richmond  v.  McGirr,  78  Ind.  192,  197 
(1881). 

2  Text  quoted  with  approval.  Wil- 
liams v.  Davidson,  43  Tex.  33;  Brenham 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  £0 

■      pal  corporation  the  charter  or  statute  by  which  it  is 
■    |   [3    ■      irganic  act.     Neither  the  corporation  nor  its  officers 
do  any  act,  or  make  any  contract,  or  incur  any  liability,  not 
ed  thereby,  or  by  some  legislative  act  applicable  thereto. 
AH  |  j      !  •  pe  of  the  powers  granted  are  void.1     Much 

i  an  any  power  be  exercised,  or  any  act  done,  which  is  forbidden 
barter  or  statute.  These  principles  are  of  transcendent  impor- 
tance, and  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  municipal  corporations. 
Their  reasonableness,  their  necessity,  and  their  salutary  character 
have  been  often  vindicated,  bul  never  more  forcibly  than  by  the  late 
learned  Chief-J ustice  Shaw,  who,  speaking  of  municipal  and  public 
corporations,  says  •.  "  They  can  no  powers  hut  those  which  are 

iferred  upon  them  by  the  act  by  which  they  are  constituted,  or 
ire  accessary  to  the  exercise  of  their  corporate  powers,  the 
performance  of  their  corporate  duties,  and  the  accomplishment  of 
i!i,'  purposes  of  their  association.  This  principle  is  derived  from  the 
nature  of  corporations,  the  mode  in  winch  they  are  organized,  and  in 
which  their  affairs  must  he  conducted." 

£  On.  Same  subject. — "In  aggregate  corporations,  as  a  general 
rule,"  continues  Chief-Justice  Shaw,  "  the  a.t  and  will  of  a  majority 
is  deemed  in  law  the  act  and  will  of  the  whole,  —  as  the  act  of  the 

v,  Wat  i  Co.,  '''7  Tex.  542;  Banger  v.  Des  County  Comm'rs,  25  Minn.  259;  Fulton  v. 

Moini  _.  ;,|  [owa,  193;  City  of  Corvallis  v.  Lincoln,  '.»  Neb.  358;  Hurford  v.  Omaha, 

le,  lOOreg.  L39;  Kirkham  v.  Russell  4  Neb.   350;    Reis  v.   Graff,  51  Cal.  86. 

7-;  Va.  956;  Tax  Collector  v.  Dendinger,  Text   cited  with  approval  in  Cook  Co.  v. 

An.  261.  McCrea,  03  111.  236;  Birmingham  &  Pratt 

\l  Cann    v.  Otoe  Co.,  9  Neb.  324;  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Birmingham  Street Ry.  Co., 

Co.,  2  Neb.  177;  S.  C.  &  79  Ala.  465;  Davenport  v.  Kleinschmidt, 

;■    K.  i;.  Co.  v.  Washington  Co.,  3  Neb.  6   Mont.  502;   Heiskell  v.  Baltimore,  65 

12;  Somerville  v.   Dickerman,  127  Mass.  Md.  125;  Dwyer  v.  City  of  Brenham,  65 

272:    Boylston    Markel    v.    Boston,    113  Tex.  526;  St.  Johnsburyv.  Thompson,  59 

B          i    College  v.  Boston,  Vt.  300;    Christie  v.  .Maiden,  23  W.  Va. 

104   Mass     17";    Brimmer  v.  Boston,  102  6.67;  Spengler  v.  Trowbridge,  62  Miss.  46 

r..;  Peopl<    '■.  Webber,  89  111.  847;  (an  appropriation  to  pay   expenses  of  a 

Bi                          :.l    T        532;    Francis*.  committee  in  endeavoring  to  obtain  legis- 

Troy,  74  N.  Y.  888;  State  v.  Passaic,   11  lation  from  Congress  held  illegal,  and  pay- 

Perrine  v.  Fan-,  2  Zabr.  (22  menl  enjoined);   Gas  Co.  v.  Parkersburg, 

N.  J.  L.)856;  Carron   v.  Martin,  2Dutch.  30  W.  Va.  435  (1S87).     The  citizens  of  a 

Hudson,  5   Dutch,  city  cannot  confer  upon  its  common  coun» 

(N.J.)  104;  31   '        Marion  Co.,  21  Kan.  cil  powers  not  granted  by  charter.  Torrent 

II'.'-.  Green  v.                  .  H    N.J.  L.  45;  v.   Muskegon,    17   Mich.    115.     Applying 

tconto,  17  Wis.  886;  Garvey,  In  the  rule  in  the  text,  an  act  authorizing  the 

11  \.  Y.  523;  Smith  v.  Newburgh,  77  sale  of  municipal  bonds  at  not  less  than 

i    All.  n   v.  Galveston,  51   Tex.  par  was  held  not  to  warrant  the  allowance 

Dore    r.    Milwaukee,    12  Wis.   18;  of  a  commission  to  a   purchaser  of  the 

'.   .ins,    88   111.   575;    Kansas  bonds  from  the  city a1  par.    Whelen's  Ap- 

■  Mo.  22;  Bentley  v.  peal,  108  Pa.  St.  162,  197. 


§00 


SUMMARY   OF    CORPORATE    POWERS. 


147 


corporate  body.  The  consequence  is  that  a  minority  must  be  bound 
uot  only  without,  but  against,  their  consent.  Such  an  obligation 
may  extend  to  every  onerous  duty,  —  to  pay  money  to  an  unlimited 
amount,  to  perform  services,  to  surrender  lands,  and  the  like.  It  is 
obvious,  therefore,  that  if  this  liability  were  to  extend  to  unlimited 
and  indefinite  objects,  the  citizen,  by  being  a  member  of  a  corpora- 
tion, might  be  deprived  of  his  most  valuable  personal  rights  and 
liberties.  The  security  against  this  danger  is  in  a  steady  adherence 
to  the  principle  stated,  viz.,  that  corporations  can  only  exercise  ilu  ir 
potvers  over  their  respective  members,  for  the  accomplishment  of  limited 
and  defined  objects.  And  if  this  principle  is  important,  as  a  general 
rule  of  social  right  and  municipal  law,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance 
in  these  States,  where  corporations  have  been  extended  and  multi- 
plied so  as  to  embrace  almost  every  object  of  human  concern."  l  The 
language  of  another  learned  judge  on  this  subject  is  well  chosen,  and 
fittingly  supplements  that  which  we  have  quoted  in  the  preced- 
ing section.  "In  this  country,"  says  Church,  J.,  "  all  corporations 
whether  public  or  private,  derive  their  powers  from  legislative  grant, 
and  can  do  no  act  for  which  authority  is  not  expressly  given,  or  may 
not  be  reasonably  inferred.     But  if  we  were  to  say  that  they  can  do 

1  Per  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Spaulding  v. 
Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  74  (1839);  Bangs 
v.  Snow,  1  Mass.  181;  Stetson  v.  Kemp- 
ton,  13  Mass.  272;  Willard  v.  Newbury- 
port,  12  Pick.  227;  Keyes  v.  Westford,  17 
Pick.  273,  279;  Comw.  v.  Tamer,  1  Cush. 
493,  495  (1848)  ;  Cooley  v.  Granville,  10 
Cush.  57  (1852);  Merriam  v.  Mood}-,  25 
Iowa,  163  (1868);  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23 
How.  435;  Lafayette  v.  Cox,  5  Ind. 
(Port.)  38  (1854)  ;  Paine  v.  Spratley,  5 
Kan.  525;  Vincent  v.  Nantucket,  12  Cush. 
103,  105  ;  Clark  v.  Davenport,  14  Iowa, 
494 ;  Mays  v.  Cincinnati,  1  Ohio  St.  268  ; 
Gallia  Co.  v.  Holcomb,  7  Ohio,  Part  I. 
232 ;  Comin'rs  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St. 
109;  Fitch  v.  Pinckard  (taxing  power)  4 
Scam.  (5  111.)  78;  Caldwell  v.  Alton  (mar- 
ket ordinance),  33  111.  416;  Trustees,  &c. 
v.  McConnel,  12  111.  140;  Louisiana  State 
Bank  v.  New  Orleans  Nav.  Co.,  3  La.  An. 
294;  State  v.  Mayor,  &c.  (market-house 
case),  5  Port.  (Ala.)  279;  Head  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  2  Cranch,  168  ;  DeRussey  v.  Davis 
(sale  of  ferry  lease),  13  La.  An.  468;  Peo- 
ple v.  Bank,  &c,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  282; 
City  Council  v.  Plank  Road  Co.,  31  Ala. 
76;  State  v.  Mayor,  5  Port,  (Ala.)  279; 
Burnett,    In  re,    30  Ala.   461,  and  cases 


cited  ;  Le  Couteulx  v.  Buffalo,  33  N.  Y. 
333  ;  Hayes  v.  Appleton,  24  Wis.  544  ; 
People  v.  Railroad  Co.,  12  Mich.  389; 
Vance  v.  Little  Rock,  30  Ark.  435  (1876); 
Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66 
Ind.  396.  Text  approved  in  the  follow- 
ing cases  :  Noyes  v.  Mason,  5  N.  W.  R. 
595  ;  Frank,  In  re,  52  Cal.  606;  Green  v. 
Cape  May,  41  N.  J.  L.  45. 

"  The  powers  of  all  corporations  are  lim- 
ited by  the  grants  in  their  charters,  and 
cannot  extend  beyond  them."  Per  Brcese, 
J.,  Petersburg  v.  Metzger,  21  111.  205. 
"  Corporations  have  only  such  rights  and 
powers  as  are  expressly  granted  to  them, 
or  as  are  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the 
rights  and  powers  so  granted."  Per  Storrs, 
J.,  in  New  London  v.  Brainard  (illegal  ap- 
propriation of  money  to  celebrate  Fourth 
of  July),  22  Conn.  552  (1853),  approving 
Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272;  Hodges 
v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio,  110.  So,  where  the 
statute  placed  the  care  of  fire  departments 
in  the  hands  of  chief  engineers,  a  power 
"to  regulate  and  protect  fire  engines," 
&c,  was  held  not  to  authorize  a  city  to 
establish  a  "fire  board"  to  have  charge  of 
that  department.  Benjamin  v.  Webster, 
100  Ind.  15.     Ante,  sec.  29. 


MS  MUNICIPAL  CORPOBATTONS.  §01 

nothing  for  which  a  warrant  could  not  be  found  in  the  language  of 
their  charters,  we  should  deny  them,  in  some  cases,  the  power  of 
rvation,  as  well  as  many  of  the  means  necessary  to  effect 
the  essential  objects  of  their  incorporation.  And  therefore  it  has 
long  been  an  established  principle  in  the  law  of  corporations,  that 
they  may  exercise  "II  the  powers  ivithin  th  fair  intint  <i,i<!  jmrposi  <>f 

r  creation  which  <ir>  reasonably  proper  to  givt  effect  to  ji"  •  - 
ly  granted.     In  doing  this,  they  musl   [unless  restricted  in  this 

pect]  have  a  choice  of  means  adapted  to  ends,  and  are  not  to  be 
confined  t"  any  one  mode  of  operation." ] 

§  91.  Same  subject.  Principles  of  Construction.  —  The  exti 
tin  powers  of  mimicipalities,  whether  express,  implied,  or  indispensa- 
ble, is  line  i'l  1 1 instruction.  And  here  the  fundamental  and  univer- 
sal rule,  which  is  as  reasonable  .is  ii  is  necessary,  is,  that  while  the 
construction  is  to  be  just,  seeking  first  of  all  for  the  legislative  in- 
tent in  order  tii  ^ive  it  fair  effect,  yet  any  ambiguity  or  doubt  as  to 
tin-  extent  of  the  power  is  to  lie  determined  in  favor  (if  the  State  or 
era!  public,  and  against  the  State's  grantee.  The  rule  of  strict 
construction  of  corporate  powers  is  not  so  directly  applicable  to  the 
ordinary  clauses  in  the  charter  or  incorporating  acts  of  municipali- 
ties as  it  is  to  the  charters  of  private  corporations;  but  it  is  equally 
applicable  to  grants  of  powers  to  municipal  and  public  bodies  which 
are  i nit  df  the  usual  range,  or  which  may  result  in  public  burdens, 
or  which,  in  their  exercise,  touch  the  right  to  liberty  or  property  or, 
as  it  may  he  compendiously  expressed,  any  common-law  right  of  the 
citizen  in-  inhabitant.  The  subject  is  copiously  illustrated  in  the 
notes.2 

1  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn,  (license  to  bakers);  Harris  v.  Intendant, 

475,    r.nl     (1843),    per    Church,  J.      So  28 Ala.  577  (retailing  liquors) ;  Intendant 

where  power   is    conferred    upon   a   city  v.  Chandler,  »'•  Ala.  899  (retailing  liqm 
council  to  levj  ami  collect  taxes,  and  no         2    Courts  iii/,,j,t   a  strict,    rather  than 

!■  foi  th..  purpose  is  provided  in   the  liberal   construction  of  powers:    "It  is  a 

charter,  the  authority  to  use  and  employ  well  settled  rule  of  construction  of  grants 

tin'  necessary  machinery  to  make  tin-  levy  bj  tin-  \< •■_  rporations,  whi  ther 

collection   was   held  to  be  implied,  public  or  private,  thai  only  such  powers 

Union  Pacific  By.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  2   Wyo.  and  rights  can  be  exercised  under  the] 

But  see  8.  o.  in  Supreme  Court   of  are  clearly  comprehended  within  the  words 

United  States,  113  U.  S.  516,  where  the  of  the  act,  or  derived  therefrom  by  neces- 

judgi  1  mi  other  grounds,  sary  [lair  and  reasonable]  implication,  re- 

Express  authority  to  establish  and  main-  gard  being  had  to  the  objects  of  the  grant. 

tain  a  public  bath  includes  the  power  to  Any  ambiguity  or  doubt  arising ou1  of  the 

secure  a  proper  location  for  it.     Poillon  v.  terms  used  by  the  legislature  must  be  re- 

.  101  X.  V.  132.     The  incidental  solved  in  favor  of  tht  public."     Mintumv. 

era  of  a  municipal  corporation  must  be  Larue,    23  Bow,    135,    436   (1859).     Per 

lane  to  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  Nelson,  J.,  construing  municipal  charter 

created*     .Mayor  v.   Yuille,   3   Ala.    187  as  to  ferry  rights  of  corporation  there- 


PRINCIPLES   OF    CONSTRUCTION. 


149 


The  general  principles  of  law,  stated  in  this  and  in  the  preceding 
sections,  are  indisputably  settled,  but  difficulty  is  often  experienced 


under.  In  subsequent  cases,  the  Supreme 
Court  has  said  that  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion "can  exercise  no  power  which  is  not, 
in  express  terms  or  by  fair  implication, 
conferred  upon  it."  Thomson  v.  Lee  Co. 
(municipal  bond  case),  3  Wall.  320; 
Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349 
(1871)  ;  s.  P.  Clark  v.  Davenport,  14 
Iowa,  495;  Merriam  v.  Moody's  Executors, 
25  Iowa,  163  ;  Nichol  v.  Mayor,  &c,  9 
Humph.  252  ;  Leonard  v.  Canton,  35 
Miss.  189;  where  Fisher,  J.,  gives  a  clear 
exposition  of  the  rationale  of  the  doctrine 
that  corporate  grants  should  be  strictly 
construed.  Douglass  v.  Placerville,  18 
Cal.  643,  647  ;  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco, 
16  Cal.  282;  Wallace  v.  San  Jose,  29  Cal. 
180.  With  us,  cities,  towns,  and  mu- 
nicipal corporations  of  all  kinds  are  cre- 
ated and  endowed  with  powers  by  the 
legislature.  These  are  of  a  legislative  and 
administrative  character,  to  aid  in  the 
better  government  of  localities  or  por- 
tions of  the  State.  This  power  exists  no 
further  than  it  has  been  delegated.  And 
municipal  corporations,  in  their  action, 
are  confined  "to  a  strict  construction  of 
the  grants  of  powers  contained  in  their 
charters  "  or  acts  of  incorporation.  La- 
fayette v.  Cox,  5  Ind.  (Porter)  38  (1854). 
"  It  is  proper,  too,  that  these  powers 
should  be  strictly  construed,  considering 
with  how  little  care  chartered  privileges 
are  these  days  granted."  Bank  v.  Chili- 
cothe,  7  Ohio,  Part  II.  31,  35  (1836),  per 
Hitchcock,  J.;  Collins  v.  Hatch,  18  Ohio, 
523  ;  Port  Huron  v.  McCall,  46  Mich. 
565  ;  "  Boroughs  and  towns  are,  confes- 
sedly, inferior  corporations.  They  act  not 
by  any  inherent  right  of  legislation,  like 
the  legislature  of  the  State,  but  their  au- 
thority is  delegated,  and  their  powers,  there- 
fore, must  be  strictly  pursued.  Within 
the  limits  of  their  charter,  their  acts  are 
valid  ;  without  it  they  are  void."  Wil- 
lard  v.  Killingworth,  8  Conn.  247,  per 
Daggett,  J.,  approved  10  Conn.  442.  "The 
action  of  municipal  corporations  is  to  be 
held  strictly  within  the  limits  prescribed 
by  statute.  Within  these  limits,  they  are 
to  be  favored  by  the  courts.  Powers  ex- 
pressly granted,    or   necessarily   implied, 


are  not  to  be  defeated  or  impaired  by  a 
stringent  construction."  Smith  v.  Madi- 
son, 7  Ind.  86  ;  Kyle  v.  Malm,  8  Ind.  34; 
57,  per  Stua,rt,  J.;  Memphis  v.  Adatn3 
(implied  power  to  employ  an  attorney),  9 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep. 
331.  Per  Nicholson,  C.  J.  A  municipal 
corporation  has  no  right  to  appropriate 
its  revenues  to  obtain  an  increase  of  its 
powers,  through  persons  sent  by  the  city 
council  to  appear  before  the  State  General 
Assembly  and  Congress.  Henderson  v. 
Covington,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  312;  Spenzler 
v.  Trowbridge,  62  Miss.  46. 

In  concluding  this  note,  the  author  may 
be  permitted  to  observe  that  the  principle 
of  strict  construction  should  not  be  pressed 
in  any  case  to  such  an  unreasonable  ex- 
tent as  to  defeat  the  legislative  purpose 
fairly  appearing  upon  the  entire  charter 
or  enactment.  Perhaps  the  rule  as  it  is 
briefly  expressed  in  the  text  (sees.  90,  91) 
best  embodies  the  result  of  the  adjudica- 
tions upon  this  point,  namely  :  If,  upon 
the  whole,  there  be  fair,  reasonable,  sub- 
stantial doubt  whether  the  legislature  in- 
tended to  confer  the  authority  in  question, 
particularly  if  it  relates  to  a  matter  extra- 
municipal  or  unusual  in  its  nature,  and 
the  exercise  of  which  will  be  attended 
with  taxes,  tolls,  assessments,  or  burdens 
upon  the  inhabitants,  or  oppress  them,  or 
abridge  natural  or  common  rights,  or  di- 
vest them  of  their  property,  the  doubt 
should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  citizen, 
and  against  the  municipality.  The  rule 
as  here  expressed  has  been  cited  and  ap- 
proved in  Ex  parte  Mayor  of  Florence,  in 
re  Jones,  78  Ala.  419;  Grand  Rapids  Elec- 
tric, &c.  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  Edison,  &c. 
Co.,  33  Fed.  Rep.  659  (holding  that  a 
power  to  make,  amend,  and  repeal  ordi- 
nances deemed  advisable  for  lighting  streets 
did  not  confer  control  of  the  streets  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  legislature,  or  authorize 
the  city  to  grant  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
streets  for  electric  lights  for  fifteen  years). 
Power  to  fill  up  and  drain  lots  holding 
stagnant  water,  at  the  expense  of  their 
owners,  was  held  not  to  authorize  filling 
them  up  to  a  greater  height  than  was 
necessary  to  abate  the  nuisance.    Bush  v. 


150  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  93 

in  their  application,  on  account  of  the  complex  character  of  munici- 
pal duties,  and  the  various,  miscellaneous,  and  frequently  indefinite 
or  objects  which  municipalities  are  authorized  to  execute 
irry  into  operation.1 

,'      .  •&  and  tin  ir  ( "mist ruction. 
£  92     56  .    Usage  and  Prescription.  —  In    EmjUmd  municipal  cor- 

porations  claim  and  exercise  many  powers  wholly  m  virtue  of  long- 
established  usage,  or  oi  prescription,  which  implies  a  lost  charter 
conferring  such  powers.2  Indeed,  from  immemorial  usage,  powers 
are  recognized  as  valid  which  could  not  lawfully  originate  in  a  royal 
charter.  A  usage  to  give  a  right  must,  however,  be  long  established, 
and  forty  years'  duration  was  not  considered  of  itself  to  be  suffi- 
cient for  this  purpose.8  But  usage  in  this  country  has  a  much  more 
Limited  operation.  It  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  manner  in  which 
our  municipal  corporations  arc  created — viz.,  by  express  legislative 
act,  wherein  their  powers  and  duties  are  wholly  prescribed  —  that 
the  powers  themselves  cannot  be  added  to,  enlarged,  or  diminished 
by  proof  of  us 

8  93  (57).  Same  subject.  —  In  a  case  in  Massachusetts,  the  learned 
( 'hiel'-d ust  ice  Bigelovt , alter  stating  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
that  towns  in  Massachusetts  had  no  authority  to  appropriate  money 
the  celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July,  remarks,  in  relation  to  the 
nipt  to  sustain  the  appropriation  on  the  ground  of  usage:  "Usage 
cannot  alter  the  case.  An  unlawful  expenditure  of  money  by  a 
town  cannot  be  rendered  valid  by  usage,  howeveT  long  continued. 
Abuses  of  power  and  violations  of  right  derive  no  sanction  from 
time  or  custom.  A  casual  or  occasional  exercise  of  a  power  by  one 
or  a  few  towns  will  not  constitute  usage.  It  must  not  only  be  gen- 
eral and  of  long  continuance,  but,  what  is  more  important,  it  must 
be  a  i  nst . .in  accessary  to  the  exercise  of  some  corporate  power, 
or  the  enjoyment  of  some  corporate  right,  or  which  contributes  es- 
sentially to  the  necessities  and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
usage  relied  on  in  the  present  case  would  cot  satisfy  either  of  these 
last-named  requisites,  which  are  necessary  to  give  it  validity."4     But 

ique,  69  Iowa,  233.     /                   109;  3  Chad   v.  Tilsed,   5  J.  B.  Moore,  185. 

.  Pyne,  48  Iowa,  524(1876);  s.  c.  As  to  the   proper  office  of  usage  in  Eng- 

22  \:i    !;■  p,  261.  i.  both  as  a  Bource  of  power  and  to  aid 

tulding   v.    Lowell,    28    Pick.    71;  in  the  interpretation  of  charters,  see  Grant 

28;  post,  ch.  \i.,  where  some  on  Corp.  19,  27,  28,  29,  552,  564. 

()f  thi       mi  ■  >  llaneous  or  special   powers  *   Hood   V,  Lynn,  1   Allen  (Mass.),  103 

ered.  (1861).     Further  as  to  usage  consult  Wil- 

9  Jh/>,  ch.  ii.  sec.  29;  ch.  iii.  sec.  32.  lard  v.  Newburyport,  12  Pick.  227;  SpauL- 


94 


USAGE  ;    DISCRETIONARY    POWERS. 


151 


general  and  long -continued  usage  is  not  without  its  importance,  and 
usage  of  this  character  may  be  resorted  to  in  aid  of  a  proper  con- 
struction of  the  charter  or  statute,  but  no  further.  If  the  language 
be  uncertain  or  doubtful,  a  uniform,  long-established,  and  unques- 
tioned usage  will  be  regarded  by  the  courts  in  determining  the 
mode  in  which  powers  may  be  exercised,  and  to  a  reasonable  ex- 
tent in  determining  the  scope  of  the  powers  themselves  ;  but  usage 
can  have  no  room  for  operation  where  the  language  of  the  en- 
actment is  plain  and  the  legislative  intent  is  clear  upon  the  face 
of  it.1 


§  94  (58).  Discretionary  Powers  not  subject  to  Judicial  Control.  — 
Power  to  do  an  act  is  often  conferred  upon  municipal  corporations, 
in  general  terms,  without  being  accompanied  by  any  prescribed  mode 
of  exercising  it.  In  such  cases  the  common  council,  or  governing 
body,  necessarily  have,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  a  discretion  as 
to  the  manner  in  which  the  power  shall  be  used.2     This  discretion, 


ding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71;  Smith  v. 
Cheshire,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  308  (1859); 
Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  Gray,  12,  16 
(1856)  ;  Benoit  v.  Conway,  10  Allen,  528. 

1  Smith  v.  Cheshire,  13  Gray,  308  ; 
Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  Gray,  12,  16; 
Sherwin  v.  Bugbee  (validity  of  school 
meeting),  16  Vt.  439,  444,  where  Redfiehl, 
J.,  remarks  :  "  In  construing  statutes  ap- 
plicable to  public  corporations,  courts  will 
attach  no  slight  weight  to  the  uniform 
practice  under  them,  if  this  practice  has 
continued  for  a  considerable  period  of 
time."  It  is  a  rule  "founded  on  reason 
and  common  sense,"  says  the  Court  of 
Appeals  of  Maryland,  that  "  doubtful 
words  in  a  general  statute  may  be  ex- 
pounded with  reference  to  a  general  usage; 
and  when  a  statute  is  applicable  to  a  par- 
ticular place  only,  such  words  may  be  con- 
strued by  usage  at  that  place."  Frazier  v. 
Warfield  (Inspection  Act  for  Baltimore), 
13  Md.  279,  303;  s.  p.  Love  v.  Hinckley, 
Abt.  Adm.  436;  see,  also,  Rex  v.  Chester, 
1  Maule  &  Selw.  101;  Rex  v.  Salway,  9 
B.  &  C.  424. 

Where  the  true  construction  of  a  char- 
ter admits  of  doubt,  and  the  construction 
adopted  by  the  city  authorities  has  been 
acquiesced  in  generally,  and  acted  upon 
by  third  persons  in  good  faith,  in  their 
transactions  with  the  city,  it  will  be  pre- 
cluded by  the  courts  in  actions  by  such 


third  parties  from  denying  its  construc- 
tion to  be  the  true  one.  Van  Hostrup  v. 
Madison  City  (on  railroad  bonds),  1  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  291  (1863);  Meyer  v.  Muscatine 
(on  railroad  bonds),  lb.  384,  391.  Post, 
sees.  420,  457,  560  n.,  562  n.,  591  n. ; 
chaps,  xxii.  xxiii. 

2  Railroad  Co.  v.  Evansville  (power  to 
subscribe  stock  and  to  borrow  money),  15 
Ind.  395  (1860);  Kelly  v.  Milwaukee,  18 
Wis.  83;  Slack  v.  Railroad  Co.,  13  B. 
Mon.  1;  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15 
Conn.  475,  501  (1843),  per  Church,  J.; 
Harrison  v.  Baltimore,  1  Gill  (Md.),  264 
(1843);  Cincinnati  v.  Gwynne,  10  Ohio, 
192  ;  Markle  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio.  586. 
Where  a  municipal  corporation  is  en- 
trusted with  the  execution  of  a  power, 
and  is  not  confined  to  a  particular  mode, 
but  has  a  discretion  in  the  choice  of 
means,  a  plain  case  of  abuse  must  be 
shown,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  the  pe- 
titioner, to  warrant  an  injunction  against 
the  corporation.  Page  v.  St.  Louis  (spe- 
cial assessment),  20  Mo.  136(1853);  Col- 
ton  v.  Hanchett,  13  111.  615;  Bush  •. 
Carbondale,  78  111.  74  (1875);  Mayor  of 
Baltimore  v.  Gill,  31  Md.  375;  Holland  v. 
Baltimore,  11  Md.  186;  post,  sec.  146; 
Dodd  v.  Hartford,  25  Conn.  232;  Sheldon 
v.  School  District,  Tb.  224;  Lockwood  v. 
St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20;  Deane  v.  Todd,  22 
Mo.    90  ;    Mayor,    &c,    v.    Meserole,    26 


152 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


where  it  is  conferred  or  exists,  cannot  be  judicially  interfered  with 
or  questioned  except  where  the  power  is  exceeded  <u-  fraud  is  im- 
puted  and  shown,  or  there  is  a  manifest  invasion  of  private  rights. 
Thus  where  the  law  or  charter  confers  upon  the  city  council,  or 
legislature,  power  to  determine  upon  the  expediency  or  necessity 
'  to  the  local  government,  their  judgment  upon 
matters  thus  committed  to  them,  while  acting  within  the  scope  of 
their  authority,  cannot  be  controlled  by  the  courts.  In  such  ci 
the  decision  of  the  proper  corporate  body  is,  in  the  absence  of  fraud, 

1  and  conclusive,  unless  they  transcend  their  powers.1  Thus,  for 
example,  if  a  city  has  power  to  grade  streets,  the  courts  will  not  in- 
quire into  the  necessity  of  the  exercise  of  it,  or  the  refusal  to  exer- 

ii,  nor  whether  a  particular  grade  adopted,  or  a  particular  moor 
of  executing  the  grade,  is  judicious.2     So  if  a  city  has  power  to  build 


Wend.  182  ;  Union  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Ryan,  2    Wyo.  408  ;  8.   c.   on   appi 

I  nion  P  u  iti<-  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chey- 
enne, 113  IT.  S.  516;  Poillon  v.  Brooklyn, 
I  \ .  Y.  1 32.  A  power  "  to  remove  or 
confine  persons  having  infectious  or  pesti- 
lential diseases"  confers  mitlmritii  to  select 
th,    m  j  in,Lr  it   out,  and  a  city 

inder  such  a  power,  rent  a  house  to 
■  small-pox  hospital.     Ander- 

1 1'(  lonner,  98  [nd.  168.  See  chap- 
ters "ii  Contracts  and  Taxation,  post; 
Atlanta,  43  Ga.  67(1871);  Coul- 
son  v.  Portland,  Deady  R.  481  (1868); 
.  11  •_!,  also  ch.  xxiii.  In  respect 
to  the   '  f  a  municipal 

body,   the  courts   are    bound   to  presume 

■  y  will  exercise  any  discretion  with 
which  they  are  clothed  properly,  and  that 
they  bad  Bufficienl   reasons  for  doing  an 

It  of  such  discretion.     Rail- 

r.  Mayor  of  New  York,  1  Hilton, 

562   (1858);    Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  Des 

Moines,    11    [owa,  508  (187G)  ;   s.  c.   24 

\   i    !,'•  p.  756;  p    '.    ec.  379. 

By    tatnte  in  Canada,  certain  superior 

irts  have  power  in  their  discretion  to 

de  by-laws  for  illegality,  on  the  ap- 
n  of  persons  interested,  bul  these 

■  ill  not  entertain  an  application  to 
de  a  by-law  on  a    matter  of  fact, 

which,  according  to  municipal  act,  or  a 
by-law  passed  under  it,  should  be  ascer- 
tained and  finally  determined  by  an  officer 
-I  poration,  unless  perhaps  fraud 
or  corrupt  conduct  be   imputed   to  such 


officer.  See  Michie  and  the  Corporation 
of  tlic  City  of  Toronto,  ///  re,  11  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  379. 

Powers  which  involve  the  exercise  of 
judgmenl  oi  discretion  as  whether  to 
commence  a  suit  in  the  name  of  a  county, 
&c, — cannot  be  delegated  toothers.  Scol- 
lay  v.  County  of  Butte,  67  Cal.  249. 

'i  Baker  v.  Boston,  12  Pick.  1S4  ;  Ho- 
vey  v.  May<»,  Ci  Me.  322  (1857);  Fay, 
Petitioner,  15  Pick.  243(1834);  Parks  v. 
Boston,  8  Pick.  218  (1829);  Danielly  v. 
Cabaniss,  52  Ga.  211  (1874);  Sheridan 
o.  Colvin,  78  111.  237  (1875);  Droz  v. 
Baton  Rouge,  36  La.  An.  307;  Alberger 
v.  Baltimore,  64  Md.  1;  United  States  v. 
New  Orleans,  31  Fed.  Rep.  537;  Torrent 
r.  Muskegon,  47  Mich.  115.  Where  a 
common  council  was  authorized  by  the 
city  charter  to  construct  breakwaters,  &c, 
and  to  defray  the  cost  thereof  by  special 
assessments  upon  the  property  benefited, 
and  was  required  to  determine  the  amounts 
to  be  charged  to  each  lot,  it  was  held  that 
the  ac1  Lon  of  I  he  council  in  determining 
what  property  would  be  benefited  was 
conclusive,  while  its  decision  of  what 
amounts  should  be  charged  to  each  lot 
could  be  reviewed.  Teegarden  v.  Racine, 
56  Wis.  545. 

2  Hovey  v.  Mayo,  street  commissioner, 
18  Me.  S22  i  L857);  Benjamin  v.  Wheeler, 
8  Gray,  409,  413  (1857);  Richmond  v. 
McGirr  (purchase  of  land  for  public  build* 
ings),  78  Ind.  192  (1881),  citing  text. 


§  95  DISCRETIONARY   POWERS.  153 

a  market-house,  the  courts  cannot  inquire  into  the  size  and  fitness  of 
the  building  for  the  object  intended.1  So,  in  the  absence  of  fraud, 
the  court  refused  to  interfere  by  injunction  with  the  action  of  the 
city  council  in  agreeing  to  rent  a  room  for  city  purposes  for  twenty 
years  and  to  pay  for  the  same  in  advance.2  So,  also,  the  use  of  the 
revenue  of  a  city,  above  that  set  apart  by  law  for  the  payment  of 
interest  on  its  bonded  debt  and  for  a  sinking  fund,  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  municipal  authorities,  and  the  court  will  not  in- 
terfere by  mandamus  to  require  a  part  of  it  to  be  applied  to  the 
payment  of  a  judgment  before  there  is  an  ascertained  surplus  over 
expenditures.3 

§  95  (59).  The  Subject  illustrated.  —  So,  also,  where,  by  its  char- 
ter, a  municipal  corporation  is  empowered,  if  it  deems  the  public 
welfare  or  convenience  requires  it,  to  open  streets  or  make  public  im- 
provements thereon,  its  determination,  whether  wise  or  unwise,  can- 
not be  judicially  revised  or  corrected.4  On  the  ground  that  it  is  the 
province  of  the  municipal  authorities,  and  not  of  the  judicial  tribu- 
nals, to  determine  what  improvements  shall  be  made  in  the  streets 
and  highways  of  the  corporation,  the  court,  on  application  of  citizens, 
refused  to  compel  a  city  to  cover  over  an  open  draining  canal  of  long 
standing,  it  "  not  appearing  to  be  a  nuisance  in  the  legal  sense  of 
the  word."5  So  where  it  is  made  the  duty  of  a  city  to  remove,  as 
far  as  they  may  be  able,  every  nuisance  which  may  endanger  health, 
the  courts,  unless  the  power  be  transcended,  cannot  ordinarily  inter- 
fere to  control  the  manner  in  which  this  shall  be  done.6  But  the 
power  to  abate  nuisances,  like  all  other  municipal  powers,  must  be 
reasonably  exercised ;  and  although  the  power  be  given  to  be  exer- 
cised in  any  manner  the  corporate  authorities  may  deem  expedient, 
it  is  not  an  unlimited  poiver,  and  such  means  only  are  intended  as 
are  reasonably  necessary  for  the  public  good ;  wanton  or  unneces- 
sary injury  to  private  property  and  private  rights  are  not  thereby 

1  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  80  Gill  (Md.),  391  (1848.)  Passing  ordi- 
(1839).  So  where  a  city  has  power  to  nances  in  relation  to  opening,  &c,  of 
lease  real  estate  at  a  "reasonable  rent,"  streets,  is  the  exercise  of  legislative,  not 
the  council  is  to  determine  what  is  reason-  judicial  power.  Wiggiu  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
able,  and  their  discretion  in  the  absence  New  York,  9  Paige,  16  (1841).  See  chap- 
of    fraud    cannot    be   judicially    revised,  ter  on  Eminent  Domain,  post. 

Schauck  v.  Mayor,   69  N.  Y.  444  (1877).  5  Inhabitants  v.   New  Orleans,  14  La. 

2  Moses  v.  Risdon,  46  Iowa,  251  (1877);     An.  452  (1859). 

qucere,  and  compare  Garrison  v.  Chicago,  6  Baker  v.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184  (1831); 

7  Bissell,  480  (1877).  see  also  Kelly  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  83 

8  East   St.  Louis  v.  Zebley,  110  U.  S.  (1864);  Goodrich  v.  Chicago,  20  111.  445. 

321.     More  fully  post,  chap.  xiv.  Further  as  to  nuisances,   see  chapter  on 

4  Methodist  P.  Church  v.  Baltimore,  6  Ordinances,  post      Index  —  Nuisances. 


154 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§96 


authorized.1     And  generally  the  judicial  tribunals  will  not  interfere 
with  municipal  corporations  in  their  internal  police  and  administra- 
tive ment,  unless  they  are  transcending  their  powers  or  some 
right  has  been  withheld  or  wrong  perpetrated  or  threatened.2 

i  (60).  Public  Powers  and  Trusts  incapable  of  Delegation.  — 
The  principle  is  a  plain  one,  that  the  public  powers  or  trusts  de- 
volved  by  law  or  charter  upon  the  council  or  governing  body,  to  lie 
exercised  by  it  when  and  in  suoh  manner  as  it  shall  judge  best,  can- 
noth  delegated  to  <>t La*.  This  principle,  its  scope  and  limitations, 
is  best  shown  by  examples  of  its  application  to  actual  cases.  Thus, 
where  by  charter  or  statute,  local  improvements,  to  be  assessed  upon 
the  adjacent  property  owners,  are  to  be  constructed  in  "such  man- 
ner as  the  common  council  shall  prescribe  "by  ordinance,  it  is  not 
competent  for  the  council  to  pass  an  ordinance  delegating  or  leaving 
to  any  officer  or  committee  of  the  corporation,  the  power  to  deter- 
mine the  mode,  manner,  or  plan  of  the  improvement.  Such  an 
ordinance  is  void,  since  powers  of  this  kind  must,  as  above  shown,3 
be  exercised  in  strict  conformity  with  the  charter  or  incorporating 
act.4 


i  Babcock  v.  Buffalo,  56  N.  Y.  268 
(1874),  where  the  city  was  enjoined  from 
lilliij^'  up  plaintiffs  slip  in  the  canal,  be- 
cause, under  the  circumstances,  it  was  not 
a  proper  exercise  of  the  power  to  abate 
nuisances. 

2  State  v.  Swearingen,  12  Ga.  23;  post, 
chap.  xxii. 

:1  Supra,  sees.  90,  91. 

1  State  v.  Eauser,  63  Ind.  155;  State 
v.  Bell,  :;i  OhioSt.  194;  Birdsall  v. Clark, 
73  N.  V.  73;  X.  Y.  &c.  Trustees,  Lire, 
:>1  How.  Pr.  500  ;  Thompson  v.  Scher- 
merhorn,  6  NT.  V.  (2  Seld.)  92  (1851),  re- 
lating to  grading  and  levelling  streets; 
affirming  9  Barb.  152,  and  approving 

in  the  main  tie-  views  tin  re  expri  e  ed  by 
Mi.  .In  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin, 

57  N.  V.  591  (1874),  distinguishing 
Thomp  irmerhorn,  supra  ;  State 

.  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  309;  see 
1  lint.  716,  780;  In- 

dianapolisv.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind. 

396  :    Baltii 'e  v.  Scharf,    54    Md.    199, 

this  Election.      Sane-  princi] 

plied    in    similar    rase,    Ruggles  V.  ColliiT, 

43  Mi  ').    holding   thai   where 

the  charter  gave  the  city  power  to  require 

p  •!'■'/,  "  in  all  cast  i  whi  re  thi 


city  council  shall  deem  it  necessary,"  it 
could  not  by  ordinance  make  the  mayor 
the  judge  of  the  necessity  for  paving.  Re- 
affirmed but  distinguished,  Shehan  v. 
Gleeson,  46  Mo.  100  (1870);  East  St. 
Louis  v.  Wehrung,  50  111.  28  (1869).  So, 
where  the  charter  gives  the  city  council 
power  to  construct  sewers  of  such  "di- 
mensions as  may  be  prescribed  by  ordi- 
nance," the  council  cannot  by  ordinance 
require  sewers  to  be  constructed  of  such 
dimensions  as  may  be  deemed  requisite  by 
the  city  engineer.  St.  Louis  v.  Clemens, 
43  Mo.  395  (1869),  overruling  St.  Louis 
v.  Eters,  36  Mo.  456;  reaffirmed,  St.  Louis 
v.  Clemens,  52  Mo.  133  (1873);  Jackson 
Co.  v.  Brush,  77  111.  59  (issuing  bonds). 
See  further,   State  v.   New  Brunswick,  1 

V m  (30  N.  J.  L.),  395  (1863);  Meuser 

v.  Risdon,  36  Cal.  239;  Hydes  v.  Joyes,  4 
Bush  (Ky.),  464;  Darling  v.  St.  Paul,  19 
.Minn.  389,  (1872),  citing  text.  When  a 
charter  authorized  a  city  ''//ordinance  "to 
erect  lamps  and  to  provide  for  lighting  the 
city,"  &c,  the  delegation  of  the  power  so 
conferred  to  a  committee  whose  action  Was 
to  be  final,  was  declared  illegal.  Minne- 
apolis Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Minneapolis,  36 
Minn.  151».     The  doctrine  of  the  text  ap- 


§96 


DELEGATION   OF   POWERS. 


155 


So,  where  a  power,  for  example,  the  power  to  issue  licenses,  is 
granted  by  law,  or  by  an  ordinance  duly  passed,  to  the  mayor  and 
aldermen,  they  are  constituted  to  act  as  one  deliberative  body,  to  the 
end  that  they  may  assist  each  other  by  their  united  wisdom  and 
experience,  and  the  result  of  their  conference  be  the  ground  of  their 
determination:  where  this  is  the  case,  the  board  of  aldermen  cannot, 
even  by  a  vote,  delegate  the  power  to  the  mayor  alone.1     But  the 


plied  where  a  city,  empowered  to  erect 
and  regulate  public  wharves,  and  fix  the 
rates  of  wharfage  thereat,  undertook  to 
lease  the  wharf,  farm  out  its  revenues, 
and  delegate  a  person  to  fix  the  rates. 
Matthews  v.  Alexandria,  68  Mo.  115  ; 
post,  chapter  on  Taxation.  So,  where  a 
charter  directed  the  common  council  to  ap- 
point a  time  when  persons  interested  in 
an  application  for  opening  a  street  would 
be  heard,  the  council  must  itself  fix  the 
time,  and  cannot  delegate  that  duty  to 
the  clerk.  If  it  does  so,  its  proceedings 
will  be  set  aside  on  certiorari  or  other 
direct  proceeding.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  309  (1855);  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  2  Dutch.  444,  447;  State  v.  Pat- 
terson, 34  N.  J.  L.  163  (1870).  The 
text  is  cited  and  approved  in  the  fol- 
lowing cases  :  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N. 
Y.  73;  State  v.  Trenton,  42  N.  J.  L. 
74;  Parker  v.  New  Brunswick,  1  Vroom 
(30  N.  J.  L.),  395;  State  v.  Patterson, 
5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  163.  A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  cannot  delegate  powers 
conferred  upon  and  to  be  exercised  by 
it  to  a  street  committee  or  others.  Whyte 
v.  Mayor  (sidewalk  assessment),  2  Swan 
(Tenn.),  364  (1852).  See  Smith  v. 
Morse,  2  Cal.  524;  Oakland  v.  Carpentier, 
13  Cal.  540;  White  v.  Nashville,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.),  364;  compare  State  v.  Atlantic 
City,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  99,  108. 
See  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  591 
(1874),  distinguishing  Thompson  v.  Scher- 
merhorn,  supra.  A  delegation  of  power 
is  of  course  valid  when  expressly  author- 
ized by  the  legislature.  Brooklyn  v.  Bres- 
lin, supra;  State  v.  Patterson,  5  Vroom 
(34  N.  J.  L.),  163;  post,  sees.  716,  779. 

1  Day  v.  Green,  4  Gush.  433  (1849), 
and  cases  there  cited.  Further,  as  to 
delegation  of  power,  Coffin  v.  Nantucket, 
5  Cush.  269  (1850)  ;  Ruggles  v.  Nan- 
tucket, 11  Cush.  433;  Clark  v.  Wash- 
ington, 12  Wheat.  40,  54  (1827);  Cooley, 


Const.  Lim.  204;  Railway  Co.  v.  Balti- 
more, 21  Md.  93  (1863);  Winants  v.  Bay- 
onne,  44  N.J.  L.  114;  States.  Patterson, 
34  N.  J.  L.  163.  Power  of  mayor  and 
aldermen  as  to  choosing  site  for  markets 
cannot  be  delegated  to  commissioners.  lb. 
A  grant  by  the  council  of  a  corporation 
to  build  a  street  railroad  must  be  made  by 
ordinance  directly  to  the  parties  to  be 
therein  named,  and  the  authority  to  make 
the  grant  cannot  be  delegated  by  the  coun- 
cil to  any  officer  or  board.  State  v.  Bell, 
34  Ohio  St.  194.  So  where  the  city  built 
a  pier  in  respect  of  which  it  was  author- 
ized to  fix  tolls  for  its  use  and  collect  the 
same.  It  leased  it  to  a  party;  failing  to 
keep  the  pier  in  repair  the  lessee  brought 
an  action  for  damages;  the  power  of  the 
council  not  being  subject  to  delegation 
the  lease  was  declared  void.  Lord  v. 
Oconto,  47  Wis.  386 ;  s.  p.  Lauenstein 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  28  WTis.  336;  Mullarky  v. 
Cedar  Falls,  19  Iowa,  21;  Gale  v.  Kala- 
mazoo, 23  Mich.  344;  Milhau  v.  Sharp,  19 
Barb.  435;  Rogers  v.  Collier,  43  Mo.  359; 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehrung,  50  111.  28. 
Any  work  not  done  within  the  time  speci- 
fied, the  common  council  was  required  to 
cause  to  be  done  by  contract  or  otherwise. 
An  ordinance  directed  that  the  superin- 
tendent of  streets  should  "  cause  the  work 
to  be  done," 'thus  delegating  the  precise 
authority  conferred  upon  it.  This  was 
held  to  be  unauthorized.  The  charter 
conferred  the  power,  said  the  court,  to 
cause  it  to  be  done  by  contract  or  other- 
wise; this  required  the  exercise  of  dis- 
cretion and  judgment  as  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  work  should  be  done.  The  le- 
gislature said  it  must  be  the  judgment  of 
the  council,  and  they  attempted  to  invest 
the  superintendent  of  streets  with  its  ex- 
ercise. This  they  had  no  power  to  do; 
they  could  not  delegate  the  power  thus 
conferred.  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73  N.  Y. 
73. 


156  MUNICIPAL   C0EP0EATI0N8.  §  97 

principle  that  the  exercise  of  municipal  powers  or  discretion  cannot 
}„.  delegated  docs  not  prevent  a  corporation  from  appointing  agents 
and  empowering  them  to  make  contracts,  or  from  appointing  com- 
mittees and  investing  them  with  duties  of  a  ministerial  or  adminis- 
trative character.1 

A    municipal  council    having    authority  to   pave  streets   at   the 
primary  expense  of  the  city,  directed  the  making  of  the  pavements 

of  01 •  the  other  of  specified  materials,  hut  giving  to  the  owners 

.if  abutting  lots,  on  whom  the  expense  would  ultimately  fall,  the 
privilege  of  selecting  which,  and  reserving  to  the  street  committee 
the  authority  to  select,  in  case  the  lot-owners  failed,  and  authorized 
the  mayor  to  execute  a  contract  accordingly,  which  was  done.  It 
was  objected  by  the  city  that  this  contract  was  invalid  :  (1)  because 
the  city  could  not  delegate  the  power  to  the  mayor  to  make  it;  and 
(2)  because  the  mayor  could  not  delegate  to  the  lot-owners  the  power 
of  determining  the  kind  of  materials.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  while  admitting  that  "the  council  could  not  delegate 
all  the  power  conferred  upon  it"  in  this  respect,  yet  held  that  it 
could  do  its  ministerial  work  by  agents,  and  that  there  was  here  no 
unlawful  delegation  of  power.2 

§  07  (Gl).  Legislative  Powers  cannot  be  surrendered  or  bargained 
away.  —  Powers  are  conferred  upon  municipal  corporations  for  public 
purposes;  and  as  their  legislative  powers  cannot,  as  we  have  just 
seen,  be  delegated,  so  they  cannot  without  legislative  authority,  ex- 
j  or  implied,  be  bargained  or  bartered  away.  Such  corporations 
may  make  authorized  contracts,  but  they  have  no  power,  as  a  party, 
to  make  contracts  ot  pass  by-laws  which  shall  cede  away,  control,  or 
embarrass  their  legislative  or  governmental  powers,  or  which  shall 
disable  them  from  performing  their  public  duties.8    The  cases  cited 

1  Railroad  Co.  v.  Marion  Co.,  36  Mo.  the  making  of  regulations  which  the  char- 

oley  v.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  ter  gave  the  council  alone  the  power  to 

it   v.    Council    Bluffs,    58  make.     Gregory  v.  Bridgeport,  41  Conn. 

1           642.     Where  the  charter  gave  the  76(1874).     See  chapters  on  Contracts  and 

common   council   power   to   "ordain  hy-  Corporate  Meetings,  post. 

laws  relating  to  wharves,  and  the  anchor-  -  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  06  V.  S.  341 

ing,  moving,  and  mooring  of  vessels,"  and  (1877).     If  a  contract  should  be  invalid 

officers  to  carry  because  of  the  delegation   of  powers,   it 

the  by-law                         rod  the  council  may  be  Tatified  by  the  council.     Tb. 

1  a  by-law  creating  the  office  of  stir  3  Richmond  Gaslight  Co.   v.    Middle- 

,  and  giving  him  town  (gas  contract),  59  N.  Y.  228  (1874); 

"full  power  to  order  and  regulate,  when-  Lord  v.  Oconto,   47  Wis.  886,  approving 

ever  requested   by  the  owner  or  lessee  of  text;    Matthews  v.    Alexandria,    68   Mo. 

wharf,  the  mooring  of  vessels  at  such  115;    Bodine    o.  Trenton   (boundaries  of 

wharf,"  such  a  by-law  is  Dot  void  as  dele-  Btreets),  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.)  198;  State 

g  to  the  superintendent  of  wharves  v.   New   Brunswick;   1  Vroom  (30  N.J. 


§  98     IMPERATIVE    AND    DISCRETIONARY   POWERS   DISTINGUISHED.     157 

mark  the  scope  and  illustrate  the  application  of  this  salutary  princi- 
ple in  a  great  variety  of  circumstances,  and,  for  the  protection  of  the 
citizen,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  it  shall  be  maintained  by 
the  courts  in  its  full  extent  and  visor. 


§98  (62).  Imperative  and  Discretionary  Powers  distinguished. —  It 
is  often  material  to  determine  whether  a  duty,  imposed  by  law  or 
charter  upon  municipal  corporations  or  public  officers,  is  imperative 
or  discretionary.  This  is  always  a  question  of  legislative  intention, 
and,  therefore,  of  construction.  The  general  tests  to  ascertain  this 
intention,  propounded  in  the  cases  cited,  are  of  doubtful  value.  The 
words  that  a  corporation  or  officer  "  may "  act  in  a  certain  way,  or 
that  it  "  shall  be  lawful  "  to  act  in  a  certain  way,  may  be  imperative. 
On  this  subject  some  of  the  cases  declare  the  doctrine  that  what 
public  corporations  or  officers  are  empowered  to  do  for  others,  and 


L. ),  395  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis 
Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  approving  text. 
Milhau  v.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611  (1863); 
111.  &c.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon  C.  C. 
Rep.  70  ;  Gale  v.  Kalamazoo  (market- 
house  contract),  23  Mich.  344  (1871); 
s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  80;  Louisville  City  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Louisville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415 
(1871)  ;  Covington,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Covington,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  127;  People's 
Railroad  v.  Memphis  Railroad,  10  Wall. 
38,  50  (1869);  Presb.  Church  v.  Mayor, 
&c.  of  New  York,  5  Cow.  538  (1826); 
followed,  Stuyvesant  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  7  Cow.  588  ;  Sav.  Fund  v. 
Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175  ;  Lehigh 
Water  Co.'s  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  515;  San 
Francisco  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Dunn,  62  Cal. 
580  ;  Mayor,  &c,  of  Albany,  In  re,  23 
Wend.  277;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Mayor,  &c,  1 
Hilt.  562,  568;  Martin  v.  Mayor,  &c,  1 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  545  (1841);  Goszler  v. 
Georgetown,  6  Wheat.  593  ;  Sedgw. 
Const,  and  St.  Law,  634;  State  v.  Graves, 
19  Md.  351,  373  (1862);  Bryson  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 47  Pa.  St.  329  ;  Coolev,  Const. 
Lira.  206  ;  Albany  St.,  6  Abb.  Pr.  R. 
273  ;  Britton  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York,  21  How.  Pr.  R.  251 ;  New  York 
v.  Second  Av.,  &c,  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  261; 
Dingman  v.  People,  51  111.  277;  Brimmer 
v.  Boston,  102  Mass.  19  (1869);  Johnson 
v.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  445;  State  v. 
Cin.  Gas  Co.,  18  Ohio  St.  262,  295;  Jack- 


son v.  Bowman,  39  Miss.  671  (1861);  Oak- 
land v.  Carpentier,  13  Cal.  540  (1859), 
opinion  of  Baldwin,  J.;  Smith  v.  Morse, 
2  Cal.  524;  Louisville  City  Railway  v. 
Louisville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415;  Karat  v. 
St.  Paul,  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Minn.  118 
(1875);  Peru  v.  Gleason,  91  Ind.  566; 
Brenham  v.  Water  Co.,  97  Tex.  542; 
National  Bank  v.  St.  Joseph,  31  Fed. 
Rep.  216;  ante,  sec.  54  and  note;  post, 
sees.  116,  692,  716.  Compare  Attorney- 
General  v.  Mayor  &c.  of  New  York,  3 
Duer,  119,  131,  147;  Davis  v.  Same,  14 
N.  Y.  (4  Kern.),  506,  532;  Costar  v. 
Brush,  25  Wend.  628;  Brooklyn  v.  City 
Railroad  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  475  (1872).  One 
legislature,  in  the  enactment  of  lavs,  can- 
not, by  contract,  put  it  out  of  the  pou;er  of 
a  subsequent  legislature  to  repeal  or  amend 
them;  cannot  thus  surrender  a  portion  of 
its  sovereign  power.  Debolt  v.  Ins.  and 
Trust  Co.,  1  Ohio  St.  564;  Plank  R.  Co.  v. 
Husted,  3  Ohio  St.  578,  per  Bartlnj,  C.  J., 
dissenting  ;  Matheny  v.  Golden,  5  Ohio 
St.  375;  Mott  v.  Pa." Railroad  Co.,  30  Pa. 
St.  9  (1858).  But.  see,  in  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  Home  v.  Rouse,  8 
Wall.  430,  and  prior  cases  cited,  and  the 
vigorous  dissent  (lb.  441),  which  seems, 
were  the  question  open,  to  be  the  sound 
view.  Coolev.  Const.  Lim.  127,  280  ; 
Sedg.  Const,  and  St.  Law,  616,  633;  post, 
sees.  385,  692,  716. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  98 


that  which  ia  beneficial  to  them  or  to  the  public  to  have  done,  the 

law  li  ought  to  'In,  especially  if  the  law  specifically  or  ade- 

pplies  them  with  the  means  of  executing  the  power.    The 

power  in  such  cases  is  conferred  for  the  benefit  of  others  or  of  the 

:  -1  tlif  intent  of  the  Legislature,  which  is  the  test  in  such 

ordinarily  seems,  under  such  circumstances,  to  be  to  impose  a 

p  isitive  and  absolute  duty.     But,  under  other  circumstances,  where 

:  to  be  done  does  uot  affect  third  persons,  and  is  not  clearly 

ial  to  them  or  the  public,  and  the  means  for  its  performance 

are  not  thus  supplied,  the  words,  "  may  "  <h>  an  act,  or  it  is  "  lawful " 

to  do  it,  do  not  mean  "must,"  but  rather  indicate  an  intent  in  the 

i  to  confer  a  discretionary  power.1     Each  case,  we  repeat, 

ly  decided  on  its  own  circumstances,  and  the  legis- 

1  itive  intent  gathered  from  the  whole  act.     No  positive,  inflexible, 

tereotyped  rule  can  be  laid  down. 


1  .M.i  ion   -.  Fi  arson  (duty  of  city  under 

tax  law),  9  Bow.  (U.S.)  248,  259,  per 

r.,  and  authorities  there  cited. 

Jn   Hurford  v.  Omaha,  4  Neb.  336,  350 

.  the  aubjecl  is  fully  examined,  and 
certain  tests  to  ascertain  the  legislative 
intention  are  stated.  Veazie  o.  China,  50 
Me.  526.  It  is  the  settled  doctrine  in 
New  York,  thai  wherea  public  or  munici- 
pal corporation  or  body  is  invested  with 
power  to  do  an  act  which  the  public  inter- 
esterequirt  to  h  done,  and  the  humus  for 
its  complete  performance  are  placed  at  its 

..  no i  "iil\  tin-  execution,  but  the 
proper  execution  of  the  power,  may  be  in- 

on  a-  a  duty,  though  the  statute 
conferring  it  be  only  permissive  in  its 
terms.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v. 
Furze,  '■',  Hill,  612,  holding  corporation 
liable  for  omitting  its  duty  to  repair  sew- 
ers, although  it  would  not  have  been  lia- 
ble for  having  omitted  to  construct  them 
originally.     Approved  16  N".  Y.  162, 

r.j  per  Denio,  J.,  i'  N.  V.  L68, 
■  AIL  a.  .1..  /'/.   461.     The  same 
doctrine  has  l n  declared  in  New   I 

.  Newark,  4  Dutch.    191  ;    Si  iple 
-•     Elizab    '..   ::    Dutch.     107  ;     Rei  d    v. 
Bainbrid  ;e,  1  Southard,  351,  358.    Com- 
R  fewark,  4  Vroora  (33    X. 

J.  L.),  129.     Sit,  further,  the  chapter  on 
Actions,  />"■'.  chap,  xxiii. 

//'//■  ratiiH ,  and  when 

directory,  sir  further,  Grant,  Corn.  34,  35; 


Rex  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Hastings,  5  Barn, 
.v  AM.  692,  note;  Attorney-General  u. 
Lock,  3  Atk.  164;  Rex  V,  Mayor,  .v.-.  of 
Chester,  1  Maule  &  SeL  101;  Rex  v.  Bail- 
iffs, &c.,  1  Barn.  &  Cress.  86;  3  Bain.  & 
Cress.  272;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Platte  Co.  42 
Mo.  171;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Buchanan  Co.,  39 
Mo.  485;  Grant  v.  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.42u;  8.  C. 
8  Am.  Rep.  272;  Goodrich  v.  Chicago,  20 
111.  445,  authority  to  fity  "  to  remove  all 
obstructions  in  the  harbor,"  held  not  im- 
perative, lb.  Ottawa  v.  People,  48  111. 
233;  Carr  v.  North  Liberties,  35  Pa.  St. 
324;  Joliet  v.  Verley,  35  111.  58;  Wilson 
V.  Mayor,  &c.,  1  Denio,  595.  An  act 
that  "  the  cit y  council  are  hereby  <tt'th'>r- 
ized  to  elect  a  recorder,  in  whom  tiny 
may  vest  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  all  vio- 
lations of  their  ordinances,"  Imposes  the 
duty  to  elect  this  officer.  The  language 
i-,  mandatory,  ami  not  discretionary.  Va- 
son  '•.  Augusta,  38  Ga.  542  (1868).  The 
expression,  in  a  supplemental  charter, 
"  U  shall  in  lawful,"  construed  not  to  en- 
join an  imperative  duty  on  tin  corpora- 
tion. Seiple  '-.  Elizabeth,  3  Dutch.  (N. 
.1.  i  107;  Steines  ».  Franklin  Co.,  i-  Mo 
167(1871).  Privatt  action  lor  breach  of 
statutory  duty,  when,  Heeny  /-.  Sp 
11  R.  1.  156;  a.  Rep.  502.     R  .' 

in  the  English  courts.  Addison  on  Torts 
( l  Eng.  ed. ).  1054.  See,  further,  post,  sees 
468,  832,  836,  857,  908,  934,  949. 


§  100  EXEMPTION    FROM    JUDICIAL   PROCESS.  159 

§  99  (63).  Same  subject. — It  is  also  sometimes  difficult  to  deter- 
mine whether  specific  duties  prescribed  by  the  charter  or  incorpo- 
rating act  rest  upon  the  corporation  or  upon  the  aldermen  or  other 
officers  named  in  their  individual  capacity.  The  question  also  is  one 
of  construction.  The  general  rule  is  this :  that  where  powers  per- 
taining to  the  duties  of  a  corporation  are  conferred  upon  those  who 
officially  represent  the  corporation,  such  powers,  unless  the  contrary 
appears,  are  deemed  to  be  conferred  upon  them  in  their  corporate, 
not  their  individual  character ;  in  other  words,  upon  the  corporation 
itself.1 

§100  (64).  Exemption  of  Municipal  Revenues  from  Judicial  Seiz- 
ure for  Debts.  —  Municipal  corporations  are  instituted  by  the  supreme 
authority  of  a  State  for  the  public  good.  They  exercise,  by  delega- 
tion from  the  legislature,  a  portion  of  the  sovereign  power.  The 
main  object  of  their  creation  is  to  act  as  administrative  agencies  for 
the  State,  and  to  provide  for  the  police  and  local  government  of  cer- 
tain designated  civil  divisions  of  its  territory.2  To  this  end  they  are 
invested  with  governmental  powers  and  charged  with  civil,  political, 
and  municipal  duties.  To  enable  them  beneficially  to  exercise  these 
powers  and  discharge  these  duties,  they  are  clothed  with  the  author- 
ity to  raise  revenues,  chiefly  by  taxation,  and  subordinately  by  other 
modes,  as  by  fines  and  penalties.  The  revenue  of  the  public  corpo- 
ration is  the  essential  means  by  which  it  is  enabled  to  perform  its 
appointed  work.  Deprived  of  its  regular  and  adequate  supply  of 
revenue,  such  a  corporation  is  practically  destroyed,  and  the  ends  of 
its  erection  thwarted.3  Based  upon  considerations  of  this  character, 
it  is  the  settled  doctrine  of  the  law  that  not  only  the  public  property 
but  also  the  taxes  and  public  revenues  of  such  corporations  cannot 
be  seized  under  execution  against  them,4  either  in  the  treasury  or 
when  in  transit  to  it.     Judgments  rendered  for  taxes,  and  the  pro- 

1  Conrad  v.  Ithaca,   16  N.  Y.  158,  per  provided    for    filling   the  vacancy  in  the 

Selden,  J.,  p.  170;  Hickok  v.  Plattsburg,  commission. 

15  Barb.  S.  C.  427;  Glidden  ,v.  Unity,  10  Where  all  are  notified  to  attend,  a  ma- 

Fost.  (30  N.  H.)  104,  119;  post,  sees.  208,  jority  may  act.    Post,  sees.  221,  note,  283; 

236,  237,  974  el  seq.      A  power  conferred  Astor  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  567  (1875); 

by  statute  upon  three  or  more  persons  as  Astor  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  580.     Prc- 

commissioners,  or  otherwise,  for  a  public  sumption    as   to    notice,  lb. ;  post,  chap. 

purpose,  is  not  extinguished  by  the  death  xxiii. 

of  one,  where  no  provision  exists  for  fill-  2  Ante,  chap.  ii.  sees.  9,  28. 

ing  the  vacancy,    but   vests   in  the   sur-  8  Text    approved.     Saloy  v.    New  Or- 

vivors.     People  v.   Palmer,   52  N.  Y.   83  leans,  33  La.  An.  79. 

(1873);  People  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Syracuse,  4  Brown   v.  Gates,  Treasurer,  &c,   15 

63  N.  Y.  291,  297  (1875),  distinguishing  W.  Va.  131. 
People    v.    Nostrand,    where    the   statute 


160 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


la  of  such  judgments  in  the  hands  of  officers  of  the  law,  are  not 
subject  tn  execution  unless  so  declared  by  statute.  The  doctrine  of 
the  inviolability  of  the  public  revenues  by  the  creditor  is  maintained, 
although  the  corporation  is  in  debt,  and  has  no  means  of  payment 
hut  the  taxes  which  it  is  authorized  to  collect.1 


§101  65).  Garnishment.  —  Upon  similar  considerations  of  pub- 
lic policy,  municipal  corporations  and  their  ojfirer.s  have  usually, 
though  not  uniformly,  been  considered  not  to  be  subject  to  garnish- 
ment, although  private  corporations,  equally  with  natural  persons, 
are   liable  to  this  process.     The  cases  on  the  subject,  as  respects 


'  E  Igi  rton  ».  Muni  ip  dity,  I  L  l.  An. 
435(1846),  where  the  subject  is  ably  dis- 
cussed in  the  opinion  of  Rost,  J.  He  sa 
"On  the  first  view  of  this  question  there 
is  something  very  repugnant  to  the  moral 
sense  in  the  idea  that  a  municipal  corpo- 
ra should  contract  debts,  and  that, 
having  no  resources  but  the  taxes  which 
lue  to  it,  these  should  not  be  sub- 
jected by  legal  process  to  the  sati 
timi  of  its  creditors.  This  considera- 
tion, deduced  from  the  principles  of  moral 
duty,  has  only  given  way  to  the  more  efl- 
larged  contemplation  of  the  great  and 
rests  of  public  order  and 
ih,  principles  of  government."  lb.  440; 
s.  p.  Municipality  v.  Hart,  6  La.  An. 
570  (1851 ).  This  case  holds  that  a  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  th«'  corporation  for  a  fine 
incurred  for  a  violation  of  a  municipal 
ordinance  is  exempt  from  execution;  but 
thai  an  ordinary  debt  due  the  corporation 
(as  on  a  bond  taken  for  paving)  is  liable 
to  be  seized.  But  quaere.  In  Edgerton 
r.  Municipality,  supra,  it  was  decided 
thai  the  public  taxes  and  revenues  of  the 
.ill  nil!  be  seized  under  exe- 
cution, notwitb  iV's- 

sion  of  the  Code  of  Practii f  Louisiana, 

lorizing  the  seizure,  under  execution, 
of  "all  sums  of  money  which  may  be 
due  to  the  debtor  in  whatsoever  ri 
—  tins  general  language  being  construed 
to  refer  alone  to  rights  of  prop  .  md 
not  to  taxes  imposed  for  the  protectio 
tho  3o  in  The  Railroad  I  o 

Municipality,   7    La.    An.    1  is   (1852),  it 
held  that  perpetual  ground  rents,  ere- 
1  and    intended   by  the  legislature  to 
form  pari   of  the  permanenl    revenue  of 
tin    city  to  enable  it  to  exercise  its  mu- 


nicipal powers  of  police  and  local  govern- 
ment, cannot  be  sold  on  execution  against 
the  corporation.  In  Police  Jury  v.  Mich- 
a.  I,  1  La.  An.  84,  a  seizure  of  public  build- 
ings, &c.,  by  a  creditor  was  enjoined. 

The  public  nature  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations is  well  illustrated  by  the  decision 
of   the    Supreme    Court    of   the    United 
States,  in  the  case  of  The  United  States  v. 
The    Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Co.,  17 
Wall.  322  (1872).     The  ease  involved  the 
right  of  Congress  to  levy  a  tax  upon  the 
income  or  property  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration,  and    viewing    such    a   corporation 
as    an    arm    of   the    State,    and    partak- 
ing  of    the  State's    exemption    from  lia- 
bility to  be  taxed   upon    the  means  and 
instrumentalities  employed  in  conducting 
its  operations,    it  was  held    that  the  tax 
sought  to  be  enforced  under  the   Internal 
Revenue  Act  could  not  be  collected.     Post, 
sec.  775.     The  still  later  and  notable  case 
of  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.   S.  472 
(1880),  noted,  infra,  chap,  vii.,  still  more 
distinctly  illustrates  the  principles  of  the 
ti  .i.     Post,  Me.   169  et  seq.     See  chapter 
on  Taxation,  post.     Property  owned  by  a 
city  as  an  investment   of   funds  merely, 
held  liable  to  seizure  on  execution.     New 
Orleans    v.   Insurance  Co.,  23  La.  An.   61 
(1871).     In  this  ease  the  court  declare  a 
distinction   between   it    and    Edgerton  v. 
Municipality,  supra,    and    Police  Jury  v. 
Michael,  1  La.  An.   84;   but  quaere.     Un- 
derbill v.  Calhoun,   68  Ala.  216,   approv- 
ing the   text.     Post,  sees.  576,  850,  861, 
884.     The  r,  mi dy  "/creditors of  municipal 
corporations   is   discussed   in   the    subse- 
quent chapters  on  Contracts  and   Manda- 
mus. 


§101 


GARNISHMENT. 


161 


municipal  corporations,  are  referred  to  in  the  note ;  and  it  will  be 
seen,  on  examination,  that  some  of  them  turn  on  the  construction  of 
particular  statutes,  and  that  the  judges  differ  in  opinion  respecting 
the  policy  and  expediency  of  subjecting,  upon  general  principles, 
such  corporations  to  the  process  of  garnishment.  The  author's 
view,  where  the  question  is  left  entirely  open  by  statute,  is,  that,  on 
principle,  a  municipal  corporation  is  exempt  from  liability  of  this 
character  with  respect  to  its  revenues  and  the  salaries  of  its  officers, 
but  that  where  it  owes  an  ordinary  debt  to  a  third  person,  the  mere 
inconvenience  of  having  to  answer  as  garnishee  furnishes  no  suffi- 
cient reason  for  withdrawing  it  from  the  reach  of  the  remedies 
which  the  law  gives  to  creditors  of  natural  persons  and  of  private 
corporations.1 


1  The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania 
is  of  the  opinion  that,  on  principle,  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  or  its  officers  are  not 
subject  to  garnishment  or  attachment  or 
execution,  and  that  by  the  statutes  of  that 
State  they  are  not  made  liable  thereto. 
Erie  v.  Knapp,  29  Pa.  St.  173  (1857); 
Bulkley  v.  Eckert,  3  Barr  (Pa.),  36S,  per 
Sargeant,  J.;  s.  P.  McDougal  v.  Super- 
visors, 4  Minn.  184;  Bradley  v.  Richmond, 
6  Vt.  121;  Burnham  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  15 
"Wis.  193  (1862),  where  the  inconvenience 
of  the  opposite  doctrine  is  forcibly  pointed 
out  by  Paine,  J.;  Merrell  v.  Campbell,  49 
"Wis.  535;  Drake  on  Attach.,  sec.  516,  10; 
Hadley  v.  Peabody,  13  Gray,  200;  Brown 
v.  Gates,  15  W.  Va.  131.  Approving 
text,  Droz  v.  Baton  Rouge,  36  La.  An. 
340;  Walker  v.  Cook,  129  Mass.  577; 
State  v.  Eberly,  12  Neb.  616.  That  the 
salary  of  an  officer  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration cannot  be  garnished,  see  School 
District,  &c.  v.  Gage,  39  Mich.  484; 
Hebel  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.,  33  Mich.  407; 
"Wallace  v.  Lawyer,  54  Ind.  501;  Merwin 
v.  Chicago,  45  111.  133;  Chicago  v.  Halsey, 
25  111.  595;  Thayer  v.  Tyler,  5  Allen,  95; 
Colby  v.  Coates,  6  Cush.  559;  Clark  v. 
Mobile,  36  Ala.  621  (salary  of  school 
teacher)  ;  Hightower  v.  Staton,  54  Ga. 
108;  McLellan  v.  Young,  54  Ga.  399;  s.  c. 
21  Am.  Rep.  276;  Hadley  v.  Peabody,  13 
Gray,  200;  or  be  reached  by  proceedings 
supplementary  to  execution.  Roeller  v. 
Ames,   33  Minn.   132. 

In  Missouri,  also,  it  is  held  upon  gen- 
eral principles  that  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  not  subject  to  garnishment  on 
VOL.  I.  —  11 


account  of  salary,  due  to  their  officers. 
Hawthorne  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  59 
(1847);  s.  p.  Fortune  v.  St.  Louis,  23  Mo. 
239  (1856),  where  the  decision  is  placed 
upon  the  broad  ground  that  such  corpo- 
rations are  not  liable  to  be  garnished,  and 
not  on  the  ground  that  an  officer's  salary 
is  exempt  from  such  process.  See  also 
Neuer  v.  Fallon,  18  Mo.  277.  Since  the 
first  edition  of  this  work  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  has  modified  in  an  im- 
portant respect  the  broad  statement  of 
the  doctrine  held  in  the  former  cases. 
See  Pendleton  v.  Perkins  and  the  City  of 
St.  Louis,  49  Mo.  565  (1872).  It  was 
there  held,  after  great  consideration,  that 
a  city  corporation  in  that  State  is  subject 
to  garnishment,  where  the  main  debtor 
has  absconded  so  that  judgment  cannot 
be  obtained  against  him,  and  he  has  no 
property  in  the  State  subject  to  attach- 
ment, but  has  money  in  the  city  treas- 
ury belonging  or  due  to  him;  ami  that 
it  may  in  such  case  be  reached  by  bill 
in  equity  in  the  first  instance  without 
a  previous  judgment  at  law,  and  without 
showing  fraud  or  other  ground  of  equi- 
table jurisdiction.  It  was  so  decided,  not- 
withstanding the  garnishment  act  in  terms 
exempts  municipal  corporations  from  its 
operation.  The  opinion  of  Bliss,  C.  J. ,  is 
very  full  and  elaborate. 

In  Tennessee,  a  municipal  corporation 
is  not  subject  to  garnishment  at  the  suit 
of  a  creditor  of  one  of  its  employees;  citing 
Bank  v.  Dibrell,  3  Sneed,  379;  Burnham 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  15  Wis.  19?,;  Chicago  v. 
Hasley,  25  111.  596;  Baltimore  v.  1 


162 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§101 


Md.  102;  Hawtl  i\    Louis,  1  1  Mo. 

Memphis    v.    Laski,    9    Heisk.    511 

1 1-;,  i  .        .  .  21   Am.   Rep    S27.     So  in 

Mi  Lellan    u.    Young,    ■<!    Ga. 

21   Am.   Rep.  276.     So  in  /»• 

,    W  ill  lci  .   5  i    lu'l-    501 ; 

•_•:;   Am.   Rep.    661.      In    A 

uished  in  respect  ol  salary 
Rodman   v.   Musseli 
12  Bush,  23  Am.   K.  p. 

7.1. 

public  officers  having 
mouey  in  their  hands,  to  which  an  indi- 
vidual is  entitled,  are  no1  Bubject  to 
nishmeul  at  the  suil  of  the  creditors  of 
Buch  individual.  Stillman  v.  [sham,  11 
('mm.  123  (183£  -  cited;   v 

mntyof  Hartford,  12  Conn.  104,  108. 
And  in  that  State  a  comity,  nut  having 
power  t<>  contract  a  debt  tor  which  an 
action  will  lie  against  it,  N  no1  subjeel  to 
garnishment  in  such  a  case.  Ward  v. 
ity  <>f  Hartford,  12  Conn.  404.  But 
under  a  statute  enabling  towns  and  citii  - 
to  contract  debts,  ami  which  piw 
that  debts  due  from  "any  person"  to  a 
debtor  may  be  attached,  these  corpora- 
tions  may  be  factorized  or  garnisbed. 
I,  fv.  Wallingford,  20  Conn.  416  (1850). 
In  New  Jersey  a  municipal  corporation 
may  be  garnished.  Davis  v.  Gra\ 
Vroom  (38  X.  J.  I..).  104;  see  Jersey 
v.  Horton,  9  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.)  88. 
Alabama:  In  Underbill  v.  Calhoun,  63 
Ala.  21-;  (overruling  Smoot  v.  Hart,  33 
Ala.  69),  it  was  held  that  on  grounds  of 
public  policy  a  judgment  creditor  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  cannot  reach  by  gar- 
nishment funds  accruing  to  it  by  taxation 
whether  in  course  of  collection  or  alter 
being  paid  into  the  treasury.  Mayor  v. 
I;  i  md,  26  Al  i.  198,  hold  that  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  cannot  be  garnisbed 
as  d  cruing   salaries  to  its    offi- 

g  i    also  Clark  V.  School  ( 'omm'rs, 

36  Al.i.  621.     But  by  act  of  the  I< 
ture  (1866),  process  of  garnishment  lies 
against  a  municipal   corporation  to   sub- 
ject the  wages  oi   salarj  of  a  policeman  to 
the  satisfaction  of  a  judgment    obtained 

mst  him.  City  Council  v.  Van  Dorn, 
41  Ala.  505,  overruling  Mobile  v.  Row- 
land, ami  clavk  v.  Mobile  s.  C,  36 
Ala.  621.     In    Massachusetts  a  county   is 

■  chargeable  as  ;i  garnishee  for  jurors' 


feo.      Williams   v.    Boardman,    9    Allen, 
570.       In     U  ■,    notw ithstandinj 

general  .statute   of    th<    State  authorized 
the  garnishment  oi  any   "person  or  per- 
sons  what.  .  it   was 
held  that  municipalities  were  not  included, 
Int.  upon  genera]  mounds  of  public 
policy  ami  convenii  no  .  the  citj  could  not 
irnislied  in  respect  of  monej  due  from 
alat  ii  i   of  its  officers,  although  the 

officer    whose    salary     was    attached    could 

have  .sued  the  city  therefi  i       Baltimore  v. 
.  8  Md.  95  (1855).     The  city,  in  this 
case,  ■  hed  in   respect   of  mi 

due  from  it  to  a  polia  ■ 

But  in  A"<  "•  Hampshire,  under  a  statute 
making  "anj  corporation  possessed  of  any 
monej  "  of  the  dd, tor  subject  to  garnish- 
ment,  a  town,    was  held  to  be    included. 
Whidden   v.    Drake,    5   N.    H.    13.     See 
Brown  v.  Heath,   15  N.  II.  168.     In  / 
it  was  held  that  the  words  "debtor  or  per- 
son holding  property,"  in  the  attachment 
act,  extended   to  municipal  corporate 
and  that  they  were  subject  to  garnishment 
with  respect  to  ordinary  debts  which  they 
owed  the  main  debtor.     Wales   r.  Musca- 
tine,  1  Iowa,  302  |  1856).     The  decision  of 
the  court  asserts  the  Liability  to  garnish* 
lm-nt  on   general   principles  ;    bul  subse- 
quently  the  legislature  enacted   that  "a 
municipal  or  political  corporation   should 
not  be  garnished."     Rev.  1860,  sec.  3196. 
Under  the  legislation  of  Iowa,  the  exemp- 
tion   from    garnishment    is  complete   ami 
universal.      .Icnks  v.  Township,  45   Iowa, 
554.     Requisites  of  notice  to  corporation, 
Claflin  v.  Iowa  City,  TJ   Iowa,  284;  Wil- 
liams v.  Keiiuey.  98  Mass.  142.     In  Ohio, 
undei  a  statuti  which  provides  that  "any 
claims  or  chose.-,  in   action,  due  or  to  be- 
come due "    to   the  judgmenl    debtor,  or 
"money  which  he  may  have  in  the  hands 
oj  any  person,  body  politic  or  corporate," 
abjei  t   to  execution,  salaries  of  < »tfi- 
cers  of  incorporated  cities,  due   and  un- 
paid., may  be  subjected  by  the  judgment 
creditors  of  such  officers  to  the  payment  of 
their   judgments,  and    municipal   corpora- 
tions  may   be   garnished   with  respect  to 
smh   salaries.      Tic   court  admits  the  con- 
flicl  in  the  decisions  of  other  States  upon 
similar  statutes,  but  regards  the  construe. 
tion  above    givm  as  heing  in  accordance 
with  public  policy   and  the    meaning  of 


§101 


GARNISHMENT. 


103 


the  statute.  Newark  v.  Funk,  15  Ohio 
St.  462  (1864).  In  Illinois,  municipal 
corporations  are  not  subject  to  garnish- 
ment in  any  case,  no  matter  what  may  be 
the  character  of  the  indebtedness.  This 
position  is  maintained  by  Lawrence,  J., 
with  great  force.  Merwin  v.  Chicago,  45 
111.  133;  Burns  v.  Harper  (money  in 
hands  of  school  directors),  59  111.  21 
(1871)  ;  Millison  v.  Fisk,  43  111.  112. 
So  in  Iowa,  Jenks  v.  Township,  supra. 
Waiver.  Clapp  v.  Walker,  25  Iowa,  315. 
In  Minnesota  a  judgment  debtor  may  be 
ordered  to  assign  to  his  creditor  a  debt 
due  him  from  a  municipal  corporation. 
Knight  v.  Nash,  22  Minn.  452  (1876).  In 
Texas  the  view  suggested  in  the  text  is 


adopted,  and,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute,  -j 
city  is  subject  to  garnishment  for  ■< 
nary   debt   due  by  it   to  a  third   | 
City  of  Laredo    v.    Nalle,   65    T. 
(quoting  text). 

In  Kansas  a  city  cannot  be  garnished 
and  made  liable  to  pay  a  creditor  of  its 
creditor  without  express  statutory  pro- 
vision. Switzer  v.  Wellington  (Sup.  I  t. 
Kansas,  1889),  28  Am.  Law  Reg.  281, 
and  note  citing  and  reviewing  the  cases. 
Holt,  C,  said:  "Cities  are  a  part  of  the 
government,  and  should  not  be  required  to 
become  involved  in  litigation  in  which 
they  have  no  interest.  This  exemption 
from  garnishment  process  is  based  entirely 
upon  the  ground  of  public  policy." 


L64  MINICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §102 


CHAPTER   VI. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS—  CONTINUED. 

Special  Powers  and  Special  Limitations  upon  ordinary  Municipal 

Powers. 

§102  (66).  Outline  of  Subject.  —  While  municipal  corporations 
are  everywhere  instituted  for  the  same  general  purposes,  heretofore 
explained,1  and  while  there  is  a  striking  resemblance  in  the  author- 
ity with  which  they  are  clothed,  yet,  except  when  organized  under 
general  acts,  the  powers  given  to  them  in  their  single  and  separate 
charters  are  various,  both  in  character  and  extent.2  True  policy, 
indeed,  requires,  as  before  suggested,  that  the  powers  of  these  bodies 
should,  in  general,  be  confined  to  subjects  connected  with  civil 
g<  >vernment  and  local  administration ;  but  legislatures  are  usually 
Liberal  in  grants  of  this  character,  and  there  is  no  limit  to  the  facul- 
ties and  capacities  with  which  municipal  creations  may  be  endowed, 

ept  as  that  limit  is  contained  in  the  State  or  Federal  Constitu- 
tion.8  The  leading  powers  ordinarily  granted  to  municipalities,  such 
as  those  relating  to  contracts,  eminent  domain,  streets,  taxation, 
ordinances,  corporate  officers,  actions,  and  the  like,  will  be  hereafter 
aately  treated.  But  it  will  be  convenient  to  notice  in  this  place 
certain  special  powers  usually  or  often  conferred  upon  municipalities, 
and  some  special  limitations  upon  ordinary  municipal  powers,  and 
the  construction  which  such  provisions  have  judicially  received. 

We  shall  here  consider  the  following  subjects  as  they  relate  to 
municipal  corporations:  — 

1.  Wharves,  §§  103-113. 

2.  Ferries,  §§  114-116. 

3.  Borrowing  Money,  §§  117-129. 

4.  Limitations  on  the  Power  to  create  Debts,  §§  130-138. 
".     Pe  wards  for  Offenders,  §  139. 

6.  Public  Buildings,  §  140. 

7.  Police  Powers  and  Regulations,  §§  141,  142. 

8.  Prevention  of  Fires,  §  143. 

1  Ante,  chaps,  i.  ii. ;  supra,  sees.  99,  100.  8  Ante,  sees.  12,  14,  73,  and  chap.  iv. 

-  Ante,    sec.    39,    where    the    general  passim.      Aurora    v.    West,    9    Ind.    74 

model  of  an  ordinary  municipal   corpora-  (1857). 
is  given. 


§103 


WHARVES   AND    WIIARFAGE. 


165 


9.  Quarantine  and  Health,  §§  144-146. 

10.  Indemnifying  Officers,  §§  147,  148. 

11.  Furnishing  Entertainments,  §  149. 

12.  Impounding  Animals,  §  150. 

13.  Party  Walls,  §  151. 

14.  Public  Defence,  §  152. 

15.  Aid  to  Railway  Companies,  §  153. 

§  103  (67).  Wharves  and  Wharfage.  —  Among  the  special  powers 
often  conferred  by  the  legislature  upon  municipal  corporations 
bordering  upon  the  high  seas  or  navigable  waters  is  the  authority  to 
erect  wharves,  and  charge  wharfage  as  a  compensation  for  making 
and  keeping  the  same  and  their  approaches  in  a  proper  and  safe 
condition  for  the  landing,  loading,  and  unloading  of  vessels.1     The 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53, 
82  (1851)  ;  Pollard's  Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3 
How.  (U.  S.)  212;  Municipality  v.  Pease, 
2  La.  An.  538  (1847);  Worsley  v.  Munici- 
pality, 9  Eob.  (La.)  324;  New  Orleans  v. 
United  States,  10  Pet.  662,  737;  The 
Wharf  Case,  3  Bland  Ch.  (Md.)  383;  111. 
&c.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 
70  (1872);  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk,  95  U. 
S.  80  (1877);  distinguished,  Baldwin  v. 
Franks,  120  U.  S.  688;  Barneys  Keokuk, 
94  TJ.  S.  324  (1876);  Weber  v.  Harbor 
Comm'rs,  18  Wall.  57  (1873);  Packet  Co. 
v.  St.  Louis,  100  U.  S.  423  (1879);  Vicks- 
burg  v.  Tobin,  100  U.  S.  430  (1879); 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman,  105  U.  S.  166 
(1881);  note  to  18  Am.  and  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  511:  Mayor  of  St.  Martinsville  v. 
Steamer  Mary  Lewis,  32  La.  An.  1293; 
The  Geneva,  16  Fed.  Rep.  874;  Leathers 
v.  Aiken,  9  Fed.  Rep.  679.  Such  a  power 
does  not  violate  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  Packet  Co.  v.  Catletts- 
burg,  105  U.  S.  559.  The  right  of  a  mu- 
nicipality to  collect  wharfage  is  in  com- 
pensation for  actual  use  of  structures  pro- 
vided by  the  municipality.  Railroad  v. 
Ellerman,  105  U.  S.  166;  New  Orleans  v. 
Wilmot,  31  La.  An.  65.  An  incorporated 
town  cannot  charge  wharfage  for  the  use 
of  an  unimproved  river  bank  in  front  of 
it.  Christie  v.  Maiden,  23  W.  Va.  667 
(1884).  See  infra,  sec.  112,  note.  For 
rights  and  poivcrs  of  City  of  New  York,  in 
respect  to  wharves,  see  Kingsland  v.  New 
York,  110  N.  Y.  569  (18S8);  Williams  v. 


New  York,  105  N.  Y.  419;  Langdon  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  93  N.  Y.  129, 
and  cases  cited;  Turner  v.  People's  Ferrj 
Co.,  21  Fed.  Rep.  90.  Brooklyn:  Brook- 
lyn v.  New  York  Ferry  Co.,  87  N.  Y. 
204.  New  Orleans:  The  Lizzie  E..  30 
Fed.  Rep.  876;  Silver  v.  Tobin,  28  Fed. 
Rep.  545;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman,  105 
U.  S.  166;  New  Orleans  v.  Wilmot,  31 
La.  An.  65. 

Wharfage  charges  must  be  reasonable  (see 
infra,  sec.  112),  and  may  be  graduated  by 
the  tonnage  of  vessels  using  a  wharf  ;  and 
this  is  not  a  duty  of  tonnage  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Ouachita  Packet  Co.  v.  Aiken.  121 
U.  S.  444  (1886)  ;  Packet  Co.  v.  Catletts- 
burg,  105  U.  S.  559;  Packet  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  100  U.  S.  423  ;  Packet  Co.  v.  Keo- 
kuk, 95  U.  S.  80;  Transportation  Co.  v. 
Parkersburg,  107  U.  S.  691  ("wharf 
and  "  duty  of  tonnage"  defined  and  dis- 
tinguished); N.  W.  Tacket  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  4  Dillon,  10  (1876);  Keokuk  v. 
Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196  (1876);  >.  C. 
affirmed,  95  U.S.  80  (1877);  Ellerman 
v.  McMains,  30  La.  An.  190.  See,  also, 
United  States  v.  Duluth,  1  Dillon  ('.  C. 
469;  Packet  Co.  v.  Atlee,  2  Dillon,  479 
(1873);  s.  c.  21  Wall.  389.  In  Me  Mur- 
ray v.  Baltimore,  54  Md.  103,  it  was  held 
that  the  "dedication  of  a  street  to  public 
use  as  a  street  exit  ml  inn  to  t)  rried 

with  it  by  necessary  implication  the  right 
of  the  city  to  extend  it  into  a  harbor  by 
the    construction    of  a  wharf  at  the  end 


166 


MUNICIPAL   C0BP0RATI0N8, 


§103 


authority  of  the  State  over  navigable  waters  and  the  shores  is,  of 

Constitution  of  the   United  States,  and  the  laws 

made  in  pursuance  thereof  regulating  commerce,  and  to  the  admi- 

v    jurisdiction  of  the   Federal  courts.1     Although  the  power  to 

-    wharves  and  charge  wharfage  is  not  strictly  one  relating  to 

municipalities  in  their  private  or  local  character,  it  is,  nevertheless, 

competent  for  the  Legislature  to  make  them,  in  such  measure  as  it 

deems  expedient,  the  repository  of  it.2     Such  power  may  be  modi- 


To   same  effect,  Backus  v.  De- 
19  Mich.  llo.      Infra,  sec.  109  and 
1 10. 
-    te  and  authorized  municipal  •pilot 
■  vrbor  regulations,  when  not  in  con- 
.iih  the  Federal  Constitution  or  Fed- 
eral legislation,  are  valid.     Steamship  Co. 
2  Wall.  450;  Cooley  v.  Board  of 
Wardens,  L2  How.  (U.  S.)  296;  Pollard's 
in,  3  How.  -212  ;   Ouachita 
Co.   B.Aiken  (wharfage  charges), 
121  I'.   S.    in  co  r.  Rob 

36  N.  V.  292;  Port  Wardens  o.  Ship,  &c, 

I  l  La.  An.  -J-'.'  (1859);  Same  v.  Pratt,  10 
Rob.  (La.)  459;  Chapman  v.    .Miller   (pi- 

I,   -i   Speers    (S.  I '. )   Law,  769; 
aider  v.  Railroad  Co.  (duty  on  ton- 
|,    3  Strob.  (S.  C.)    Law,  594(1847); 
State    o.   City  Coumil,    1    Rich.   (S.  C.) 
Law,     286;     Commonwealth   v.  Alger,    7 
<  lush.    53,   82  (1850)  ;    Worsley    v.    Mu- 
nicipality,   above    cited  ;     Jeffersonville 
Ferry     Boat,    35     Ind.     19     (1870); 

II  M-lior-master    v.    Southerland,    47    Ala. 
511  (1872).    But  State  enactments,  which 

nut  to  a  regulation  of  commerce  or 
impose  a  duty  on  tonnage,  are  of  course 
void.  Cannon  o.  New  Orleans,  20  Wall. 
577  (1874);  Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Paul,  3 
Dillon,  154;  Peete  v.  Morgan,  19  Wall. 
581  (1873);  Steamship  Co.  v.  Port  Ward- 

.  6  Wall.  31  (1867).  The  collection 
of  wharfage  dues   do  Lolate  any 

provision  of  the  United  States  <  'onstitu- 
Where  a  municipal  corporation 
under  express  legislative  tuthority  is 
clothed  with  the  exclusive  right  to  col- 
from  all    vessels   thai 

niaki     use    of    its    wharves,  it    is    a    vested 

right    that    cannot  be    impaired   by   the 

;  iture.      Ellerman     v.    McMain 
La.   An.  pt.   1,   190.      But  tin-  is  denied 
and  overruled   by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  .States.     Railroad  Co.  i>.  Eller- 


man, 105  U.  S.  166.  A  city  has  no  ve 
right  to  wharfage.  "  Whatever  powers  the 
municipal  body  rightfully  enjoys  over  the 
subject  are  derived  fjrom  the  legislature, 
and  may  be  revoked  at  any  time,  not 
touching,  of  course,  any  property  of  the 
city  actually  acquired  in  the  course  of  ad- 
ministration." Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman, 
105  U.  S.  166,  172  (1881 ).  per  Matthews,  J. 
2  Fuller  v.  Edings,  11  Rich.  (S.  C) 
Law,  239  (1858) ;  Waddington  v.  St. 
Louis,  14  Mo.  190  (1851);  Baltimore 
r.  White,  2  Gill  (Md.),  444  (1845);  Wil- 
son v.  Inh.es,  11  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  351; 
Weber  v.  Harbor  Comm'rs,  18  Wall.  57 
(1873)  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman,  105 
U.  S.  166  (1881);  Town  of  Ravenswood 
v.  Flemings,  22  W.  Va.  ~r2,  where  an  act 
conferring  upon  a  town  the  exclusive  right 
to  erect  wharves  within  its  limits  between 
ordinary  high-water  mark  and  low-water 
mark  without  compensation  to  the  ad- 
jacent lot-owners,  was  held  constitutional, 
and  an  adjacent  owner  enjoined  from  con- 
structing a  wharf  within  those  limits  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  town.  The  owner 
of  a  private  wharf,  whose  land  is  com- 
pulsorily  taken  for  a  public  wharf,  is  not 
nih  entitled  to  be  compensated  for 
loss  of  incomt  from  his  private  wharf,  re- 
suiting  from  the  establishment  of  the  pub- 
lic wharf  near  to  the  private  one.  Fuller 
v.  Edings,  supra.     The  grant  of  an  «» 

\arf,  in  order  to  se- 
cure its  erection,  does  not  violate  the  pro- 
vision of  a  State  Constitution,  declaring 
"that  no  man  or  Bet  of  men  are  entitled 
to  exclusive,  separate  public  emoluments 
or  privileges  from  the  community,  but  in 
consideration  of  puhlie  services."  Such 
an  improvement  is  beneficial  to  the  puhlie, 
and.  in  older  to  secure  it,  the  exclusive. 
profits  fur  a  given  period  may  he  granted 
to  the  contractor.      Martin  v.  O'Brien,  34 


§103 


WHARVES    AND    WHARFAGE. 


167 


fied  or  revoked  by  the  legislature  at  its  pleasure  if  it  does  not  deprive 
the  municipality  of  property  actually  acquired  under  the  exercise  of 
the  power.1  It  may  authorize  a  municipal  corporation  to  establish 
a  public  wharf  upon  private,  propcrti/  mi  making  compensation  to 
the  owner  of  the  land;  and  the  power,  when  conferred  upon  the 


Miss.  (5  George)  21,  (1857);  see,  also, 
Geigei  v.  Filor,  8  Flor.  325  (1859).  Ef- 
feet  cf  14th  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitution  on  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  grant  exclusive  privileges.  See 
Slaughter  House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36 
(1872). 

1  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman,  105  U.  S. 
166(1881).  This  ease  adjudged  two  im- 
portant points.  The  city  of  New  Orleans 
was  empowered  by  the  legislature  to  con- 
struct levees  and  wharves  on  the  banks  of 
rhe  Mississippi  River  within  its  limits, 
and  to  charge  reasonable  compensation  for 
their  use.  Under  this  authority  the  city, 
at  its  expense,  graded  the  banks  of  the 
river  at  certain  points,  drove  piles,  covered 
them  with  plank  flooring,  and  thus  con- 
structed wharves  for  the  convenient  land- 
ing of  vessels.  The  legislature  also  au- 
thorized the  defendant  railroad  company, 
whose  terminus  was  in  New  Orleans,  to 
construct,  manage,  use,  and  enjoy,  not 
only  its  railroad  property  and  appurte- 
nances, but  also  any  steamboat  piers  and 
wharves  that  the  directors  might  deem 
necessary  or  convenient.  And  afterwards, 
by  an  act  passed  in  1869,  the  legislature 
authorized  this  railroad  company  to  en- 
close a  portion  of  the  banks  of  the  river 
(at  a  place  never  improved  or  used  by  the 
city  as  a  wharf),  and  to  use  the  place  thus 
enclosed  for  the  purposes  of  a  wharf  for 
vessels;  and  the  act  further  provided  that 
no  vessel  should  use  such  wharf  without 
the  consent  of  the  railroad  company,  and 
that  all  vessels  so  using  such  wharf  and 
not  using  any  other  wharf  in  the  city 
should  be  exempt  from  the  payment  of 
levee  and  wharf  dues  to  the  city.  The 
railroad  company  afterward  leased  its 
wharf  to  others,  which  lease  provided  that 
vessels  coming  to  the  consignment,  cus- 
tody, or  care  of  the  lessees  might  load  and 
unload  their  cargoes  on  the  said  wharf, 
exempt  from  wharf  and  levee  dues  to  the 
city.     The  city  made  two  points  :    First, 


that  inasmuch  as  under  its  franchise  to 
construct  wharves  it  had  expended  large 
sums  in  making  wharves  for  the  public 
convenience,  it  had  a  vested  right  to  the 
franchise  and  its  revenues,  of  which  it 
could  not  be  deprived,  as  the  legislature 
had  sought  to  do,  by  the  act  of  1869. 
Second,  it  was  also  contended  that  it  was 
a  violation  of  the  city's  rights  for  the 
railroad  company  to  permit  the  use  and 
employment  of  their  property  as  a  wharf 
by  persons  not  engaged  in  conducting  the 
proper  business  of  the  railroad  company, 
thus  opening  a  rival  wharf  business  in 
competition  with  the  city  ;  and  that  the 
act  of  1869,  if  it  authorizes  this  to  be 
done,  is  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  which  forbids  the  tak- 
ing of  private  property  without  due  pro- 
cess of  law.     See  ante,  sec.  68,  note. 

The  Supreme  Court  decided  that  the 
action  could  not  be  maintained;  that  the 
act  of  1869  did  not  infringe  any  vested 
rights  of  the  city,  and  that  the  question 
as  to  whether  the  company  in  constructing 
its  wharf  and  in  leasing  it  out,  as  above 
stated,  acted  ultra  vires,  could  not  be 
raised  by  the  city,  which  was  not  a  stock- 
holder in  the  defendant  company. 

The  decision  below  (2  Woods,  120),  fol- 
lowing the  decision  of  the  Supremi 
of  Louisiana  in  New  Orleans  v.  The  Rail- 
road Co.  (27  La.  An.  414),  based  on  the 
proposition  that  the  act  of  1S69  did  not 
confer  upon  the  railroad  company  the 
right  to  charge  wharfage  dues  against  ves- 
sels landing  at  the  said  wharf  which  were 
in  no  way  connected  with  the  business  oi 
the  railroad  company,  and  the  right  to 
maintain  a  free  wharf  for  such  \. 
was  reversed.  Onthispoinl  the  Supreme 
Court  was  of  opinion  that  the  city  was 
not  entitled  to  raise  the  question  that  the 
company  was  violating  its  charter  in  this 
respect,  and  under  that  cover  to  create 
and  protect  a  monopoly  which  the  law 
did  not  give  to  it. 


L68 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§105 


municipality,  cannot  be  arrested  by  an  offer  on  the  part  of  the  land- 
owner himself  to  erect  a  wharf.1 

§   L04   (08).      Public   and    Private. — Wharves,    piers,    <piays,    and 

lauding  places  may  be  either  public  or  private.  They  may  be,  in 
their  nature,  public,  although  the  property  be  owned  by  an  indi- 
vidual If  private,  the  public  have  no  right  to  use  the  erection 
without  the  owner's  consent,  express  or  implied;2  i£  public,  they  may 
be  used  by  persons  generally  upon  the  payment  of  a  reasonable  com- 
pensation. Whether  they  are  public  or  private  depends,  in  case  of 
dispute,  upon  circumstances,  such  as  the  purpose  for  which  they 
were  built,  the  uses  to  which  they  have  been  applied,  the  place 
where  situated,  and  the  character  of  the  structure.3 


§  105 


(69).  Duties  and  Rights  of  Owner.  —  The  keeping  of  a 
wharf  or  dock,  erected  and  opened  to  the  public,  like  the  keeping  of 
an  inn,  confers  a  general  license  to  boats  and  vessels  to  occupy  it  for 
lawful  purposes,  —  a  license  which  can  be  terminated  only  by  notice 


1  WaddiDgton  v.  St.  Louis,  above 
cited  ;  [roil  Railroad  Co.  v.  I  ronton,  19 
Ohio  St.  299  (1869);  Page  v.  Bal 
34  .\M.  558  (1871);  State  v.  Jersey  City, 
4->  X.  J.  L.  390.  Municipalities  may 
under  legislative  grant  build  whan 

on  streets  bordering  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi  River,  and  make  or  authorize  the 
making  of  other  improvements  thereon  : 
such  as  a  steamboat  depot  building,  for  the 
of  freight  and  the  convenienci  of 
travellers.  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S. 
324  (1876);  .    1   Dillon,   593  ; 

111.  &c.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon,  70. 
Although  its  charter  and  the  statutes  give 
a  city  power  to  maintain  wharves 
led  wharfage,  the  legislature  may  law- 
fully granl  to  a  railroad  company  a  par- 
//,.  water  jr>>i,i  for  its  own  wharf 
i  j,  five  from  the  control  of  the  city. 
Railroad  Company  v.  Ellerman,  1". 
166. 

-  a  town  L  'i  under  thi 

of  West  Virginia  has  no  povi 
and  collect  v  om  the  ovi  - 

private  wharf  who  uses  it  as  the  landing 
of  .i  ferry  of  which  he  is  the  proprietor. 
.  Maiden,  23  W.  Va.  667. 
D  itton  v.   Strong,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 
$61).     The  owner  of  a  privaU  pier 
may,  it  w-as  held  in  this  case,  cut  loose  a 


I  attached  to  it  without  a  license  if 
the  pier  be  thereby  endangered,  no  matter 
how  great  the  stress  of  the  weather  or  the 
peril  to  which  the  vessel  may  be  thereby 
subjected.  That  compensation  is  received 
for  the  use  of  a  public  wharf  does  not  de- 
prive it  of  its  public  character.  Galves- 
ton Wharf  Co.  v.  Galveston,  63  Tex.  14. 

Wharf:   What  constitutes.   Upon  anon' 

tidal  stream,   any  i struction  of  timber 

or  stone  upon  the  hank,  of  such  shape 
that  a  vessel  may  lie  alongside  of  it,  with 
its  broadside  to  the  shore,  constitul 
wharf;  and  a  paved  street  extending  to  the 
water's  ■  Ige,  and  used  hy  vessels  as  a 
place  for  receiving  and  discharging  freight 
and  passengers,  may  be  so  designated. 
Keokuk  v.  Keokuk,  kc.  Packet  Co.,  45 
Iowa,  196  (1876). 

Expenditures  in  providing  wharves  is 
the  basis  of  the  municipality's  right  to 
colled  wharfage.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Eller- 
man, I"-  U.  S.  166  (1881).  A  paved 
•  u  depth  into  the 
watt ".  and  used  by  the  citizens  generallyfor 
all  purpose  I  and  by  vessels  for  a 

landing  pie.-,  is  a  Buf&cient  wharf  to  jus- 
tify a  city  in  charging  wharfage  on  a  non- 
tidal  .stream  like  the  Mississippi  River. 
Keokuk  v.  Keokuk  &c.  Packet  Co.,  45 
Iowa,  196,206(1876). 


§  106 


RIGHT    OF   RIPARIAN    OWNER. 


169 


and  request  to  remove  the  vessel.1  When  thus  established,  the 
owner  at  common  law  is,  as  respects  the  public,  bound  to  keep  it  in 
good  repair?  In  view  of  these  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  owner 
of  the  wharf,  the  common  law  gave  him  the  right  to  distrain  for  his 
wharfage  or  toll.3 

§  106  (70).  Right  of  Riparian  Owner.  —  By  the  common  law, 
the  riparian  owner  has  the  right  to  establish  a  wharf  on  his  own  soil, 
this  being  a  lawful  use  of  the  land.4  The  right  is  judicially  recog- 
nized in  this  country,  and  riparian  proprietors  on  ocean,  lake,  or 
navigable  river  have,  in  virtue  of  their  proprietorship,  and  without 
special  legislative  authority,  the  right  to  erect  wharves,  quays,  piers, 
and  landing  places  on  the  shore,  if  these  conform  to  the  regulations 
of  the  State  for  the  protection  of  the  public,  and  do  not  become  a 
nuisance  by  obstructing  the  paramount  right  of  navigation.  This 
right  has  been  exercised  by  the  owners  of  the  adjacent  land  from  the 
first  settlement  of  the  country.  The  right  terminates  at  the  point 
of  navigability,  unless  special  authority  be  conferred,  because  at  this 
point    the    necessity   for   such   erections   ordinarily    ceases.     Such 


1  Heeney  v.  Heeney,  2  Denio,  625  ; 
Nicoll  v.  Gardner,  13  Wend.  289  (1835); 
Lansing  v.  Smith,  4  Wend.  9;  Dutton  v. 
Strong,  1  Black,  23,  distinguished  from 
Heeney  v.  Heeney,  supra;  Chicago  Dock 
Co.  v.  Garrity,  115  111.  155. 

2  A  municipality  owning  a  wharf  is 
bound  to  exercise  the  same  care  as  is 
required  of  an  individual  owner,  for  the 
convenience  and  safety  of  boats,  &c, 
using  it.  Willey  v.  Allegheny,  118  Pa. 
St.  490.  See,  also,  Watson  v.  Turnbull, 
32  La.  An.  856;  infra,  sec.  114. 

3  Hale  de  Port.  Maris,  77;  Bradley  on 
Distress,  133 ;  Nicoll  v.  Gardner,  13 
Wend.  289.  The  right  of  distress  is  reg- 
ulated by  statute  in  the  city  of  New 
York,  and  it  was  there  held,  that  where 
wharfage  accrued  in  the  seventh  ward, 
the  owner  of  the  wharf  might  distrain 
therefor  in  the  eleventh  ward.  13  Wend. 
289.  See  Lansing  v.  Smith,  4  Wend.  9, 
21.  Wharfage  is  not  properly  a  tax,  like 
that  levied  to  support  government,  but 
rather  compensation  paid  by  owners  of 
vessels  for  accommodation  for  their  boats 
and  merchandise.  Swartz  v.  Flatboats, 
14  La.  An.   243  (1859);  s.  p.  Keokuk  v. 


Keokuk  Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196  (1876). 
If  a  city  is  entitled  to  the  wharfage  from 
public  wharves,  and  the  owner  of  a  lot 
adjacent  to  such  wharf  receives  wharfage, 
he  is  liable  to  the  city  therefor.  Balti- 
more v.  White  (assumpsit),  2  Gill  (Md. ), 
444.  The  right,  as  between  private  per- 
sons and  a  city  corporation,  to  the  money 
collected  for  wharfage,  may  be  tried  in  an 
action  for  money  had  and  received.  Mur- 
phy v.  City  Council,  11  Ala.  586  (1847). 
See  Grant  v.  Davenport,  18  Iowa,  179. 

4  Nicoll  v.  Gardner,  13  Wend.  289, 
(1835),  per  Nelson,  J.;  Lansing  v.  Smith, 
4  Wend.  9,  affirming  s.  c.  8  Cow.  146. 
See  observations  of  Finch,  J.,  in  Mayor 
v.  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443,  457  (1S84),  as'  to 
nature  of  riparian  rights  and  privileges. 
Heeney  v.  Heeney,  2  Denio,  625;  Myers 
v.  St.  Louis,  82  Mo.  367;  s.  c.  below,  3 
Mo.  App.  266;  Union  Depot  ,Co.  v. 
Brunswick,  31  Minn.  297;  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Schurmeir,  7  Wall.  272  ;  Yates  r.  Mil- 
waukee, 10  Wall.  497  ;  Weber  v.  Harbor 
Comm'rs,  IS  Wall.  57;  Potomac  Steam- 
boat Co.  v.  Upper  Potomac  &c.  Co.,  109 
U.  S.  67'J;  Hoboken  v.  Peun.  R.  R.  Co., 
124  U.  8.  556.     Infra,  sec.  10'/,  and  note. 


L70 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  106 


structures  are  presumptively  lawful  where  they  arc  confined  to  the 
shore,  and  no  positive  law  is  violated  in  their  erection.1 


1   Id  •  i    .    r.    Beeney,   2    Denio,   625  ; 
Thornton   v.  Grant,    10    R.  I.  177  (1873); 
s.  o.  11  Am.  Rep.  701;  Sherlock  v.  Bain- 
i!    [nd.  35  (1872);  8.  c.  13  Am. 
Rep.   302;  Wisconsin,   &c.  Co.  v.  Lyons, 
30  Wis.  61;   Dutton  v.  Strong  (action  of 
owner  of  vessel  against  own- 
er  of   private  pier  for  catting  the  vessel 
l  Black  (U.  S.),  23  (1861),  distin- 
guished   from    Heenay   c.   Eeeney,   above 
cited.     Same    principle  reaffirmed,   Rail- 
road Co.  c  Schurmeir,  7  Wall.  272;   fates 
v.    Milwaukee,    lu  Wall.    497;   approved, 
Weber  v.  Harbor  Comm'rs,   18  Wall.   57 
(1-7:;);    Illinois    V.  Illinois  Central    R.  R. 
Co.    (Chicago   lake   front    case),   33  Fed. 
Rep.   730;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1   Dutch. 
(X.  J.)  525,  530;   Wetmore   v.   Brooklyn 
l    ...     12    X.    V.    384  ;  Galveston   v. 
Menard,  23  Tex.  319;  Grant  v.  Davenport, 
L8    Iowa,    179,  per    Wright,  J.      Bui  in 
see  1  '.ma  v.  Jackson,  &c    '  !o., 
L18.     As  to  right  to  erect   wharf 
than  riparian   owner  on  a  tidal 
1  elow  high-water  mark,  quaere  ;  see 
Hagan  v.  Campbell,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  9.    In 
ise   it  is  said;  "It  is  clear  that  no 
part  of  lions  can  be  rested  upon 

the  funis  of  the  riparian  proprietor,  nor 
ran  he  be  excluded  from  the  use  of  the 
other  riparian  rights." 
Sei  People  v.  Davidson,  30  Cal.  379; 
Walker  v.  State  Harbor  Comm'rs,  17 
Wall.  (548  (1873);  Packet  Co.  v.  Atlee,  2 
Dillon,  179  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  21  Wall.  389. 
The  plaintiff  owned  in  fee,  subject  to  the 
public  easement  of  travel  thereon,  land  to 
the  centre-  of  a  street  extending  to  the 
water  line  of  the  Ea  I  River,  on  which  he 
bad  constructed  a  bulkhead  and  wharf, 
and  bad  the  righl  to  colled  wharfage; 
the  city  of  Brooklyn,  withoul  plaintiffs 
and  wrongfully,  built  a  pier  at 
the  end  of  the  street,  which  pier  was  at- 
tached to  t  he  plaintiffs  soil  and  between 
his  land  and  the  water  line,  and  shul  off 
the  water  from  the  plaintiff s  wharf ;  and 

rds    the    city    collect*  'I    h 
from  all  persons  using  the  same.     It  was 
ln-ld  thai  the  pier  in  fronl   of  the   plain- 
i  he  si  reel  became  the  prop- 
tie-  plaintiff  by  accretion,  and  that 


the  plaintiff  could  compel  the  city  to  ac- 
count  by  way  of  damages  for  all  of  the 
ived  by  the  city,  without  al- 
lowance  for  any  expense  of  collecting  tin- 
same, —  which  latter  seems  to  be  a  very 
rigid  rule,  as  it  apparently  goes  beyond  the 
line  of  compensation.  Steers  v.  Brooklyn, 
101  X.  V.  51  (1885). 

Riparian  rights  such  as  wharfage,  'I" 
do1  necessarily  attach  to  grants  -;;  land  by 
the  State  under  tide  water  below  the  shore 
line,  "/■  low-water  mark.  In  such  ease  the 
right  to  wharfage  depends  upon  the  terms 
of  the  grant,  or  its  intent  as  shown  by  its 
declared  purpose  or  by  fair  inference  from 
its  terms  and  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances, such  as  long  continue, 1  prior  use, 
&c.  Weber  v.  Harbor  Comm'rs,  18  Wall. 
57  (1873);  Potomac  Steamboal  Co.  o. 
Upper  Potomac  Co.,  109  U.  S.  672.  The 
principles  of  these  cases  were  applied  in 
Turner  v.  People's  Ferry  Co.  (U.  S.  Cm. 
Court,  N.  Y.),  21  Fed.  Rep.  90  (1884), 
where,  under  the  circumstances,  it  was  held 
that  the  owner  or  lessee  of  premises  along 
the  bulkhead  line  at  the  bead  of  a  slip, 
between  two  wharves  owned  by  the  city  of 
New  York,  was  not  entitled  to  an  injunc- 
tion to  restrain  the  erection  of  a  ferry  rack 
and  structures  under  authority  of  the 
State  and  the  city  in  the  slip  in  front  of  his 
premises;  which  structures  when  erected, 
although  they  would  impair,  would  not 
en'  the  complainant  off  from  free  ami  open 
access  to  his  premises.  The  legislation* of 
New  York  applicable  to  the  questiim  and 
•  bearing  upon  it  are  clearly  pre- 
sented in  the  opinion  of  Brown,  J.  See 
greal  ease  of  Langdon  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  93  N.  Y.  129  (1883),  and  ob- 
servations  of  Earl,  J.  pp.  144,  1  15,  as 
tu  construction  of  water  grants  by  the 
State  and  by  tbo  city.  Hoboken  v. 
I  in.  R.  R.  Co.,  124  U.  S.  656,  di 
tie-  power  of  the  legislature  in  respeel  of 
making  grants  of  land  under  the  naviga- 
ble waters  of  the  State.  Gould  v.  Hudson 
River  R.  1.'.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  522;  Langdon  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  93  X.  Y.  L30, 
111;  Mayoi  &C.  ».  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443 
(1884);  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Trone; 
28  Pa.   St.    206  ;  Tomlin   v.    R.   R.    Co., 


§107 


LIMITATIONS   ON   RIPARIAN    RIGHT. 


171 


§  107    (71).      Limitations  on  Riparian  Right.  - — -The  rvjlits  of  rip  <- 

ri'in  proprietors  in  respect  to  the  election  of  wharves,  are  .suLject  to 
such  reasonable  limitations  and  restraints  us  the  legislature  may 
think  it  necessary  and  expedient  to  impose.  Therefore  it  is  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  to  pass  acts  establishing  harbor  and  '/'«/.■  Inn  % 
and  to  take  away  the  right  of  the  proprietors  to  build  wharves  on 
their  own  land  beyond  the  lines,  even  when  such  wharves  would  be 
no  actual  injury  to  navigation.1     But  the  right  of  wharfage  held  by 


32  Towa,    106  ;   Ingraham   v.   R.    R.   Co., 
34  Iowa,  249. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53 
(1851).  This  subject  is  here  very  fully 
ami  learnedly  discussed  and  examined. 
See  also,  Hart  v.  Mayor,  9  Wend.  571, 
valuable  case,  affirming  3  Paige,  213; 
Wetmore  v.  Brooklyn  Gas  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 
384;  People  v.  Vanderbilt,  26  N.  Y.  287; 
Same  v.  Same,  28  N.  Y.  396;  Pollard's 
Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3  How.  (IT.  S. )  212; 
Hagan  v.  Campbell,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  9; 
Mobile  v.  Eslava,  9  Port.  (Ala.)  577, 
(1839);  Railroad  Co.  v.  Winthrop,  5  La. 
An.  36.  In  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall. 
497,  Mr.  Justice  Milhr,  on  behalf  of  the 
court,  speaking  of  an  existing  wharf,  de- 
nied that  the  city  of  Milwaukee,  under 
the  power  to  establish  dock  and  wharf  lines, 
could  create  an  artificial  and  imaginary 
dock  line,  hundreds  of  feet  away  from  the 
navigable  part  of  the  river,  and,  without 
making  the  river  navigable  up  to  that 
line,  deprive  the  riparian  owners  of  the 
right  to  avail  themselves  of  the  advantages 
of  the  navigable  channel  by  building 
wharves  and  docks  to  it  for  that  purpose; 
and  said  that  if  the  city  deemed  the  re- 
moval of  the  wharf  in  question  necessary 
in  the  prosecution  of  any  general  scheme 
of  widening  the  channel  or  improving  the 
navigation  of  the  river,  it  must  first  make 
the  owner  compensation  for  his  property 
thus  taken  for  the  public  use.  As  to  this 
case,  see  infra,  sec.  111.  Nature  and 
extent  of  ripariim  rights  fully  considered  in 
Lyon  v.  Fishmongers'  Co.,  L.  R.  1  App. 
Cas.  662  (1876);  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94 
U.  S.  324  (1876).  The  riparian  proprie- 
tor upon  a  navigable  lake,  subject  to  the 
rights  of  the  public,  has  the  right  to  build 
piers  and  wharf  in  aid  of  navigation  in 
front  of  his  land,  not  interfering  with  the 
public  easement  ;   which  rights  appertain 


to  his  title,  and  arc  of  such  a  nature  that 
the   legislature    cannot  ;i    rail- 

way company  to  build  in  front  thereof  so 
as  to  cut  off  access  to  the  water,  v 
such  company  being  liable  for  dam 
the  riparian  proprietor.  Delaplaine  v.  < '. 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  42  Wis.  214  (1887). 
The  judgment  is  largely  founded  on  and 
approves  the  opinions  in  Lyon  v.  Fish- 
mongers'Co.,  I..  II.  1  App.  Cas.  662.  As 
to  power  of  the  legislature  in  respect  of 
making  grants  of  lands  under  navigable 
waters,  see  Hoboken  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co., 
124  U.  S.  656,  distinguishing  Hoboken 
Land  and  Improvement  Co.  v.  Hoboken, 
36  N.  J.  Law,  540,  and  other  cases  in 
New  Jersey.  See  Yates  ■;;.  Milwaukee,  10 
Wall.  497;  Weber  v.  Harbor  Comm'rs,  18 
Wall.  57;  Railway  Co.  v.  Renwick,  102 
U.  S.  180.  The  leading  case  in  New 
York  as  to  construction  and  effect  of 
grants  of  land  under  water  is  Langdon  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  93  X.  Y.  129. 

Referring  to  the  conflicting  cases  as  to 
tin-  nature  and  extent  of  the  rights  of  the 
riparian  proprietor,  Cooley,  J.,  said:  "In 
Railway  Co.  v.  Renwick,  102  F.  S.  180, 
the  bi  iter  and  more  substantial  doctrine 
is  laid  down,  that  the  land  under  the  water 
in  front  of  a  riparian  proprietor,  though 
beyond  the  line  of  private  ownership,  can- 
not be  taken  and  appropriated  to  a  pub- 
lic use  by  a  railway  company  under  its 
right  of  eminent  domain  without  making 
compensation  to  the  riparian  proprietor." 
Backus  v.  Detroit,  49  Mich.  110,  114 
(1882).  Contra,  Langdon  -■.  Mayor  of 
New  York,  93  N.  Y.  12!',  and  New  York 
cases  there  cited.  See  interesting  opinion 
of  Finch,  J.,  in  Mayor  v.  Hart,  95  N.  Y. 
443,  457  (1884). 

In  the  Chicago  Lake  Front  Case,  33 
Fed.  Rep.  730,  U.  S.  Cir.  Court,  Harlan 
and  Blodgett,  JJ.  (Illinois  v.  Illinois  Cent. 


172 


MI'NICTPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§109 


a  grantee  under  a  valid  city  grant,  although  it  is  an  incorporeal 
right,  is  nevertheless  property,  or  a  property  right  which  can  only 
be  taken  away  by  the  legislature  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
eminent  domain,  on  making  compensation  to  the  owner  of  the 
wharfag<    right1 

sj  L08  (72).  Right  to  erect  Public  Wharves. — While  the  riparian 
proprietor  has  the  right  to  erect  wharves  which  are  private  in  their 
nature,  but  which  may  be  used  by  the  public  with  the  consent  of  the 
<>\\  ner,  express  or  implied,  the  right  to  erect  public  ivharves  and  to  de- 
mand  tolls  or  fixed  rates  of  wharfage  is,  according  to  the  better  view, 
a  franchise,  which  must  have  its  origin  in  a  legislative  grant.2 


§  10'.»    (73).    By  Municipality. — 

rian  proprietor,  this  will  probably 

R.  R.  Co. ).  it  was  held  that  the  defendant 
railroad  company,  as  the  riparian  owner  of 
in  water  lots  in  Chicago,  had  the 
,  by  virtue  of  such  ownership,  to 
tore-line  by  artificial  con- 
Btruction  with  outside  waters  thai  were 
navigable  in  fact,  in  the  absence  of  legis- 
lative or  governmental  direction  to  the 
contrary  ;  although  the  courl  added,  thai 
the  exercise  of  that  right  is  at  all  times 
Bubject  to  such  regulations—  al  least, 
those  no1  amounting  to  prohibition  —  as 
the  State  maj  establish  ;  citing  text, 
sees.  70  77;  Yates  '•.  Milwaukee,  10 
Wall.  397,  and  other  cases.  It  was  also 
declared  in  the  same  case  that  the  State  of 
Illinois  had  the  power,  by  legislation,  to 
fix  pier,  dock,  or  wharf  lines,  other  than 
those  erected  under  authority  of  the 
United  SI  ites,  to  which  riparian  owners 
in  waters  navigable  in  point  of  fact  must 
conform. 

.1/     icipal    control,     wader    legislative 

'■'./    of  riparian    owner    to 

wharj  Baltimore  v.   White,   2  Gill 

(Md.),  til   (1845);  Wilson  v.  [nloes,  11 

Gill    &  J.  (Md.)  851;  Barney  v.    Keokuk, 

94  f.  s.  324  (1876);     .0.4    Dillon,  593; 

Weber  v.  Harbor  Comm'rs,  18   Wall.   57 

(1873).     When,  mi. In- acts  of  the  legisla- 

tun  .  I  the  power  to  refuse  assent 

to  riparian  owners  to  i  reel  wharves,  or  to 

allow  it  upon  such  terms  as  they  deemed 

I  thi   'i  e  of  the 

of  that  city,  it  was  held  thai  the  city 

might  make  the  grant  of  the  righl  '"  erect 


If  a  municipality  is  itself  a  ripa- 
give  to  it,  in  the  absence  of  any 

a  wharf  upon  the  condition  that  its  ex- 
terior margin  should  constitute  a  jniblic 
wharf.     Baltimore  v.  White,  supra. 

1  Langdon  v.  Mayor,  &c.  93  N.  Y. 
L29;  Williams  v.  Mayor,  &c.  105  N.  Y. 
419.  For  measure  of  compensation  to 
the  wharf  proprietor  in  such  case,  see 
Kingsland  v.  Mayor,  &c.  110  N.  Y.  569. 

-  People  v.  Wharf  Co.,  31  Cal.  34; 
The  Wharf  Case,  3  Bland  Ch.  (Md.)  383; 
Wiswall  v.  Hall,  3  Paige  Ch.  313  ;  Houck 
on  Rivers,  sec.  282;  Thompson  v.  Mayor, 
11  N.  Y.  115.  Text  approved:  Christie  v. 
Maiden,  23  W.  Va.  667;  The  Geneva, 
16  Fed.  Rep.  874.  See,  as  to  nav 
right  to  moor  and  land,  Rainhridge  v. 
Sherlock,  29  Ind.  304  ;  modified,  Sher- 
lock v.  Rainhridge,  41  Ind.  35  (1872)  ; 
Talbol  u.Grace,  30  Ind.  389  ;  Jefferson. 
ville  v.  Ferry  Co.,  27  Ind.  100  ;  8.  c.  35 
linl.  19  (1870) ;  Railroad  Co.  p.  Ellerman, 
105  IT.  S.  166;  New  Orleans  v.  Wilmot, 
31  La.  An.  65.  Right  of  city  as  to  grant 
to  it  of  land  under  water,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  such  grant.  Langdon  v.  Mayor, 
&c.  of  New  York,  93  N.  V.  129  ;  Weber 
r.  Harbor  Comm'rs,  18  Wall.  57  ;  Ho- 
boken  ».  Pa.  R.  It.  Co.,  124  U.  S.  656, 
distinguishing  Boboken  Land  Imp.  Co.  v. 
Hoboken,  86  N.J.  L.  540 ;  supra,  sec. 
107,  note.  State  courts  have  jurisdiction 
of  suits  for  wharfage  against  domestic 
vessels.  Jeffersonville  v.  Ferry  Co.,  35 
Ind.  19,  23  ;  The  Phebe,  1  Ware  Rep. 
860  :  Russell  v.  The  Swift,  Newb.  R.  553  ; 
Lewis,  In  re,  2  Gallis.  483. 


§109 


AUTHORITY   TO    ERECT   WflARVES. 


173 


restrictive  provision  in  its  organic  act,  the  implied  authority  to  erect 
a  wharf  thereon,  and  it  would  have  the  incidental  right,  the  same  as 
a  private  owner,  to  charge  compensation  for  its  use.1      Its  rights 


1  Murphy  v.  City  Council,  11  Ala.  586 
(1847).  The  court  suy:  "The  title  to 
the  wharf  is  in  the  city,  and,  such  being 
the  fact,  it  had  the  same  right  as  any  other 
proprietor  to  collect  wharfage  from  those 
landing  goods  there.  This  right,  result- 
ing from  its  proprietary  interest,  is  not  a 
franchise,  but  a  right  of  property."  lb., 
per  Ormond,  J.,  p.  558.  The  city  of 
Boston  has,  under  the  laws  of  Massachu- 
setts, the  same  rights  as  other  littoral 
proprietors,  and  was  held  not  to  dedicate 
a  dock,  which  it  owned,  to  the  public,  by 
merely  abstaining  from  any  control  over 
it.  The  court  observe  :  "  The  people  of 
Boston,  who  owned  the  land  as  their  com- 
mon and  private  property,  acted  through 
a  corporation  (the  city),  whose  corporate 
grants  and  licenses  are  matters  of  record. 
Their  own  use  of  their  own  property  for 
their  own  benefit  cannot  be  called  a  dedi- 
cation of  it  to  any  other  public  of  wider 
extent.  Whether  it  was  called  '  town 
dock  '  or  '  public  dock '  which  were  used 
as  synonymous  terms),  it  would  furnish 
no  ground  to  presume  that  they  had  parted 
with  their  right  to  govern  and  use  it  in 
the  manner  most  beneficial  to  the  people 
or  public  of  the  town  or  city."  Boston  v. 
Lecraw,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  426  (1854).  The 
title  and  right  involved  in  the  Lecraw  case, 
just  cited,  were  before  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  three  times  (17  How. 
426;  19  How.  263;  24  How.  188).  The 
plaintiff  was  the  owner  of  two  wharves, 
called  the  Price  Wharf  and  the  Bull  Wharf, 
which  extended  from  high  to  low  water 
mark.  Tho  City  of  Boston  (the  defendant) 
laid  out  Summer  Street  thirty  feet  in  width 
to  the  water,  and  the  lines  of  the  street  if 
extended  into  the  water  would  separate 
the  plaintiff's  two  wharves.  The  land 
under  the  waters  within  such  extended 
space  between  high  and  low  water  mark 
belonged  to  the  city.  The  action  was 
brought  by  the  wharf  owner  or  his  tenant 
against  the  city  for  nuisance,  charging  that 
the  city  had  erected  piles  in  the  said  water 
space,  or  dock,  between  the  plaintiff's  two 
wharves  ;  also  a  drain  in  the  dock  for  car- 
rying off  sewage.     In  the  case  in  17  How. 


426,  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  tho 
City  of  Boston,  as  the  proprietor  of  tin: 
land  under  water  at  the  foot  of  Summer 
Street,  might  reclaim  the  land  underwater 
by  filling  up  the  space  and  building 
on,  and  thus  exclude  the  public,  including 
the  plaintiff,  from  its  use  for  navigation 
when  covered  by  the  tide  ;  but  that  until 
the  owner  (the  city)  did  so  the  public 
might  lawfully  use  the  same  ;  and  that 
such  use  is  not  adverse  to  the  city  or  the 
owner  of  tin:  land,  and  lays  no  foundation 
for  a  claim  of  dedication  of  the  land  to 
that  use,  since  the  right  of  navigation  is 
the  paramount  right,  but  was  a  right  de- 
feasible by  the  exercise  of  the  city's  right 
to  reclaim  its  land  under  water  by  wharf- 
ing  out  or  making  erections  thereon  bene- 
ficial to  itself  ;  and  the  court  held  that 
there  was  no  evidence  whatever  that  the 
city  or  the  people  of  Boston  had  dedicated 
the  slip  or  dock  between  the  plaintiffs 
wharves  to  any  public  use,  and  that  the 
city  had  the  right  to  drive  piles  or  extend 
its  sewers  in  the  locus  in  quo  to  low-water 
mark.  In  the  case  in  19  How.  263,  the 
court  decided  that  if  the  city  had  deter- 
mined to  reclaim  this  dock  or  land  under 
water  between  the  plaintiff's  wharves,  and 
had  laid  out  and  constructed  a  street 
thereon  or  continued  tho  street  to  low- 
water  mark,  then  the  right  to  use  it  as  a 
street  or  highway  on  land  became  appurt- 
enant to  the  wharf  property  of  the  adjoin- 
ing owners  ;  and  also  that  if  the  city  in 
the  exercise  of  its  power  to  make  drains 
under  the  streets  should  so  construe!  them 
as  to  hinder  the  public  in  their  use  of  the 
streets  as  streets,  or  to  create  a  nuisa 
the  adjoining  properties,  it  would  be  liable 
therefor,  since  if  such  a  street  be  made  the 
plaintiff  would  have  a  right  to  pass  along 
the  same  as  well  as  the  public.  In  the 
case  in  24  How.  188,  it  appeared  that 
tlie  spaee  had  not  been  reclaimed  from  the 
water,  and  that  no  street  on  land  had  been 
made  ;  and  the  court  decided  that  though 
the  city  was  the  owner  of  the  land  at  the 
foot  of  the  street  between  high  and  low 
water  mark,  it  could  not  lay  out  a  street 
or  highway  in   the  water  of  the  ocean   for 


174 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


110 


1,1  be  thi  e  of  any  similar  proprietor,  and  no  greater, 

unless  enlarged  by  legislative  grant 

§110  74).  Powers  of  Municipality.  —  Except  as  mentioned  in 
t|1('.  lasi  3ection,  all  of  the  powers  of  a  municipality  In  respect  to 
wharves  and  .locks  must,  like  all  its  otheT  powers,  be  derived  from 
the  legislature.1     Where  streets  terminating  or  fronting  on  navigalle 


boats  and  ■  i  I  that  on  the  facts  of 

the   case  the   city  was  not  liable  to  the 
plaintiff,    the  owner  of  the  wharves,   for 

e  city's 
own  land  a1  the  fool  of  the  street,  for  the 

rvation  of  the  health  of  I 
Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury,  (J  Gray,  514, 
519,  and  noti  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  EUerman, 
L05  U.  S.  L66.  BonaficU  purchaser  of  a 
wharf  in  the  city  of  Baltimon  . 
onder  contracl  with  the  city,  andin which 
thecityhad  certain  rights,  held  affected 
with  notice  of  those  rights.  Baltimore  v. 
White,  2  Gill  (Md.),  Hi.  A  city,  author- 
by  its  charter  to  build  wharves  on  its 
own  property,  and  to  obtain  by  contract 
archase  the  title  or  the  control  of  other 
wharves  in  thecity,  and  to  raise  a  revenue 
there!  stablishing   and   collecting 

a  rate  of  dockage  and  wharfage,  had  no 
power  to  ■  of  a  wharf  contain- 

ing a  provision  that  it  should  be  kepi 
fret  wharf.     Mobile  t>.  Mood,  53  Ala.  561. 
Wharves,    whether   terminating  struts   or 
.  are  not  streets  ;  if  owned  by  the  city 
they  ma\  '  L  to  private  persons.     In 

such  case  the  title  is  not  a  public  ease- 
ment, but  proprietary.  Horn  ».  People, 
26  Mich.  221  ;  and  see  Scott  v.  Layng,  59 
Mich,  13;  upra,  sec.  103,  aote;  infra,  sec. 
1  [o,  .  lit,  aote,  as  to  ferry  land- 

ing ai  fa  :.     "  Within  the  cor- 

p  irate  limits,  the  city  of  New  Orleans, 
under  her  charter  and  under  the  general 
law,  has  the  rightto  mage,  and 

administer  the  use  of  the  river  tanks  for 
the  public  convenience  and  utility  ;  to 
iblish  wharves  and  landings  ;  to  erecl 
works  and  provide  facilities  for  the  use  of 
,.  ;  tnd  water  craft;  and  to  charge  just 
compensation  for  the  use  thereof.  Ripa- 
rian proprietors  have  do  righl  to  appro- 
priate to  their  exclusive  use  these 
banks,  an  I  they  have  do  private  prop- 
.   in  the  use  thereof,  which  is  public. 


The  discretion  of  the  city  authorities 
in    determining    whal     are    proper    and 

needed  facilities  for  commerce,  and  on 
what  part  lit'  the  river  bank,  within  her 
limits,  they  should  be  established,  is  mani- 
festly Dot  a  proper  subject  for  judicial 
control  or  interference.  Whatever  inci- 
dental damage  may  result  to  proprietors 
from  the  exercise  of  these  unquestionable 
corporate  rights,  it  is  damnum  absque 
injuria."  Per  Fenner,J.,  in  Watson  v. 
Turnbull,  34  La.  An.  856. 

1  Snyder  v.  Rock  port,  6  Ind.  (Porter) 
237  (1855);    Railroad  Co.   v.   Winthrop, 
5  La.  An.   36;    State  v.   Jersey   City,   34 
N.  J.  L.  31  ;  Mayor  of  St.  Martinsville  v. 
Steamer   Mary  Lewis,  32    La.  An.   1293. 
As  the  municipality  derives  such  powers 
from  the  legislature,   the  legislature  may 
repeal  or  revoke  them  at   pleasure,  if  it 
dues  not  deprive  the  municipality  of  prop- 
erty acquired  by  it  under  the  legislative 
grant.     Railroad     Co.  v.    Ellerman,    105 
i  .  S.  166  (1SS1).     Under  the  charter  of  a 
city  providing  that  the  city  "  shall  have 
control  of  the  landings  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  the  rightto  build  wharves  and 
regulat,  iht   landing,  wharfage,  and  dock- 
ing of  boats,"   it  may  establish  and  con- 
i  t    wharves,   and   culled    a    reasonable 
compensation  for  their  use.     Muscatine  v. 
Keokuk,   &c.  Packet   Co.,   45   Iowa,   185 
(1876);  post,  sec.   112.     While  a  city  may 
be  enjoined,  at  the  instance  of  a  taxpayer, 
from  raising  taxes  or  appropriating  money 
for  the    unauthorized    construction    of    a 
wharf,  it  will  not  be  restrained  from  exer- 
cising   a   clear    power    to    grade    streets, 
merely  because,  by  such  grading,  a  wharf 
at  the  river  end  of  the  street  will  incident- 
ally result.      Snyder  v.   Rockport,  above 
cited.     The   city   of  Dubuque,  under    its 
charter,  was  held  to  have  power  to  prohibit 
all   persons,    including  riparian    owners, 
from  using  any  place  but  the  public  wharf 


§110 


WHARVES  ;    POWERS   OP   MUNICIPALITY. 


175 


waters  have  been  established,  whether  by  condemnation  or  dedica- 
tion, and  whether  the  fee  is  in  the  municipality  01  in  the  adjoining 
proprietor,  the  municipality,  under  legislative  authority  to  establish 
and  regulate  wharves,  may  cause  public  wharves  to  be  constructed 
at  the  ends  or  in  front  of  such  streets  and  receive  the  wharfage  from 
the  same  ;  and  this  is  no  invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  owm  i  of  pri- 
vate property  abutting  on  such  streets,  or  of  the  rights  of  the  adjoin* 
ing   riparian   proprietor.1     In  regard   to  private   wharves  lawfully 


without  paying  wharfage.  Dubuque  v. 
Stout,  32  Iowa,  80 ;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep. 
171;  post,  sec.  112,  note.  As  to  the  use, 
under  municipal  authority,  of  streets 
bordering  on  a  navigable  river  for  struc- 
tures for  the  accommodation  of  passengers 
and  the  storage  of  freights,  &c,  see  Bar- 
my v.  Keokuk,  94  TJ.  S.  324(1876);  s.  c. 
below,  4  Dillon,  593  ;  111.  &c.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  2  Dillon,  70. 

1  McMurray  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Balti- 
more, 54  Md.  104  (1880) ;  Dugan  v. 
Mayor,  5  Gill  &  Johns.  375  ;  Haight  v. 
Keokuk,  4  Iowa,  199  ;  Barney  v.  Keokuk, 
94  TJ.  S.  324  ;  Rowans'  Ex'rs  v.  Portland, 
8  B.  Monroe,  253  ;  Newport  v.  Taylor's 
Ex'rs,  16  B.  Monroe,  700 ;  Barney  r. 
Mayor,  1  Hughes  (C.  C. )  118;  Potomac 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Upper  Potomac,  &c.  Co., 
109  U.  S.  672  (1883),  and  cases  cited  by 
Matthews,  J.,  on  pp.  682,  683.  The  gen- 
eral ground  of  the  doctrine  is  that  streets 
terminating  or  fronting  on  the  water  may 
Vie  legitimately  used  for  wharf  purposes  ; 
and  the  cases  show  that  there  is  a  very 
general  legislative  recognition  of  this 
right  aud  usage.  In  accordance  therewith, 
it  was  held  in  the  Chicago  Lake  Front 
case  by  the  United  States  Circuit  Court 
(Harlan  and  Blodgett,  JJ.),  33  Fed.  Rep. 
730  (1888),  that  the  city  of  Chicago,  as 
the  riparian  owner  of  ground  on  the  shore 
of  the  lake,  having,  also,  under  its  char- 
ter, power  to  maintain  wharves  and 
slips  at  the  ends  of  streets,  and  to  main- 
tain a  breakwater  to  protect  the  shore, 
coaid  delegate  the  power  to  construct 
such  breakwater  to  a  railroad  company 
as  consideration  for  allowing  the  road 
to  enter  the  city  ;  and  that  upon  the 
erection  of  the  breakwater  and  the  filling 
in  of  the  space  between  the  breakwater  and 
the  shore  Hue,  the  land  thus  reclaimed  ln- 
longed  to  the  city,  — Blodgett,  J.,  dissent- 


ing on  this  point.     It  was  decided  in  City 

of  Baltimore  v.  White,  2  Gill  (Md.),  444 
(1845),  that  under  an  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture prohibiting  any  person  from  making 
or  extending  any  wharf  in  Baltimore,  with- 
out the  city's  consent  to  the  plan  thereof 
first  obtained,  the  city  may  refuse  its  as- 
sent to  the  erection  of  a  wharf  except 
upon  the  condition  that  its  exterior  mar- 
gin shall  constitute  a  public  wharf.  If 
private  persons  accept  or  act  upon  the  city's 
assent  thus  conditioned,  and  thereupon 
build  the  wharves,  they  consent  to  the 
dedication  of  its  exterior  margin  for  that 
purpose  ;  and  in  the  absence  of  a  contract 
or  legislative  provision  as  to  who  is  en- 
titled to  the  wharfage  at  such  a  wharf,  it 
was  held  under  the  circumstances  to  be- 
long to  the  city,  and  not  to  the  riparian 
proprietor  who  constructed  the  same.  In 
Newport,  &c.  v.  Taylor's  Ex'rs,  16  B. 
Monroe,  699,  804  (1855),  it  was  decided 
that  where  a  proprietor  of  lands  laid  out  a 
town  on  a  navigable  river  and  dedicated 
the  land  along  it  to  be  a  common,  that 
such  dedication  conferred  upon  the  public 
authorities  of  the  town  the  right  to  build 
wharves,  s.  P.  as  to  lands  dedicated  as 
a  street  on  the  river  bank  of  a  town. 
Rowan's  Executors  v.  Portland,  8  B.  Mon. 
232,  cited  with  approval  by  Matthews,  J.,  in 
Potomac  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Upper  Potomac 
&c.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  686,  687:  Louisville  v. 
Bank,  3  B.  Mon.  144  ;  Kennedy  v.  Cov- 
ington, 8  Dana,  61.  A  city  in  A 
constructed  a  wharf  at  the  end  of  a  dedi- 
cated street  leading  to  the  water  :  held 
that  the  adjoining  proprietor  was  not  the 
owner  of  the  wharf,  and  could  not  eject  the 
city  therefrom.  Doe  v.  Jones,  11  Ala.  63 
(1S47).  In  Michigan,  a  dedicated  street 
terminating  upon  a  navigable  water  gives 
tn  tlie  city,  having  power  to  erect  and 
regulate  public  wharves  and  docks  at  tho 


176 


Mr.NICIl'AL    rolil'OHATIONS. 


§110 


1,  tin'  municipal  authorities  have  only  such  powers  of  local 
regulation  and  governmenl  as  their  charters  or  constituent  acts,  in 

J  or  special  terms,  confer  upon  them.1     Their  own  right  to 

may  be  express  or  implied.     The  power,  even  when 

conferred  in  terms,  is,  like  other  powers,  to  be  construed  somewhat 

strictly  when  it  affects  private  rights,  but  nut  so  strictly  as  to  defeat 


ends  of  streets,  the  right,  as  against  a  pro- 
prietor   whose    property    fronts    on    the 
nd  the  navigable  water,  to  erect  a 
wharf  for  public   purposes,   and  this  irre- 
spective of  whether  tho  city  holds  the  fee 
of  the  street  or  not.     Backus  v.   City  of 
Detroit,  19    Mich.    110   (1882).     In  this 
.].,    Baid  :    "  The   dedication 
itute]  til  streets 

marked  upon  it  to  the  county  in  which  the 
city  was  situated.  But  this  was  only  in 
trust  for  streel  purposes.  We  attach  no 
special  importance  to  the  fact  that  the 
tit!-  passed  instead  of  a  mere  easement. 
The  purpose  of  the  statute  is  not  to  give 
the  county  the  usual  rights  of  a  proprietor, 
but  to  preclude  questions  which  might 
arise  res]  public  uses,  other  than 

those  of  men  to  which  the  land 

might  be  devoted."  The  city  of  Detroit 
is,  by  its  charter,  authorized  "to  erect, 
repair,  and  regulate  '  public  wharves'  and 
docks  at  the  ends  of  streets,  and  on  the 
property  of  the  corporation,  and  to  fix  lines 
beyond  which  private  docks  shall  not  ex- 
tend, and  tn  lease  wharf  and  wharfage 
privileges  at  the  ends  of  streets,"  &c.  This 
gives  the  power  to  the  city  to  authorize  a 
wharf  to  he  built  at  the  end  of  a  street 
terminating  on  the  navigable  water.  It 
Id  in  Hum  v.  People,  26  Mich.  222, 
that  wharves  constructed  by  the  city 
under  this  power,  whether  at  the  end  of 
highways  or  on  itsproperty,  are  the  prop- 
the  city,  and  maybe  Leased  as  such. 
7,  J.,  thus  defines  the  words 
"public  wharf,"  as  used  in  the  charter 
(7ft.  p.  224):  "There  is  no  ins! 
which  the  term  'public  wharf  has  been 
ased  hi  our  legislation  to  indicate  any- 
thing analogous  to  a  dedication  to  any 
public  use,  like  that  of  highways.  Such 
a  pnblic  right  is  unknown  to  the  common 
law.  Wharfage  involves  exclusive  use, 
fur  longer  or  shorter  periods,  by  each  ves- 
sel, di  pending  on  the  nature  of  its  busi- 


ness, and  the  extent  of  its  cargo.  All  that 
[s  meant  in  the  charter  by  a  'public  wharf' 
is  a  wharf  belonging  to  the  city,  and  to  be 
used  like  any  other  wharf  property.  The 
term  is  applied  as  well  to  wharves  on  city 
property  away  from  streets,  as  to  wharves 
at  the  end  of  streets."  See  also,  Scott  v. 
Layng,  59  Mich.  43,  49  (1886).  See  post, 
chap,  on  Dedication. 

1  Grant  v.  Davenport,  18  Iowa,  179 
(1865).  Where  the  charter  of  a  city 
authorizes  it  "  to  regulate  the  erection  and 
repair  of  private  wharves  and  the  rates  of 
wharfage  thereat,  the  city,"  says  Wright, 
('..I.,  "may  regulate,  but  not  destroy; 
may  exercise  control,  as  over  other  private 
property  within  its  limits,  but  not  to  the 
extent  of  appropriating  the  use  and  enjoy- 
ment thereof  to  the  public  without  com- 
pensation." lb.  Liability  of  city  corpo- 
ration for  an  injury  to  a  private  wharf, 
caused  by  diverting  streams  of  water  to  a 
point  near  the  wharf,  thereby  causing  a 
gnat  deposit  of  sand  and  earth,  which 
lessened  the  depth  of  water  at  the  wharf 
and  impaired  its  value.  Barron  v.  Balti- 
more, 2  Am.  Jurist,  203,  cited  and  ap- 
proved in  Stetson  v.  Faxon,  19  Pick.  147 
(1858);  and  see,  also,  Thayer  v.  Boston, 
19  Pick.  510.  If  the  deposits  from  sewers 
constructed  by  the  city  cause  a  peculiar 
injury  to  the  wharf  owner,  the  city  is  Until, 
to  the  latter  in  damages.  Franklin  Wharf 
Co.  v.  Portland,  67  Me.  46  (1877)  ;  s.  c. 
24  Am.  Rep.  1,  and  Mr.  Thompson's  note; 
Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  108  Mass.  208; 
Brayton  f).  Fall  River,  113  Mass.  218; 
s.  o.  18  Am.  Rep.  470;  post,  chap,  xxiii. 
Power  to  erect  public  wharves  and  to  con- 
demn private  property  therefor  includes 
the  power  to  extend  a  wharf  already  estab- 
lished, and  compulsorily  to  appropriate 
the  necessary  land  for  that  purpose,  on 
making  compensation  to  the  owner. 
Hannibal  v.  Winchell,  54  Mo.  172(1873). 


§111 


WHARVES  ;    SCOPE    OF    MUNICIPAL    POWER. 


177 


the  purpose  of  the  grant.1  Thus,  although  the  corporate  boundaries 
may  by  the  charter  be  extended  to  low- water  mark,  and  the  corpo- 
ration has  express  power  "  to  regulate  the  erection  and  occupation  of 
all  wharves  or  levees  within  the  corporate  limits,"  this  does  no1  give 
the  corporation,  as  against  the  riparian  proprietor  (whose  right  was 
construed  to  extend  to  low-water  mark),  the  power  to  control  the 
river  bank  so  as  to  require  such  proprietor  or  his  lessee  to  take  out 
a  license  for  his  wharf-boat,  fastened  to  the  shore  of  his  own  land, 
and  used  for  business  purposes.2 

§  111  (75).  Scope  of  Municipal  Power.  —  So  where  a  riparian 
proprietor  had  constructed  a  wharf  which  extended  to,  but  did  not 
encroach  upon  the  navigable  part  of  the  river,  and  which  was  not 
shown  to  be  a  nuisance  in  fact,  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  that  the  city  within  which  the  wharf  was  sit- 
uated could  not,  under  the  charter  power  to  establish  clock  and  wharf 
lines  and  restrain  and  prevent  encroachments  upon  the  river  and,  ob- 
structions thereto,  pass  an  ordinance  declaring  the  wharf  to  be  an 
obstruction  to  navigation,  and  a  nuisance,  and  ordering  it  to  be  sum- 
marily abated.3 


1  As  to  the  extent  of  municipal  power 
over  public  and  private  wharves  and  the 
respective  rights  of  the  riparian  owner  and 
municipal  authorities,  concerning  wharves 
and  wharfage :  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellerman, 
105  U.  S.  166  (1881);  Grant  v.  Daven- 
port, 18  Iowa,  179  (1865);  Cincinnati  v. 
Walls,  1  Ohio  St.  222;  Muscatine  v.  Her- 
shey,  18  Iowa,  39;  Galveston  v.  Menard, 
23  Tex.  348;  Baltimore  v.  White,  2  Gill 
(Md.),  444  (1845);  Furman  v.  New  York, 
5  Sandf.  S.  C.  16;  affirmed,  10  N.  Y.  567; 
Dugan  v.  Baltimore,  5  Gill  &  Johns. 
(Md.)  357  (1833);  reversing  s.  c.  3  Bland, 
Ch.  361;  Wilson  v.  Inloes,  11  Gill  & 
Johns.  (Md.)  358;  Shepherd  v.  Munici- 
pality, 6  Rob.  (La.)  349;  Columbus  v. 
Grey,  2  Bush  (Ky. ),  476  ;  Kennedy  v. 
Covington,  17  B.  Mon.  567;  Memphis,  &c. 
Packet  Co.  v.  Grey,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  137 
(1872);  Comm'rs  v.  Neil,  3  Yeates  (Pa.), 
54;  Richardson  v.  Boston,  24  How.  (IT.  S.) 
188;  s.  c.  19  How.  263;  17  How.  426; 
Newport  v.  Taylor,  16  B.  Mon.  699 
(1855)  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury,  9 
Gray,  514,  519,  and  note  by  Mr.  (now 
Justice)  Gray;  Trowbridge  v.  Mayor  (right 
of  Albany  under  Dongan  charter),  7 
VOL.    I.  —  12 


Hill  (N.  Y.).  429;  s.  C.  5  Hill,  71;  Hart 
i".  Mayor,  9  Wend.  571  ;  Lansing  v. 
Smith,  4  Wend.  4;  Thompson  v.  Mayor. 
11  N.  Y.  115  ;  Marshal]  v.  Guion,  lb. 
461;  Corporation  v.  Scott,  1  Cairns.  543; 
Mayor,  &e.  v.  Hart,  95  N.  Y.  443  (1884); 
Langdon  v.  Mayor,  &c.  N.  Y.  93  N.  Y. 
129,  and  cases  cited;  Potomac  S.  B.  Co. 
v.  Upper  Potomac,  &c.  Co.,  109  V.  S.  672 
(1883).  Principles  of  construction,  aide, 
sec.  89,  and  notes;  post,  113,  note. 

The  charter  powers  of  a  municipality 
in  respect  to  wharfage  are  subject  to  the 
unlimited  control  of  the  legislature,  ex- 
cept so  far  as  the  rights  of  creditoi 
be  impaired.  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  52 
Mo.  361(1873);  Railroad  Co.  v.  Eller- 
man, 105  U.  S.  166  (1881);  ante,  sec.  69. 

2  McLaughlin  v.  Stevens,  18  Ohio,  94, 
(1849)  ;  Blanchard  v.  Porter  (extenl  of 
riparian  right),  11  Ohio,  13S,  144;  Mus- 
catine v.  Hershey,  IS  Iowa,  39:  Martin  v. 
Evansville,  32  hid.  85  (1S69). 

:!  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497 
(1870).  Yates  v.  Milwaukee  was  ap- 
proved and  applied  in  the  Chicago  Lake 
Front  case  by  Harlan  and  Blodgett,  JJ., 
in   State  of  Illinois  v.  Illinois  Central  R. 


178 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§113 


£  L12     76  .    Tolls  and  Wharfage.  —  If  the  right  to  impose  wharf- 

i  to  a  municipality,  but  uot  limited,  the  question  of  the 

which    the    municipal    authorities    may   exact   is   confided 

to  their  discretion,  and  is  one  with  which  the  courts  cannot  inter- 

,■  '■  -.  perhaps,  in  a  case  where  the   by-law  imposing  it  is 

plainly  unreasonable.2     But  the  amount  of  tolls  or  wharfage  may, 

lurse,  be  regulated  by  the  legislature.8 

^   1  13    (77).    Duties  and  Liability  of  Municipality.  —  The  interests 

of  commerce  imperatively  require  that  public  wharves  should  be  in  a 

.  38   Fed.    Rep.   730  (1888).     Ap- 
.   and  distinguished,  Weber  v.  Har- 
in    Francisco),  18   Wall. 
57  (187  S      tupra,  sec.  107,  note. 

1  Municipality   v.    Pease,    2    La.    An. 
547) ;    Muscatine   v.    Hers] 
9,  12  (1864),  per  Wright,  J.    Coal 
Jeffersonville,  112  Ind.  15  (1887). 
rection   of  a  wharf  by  a  city  was 
pn  sunied  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  the  pub- 
lic, and  in  thi  /  an  ordinance  tix- 
•    wharfage  dues  or   providing  for 
ij  ment  of  a  compensation   for  the 
ii-,-  ol  its  wharves,  it  was  hold  that  such 
i  ompensation  could  not  be  collected  by  the 
city.     Muscatine   v.  Keokuk,  &c.   Pa  kel 
l      .    15  Iowa,    L85  (1876).     A  citj   may 
i  nee  (In  fees  which  shall 
be  paid  for  the  use  of  the  wharves  within 
its   limits,   and   this   power  is   impliedly 
only  to  the  limitation   thai  such 
n     onable.     Keokuk  v.  Keo- 
N  irthern  Line  Packel  Co.,  45  Iowa, 
to   right  of  a   city  to 
es  when  vessels  or  boats 
1  ices  where   no    wharves 
,  en    founded.     Tb.  ;    Dubuque    v. 
3.c.  7  Am.  Rep.  171. 
Uary  Paymt »'.     When-  the  own- 
have  paid  wharfage  fees  under 
.   which   were  demanded  and    col- 
:  ce  of  anthority  to  make 
mand,  they   cannol    recovi 

city.     Mas- 
v.   Keokuk,    &       P  icki  I    :  15 

Iowa,  I  The  mere  danger  thai 

i1    law  will  be  commenced  to 
■  il  make  the  i'-iy- 
if  a  demand  unjustly  and  illegally 
■  compulsory  payment.      Tb.      See 
•:  the  Bnbjecl  of  voluntary  and  corn- 
payment,    cited    at 


chap,  xxiii.  Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  4 
Dillon,  10  ( L876);  ante,  sees.  94,  95. 

2  See  ante,  sec.  94  and  note,  as  to  when 
and  how  far  discretionary  powers  are  sub- 
ject to  judicial  cognizance.  As  to  reason- 
ableness  of  wharfage  charges  :  supra,  sec. 
103  note.  Coal  Float  v.  Jeffersonville, 
112  Ind.  15  (1887).  As  to  genera]  re- 
quirement of  law  that  all  ordinances  or 
by-laws  must  be  reasonable,  see  infra, 
chap.  xii.  Municipal  Ordinances  and  By- 
Law  >. 

8  Baltimore*.  White,  2  Gill  (Md.),  444 
(1845):  Murphy  v.  Citj  Council,  11  Ala. 
586  (1847):  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S. 
113.  Authority  to  a  city  "to  erect,  re- 
pair,  and  regulate  wharves  and  the  rates 
of  wharfage,"  authorizes  it  to  collect  wharf- 
age uj>on  goods  landed  on  the  hank,  the 
space  in  front  of  the  city  being  dedicated 
to  the  public,  although  no  artificial  wharf 
was  erected.  Sacramento  v.  Steamer,  4 
Cal.  11.  This  subject  is  discussed  by 
Wright,  J.,  in  Muscatine  i>.  Bershey,  18 
Iowa,  39,  but  the  point  is  not  decided  by 
the  court.  See  Dubuque  ».  Stout,  32 
Iowa,  47,  80  (1871);  s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep. 
171.  In  Kentucky,  however,  it  is  held 
thai  the  owner  of  the  land  must  build 
wharves,  or  improve  the  shore,  or  make 
some  preparation  for  the  reception  or  de- 
livery  of  goods,  or  accommodation  of  ves- 
sels, befoi-e  he  is  entitled  to  collect  tolls 
or  wharfage.  Columbus  v.  Grey,  2  Bush 
(Ky.),  476.  See  supra,  sec.  103,  note.  If 
he  permit-  the  municipal  authorities  so  to 
improve  the  wharves,  he  will  only  be  en- 
titled to  re  isoiiahle  compensation  for  the 
use  of  the  river  bank.  lb.  The  word 
"quay"  defined  by  McLean,  J.,  in  New 
Orleans  v.  United  States,  10  Pet.  661, 
715. 


§114 


FERRIES. 


179 


safe  condition ;  and  if  a  municipal  corporation  is  in  possession  of 
such  a  wharf  and  exercises  control  over  it,  and  receives  tolls  for  its 
use,  it  owes  a  duty  to  the  public  to  keep  it  in  proper  and  secure  con- 
dition for  use,  and  it  is  liable,  without  statutory  enactment  to  that 
effect,  to  an  action  for  any  special  injuries  to  boats  and  vessels 
caused  by  its  failure  to  discharge  this  duty.  In  such  a  case  it  is 
not  material  whether  the  city  had  adopted  ordinances  for  the  regu- 
lation of  the  wharf,  or,  having  such,  neglected  to  enforce  them,  as  in 
either  event  the  responsibility  is  the  same.1 

§  114  (78).  Ferries  ;  Nature  of  Ferry  Grant  to  a  Municipality.  — 
It  is  not  unusual  for  the  legislature  to  make  to  a  municipal  cor- 
poration a  more  or  less  extensive  grant  respecting  ferries  and  ferry 
franchises.  Such  a  grant  is  not,  unless  otherwise  expressed,  a  com- 
pact which  cannot  be  impaired,  but  in  the  nature  of  a  public  law, 
subject  to  be  repealed  or  changed,  as  the  public  interests  may  de- 
mand.2    If  the  legislature  has  conferred,  as  in  some  of  the  ancient 


1  Pittsburgh  o.  Grier,  22  Pa.  St.  54 
(1853).  "Tiiis  ruse."  .says  Perky,  C.  J., 
in  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284, 
295,  "is  put  distinctly  upon  the  ground 
that  the  public  duty,  which  was  the  foun- 
dation of  the  action,  arose  out  of  the  con- 
trol which  the  city  exercised  over  the 
wharf,  and  the  income  received  for  the 
use  of  it."  That  the  right  to  collect 
wharfage  by  the  city  imposes  the  duty 
to  keep  in  repair,  and  a  correlative  lia- 
bility, has  been  often  determined.  City 
not  liable  for  filling  up  slip  from  a  sewer. 
Reed  v.  Lynn,  126  Mass.  367;  Shinkle  v. 
Covington,  1  Bush  (Ky. ),  617,  where 
there  was  a  failure  to  provide  proper  fas- 
tenings for  boats.  Allegheny  v.  Camp- 
bell, 107  Pa.  St.  530 ;  Willey  v.  Alle- 
gheny, 118  Pa.  St.  490;  supra,  sec.  105, 
and  note.  People  v.  Albany,  11  Wend. 
539,  543;  Buckbee  v.  Brown,  21  Wend. 
110;  Mersey  Dock  Trustees  v.  Gibbs,  Law 
R.  1  H.  L.  93.  Lessee  of  city  is  under  like 
liability.  Railway  v.  Briggs,  37  N".  Y. 
256  (1867).  In  form,  the  action  in  such 
a  case  against  the  city  may  be  either  case 
npsit.  Pittsburgh  v.  Grier,  22  Pa. 
St.  54  (1853).  But  it  is  no  defence  to  an 
action  by  a  city  for  wharfage  that  the 
wharf  was  not  well  built  and  needed  further 
improvement  or  repairs.  Prescott  v.  Du- 
quesne,  48  Pa.  St.  118;  Jeffersonville  v. 
Ferry  Co.,   27   Ind.  100;  s.  c.  35  Ind.  19 


(1870);  Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa. 
St.  135  (1870).  Where  it  was  rendered 
unsafe  by  acts  of  others,  notice,  express 
or  implied,  is  an  element  necessary  to  lia- 
bility, the  same  as  in  the  case  of  defective 
highways.  Seaman  v.  New  York,  3  Daly 
(N.  Y.),  147;  post,  chap,  xxiii.,  where  the 
subject  and  the  ground  of  the  liability  of 
the  corporation  for  torts  is  considered  at 
large. 

The  duty  of  those  having  control  of  a 
harbor  is,  so  long  as  it  is  open  to  the  pub- 
lic, to  have  it  reasonably  safe  for  the  pub- 
lic icse,  and  this  whctlier  tolls  are  a 
or  not  for  the  use  of  it.  Parnaby  v.  Lan- 
cashire Canal  Co.,  11  A.  &  E.  223  ;  Met- 
calfe v.  Hetherington,  11  Ex.  257;  s.  c.  5 
H.  &  N.  719 ;  Gibbs  v.  Liverpool  Docks, 
3  H.  &  N.  164;  s.  c.  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  C.  93, 
104,  122  ;  Longmore  v.  Great  Western 
Railway  Co.,  35  L.  J.  C.  P.  135;  Francis 
v.  Pockrell,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  184;  Webb  v. 
P.,rt  Bruce  Harbor  Co.,  19  Upper  Can.  Q. 
B.  626;  Cie  v.  Wise,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  711; 
Winch  V.  Conservators  of  the  Thames,  L. 
R.  7  C.  P.  471;  see  Sweeney  v.  Port  Bur- 
well  Harbor  Co.,  17  Upper  Can.  C.  P. 
574;  reversed,  19  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  376; 
Berrymari  v.  Port  Burwell  Harbor  C 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  34. 

'-'  Easl  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge 
Co.,  10  How.  (U.  S.)  r.ll  (1850);  Roper 
v.    McWhorter,   77   Va.    214;    ante,    sec. 


Mr:.  ■  ORPOBATIONS. 


§114 


charters  in  England  and  in  this  country,  upon  a  municipal  corpora- 

to  i  stablish  and  regulate  ferries  within  the  cor- 

te  limits,  the  corporation  thus  representing  the  sovereign  power 

may  make  an  exclusivt  grant.1     But  8uch  a  corporation  has  not  an 

,  dv{    power  over  the  subject,  unless,  by  express  words  or  neces- 

.  inference,  it  he  plainly  given  to  it  by  the  legislature.     Hence, 

power  to  a  municipality  to  establish  and  regulaU  f&rries  within  its 

limits  does  not  giv<  it  an  exclusivi  power,  and  consequently  does  not 

authorize  it  to  confer  an  exclusive  privilege  upon  others  to  establish 

a  ferry.3 


68.  As  to  extinguishment  of  ferry  fran- 
chise by  a  subsequent  legislative  grant  tn 
build  a  bridge  at  the  site  of  the  ferry,  and 
take  tolls,  boo  the  famous  case  of  Charles 
River  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet. 
120  (1887).  'I'll''  dissenting  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Justice  Story,  on  the 
tint  constitutional  question  involved  in 
tin-  case,  i-  referred  to  by  Mr.  Webster, 
in  a  letter  to  Judge  Story,  as  "tin-  ablest 
and  best  written  opinion  1  ever  heard  you 
deliver;  it  is  close,  searching,  and  scrutin- 
izing ;  tin-  opposite  opinion  has  no 
oor  an  inch  of  ground  to  stand  on."     2 

Life  and  Letters,  268.  Chancellor 
Kent  expressed  the  same  opinion.  lb. 
270.  l!ni  fifty  years'  subsequent  experi- 
ence has  vindicated  the  judgment  of  the 
tnd  placed  it  upon  an  immovable 
and  unquestioned  foundation.     ' ' 

tpecial  grant.    Hartfoi 

c...  29  Conn.  210,  v  here  a  ferry 

had  been  maintained  by  a  city  for  a  time 

beyond  the  memory  of  living  nun,  it  was 

held,  in  the  absence  of  other  evidence,  that 

its  fninrh ,V  inisisliililisli'il  hij  /inscription; 

ami  also,  that  \\  I  31  ite  could  di- 

vest th.-  city  of  the  franchise,  its  purpose 
mid  intent  to  do  bo  must  clearly  appear, 
ami  cannot  he  left   to  implication.     <  ity 
a,  52  T(  •.   548 

prescription,  b  e  ante, 
!2,  :;7. 

r.    Brush,     25     Wend.    628 
(1841),      See    also    Ma  I    N  w 

Yoik  v.  Starin,  106   X.  Y.  1;   Ma 
of  New  York  v.  New  York  .v  X.  J.  S.  X. 
106  X.  Y.  28. 
-  Minturn  o.  Larue,  'J'.  How.    (U.   S.) 
W,:,  (1859);    liar-     i     o.    State,    9    Mo. 
526    (1845);    McEwen  v.    Taylor,    4    (J. 


Greene  (Iowa),  532  ;  ante  sees.  89-91, 
and  cases  in  notes.  While  the  exclusive 
power  conferred  by  the  legislature  upon  a 
city  t<>  grant  a  ferry  license  docs  not  au- 
thorize it  to  grant  a«  license,  yet 

the    power  to  giant     an    exclusive   license  is 

conferred  when  the  city  is  authorized 

grant  or  refuse  a  license."  I',.  &  II.  Ferry 
18  Iowa,  133  (1878).  The 
power  to  refuse  gives  the  power  to  limit 
th.-  issue  of  licenses;  if  it  can  limit,  I 
is  no  reason  why  it  cannot  hind  itself  to 
issue  no  other:  hut  the  power  to  license, 
oi  to  license  and  regulate  certain  occupa- 
tions, does  not,  it  seems,  include  the 
power  to  create  a  monopoly.  Chicago  v. 
Rumph,  45  111.  90;  Logan  i:  Pyne,  43 
Iowa,  524;  15.  &  H.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Davis,  48 
Iowa,  L33.  But  "'the  grant  of  exclusive 
ferry  licenses  rests  upon  peculiar  grounds. 
It  is  in  some  sense  an  extension  of  a  pub- 
lic road.  The  objection  to  the  creation  of 
a  monopoly  is  overcome  in  the  matter  of 
a  (t\\  by  the  consideration  of  the  public 
necessity  or  advantage."  //<..  per  Adams, 
.1.  The  question  whether  th,'  grant  of  a 
ferry  to  individuals  by  the  legislature  de- 
prives a  munici]  I  ion  possessing 
the  usual  powers  to  provide  for  the  con- 
venience and  prosperity  of  its  citizens,  of 
the  right  to  establish  a  competing  ferry, 
discussed  hut  not  decided,  in  Gibbes  v. 
Beaufort,  20  S.  C.  213.  A  city  owning  i 
ferry  must  administer  flt>  public  (rust 
tints  impose. 1  as  the  public  interest  may 
require.     Waterbury  v.  Laredo,   CS  Tex 

tract    by    which    a   city   ga\ 

an  attorne}    etc  third  of  tin-  rents  of  a 

ferry,  and   hound  itself  not  to  make  any 

'I'tiient  which  would    interfere    with 

its  terms,  held  void  as  being  against  pub- 


§  116         FERRIES  ;    POWER   TO    TAX,    LEASE,   COVENANT,    ETC.  181 

§  115  (70).  License  Fee  and  Tax;  Construction  of  Special  Grant. — 
By  its  charter  a  city  was  empowered  "to  license,  continue,  and  regu- 
late" as  many  ferries  within  its  limits,  to  the  opposite  shore  of  a 
river  bounding  it,  as  the  public  good  required,  and  the  common 
council  were  further  authorized  "  to  direct  the  manner  of  issuing 
and  registering  the  licenses,  and  to  prescribe  the  sum  of  money  to  be 
paid  therefor  into  the  treasury  of  the  corporation."  Under  this,  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  all  persons  from  ferrying,  without  a  license 
from  the  mayor,  and  authorizing  this  officer  to  grant  licenses  to  any 
person  upon  payment  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  of  the  sum  of 
fifty  dollars,  was  sustained  against  the  objections  that  there  was  no 
power  to  prohibit  ferrying  without  a  license,  and  that  the  license  fee 
was  a  tax.  The  words  of  the  charter,  "To  prescribe  the  sum  of 
money  to  be  paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  corporation,"  were  re- 
garded by  the  court  as  showing  a  clear  intent  to  make  licenses  a 
source  of  revenue  to  the  city  ;  and  the  court  added  that  the  amount 
charged  as  a  license  fee  did  not  appear  to  be  unreasonable.1 

§  116  (80).  Power  to  Lease,  Covenant,  etc.  —  If  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, seized  of  a  ferry,  lease  the  same,  through  the  agency  of  the 
mayor  and  aldermen,  with  a  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment,  this  cove- 
nant will  not  restrain  the  mayor  and  aldermen  from  exercising  the 
powers  vested  in  them  by  statute,  to  license  another  ferry  over 
the  same  waters,  if  in  their  judgment  (which  cannot  be  reviewed  by 
the  courts)  the  public  necessity  and  convenience  require  it.  On  such 
a  covenant  the  city  may  be  liable  to  the  covenantees  ;  but  the  powers 
vested  in  the  city  officers  as  trustees  for  the  public  cannot  be  thus  abro- 
gated. If,  however,  the  city  in  its  corporate  capacity  is  the  legal 
owner  of  an  exclusive  franchise,  its  grantees  or  lessees  would  hold  it, 
notwithstanding  any  license  to  others,  whether  granted  by  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  or  any  other  tribunal.2 

lie  policy).       Whether  the  dedication  of  J.    L.    118,    and    the   chapters   on    Ordi- 

ht ml  for  a  highway  or  street  terminating  nances  and  Taxation.    Post,  sees.  357,  768. 

on  a  river   will  authorize  the  use  of  the  Amount  of  license  city  may  exact,    the 

same  for  a  ferry  landing,  that  is,  for  fas-  State  law   on  the  subject  being  held  to 

tening  boats  and  receiving  and  discharg-  affect  the  city.     Reddick  v.  Amelia,  1  Mo. 

ing  freights  and   passengers,  without  the  5  (1821). 

consent  of  the  abutting  owner,  see  Prosser  2  Fay,  In   re,    15    Pick.    (Mass.)   243 

v.  Wappello  County,   18  Iowa,    327,  and  (1834).     The  court  will  not  try  on  certio- 

cases  cited;  also  4  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s. )  rari  the  conflicting  titles  of  parties  to  a 

519  (1865);  supra,  sec.  103,    note;    sec.  ferry  franchise.    lb., -ante,  chap.  v.  sec.  97. 
109,  note.  Eights  of  municipal  corporations  in  con- 

1  Chilvers    v.    People,    11    Mich.    43  ruction  with  ferries,  and  extent  of  legisla- 

(1862).     As  to  distinction  between  a  li-  tive  control.     See     Fanning    v.    Gregoire 

cense  fee  and  a  tax,  see  As],  v.  People,  11  •'  "A,  IP  How.   (U.  S.)  .r>24   (1853);   East 

Mich.    347;    Flanagan  v.  Plainfield,  44  N.  Hartford  p.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  10  How. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATE 


L),     Borrowing    Money  ;     concerning    Implied    Power     to 

borrow  Money.  —  We  shall  hereafter  treat  of  the  implied  power  of 
municipal  corporations  to  issm  negotiabh  securities.  But  this  is  a 
ireut  question  from  the  "power  to  borrow  money.  The  power  to 
borrow  may  be  given  in  express  language,  in  which  case  the  terms 
and  purpose  of  the  grant  will,  of  measure  its  extent.     But 

suppose  the  power  is  not  expressly  conferred,  does  it  exist  by  impli- 
n  :     It  is  perhaps  settled  law  in  this  country  that  private  cor- 
bions,  organized   for  pecuniary  profit,  have,  in   the  absence  of 
ial  limitation  or  restriction,  an  implied  or  incidental  authority 
tu  borrow  money  for  their  legitimate  purposes,  and  to  give  negotia- 
ble obligations  for  its  repayment.1     The  question  of  the  incidental 
authority  of  municipal  corporations  to  borrow  money  has  not  been  so 
thoroughly  considered  and  so  often  decided  as  to  be  entirely  closed 
tu  controversy.     In  view  of  the   legislative  practice  to  confer,  in 
terms,  all  powers  so  important  as  this,  the  dangerous  nature  of  this 
power,  by  reason  of  the  temptation  it  holds  out  to  incur  needless 
del  Is  and  to  make  extravagant   expenditures,  and  the  facilities  it 


I     mi.    140;    17 
JO,  96;  Chilvera  v.  People,  1]  M    h. 
N-  ill  v.    Police  Jury,  lit    La.    An. 
.  kin    v.    Railroad  Co.,    20  N.    Y. 
870  (1859),  relating  to  the  ferry  rig 
the  city  of  Albany;    Benson  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
\     .    York,    In    Barb.    22-3  ;    Harris  v. 
Nesbit,    21    Ala.  398  ;    United  Si 
Fanning,    Morris  I  Iowa),  :5ls;  Conner  v. 
New   Albany,    1    Blackf.   (Ind.)  43;  City 
v.    Ferry    Co.,  27    hid.    100;  Shall  i 
Jeffersonville,  26  Iml.  103.     The  right  of 
a  city,  given  by  charter,  to  license  and  tax 
.  is  not,  unless  so  expn 

like  righl  in  the  State  or  county. 
H  3  Mo.    526    (1845). 

r  to  regulati  ferries,"  given  to  imi- 
ni<  ipal  corporations  in  genera]  incorpora- 
tion act,  construed.  Duckwall  v.  New 
Albany,  25  [nd.  283.  Winn  equity  will 
annul  lease.  Phillips  v.  Bloomington,  1 
•  in-  ( [owa),  498.  A  power  con- 
ferred upon  a  city  to  establish  fen  ii 
to  fix  the  r  inthor- 

•  >  rent  the  ferry,  but  it  cannot  swr- 
Urol  and  supervision  wholly 
I  er.      Macdonell    v.    International 
.v  G.  N.  Ry.  I  590.  See  supra, 

In  Virginia  it  was  held  that 
ing  join!  grantees 
no  power  to  lease 


the  ferries  to  private  persons,  the  fran- 
chise being  a  public  trust  which  they 
could  not,  without  legislative  sanction, 
dispose  of  or  delegate.  Roper  v.  Mc- 
Whorter,  77  Va.  214.  Upon  division  of 
an  old  town  owning  ferry  franchise,  the 
new  town  owns  no  interest  therein  except 
so  far  as  conferred  by  the  legislature. 
Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  East  Hartford,  16 
Conn.  140;  post,  chaps,  vii. ,  viii. 

1  Stratton  v.  Allen,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  229; 
see  ante,  sec.  50,  and  chapter  on  Contracts, 
post,  sec.  488.  Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  221;  Hackettstown  v.  Swack- 
hamer,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  191; 
construction  of  specific  grant,  Mayor,  &c. 
v.  Bailey,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  519. 
But  see  observations  of  Bylcs,  J.,  in 
Bateman  v.  Mid-Wales  Railway  Co., 
L  K  1  C  P.  510  (1S66),  as  to  powers  of 
common-law  corporations  in  England  in 
respect   to  drawi  pting,  or  indors- 

ing negotiable  securities.  The  court  in 
this  case  deny  (in  the  absence  of  express 
legislative  authority  conferring  the  power) 
that  it  is  competent  to  a  company  incor- 
porated in  the  usual  way  for  the  forma- 
tion and  working  of  a  railway  to  draw, 
accept,  or  indorse  bills  of  exchange.  Ia- 
-•■<■■  125. 


S  118  POWER   TO   BORROW   MONEY.  183 

offers  for  frauds,  and  the  settled  and  salutary  doctrine  that  such  cor- 
porations have  no  powers  but  such  as  are  expressly  conferred,  and 
those  which  are  necessary  to  effect  the  objects  of  the  corporation, 
and  those  which  are  incidental  to  the  express  grants,1  the  author, 
where  the  legislative  will  is  wholly  silent,  is  strongly  inclined  to 
deny  the  existence  of  a  general  implied  or  incidental  power  to  borrow 
money.  But  it  must  be  admitted  that  down  to  the  present  time  a 
majority  of  the  express  adjudications  on  the  subject  favor  the  con- 
trary opinion.2 

§  118  (82).  The  Subject  considered  in  Ohio  and  elsewhere.  —  The 
question  arose  in  Ohio,  in  1836,  and  was  fully  argued  and  considered. 
The  town  of  Chillicothe  possessed  authority  to  purchase  real  estate, 
erect  public  buildings,  repair  streets,  and  the  usual  municipal  pow- 
ers. The  right  to  borrow  money  was  not  expressly  granted,  and  the 
only  question  in  the  case  (an  action  upon  the  bonds  of  the  town 
given  for  borrowed  money)  was,  whether  it  was  granted  by  impli- 
cation. The  case  was  regarded  as  of  the  first  impression,  no  author- 
ities in  point  being  produced.  The  court  distinctly  decided  that  in 
carrying  out  the  express  powers,  or  in  effecting  any  legitimate  mu- 
nicipal object,  the  corporation  possessed  the  incidental  or  implied 
right  to  borrow  money.3  Subsequently  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wis- 
consin affirmed  the  implied  authority  of  a  municipal  corporation,  as 
incidental  to  the  execution  of  the  general  powers  granted  by  its 
charter,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  special  restriction,  to  borrow  money 
and  issue  its  bonds  therefor,  it  appearing  that  the  proceeds  thereof 
went  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  and  were  expended  by  it.4  "  The 
charter,"  says  the  court,  stating  its  reasons,  "  does  confer  the  power 
to  purchase  fire  apparatus,  cemetery  grounds,  etc.,  to  establish  mar- 
kets, and  to  do  many  other  things,  for  the  execution  of  which  money 
would  be  necessary  as  a  means.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in 
the  absence  of  any  restriction,  the  power  to  borrow  money  would 

1  Ante,  sees.  90,  91.  notes  given  for  the  money  borrowed  ;  it  is 

2  Text  eited  Robertson  v.  Breedlove,  61  not  held  that  notes  so  given  under  the 
Tex.  316;  Richmond  v.  McGirr,  78  Ind.  incidental  power  to  provide  for  the  pay- 
192.  ment  of   debts  have  all  the  qualities  of 

8  Bank  v.  Chillicothe,  7  Ohio,  Part  II.  commercial   paper.        In    State,  ex  rel.    v. 

p.  31  (1836).  Babcock,  22  Neb.  614  (1888),  it  was  held 

4  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11  Wis.  470  (1860);  that  a  power  to  make  regulations  to  secure 

8.  c.  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  692  ;  State  v.  Mad-  the  general  health  of  a  city  and  to   con- 

ison,  7  Wis.  688  ;  Clark  v.  Janesville,   10  struct  sewers  and  to  regulate  their  use, 

Wis.    136  ;    Clarke   v.  School    District,  3  conferred  necessarily  the  power  to  provide 

R.  I.  199  (1855),  in  which  it  is  held  that  money  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  for 

when  money  is  borrowed  to  pay  a  law-  the    purpose    of    draining    its     principal 

ful   debt    of  a   corporation,  and  it   is  so  street,   by   issuing   bonds   therefor.      s 

applied,  the  corporation  is  liable   on  the  infra,  sees.  120,  125,  126. 


L84 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§118 


ui  to  these  general  powers,  according  to  vhe  well- 
rule  that  corporations  may  resort  to  the  usual  and  conven- 
tent  m  iiting  the  powers  granted  ;  for  certainly  no  means 

ual  for  the  execution  of  such  objects  than  that  of  borrowing 
In  this  case,  as  in  the  other,  the  question  was  not  raised 
until  the  money  had  been  borrowed  and  the  rights  of  third  persons 
bad  attached.3 


1  city    o.    Lamson,    9   Wall.  477,  486 
where  the  Wisconsin  i 

.    ec.  50,  and 
Tin-  i  ii^li t  of  privaU    corporations 
generally  to  borrow  moru 

Qsively 
considered  upon   principle  and  authority, 
in  the  important  case  of  Curtis  v.  Leavitt, 
i  .   9   1 1857).     See,  also.  Barry  v. 
Merch.  Ex.  Co.,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  280  ;  Beers 
v.  Phoenix  Glass  '  '■>.,  1  I  Barb.  :',.r<s  ;  Strat- 
ton  v.  Allen,  1  *5  N.  .1.   Eq.  229;  Lucas  v. 
Pitney   (power  of   railroad    company),  3 
Dutch.  (X.  J.)  221  ;  Fay  v.  Noble  (manu- 
facturing  corporation),  12  Cush.  1  ;  Davis 
&c.   of  Meeting-house    (religious 
•;•■!).-    Met.   32] .      Perhaps  it  is 
difficult   to   draw  a   distinction     between 
::   u  icipaJ  coi porations  in  re- 
to   the  incidental    right  to   borrow 
money.     But  wesee  much  more  reason  for 
affirming  the  existence  of  an    incidental 
p  iwer  of  tins  kind  with  n  3pec1  to  trading, 
banking,  manufacturing,  and  railroad  cor- 
;i  i,  than  in  relation  to    municipal 
i  orporations.      There  is  a  difference  be- 
tween contracting  a  debl  in  the  prosecu- 
i  ::n  ordinary  legitimate  corporate 
purpoi  iwing   money  for    that 

In  the  one  case,  the  application 
of  the  credit  is  necessarily  Becured  to  the 
advancement  of  the  authorized  object, 
while  money  borrowed  is  liable  to  be  lost 
livi  rted  to  Qlegitimate  purposes. 
This  difference  i-  insisted  on  with  great 
•  .  J,,  in  the  dissent- 
ing opinion  in  Williamspoi  t  v.  C 
wealth,  si  Pa.  Si  187,  507  (1877).  It 
should  be  remembered,  thi    ex> 

powers  can  be  executed  without 
holding  that  there  is  an  implied  power  to 
borrow    money.     The   revenue  pr\ 

npply  the  municipality  with 

ned   to  furnish   it  with 

And    powers    ire   nol    held    to 

exist   merely   because    they    are    conven- 


ient. Supra,  sees.  89-91,  and  notes. 
As  applicable  to  municipal  corporations, 
there  is  great  and  almost  convincing 
forci     in    the    argument    of    Selden,   J., 

in  Curtis  v.  Leavitt,  supra,  267,  268. 
And  see  Ketchum  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 
14    N.   Y.    356,    365    (1856),  where    the 

BUbjeCt    is  considered    by    the    sallie   judge, 

and  the  power  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  contract  debts  on  credit,  for  le- 
gitimate purposes,  is  admitted  to  be  a 
question  which  has  "yet  to  be  judicially 
settled."  Infra,  sees.  125,  126.  See,  on 
the  general  subject,  Canal  Bank  ■:.  Super- 
visors, 5  Denio,  517  (1848)  ;  Barker  v. 
Lootnis,  6  Hill,  463  (1844);  People  v. 
Brennan,  39  Barb.  522  (1863).  In  Com- 
monwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  41  Pa.  St.  278, 
Strong,  J.,  says  thai  the  power  to  execute 
and  issue  bonds  is  inseparable  from  the 
existence  of  all  corporations,  public  and 
private.  Douglass  v.  Virginia  City,  5 
Nev.  147  (1869).  In  New  York,  si  e  Stat, 
1853,  1135,  chap.  603.  In  Mississippi, 
Hoards  of  Police  of  counties  have  no  im- 
plied power  to  borrow  money  ;  and  when 
special  jiower  to  borrow  money  is  conferred 
it  must  be  fairly  pursued  ;  and  it  was 
held  that  where  a  warrant  properly  signed 
did  not  (as  required  by  the  statute)  state 
on  its  face  the  object  for  which  it  was 
issued,  nor  upon  whal  fund  drawn,  it 
could  not  be  enforced.  Beamair©  Board 
of  Police,  42  Miss.  288  ;  8.  c.  16  Wall. 
566.  There  may  be  ground  for  a  distinc- 
tion as  to  the  implied  power  to  borrow 
money,  between  counties  and  ordinary 
city  corporations. 

English  Decisions.  —  Bond  for  hot-rowed 
money,  given  after  the  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act,  held  valid.  Pallister  v.  Mayor, 
fcc,  67  Eng.  C.  L.  (9  C.  B.)  774  ;  Payne 
r.  Mayor,  &c,  3  Hurl.  &  Nor.  572.  See 
Nowell  v.  Mayor,  &c,  9  Exch.  457; 
Kendall  v.  King,  84  Eng.  C.  L.  (17  c.  B.) 
483.     Note  for  borrowed  money  held  in- 


§119 


POWER   TO   BORROW   MONEY. 


185 


§  119.  Same  subject. —  In  Indiana,  the  doctrine  that  corpora- 
tions, along  with  the  express  and  substantive  powers  conferred  by 
their  charters  take  by  implication  all  the  reasonable  modes  of  exe 
cuting  such  powers  which  a  natural  person  may  adopt,1  is  so  applied 
as  to  hold  that  it  is  a  power  incident  to  corporations,  in  the  absence 
of  positive  restriction,  to  borrow  money  as  means  of  executing  their 
express  powers?  In  Iowa,  school  districts  have  the  power  to  borrow 
money  to  discharge  debts  legitimately  created  and  to  pledge  the 
credit  of  the  district  for  that  purpose.3  In  Illinois,  the  same  power 
exists  if  authorized  by  a  vote  of  the  people  of  the  district*  But  where 
a  law  authorizes  the  donation  of  money  by  a  municipal  corporation 
to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad,  and  provides  for  levying  a 
tax  to  raise  the  amounts  donated  as  they  become  due,  neither  the 
corporation  nor  its  officers  have  the  power  to  borrow  money  or  to 


valid  under  the  act.  Attorney-General 
v.  Lichfield,  13  Sim.  547;  Reg.  v.  Lich- 
field, 4  Q.  B.  893.  See  Bateman  v.  Mid- 
Wales  Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  510 
(1866)  ;  ante,  sees.  117,  note,  sees.  125, 
126. 

1  New  England,  &c.  Co.  v.  Robinson, 
25  Ind.  536  ;  Lafayette  v.  Cox,  5  Ind.  38; 
Board,  &c.  v.  Day,  19  Ind.  450  ;  Kyle  v. 
Malin,  8  Ind.  34;  Hang  v.  Board,  &c, 
60  Ind.  511  ;  Second,  &c.  Bank  v.  Dan- 
ville, 60  Ind.  504  ;  Richmond  v.  McGirr 
(quoting  text),  78  Ind.  192,  198  (1881); 
Board  v.  Saunders,  17  Ind.  437.  See,  also, 
Merrill  v.  Town  of  Monticello,  22  Fed. 
Rep.  589. 

2  Board  v.  Day,  19  Ind.  450  ;  Miller  v. 
Board,  66  Ind.  162,  citing  Ketchum  v. 
Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356  ;  Mills  v.  Gleason, 
11  Wis.  470;  State  v.  Madison,  7  Wis. 
688  ;  Bank  v.  Chillicothe,  7  Ohio,  354  ; 
Moss  v.  Harpeth  Academy,  7  Heisk.  283  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  34  Pa.  St. 
496  ;  Clark  v.  School  Dist.,  3  R.  I.  199  ; 
Hardy  v.  Merriwether,  14  Ind.  203  ;  Shef- 
field v.  Andress,  56  Ind.  157.  Where  a 
city  negotiated  its  bonds  to  raise  means 
to  construct  water-works,  and  the  city 
treasurer  misapplied  a  part  of  the  funds  so 
realized,  leaving  debts  unpaid  on  account 
of  such  works,  it  was  competent  for  the 
city  council  to  issue  and  sell  other  bonds 
to  make  up  such  deficiency.  Daily  v.  Co- 
lumbus, 49  Ind.  169  (1874).  Under  Ind. 
Rev.  Stat.  (1876),  authorizing  towns  to 
provide  apparatus  for  extinguishing  fires, 


and  to  incur  a  debt  on  petition  of  tax- 
payers, levy  a  tax,  &c. ,  the  board  of  town 
trustees  has  power  to  purchase  such  ap- 
paratus on  credit,  and  direct  a  note  there- 
for to  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the  town. 
And  this  power  is  not  exhausted  by  the 
passage,  pending  the  negotiation  there- 
for, of  an  ordinance  for  issuance  of  bonds 
to  realize  means  to  purchase  the  apparatus, 
if  no  bonds  are  in  fact  issued  thereunder. 
New  Albany  Bank  v.  Danville,  60  Ind.  _ 
504.  So,  in  Richmond  v.  McGirr,  78  Ind. 
192,  198,  unrestricted  power  in  the  city  to 
purchase  real  estate  for  public  buildings 
gives  to  the  council  implied  power,  in  its 
discretion,  to  purchase  on  credit,  and  to 
issue  negotiable  bonds  for  the  purchase 
money  ;  the  court  refused  to  enjoin  the 
issue  of  such  bonds.  Infra,  sec.  127,  and 
note.  As  to  power  to  issue  bonds  for  sub- 
scriptions in  aid  of  railroads,  see  post, 
sec.  161. 

3  Austin  v.  Colony,  51  Iowa,  102. 

4  Folsom  v.  School  Directors,  91  111. 
404,  where  it  is  held  that  the  power  to 
borrow  money  carries  with  it  at  common 
law,  independent  of  the  statute,  the  power 
to  give  evidence  of  the  loan.  The  power 
to  give  bonds  for  money  borrowed  is  not 
a  limitation  but  an  enlargement  of  their 
powers,  and  an  order  given  by  them  on 
their  treasurer  is  valid  and  may  be  en- 
forced against  the  district.  lb.  The  court 
limits  and  distinguishes  the  case  of  Clark 
v.  School  Directors,  78  111.  474. 


186  MUNICIPAL  COEPOEATIONS.  §  120 

in  paymenl  of  such  donation,  and  bonds  issued  in  pay* 
ment  thereof  are  void.1 

i;  1  20.  Same  3ubject.  Doctrine  in  Pennsylvania.  —  The  subject  of 
the  incidental  or  implied  power  of  a  municipal  corporation  toborrow 
to  pay  pre-existing  indebtedness,  and  also  to  enable  it  to  grade 
ami  pave  its  streets,  and  to  issnc  najiAiahl,  pn^wr  for  this  purpose,  is 
elaborately  discussed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania.2  It 
was  admitted  that  "  taken  in  its  broad  sense,  the  power  to  borrow 
money  and  issue  bonds  therefor  cannot  be  said  to  be  among  the  im- 
plied powers  of  a  municipal  corporation."  But,  nevertheless,  the 
majority  of  the  court,  after  examining  the  subject  and  reviewing  the 
authorities,  sums  up  the  result  in  guarded  language,  as  follows: 
"The  foregoing  cases  rest  upon  the  principle,  which  we  think  a 
sound  one,  that  when;  a  municipal  corporation  has  lawfully  con- 
tracted  a  debt,  it  has  the  implied  power,  unless  restricted  by  its 
charter  or  prohibited  by  statute,  to  evidence  the  same  by  a  bill, 
bond,  noie,  or  other  instrument ;  that  the  power  to  contract  a  debt 
carries  with  it  by  necessary  implication  the  right  to  give  an  appro- 
priate acknowledgment  of  such  debt,  and  to  agree  with  the  creditor 
as  to  the  time  and  mode  of  payment ;  that  in  the  absence  of  statu- 
tory provision  there  is  no  rule  of  law  limiting  the  extent  of  the 
credit."     There  was  a  dissent  by  three  judges  on  the  ground  that 

1   Lippincott  v.  Pana,  92  111.  2-1;  Mid-  trustees  contract  to  keep  up,  in  the  build- 

dleporl  v.  /Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.  ,82  111.  562;  ing,  a  public  school.     Quarc.   Danielly  ct 

Dixon  County  v.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83.     In  al.  v.  Cabauiss,  52   Ga.  211   (1874).     In 

:\  bonds  may  be  issued  to  Wyoming,  the  law  prohibiting  the  trustees 

inert   current  expenses  in  of  a  municipal  corporation  from  incurring 

case  of  a  deficit   in  the  county  revenue,  any  debl  or  borrowing  money  for  the  use 

bul    this   must  first  be  authorized    by  a  of  the  city,  without    having  the  concur- 

0f  theelectors  of  the  county.     Daw-  rence  of  five-eighths  of  the  taxable  property 

Bon   Co.  v.  McNamar,  1  N.  W.  Rep.   991.  owners, —to  be  ascertained  by  a  petition 

.\-    to    implied    power    in    Nebraska    to  for  that  purpose,  —  does  not  preclude  the 

issue    municipal  bonds,  see  Stater.  Bab-  trustees  from  issuing  warrants  on  the  treaf 

cock,  22   Neb.   614   (1888),  cited   supra,  wry,  to  be  used  as  evidences  of  indebt- 

118  '.     In  Georgia,  it   is  held  to  be  edness,  although  there  is  no  money  in  the 

within   the  purpose  and  scope  of  a  muni-  municipal  treasury  at   the  time,   nor  any 

cipal  corporation   to  apply  tin rporate  Bpecia]    authority    therefor    in    the    city 

funds  or  to  create  a  corporate  debt  for  the  charter.     Iviuson   v.   Bance,    1    W'v.  Ter. 

purchase  of  an  interest  in  a  building  to  be  270.      Difference  between    warrants   and 

.  ii.'ir  school  or  college   for  the  negotiable  paper,  infra,  sec.  487. 

modation  of  the  ] pie  of  the  town  ;  2  Williarasporl  v.  Commonwealth,    84 

and  the  '                   perintendence  "I  the  Pa.  St   187  (1877).   Paxson,  J.,  delivered 

.]  is  left  in  the  hands  of  trustees  not  the  opinion  of  the  court,  in  which  Shars- 

elect                  orporation  d               ender  wood,  Mercur,  and  Gordon,  JJ.,  concurred; 

the  appropriation  of  the  corporate  funds  ('   J.,  delivered    the    dissenting 

illegal,  it  appearing  thai  the  enterprise  is  opinion,  in  which  Woodward  and  Sterrett, 

oof  for  any   private   gain,   and  that    the  JJ.,  concurred. 


§  122        DECISIONS    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   SUPREME   COURT.  187 

part  of  the  bonds  in  question  were  issued  in  advance  of  any  debt  in- 
curred for  grading  and  paving,  and  as  a  means  of  raising  money  to 
pay  for  future  improvements  ;  that  they  were  sold  at  a  heavy  dis- 
count, and  the  proceeds  only  thus  applied  ;  and  while  admitting 
that  a  municipal  corporation  may  have  the  implied  power  to  give 
suitable  evidences  of  an  authorized  debt  actually  incurred,  they  de- 
nied any  incidental  power  in  such  corporations,  as  a  means  of  rais- 
ing money  to  execute  its  ordinary  charter  powers  or  duties,  "  to  issue 
commercial  paper,  be  it  bonds  or  notes,  payable  to  bearer,  and  nego- 
tiable according  to  the  law  merchant  or  general  usage,  and  either 
to  sell  them  in  the  market  or  pass  them  off  to  individuals  by  way 
of  a  general  loan."  The  dissenting  judges  admitted  that  where  ex- 
press power  to  borrow  is  given,  the  municipality  has  the  implied 
right  to  issue  negotiable  evidences  of  the  debt ;  and  they  also  seemed 
to  concede  that  if  an  authorized  debt  is  actually  incurred  for  paving 
or  other  proper  purposes,  the  municipality  has  the  right  to  issue  a 
bond  or  note  or  warrant  as  evidence  of  it ;  but  it  was  not  said  that, 
even  when  thus  issued,  that  is,  issued  by  virtue  of  a  merely  inciden- 
tal power,  the  instrument  partook  of  all  the  attributes  of  commercial 
paper,  especially  the  one  which  protects  such  paper  in  the  hands  of 
a  holder  for  value  before  maturity,  from  defences  of  which  he  has  no 
notice. 

§  121.  Author's  comment.  —  If  the  judgment  of  the  court  in  this 
case  is  to  be  taken  as  holding  that  a  municipal  corporation,  merely 
by  virtue  of  its  authority  to  pave  streets,  may,  without  any  express 
power  to  borrow  money,  issue  its  negotiable  bonds  in  advance,  and 
sell  them  as  a  means  of  raising  money  to  be  applied  to  this  purpose  ; 
may  issue  them  in  any  sum  it  pleases  and  sell  them  for  any  price  it 
can  obtain,  and  that  bonds  so  issued  are  commercial  paper  with  all 
the  qualities  and  incidents  of  such  paper,  —  if  such  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  court,  we  feel  constrained  to  say  that  we  are  unable,  notwithstand- 
ing the  ability  with  which  it  is  supported,  to  regard  it  as  otherwise 
than  unsound  and  dangerous. 

§  122.  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  —  The 
question  under  consideration  has  been  considered  and  discussed  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the   United  States.1     Four  of  the  justices  as- 

1  Mayor  of  Nashville  v.  Ray,   19  Wall.  Ill  U.  S.  400,  the  same  court  decided  that 

46S  (1873)  ;  Ottawa  v.  Carey,  108  TJ.   S.  the  power  to  issue  commercial  paper  can- 

110;  Hopper  v.  Covington,  8  Fed.  Rep.  not  be  conceded  to  counties  and  townships, 

777  ;  Merrill  v.  Monticello,  14  Fed.  Hep.  which  are  political  divisions,  unless  it  is 

628.       In  Claiborne    County   v.    Brooks,  authorized    by  express   legislation  or   by 


L88 


Ml  NICIP  \l.   CORPORATIONS. 


§123 


.  the  proposition  that  a  municipal  corporation  pussessed  no 
;  power  to  raise  loans  or  to  borrow  money  for 
thai  :  such  a  power  must  in  their  judgment  be  conferred  by 

;  ,11, ,n,  expressly  or  by  plain  implication.  Indebtedness  may  be 
ted,  it  was  conceded,  for  authorized  purposes,  to  the  extent  per- 
mitted, but  tin-  legitimate  means  of  paying  such  indebtedness  was 
by  taxation  in  the  usual  mode  and  not  by  the  issue  of  commercial 
papi  i  for  sale  in  the  market  ;  and  such  paper,  if  issued  without  the 
sanction  of  the  legislature,  although  it  may  be  valid  as  a  voucher,  is 
op<  n.  into  whosi  soever  hands  it  may  come,  to  all  defences. 


^  123.  Same  subject.  —  Tt  was  not  denied  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  the  case  referred  to  in  the  preceding  section,1 
that  the  power  to  borrow  might  be  implied  from  tfa  <  vistenet  of  ex/p'i 


very  strong  implication  from  such  legis- 
lation. 

Tlii-;  subject  being  under  consideration 
in  Rackettstown  v.  Swackhanier,  37  N.  J. 
I..  191,  the  able  and  learned  judge  who 
delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court  said, 
"Municipal  corporations,  in  the  absence 
pecific  granl  of  power,  do  not  in 
general  possess  the  capacity  to  borrow 
A  note  given  by  such  corpora- 
tion for  an  unauthorized  loan  cannot  be 
enforced,  even  though  the  money  bor- 
row,■,!  I  cpended  for  municipal 
a  promi  ory  note 
given  for  legitimate  purposes  by  a  mu- 
ni.'ij.al  corporation  will  not  have  the 
effect,  when  in  the  hands  of  a  i 
holder,  of  cutting  off  the  equities  existing 
juch  corporation  and  the  payee. 
An  examination  of  the  books  will  show 
that  tliis  question  has  not  as  yet  received 
much  judicial  con  The  courts 
of  Wisconsin  and  <  >hio  have  had  this  o  at- 
t,-r  before  them,  and  have  arrived  at  a  re- 
sult the  opposite  of  thai   which  has  just 

ted.  [  have  carefully  weighed  the 
learned  tribunals,  but 
they  have  failed  to  convince  my  under- 
standing, l  ferred  to  are  those 
of  Mill  .  '  in,  and  Bank  v.  Chuli- 
cothe.  As  a  counterpoise  to  these  views 
i  be  weighty  opinion  of  Judge  Dillon 
in  his  treatise  on  Municipal  1 Corporations, 
Vol.  I,  sec.  117.  Much  emphasis  is  added 
to  this  expression  of  opinion  from  the  fad 

is  author  had  before  him,  at  the 


time  he  wrote,  the  opposing  cases  just 
cited.  In  this  state  of  the  authority,  it 
cannot  be  claimed  that  the  principle  is  so 
settled  thai  the  judgment  of  this  court 
cannot  be  freely  exercised  with  respect  to 
this  important  subject.  My  conclusion 
i.s  that  already  expressed,  that  a  right  to 
borrow  money  is  not  to  be  inferred  from 
any  of  the  ordinary  powers  conferred  in 
the  charters  of  municipal  corporations, 
and  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
such  a  power  can  proceed  only  from  an 
express  grant  to  that  effect. 

■'The  farther  question  was  discussed  at 
the  bar,  whether  a  municipal  corporation, 
lacking  a  special  authority  to  that  end,  can 
execute  a  promissory  note.  I  have  exam- 
ined the  subject,  but  the  views  already  ex- 
pressed render  it  unnecessary  to  pronounce 
any  final  conclusion  with  respect  to  it  ;  for 
the  purposes  of  the  present  case,  I  may 
Bay,  however,  that  my  present  view  is, 
that  a  corporate  body  of  this  character  has 
the  general  and  inherent  right  to  execute  a 
noU  as  a  voucher  of  indebtedness,  but  that 
such  note  will  not  have  the  effect,  when  in 
the  hands  of  a  '  I  older  before  ma- 

turity, of  cutting  oil'  the  equities  existing 
between  the  maker  and  payee.  In  this  re- 
spect I  fully  concur  in  the  learned  opinion 
of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  recently  read  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  1  niteil  States, 
in  the  ease  of  The  Mayor  v.  1,'ay,  19  Wall. 
168  "     /■  .  C.  J. 

1  Mayoi  of  Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  Wall. 
168. 


§123       DECISIONS   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   SUPREME   COURT.  189 

poivers ]  of  such  a  nature  as  to  bo  beyond  the  ordinary  range  of  mu- 
nicipal expenditure,  and  which  are  usually  executed  by  means  of 
borrowing;  but  it  was  denied  by  four  of  the  judges  that  such  a 
power  was  incidental  to  the  ordinary  grants  of  municipal  authority. 
To  the  author,  the  brief  and  compact  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley 
seems  to  be  a  careful  and  accurate  exposition  of  the  law  on  the  sub- 
ject; but  the  remaining  four  justices  appear  to  have  considered  that 
it  unduly  restricted  the  powers  of  municipal  corporations.2  The 
court  has  since  decided  that  quasi  corporations,  such  as  counties, 
have  no  implied  power  to  issue  commercial  paper  unless  by  virtue 
of  express  legislation  or  by  very  strong  implication  therefrom,  and 


1  Infra,  sees.  127,  161,  and  note  ;  ante, 
sec.  118,  note. 

2  The  prior  case  of  Lynde  v.  The 
County  of  Winnebago,  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
16  Wall.  6  (1872),  when  carefully  viewed 
with  reference  to  the  legislation  of  Iowa 
as  to  the  powers  of  the  county  judge  in 
the  erection  of  court-houses,  and  the  express 
■power  to  borrow  money  for  this  purpose 
when  the  proposition  to  borrow  is  sanc- 
tioned by  a  popular  vote,  will  be  found  to 
assert  or  involve  no  general  principle,  but 
to  turn  upon  the  special  statutory  pro- 
visions, and  on  the  construction  and  effect 
to  be  given  to  the  particular  proposition 
that  was  submitted  to  the  people.  That 
proposition,  having  been  adopted  Ly  the 
voters,  was  held  by  the  majority  of  the 
court  to  imply  the.  powci  to  borrow  money 
to  accomplish  the  object  in  view  ;  and  as- 
suming the  construction  adopted  to  be  the 
true  one,  the  result  readied  logically  fol- 
lowed. That  this  judgment  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  case  just  referred  to  is  aot 
authority  in  favor  of  the  broad  proposition 
that  the  power  to  make  contracts,  —  for 
example,  as  in  that  case,  the  building  of  a 
court-house,  —  carries  with  L  the  power  to 
borrow  money,  and,  as  incidental  to  that, 
tbe  power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds  for 
the  money  borrowed,  will  clearly  appear 
when  the  statutory  provisions  and  the 
facts  in  that  case  are  considered.  Power 
to  build  court-houses  when  payment  there- 
for is  to  be  made  out  of  the  ordinary 
revenue  is  conferred  by  statute  upon  the 
county  judge  without  the  sanction  of  a 
popular  vote.  When,  however,  money  is 
to  be  borrowed  for  this  purpose  the  statute 


requires  the  proposition  to  borrow  to  be 
submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  people  of  the 
county.  No  proposition  to  borrow  money 
and  to  issue  bonds  was  in  terms  submitted 
to  the  people  ;  but  there  was  submitted 
this  question,  viz.,  "Shall  the  county 
judge,  in  1860,  levy  a  tax  of  seven  mills 
for  constructing  a  court-house  in  the 
county,  said  tax  to  be  levied  from  year  to 
year  until  a  sufficient  amount  is  raised  for 
that  purpose,  not,  however,  to  exceed  ten 
years."  The  proposition  having  been 
carried,  a  majority  of  the  court  (three 
judges  dissenting)  held  that  under  the 
Iowa  statute  the  vote  gave  the  authority 
to  borrow  money  and  issue  the  bonds. 
Mr.  Justice  Swayne  said,  "  It  was  ex- 
pressed in  this  formula  (of  the  vote  taken), 
that  a  court-house  was  to  be  built,  and  we 
think  that  it  was  implied  that  money  wa3 
to  be  borrowed  to  accomplish  that  object. 
Otherwise  the  vote  gave  no  authority 
which  did  not  already  exist,  and  was  an 
idle  ceremony.  The  statute  authorized 
an  appeal  to  the  voters  only  that  they 
might  give  or  refuse  authority  to  incur  a 
debt.  It  could  not  have  been  intended  that 
the  erection  should  be  delayed  till  a  sum 
sufficient  to  pay  for  the  structure  had 
been  realized  from  the  tax  authorized  to 
be  imposed,  or  that  the  work  should  pro- 
ceed only  pari  passu  with  the  progress  of 
its  collection  from  year  to  year.  What 
is  implied  is  as  effectual  as  what  is 
expressed." 

The  dissenting  judges  said,  "We  can- 
not find  in  this  vote  any  authority  in  the 
county  judge  to  issue  the  bonds  of  the 
county." 


!i-  \L    COBPOR  \Th>\>.  §  125 

altl  inty  may  have   power  to  erect  a  court-house    and 

iry  public  buildings  this  does  doI  authorize  the  issue  of 
commercial  paper  for  that  purpose.3 

>;   124.    When  Power  will  beheld  to  exist. — The  no  tun  and  extent 
■-, ,-  to  borrow  moi  'e  paper  there/or  was 

sidered  at  length  by  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  Missouri,2 
in  which  after  a  review  of  the  decisions —  English  and  American  — 
the  following  conclusions  were  reached:  Whether  a  municipal  cor- 
poration possesses  the  power  to  borrow  money,  and  to  issue  nego- 
tiable securities  therefor,  depends  upon  a  true  construction  of  its 
charter  and  the  legislation  of  the  Stale  applicable  to  it.  It  has  no 
'/  or  inherent  authority  under  the  usual  grants  of  municipal 
powers  as  a  means  of  discharging  its  ordinary  municipal  functions. 
Such  authority  may  be  inferred  from  special  and  extraordinary 
powers,  which  require  the  expenditure  of  unusual  sums  of  money, 
when  it  is  usual  to  execute  such  powers  by  means  of  borrowing,  and 
when,  upon  the  whole  legislation  applicable  to  the  municipality, 
such  appears  to  have  been  the  legislative  intent.3  These  principles 
wer<  applied  ;  and  coupon  bonds  to  borrow  money  to  erect  and  repair 
wharves  and  to  open  streets,  issued  under  the  general  grants  of  mu- 
\al  power  in  tfa  charter,  were  held  not  to  be  binding  upon  the 
city,  while  other  bonds  issued  under  a  special  act  of  the  legislature, 
in  payment  of  stock  in  companies  organized  to  construct  macadamized 
loads  from  the  city,  were  held  to  be  valid. 

§  125.  Author's  Views  and  Conclusions  summed  up.  —  Whether 
there  is  power  in  a  municipal  corporation  to  borrow  money  and  to 
■  negotiable  paper  depends,  we  think,  upon  the  legislative  intent, 
to  be  collected  from  statutes,  general  and  special,  applicable  to  the 
municipality  or  to  the  particular  case  in  hand.  The  American 
cases  are  conflicting  and  cannot  he  harmonized. 

The  following  summarizes  our  view  of  the  sound  and  true  doc- 
trine-; on  this  subject:  — 

1  '  lail  County    v.    Brooks,    111  be  for  the  money  or  property   received. 

r.  8.    (00  (1883)  ;  approving  Police  Jury  Post,    ecs.  125,   L26,  161  and  notes.    The 

>     Britton,   15  Wall.  tingnishing  remedy  where  bonds  of  a  city  are  issued 

v.  County  of  Winnebago,  16  Wall,  withoul  authority  and  the  rponey  thereon 

•'.,  where  the  county  had  express  legislative  is  actually  r sived  by  the  eity,  is  nut  an 

authority  to  borrow  money  fur  the  erec-  action  on  the  bonds,   but  to  recover  the 

tion  of  public  buildings  when  authorized  money.      Gause    v.    Clarksville,    supra, 

by  tl  lection  called  for  the  See  also  R  v.   Breedlove,  61  Tex. 

122,  and  no1  816.     Infra,  sec.  126  note. 

ville,  5  Dillon,  165,  Infra,  sec.  161,  and  note;  and  })oit, 

II         a,  -7  chap.  xiv.  on  Contracts. 
lares  the  remedy  to 


§  125 


author's  views  and  conclusions. 


191 


1.  The  power  to  oorrow  money  as  a  means  of  raising  a  fund  to 
make  future  local  improvements,  or  to  carry  on  the  ordinary  opera- 
tions of  the  municipality,  cannot  be  implied  from  the  mere  authority 
to  make  such  improvements  or  from  the  usual  grants  of  municipal 
power.  These  contemplate  that  the  expense  of  the  execution  of  the 
ordinary  municipal  powers  shall  be  met  bv  the  revenues  derived 
year  by  year  from  taxation. 

2.  It  does  not  follow  because  banking,  trading  corporations  and 
other  private  corporations  organized  for  pecuniary  profit  are  held  in 
this  country  to  possess  the  incidental  power  to  borrow  money,  and 
to  issue  commercial  paper  having  all  the  qualities  attributed  to  such 
paper  by  the  law  merchant,  that  a  like  power  is  inherently  possessed 
by  public  and  municipal  corporations.1     The  analogy  is  false  and 


1  As  to  the  power  of  corporations  to 
issue  commercial  paper,  the  law  of  Eng- 
land is  settled.  In  England  no  corpora- 
cion,  whether  municipal  (Reg.  v.  Lich- 
field, 4  Ad.  &  El.  N.  s.  S91,  906)  or 
private  (Bateman  v.  Mid- Wales  Railway 
•:o.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  499,  1S6G),  has  the 
incidental  right  to  make  commercial 
paper,  except  the  Bank  of  England,  which 
was  incorporated  for  the  very  purpose, 
and  trading  corporations  strictly,  such  as 
the  East  India  Company.  Accordingly 
it  is  laid  down  by  Mr.  Justice  Byles,  in 
his  work  on  bills,  that,  "without  special 
authority,  expressed  or  implied,  a  corpora- 
tion has  no  power  to  make,  indorse,  or 
accept  bills  or  notes."  Byles  on  Bills 
(8th  Eng.  ed.),  62;  Grant  on  Corp.  276. 
Thus,  a  water- works  company  (Broughton 
v.  Manchester  Water-Works,  3  Barn.  & 
Aid.  1),  a  gas  joint-stock  company 
(Bramah  v.  Roberts,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  963), 
or  even  trading  companies,  unless  such  a 
power  is  essential  to  the  purposes  for 
winch  they  are  formed  (Bateman  v. 
Railway  Co.,  supra),  have  no  general  or 
implied  authority  to  make  commercial 
paper.  In  Bateman's  case,  last  cited,  the 
question  for  the  first  time  arose  in  Eng- 
land, as  late  as  1866,  as  to  the  right  of  a 
railway  company,  with  an  authorized 
capital  of  £170,000,  to  make  or  accept 
bills  of  exchange,  and  it  was  unanimously 
decided,  by  judges  of  great  eminence 
(Erie,  C.  J.,  Byles,  Keating,  and  Montague 
Smith,  J.T.),  that  the  company  had  no 
such  power.  The  acceptance  was  under 
seal,   and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 


the  decision  rested  on  the  technical  ground 
that  a  corporation  can  only  contract  under 
seal.  It  was  placed  upon  the  broad 
ground  that  there  was  no  act  of  parlia- 
ment, general  or  special,  which  conferred 
the  power.  It  was  admitted  by  all  the 
judges  that  the  railway  company  might 
incur  debts  in  the  construction  or  opera- 
tion of  the  road  ;  "but  it  is  one  thing," 
says  Keating,  J.,  "to  say  that  they  shall 
be  liable  to  be  sued  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered or  for  work  done,  and  an  entirely 
different  thing  to  say  that  they  may 
accept  bills  in  payment."  And  to  the 
same  effect  was  the  opinion  of  the  other 
judges.  The  principle  of  this  case  was 
approved  in  The  Peruvian,  &c.  Railway 
Co.  v.  Thames,  &c.  Insurance  Co.,  L. 
R.  2  Ch.  617,  when  a  general  incidental 
power  to  issue  bills  of  exchange  and 
negotiable  instruments  under  the  Com- 
panies Act  of  1862  was  denied,  and  the 
power  held  to  depend  upon  the  proper 
construction  of  the  memorandum  and 
articles  of  association.  The  companies 
organized  under  that  act  may  communi- 
cate this  power  to  their  directors,  but  it 
must  be  given  expressly  or  by  fair  intend- 
ment in  the  memorandum  and  articles  of 
association  of  the  company,  or  it  will  not 
exist.  In  England,  as  shown  by  Bite- 
man's  case,  supra,  it  is  held  that,  inasmuch 
as  the  corporation  has  no  power  to  accept 
bills,  it  cannot  be  made  liable  on  its  ac- 
ceptance, though  the  bill  was  drawn  for 
a  valid  and  binding  debt.  On  this  point 
Erie,  C.  J.,  says:  "  The  bill  of  exchange 
is  a  cause  of  action,  a  contract,  by  itself, 


192  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  1-0 

delusive.     The   purposes  of  the   two   classes   of  corporations,  the 
;    officers,  and   the  means  of  making  provision  for 
their  liabilities,  are  all  essentially  different.     The  nature  of 
the  usual  duties  devolved  by  law  upon  municipalities  does  not  make 
it  necessary  to  imply  the  existence  of  a  general  power  to  borrow 
,  [ssue  commercial  paper.     The  consequences  of  recog- 
nizing such  a  power,  in  the  extravagance  it  will  stimulate,  in  the 
frauds  it  will  engender,  and  in  the  onerous  indebtedness  it  will  in- 
evitably produce,  are  alarming  to  contemplate.     The  history  of  the 
express  power  given  to  municipalities  to  aid  railways  by  borrowing 
money  and  issuing  commercial  obligations  is  full  of  warning  and 
instruction. 

3  The  power  to  issue  commercial  paper  which  is  unimpeachable 
in  the  hands  of  the  holder  is  not  among  the  ordinary  incidental 
powers  of  a  public  or  municipal  corporation.  It  must  be  conferred 
expressly,  or  by  fair  implication,  as  a  necessary,  or  at  least  a  reasona- 
ble and  usual  means  of  executing  the  particular  power  to  which  it 
is  claimed  bo  be  incidental. 

4.  Express  power  to  borrow  money,  perhaps  in  all  cases,  but  es- 
ially  if  conferred  to  effect  objects  for  which  large  or  unusual  sums 
aiv  required,  as  for  example  subscriptions  to  aid  railways  and  other 
public  improvements,  will  ordinarily  be  taken,  if  there  be  nothing 
in  the  legislation  to  negative  the  inference,  to  include  the  power  (the 
same  as  if  conferred  upon  a  corporation  organized  for  pecuniary 
profit)  to  issue  negotiable  paper  with  all  the  incidents  of  negotia- 
bility.1 

whirl,    binds    the  acceptor   in  tin-    hands  be  sued   by  an  indorsee,  but   in    respect 

for  value;  and  I  conceive  of    the    latter,  not."     See    Bubject    dis- 

it  would  1"-  altogether    contrary    to    the  cussedin  Gause  v.    Clarksville,  5  Dillon, 

principles    oi    the    law     which    regulates  165(1879). 

such  instruments  thai  thej  should  be  valid  In  America  the  courts,  however,  have 

ornol                g  as  the  consideration  be-  generally     held    that    hanking,   trading, 

rinal    parties    was  good   or  commercial,    railway,    ami    other  private 

orpo-  corporations,     organized     for     pecuniary 

msideration    in    resped  of  profit,  have  an   incidental  power  to  issue 

which    the   acceptance         given  is   suffi-  commercial    paper  when    such  power    is 

ciently   connected    with    the   purpose  for  not  negatived    by   a    true  construction  of 

which  the            oi     i     i                        It  their   charters  or  constituent  acts.      See 

would  he  ii nvenient  to  the  last  degree  ante,    Bees.    117,    118;    also    chapter   on 

h    .hi   inquiry  could  be  gone    into.  Contracts,  post. 

Borne  bills  mighl    b                    a  consid-  '  Ante,  sec.  117,  note;  post,  sees.  127, 

foi     work  161,  note,  and  chap.  xiv.  on  Contracts,  sec 

507   et   8eq.\     Williamsport    v.  Common- 

security  for  money  obtained  on  loans  be-  wealth,   84    Pa.  St.   487;  Commonwealth 

;  their   borrowing   powers.     It    would  o.  Pittsburg,  34   Pa.  St.    196;  Reinbothw. 

■  pernicious  thing  to  hold  that,  in  re-  Pittsburg,  11    Pa.    St.  278;  Middleton  v. 

•  of  the  former  I                  tion  might  Allegheny  Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  241;  Seybert  v 


§126 


author's  views  and  conclusions. 


193 


5.  When  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute,  that  public  and 
municipal  corporations  shall  audit  all  claims  presented,  and  shall 
issue  to  the  creditor  vxirrants  or  orders,  and  no  other  provision  is 
made,  this  will  not  authorize  as  a  means  of  payment  the  issue  of 
negotiable  or  commercial  paper  which  shall  possess  all  the  incidents 
of  negotiability ;  and  if  issued,  it  is  subject  to  all  defences  in  the 
hands  of  a  transferee  to  which  it  would  be  subject  in  the  hands  of 
the  original  holder.1 

6.  Although  a  municipal  corporation  proper,  in  the  execution  of 
its  ordinary  corporate  powers  and  the  discharge  of  its  corporate 
duties,  may  make  contracts  and  create  debts,  and  may,  when  not 
restrained  by  statute,  evidence  the  liabilities  thus  incurred,  yet  if 
the  instrument  is  made  to  assume  the  form  of  negotiable  paper,  such 
paper  is  always  open  to  defences  in  the  hands  of  transferees  when 
it  is  issued  without  express  authority  from  the  legislature,  or  au- 
thority fairly  to  be  implied  from  the  charter  or  legislation  applicable 
to  the  municipality.2 


§  126.    Same  subject.  —  Stated  in  other  words,  the  author  regards 
it  as  the  true  doctrine  that,  merely  as  incidental  to  the  discharge  of 


Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272;  Galena  v.  Cor- 
with,  48  111.  423;  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  4  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  265;  DeVoss  v.  City  Richmond, 
18  Gratt.  338;  R.  R.  v.  Evansville,  15 
Ind.  395;  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall. 
572;  Daniel  on  Nego.  Inst.  sees.  1527  and 
1531;  Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654, 
666  ;  Milner's  Admr.  v.  Pensacola,  2 
Woods,  637  ;  Mayor  v.  Inman,  57  Ga. 
370;  Tucker  v.  City  of  Randolph,  75  N. 
C.  267;  City  of  Vicksburg  v.  Lombard,  51 
Miss.  125;  Mercer  Co.  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall. 
95.  See  cases  cited  in  notes  to  sec.  488, 
post.  In  Holmes  v.  Shreveport,  31  Fed. 
Rep.  113  (1887),  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 
United  States,  Boarmau,  J.,  while  recog- 
nizing the  rule  that  there  is  no  implied 
general  power  to  issue  commercial  paper 
{lb.  p.  115),  held  that  a  city  vested  with 
extensive  powers  and  authorized  to  con- 
tract for  the  construction  of  public  works, 
to  give  bonds,  &c,  had  power  to  issue 
bonds  to  evidence  the  credit  part  of  the 
price  agreed  to  be  paid  to  the  contractor 
for  certain  public  works,  and  that  such 
bonds  are  protected  by  the  law  merchant 
in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder.  See 
also  Dorian  v.  Shreveport,  28  Fed.  Rep. 
287.  As  to  public  buildings,  post,  sec. 
VOL.  I.  —  13 


140,  where  a  municipality  is  given  express 
power  to  "negotiate  loans  in  anticipation 
of  the  revenues  thereof,"  bonds  negotiable 
in  form  are  not  void,  but  they  lack  the 
characteristics  with  which  actual  negoti- 
ability would  clothe  them.  Sioux  City 
v.  Weare,  59  Iowa,  95. 

1  For  difference  between  such  warrants 
and  orders  and  negotiable  paper,  see  post, 
sec.  487. 

2  The  arguments  in  support  of  the  prop- 
ositions of  the  text  embodied  in  this  section 
will  be  found  to  be  ably  presented  by 
Bradley,  J.,  in  The  Mayor  of  Nashville  v. 
Ray,  19  Wall.  468  (1873);  by  Beasley, 
C.  J.,  in  Hackettstown  v.  Swackhamer, 
37  N.J.  L.  (8  Vroom)  191  (1874);  and 
by  Agnew,  C.  J.,  dissenting  in  Williams- 
port  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  St.  487, 
505  (1877).  See  also  Cause  v.  Clarks- 
ville,  5  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  165  (1879);  Knapp 
v.  Hoboken,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom) 
394  (1877). 

The  authorities  in  favor  of  the  other 
view  are  collected,  and  the  argument  in 
support  of  that  view  is  presented  with 
fulness,  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of 
the  court,  delivered  by  Parson,  J.,  in  Wil- 
liamsport  v.  Commonwealth,  supra. 


L94 


MfM"'ll'\L    CORPORATIONS. 


§127 


'«■  functions,  no  municipal  or  public  corporation 

has  the  ri,urht  to  invesl   any  instrument  it   may  issue,  whatever  its 

form,  with  thai   supreme  and  dangerous   attribute   of  commercial 

which  insulates  the  holder  for  value  from  defences  and  equi- 

ittach  tn  its  inception.     This  point  ought  to  be  guarded 

by  the  courts  with  the  utmost  vigilance  and  resolution.1 


^   1  '11  (83).    Express  Power  to  borrow  Money  ;   Negotiable  Paper. 

press  power  to  a  municipal  corporation  "to  borrow  money"  is 

usually  held  to  include  the  power  to  issue  its  negotiable  bonds,  or 
othei  securities  to  the  lender.2     But  it  does  not  include  the  power 


1  If  money  ia  improperly  borrowed  in 
advance  of  liabilities  actually  created,  and 
i  the  municipal  tn  asury,  and  is  ex- 
I  by  direction  of  the  governing  body 
for  authorized  municipal  objects,  the  mu- 
nicipality may  then  in  the  ibsence  of  con- 
trolling  statute  or  constitutional  provision 
to  the  contrary  (see  post,  sees.  180   L38J 
be  liable  in  the  propel  action  or  suit;  but 
ion  ihould  be,  we  think,  for  money 
had  and  received  or  by  suit  in  equity,  and 
in  the  invalid  bonds.     Bateman  v. 
Mid-Wales    Railway  Co.,    L.    K.  1  C.  P. 
rhomas     v.     Porl     Hudson, 
27  Mich.    320  ;    Hackettstown  v.   S 
hamer,  37  N.  J.   I..  191;    Reg.  v.    Lich- 
field, 4   Ad.  &    El.   v  s.  891,   906;  .Mayor 
19  Wall.  168,  480,  per  Brad- 
,  J. ;  c.   124,  note.      Tfu   hoick  r 

bonds,  will,  it  seems,  he  considered 
I  the  original 
l  ineida  Bank  v.  '  m- 
B  nk,  21    X.  Y.    190;  Mayor  &c.  v. 
■    "•    II.    168,    184,  per  E\     .  J  . 
Shirk   v.    Pulaski  County,   4    Dillon.  208 
d-77):    Paul  v.  Kenosha,  22  Wis.  266; 
v.  Clarksville,  5  Dillon,  C.  C.  165 
.  jecs.  130-188,  i  i 
\iv.  on  Contracts.      In   Hackettstown  v. 
h  imer,  supra,  any  remedy  upon  the 
asdenied,  and  ; 
!    \>>  think   the  only 
equity    to    be  to  the 

•    the  corporation 
I  been  paid  by  the  proceeds  of  the 
money  improperly  borrowed  ;  but  no  ne- 

octrine. 

•  imonwealth  v.  ]  .    ■  i   Pa. 

LI     (1859);    Railroad    Co.    v. 

ille,  L5  In.l.  895,  112  (1860);  Mid- 


dleton  r.  Allegheny  Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  241; 
Ri  inboth  v.  Pittsburg,  41  Pa.  St.  278; 
Seyberl  v.  Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272;  Ro| 
v.  Burlington,  8  WalL  654,  666,  per  • 
ford,  J.;  DeVoss  v.  Richmond,  18  Graft. 
(Va.)  338;  s.  C.  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s.) 
589;  Galena  v.  Corwith,  48  111.  423 
(1868);  post,  sec.  188;  German  Hank  v. 
Br<  nham,  35  Fed.  Rep.  185  (1888).  Money 
borrowed,  and  note  given  by  officers  of  a 
town,  without  authority,  does  not  bind 
the  town  in  ease  it  never  receives  the 
benefit  of  it.  Benoil  v.  Conway,  10 
Allen,  528:  People  r.  Supervisors,  34  N. 
Y.  516;  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall. 
566. 

The  ground  has  been  broadly  taken, 
that  for  debts  and  obligations  lawfully 
created,  any  corporation,  public  as  well  as 
private,  has  the  implied  authority,  unless 
prohibited  by  statute,  charter  or  by-law, 
to  evidence  the  same  by  the  execution  of 
a  bill,  note,  bond,  or  other  contract,  and 
to  secure  the  same  by  a  mortgage,  pledge, 
or  other  proper  disposition  of  its  property; 
that  power  tn  contract  a  debt  carries  with 
it  the  power  to  give  a  suitable  acknowl- 

ment  of  it  ;  and  there  is  no  rule  of 
law  in  the  absence  ol  a  statute  limiting 
the  length  of  the  credit.  Municipality  v. 
McDonough,  '2  Rob.  (La.)  242,  250 
(1842);  Barry  ».  Merchants'  Express 
Company,   1    Sandf.  Ch.   280;  cited  with 

roval  in  Curtis  o.  Leavitt,  L5  X.  Y. 
9,  62,  and  in  Smith  ».  Law,  21  X.  Y. 
296,  'J'.".'  I  I860);  Hank,  &c.  r.  Cbillicothe, 
7  Ohio,  Pari  II.  31  (1830):  Ketchum  v.' 
Buffalo,  1  i  X.  V.  356  (1856),  market- 
house  bonds  given  on  twenty-five  years' 
time  held  valid  ;  and    see   eases   cited   on 


§127 


EXPRESS   POWER   TO    BORROW   MONEY. 


195 


to  issue  notes  to  circulate  as  money,  in  violation  of  the  statute  law 
and  public  policy  of  the  State.1 


page  375,  by  Wright,  J.  ;  Douglass  v. 
Virginia  City  5  New  147;  Richmond  v. 
McGirr,  78  Ind.  192  (1881),  noted  supra, 
sec.  119,  note.  See,  also,  and  compare, 
Bateman  v.  Mid- Wales  Railway  Co.,  L.  R. 

I  C.  P.  510 ;  Hackettstown  v.  Swack- 
hamer,  37  N.  J.  L.  191;  Wyandotte  v. 
Zeitz,  21  Kan.  649;  Lawrence  v.  Kellam, 

II  Kan.  512. 

As  to  express  power  to  issue  bonds,  &c, 
see  also  Bank  of  Rome  v.  Village  of 
Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38,  4-4,  and  cases  cited; 
Mills  v.  Gleason,  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  683  ; 
Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Orleans  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  3  La.  An.  294.  State  bonds 
negotiable.  Delafudd  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill, 
159. 

Express  power  to  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  railroad  cor- 
poration does  not  carry  with  it  the  power 
to  issue  negotiable  bonds  in  payment  of 
the  subscription,  unless  the  power  to  issue 
such  bonds  is  expressly,  or  by  reasonable 
implication,  conferred  by  the  statute  ; 
and  such  power  is  negatived  where  the 
statute  authorizing  the  subscription  is 
silent  as  to  the  issue  of  bonds,  and  makes 
special  provision  for  the  payment  of  the 
subscription  by  taxation.  Kelley  v.  Mi- 
lan, 127  U.  S.  139,  150,  and  cases  cited; 
Norton  v.  Dyersburg,  127  U.  S.  160,  and 
cases  cited.  Post,  sec.  161,  note.  As  to 
the  implied  power  to  issue  municipal 
bonds,  see  further,  Wells  v.  Supervisors, 
102  U.  S.  625  ;  Claiborne  County  v. 
Brooks,  111  U.  S.  400;  Ottaway  v.  Carey, 
108  U.  S.  110,  123;  Daviess  County  v. 
Dickinson,  117  U.  S.   657,  663. 

Power  "  to  borrow  money "  held  to  in- 
clude power  to  issue  negotiable  h<>,i<h  or 
other  usual  securities  to  the  lender.  Com- 
monwealth v.  Pittsburg,  34  Pa.  St.  496, 
511;  Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654 
(1865)-;  ante,  sec.  117.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  a  county  have  not  power  to  issue 
bill  of  exchange.  Canal  Bank  v.  Super- 
visors, &c,  5  Denio,  517  (1848).  Nor 
have  village  trustees.  Lake  v.  Trustees, 
4  Denio,  520.  Corporate  city  has  the 
power.  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  4  Hill,  263; 
compare  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,   19    Iowa, 


199,  213.  In  Inhabitants,  &c.  v.  Weir,  9 
Ind.  224  (1857),  an  action  against  a  con- 
gressional township  upon  a  promissory 
note  made  by  the  trustees,  the  court,  per 
Stuart,  J.,  says  :  "There  is  no  power  to 
make  notes  conferred  by  the  act  of  1841. 
That  act  was  the  charter  under  which 
they  acted.  The  trustees,  as  a  corpora- 
tion, had  no  power  but  such  as  that  act 
expressly  conferred,  and  such  as  might 
arise  by  implication,  or  be  essential  to 
the  exercise  of  those  granted.  Such  a 
power  is  always  expressed,  even  in  bank 
charters.  In  so  limited  a  corporation  as 
a  congressional  township,  the  power  to 
make  promissory  notes  could  hardly  be 
implied.  The  case  at  bar  cannot  easily  be 
distinguished  in  principle  from  McClure 
v.  Bennett,  1  Blackf.  189,  and  Mears  v. 
Graham,  8  Blackf.  144."  Power  to  bor- 
row money,  if  granted  on  condition  of  a 
previous  popular  vote,  must  be  exercised 
in  conformity  with  the  condition  or  the 
orders  issued  therefor  will  be  void.  Lock- 
port  v.  Gaylord  61  111.  276  (1871).  What 
amounts  to  a  borrowing.  lb.  In  Illinois 
the  Constitution  of  1848  gave  to  municipal 
corporations  the  power  to  assess  and  collect 
taxes  for  corporate  purposes.  This  was  con- 
strued to  be  a  limitation  upon  the  taxing 
power  of  the  State,  under  which  such  cor- 
porations could  not  be  taxed  except  for  cor- 
porate purposes;  and,  consequently,  bonds 
issued  ' '  for  the  use  of  said  city,  to  be  ex- 
pended in  developing  the  natural  advan-. 
tages  of  the  city  for  manufacturing  pur- 
poses," were  declared  void,  although  the 
enterprise  intended  to  be  aided  was  recog- 
nized as  being  of  general  interest  and  of 
great,  value  to  the  city.  Mather  v.  Ot- 
tawa, 114   111.  659.      Post,  sees.  159,  736. 

1  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349 
C1871). 

Construction  of  the  constitutional  power 
of  the  general  government  to  "borrow 
See  Hepburn  v.  Griswold,  8 
Wall  603.  Knox  v.  Lee,  12  Wall.  457 
(1871),  and  Juilliard  r.  Greenman,  110 
U.  S.  421  (1884),  known  as  the  "legal- 
tender  cases." 


[96  MUNICIPAL  COBPOBATIONS.  §129 

§   L28.      The  Subject  illustrated;   Place  of  Payment,  etc.  —  Express 

charter  power  to  borrow  money  for  general  purposes,  not  exceeding  a 
was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
upon  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  other  powers  contained  in  the 
charter,  not  to  prohibit  or  limit  the  city  in  incurring  an  indebted- 
for  authorized  purposes  greater  than  the  sum  it  was  empowered 
to  borrow.1 

^   1  29    (84).      What   is   a   borrowing ;   Power   construed.  —  A   con- 

tract  whereby  a  city  agrees  with  an  individual  that  it'  the  latter  will 
pay  or  advance  the  amount  of  interest  due  and  to  become  due  on 
certain  bonds  of  the  city  already  issued,  the  city  will  pay  or  refund 
the  amount,  is  "not  a  borrowing  of  money"  within  the  terms  or 

it  of  the  charter  prohibiting  the  municipal  authorities  from  bor- 
rowing  money  unless  authorized  by  a  prior  vote  of  the  citizens; 

,  a  contracl  being  one  simply  for  the  payment  of  a  debt.2 
in  leT  authority  to  a  city  to  borrow  money,  it  may,  if  there  be  no 
statutory  restriction,  make  the  principal  and  interest  payable  at  tfo 
where  the  money  is  borrowed  or  vjhere  it  pleases,  though  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  State.3  Among  certain  powers  of  a  strictly  muni- 
cipal nature  conferred  upon  a  city  was  the  power  "to  borrow  money 
for  any  object  in  its  discretion,"  or  "for  any  public  purpose,"  on  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  the  citizens;  and  this  was  held,  in  connection 
with  a  general  statute  of  the  State,  recognizing  by  implication  (as 
construed)  the  validity  of  city  and  county  bonds  generally,  to  au- 
thorize such  city  to  issue  bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a 
railway  or  plank  road  leading  to,  through,  or  from  the  city.4 

Galveston,  96  U.  S.  341  pay  where  they  are  found,  or  elsewhere. 

(1877) ;  approved,   [Jnited  States  v.  Fort  The    principal    power,    when    expressed, 

99  r.  s.  L52.  draws  to  it,  by  necessary  implication,  the 

v.  Duhuqne,]  Wall.  (U.S.)  means    of    its    execution.      This    is    the 

221  (1863),  Miller,  J.,  dissenting.    Where  settled   rale   in    the   construction    of    all 

a  city  can  make  such  a  contract,  with  the  grants  of  authority,   whether  to  govern- 

■ion  of  a  prior  vote,  the  sanction  will,  ments  or  individuals/'    Express  mithoritu 

:,  action  on  such  a  contract,  be  pre-  to  a  city  "to  borrow  money"  necessarily  ini- 

sumed  until  the  contrary  is  shown  by  the  plies  the  power  to  determine  the  time  of 

city.     lb.  per  Swayne,  J.  payment,  and  to  issue  bond-  or  other  evi- 

M   jrei  v.   Muscatine,  1   Wall.  (TJ.  S.)  dence  of  indebtedness,  to  borrow  within 

384  (1863).     In  this  case,  the  court,  per  or  withonl    the  State,    and   to  agree  to 

Swa  ■■.    (1    Wall.   391):     "The  pay   where    borrowed.      Railroad    Co.   v. 

power  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  make  Evansville,  IS  tnd.  39.5,  412  (1860),  dis- 

any  contracl   does  nol   depend  apon  the  tinguished  as  to  place  of  payment  from 

aance,  bul  apon  it-  Bcope  Prettyman  v.  Tazwell  Co.,  l'.»  111.406  ;  22 

and  object.     A  city  authorized  to  estab-  111.  147,  which  were  regarded  as  turning 

lish  and   water-worli  i  upon  peculiar  statutory   provisions.     See 

may  buy  v.  .  further,  chapter  xiv.  on  Contracts,  post. 

and  gravel  beyond  its  limits,  and  agree  to         4  Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.) 


§  130  LIMITATIONS    OF    INDEBTEDNESS.  197 

§  130  (85).  Bpecial  Limitations  on  the  Power  to  become  in- 
debted ;  Creation  of  Debt  defined.  —  Provisions  are  frequently  made 
in  Constitutions  or  in  charters  or  legislative  acts  to  prevent  the  crea- 
tion or  increase  of  municipal  indebtedness  beyond  specified  limits  or  ex- 
cept upon  certain  conditions.  Such  limitations  have  been  found  by 
experience  to  be  necessary  to  prevent  extravagance,  are  remedial  in 
their  nature,  are  based  upon  the  wise  policy  of  paying  as  you  go,  and 
ought,  therefore,  to  be  construed  and  applied  to  secure  the  end 
sought.  The  cases  referred  to  will  show  that  the  courts  have  fairly 
given  them  full  effect.  The  judicial  construction  of  some  of  these 
provisions  will  be  noticed  in  this  place. 

The  Constitution  of  Maryland  contains  a  provision  that  "  no  debt 
shall  be  created  by  the  mayor  and  city  council  of  Baltimore"  (except 
for  specified  temporary  purposes),  unless  it  shall  be  first  sanctioned 
by  the  legislature  and  approved  by  the  voters  of  the  city.  The  city, 
being  the  owner  of  a  large  amount  of  stock  in  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  Company,  without  previous  legislative  authority  or  the 
approval  of  the  voters  passed  an  ordinance  to  provide  for  the  raising 
of  one  million  of  dollars  by  hypothecating  its  railroad  stock,  and  for 
the  investment  of  the  same  in  the  bonds  of  another  railroad  company 
whose  road  was  in  process  of  construction.  The  validity  of  this  ordi- 
nance being  drawn  in  question,  the  court  considered  it  to  be  plain  that 
the  constitutional  provision  quoted  was  intended  to  prohibit  the  city 
from  aiding  in  the  construction  of  works  of  internal  improvement 
without  the  previous  assent  of  the  legislature  and  of  a  majority  of 
the  voters  of  the  city ;  and  that  the  ordinance  (notwithstanding  the 
ingenious  use  of  the  phrase  raising  instead  of  borrowing  money,  and 
the  further  provision  that  the  parties  furnishing  the  money  should 
look  for  its  repayment  exclusively  to  the  stock  pledged,  and  that 
the  city  should  not  be  responsible  for  any  deficit)  did  create  a  debt 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution,  and  was  therefore  void.1 

384  (1863),  Miller,  J.,  dissenting,  in  an  l  Baltimore  v.  Gill,  31  Md.  375  (1869), 

opinion   of  marked   ability ;    Mitchell  v.  distinguished,    Richmond   v.    McGirr,    78 

Burlington,  4  Wall.  270  (1866) ;  Rogers  v.  Ind.  192,  196  (1881).      That  a  debt  may 

Burlington,  3  Wall.  654  (1865).     General  be  created  by  borrowing  money,  although 

power  granted  to  a  city  to  create  a  debt  there  be  a  provision  exempting  the  bor- 

will  be  construed  to  mean  debts  for  sped-  rower  from  liability  beyond  the  property 

fied,  legitimate,  and  proper  municipal  pur-  pledged,  see  Newell  v.  People,  3  Seld.  (7 

poses,  and  not  for  any  or  all  purposes,  at  N.  Y. )  9,    87.     Where  a  municipal  cor- 

the  discretion  of  the  city  council  or  in-  poration  is  forbidden,  by  the  Constitution  to 

habitants.       Lafayette    v.     Cox,     5    Ind.  become  indebted  in  any  amount  exceeding 

(Porter)  38  (1854).     Limitation  on  taxing  a  specified  limit,  held,  1,  that  if  it  exceed 

power  does  not  Ivmitpower  to  contract  debts,  the  limited  amount  it  may  be  enjoined ; 

Emerson   v.    Blairsville,    2    Pittsb.    (Pa.)  2,  that  the  bill  is  maintainable  by  a  citizen 

Rep.    39  ;    post,    sec.    162.     See,    further,  and  taxpayer  of  the  place.     Springfield  v. 

ch.  xiv.  on  Contracts,  post.  Edwards,  84  111.  626  (1877).      Remedy  of 


MUNICIPAL    COIU'OKATIONS. 


R    ]  :;  1       36  .      Special    Charter    Limitations    construed. —  Under  a 

charter  prohibiting  the  common  council  of  a  city  from  "authorizing 
yenditun  for  any  'purpose*'  in  the  current  political  year,  <<- 


91  t— 922.  Such  a 
limitation  was  held  to  forbid  implied  as 
idebteduess,  and  to  be 
bindiug  equally  upou  courts  of  equity  and 
of  law.  Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  111  U.  8.  190 
(where  relief  in  equity  was  denied  to  one 

1  loaned  money  to  a  city,  in  • 
of  it-  constitutional  limit  of  indebtedness, 
which  had  been  used  in  constructing  pub- 
lic works,  ami  who  prayed  for  a  return  of 
the  money).  Where  the  contract  of  a 
issue  it-  bonds  was  Illegal  because 
the  issue  would  create  a  debt  in  excess  of 
it-  power  under  the  Constitution  to  con- 
tract,  tlic  fact  that  it  afterwards,  under 
tin-  general  municipal  incorporation  law. 
became  a  city  with  power  to  create  a  debt 

reater  amount,  was  held  not  to 
validate  the  contract  made  while  it  was 
:i  town,  ami  that  the  city  could  not  ratify 
the  contract.  Waxahachie  v.  Brown,  67 
Tex.  519;  Could  v.  Paris,  tJ8  Tex.  511. 
The  charter  of  Atlantic  City  in  New 

ontained  a  limitation  that  its  debt 

•'.-hall  at  no  time  exceed  $35,000."      The 

indebtt  '1    in    this  sum    when    it 

entered  into  "   cunt  met    with  a  water  cant- 

<,//>/>/,/  itself  with  water  for  public 

purposes  for  an  indefinite  period,  making 

e  r,  in  raise  tni  tii  cation 

■  mit  //nit  tin  city  could  be  called  on 
I.,  pay  mall  elite  contract.  On  certiorari, 
bringing  up  the  contract  for  judicial  re- 
view, it  was  held  that  the  contract  and 
ordinances  were  ultra  vires,  and  the  same 

:  aside.  After  reviewing  the  cases 
cited  16  •..   from   [owa, 

Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania,  .'/"- 
lie,  3.,  tid :  "It  is  impossible,  perhaps, 
I,,  entirely  reconcile  these  cases.  The 
true  interpretation  of  such  restrictions  on 
municipal  indebtedness,  in  my  judgment, 
lies  between  the  extremes  they  exhibit. 
The  plain  obje  si  of  such  restrictions  is  to 
'hit  all  moneys  which  are  to  he 
paid  for  municipal  expenses,  after  the  debt 

-  led  the  fixed  limit,  shall  he  raised 

•inn.      Iii  view  of  this  object,  it    is 

clear  (and  all  the  cases  agree  in  this)  that 

prohibitions  against  increasing  the  indebt- 

i  municipality  are 


not  to  In  construed  as  limited  to  obliga- 
tions which  are  debts  eo  nomine,  but  are 
tu  be  extended  t"  all  contracts  for  the  paj  - 
nieiit  of  money  or  contracts  whereon  the 
it  of  money  may  be  enforced.  But 
when-  the  money  to  be  paid  upon  such  con- 
tracts is  provided  for,  to  be  raised  by  tax- 
ation Upon  some  fixed  and  definite  scheme, 

such  contracts  are  not,  in  my  judgment, 
within  such  prohibitions.  Where,  how- 
ever, the  money  requin  d  to  mi  et  such 
contracts  is  not  provided  for,  either  by 
being  legally  ordered  to  be  raised  by  tax- 
ation ami  appropriated  for  that  purpose, 
or  by  sume  legislative  scheme  which  pos- 
itively prescribes  that  it  shall  be  raised  by 
taxation  and  appropriated  for  its  payment 
as  needed,  then  such  contracts  do  increase 
the  indebtedness  or  debt  of  municipal  cor- 
porations within  the  meaning  of  such  pro- 
hibitions. Any  other  construction  would 
deprive  these  rot  rid  inns  of  the  force 
requisite  to  reach  ami  cure  the  evil  in- 
tended to  be  prevented  thereby."  Read 
v.  Atlantic  City,  49  N.  J.  L.  (20  Vroom) 
558. 

In  Lauisiana  it  was  held  that  an  act 
of  tic  legislature  prohibiting  counties  and 
cities  fr<mi  thereafter  "contracting  any 
debt  or  pecuniary  liability,  without  fully 
providing,  in  the  ordinance  creating  the 
debt,  the  means  of  paying  the  principal 
and  interest  of  the  debt  so  contracted," 
does  not  extend  to  a  liability  for  ordinary 
street  work,  which  forms  part  of  the  cur- 
rent expenses  uf  i  tie  cm,  poration,  and  which 
may  be  paid  out  of  its  current  revenues. 
Reynolds  v.  Shreveport,  13  La.  An.  426 
(1858).  A  provision  in  a  city  charter  that 
the  council  shall  not   have  power  to  pledge 

the  credit  of  the  citj  for  more  than  a  speci- 
fied sum  without  submitting  tin  question  ta 

tie  voL  es  of  tht  city  was  regarded  as  a  defi- 
nite restriction  on  the  power;  and  hence  a 
statute  authorizing  the  city  to  issue  bonds 
to  defray  the  expenses  of  building  a  bridge 

i-    Subordinate    to,    and    does    not     override, 

triction  in  the  charter.  Cumber- 
land v.  Magruder,  34  Md.  381  (1871). 
But  see  Butz  *'.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575 
(1860)  ;  post,  sec  L62. 


§  132  SPECIAL   CHARTER   LIMITATIONS    CONSTRUED.  199 

cceding  the  amount  of  the  annual  tax  levy,  the  council  cannot  author- 
ize any  expenditure  to  be  made  within  the  year  exceeding  the  limit ; 
but  they  are  not  forbidden  to  authorize  in  that  year  an  expenditure 
to  be  made  in  a  subsequent  year,  for  services  to  be  performed  in 
such  subsequent  year.1  The  charter  of  Chicago  contained  the  pro- 
vision that  "  no  contract  shall  be  made  by  the  common  council,  and 
no  expense  incurred  unless  an  appropriation  shall  have  been  previously 
made  concerning  such  expense"  and  the  comptroller  is  required  to 
submit  each  year  an  estimate  of  the  amount  necessary  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  city  for  the  current  year.  With  this  provision  in 
force  the  city  made  a  contract  with  a  gas  company  whose  works 
were  already  complete  to  take  gas  for  its  streets  and  public  build- 
ings at  a  specified  price  for  the  period  of  ten  years.  This  contract 
was  held  invalid  on  the  ground  that  under  the  above  charter  pro- 
vision there  was  no  actual  or  reasonable  necessity  to  make  a  contract 
extending  over  ten  years,  no  appropriation  having  been  made  com- 
mensurate with  the  obligations  of  the  contract ;  and  aside  from  the 
special  provision  of  the  charter,  the  court  inclined  to  the  same  re- 
sult on  the  ground  that  the  power  was  legislative  and  that  the 
council  could  not,  without  any  reasonable  necessity  appearing,  bind 
their  successors  for  ten  years  or  indefinitely.  Drummond,  J.,  added, 
"  In  all  cases  of  contracts  to  rim  for  years,  the  authority  to  make 
them  should  be  clear.  It  is  better  that  all  parties  should  under- 
stand there  is  a  limit  to  the   power  of  municipal  bodies  in  such 


cases."2 

§  132.  Special  Charter  Limitation  construed. — The  city  of  Gal- 
veston under  a  provision  of  its  charter  authorizing  it  to  construct 
sidewalks  and  make  street  improvements  and  to  reimburse  itself  for 

i  "Weston  v.   Syracuse,  17   N.  Y.   110  Burr  v.  Carbondnle,  76  111.  455,  474  (1875). 

(1858).    See,  also,  Cook  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  See  Smith  v.  Morse,   2  Cal.  524  ;  Police 

1  Clinton's  N.  Y.  Digest,  "Buffalo,"  sec.  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  566  ;  ante,  sees. 

2.     Limitation  on  rate   of  tax  to  be  an-  63,  69. 

nually  levied  construed.  State  v.  Mayor,  2  Garrison  v.  Chicago,  7  Biss.  480 
23  La.  An.  358.  Funded  debts. — The  (187 7), Drummond,  J.;  ante,  sec.  97.  The 
charter  of  a  city  provided  that  "no  funded  statute  of  California,  which  declares  that 
debt  shall  be  contracted."  It  was  decided,  the  board  of  supervisors  must  not  contract 
that  a  city  bond,  issued  on  time,  for  the  debts  and  liabilities  which,  added  to  the 
purchase  of  market  grounds,  was  not  a  salaries  of  officials,  will  exceed  the  reve- 
funded  debt.  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  nue  of  the  county  for  the  year,  does  not 
N.  Y.  356.  Meaning  of  "funded  debt"  mean  by  "revenue"  the  actual  amount  of 
and  "funding"  considered  by  Selden,  J.,  money  received  into  the  County  Treasury, 
lb.  p.  367,  and  by  Wright,  J.,  p.  378.  but  the  estimate  of  the  board  of  super- 
City  may  fund  valid  bonds  and  issue  new  visors  of  what  the  revenue  will  be.  Bab- 
bonds  therefor,  without  express  authority,  cock  v.  Goodrich,  47  Cal.  488  (1874). 
Galena  v.   Corwith,   48   111.    423  (1868)  ; 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§134 


inse  from  abutting   lol  owners,  made  a  contract  for  local 
improvements  of  this  character  which  created  a  liability  exceeding 
This  contract   was  claimed  by  the  city  to  be  invalid  by 
:i    of  another  provision  of  the  charter,  that  the  council  shall 
ey  for  general  purposes  to  an  amount  greater  than 
000.     The  Supreme  Court  of  the   I'nited  States  held  the  objec- 
tion to  the  validity  of  the  contract    not  to  be  well  taken;  and  the 
ons  for  its  judgment,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  are  given 
in  the  note.1 


§  1  33.      Prohibitory  Statute   construed.  —  Under   a  Statute  which 

was  passed  to  prohibit  the  making  of  contracts  by  unauthorized  official 
agents  for  supplies  for  the  use  of  the  city  of  New  York,  if  a  con- 
tractor makes  a  contract  without  observing  the  protective  require- 
ments of  the  statute  and  furnishes  supplies  thereunder,  the  city  is 
not  bound,  although  the  materials  supplied  were  used  by  it,  and  an 
implied  liability  cannot  be  raised  in  the  face  of  the  words  and  pur* 
pose  of  the  statute.2 

§  134  (87).    Special  Charter  Provision  construed.  —  A   municipal 
charter  provided  that  it  should  nut  be  lawful  for  the  city  council  to 


1  Hitchcock    ».    Oalveston,    96  U.    S. 
77).      Approved,    I'.    S.    v.    Fort 
19  I  .  s.  L52  (1878).     "The  limita- 
tion,"   says   Strong,   J.,  in  the    rase   first 
"is    upon    the   power   to   borrow 
.  ami  to  borrow  it  for  general  pur- 
poses.    It  implies  that  there  may  be  law- 
ful purposes  which  are  not  general  in  the 
in  which  that  word  is  used  in  the 
An  examination   of  the  whole 
ii  strument,    anil    of    the    numerous    and 
••tit.  i red  upon  the  council, 
as  well  a-  duties  imposed,  makes  c  i  \  idenl 
■    e  provision  could  qo!  have  been  in- 
tended t..  prohibil  incun ing  an  indebted- 
i    ceeding  the  sum  named.      It   is  in 
limitation  of  the  debl  of  the 
If  it    is,   the  granl    of  power   tin' 
contains  was  an  idle  thing,  and 
•'::'■  duties  imposed  could  not  lie  perl 

mncil,   as   we   have   Been,    i-    em- 
powered to  grade  and  pave  the  streets,  and 
iralks.     There  is  no  ex- 
rnitation  of  these  powers.     Their 
rily    involves    large    ex- 
penditure.      Such  expenditure    is,    there- 
I       It  is  a  plain  incident  of 
.  expenditure. 


It  is  for  a  new  work,  unlike  the  work  of 
keeping  in  repair.  Conceding  that  it  is 
a  purpose  of  the  act  incorporating  the 
city,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  general 
purpose,  for  if  it  is,  all  purposes  of  the 
charter  are  general.  Grading  a  street  or 
making  a  sidewalk,  where  none  had  ex- 
isted before,  is  a  special  improvement,  not 
like  repairs  of  constant  recurrence.  By 
another  article  of  defendant's  charter  the 
city  council  was  authorized  to  provide  by 
ordinance  special  funds  for  special  pur- 
poses, and  to  make  the  same  disbursable 
only  for  the  purpose  for  which  tin'  fund 
was  created.  For  these  reasons  we  are  of 
opinion  that  the  limitation  upon  the 
power  of  the  council  to  borrow  for  general 
purposes  did  not  make  the  agreement 
with  the  plaintiffs  invalid." 

-  McDonald  v.  New  York,  68  N.  Y. 
23  (1876)  ;  s.  C.  23  Am.  Rep.  114,  dis- 
tinguishing Nelson  v.  Mayor,  &c,  63  N. 
Y.  535  ;  and  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco,  16 
Cal.  255,  as  to  implied  liability.  See 
Gould  v.  I'aris,  68  Tex.  511  ;  pnst,  sees. 
135,  note,  460  ;  ante,  sees.  124,  note, 
126,  note. 


§  134  a  CONSTITUTIONAL   PROVISIONS   CONSTRUED.  201 

make,  or  authorize  to  be  made,  "  any  contract  for  the  payment  of 
money  beyond  the  current  fiscal  year"  declaring  every  such  prohib- 
ited contract  "illegal  and  void."  In  construing  this  language  the 
court  says  :  "  By  this  section  of  the  charter,  the  legislature  have,  in 
the  most  explicit  manner,  prohibited  the  city  council  from  contract- 
ing any  debt  beyond  the  fiscal  year.  If  the  city  council  had,  at 
the  time  the  contract  was  made  in  1845,  passed  an  ordinance  that 
the  expense  of  lighting  the  streets  of  the  city  for  that  year  should 
be  paid  in  1848,  by  a  tax  then  assessed  for  that  purpose,  it  would 
have  come  within  the  letter  of  the  prohibition.  It  is  none  the  less 
a  violation  of  its  spirit  that  the  council  did  not  pass  the  ordinance 
providing  for  its  payment  until  1848."  l 

§  134  a.  Constitutional  Provisions  of  California  and  of  Colorado 
construed.  —  The  Constitution  of  California  provides  that  no  mu- 
nicipal corporation  "  shall  incur  any  indebtedness  or  liability  in  any 
manner  or  for  any  purpose,  exceeding  in  any  year  the  income  and 
revenue  provided  for  it  for  such  year,  without  the  assent  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  qualified  electors  thereof  voting  at  an  election  to  be 
held  for  that  purpose,"  &c;  and  this  provision  is  held  to  mean  that, 
subject  to  the  exception,  "  each  year's  income  and  revenue  must  pay 
each  year's  indebtedness  and  liability,  and  that  no  indebtedness  or 
liability  in  any  one  year  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  income  or  revenue 
of  any  future  year."  2  By  the  Constitution  of  Colorado  "  no  county 
shall  contract  any  debt  by  loan  in  any  form  except  for  the  purpose  of 
erecting  necessary  public  buildings,"  &c,  and  "  the  aggregate  amount 
of  indebtedness  of  any  county  for  all  purposes  exclusive  of  debts 
contracted  before  the  adoption  of  this  Constitution,  shall  not  exceed 
at  any  time  "  a  specified  rate.  The  Supreme  Court  of  that  State, 
ruling  upon  a  contention  that  the  limitation  was  upon  indebtedness 
"  by  loan,"  held  that,  "  while  these  two  propositions  are  associated 
they  are  none  the  less  independent  declarations ; "  that  in  deter- 

1  Per  Caldwell,  J.,  Jonas  v.  Cincinnati,  made.     Where  a  charter  forbade  a  city  to 

18  Ohio,  318,  322  (1849)  ;  distinguished,  contract  a  debt  exceeding  in  any  one  year 

Richmond   v.   McGirr,   78  Ind.    192,   197  the  revenue  for  that  year,  a  contract  for  a 

(1881).     Construction  of  similar  provision  term  of  thirty  years  for  the  use  of  water 

in  other  charters.     Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12  was  held  to  create  a  liability  to  the  full 

Mich.  279  ;  Philadelphia  v.  Flanigen,  47  extent  of  the  term,  and  that  as  the  aggre- 

Pa.  St.  21  ;  Johnson  v.  Philadelphia,  lb.  gate  liability  was  in  excess  of  the  revenue 

3S2  ;  Wallace  v.  San  Jose,   29  Cal.   180 ;  of  any   one   year  the  contract  was  void. 

Bladen  v.   Philadelphia,   60  Pa.   St.  464,  Niles  Water    Works   v.   Niles,  59    Mich. 

construing  an  act  applying  to  the  city,  to  311.     Infra,  sees.  135,  note,  136,  136  a. 
the  effect  that  no  debt  shall  be  binding         2  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  Brickwedel, 

unless   authorized    by  law    or  ordinance,  62  Cal.  641. 
and  a  sufficient  appropriation  therefor  be 


202  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  135 

mining  the  amount  of  indebtedness  at  any  time  county  warrants  are 
to  be  taken  into  the  account,  all  those  which  increase  the  indebted- 
beyond  the  amount  limited  being  void;  that  the  county  au- 
thorities as  well  as  the  parties  dealing  with  them  are  bound  to  take 
notice  of  the  limit  prescribed  in  the  Constitution  ; 1  ami  that  the  limi- 
tation includes  debts  incurred  by  (.novation  of  law  as  well  as  those 
arising  upon  express  contracts,  but  does  not  include  involuntary 
liability  arising  ex  di  licto? 

§135(88).  Constitutional  Provisions  construed.  —  The  Consti- 
tution of  Iowa  contains  the  provision  that  "no  county  or  oilier 
political  or  municipal  corporation,  shall  he  allowed  /<>  become  indebted 
inany  manner,  or  for  any  purpose,  to  an  amount  exceeding  five  per 

on  the  ruin,  qf  tin*  taxable  property  within  such  county  or 
corporation,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  last  State  and  county  list, 
previous  to  the  incurring  of  such  indebtedness."  Under  this  pro- 
vision, as  construed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  no  in- 
debtedness, for  whatever  purpose  created,  is  exempted  from  the 
operation  of  the  prohibition,  and  it  applies  to  negotiable  bonds 
issued  under  legislative  authority  as  well  as  to  other  debts;  and  the 
creditor  or  bondholder  must  at  his  peril  take  notice  that  the  con- 
stitutional limit  is  not  exceeded.8  Substantially  similar  provisions 
in  other  Constitutions,  referred  to  in  the  note,  have  received  alike 
construction.4    If  a  municipal  corporation  has  the  means  in  its  treas- 

1  People  v.  May,  9  Col.  81  (1885).    The  debt,  whether  the  identical  money  received 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  for  the  bonds  could  he  recovered  of  the 

itly  construed    this  provision  of  the  municipality,    the  court   left    undecided. 

titution.     Lake   County  v.  lb.     See  ante,  sees.  124,  note,    126.     In 

Rollins,    130    U.    S.    662   (1889)    (county  Mosher  v.  School  District,    41    Iowa,  122 

warrants);  Lake  County  v.  Graham,  130  (1876),    the    doctrine  of    the    preceding 

I".  S.  '',71   (1889)  (county  bonds).     These  cases    was  adhered    to,    and    the  attempt 

cases  are  more  fully  considered,  post,  ch.  of    the    legislature    to    give     a     remedy 

xiv.  was  held  to   be    ineffectual.     A  contract 

-   People   v.   May,   9  CoL   404    (1886).  for  building  a  sewer,  by   which  the  con- 

Infira,        .  L37.  ti ad or  was  to  receive  certificates  of  assess- 

k  v.    School    District,    39    Iowa,  menta  upon  owners   of  adjacent  property 

190;  Free  ;i  v.  Burlington,  42  Iowa,  614  in    full    payment,  held    not   to   create   a 

(1876);    Grant    <\    Davenport,    36    Iowa,  debt    within    the    meaning  of    the    eon- 

396    (1873);    McPherson    v.    Foster,    43  stitutional    limitation.       Davis    v.     Des 

Iowa,      i-     '1-71'.);     Council     Bluffs     v.  Moines,  71  Iowa,  500. 

Stewart,  51  Iowa,  385.     The  fact  thai  the         4  The  courts  of  Indiana  have  decided 

corporation  received  the  value  of  its  bonds,  that  a  constitutional  provision  similar  to 

and  that  the  purchaser  acted  ing 1  faith,  that  of  Iowa  is  prospectivt  in  its  operation, 

and  witl  does  not  entitle  him  and   does  not  prevent  the   issue  of  new 

to    recover    the    amount    paid   therefor,  bonds  bearing  interest  fur  the  purpose  of 

Since,  in  the  view  of  the  court,  the  receipt  funding  debts  and  interesl    in   existence 

of  value  for  the  bonds  does  not   create  a  when  the  constitutional   amendment  was 


§135 


CONSTITUTIONAL   PROVISIONS   CONSTRUED. 


203 


ury  to  meet  its  indebtedness,  the  issue  of  warrants  to  an  amount  larger 
than  five  per  cent  of  its  taxable  property  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
section  of  the  State  Constitution  which  provides  that  "  no  municipal 
corporation  shall  be  allowed  to  become  indebted,  in  any  manner  or 
for  any  purpose,  to  an  amount  exceeding  five  per  cent  of  the  taxable 
property  within  the  corporation."  In  such  case  it  would  not  be- 
come indebted  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  clause.1 


adopted.     Powell    v.    City    of    Madison, 
107  Ind.  106. 

Under  a  constitutional  provision  in 
Pennsylvania,  similar  to  that  in  Iowa, 
municipal  bonds  (as  to  which  see  more 
fully,  post,  chap.  xiv.  on  Contracts)  is- 
sued in  violation  of  the  provision  were 
held  void  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide  holders. 
Millerstown  v.  Frederick,  114  Pa.  St.  435  ; 
see  also  appeal  of  Wilkes-Barre,  109  Pa. 
St.  554.  The  Constitution  of  Georgia 
contains  a  like  provision.  Butts  v.  Little, 
68  Ga.  272  ;  Walsh  v.  Augusta,  67  Ga. 
293  ;  Hudson  v.  Marietta,  64  Ga.  286 ; 
Spann  v.  Webster  County,  64  Ga.  498. 
Construction  of  like  provision  of  Consti- 
tution of  Texas,  Gould  v.  Paris,  68  Tex. 
511  ;  Waxahatchie  v.  Brown,  67  Tex. 
519. 

i  Dively  v.  Cedar  Falls,  27  Iowa,  227 
(1869).  A  contract  by  the  corporation  to 
pay  for  work  when  it  shall  be  performed 
in  the  future,  does  not  constitute  an  in- 
debtedness, within  the  meaning  of  this 
provision  of  the  Constitution,  until  the 
performance  of  the  work.  lb.  Valparaiso 
v.  Gardner,  97  Ind.  1.  But  quaere. 
See  Davenport,  &c.  Gas  Co.  v.  Davenport, 
13  Iowa,  229.  Supra,  sec.  134,  and  note. 
The  meaning  and  effect  of  the  Iowa  Con- 
stitution quoted  above  were  much  dis- 
cussed before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iovia, 
in  which  the  question  was,  "  Is  a  city 
corporation  liable  to  a  bona  fide  holder, 
upon  its  negotiable  bonds  issued  for  value, 
when  at  the  time  of  such  issue  the  city 
was  indebted  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
constitutional  limit  ? "  The  cause  wan 
settled  before  being  decided,  and  no 
opinions  were  filed  ;  but  the  judges  dif- 
fered in  their  judgment.  In  the  Western 
Jurist  (Vol.  VI.  p.  1,  January,  1872)  will 
be  found  two  able  and  interesting  articles 
upon  the  question  above  stated,  contain- 
ing the  arguments  upon  both  sides  of  it, 


—  the  one  being  prepared,  as  it  is  under- 
stood, by  Mr.  Justice  Beck,  and  the  other 
by  Mr.  Justice  Cole,  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Iowa.  The  proposition  upon  which 
they  differ  is  whether  the  power  given  to 
a  city  to  issue  its  bonds  absolutely  ceases, 
as  to  innocent  holders,  the  moment  the 
constitutional  limit  is  reached,  the  same 
as  if  it  had  never  been  conferred.  Sub- 
sequently the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 
decided  that  bonds  issued  in  excess  of  the 
constitutional  limit  were  void  in  the 
hands  of  innocent  holders  for  value  ;  and 
denies  any  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
municipality,  either  on  the  bonds  or  in 
respect  of  the  value  it  received  for  them. 
McPherson  v.  Foster,  43  Iowa,  48  (1876). 
The  subject  is  further  discussed  in  chap, 
xiv.  post,  on  Contracts.  Ante,  sees.  126, 
note,  130,  note. 

The  provision  of  the  Iowa  Constitution, 
above  quoted,  was  expounded  in  the  case 
of  Grant  v.  Davenport,  36  Iowa,  396 
(1873),  which  involved  the  validity  of  a 
contract  by  the  city  to  supply  itself  with 
water  ;  and  it  was  held  that  where  a  con- 
tract made  by  a  municipal  corporation 
pertains  to  its  ordinary  expenses,  and  is, 
together  with  other  like  expenses,  within 
the  limit  of  its  current  revenues  and  such 
special  taxes  as  it  may  legally  levy,  and 
in  good  faith  intends  to  levy  therefor, 
such  contract  does  not  constitute  "the 
incurring  of  indebtedness "  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision 
limiting  the  power  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions to  contract  debts. 

An  ordinance  authorizing  a  corporation 
to  construct  water-works  within  a  city  upon 
certain  conditions  prescribed,  and  provid- 
ing that  the  city  may,  whenever  its  finan- 
cial condition  will  permit,  purchase  and 
control  them,  is  not  an  "incurring  of  in- 
debtedness" within  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision ;  it  is  only  assuming  an  obligation, 


_"1 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§136 


#£  136.  Constitutional  Provisions  construed. —  Under  the  Consti- 
tutional provision  in  Illinois  (quoted  in  the  note1)  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  State  has  established  the  doctrine  that  a  corporation 
Is  prohibited  from  becoming  indebted  in  any  manner  or  for  any  pur- 
beyond  the  limit,2  even  for  necessary  current  expenses*  It  can- 
not incur  corporate  indebtedness  beyond  the  limit  in  anticipation  of 
the  collection  of  taxes  levied;  and  such  indebtedness  and  the  evi- 
dences thereof  are  void.4  But  a  corporation  may  issue  a  warrant  for 
authorized  expenses  drawn  against  taxes  actually  levied  and  to  be 
collected  for  the  purpose,  which  wan-ant,  while  not  creating  a  debt 
or  liability  against  the  corporation,  may  yet  operate  as  an  assign- 
ment of  so  much  of  the  particular  taxes  when  collected,  and  such 
warrant   may  be  made  receivable  for  taxes.6 

The  Constitution  of    Indiana   contains  a  provision  substantially 
atical  with  that  of  Iowa  and  Illinois  before  referred  to,6  under 


which,  without  further  action  on  the  part 
of  the  city,  will  not  ripen  into  a  deht  thai 
ib  thus  forbidden.  The  city  may  provide 
a   tax   not    exceeding   five   mills  for  the 

nance  of  water-works,  and  a  sink- 
ing fond  to  rednce  the  debt  thereon.  The 
bhat,  by  the  levy  of  the  tax,  the  city 
may  in  time  become  the  owner  of  the 
works  does  not  render  the  ordinance  liable 
to  the  objection  that  it  permits  the  city  to 
(In  indirectly  what  it  cannot  do  directly, 
none  but  legal  and  constitutional 

are  employed.     Burlington  Water 
Co.  o.  Woodward,  49  Iowa,  58.    See  supra, 
see.  L34,  oote. 
The  charter    of  the  city   of  Portland, 

.    prohibited    the    city   from  con- 
tracting  an  indebtedness  exceeding  $50,- 

ad  it  was  held  by  Judge  Deady 
that  an  ordinance  assuming  a  liability  of 

0,  to  be  paid  in  Bemi-annual  instal- 
ment -,  extending  through  twenty  years, 
was  in  of  the  charter,  and  this, 

;h  the  ordinance   made  provisions 
f'.r  the  payment  of  such  in 
they  fell  ilue,  by  tin-  levy  of  taxes  f"r  that 
purpose.      Coulson   v.    Portland,    I 
>«38). 

utional  provision  requiring 
tin-  legislature  to  restrict  the  \ 
s  to   levy  taxes,  >> 
&c,  -'.  a   '  ,  chap,  iii-  see.  50. 

1   '•  No  county,   city,  township,  Bchool 

.  "r  other  municipal  corp 
shall  he  allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any 


manner  or  for  any  purpose,  to  an  amount, 
including  existing  indebtedness,  in  the 
aggregate  exceeding  live  per  centum  on 
the  value  of  the  taxable  property  therein, 
to  he  ascertained  by  the  last  assessment 
fur  State  and  county  taxes,  previous  to  the 
incurring  of  such  indebtedness."  Const. 
1870,  art.  9,  sec.  12. 

-  Springfield  v.  Edwards,  84  111.  626. 

3  Prince*.  Quincy,  105  111.  138;  Prince 
v.  Quincy,  105  111.  215.  See  Gould  v. 
Paris,  68  Tex.  511. 

*  Law  v.  People,  87  111.  385;  Fuller  v. 
Chicago,  89  111.  282. 

5  Fuller  r.  Heath,  89  111.  296;  Law  v. 
People,  87,  111.  385. 

A  debt  already  in  existence  at  the  time 
of  the  adoption  of  such  constitutional 
provision,  although  in  excess  of  the  limit, 
may,  of  course,  bt  refunded,  and  such  re- 
funding is  not  a  violation  of  the  Consti- 
tution. Powell  v.  Madison,  107  Ind.  106. 
"The  fact  that  the  property,  for  whirl) 
the  ' iel >t  is  contracted,  is  valuable,  and  a 
source  of  profit  or  revenue,  does  not  remove 
or  change  tin-  character  of  the  indebted- 
ness." Per  Miller,  .1.,  in  Scott  r.  Daven- 
port, 84  Iowa,  208,  213.  The  property  in 
question  was  water-works. 

fi  The  13th  article  of  the  Constitution 
of  Indiana,  adopted  in  1881,  ordains  that, 
"  No  political  or  municipal  corporation  in 
this  State  shall  ever  hecome  indebted,  in 
any  manner  or  for  any  purpose,  to  an 
amouut  in  the  aggregate  exceeding  two  per 


136  a 


CONSTITUTIONAL   PROVISIONS   CONSTRUED. 


205 


which  it  is  held  that  a  city  whose  indebtedness  has  reached  the 
limit  cannot  create  a  further  debt  even  for  necessaries.1 

The  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania  provides  that  "  The  debt  of  any 
city,  except  as  herein  provided,  shall  never  exceed  seven  per  centum 
upon  the  assessed  value  of  the  taxable  property  therein."  The  city 
of  Erie  made  a  contract  with  private  persons  for  the  erection  of  a 
market-house,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  city  agreed  to  pay  for 
twenty-five  years  a  rental  of  $1500  per  annum.  A  bill  in  equity 
was  filed  by  taxpayers  stating  the  above  contract,  also  that  the 
indebtedness  of  the  city  was  already  in  excess  of  the  seven  per 
centum  limit,  and  praying  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  city 
from  paying  any  money  on  the  said  contract.  The  defendant  filed 
a  general  demurrer.  As  it  did  not  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  bill 
that  the  annual  revenue,  after  meeting  the  other  municipal  liabili- 
ties, was  sufficient  to  meet  the  proposed  contract  liability,  the  court 
held,  on  the  facts  before  it,  that  the  contract  created  an  indebtedness 
in  violation  of  the  Constitution,  and  granted  the  injunction.2 

§  13G  a.  Same  subject.  — Under  the  constitutional  provisions  in 
Iowa,   Illinois,  Indiana   and  Pennsylvania,  referred   to,  it  is  held 


centum  on  the  value  of  the  taxable  prop- 
erty within  such  corporation,  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  last  assessment  for  State  and 
county  taxes  previous  to  the  incurring  of 
such  indebtedness  ;  and  all  bonds  or  ob- 
ligations in  excess  of  such  amount,  given 
by  such  corporation,  shall  be  void."  The 
provisions  as  to  the  limit  of  municipal  in- 
debtedness in  the  Constitutions  of  Illinois 
and  Indiana  were  probably  copied  from 
the  Constitution  of  Iowa.  See  Prince  v. 
Quincy,  105  111.  215;  Valparaiso  v.  Gard- 
ner, 97  Ind.  1,  9. 

1  Sackett  v.  New  Albany,  88  Ind.  473. 
This  case  was  substantially  like  Prince  v. 
Quincy,  105  111.  138,  and  Prince  v. 
Quincy,  105  111.  215,  and  the  decision 
was  the  same.  See  also  Valparaiso  v. 
Gardner,  97  Ind.  1. 

2  Appeal  of  City  of  Erie,  91  Pa.  St. 
398.  In  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court 
Gordon,  J.,  quotes  the  following  from  Grant 
v.  Davenport,  36  Iowa,  396:  "When  a 
contract  made  by  a  municipal  corporation 
pertains  to  its  ordinary  expenses,  and  is, 
together  with  other  like  expenses,  within 
the  limit  of  its  current  revenues  and  such 
special  taxes  as  it  may  legally  and  in  good 


faith  intends  to  levy  therefor,  such  con- 
tract does  not  constitute  the  incurring 
of  indebtedness  within  the  meaning  of 
the  constitutional  provision  limiting  the 
power  of  municipal  corporations  to  con- 
tract debts."  And  adds  :  "  This,  we  hesi- 
tate not  to  say,  is  a  sound  constitu- 
tional interpretation,  and  in  a  similar  case 
might  well  be  adopted  in  the  construction 
of  our  own  Constitution.  If  the  contracts 
and  engagements  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions do  not  overreach  their  current  reve- 
nues, no  objections  can  lawfully  be  made 
to  them,  however  great  the  indebtedness 
of  such  municipalities  may  be  ;  for  in 
such  case  their  engagements  do  not  ex- 
tend beyond  their  present  means  of  pay- 
ment, and  so  no  debt  is  created."  So  a 
contract  entered  into  by  a  city  for  the 
building  of  a  sewer,  whereby  the  con- 
tractor agrees  to  accept,  in  full  satisfac- 
tion for  the  whole  work,  certificates  of  as- 
sessment made  upon  the  property  adja- 
cent to  tlie  sewer,  ht  Id  not  to  create  a  debt 
against  the  city,  and  so  not  to  be  within 
the  constitutional  prohibition.  Davis  v. 
DesMoines,  71  Iowa,  500. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  136  b 


that  n  corporation  may  make  a  contract  (at  lea  I  for  necessaries) 
ering  a  series  of  years,  upon  which  an  obligation  to  pay  may 
arise  frpm  year  to  year  as  the  thing  contracted  for  is  furnished  ;  and 
in  such  case,  tJie  whole  amount  which  may  ultimately  become  due 
a,  debt  within  the  constitutional  prohibition.  But 
in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  corporation  by  such  contract  is 
transgressing  the  limit,  regard  is  had  only  to  the  amount  which  may 
fall  due  within  a  certain  year  or  other  period ;  and  if  the  revenues 
for  that  year  or  other  period  are  sufficient,  over  and  above  the  pay- 
ment of  tin-  other  expenses,  to  pay  such  amount,  there  is  no  debt 
incurred  within  the  constitutional  prohibition.1 

§  L36  /'.  City  Stock  in  Sinking-Fund  not  a  Debt.  —  The  Con- 
stitution  of  New  York  (see.  11,  art.  8)  was  in  1884  amended,  inter 
alia,  by  ordaining  that  "  No  county  containing  a  city  of  over  one 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants,  or  any  such  city,  shall  he  allowed  to 
become  indebted  for  any  purpose  or  in  any  manner  to  an  amount 
which,  including  existing  indebtedness,  shall  exceed  ten  per  centum 


nt    v.    Davenport,    36    [owa,   396 

(water  supply);    E.   St.    Louis  v.   E.  St. 

a.   Co.,    98    111-  H5  (gas  supply); 

Valparaiso  v.  Gardner,   '.'7    Ind.    1   (water 

supply);  Appeal  of  Citj    of   Erie,   91   Pa. 

t-house). 

Compare  Coulson  v.  Portland,  Deady, 

481,   where    tin-  debt   was   for  a  railroad 

..   and  it  seems  there  would   have 

been  an  -•  bt  for  the  whole  amount 

immediately,  though  payable  infuturo. 

[n  Jacksonville  By.  Co.  v.  City  of  Jack- 
sonville,   lit    111.    562  (1885),  an  .assess- 
ment had  been  made  by  the  municipal  au- 
thorities, pursuant  .  against  the 
property  of  the  railway  company  for  its 
n   ni  the  estimated  post  of  a 
pavement,  tin-  construction  of  which  was 
i            I  ami  authorized.    Tin-  municipal 
ordinance  which  authorized  tin'  construc- 
tion and               Nt  contained  a  provision 
put  .if  tli.-  cost  ni'  tlir  pavement 
aid  fall  mi  the  city  Bhould  be  raised 
.11.     In  a  pro  eedinp  to 
review  tin'  validity  of  I  i  nt,  the 
railway  corn'                     I    to  show  thai  tin' 
I     indebted   in   excess   of 
til  i1  oi  '1  limit.     The  '-"Hi i  held 
irdinance  did  uo1  create  a  di  bl 
it  .li'l  ma  violate    the  constil  nt  ion  <1   pro- 
.  130,  uote;  Wallace 


r.  s.m  Jose,  29  Cal.  180;  Niles  '•.  Niles,  11 
Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cases,  299. 

A  statute  in  Nebraska  provided  that 
"it  shall  cot  be  lawful  for  any  warrants 
to  be  issued  for  any  amount  exceeding  in 
tin'  aggregate  the  amount  levied  by  tax  fur 
tin-  current  year."  The  county  commis- 
sioners after  the  exhaustion  of  the  levy 
allowed  claims  against  the  county,  ami 
levied  a  tax  under  the  name  of  a  "sink- 
ing-fund tax"  for  their  payment.  The 
tax  was  held  illegal,  because  under  the  le- 
gislation of  the  Stall-  a  sinking-fund  tax  is 
authorized  only  in  the  case  of  loans,  and 
an  audited  claim  is  not  a  Loan.  I'.  P.  K. 
E.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  County,  9  Neb.  449. 

A  city  council  in  Ohio  was  authorized 
to  levy  not  to  exceed  fifteen  mills  on  the 
dollar  for  all  municipal  purposes.  It  first 
levied  for  fifteen  mills,  and  later  made  an 
additional  levy  of  two  mills  for  the  same 
year.  The  additional  levy  of  two  mills 
was  held  void.  In  L874  the  same  city 
Council    hail    authority  to    make    the    same 

levy  as  in  1-71.  It  first  levied  ten  and 
live-tenth-  mills,  ami  later  made  an  addi- 
tional levy  of  sixteen  mills.  The  addi- 
tional levy  of  sixteen  mills  was  held  void 
throughout.    Cummings  v.  Fitch,  40  Ohio 

St.  Ou. 


§  137  LIABILITIES    EX   DELICTO.  207 

of  the  assessed  valuation  of  the  real  estate  of  such  county  or  city 
subject  to  taxation,  as  it  appeared  by  the  assessment  rolls  of  the 
said  county  or  city  on  the  last  assessment  for  State  or  county  taxes 
prior  to  the  incurring  of  such  indebtedness ;  and  all  indebtedness  in 
excess  of  such  limitation,  except  such  as  may  now  exist,  shall  be 
absolutely  void,  except  as  herein  otherwise  provided.  No  such 
county  or  such  city  whose  present  indebtedness  exceeds  ten  per 
centum  of  the  assessed  valuation  of  its  real  estate  subject  to  taxa- 
tion shall  be  allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any  further  amount 
until  such  indebtedness  shall  be  reduced  within  such  limit."  Con- 
struing this  provision,  it  was  held  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  that 
"  city  stock  "  of  the  city  of  New  York  held  by  the  Commissioners  of 
the  Sinking  Fund  for  that  city  is  not  an  indebtedness  of  the  city 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision,  since'  such  city 
stocks  are  not  debts  which  the  municipality  can  be  called  upon  to 
pay,  and  that  the  indebtedness  referred  to  in  the  Constitution  is  an 
indebtedness  to  be  met  in  the  future  by  taxation.1 

§  137  (89).  Liabilities  ex  delicto.  — A  restrictive  provision  in  a 
city  charter,  that  the  "  council  shall  not  create  or  permit  to  accrue 
any  debts  or  liabilities  which  shall  exceed  "  a  specified  sum,  unless  a 
certain  course  be  pursued  by  the  council  and  approved  by  a  vote  of 
the  people,  has  been  considered  to  have  no  relation  to  liabilities 
arising  ex  delicto,  or  to  those  which  the  law  may  cast  upon  the  cor- 
poration, and  to  apply  at  most  only  to  contracts  or  liabilities  volun- 
tarily created.  The  court,  indeed,  seems  to  consider  the  provision 
as  directory  simply,  and  not  as  a  limitation  on  the  power  of  the 
council  to  create  debts.2  The  provision  in  the  Constitution  of  Iowa 
referred  to  in  a  preceding  section,  although  it  is  construed  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State  to  fix  an  absolute  limit  to  the  amount 
of  indebtedness  which  a  municipality  has  the  power  to  incur,3  is  by 

1  Bank  for  Savings  v.  Grace,  Mayor,  &c.  charge  upon  the  taxpayer  and  a  burden 
of  New  York,  102  N.  Y.  313.  After  re-  for  him  to  remove  ;  not  a  formal  obliga- 
ferring  to  the  constitutional  amendment  tion  which  may  remain  as  evidence  of  a 
and  reviewing  the  legislation  respecting  the  once  existing  debt,  but  which  can  in  no 
sinking  fund  of  the  city  of  New  York,  the  way  be  regarded  as  a  present  debt  to  be  en- 
court  said:  "This  construction  cannot  forced,  and  which,  if  not  before  cancelled 
lead  to  a  diversion  of  the  sinking  fund,  but  in  the  discretion  of  the  commissioners, 
to  the  accomplishment  of  its  object.  It  sat-  becomes  waste  paper  by  the  mere  efflux  of 
isfies  also  the  intent  of  the  constitutional  time." 

prohibition.     That  is  aimed  at  an  actual,  '-'  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal. 

not  a  theoretical  indebtedness, — at  a  sub-  591   (1860);  supra,  sec.  134  a. 
stantial   liability  which  can  be  discharged  8  French  v.  Burlington,   42  Iowa,    614 

only  by  the  enforcement  of  a  tax  or  an  (1876);  supra,  sec.  135. 
assessment  which,  when  levied,  will  be  a 


[CIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  139 

•  •   held  to  have  no  application  to  liabilities  arising  in 
it  iS]  therefore,  no  defence  in  an  action  against  the  muni- 
Lity  for  damages  caused  by  a  defective  street  or  sidewalk  that  it 
.    time  of  the  accident  up  to  or  beyond  the  con- 
stitutional limit.1 

8    L38    (90),     Limitation    on    State    Indebtedness.  —  Constitutional 

/;■„),     -  i  Stati  indebtedness  apply  to  the  State  alone,  and  not  to 

her  political  and  municipal  subdivisions.2  A  legislative  provision 
prohibiting  the  city  authorities  from  incurring  an  indebtedness 
beyond  a  designated  amount  docs  not  apply  to  the  legislature 
,,f  the  State;  and  the  latter  may,  of  course,  by  a  subsequent  act, 
authorize  an  increase  of  the  amount.3 

§  139  (91  .   Rewards  for  Apprehension  of  Offenders.  —  Thegovern- 

dyofa  municipal  corporation  (which  has  express  power  to  pro- 

the  property  and  promote  the  welfare  of  its  inhabitants)  may,  it 

has  been  held,  offer  a  reward  for  the  detection  of  offenders  against 

the  general  sn/dy  of  its  people,  as,  for  example,  those  guilty  of  the 

me  of  arson  within  the  corporate  limits.4     The  contrary  doctrine 

has  also  been  held.'0     If  the  reward  be  offered  by  the  mayor  of  a 

i  Bartle  o.   Dea  Moines,  38  Iowa,  414  180;  Wyncoop  v.  Society,  10  Iowa,  185; 
M874      R           Dea  Moines,  40  Iowa,  638  Rice  v.  Keokuk,  15  Iowa,  579;  Gibbon  v. 
(187i                  sec.  134a.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Ala.   410;  Foote  v.  Sa- 
-  Pattison  v.  Supervisors,  13  Cal.   17"-  lem,  14  Allen,  487;  Dunn. .van  v.  Green, 
I   Cass   v.   Dillon,   '1  Ohio  St.   007  5"  111.  63. 
-    ck«.  Railroad  Co.,  13  B.  Mon.  '  Fork   v.    Forscht,    2:5    Pa.    St.   391 
16;    Clark  v.  Janesville,    10   Wis.    136;  (1854);   Crawshaw  v.   Roxbury,  7  day, 
Prettyman  v.  Supervisors,  19  111.  406.     A  374  (1856).     An  offer  of  a  reward  is  rev- 
titutional  provision   that  "the  State  ocable  at  any  time  before  its  terms  have 
i  party  to  carrying  on  any  been  complied  with,  and  may  be  revoked 
.  ,,,,,,)  "  does  nol  in  the  same  manner  in  which  it  was  made, 
ttun    from    authorizing  yetit  is  immaterial  thai  the  claimant  of 
municipalities  and  counties  to  subscribe  for  the  reward  was  ignoranl  of  its  withdrawal. 
the  stock  of  railway  companies  n  !      tie  Shuey   v.   United    States,    92  I  .   >S.    73 
their  bon                  therefor.     Comm'rs  v.  (1875).     Such  an  offer  is  not  void  for  am- 
Mill                   179  (1871);  s.  c.   12  Am.  biguity,   and  entitles  a  person  to  the  re- 
Rep,    125.     See  People  v.  Supervisors,  16  ward  who  gives  information  to  the  police 
Mich.  254,  and  Mr.  Justice  Lowe's  indi-  officers  of  the  city  upon  which  the  incen- 
vidual    opinion    -not    the    court's  —  in  diary  is  arrested,  he  being  afterwards  con- 
I  ounty  of  Wapello,  18  [owa,  388,  victed. 

Dubuque  County   v.    Railr 1  B  The  power  of  towns  in  Maine  to  offer 

(Iowa),  1,  Dean  v.  Madi-  rewards  denied.     Gale  v.  South  Berwick, 

B]   Me.   17  1.     See  Lee  v.   Fleminsburg,  7 

Allegheny   City,    24    How.  Dana,  59,   and    Loveland   v.    Detroit,   11 

(XJ.   -                                                oi  par-  Mich.  867.     In  Towa  it  is  held  that  "in 

-    ,  on  1        fen-  the  absence  of  express  statutory  authority 

.    Wallace  v.    Mayor,  29  Cal  acityhas  no  power  to  offer  a  reward  for 


§  140 


PUBLIC    BUILDINGS. 


209 


city  which  has  such  power,  it  may  be  ratified  by  the  city  council 
subsequently,  and  is  binding  upon  the  city,  though  not  so  ratified 
until  after  the  performance  of  the  service  for  which  the  reward  is 
claimed.1  A  promise  to  reward  an  officer  for  doing  that  which, 
without  such  reward,  it  was  his  duty  to  do,  is  void.  Such  a 
promise  is,  on  general  principles,  without  consideration,  if,  indeed, 
it  be  not  illegal.2  Therefore,  a  watchman  of  a  city,  who,  while  in 
the  discharge  of  his  duty  as  such,  discovers  a  person  in  the  act 
of  committing  a  crime,  cannot  recover  from  the  city  a  reward 
offered  by  it.3 

§  140  (92).  Public  Buildings.  —  Power  to  the  officers,  or  to  one 
of  the  departments  of  a  municipal  corporation,  to  provide  for  repairs 
to  public  buildings,  does  not  give  authority  to  erect  a  new  building, 


the  apprehension  of  criminals,  such  power 
not  being  included  in  the  general  author- 
ity given  to  the  city  council  to  pass  ordi- 
nances for  the  preservation  of  peace  and 
good  order  in  the  city."  Hawk  v.  Marion 
Co.,  48  Iowa,  472;  Hanger  v.  Des  Moines, 
52  Iowa,  193;  s.  c.  9  C.  L.  J.  478.  So  in 
Kentucky.  Patton  v.  Stephens,  14  Bush 
(Ky.),  324,  where  the  court  says,  "The 
power  to  pass  all  needful  by-laws  and  ordi- 
nances for  the  due  and  effectual  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  said  city,"  and  to 
"legislate  upon  all  subjects  which  the 
good  government  of  said  city  shall  re- 
quire," does  not  authorize  an  appropria- 
tion of  money  to  enforce  laws  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, wherein  every  other  commu- 
nity thereof  has  the  same  interest.  In 
Nciv  Hampshire  the  power  to  offer  re- 
wards for  offenders  is  conferred  upon 
towns  by  statute.  It  is  there  held  that, 
under  the  statute,  a  reward  cannot  be 
claimed  for  services  rendered  before  it  is 
offered.  Abel  v.  Pembroke,  61  N.  H.  357. 
The  Constitution  of  Florida  authorizes  the 
imposition  of  taxes  for  "corporation  pur- 
poses and  for  no  other  purpose,"  and  the 
courts  there  hold  that  cities  are  not  liable 
to  pay  rewards  offered  for  the  detection 
and  punishment  of  criminals.  Murphy  v. 
Jacksonville,  18  Fla.  318.  A  county  in 
Indiana  has  no  such  power.  Board  of 
Commissioners  v.  Bradford,  72  Ind.  455. 
1  Crawshaw  v.  Roxbury,  supra.  Under 
a  statute  authorizing  the  mayor  and  city 
council  of  any  city,  or  the  selectmen  of 
VOL.   I.  —  14 


any  town,  to  offer  and  pay  from  the  treas- 
ury of  such  city  or  town  a  suitable  reward, 
not  exceeding  $300,  for  apprehending  and 
securing  a  person  charged  with  a  capital 
or  other  high  crime,  any  city  or  town  may 
be  bound  by  an  offer  of  a  reward  in  such 
cases  ;  and  any  person  wdio  performs  the 
service,  relying  upon  such  offer,  may,  in 
action  of  assumpsit,  recover  the  amount 
offered  of  such  city  or  town.  Janvrin  v. 
Exeter,  48  N.  H.  83.  If  two  persons 
jointly  perform  the  service  they  must  be 
joined  as  plaintiffs.  lb.  Recpiisites  of 
declaration  where  reward  is  offered  by  a 
town,  see  Codding  v.  Mansfield,  7  Gray, 
272.  In  order  to  recover  the  reward  the 
plaintiff  must  in  general  prove  perform- 
ance according  to  the  terms  of  the  adver- 
tisement. See  Neville  v.  Kelly,  12  C.  B. 
N.  s.  740;  Smith  v.  Moore,  1  C.  B.  438; 
Thatcher  v.  England,  3  C.  B.  254;  Eng- 
land v.  Davidson,  11  A.  &  E.  856:  Lan- 
caster v.  Walsh,  4  M.  &  W.  16;  Fallick 
v.  Barber,  1  M.  &  S.  108;  Williams  v. 
Carwardine,  4  B.  &  Ad.  621;  Tamer  v. 
Walker,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  641;  s.  c.  L.  R.  2 
Q.  B.  301. 

2  Stotesbury  v.  Smith,  2  Burr.  924  ; 
Harris  v.  Watson,  Peake,  72  ;  3  Kent 
Com.  185  ;  Stilk  v.  Myrick,  2  Campb. 
317  ;  Bridge  v.  Cage,  Cro.  Jac.  103.  See 
chapter  on  Corporate  Officers,  post,  sees. 
233,  234. 

3  Pool  v.  Boston.  5  Cush.  219  (1849)  ; 
Gilmore  v.  Lewis,  12  Ohio,  2S1  ;  Means  v. 
Hendershott,  24  Iowa,  78  ;  chap.  ix.  post. 


210 


MFNIflPAL    CORPORATIONS 


§140 


and  certainly  not  a  large  ami  expensive  edifice.1     But  power  to  a 
municipal  corporation  t>>  build  or  repair  carries  with  it  the  right  to 
mine  plan  ami  mode.2 

rson    v.    Mayor,    &c,    17    N.   Y. 
U9,  151  .  .1.     <  lontracl  1 

I  county  in  res] t  to  public  build- 

.  I  :   p]    on,  I  II   I  i    ( X . .) . ) 
352  (1796)  ;  De  Witl  v.  San  Fran 
52).     In  Georgia  Lt  ha 


inhabitants.  .  .  .  There  is  no  Lack  of  au- 
thority for  allowing  municipal  corpora? 
tions  tn  aid,  or  in  some  cases  to  establish, 
improvements  which  are  no1  purely  for 
municipal  purposes.  ...  It  is  also  very 
common  both  in  this  country  and  in  Eng- 


held  thai  the  powerto  build  a  school-house  land,  from  which  we  have  drawn  the  prin- 
ts within  the  scope  of  the  general  power  ciples  of  our  common  law,  for  cities,  in 
(it'a  municipal  corporation  in  thai  State,  building  their  municipal  buildings,  to 
without  express  authoi  ithechar-  furnish  accommodations,  gratuitously  or 
■  trtersville  v.  Baker,  73  Ga.  otherwise,  for  public  officers  and  hodies 
686.  which  do  not  represenl  the  city.  .  .  . 
r.  Rochester,  26  Barb.  133;  Bell  The  question  whether  the  city  of  Saginaw, 
v,  Platteville,  71  Wis.  L39.  An  unre-  which  must,  at  the  present  ratio  of  tax- 
stricted  power  to  purchase  real  estate  for  ation,  bear  about  one-fifth  of  the  expense 
the  erection  of  public  buildings  held  to  of  a  court-house,   may  be  authorized  to 


give,  by  implication,  the  exclusive  right 
to  the  City  Council  to  determine  the  ex- 
pediency of  purchasing,  the  power  to  pur- 
■  :i  credit  ami  to  issue  bonds  for  the 
•  ■  money.  Richmond  v.  McGirr, 
7-  Ind.  192  (1881)  ;  ante,  sees.  119,  124, 
L25.  As  to  power  to  build  town-house. 
French  v.  Quincy,  3  Allen,  9.     Incidental 


raise  money  enough  to  build  the  whole  of 
it,  does  not  therefore  seem  to  he  so  much 
whether  it  ran  raise  anything  more  than 
its  ratable  proportion  for  what  is  not 
strictly  a  municipal  purpose,  but  how 
much  it  .an  raise  without  violating  prin- 
ciple. It  seems  to  us  that  if  the  door  can 
be  opened  at  all,  this  is  not  a  matter  for 


power  to  provide  suitabl    mi lations     the  courts  to  decide.    The  legislature  can- 


for  the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the 

Li  n.     People  v.   Hani-,  t  Cal.  9  ; 

over  '-.  Davis,  27  Ga.  354;  chapter 

Property,  post.     In  ( lallam 

a  ".v,  50  Mich.  7,  a  taxpayer  filed  a 

bill  for  an  injunction  to  restrain  th 


not  compel  a  city  to  be  generous  to  the 
State  nr  county  ;  but  we  do  not  think  the 
Constitution  forbids  a  city  —  if  authorized 
by  statute — from  determining  for  itself 
whether  such  an  investment  of  city  money 
for  purposes  in  which  the  city  is  directly 


of  bonds  of  the  city  of  Saginaw  to  pay  for     concerned  in  part,  will  not  be  wise  and 
the  i  l-house  for  the  county     profitable.     If  it  may  pu1    up  handsome 


at   tli' 

■//    action.     The  court, 
11,  J.,  said  :    "It  is  claimed,  and  is 
true,  thai  the  legislature  cannot  compel  << 
city  to 

72,  73).  .  .   .  The 

is  whether 

authorized  to  raise   by  corporate 

money  required 

... 

No  precedents  have  been  found  precisely 

I'he  power   is   rested  by  the 

the  validity  of  city  <  spend- 


;  of  mean  buildings  fur  its  own  uses, 
and  may  accommodate  the  county  in  those 
buildings  upon  as  e  isy  terms  as  it  chooses, 
we  do  nut  see  thai  what  is  now  proposed 
involves  substantially  any  very  different 
principle."  The  action  of  the  court  below 
in  dismissing  the  bill  was,  however,  re- 
versed on  other  grounds. 

Council  have  power  to  lit  up  and  fur- 
nish the  room  in  which  they  meet,  and 
the  court  refused  to  enjoin  them  from  fur- 
nishing the  council  chamber  with  por- 
traits   of    the    governors    of   the    State. 


■   a  public   charactei  Reynolds   v.   Mayor  of  Albany,   8  Barb.. 

h    make  a  city  more  desirable  as  a  .ri'.i7  ;  People  v.   Harris,  1  Cal.  9;  but  see 

.   promote  its  improvemenl    and  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio,  110;  Stetson 

the  increa                 taxable  property,  and  v.    Kempton,    1.3   Mass.   272    (1816),  per 

add  to  the  comforts  or  prosperity  of  its  Parker,  C.  J.    Proper  uses  of  public  build* 


141 


POLICE   POWERS    AND    REGULATIONS. 


211 


§  141  (93).  Police  Powers  and  Regulations.  —  Many  of  the 
powers  exercised  by  municipalities  fall  within  what  is  known  as 
the  police  power  of  the  State,1  and  are  delegated  to  them  to  be 
exercised  for  the  public  good.  Of  this  nature  is  the  authority  to 
suppress   nuisances,  preserve  health,  prevent  fires,  to  regulate  the 


ings.  Scofield  v.  School  District,  27 
Conn.  499  ;  French  v.  Quincy,  3  Allen,  9. 
Market  Houses,  post,  sees.  380-385,  562, 
648.  Equity  will  not  interfere  to  prevent 
the  erection  of  suitable  public  buildings 
unless  the  provisions  of  the  charter  forbid. 
Torrent  v.  Muskegon,  47  Mich.  115. 

In  organizing  a  coif.nty  the  legislature 
may  delegate  the  authority  to  locate  the 
county  scat  to  the  county  commissioners. 
Rice  v.  Shuey,  5  N.  W.  R.  435.  But  the 
county  seat  cannot  be  changed  at  the 
will  of  the  county  board  after  they  have 
canvassed  the  vote  and  located  it  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  result.  People  v.  Ben- 
zie Co.,  41  Mich.  6  ;  Attorney-General  v. 
Lake  Co.,  33  Mich.  2S9  ;  Attorney-General 
v.  Benzie,  34  Mich.  211. 

1  Ante,  chap.  iv.  The  power  of  a  corpor- 
ation to  exercise  police  jurisdiction  is  a 
power  delegated  by  the  State.  Cranston  v. 
Augusta,  61  Ga.  572.  The  police  power  of 
a  State  is  not  impaired  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Barbier  v.  Connolly,  113 
U.  S.  27  (1885).  Ordinance  of  San  Fran- 
cisco prohibiting  washing  and  ironing  in 
public  laundries  within  a  specified  district, 
from  ten  o"clock  at  night  to  six  in  the 
morning  held  Valid  under  the  police  power, 
s.  p.  Soon  Hing  v.  Crowley,  113  U.  S. 
703  (1885).  See  full  discussion  in  New 
Orleans  Gas  Co.  v.  Lousiana  Light  Co., 
115  U.  S.  650,  661  (1885)  ;  Butchers' 
Union  Co.  v.  Crescent  City,  &c.  Co.,  Ill 
U.  S.  746  (1883)  (Slaughter-house  case). 

An  act  prohibiting  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  oleomargarine  or  keeping  the  same 
with  intent  to  sell,  is  valid  as  a  legitimate 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State, 
and  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 
Powell  v.  Commonwealth,  114  Pa.  St.  265 
(1886).  Affirmed  by  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  127  U.  S.  678  (1888); 
s.  p.  State  v.  Addington,  77  Mo.  110 
(1882).  Contra:  People  v.  Marx,  99 
N.  Y.  377.     See,  also,  Matter  of  Jacobs, 


98  N.  Y.  98  (1885)  (prohibiting  manufac- 
ture of  cigars  in  tenement  houses)  ;  and 
the  views  of  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  Munn  t>. 
Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113,  142  (1876),  and  in 
Powell  v.  Pennsylvania,  127  U.  S.  687. 
We  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  our 
full  concurrence  in  the  views  and  conclu- 
sions of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York 
in  The  People  v.  Marx,  supra.  It  will  not 
escape  observation  that  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals of  New  York  and  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Pennsylvania  reached  opposite  conclu- 
sions on  a  question  relating  so  vitally  to 
the  natural,  inalienable,  and  primordial 
rights  of  the  citizen.  The  judgment  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  sus- 
taining the  Act  of  1885,  was  affirmed  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  ; 
and  on  like  grounds,  if  the  New  York 
statute  (which  was  in  judgment  in  the 
case  of  The  People  v.  Marx)  had  been 
before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  its  validity  would  have  been  up- 
held, unless  the  Supreme  Court  had  fol- 
lowed the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals.  We  have,  at  all  events,  that 
which  is  regarded  as  a  fundamental  right 
in  New  York  considered  not  to  be  such  in 
Pennsylvania.  The  Pennsylvania  Act  of 
1885,  under  which  Powell  was  convicted, 
makes  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  oleo- 
margarine, though  open  and  unconcealed, 
a  crime.  We  cannot  but  express  our  re- 
gret that  the  Constitution  of  any  of  the 
States,  or  that  of  the  United  States,  ad- 
mits of  a  construction  that  it  is  competent 
for  a  State  legislature  to  suppress  (instead 
of  regulating)  under  fine  and  imprison- 
ment the  business  of  manufacturing  and 
selling  a  harmless,  aud  even  wholesome, 
article,  if  the  legislature  chooses  to  affirm, 
contrary  to  the  fact,  that  the  public  health 
or  public  policy  requires  such  suppression. 
The  record  of  the  conviction  of  Powell  for 
selling  without  any  deception  a  healthful 
and  nutritions  article  of  food  makes  one's 
blood  tingle. 


212  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  141 

and  storing  of  dangerous  articles,  to  establish  and  control 
markets,  and  the  like.  These  and  other  similar  topics  "ill  be  con- 
in  appropriate  places.  But  it  may  here  be  observed  that 
every  citizen  holds  his  property  subject  to  the  proper  exi 
this  power,  either  by  the  Stair  legislature  directly,  or  by  public 
or  municipal  corporations  to  which  the  legislature  may  delegate  it.1 
Laws  ami  ordinances  relating  to  the  comfort,  health,  convenience, 

1  order,  and  general  welfare  of  the  inhabitants  are  comprehen- 
sively styled,  "  Police  Laws  or  Regulations."  It  is  well  settled 
that  laws  and  regulations  of  this  character,  though  they  may  dis- 
turb the  enjoyment  of  individual  rights,  air  not  unconstitutional, 
though  no  provision  is  made  for  compensation  for  such  disturbances. 
They  do  nut  appropriate  private  property  for  public  use,  but  simply 

date  its  use  and  enjoyment  by  the  owner.  If  he  suffers  injury, 
it  i-  either  damnum  absque  injuria,  or,  in  the  theory  of  the  law,  he 
i>  compensated  for  it  by  sharing  in  the  general  benefits  which  the 
regulations  are  intended  and  calculated  to  secure.  The  citizen 
owns  his  property  absolutely.it  is  true;  it  cannot  be  taken  from 
him  for  any  private  use  whatever,  without  his  consent,  nor  can  it 
he  taken  lor  any  public  use  without  compensation;  still  he  owns  it 

eel  to  this  restriction,  namely,  that  it  must  be  so  used  as  not 
unreasonably  to  injure  others,  and  that  the  sovereign  authority  may, 
hv  police'  regulations,  so  direct  the  use  of  it  that  it  shall  not  prove 
pernicious  to  his  neighbors,  or  the  citizens  generally.  These  reg- 
ulations rest  upon  the  maxim,  Solus  populi  suprema  est  lex.  This 
power  to  restrain  a  private  injurious  use  of  property,  is  essentially 
different  from  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  It  is  not  a  taking  of 
private  property  for  public  use,  but  a  salutary  restraint  on  a  nox- 
ious use  hy  the  owner,  contrary  to  the  maxim,  Sic  uterc  tuo  ut 
(dun mil  nan  l&das.2 

1   McKibbin    v.    Fort   Smith,    35    Ark.  Boston,    100   Mass.  544;  Cobb  v.  Boston, 

Baltimore  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.,  Hi'   Mass.   181;    Bancroft  v.   Cambridge, 

69  Md.                  tt  railroad  i  126  Mass.   438:    Welch    v.    Boston,     126 

q,  12  Pick.  184  (1831)  Mass.    442;    Little    Rock    v.    Barton,    33 

);    Wadleigh  v.  Gillman,  Ark.    436,    citing    ami    approving    text. 

wooden    buildings);  Hollingsworth   v.    Parish   of   Tensas,    17 

Vanderbill  >•.  Adams,  7  Cow.    348  (as  to  Fed.  I>V|>.  109;  Coates  v.  Mayor,  &c.    of 

ir  regulations,  where  the  general  prin-  New  York,  7  Cow.  585  (1826)  (as  to  ordi- 

ciple  upon  which  police  laws  resl  is  wry  nance    prohibiting    the  interment  of  the 

rily    discussed    by    Woodvxrrth,  dead  within  the  city);  Goszler  v.  George- 

.!.);  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cnsh.  .".:;,  town,  6  Wheat.  593  (as  to  power  to  grade). 

duable  opinion    by    Shaw,   C.  J.)j  'Die  power  to  regulate    the  keeping  of 

M  Girr,    1   Gray,  1;   Common-  dogs  and  to  enforce   such   regulations  by 

bury,  11    M              -   lem  forfeitures,   lines,  and   penalties   is   recog- 

R                   Mass.  131;  Water-  nized   as   one  within    the    police    power. 

115;  Dingleyv.  City  of  Faribault  v.  Wilson,  34  Minn.  264. 


§142 


police  power;  constitutional  control. 


213 


§  142.    Subject    to    Federal     Constitution.  —  All-embracing    and 

penetrating  as  the  police   power  of  the  State  is,  and  of  necessity- 
must  be,  it  is  nevertheless  subject,  like  all  other  legislative  powers,  to  the 


The  legislature  may,  it  seems,  pass  an  act 
limiting  the  height  of  dwell ing -houses  in 
cities.  The  New  York  act  of  1885  con- 
strued not  to  extend  to  buildings  designed 
for  hotels.  People  v.  D'Oench,  111  N.  Y. 
359  (1888). 

In  the  case  of  the  Boston  Beer  Co.  v. 
Massachusetts,  97  U.  S.  25  (1877),  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley,  speaking  for  the  court, 
said:  "  Whatever  differences  of  opinion 
may  exist  as  to  tlie  extent  and  boundaries 
of  the  police  power,  and  however  difficult 
it  may  he  to  render  a  satisfactory  defini- 
tion of  it,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that 
it  does  extend  to  the  protection  of  the 
lives,  health,  and  property  of  the  citizens, 
and  to  the  preservation  of  good  order  and 
the  public  morals."  See  also  New  Orleans 
Gas  Co.  v.  Louisiana  Light  Co.  115 
U.  S.  650,  661  (1885).  Prohibitory  liquor 
laws  valid.  Bartemeyer  v.  Iowa,  18  Wall. 
129  (1873);  Foster  v.  Kansas,  112  U.  S. 
201  (1881);  Kiddi;.  Pearson,  128  U.  S.  1 
(1888);  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623 
(1887);  Bowman  v.  Railway  Co.,  125  U.  S. 
465  (1888),  sustaining  a  statute  of  a  State 
prohibiting  common  carriers  from  bringing 
intoxicating  liquors  into  the  State  without 
first  having  a  certificate  from  the  county 
auditor  that  the  consignee  is  authorized 
to  sell  in  the  county.  See  also  Fertiliz- 
ing Co.  v.  Hyde  Park  (village  of),  97 
U.  S.  659  (1878).  In  the  last  case  Mr. 
Justice  Swayne  says:  "  Perhaps  the  most 
striking  application  of  the  police  power  is 
in  the  destruction  of  buildings  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  a  conflagration.  This  right 
existed  by  the  common  law,  and  the 
owner  was  entitled  to  no  compensation. 
2  Kent's  Com.  339  (marg.  paging),  and 
notes  1  and  a  and  b."     Post,  chap,  xxiii. 

It  is  within  the  police  power  of  the  State 
to  authorize  the  channel  of  a  river  to  be 
t\irned  or  straightened,  in  order  to  protect 
from  threatened  inundation  a  populous 
portion  of  the  State;  and  such  work  is  of 
a  public  character.  Green  v.  Swift,  47 
Cal.  536  (1874).  In  such  case,  the  au- 
thority of  the  State  is  none  the  less  in  de- 
gree, even  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  district 


to  be  protected  did  not  constitute  a  body 
politic.  lb.  A  power  "  to  make  and 
establish  rules  for  the  regulation  of  jut 
or  bay  windows  "  does  not  authorize  the 
council  to  pass  an  ordinance  granting  per- 
mission to  an  individual  to  construct  a 
bay  window  projecting  beyond  the  build- 
ing line.  Reimer's  Appeal,  100  Pa.  St. 
182.     See  post,  sees.  660,  734. 

Speaking  of  turnpike  acts,  paving  acts, 
&c,  Lord  Kenyan,  in  the  case  of  the  Gov- 
ernor &c.  v.  Meredith,  4  Term  Rep.  790, 
796,  says:  "Some  individuals  suffer  an 
inconvenience  under  all  these  acts  of  par- 
liament; but  the  interests  of  individuals 
must  give  way  to  the  accommodation  of 
the  public."  And  per  Puller,  J.,  in  the 
same  case:  "There  are  many  cases  in 
which  individuals  sustain  an  injury,  for 
which  the  law  gives  no  action;  for  in- 
stance, pulling  down  houses,  or  raising  bul- 
warks, for  the  preservation  and  defence  of 
the  kingdom  against  the  king's  enemies." 
But  "  the  law  will  not  allow  the  right  of 
property  to  be  invaded  under  the  guise  of 
a  police  regulation  for  the  preservation  of 
health,  when  it  is  manifest  that  such  is 
not  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  regula- 
tion." Per  Wilde,  J.,  in  Austin  v.  Mur- 
ray, 16  Pick.  126;  Green  v.  Savannah,  6 
Ga.  1  (1849);  People  v.  Hawley,  3  Mich. 
330;  Amesu.P.H.L.Co.,llMich.l39.  The 
extent  of  the  police  power  will  be  further 
discussed  in  the  chapter  on  Ordinances, 
post.  See  also  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  572- 
594.  How  far  and  when  cities,  in  exe- 
cuting police  duties,  are  agents  of  the  State, 
and  not  of  the  municipality.  See  But- 
trick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  172; 
Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  51  Me.  118,  122;  52 
Me.  118  ;  Brown  v.  Vinalhaven,  65  Me. 
402  (1876);  Keller  v.  Corpus  Christi,  50 
Tex.  614,  approving  text  ;  State  v.  St. 
Louis  Court,  34  Mo.  546;  White  v.  Kent, 
11  Ohio  St.  550;  Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12 
Ohio  St.  127;  City  Council  v.  Payne,  2 
Nott  &  McCord  (S.  C),  475;  People  v. 
Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44  (1871);  s.  c.  9  Am. 
Rep.  103;  ante,  sec.  60;  post,  sees.  253, 
393,  396,  768. 


•21  J  MUNICIPAL   COBPORATIONS.  §  142 

mount  authority  of  tfo  State  and  Federal  Constitutions.    A  right 
[Tl., 1  or  protected  by  the    Constitution  cannot  be  overthrown 
ipaired  by  any  authority  derived  from  the  police  power.     Thus 
police  power  of  the  Suae  must  be  exercised  in  subordination  to 
federal  Constitution,  and,  as  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  respect  of  State  laws  forbidding  the  trans- 
,./•  Texas  cattle,  it  cannot  extend  to  interstate  transporta- 
tion of   the    subjects  of   commerce.1      In  a  subsequent   case2   the 
rights  claimed  by  a  private  corporation,  chartered  by  an  act  of  the 
ire,  and  authorized  by  its  charter  to  establish  and  carry  on 
a  business  which   was  intrinsically  and  unavoidably  a  nuisance  to 
the  inhabitants  in    the    neighborhood,8  came  in  conilict  with   the 
police  power  of  the  State,  subsequently  delegated  to  a  municipality 
within  whose  limits  the  offensive  and  unhealthy    business  of   the 
private  corporation   was  conducted.      The    subject  was    thoroughly 
considered.     The  court  did  not  deny  that  by  a  specific  contract  the 
ilature   might  surrender  for  a  limited  period  the   right  to  inter- 
with    a    business    which    was    a  positive    nuisance.       On    the 
ground,  however,  that  the  private  corporation,  when  its  charter  was 
1    by   the   principles  of  strict  construction  applicable  to  such 
grants,4  had  no  specific  legislative  authority  to  maintain  its  works 

i  Railroad  Co.  v.  Uusen,  95  IT.  S.  465  authority  subsequently  conferred  upon  it 

(1877).      hi    Kimmish    v.  Hall,  129  U.  S.  the  municipality  of  Hyde  Park  passed  an 

•J17  (1889),  an  [owa  statute  making  per-  ordinance  absolutely  prohibiting  the  trans- 

-hi-  having  "Texas  cattle"  in  their  pos-  portation of  offa]  through  the  village.    The 

ion  whirl,    have    not    been    wintered  majority  opinion  sustaining  the  ordinance 

north  of  a  certain  point,  liable  for  damages  is  based  upon  two  propositions:   1.  That 

which  may  accrue  from  allowing  them  to  tin;    chartered    rights   of  the    Fertilizing 

run  at  large,  and  thereby  spread  "Texas  Company  were  subject  to  the  police  power 

fever  "  was  sustained.  of  the  State,   which  was  delegated  to  the 

I    i.  -.  Hyde  Park  (village  municipal  authorities.     2.  The  charter  of 

of),  97  U.  S.  659  (1878).  the   companj   is  not  a   contract  guaran- 

3  The  Fertilizing  (Company  obtained  by  teeing  in  the  locality  originally  selected, 
its  charter  from  the  State  (which  was  a  exemption  for  fifty  years  from  the  exer- 
legislative  contract),  for  the  period  of  liftj  cise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State,  how- 
mong  others  ;  first,  a  ev<  i  serious  the  nuisance  might  become  in 
right  to  establish  and  maintain  at  a  place  the  future,  by  reason  of  the  growth  of 
in  Cook  County,  south  of  the  dividing-line  population  around  it.  Mr.  Justice  Miller 
betwee,,  townships  thirty-seven  and  thirty-  limited  his  judgment  to  a  concurrence  on 
t,  works  for  converting  oflal  and  ani-  the  second  point,  and  denied  the  first. 
mal  matter;  and  the  works  had  been  es-  Strong,  .b,  dissented.  Field,  J.,  did  not 
tablished  there  at  a  cosi  >■(  more  than  two  sit.  Critically  viewed,  the  case  is  perhaps 
bunded  thousand  dollars;  second,  they  only  an  authoritative  decision  on  the  sec- 
obtained  the  right  to  establish  receiving  ond  ground,  since  it  is  relied  on  in  both 
depots  for  receiving  and  carrying  such  concurring  opinions,  and  is  amply  sum- 
matter  from  Chicago;  and  third,  they  ob-  eieni  to  sustain  the  judgment,  which 
tained  tie                   iiv  such  mutter  from  affirmed  that  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ilii* 

tie  ir  i living  depots  to  theii   converting  nois 

m  Hyde  Park.     Under  legislative         4  Ante,  sees.  89-91,  and  cases. 


§142 


POLICE    POWER  ;    CONSTITUTIONAL    CONTROL. 


215 


on  the  site  where  they  were  established,  if  not,  indeed,  on  the 
broader  ground  that  all  legislative  charters  to  private  corporations 
are  subordinate  to  the  police  power  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  or,  at 
all  events,  in  all  cases  except  where  it  is  otherwise  provided  by  the 
express  terms  of  the  contract,  or  by  what  is  necessarily  implied, 
the  mitnicipal  ordinances  to  abate  the  nuisance  were  sustained,  al- 
though the  corporation  had  erected  expensive  works,  and  the  effect 
of  enforcing  the  ordinance  would  be  to  prevent  the  further  carrying 
on  of  the  business  in  that  locality.  Similar  results  in  favor  of  the 
police  power  as  against  alleged  vested  rights  under  charters  have 
been  reached  in  other  cases.1 


1  Coates  v.  Mayor,  &e.  of  New  York,  7 
Cow.  585  (1826),  referred  to  in  the  case  of 
the  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  shj>/-", 
ami  thus  stated  by  Swayne,  J.:  In  Coates 
v.  The  Mayor,  &e.  of  New  York,  7  Cow. 
5S5,  a  law  was  enacted  by  the  legislature 
of  the  State,  on  the  9th  of  March,  1813, 
which  gave  to  the  city  government  power 
to  pass  ordinances  regulating,  and  if  ne- 
cessary preventing,  the  interment  of  dead 
bodies  within  the  city;  and  a  penalty  of 
$250  was  authorized  to  he  imposed  for  the 
violation  of  the  prohibition.  On  the 
seventh  of  October,  1823,  an  ordinance 
was  adopted  forbidding  interments  or  the 
depositing  of  dead  bodies  in  vaults  in  the 
city  south  of  a  designated  line.  A  pen- 
alty was  prescribed  for  its  violation.  The 
action  was  brought  to  recover  the  penalty 
for  depositing  a  dead  body  in  a  vault  in 
Trinity  church-yard.  A  plea  was  inter- 
posed setting  forth  that  the  locus  in  quo 
was  granted  by  the  King  of  Great  Britain 
on  the  6th  of  May,  1697,  to  a  corporation 
by  the  name  of  the  "  Eector  and  Inhabi- 
tants of  the  City  of  New  York  in  Com- 
munion with  the  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church  of  England,"  and  their  successors 
forever,  as,  and  for  a  church-yard  and 
burying  place,  with  the  rights,  fees,  &c; 
that  immediately  after  the  grant  the  land 
was  appropriated  and  thenceforward  was 
used  as  and  for  a  cemetery  for  the  inter- 
ment of  dead  bodies  ;  that  the  rector  and 
wardens  of  Trinity  Church  were  the  same 
corporation,  and  that  the  body  in  question 
was  deposited  in  the  vault  in  the  church- 
yard by  the  license  of  that  corporation. 
A  general  demurrer  was  filed,  and  the  case 
was  elaborately  argued.     The  validity  of 


the  ordinance  was  sustained.  The  court 
held  that  "the  act  under  which  it  was 
passed  was  not  unconstitutional,  either  us 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or 
taking  property  for  public  use  without 
compensation,  but  stands  on  the  police 
power  to  make  regulations  in  respect  to 
nuisances."  It  was  said:  "Every  right, 
from  absolute  ownership  in  property  down 
to  a  mere  easement,  is  purchased  and 
holden  subject  to  the  restriction  that  it 
shall  be  so  exercised  as  not  to  injure 
others.  Though  at  the  time  it  be  remote 
and  inoffensive,  the  purchaser  is  bound  to 
know  at  his  peril  that  it  may  become 
otherwise  by  the  residence  of  many  people 
in  its  vicinity,  and  that  it  must  yield  to 
by-laws  and  other  regular  remedies  for  the 
suppression  of  nuisances."  In  such  cases 
prescription,  whatever  the  length  of  time, 
has  no  application.  Every  day's  continu- 
ance is  a  new  offence,  and  it  is  no  justifi- 
cation that  the  party  complaining  came 
voluntarily  within  its  reach.  Pure  air  and 
the  comfortable  enjoyment  of  property  are 
as  much  rights  belonging  to  it  as  the  right 
of  possession  and  occupancy.  If  popu- 
lation, where  there  was  none  before,  ap- 
proaches a  nuisance,  it  is  the  duty  of  those 
liable  at  once  to  put  an  end  to  it.  Brady 
v.  Weeks,  3  Barb.  (X.  Y. )  157.  Post, 
sec.  372.  Cemetery  associations  and  their 
franchises  are  subject  to  regulation  under 
the  police  power.  Cemetery  Ass.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  121  111.  199  (1887).  So  where  a 
city  had  conveyed  hind  to  individu 
the  purpose  of  erecting  powd 
thereon,  and  afterwards  passed  an  ordi- 
nance declaring  the  magazines  so  i 
dangerous  to  life  and  property,  and  direct- 


216 


MUNICIPAL    COllVt (RATIONS. 


§143 


^  1  13    94  .   Prevention  of  Fires.  —  The  prevention  of  damage  by 
is  usually  an  object   within   the  scope  of  municipal  authority 
her  by  express  granl  or  by  the  power,  in  a  chartered  town  or 
make  police  regulations  or  ueedful   by-laws.     Under  such 
power,  it  may  establish  tin-  limits,1  prevent  the  erection  of  wooden 
ii  _-,-   regulate  the   mode   and    removal  of  ashes,8  ami  make 
.   other  reasonable   regulations  to  prevent  ami  extinguish  fires. 
Under  such  power  the   town  or  municipal  body  is  authorized  to 
appropriate  money  for  the   purchase  of  engines,  or  for  the  repair 
thereof,  if  to  be  used  lor  the  purpose  of  extinguishing  tires  there- 
in ;   and  this,  whether  they  belong  to  the  corporation  or  were  pur- 
!   by  private  subscription.4     And  money  may  also  be  appro- 


m  to  be  removed  at  the  >:rpcnse  of 
/■..  it  v.  is  held  thai  the  ordinance 
did  exercise  of  tin'  police  power, 
an  1  'li'l  ii"t  impair  tin'  obligation  of  the 
:    1 1  i  deed,  aor  \\.is  ii  a  tak- 
ing of  private  property  without  compen- 
sation.    Davenport  <••  Richmond  City,  81 
1 1  >-7).     So  in  the  case  of  the 
Boston  Beer  Company,  where  the  legisla- 
ture of  Massachusi  tl  i,  on  the  1 31  of  Feb- 
1-27,    incorporated    the    "Boston 
1  ompany,"    "  for    the   purp 

ing  malt    liquors   in  all  their 
-  in  tlir  city  of  Boston,"  &c.      By 
of  June,  1869,  the  manufacture  of 
malt  liquors  to  !«•  sold  in  Massachusetts, 
and  brewing  ami  keeping  them  for  sale, 
ohibited  under  penalties  of  tine  and 
nment  ami    the    forfeiture  of  the 
liquors  to  the  Commonwealth.      In  The 
I'-  •  ■:  i  '•■    /-.  The  < lommonwealth, 
husetts  held 
thai  "the  act  of  1869  'li'l  not  impair  the 
obligations  of  tin-  contract  contained  in  the 
■  he  claimant,  bo  Far  as  Li  relates 
to  the  sale  of  mall  liquors,  bu1  is  binding 
claimant  to  i  ictent  as  on 

individuals.     The  act   is  in  the  nature  of 
a  police  regulation  in  regard  to  the  sale  of 
•    |e  of  pi    :        .  ami  is  appli- 
i  ible  t<>  tin-  sal.'  of  such  property  by  indi- 
viduals and  corporations,  even  where  tin' 
innol   I"-   al- 
■  repealed  by  the  legislature."  This 
::t  w.-is  affirmed   by  the  Supreme 
of  tl,.'  United  States,  '.'7  I\  S.  25. 
1    ■    certain   require- 
tre    i  ['in  of  a   jj  item  of  police 


regulation  adapted  to  aid  in  the  protec- 
tion of  life  ami  health,  is  properly  one 
of  legislative  determination,  ami  a  court 
should  not  lightly  inteifere  with  such 
determination,  unless  the  legislature  has 
manifestly  transcended  its  province.  Dan- 
iels v.  Hi'lgard,  77  111.  640  (1875). 

1  Post,  sec.  405. 

2  Post,  sec.  405. 

J  Many  fnes  are  said  to  be  "  acciden- 
tal "  which  are  the  result  of  neglect  to 
keep  ashes  in  fire-proof  utensils;  and  yet 
regulations  for  tin-  safe  keeping  of  ashes 
are  seldom  made,  and  when  made,  rarely 
enforced.  Filbey  v.  Combe,  2  M.  &  W. 
677;  Law  v.  Dodd,  1  Ex.  84r>:  Lyndon  v. 
Stadbridge,  2  H.  &  N.  45.  See  further, 
The  Queen  v.  Wood,  5  E.  &  1'..  lie  Guar- 
dians of  Holborn  Union  v.  Vestry  of  St. 
Leonard,  Shoreditch,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  Div. 
145;  Gay  v.  Cadby,  L.  R.  2  C.  1'.  Div. 
391;  Harrison's  Munic.  Manual,  4th  ed.; 
Clark  v.  South  Bend,  85  Ind.  276  (ordi- 
nance regulating  the  storage  of  straw). 

4  Allen  v.  Taunton,  19  Pick.  485  (1837). 
Hunneman  v.  Fire  District,  37  Vt.  40; 
Robinson  v.  St.  Louis,  28  Mo.  488  (re- 
pair of  engine-house);  Wadleigh  v.  Gill- 
man,  12  Me.  I"":  Vanderbilt  v.  Adams, 
7  Cow.  349,  852;  post,  sees.  405,  572  n., 
690,  chap,  xxiii.  Text  approved.  Green 
r.  Cape  May.  11  N.  .1.  L.  45.  A  town 
s  implied  power,  in  the  absence 
of  express  legislative  enactment,  to  pur- 
i  re-engines.  Bluffton  v.  Studa- 
baker,  lot;  Ind.  129;  Carleton  >•.  Wash- 
ington, 3s  Kan.  72fi;  Bridgford  v.  Tus- 
cumbia,  16  Fed.  Hep.  910. 


§144 


quarantine;   public  health. 


217 


priated   for  the  benefit  of  engine  and  hook  and  ladder  companies 
therein.1 


§  144  (95).  Quarantine  and  Health  ;  Scope  of  Power  to  preserve 
the  Public  Health. — The  preservation  of  the  public  health  and  safety 
is  often  made  in  express  terms  a  matter  of  municipal  duty,  and  it 
is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  delegate  to  municipalities  the 
power  to  regulate,  restrain,  and  even  suppress,  particular  kinds  of 
business,  if  deemed  necessary  for  the  public  good.2  The  subject 
will  be  considered  more  in  detail  in  the  chapter  on  Ordinances.3 
The  general  nature  and  scope  of  the  authority,  as  it  is  not  unfre- 
quently  bestowed,  are  well  illustrated  by  a  case  in  Maryland.  By 
its  charter  the  city  of  Baltimore  was  vested  with  "  full  power  and 
authority  to  enact  all  ordinances  necessary  to  preserve  the  health  of 
the  city,  prevent  and  remove  nuisances,  and  to  prevent  the  intro- 
duction of  contagious  diseases  within  the  city  and  within  three 
miles  of  the  same."  Commenting  on  this  provision  of  the  charter, 
the  Court  of  Appeals  say:  "The  transfer  of  this  salutary  and 
essential  power  is  given  in  terms  as  explicit  and  comprehensive  as 
could  have  been  used  for  such  a  purpose.     To  accomplish,  within 


1  Van  Sicklen  v.  Burlington,  27  Vt. 
(1  Wins.)  70  (1854).  Approving  Allen 
v.  Taunton,  supra.  See  post,  chapter  on 
Ordinances.  Power  of  council  over  fire 
companies,  and  to  appoint  officers  there- 
for. See  Miller  v.  Savannah  Fire  Co.,  26 
Ga.  678. 

The  protection  of  all  the  buildings  in 
a  city  or  town  from  destruction  or  injury 
by  fire  is  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  inhabi- 
tants, and  for  their  relief  from  a  common 
danger;  and  cities  and  towns  are  therefore 
authorized  by  general  law  in  Massachu- 
setts to  provide  and  maintain  fire  engines, 
reservoirs,  and  hydrants  to  supply  water 
for  the  extinguishment  of  fires.  Allen  v. 
Taunton,  19  Pick.  485;  Hardy  v.  Wal- 
tham,  3  Met.  163;  Fisher  v.  Boston,  104 
Mass.  87  ;  Tainter  v.  Worcester,  123 
Mass.  311.  The  question  whether  and 
where  public  hydrants  should  be  erected 
is  within  the  exclusive  control  of  the 
municipal  authorities,  as  the  public  inter- 
ests may  from  time  to  time  require  ;  and 
such  municipality  does  not  assume  any 
liability  to  the  owners  of  property  to 
furnish  means  of  extinguishment  of  fires 
upon  which  an  action  can  be  maintained. 
Grant  v.  Erie,  69  Pa.  420  ;    Wheeler  v. 


Cincinnati,  19  Ohio  St.  19  ;  Brinkmeyer 
v.  Evansville,  29  Ind.  187  ;  Fisher  v. 
Boston,  104  Mass.  87  ;  Hill  v.  Boston, 
122  Mass.  344.  The  mere  fact  that  a 
volunteer  fire  association  renders  services 
in  extinguishing  fires  imposes  no  obliga- 
tion upon  a  municipal  corporation  to  pay 
its  members  therefor.  Jacksonville  v .  .Etna 
Fire  Engine  Co.,  20  Fla.  100.  Post,  sec. 
976  and  cases. 

2  Shrader,  In  re,  33  Cal.  279  (1867)  ; 
Ashbrook  v.  Commonwealth,  1  Bush  (Ky.), 
139  (1S66)  ;  Tucker  v.  Virginia  City,  4 
Nev.  20  ;  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43  Cal. 
242  (1872).  Aaron  v.  Broiles,  64  Tex. 
316;  post,  chap,  xxiii.  The  power  of  the 
State  to  protect  the  public  health  cannot 
be  surrendered  ;  but  a  municipality  en- 
trusted with  the  execution  of  this  power 
may  make  contracts  to  accomplish  the 
purpose,  and  while  the  State  or  the  muni- 
cipality may  recall  or  modify  such  con- 
tacts, they  cannot  do  so  from  mere  caprice 
or  to  gain  pecuniary  advantage.  Louis- 
ville v.  Wible,  84  Ky.  290,  where  a  con- 
tract giving  the  exclusive  right  to  remove 
dead  animals  for  five  years  was  held 
valid. 

3  Post,  sees.  369  et  scq.,  374-378. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  145 

fied  territorial  limits,  the  objects  enumerated,  the  corporate 
authorities  were  clothed  with  all  the  Legislative  powers  which  the 
smbly  could  have  exercised.     Of  the  degree  of  necessity 
pal  Legislation,  the  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
were  ,i  es.     To  their  sound  discretion  is  com- 

mitted the  selection  of  the  means  and  manner  (contributory  to  the 
end)  of  exercising  the  powers  which  they  might  deem  requisite  to 
the  accomplishment  of  the  objects  of  which  they  were  made  the  guar- 
dians. 'To  prevenl  the  introduction  of  contagious  diseases  within 
.  and  within  three  miles  of  the  .same,'  they  might  impose 
heavy  penalties  on  the  captain,  owner,  or  consignee  of  any  ship  or 
other  vessel  entering  the  port  of  Baltimore,  on  board  of  which 
small-pox  or  other  contagious  diseases  mighl  prevail,  or  they  might 
seek  the  accomplishment  of  their  object  by  causing  the  vessel  and 
all  peis,, us  to  be  taken  possession  of  and  controlled  until  their 
purification  and  disinfection  were  effected,  and  impose  on  the 
captain,  owner,  or  consignee,  the  payment  or  reimbursement  of 
all  the  expenses  incurred  by  such  proceedings;  or  they  might 
adopt,  at  the  same  time,  both  suggested  remedies,  if  for  the  success- 
ful and  faithful  execution  of  their  powers  they  deemed  it  necessary 
to  do  so."  1 

§  145  96).  Same  subject.  Appointment  of  Health  Officers  and 
their  Powers.  —  And  it  was  held  that,  under  this  authority,  it  was 
competent  for  the  city  to  pass  an  ordinance  providing  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  "  health  officer?  prescribing  his  duties  and  powers;2 
and  that  the  city  might  recover  from  the  consignee  of  a  vessel,  and 
was  not  confined  to  the  charterer,  the  expenses  incurred  by  it  in 
disinfecting  and  purifying  the  vessel,  persons,  and  baggage  on 
1,,, aid  of  her  at  the  time  of  her  arrival,  from  the  infection  of  the 
small-pox.  Respecting  the  extent  of  liability,  the  court  decided 
that  the  defendanl  was  not  entitled  to  an  instruction  that  the 
recovery  must  be  limited  to  the  amount  of  expenses  absolutely 
necessary  to  preserve  tin'  health  of  the  city,  or  to  prevent  the 
introduction  of  the  small-pox.  On  this  point  the  court  expressed 
its  judgraenl  to  be  that,  "  if  the  health  officer"  (on  whom  the  duty 
of  disinfecting  the  vessel  was  imposed  by  ordinance),  in  causing 
expenses,  "acted  bona  fide,  within  the  limits  of  a  sound  discretion, 
and  with  reasonable  skill  and  judgment,  in  the  discharge  of  his 
official  duties,  the  reasonable  expenses  thus  incurred  must  be 
paid."     Concerning  the  power  of  the  corporation  over  the  persons 

i  Harrison  «    B  1   Gill  (Md.),  -  Post,  sec.  370,  and  note,  as  to  Health 

264  (1843]  <  >fficera  and  their  powers. 


§  147  PUBLIC    HEALTH  I    INDEMNIFYING    OFFICERS.  219 

on  board  of  an  infected  vessel,  the  court  was  of  opinion  that  it  was 
competent  for  the  health  officer  to  be  authorized  by  ordinance  to 
send  persons  laboring  under  infectious  disease  to  the  hospital,  and 
also  those  on  board  of  the  vessel  liable  to  be  affected  by  the  disease, 
if,  in  his  opinion,  such  a  course  be  necessary  to  prevent  the  spread 
of  disease ;  and  the  owner,  master,  or  consignee  may  be  liable  for 
expenses  thus  incurred,  if  the  health  officer  acts  with  reasonable 
skill  and  judgment,  and  exercises  a  sound  and  honest  discretion.1 

§  14G  (97).  Water  Supply.  —  A  city  having  power  to  pass  or- 
dinances respecting  the  police  of  the  place,  and  to  preserve  health,  is 
authorized,  as  a  sanitary  and  police  regulation,  to  contract  to  pro- 
cure a  supply  of  water,  by  boring  an  artesian  well  on  the  public 
square,  or  otherwise,  and  is  the  judge  of  the  mode  best  adapted  to 
accomplish  the  object.2 

§  147  (98).  Indemnifying  Officers.  —  Where  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion has  no  interest  in  the  event  of  a  suit,  or  in  the  question  involved 
in  the  case,  and  the  judgment  therein  can  in  no  way  affect  the 
corporate  rights  or  corporate  property,  it  cannot  assume  the  defence 
of  the  suit,  or  appropriate  its  money  to  pay  the  judgment  therein ; 
and  warrants  or  orders  for  the  payment  of  money  based  upon  such  a 
consideration   are    void.3     But   such   a   corporation   has   power   to 

1  Harrison  v.  Baltimore,  1  Gill  (Md.),  owner  have  no  capacity  to  act  at  all. 
264  (1843).  Suffieldv.  Hathaway,  44  Conn.  521  ;  ante, 

2  Livingston  v.  Pippin,  31  Ala.  542  sec.  30  ;  post,  sees.  1038-1046.  Power  to 
(185S)  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  purchase  or  condemn  lauds  for  water- 
Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  approving  text  ;  ante,  works.  People  v.  MeClintock,  45  Cal. 
sec.  94.  As  to  water-works,  Rome  v.  11  (1872)  ;  post,  sees.  561,  562,  597,  610. 
Cabot,  28  Ga.  50  ;  Hale  v.  Houghton,  8  Regulations  of  water  supply.  Post,  sec. 
Mich.  458  ;  ante,  sec.  58  ;  post,  sec.  443.  320.  Pipes  in  streets.  Post,  sec.  697. 
A  municipal  corporation  owning  lands  on  As  to  liability  for  wrongful  acts  of  fire- 
a  water-course,  distant  from  the  city,  to  men,  post,  sec.  976. 

supply  its  inhabitants  with  water,  has  no  3  Halstead   v.    Mayor,  &c.  of    N.   Y., 

right  (unless  acquired  by  purchase  or  by  3  Conist.   (3  N.  Y.)  430  (1S50),  affirming 

the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do-  s.  c.   5  Barb.  218,  and  deciding  that  cor- 

main)   to   divert  water  to  the  injury  of  porate  funds  cannot   be   appropriated   to 

other  riparian  proprietors.     Stein  v.  Bur-  pay  penalties  personally  incurred  by  offi- 

den,  24  Ala.  130  (1S54)  ;  Fleming's  Ap-  cers  for  refusing  to  discharge  their  official 

peal,    65    Pa.    St.    444.       As   against  the  duties ;    see,    in    explanation,    Morris    v. 

owner   of  the  fee  abutting   on  a  highway  The  People,  3  Denio,  381.     And  see,  also, 

the  selectmen  of  a  town  have  a  right  to  People  v.   Lawrence,  6  Hill,  244,  holding 

drain  a  spring  on  the  owner's  side  of  such  that   the  supervisors  of  a  county  had  no 

road,  and  dispose  of  the  water  in  such  mode  right  to  appropriate  money  to  defray  t  he 

as  to  protect  the  highway  from  overflow  ;  costs  of  a  justice  of  the  peace   who   had 

but  if  they  divert  the  water  for  any  other  been  prosecuted    for    official  misconduct 

purpose,   they   act  individually,  and  not  and   acquitted  ;     recognized   in    Bank    v. 

for  the  public  good,   and   as  against    the  Supervisors,   5    Denio,    517,   521.      Same 


220 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§148 


indemnify  its  officers  against  liability  which  they  may  incur  in  the 
bona  fide  discharge  of  their  antics,  although  the  result  may  show 
that  the  officers  have  exceeded  their  Legal  authority.1  Thus,  it  may 
vote  to  defend  suits  brought  against  its  officers  for  acts  done  in 
■  ;i  the  exercise  of  their  office.2  So,  it'  a  public  corpora- 
tion is  charged  with  the  duty  of  repairing  highways,  and  is  made 
liable  for  defects  therein,  it  has  the  incidental  power  to  indemnify 
:lll  orfiCer  who  digs  a  ditch  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  legal  ques- 
tion as  to  the  boundary  line  of  the  highway.8 

§  148    (99).     Same    subject.       Refund-Taxes   illegally    assessed.  — 

So,  a  vote  by  a  town  to  refund  money  paid  by  assessors  of  the  town 
od  an  illegal  assessment  made  by  them  of  a  town  tax,  is  an  express 
promise,  founded  upon  a  meritorious  and  legal  consideration,  and 
is  irrevocably  binding  upon  the  town.  And  this,  although  without 
such  vote  the  town  could  not  have  been  compelled  to  refund  or 
indemnify  the  assessors.  But  such  a  vote,  by  a  town,  would  he 
without  consideration  in  respect  to  State  and  county  taxes.4     So,  if 


principle,  Merrill  v.  Plainfield,  45  N.  II. 
126.  The  trustees  of  a  town  may  employ 
counsel  to  defend  an  action  against  the 
marshal  for  false  imprisonment  brought 
by  a  person  arrested  bj  him  for  violating 

an  ordin le  of  the  town.     Cullen  v.  Car- 

,  L03  I  li.l.  196. 

ommon  council  of  a  city  in  Con- 
'.  under  authority  of  the  city 
rli ntcr,  enacted  a  by-law  with  respect  to 
wharves,  and  the  anchoring,  moving, 
and  mooring  of  vessels  in  the  harbor,  and 
appointed  a  superintendent  of  wharves,  to 
discharge  the  duties  provided  for  in  the 
by-law  ;  the  performance  of  his  duties 
was  i>. >t  enforced  by  a  penalty,  and  he 
.  |  only  upon  application  of  patties 
interested  and  at   their  expense.     In  the 

discharge   of  his   duties,    and  while  acting 

in  g I  faith,  he  ordered  a  vessel  lying  at 

a  wharf  to  be  hauled  astern  to  make  more 
room  for  another  al  an  adjoining  wharf, 
and  was  sued  by  the  owner  of  the  wharf 
for  damages.  It  was  held,  on  the  priuci- 
ciple  stated  in  the  text,  thai  tiu  city  could 
not  legally  indemnify  him  for  the  ex- 
j„  i,  red    by    him    in    defending 

t,  and  a  threatened  paymenl 
of  such  expenses  by  the  city  was  enjoined 
at  the  suit  of  a  resident  and  taxpayer. 
G  Bridgeport,   41  Conn.  76,  87 

(1874  19    Am.    Rep.    485,   where 


Phelps,  J.,   cites  the  text,   and   refers  to 
other  ease.-,  tn  the  same  point 

1  Pike  v.  Middleton  (indemnifying  tax 
collector),  12  N.  H.  278  (1841);  Fuller 
v.  Groton,  14  Gray,  340  ;  Sherman  v. 
Can-  (indemnifying  executive  officer),  8 
R.  I.  431  (1867)  ;  Briggs  v.  Whipple,  6 
Vt.  95  (1834)  ;  Bancroft  v.  Lynnfield,  18 
Pick.  566  (1836)  ;  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7 
Pick.  18,  26  (1828)  ;  Babbitt  v.  Savoy, 
3  Cush.  530  (1849)  ;  Hadsell  v.  Hancock, 
3  Gray,  526  (1853)  ;  State  v.  Hammon- 
ton,  9  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  430  (1876)  ; 
S.  C.  20  Am.  Rep.  404,  where  many  of  the 
cases  are  referred  to  by  Dixon,  J.  ;  Text 
approved  in  Roper  v.  Laurinburg,  90  N. 
i.  127;  Lewis  v.  Rochester,  9  C.  B. 
(n.  s.)  401  ;  <>ueen  v.  Litchfield,  4  Ad.  & 
E.  (n.  s.)  897  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Nor- 
wich, 2  Mylne  &  Cr.  406.  In  Page  v. 
Frankford,  9  Greenl.  (Me.)  115,  this  was 
left  aii  open  question. 

2  It).  Baker  v.  Windham,  18  Me.  (1 
Shep.)  74  (1836)  ;  Cullen  v.  Carthage, 
103  Ind.  196.     See  infra,  sec.  148. 

8  Bancroft  v.  Lynnfield,  supra. 

*  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7  Pick.  18  (1828). 
A  separate  action,  on  such  a  vote,  lies 
against  the  town  in  favor  of  each  assessor 
for  his  share,  which  does  not  include, 
however,  his  own  tax,  paid  by  him  volun- 
tarily,    lb. 


§149 


FURNISHING    ENTERTAINMENTS. 


221 


the  town  is  not  concerned,  having  nothing  to  lose  or  gain  in  the 
result  of  the  litigation,  a  vote  to  indemnity  an  officer  would  be  in 
excess  of  its  power,  and  void ; 1  but  it  would  be  otherwise  if  the 
suit  against  the  officer  was  in  respect  to  matters  in  which  the  cor- 
poration was  interested.2 

§  149  (100).  Furnishing  Entertainments.  —  Without  express 
power,  a  public  corporation  cannot  make  a  contract  to  provide  for 
celebrating  the  Fourth  of  July,  or  to  provide  an  entertainment  for 
its  citizens  or  guests.     Such  contracts  are  void,  and,  although  the 


1  Vincent  v.  Nantucket,  12  Cush.  105 
(1853)  ;  Gregory  v.  Bridgeport,  41  Conn. 
76  (1874).  "A  promise  to  indemnify  a 
tax  collector  if  he  would  collect,  by  pre- 
tence of  his  official  authority,  a  tax  which 
he  knew  was  illegal,  would  be  an  agree- 
ment to  violate  the  law,  and  could  not  be 
enforced."  Pike  v.  Middleton,  12  N.  H. 
281,  per  Gilchrist,  J.  Selectmen,  under 
their  authority  ' '  to  order  and  manage  all 
of  the  prudential  affairs  of  the  town," 
may  bind  the  town  thus  to  indemnify  its 
officers.  12  N.  H.  281,  supra;  ante,  sec. 
30,  and  notes. 

2  Briggs  v.  Whipple,  6  Vt.  95  (1834). 
A  by-law  declaring  that  the  officers  of  the 
corporation  shall  be  indemnified  for  all 
lawful  acts  done  in  an  official  capacity  is 
not  illegal.  Irwin  v.  Mariposa,  22  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  367.  The  principles  laid  down 
in  the  text  are  applied  to  municipal  cor- 
porations in  England.  Thus,  where  the 
suits  are  of  such  a  nature  that  the  rights 
of  the  corporation  are  not  in  any  way  af- 
fected by  the  result,  costs  and  expenses  for 
attorneys  cannot  be  defrayed  out  of  the 
corporate  funds  ;  as,  for  example,  in  Reg. 
v.  Leeds,  4  Q.  B.  796,  where  the  question 
was  which  of  two  councillors  was  legally 
elected.  So  costs  of  defending  Quo  war- 
ranto against  an  alderman  of  a  borough 
cannot  be  paid  by  the  corporation.  Reg. 
v.  Bridgewater,  2  P.  &  D.  558.  But 
where  the  object  of  the  Quo  warranto  or 
other  proceeding  or  suit  is  to  affect  the 
legal  rights  of  the  corporation,  or  to  ques- 
tion its  legal  existence,  the  expenses  may 
be  defrayed  out  of  the  corporate  funds. 
Holdsworth  v.  Dartmouth,  11  Ad.  &  El. 
490. 

An  indemnity  to  an  officer  for  lawful 


acts  gives  him  no  claim  for  compensation 
against  the  consequences  of  unlawful  acts. 
Irwin  v.  Mariposa,  22  Upper  Can.  C.  P. 
367.  By-law  to  indemnify  a  councillor 
for  the  costs  of  a  contested  election  would 
be  illegal.  Bell  and  Manvers,  In  re,  2 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  507  ;  3  lb.  400.  In 
England  an  agreement  by  a  corporation 
with  one  of  its  officers  for  an  increase  of 
the  salary  of  an  office  retained  by  him  as 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  an  office  of 
which  he  was  deprived,  is  not  binding  un- 
less under  the  seal  of  the  corporation. 
The  Queen  v.  Stamford,  6  Q.  B.  433  ;  see 
also  Cope  v.  Thames,  &c,  Dock  and  Rail- 
road Co.,  3  Ex.  841.  So  the  appointment 
of  a  corporation  solicitor  should  be  regu- 
larly under  the  corporation  seal.  Arnold 
v.  Poole,  4  M.  &  G.  860.  A  town  clerk, 
if  a  solicitor,  may  have  a  lien  on  papers  of 
the  corporation,  with  respect  to  which  he 
has  done  work  as  an  attorney  or  solicitor. 
The  King  v.  Sankey,  5  A.  &  E.  423.  But 
quaere  in  this  country. 

Where  persons  entrusted  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  a  fund  have  incurred  legit- 
imate and  proper  expenses  thrown  upon 
them  by  their  fiduciary  situation,  they 
have  a  right  to  reimburse  themselves  out 
of  the  funds.  See  The  King  v.  The  Inhab- 
itants of  Essex,  4  T.  R.  591  ;  The  King  v. 
The  Commissioners  of  Sewers  for  the 
Tower  Hamlets,  1  B.  &  Ad.  232  ;  Attor- 
ney-General v.  Mayor  of  Norwich,  2  M.  & 
C.  406  ;  Regina  v.  The  Mayor  and  Town 
Council  of  Sheffield,  I,.  R.  6  Q.  B.  652. 
An  attempted  appropriation  contrary  to 
the  terms  of  the  trust  may  be  restrained. 
Attorney-General  v.  Aspinall,  2  M.  &  C. 
613;  Harrison's  Municipal  Manual,  4th 
ed.  ;  post,  chap.  xxii.  sec.  709  ct  scq. 


Ml'MCIl'AL   COBPOBATIONS. 


§150 


plaii  therewith  on  his  part,  he  cannot  recover  of  the 

iration.1 

^   150       101).      Impounding    Animals. —  Tower    to    impound    "iff 

it  domestic  aniincds  must  be  expressly  granted  to  the  corpora- 
tion, and  Laws  or  ordinances  authorizing  the  officers  of  the  corpora- 
tion to  impound,  and  upon  taking  specified  proceedings  to  sell  the 
property,  are  penal  in  their  nature,  and  where  doubtful  in  their 
meaning  will  not  be  construed  to  produce  a  forfeiture  of  the  prop- 
erty,  but  rather  the  reverse.  The  pound-keeper  cannot  justify  in  an 
action  brought  against  him  by  the  property-owner  unless  he  has 
strictly  complied  with  all  the  requirements  of  the  law  under  which 
he  acts.  Thus,  if  he  sells  without  giving  the  requisite  notice,  or 
for  the  full  Length  of  time  required,  he  is  liable  although  the  owner 
sustains  no  actual  injury  from  the  omission,  or  the  owner  may  treat 
the  sale  as  void  and  recover  his  property.2     A  statute  directing  the 


1  Hodges  v.  Burl  Jo,  2  Denio  (X.  Y.), 
110  (Is  16).     Same  principle.     Cornell  v. 

Guilford,  1  Denio,  510;    11 1  o.  Lynn,  1 

Allen    (Mass.),     103    (1861)  ;     Gerry    v. 
im,   lb.    319  ;   II  de  v.    People,  s7 

111.    72.      Nor  t debrate  surrender  of 

Cornwallis.      Tash   v.    Adams,    10  Cush. 
252  (1852).     Nor  can  towns  in  Massachu- 
>ney  for  the  purchase  of  unv- 
■i.      I  latlin  v. 
1           boi  .    i  Gray,  502  (1855).     "Cor- 
porations," says  Jewett,  J.,  in   Hodges  v. 
B          ,   'J   Denio,    110,    "have   no  other 
powers  than  such  as  arc  expressly  granted, 
i  as  are  nece  -  iry  to  caTry  into  effecl 
the   powers    expressly  granted."      Ante, 
sees.    89-91.     In    New    York    there  is  a 
ion  of  this  common-law 
principle.     1    Rev.  Sts.    599,    Bees.    1-3. 
"  Until  the  case  of  Hodges  v.   Buffalo,  2 
ll".  nothing,"  says    Pratt,  J.,  3 
Comst.  433,  "  was  more  frequenl  than  for 
•  hoi  ities  to  and  give 

Bplendid   !• objects   and    pur- 
poses having  no  possible  connection  with 
the  growth  or  weal  of  t  T  i » -  body   politic, 
objecting  their  constituents  to  on- 
l  oppi  I  i     I  ion."     I  n- 

!  inse  in  a  charter  providing  that 
"  nothing  in    this  charter  shall   be  con- 
jiving  the  power  to  vote 
for  any  ordinary  objecl  except  tor 
.!  e.  ordinary,  and  usual  expenses 
unci]  of  N<-u  port 


gave  a  ball  and  banquet;  certain 
payers  obtained  a  temporary  injunction 
restraining  the  treasurer  from  paying  the 
bills,  which,  upon  final  hearing,  was  sus- 
tained and  made  perpetual.  Austin  v. 
Coggeshall,  12  R.  I.  329  ;  s.  P.  Green- 
ough  v.  Wakefield,  L27  .Mass.  275  ;  post, 
chap.  xxii.  see.  916  et  seq. 

-  White  ,-.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
67  (1856)  ;  Willis  v.  Legris,  45  111.  289; 
lb.  218  ;  Rounds  v.  Stetson,  45  Me.  596 
(1858);  Gilmore  v.  Holt,  4  Pick.  258 
(1826)  ;  Rounds®.  Mansfield,  88  Me.  586 
(1854)  ;  Smith  v.  Gates,  21  Pick.  55, 
where  the  rule  in  the  text  was  applied, 
although  the  sale  was  made  only  twenty 
minutes  before  the  expiration  of  the  time 
required  bj  law.  So  actual  knowledge, 
by  the  owner  of  the  heist-,  of  the  im- 
pounding thereof,  is  not  equivalent  to 
the  written  notia  required  by  the  statute. 
('oilin  v.  Field,  7  Cush.  355.  Abridgment 
of  the  required  notice  for  the  shortest 
period  avoids  the  sale  ;  and  so  does  a  sale, 
at  one  bidding,  of  two  animals  having 
different  owners.  Clark  v.  Lewis,  35  111. 
117  (1864).  Purchaser  musl  show  a  regu- 
lar and  authorized  sale  when  his  title  is 
questioned  by  the  former  owner.  ///. 
Breach  of  a  pound,  and  liberating  an  ani- 
mal therein  confined,  is  no  violation  of  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  "any  person  from 
opposing  or  interrupting  any  city  officer 
in  the  execution  of  the  ordinances  of  the 


§151 


PARTY   WALLS. 


223 


mayor  to  issue  a  warrant  annually,  within  ten  days  from  July  1, 
commanding  police  officers  to  "  kill  all  dogs  not  licensed  according 
to  law,  whenever  and  wherever  found,"  is  not  in  conllict  with  the 
Constitution  of  Massachusetts,1  or  of  Kansas.2 

§  151  (102).  Party  "Walls.  —  Power  in  a  charter  to  pass  ordi- 
nances "  to  authorize  the  erection  of  party  walls  and  fences,  and 
to  regulate  them,"  includes  the  power  to  authorize  their  erection 
upon  the  application  of  either  owner,  and  without  the  consent  of  the 
other ;  and  such  an  ordinance  is  not  unconstitutional  because  com- 
pensation is  not  provided  for  the  land  occupied  by  the  wall.3 


city."  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Omburg,  22  Ga.  67 
(1857).  Marshal  must  strictly  comply 
with  the  ordinance,  or  he  becomes  a  tres- 
passer from  the  beginning.     13  Pick.  384  ; 

4  Pick.  258  ;  21  Pick.  55  ;  13  Met.  407  ; 
7  Cush.  355  ;  9  Pick.  14  ;  12  Met.  118  ;  23 
Pick.  255  ;  12  Met.  198.  Owner  cannot 
legally  break  pound  and  rescue  animals. 

5  Pick.  514;  5  Cush.  267.  Pound  defined. 
2  Cush.  305.  Marshal  cannot  delegate  his 
authority  to  others  to  impound  for  him 
generally,  and  in  his  absence,  but  may 
have  assistants  to  act  in  concert  with  him. 
Jackson  v.  Morris,  1  Denio,  199.  See 
Friday  v.  Floyd,  63  111.  50  (1872).  Offi- 
cers must  use  the  public  pound.  1  R. 
I.  219.  Replevin  does  not  lie  against 
a  pound-keeper,  at  common  law,  while 
the  creatures  are  in  his  legal  custody. 
Co.  Litt.  47  B.  ;  lb.  145  B.  ;  1  Chit.  PI. 
159  ;  Pritchard  v.  Stevens,  6  Durn.  &  E. 
522  ;  Ilsley  v.  Stubbs,  5  Mass.  283  ;  Smith 
v.  Huntington,  3  N.  H.  76 ;  King  v. 
Ford,  70  Ga.  628  ;  but  it  does  lie  if  he 
voluntarily  parts  with  his  legal  control 
over  them,  or  if  he  impounds  them  in  any 
other  places  than  those  prescribed  by  the 
law,  as,  for  example,  in  his  pasture  or 
barn,  although  this  be  done  the  more  con- 
veniently to  furnish  them  with  food  and 
drink.  Bills  v.  Kinson,  1  Foster  (N.  H.), 
448  (1850).  In  Nciv  Hampshire  if  crea- 
tures are  found  "doing  damage,"  they 
may  be  impounded,  and  appraisers  are  to 
ascertain  "whether  any  damage  was 
done."  Held  that  the  statute  contem- 
plated actual,  and  not  merely  nominal 
damages,  to  justify  impounding.  Osgood 
v.  Green,  33  N.  H.  318,  and  cases  cited. 
As  to  power  to  take  up  and  forfeit  ani- 


mals, at  large,  see  also  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances, post;  infra,  sec.  348. 

1  Blair  v.  Forehand,  100  Mass.  136. 
Approved  in  Mowery  v.  Salisbury,  82  N. 
C.  175.  The  Act  of  July  3,  1863,  en- 
titled "An  Act  in  Relation  to  Damages 
occasioned  by  Dogs,"  so  far  as  it  under- 
takes to  charge  the  owner  with  the  amount 
of  damage  done  by  his  dog,  as  fixed  by 
the  selectmen  of  the  town,  without  an  op- 
portunity to  be  heard,  is  unconstitutional; 
because  it  is  contrary  to  natural  justice 
and  not  within  the  scope  of  legislative 
authority  conferred  by  the  Constitution  on 
the  general  court ;  and  also  because  it  is  in 
violation  of  the  provision  of  the  Bill  of 
Rights,  which  secures  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  in  all  controversies  concerning  prop- 
erty, except  in  eases  where  it  had  not 
theretofore  been  used  and  practised.  East 
Kingston  v.  Towle,  48  N.  H.  57.  The 
legislature  have  power  to  make  towns 
liable  for  damage  done  within  their  limits 
by  dogs,  and  to  give  towns  a  right  of 
action  to  recover  the  actual  damage  from 
the  owners  of  the  dogs.     lb. 

2  State  v.  Topeka,  36  Kan.  76,  where  the 
constitutionality  of  ordinances  regulating 
the  keeping,  registering,  and  destruction 
of  dogs  is  fully  considered,  and  many 
authorities  cited  in  the  opinion,  by  Val- 
entine, J. 

8  Hunt  ;;.  Ambruster,  17  N.  J.  Eq. 
(2  C.   E.  Green)  208  (1865). 

Regulations  as  to  party-walls  must  be 
strictly  followed.  If  a  person,  under  color 
of  such  regulations,  does  injury  to  his 
neighbor,  he  is  liable  to  be  sued.  Pratt 
r.  Ilillmnn,  4  B.  &  C.  269  ;  see  also  The 
Queen  v.  Ponsford,  1  D.  &  L.  116.     No 


224 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§153 


6   152     '103).      Public  Defence  ;   Loans  and  Taxation  to  pay  Boun- 
ties. —  During  the  Rebellion  acts  were  passed  by  many  of  the  legis- 
latures of  the  adhering  States  in  effect  authorizing  municipalities  to 
icy  by  loans  and  taxation,  to  pay  bounties  to  volunteers  to 
■/,•  the  municipality  to  Jill  its  quota  under  the  calls  of  the  Presi- 
dent for  troops,  and  thereby  avoid  an  anticipated  draft.     The  con- 
stitutional  principles  involved  in  legislation  of  this  character  will 
be  found  Learnedly  discussed  in  the  cases  below  cited,  which  fully 
tblish   the   validity  of  such  legislation.1      Bui    without  express 
authority  a  municipality  possesses  no  such  power;2  yet  if  exercised, 
it  may  be  validated  by  subsequent  legislative  action.3 


§  153  (104).  Aid  to  Railroad  Companies;  Municipal  Subscrip- 
tions and  Bonds,  and  Taxation  to  pay  the  Same.  —  The  most  noted 
of  extraordinary  powers  conferred  upon  municipal  and  public  corpo- 


man  has  a  right  to  presume  that  his 
neighbor  will  hereafter  build  a  bouse  ad- 
joining to  his,  and  erect  half  of  his  out- 
side  wall  on  his  neighbor's  ground  in 
consequence  of  such  presumption.  Bar- 
low v.  Norman,  2  W.  Bl.  959.  An  exter- 
nal wall  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  party- 
wall.  Sims  r.  Estate  Company,  14  L.  T. 
n.  s.  55.  A  party-wall  is  a  wall  which 
belongs  to  two  persons  as  part-owners,  or 
divides  two  buildings  on.-  from  another. 
W<  3ton  r.  Arnold,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  1084. 
The  English  Stat.,  14  Ceo.  III.  ch.  lxxviii., 
held  not  to  make  party-walls  common 
property.  Matts  V.  Hawkins,  5  Taunt.  20. 
If  one  proprietor  added  to  the  height  of 
such  a  party-wall,  and  the  other  pulled 
down  the  addition,  the  first  might  main- 
tain ■  or  pulling  down  so  much  of 

it    as   st 1    on    the  half  of  the  wall  which 

was  erected  on  his  own   soil.     lb.     The 

property  in  a  wall,  thon  ;h  erected  at  joint 

tin-  property  of  tin-  land 

reon    it    stands.     Tb.     Powi  i 

ordina a   "to  authorize  tin'  erection  of 

party-walls,  &  •.,  and  to  regulate  them," 
1  been  held  to  include  the  power  to 
authorize   th  ir  erection   upon  the  appli- 

on  of  eithei  owner,  and  without   the' 

nt    of  tl tier.      Hunt    r.    Aiuhrus- 

17  N.  •'.   Eq.  208  ;  Harrison's  Muni- 
cipal   Manual,    4th    ed.      Further   as    to 
ty- walls:     McAdam  on   Landlord  and 
.   l  15-160,   ind  works  on  Easements. 
'  S;  School   Directors,  50  Pa.  St. 


150,  two  judges  dissenting.  See  Hilbish 
v.  Catherman,  04  Pa.  St.  154  (1870*,  where 
the  prior  cases  in  that  State  are  commented 
on  by  Agnew,  J.  Slater.  Richland  Town- 
ship, 20  Ohio  St.  362  ;  Thompson  v.  Pitt- 
son,  59  Me.  545  ;  Broadhead  v.  Milwaukee, 
19  Wis.  652  ;  State  v.  Tappen,  29  Wis. 
664  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  he),.  622  ;  Sperry  i. 
llorr,  32  Iowa,  1st  ;  Booth  r.  Woodbury, 
32  Conn.  118  ;  Shackford  v.  Newington, 
46  X.  H.  415  ;  Lowell  v.  Oliver,  8  Allen 
(Mass.),  247;  Freehand  v.  Hastings,  10 
Allen,  570  ;  Comer  v.  Folsom,  13  Minn. 
219  ;  Dayton  v.  Rounds,  27  Mich.  82  ; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  219-229.  Cooley  on 
Taxation  (2d  ed.)  136,  collects  the  cases 
and  states  the  result.  Veazie  v.  China,  50 
Me.  518  ;  Clark  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  63  111. 
32  ;  lb.  40  ;  Bowles  v.  Landaff,  59  N.II. 
164  ;  Gould  v   Raymond,  //<.  260. 

2  Stetson  r.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272  ; 
Fiske  v.  Hazzard,  7  R.  I.  438;  Shackford 
v.  Newington,  supra  ;  ante,  sec,  30.  It 
is  not  the  duty  or  function  of  a  town 
to  procure  the  passage  of  an  act  by  the 
legislature,  authorizing  it  to  pay  bounties. 
An  appropriation  for  that  purpose  is  ille- 
gal.    Mead  v.  Acton,  139  Mass.  341. 

a  Booth  v.  Woodbury,  32  Conn.  118  ; 
Kunkle  v.  Franklin,  l:'.  Minn.  127;  Comer 
v.  Folsom,  L3  Minn.  21'.';  Hilbish  v.  Cath- 
erman, 64  Pa.  St.  154  (1870);  State  v. 
Richland  Township,  20  Ohio  St.  362 
(1870);  ante,  sec.  79. 


§153 


SUBSCRIPTIONS   IN    AID    OF   RAILWAYS. 


225 


rations  is  the  authority  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  railways  bjr  sub- 
scribing to  their  stock,  issuing  negotiable  bonds  as  a  means  of  paving 
their  subscription,  and  taxing  the  inhabitants  or  the  property  within 
their  limits  to  pay  the  indebtedness  thereby  incurred.  Legislation 
of  this  kind  belongs  to  a  period  comparatively  recent,  and  has  been 
more  or  less  resorted  to  at  times,  by  almost  every  State  in  the 
Union.  As  it  is  an  author's  duty  to  state  what  the  law  is  rather 
than  what,  in  his  judgment,  it  ought  to  be,  he  is  constrained  to 
admit  that  a  long  and  almost  unbroken  line  of  judicial  decisions  in 
the  courts  of  most  of  the  States  has  established  the  principle  that, 
in  the  absence  of  special  restrictive  constitutional  provisions,  it  is 
competent  for  the  legislature  to  authorize  a  municipal  or  public 
corporation  to  aid,  in  the  manner  above  indicated,  the  construction 
of  railways  running  near,  or  to,  or  through  its  territory.  The  cases 
on  the  constitutional  validity  of  such  legislation  are  referred  to  in 
the  note.1     Notwithstanding  the  opinion  of  so  many  learned  and 


1  Goddin  v.  Crump  (act  authorizing 
the  city  of  Richmond  to  subscribe  stock 
in  a  company  incorporated  to  improve 
the  navigation  of  the  James  Paver,  and  to 
build  a  road  to  the  falls  of  the  Kanawha 
River).  8  Leigh  (Va.),  120  (1837).  This 
is  the  earliest  case  of  the  class.  Bridge- 
port v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn.  475  (1813); 
Society,  &c.  v.  New  London,  29  Conn. 
174;  Douglass  v.  Chatham,  41  Conn.  211 
(1874)  ;  Nichol  v.  Nashville,  9  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  252  (1848);  Powers  v.  Superior 
Court,  23  Ga.  65  (1857)  ;  Talbot  v.  Dent, 
9  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  526  (1849);  Slack  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  1  (1852); 
Maddox  v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56; 
Commonwealth  v.  McWilliams,  11  Pa.  St. 
61  (1849);  Sharpless  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  21 
Pa.  St.  147  ;  lb.  188  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Perkins,  43  Pa.  St.  410  ;  47  Pa.  St.  189  ; 
Cotton  v.  County  Comm'rs,  6  Flor.  610 
(1856);  Railroad  Co.  v.  Comm'rs,  1  Ohio 
St.  77  (1852);  Cass  v.  Dillon,  2  Ohio  St. 
607  (1853)  ;  Ohio  v.  Comm'rs,  &c.  6 
Ohio  St.  280;  7  Ohio  St.  327;  8  Ohio  St. 
394 j  12  Ohio  St.  596,  624;  14  Ohio  St. 
569;  Strickland  v.  Railroad  Co.,  (Miss.) 
MSS. ;  City  v.  Alexan.  ler,  23  Mo.  483  (1 856) ; 
39  Mo.  485;  Leavenworth  County  v.  Miller, 
Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  (1871),  7  Kan. 
479;  s.  o.  12  Am.  Rep.  425.  The  opinion 
of  Valentine,  J.,  covers  the  whole  ground 
of  controversy.  Kingman,  C.  J.,  con- 
curred, and  Brcvrr,  J.,  dissented.  Clarke 
VOL.  I.  —  15 


v.  Rochester,  24  Barb.  446  (1857);  Bank 
of  Rome  v.  Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38  (1858)  ; 
Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439  (1861)  ; 
People  v.  Mitchell,  35  X.  Y.  551  (1866)  ; 
Police  Jury  v.  Succession  of  McDonough, 
8  La.  An.  341  ;  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  74 
(1857);  22  Ind.  88;  Mt,  Vernon  v.  Hovey, 
52  Ind.  563  (1876);  Robinson  v.  Bidwell, 
22  Cal.  379;  Stein  v.  Mayor,  &c,  24  Ala. 
591  (1854);  Gibbons  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36 
Ala.  410;  Prettyman  v.  Supervisors,  19 
111.  406  (1858);  s.  p.  24  111.  75.  208; 
Butler  v.  Dunham,  27  111.  474  (1861); 
Robertson  v.  Rockford,  21  111.  451;  Chi- 
cago, &c.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith  (donation 
to  "Railroad  Co.),  62  111.  268  (1871);  s.  C. 
14  Am.  Rep.  99;  Sibley  >\  Mobile,  3  Woods 
C.  C.  535;  and  see  also  as  to  authority  to 
precinct  to  levy  tax  to  maintain  a  bridge, 
Shaw  v.  Dennis,  5  Gilm.  (111.)  405  ;  San 
Antonio  v.  Jones,  28  Tex.  19  ;  Cop1*  p. 
Charleston,  10  Rich.  (S.  C.)  491  (1857); 
Augusta  Bank  v.  Augusta,  49  Me.  507  ; 
Clark  v.  City,  &c,  10  Wis.  136;  lb.  195 
(1V.V>)  (compare  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan 
Railroad  Co.,  infra').  The  Supreme  <  !ourt 
of  Wisconsin,  in  an  opinion  delivered  in 
Phillips  v.  Albany,  28  Wis.  340  (1871), 
say  tin'  power  of  the  Legislature  to  author- 
ize municipal  subscriptions  to  the  stock  of 
railroads  is  settled  by  former  decisions  in 
this  State,  as  well  as  in  other  States, 
though  tie'  majority  of  this  court  would 
be  disposed  to  deny  the  power;  if  it  were 


MUNK  [PAL   CORPORATE 


§153 


eminent  judges,  there  remain  serious  doubts  as  to  the  soundness  of 
the  principle,  viewed  simply  as  one  of  i  tional  law.     Regarded 


Rogan  v.   Water- 
in  v.  Rail- 
\       Or- 
The  Supreme 
■  be  United  States  have  decided 
the  power  may  be  conferred  bj  the 
. 
3   Wall.  327  ;  Knox  County 
•     Aspinwall,  21    How.  (U.  S.)  539,  547 
riski        Railroad  Co.,  23  How. 
,  Mayi    .  24   How.  365,  376: 
ibuque,  1  Wall.  17.".  [It 
I  i  t,  /  ■    31;  M 
v.    Muscatine,    /  ,   384;  B  ildw  in    v.   i 

111  U.  S.  1  ;  ( 'aldwell  v.  Justices, 
\    I       :        123;  Taylor  v.  N 
bera  .  ,141     L854);  s.  p.  Hill  v. 

I      ,  67  N.  C.   367    (1870).     In 

■  th( nstitutionality  of  railroad  sub- 
scriptions by  municipalities  was  first  ( I 
affirmed  in  Dubuque  County  v.  Railroad 
I  ,  4  G.  G  iene  ( loWa),  1  ;  afterwards 
1 1862)  denied,  State  v.  Wapello  County, 
13  Iowa,  388;  denial  adhered  to  down  to 
1869,  Hanson  >•.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28;  but 

the    virtual,  yet  not    acknowledged 

throw  of  the  line  of  decisions  denying 

the  power,  in  Stewart  v.  Polk  County,  30 

;  Renwick   v.   Davenport, 

Railway  Co.,    17  fowa,  511;  Snell  v. 

Leonard,  55  Iowa,    553.     The  legislative 

ami  judicial  history  of  the  subject  is  fully 

I  in  King  v.  Wilson,  1  Dillon's  C.  C. 

R.    555  (1-71 ).     By  the  Constitution   of 

.  the  legislature  has  power  to  an- 

thorizi    counties   and   incorporated  towns 

to  imposi  and  corpo- 

l:i    Nichol         M 

.  :  II  imph.  252  (184* 

was  held,  notwithstanding  this  provision, 

that    the   legislature  possessed  the  power 

authorize    municipal    corporations    to 

subscribe  for  the   stock    of  railway  com- 

roads   run   to  or  near  such 

ons,  and  thai  thi 

■  '•  county  purpose,"  within  the  raean- 

titution;  bu1  quaere.    There 
is  nothing  in  the  <  'onstitntion  oi 

ibitingthe  legislature  from  authoriz- 

m  to  levy  a  tax 

on  |  itate  within  the  corporation 


to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad, 
even  though  the  road  i  xti  nds  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  corporation,  or  even  of  the 
State  So  held  iii  Stein  v.  Mobile,  '24  Ala. 
59]  | I  85  i ).  An  a<  t  authorizing  a  mu- 
nicipal coi  i  row  money  to 
aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad,  upon 
the  written  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
resident  taxpayers,  or  upon  the  approval 
lit'  two-thirds  of  the  taxpaying  electors, 
is  constitutional  and  valid  ;  and  it  is  not 
open  tn  the  objection  that  it  submits  a 
legislative  question  to  the  town.  Starin 
v.  Genoa,  23  N.  V.  439  (1861);  Gould  c. 
Sterling,  /  56;  Bank  of  Rome  v. 
Rome,  18  X.  V.  38;  People  v.  Mead,  24 
X.  V.  124;  Horton  v.  Thompson,  71  X. 
Y.  513;  affirmed  in  Town  of  Scipio  v. 
Wright,  101  U.  S.  665  ;  s.  c.  21  Alb.  L. 
Jour.  476.  These  cases  distinguished  on 
this  point  from  Barto  v.  Himrod,  4  S.  Id. 
(8  N.  Y.)  483.  Ante,  sec.  44.  Sine,,  the 
common  law  does  not  favor  the  principle 
that  a  majority  of  taxpayers  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  encumber  the  prop- 
erty of  a  minority  against  their  will,  in 
aid  of  a  railroad  or  other  corporation,  the 
requirements  of  statutes  authorizing  such 
aid  must  be  strictly  observed.  People  v. 
Hulhurt,  46  X.  V.  110;  Cowdrey  ».  Town 
of  Canadea,  16  Fed.  Rep.  532.  In  Smith 
0.  Fond  du  Lac,  8  Fed.  Rep.  289,  Har- 
lan, J.,  decided  that  a  statute  authorizing 
a  city  t"  suhscrihe  for  railroad  stuck  and 
issue  it-  bonds  therefor,  after  a  vote  pass*  d 
by  a  majority  of  the  voters,  without  limit- 
ing the  amount,  was  not  in  conflict  with  a 
constitutional  provision  in  Wisconsin  re- 
stricting  the  power  of  municipalities  to 
borrow  money,  contract  debts,  and  loan 
their  credit. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota  has 
affirmed  the  validity  of  compulsory  aid  to 
railways,  saying  that  it  is  wholly  for  the 
legislature  to  determine  whether  the  aid 
sh.ill  be  by  8  ;  i   to  the  stock  and 

issuing  bonds  in  payment,  or  by  a  donation 
of  money  or  bonds  to  secure  their  con- 
Btrnction,  the  court  in  either  ease  regard- 
ing the  use  to  be  a  public  use  for  which 
taxation  mav  be  authorized.  Davidson  v. 
Ramsey  County,  18  .Minn.  482  (1872).  And 


§  155  MUNICIPAL.  INDEBTEDNESS  ;    NEGOTIABLE   BONDS.  227 

in  the  light  of  its  effects,  however,  there  is  little  hesitation  in 
affirming  that  this  invention  to  aid  the  enterprises  of  private  cor- 
porations has  proved  itself  baneful  in  the  last  degree.1 

§  15-4.  Municipal  Indebtedness;  Negotiable  Bonds. —  It  is  esti- 
mated that  the  indebtedness  of  municipal  and  public  corporations  in 
this  country  has  already  reached  the  enormous  sum  of  $1,000,000,000, 
and  it  is  constantly  increasing.  A  large  portion  of  this  indebtedness 
is  evidenced  by  negotiable  bonds,  which  are  held  by  thousands  of  per- 
sons, at  home  and  abroad,  as  an  investment.  These  bonds  have  been 
issued  for  a  great  variety  of  purposes,  such  as  the  erecting  of  public 
buildings,  the  making  of  municipal  improvements,  and  in  payment 
of  subscriptions  for  the  stock  of  railway  corporations,  or  as  dona- 
tions to  aid  them  in  the  construction  of  their  roads  located  in  or 
near  the  municipality  or  public  corporation  thus  extending  its 
assistance.2 

§  155.  Same  subject.  —  The  power  conferred  upon  municipal  and 
public  corporations  to  issue  commercial  securities  for  such  purposes 
is  of  comparatively  recent  origin,  and  it  has  undeniably  been 
attended  with  very  serious,  and  it  is  perhaps  not  too  strong  a 
statement  to  add,  disastrous  consequences.  One  of  these  is  the 
stimulus  which  the  long  credit  commonly  provided  for  effectually 
supplies  to  over-indebtedness.  The  bonds  usually  fix  a  time,  twenty 
or  thirty  years  distant,  for  payment  of  the  principal.  Those  who 
vote  the  debt,  and  the  councils  or  bodies  which  create  it  and  issue 
the  bonds,  do  so  without  much  hesitation,  as  the  burden  is  expected 
to  fall  principally  on  posterity.  A  learned  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  3  has  very  fitly  described  the  effect  wit- 
nessed as  a  mania  for  running  in  debt  for  public  improvements. 
It  has  elsewhere  been  characterized  as  an  "  epidemic  insanity "  in- 
ducing extravagant  corporate  subscriptions  to  public  works. 

the  validity  of  such  legislation  has  also  sonport  v.  Watson,  33  Ark.  704;  Eicheson 
been  affirmed  by  the  Supreme   Court   of  v.  People,  115  111.  450. 
Nebraska,    Crounse   and   Lake,  JJ.,    eon-  ]  Cooley,  Const.  Lini.  5th  ed.  264  etseq., 
curring,   and  Mason,  C.  J.,  dissenting, —  discusses  the  constitutional  principles  in- 
the  opinion  of   Crounse,    J.,  reviews  the  volved  in  such  legislation  with  his  accus- 
principal  cases;   Hallenbeck  v.   Hahn,  2  tomed  clearness  and  ability. 
Neb.  377;  and  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  2  As  to  coupon  bonds,   see  Daniel  on 
California,   Stockton,  &c.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Neg.  Instr.  sec.  1486  ct  scq.      Post,  chap- 
City  of  Stockton,  41  Cal.  147  (1S71);  and  ter  xiv.  on  Contracts,  where  the  subject  of 
in    Alabama,  Opelika  v.  Daniel,  59  Ala.  Municipal   Bonds  is  considered  at  large. 
211;  Selma  &  Gulf  Railroad,  In  re,  45  Ala.  The  mode  of  enforcement  is  presented  iu 
696  (1871);  and  in  Kentucky,  Allison  v.  ch.  xx.  post,  on  Mandamus. 
Lou.,  H.  C.  &  W.  Railway  Co.,  10  Bush  8  Mr.  Justice  Davis. 
(Ky.),  1  (1873).     Text  approved.     Jack- 


228  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS..  §  157 

$  L56.      The  Abuse  of  the  Power.  —  In  many  parts  of  the  country, 
particularly  in  the   West,  this  mania  has  become  general  in 
I  wnships,  and  school-districts,  and  large  and  bur- 
densome debts  have   been  thoughtlessly  created     The  author  has 
known  new  counties  in  a  western  State  not  containing  over  L0,000 
inhabitants,  vote  for  a  single  railway,  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $300,- 
drawing  ten  per  cent   interest,  payable  annually:  and  instances 
are  not  infrequent  where  bonds  have  been  issued  greater  than  the 
I   value  of  all  the  taxable  property  at  the  time  within  the 
municipal  or  territorial  subdivision.     NTo  check  against  the  incurring 
of  over-indebtedness  is  so  effectual  as  the  one  that  you  must  pay  as 
you  go;   but  tins   i>   wholly  disregarded  in   the  legislation  which 
authorizes  bonds  payable  at  a  remote  period.     Another  serious  con- 
Bequence  oi   tins  policy   is  that   even   the  interest  on  these  bonds 
often  proves  to  be  a  heavy  burden  upon  the  community,  and  in 
many   instances   the  bonds   have   been   issued    fraudulently  by  the 
public  or  municipal  officers,  and  no  consideration  or  none  of  value 
:i  in  fact   received   therefor.     They  may,  indeed,  have  the 
stock  of  the  railway  company;  but  in  most  cases,  under  the  pre- 
vailing mode  of  constructing  railways,  the  stock  is  utterly  valueless. 
When  the  sting  of  taxation  is  felt,  and  when  the  taxpayer  knows 
that  the  bonds  were   fraudulently  issued,  and  even  when  he  feels 
that  their  issue  was  improvident,  experience  shows  that  repudiation, 
or  attempted  repudiation  is  the  next  stage,  involving  a  forfeiture  of 
the  public  faith  pledged  for  their  payment.     Occasionally  it  has 
been  witnessed  that  the  State  in  all  its  departments  has  actively 
sympathized  with  the  repudiating  municipality, and  the  public  faith 
has  been  redeemed  only,  if  at  all,  through  the  coercion  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States.     In  a  few  instances,  indeed,  the 
s  have  sel   the  example  of  repudiating  their  own  obligations 
i-  ued  in  aid  of  railways;  and  it  was  in  a  case  of  this  kind  that  the 
Supremo  Court  at  Washington  felt  itself  bound  to  declare  "that  the 
faith  of  the  State  [of  Minnesota],  solemnly  pledged,  has  not  been 
kepi  ;  and  were  sin-  amenable   to  the  tribunals  of  the  country,  as 
private  individuals  are,  no  court  of  justice  would  withhold  itsjudg- 
nient    against  her."      Examples  of  this  kind  are  demoralizing,  and 
cannot  safely  become  general   or  frequent 

§  157    (105  .    Constitutional  Principles  involved.  —  It  is  not  pro- 

posed  here  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  constitutional  princiji/>s 
involved  in  such  Legislation.  The  arguments  in  favor  of  the  power 
are  fully  presented  in  the  leading  case  of  Sharpless  v.  The  Mayor,1 

1  Sharpless  v.  Mayor,  21  Fa.  St.  147.     See,  also,  Am.  Law  llev.  Oct.  (1870);  infra, 
aec.  158. 


§157 


CONSTITUTIONAL   PRINCIPLES    INVOLVED. 


229 


and  against  it  in  Hanson  v.  Vernon,1  in  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  Rail- 
way Company,2  and  in  The  People  v.  Township  Board  of  Salem,3  to 


1  Hanson  v.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28 
(1869). 

2  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  Railway  Co., 
25  Wis.  167  (1870),  opinion  by  Dixon, 
C.  J.  ;  s.  c.  3  Am.  Rep.  30  ;  s.  c.  9  Am. 
Law  Reg.  (n.  s.)  156,  and  note  ;  Rogan 
v.  Watertown,  30  Wis.  259  (1872). 

3  People  v.  Township  Board  of  Salem, 
9  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s.)  487,  and  notes 
(1870)  ;  s.  c.  20  Mich.  452.  "  Bonds  like 
these  are  of  modern  invention,  and  when 
counties  and  towns  were  decoyed  into  the 
use  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  railroad 
corporations  they  had  to  obtain  enabling 
statutes  before  they  could  prostitute  mu- 
nicipal seals  to  any  such  purpose.  And 
as  soon  as  the  people  [of  Pennsylvania'] 
began  to  feel  the  consequences  of  apply- 
ing the  fundamental  principle  of  commer- 
cial paper  to  their  bonds,  they  altered 
their  organic  law  so  as  to  render  such 
bonds  and  enabling  statutes  impossibili- 
ties in  the  future."  Per  Woodward,  C.  J., 
County  v.  Brinton,  47  Pa.  St.  367  (1864). 
The  evil  of  these  subscriptions  was  the 
cause  of  the  amendment  to  the  Constitu- 
tion. Per  Bead,  J.,  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  lb.  193.  The  Con- 
stitution of  Pennsylvania  (1874)  provides: 
"The  General  Assembly  shall  not  author- 
ize any  county,  city,  borough,  township, 
or  incorporated  district  to  become  a  stock- 
holder in  any  company,  association,  or 
corporation,  or  to  obtain  or  appropriate 
money  for,  or  to  loan  its  credit  to,  any 
corporation,  association,  institution,  or  in- 
dividual." This  is  in  substance  the  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  made  in  1857. 
Construed  in  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia,  47  Pa.  St.  189  ;  Wheeler  v. 
Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338  ;  Wilkesbarre 
Hospital  v.  Luzerne  County,  84  Pa.  St.  55. 
Bounty  tax  to  volunteers  not  within  the 
prohibition.  Speer  v.  School  Directors, 
50  Pa.  St.  150. 

The  Ohio  Constitution  (art.  viii.  sec.  6) 
provides  that  ' '  The  General  Assembly 
shall  never  authorize  any  county,  city, 
town,  or  township,  by  vote  of  its  citizens 
or  otherwise,  to  become  a  stockholder  in 
any  joint  stock  company,  corporation,  or 
association  whatever ;   or  to  raise  money 


or  loan  its  credit  to,  or  in  aid  of,  any  such 
company,  corporation,  or  association  ;"  and 
this  was  held  not  to  prohibit  the  legisla- 
ture from  authorizing  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration to  engage  in  building  a  railroad 
mainly  outside  of  the  State  on  its  own 
account.  Walker  v.  Cincinnati,  21  Ohio 
St.  14  (1871)  ;  s.  c.  11  Am.  Law  Reg. 
(n.  s.)  346,  and  note  of  Judge  liedjield; 
a.  c.  8  Am.  Rep.  24.  Considering  the  evil 
which  this  provision  of  the  Constitution 
was  aimed  at,  it  seems  difficult  to  avoid 
the  conclusion  that  this  construction 
thwarts  the  intention  and  purpose  for 
which  the  provision  was  designed  and 
adopted. 

This  case  illustrates  the  dangerous  na- 
ture of  the  invention  of  bringing  the  taxing 
power  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railway 
lines,  and  particularly  does  it  subvert  all 
previous  notions  of  the  appropriate  powers, 
functions,  and  duties  of  municipalities. 
Here  a  single  city,  in  the  face  of  the  Con- 
stitution, was  authorized  to  borrow  $10,- 
000,000,  and  issue  its  bonds  in  payment, 
to  be  appropriated  to  the  construction  of 
a  long  railroad  line  by  itself  and  for  itself, 
lying  chiefly  in  other  States  ;  and  yet  the 
validity  of  the  act  giving  the  authority 
was  sustained.  In  May,  1873,  the  same 
constitutional  provision  was  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  and  the  act 
of  1872,  mentioned  below,  was  held  to  be 
in  conflict  with  it,  since  the  legislature 
could  not  do  indirectly  what  it  was  pro- 
hibited from  doing  directly.  The  court 
held:  1.  Taxation  can  only  be  authorized 
for  public  purposes.  When,  therefore,  a 
statute  authorizes  a  county,  township,  or 
municipality  to  levy  taxes  not  above  a 
given  per  cent  on  the  taxable  property  of 
the  locality  for  the  purpose  of  building 
so  much  of  a  railroad  as  can  be  built  for 
that  amount,  and  the  part  of  a  railroad 
so  to  be  built  can  be  of  no  public  utility 
unless  used  to  accomplish  an  unconstitu- 
tional purpose,  such  tax  is  illegal  and  can- 
not be  enforced.  2.  Where  public  credit 
or  money  is  furnished  by  any  of  the  sub- 
divisions of  the  State  named  in  the  Con- 
stitution, to  be  used  in  part  in  the  con- 
struction  of    a    work    which,    under  the 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


which,  and  to  the  other  cases  before  cited,  the  reader  is  reterred 
The  judgments  affirming  the  existence  of  the  power  bave  generally 
with  strong  judicial  dissent  and  with  much  professional  dis- 
approval, and  experience  has  demonstrated  that  the  exercise  of  it 
a  productive  of  bad  results.  Taxes,  it  is  everywhere  agreed, 
can  only  I"-  imposed  for  public  objects,  and  taxation  to  aid  in  build- 
ing the  roads  of  privatt  railway  companies,  even  if  the  use  is  a  pub- 
lic use,  is  hardly  consistent  with  our  traditional  respecl  for  the 
inviolability  of  private  property  and  individual  rights.  Fraud  often 
accompanies  the  exercise  of  the  power,and  extravagant  indebtedness 
is  the  result  ;  and,  sooner  or  later,  the  power  will  be  denied  by  con- 
stitutional provision,  as  it  already  is  in  Pennsylvania, Ohio,  Illinois,1 

statute  authorizing  its  construction,  must 

impleted,  it  completed  at  all,  by  other 
parties  out  of  their  own  means,  w  ho  are 
ii,  or  have  the  beneficial  control  and 
management  of  the  work  when  completed, 
public  money  or  credit  thus  used  can  only 
be  regarded  as  furnished  for  or  in  aid  of 
Buch  parties.  The  ai  I  of  April  23,  1872, 
to  authorize  counties,  townships,  and  other 
municipalities  therein  named  to  build  rail- 
roads, &c.  [59  0.   L.  S4],  authorizes  the 

ng  of  money  by  taxation,  which  is 
equally  applicable  to  the  unlawful  pur- 
pose of  aiding  railroad  companies  and 
others  engaged  in  building  and  operating 
railroads,  as  it  is  to  any  lawful  purpose, 
ami  gives  to  the  officers  entrusted  with  the 
control  and  operation  of  the  money  thus 
1  mi  means  or  power  of  discrimina- 
tion a-  to  the  lawfulness  of  the  work  or 
purpose  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied  ;  and 
this  is  in  contravention  of  sec.  6.  art  viii. 
of  the  Constitution,  and  therefore  void. 
By  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of 
Fork,  which  took  effecl  January  1, 
1875,  "  No  county,  town,  or  village  shall 
hereafter  give  any  money  or  property,  or 
loan  ii-  money  or  credit  to  or  in  aid  of 
any   individual.  ion,    or   corpora- 

tion."   People  v.  Ft.  Edward,  70  N.  Y.  28 

(1-7 

The  Constitution  of  Indiana  provides 
that  "no  county  shall  subscribe  for  stock 
in  any  incorporated  company,  unless  the 
same  be  paid  for  at  the  time  of  such  sub- 
scription."  Art.  x.  sec.  10.  What  is 
an  "incorporated  company,"  and  how  and 
\\  hen  stock  may  be  paid  for,  see  Lafa 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Geiger,  34    Ind.   185 


(1870),  where  the  subjed  is  verj  elaborately 
considered  by  Buskirk,  J.  John  v.  Cin., 
&c.  Railroad  Co.,  35  Ind.  539  ;  Aspinwall 
v.  Jo  Daviess  Co.,  22  How.  3G4.  The 
nev.  Constitution  of  Missouri  cuts  up  the 
business  by  the  mots.     Art.  iv.  sec.  47. 

i  Tic  m    oj    I  linois,   which 

went  into  effect  July  2,  1870,  provided 
that  no  municipality  should  "  ever  become 
subscriber  to  the  capita]  stuck  of  any  rail- 
road or  private  corporation,  or  make  do- 
nation to,  or  loan  its  credit  in  aid  of, 
such  corporation.  Provided,  howt  v&r,  That 
the  adoption  of  this  article  shall  not  be 
construed  as  affecting  the  right  of  such 
municipality  to   make  such   subscriptions 

while  the  same  have  heeli  authorized  under 

existing  laws,  by  a  vote  of  the  people  of 
such  municipalities  prior  tosuch  adoption." 
It  has  been  held  that  the  effect  of  this 
section  was  to  withdraw  a  power,  previ- 
ously conferred  by  the  legislature,  to  issue 
bonds  in  payment  of  subscriptions  and 
donations  duly  voted  to  railroads,  when 
the  power  had  not  Imvii  exercised  before  it 
went  into  effecl  ;  hut  that  subscriptions 
and  donations  Legally  voted  before  that 
time  could  he  completed  alter  it.  Concord 
,-.  Robinson,  121  I'.  S.  165.  As  to  the 
power  of  the  legislature  of  Illinois  under 
the  Constitution  of  1348  to  validate  the 
action  of  a  town  in  voting  a  subscription 
to  railway  stock  without  authority,  see 
Bolles  v.  Brimfield,  120  U.  S.  759.      The 

frOVisO    includes    dOTiatWUS   as    well  as  sub- 

seiiptions.  Fairfield  V.  County  of  Gal- 
latin, 100  U.  S.  47,  overruling  Concord 
v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank,  92  l'.  S. 
625  ;   Enfield  v.  Jordan,  119  U.  S.    O'so. 


i         J 


§158 


NEGOTIABLE    BONDS  ;    FEDERAL   DECISIONS. 


231 


New  York,  Missouri,  and  possibly  some  of  the  other  States,  or  by 
legislative  enactment.  It  is  too  late  to  expect,  in  view  of  the  line 
of  decisions  referred  to,  that  the  courts  in  the  States  which  have 
already  passed  upon  the  question  will  retrace  their  steps,  and  too 
much  to  hope  that  the  courts  in  other  States  will  have  the  boldn< 
successfully  to  stem  the  strong  tide  of  authority,  strengthened,  as  it 
will  be,  by  temporary  popular  feeling  and  corporate  influence. 

§  158  (105  a).  Same  subject.'  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States. — -Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  following  repeated  intimations  of 
its  judges  in  previous  cases,  have  directly  sustained  the  validity  of 
legislative  acts  authorizing  municipal  aid  to  railways.1  In  view  of 
the  prior  adjudications  of  that  tribunal  in  the  municipal  bond  cases, 
hereafter  referred  to  in  the  chapter  on  Contracts,  and  of  the  almost 
uniform  holding  of  the  State  courts,  no  other  result  could  have  been 
anticipated.  This  ends  judicial  discussion  if  it  does  not  terminate 
doubts.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  reaching  this  result,  places  its  judg- 
ment upon  the  ground  that  highways,  turnpikes,  canals,  and  rail- 


This  section  did  not  take  away  the  power, 
which  the  legislature  had  under  the  pre- 
vious Constitution,  of  passing  a  curative 
act  declaring  an  election  in  favor  of  au- 
thorizing a  subscription  to  a  railroad  valid 
and  giving  power  to  issue  bonds  therefor, 
when  the  election  was  held  under  a  mere 
power  to  borrow  money  and  issue  bonds, 
the  statute  being  insufficient  to  warrant  a 
subscription  to  a  railroad.  Jonesboro  City 
v.  Cairo  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.,  110  IT.  S. 
192.  The  section  held  not  to  invalidate 
township  bonds,  which  were  issued  in  pur- 
suance of  a  vote  held  on  the  same  day 
the  new  Constitution  was  adopted  (July  2, 
1870).  Louisville  v.  Savings  Bank,  104 
,  U.  S.  469. 

The  Constitution  of  Mississippi  of  1869, 
art.  xii.  §  14,  provides  that,  "The  legisla- 
ture shall  not  authorize  any  county,  city, 
or  town  to  become  a  stockholder  in,  or 
lend  its  credit  to,  any  company,  associ- 
ation, or  corporation,  unless  two-thirds  of 
the  qualified  voters  of  such  county,  city, 
or  town,  at  a  special  election,  or  regular 
election,  to  be  held  therein,  shall  assent 
thereto."  Under  this  provision  it  is  held 
that  the  legislature  of  that  State  has  no 
authority  to  pass  an  act  validating  an  issue 
of  bonds,   illegally  issued  before  the  pro- 


vision went  into  effect,  under  a  law  which, 
though  constitutional  when  enacted,  was 
not  within  the  terms  of  the  provision. 
Katzenberger  v.  Aberdeen,  121  LT.  S.  172. 
Held,  also,  under  the  same  provision,  that 
an  act  ratifying  all  subscriptions  to  the 
capital  stock  of  a  corporation  "  made  by 
any  county,  city,  or  town  in  this  State, 
which  were  not  made  in  violation  of  the 
Constitution."  did  not  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty ratify  a  subscription  made  in  pur- 
suance of  a  vote,  when  neither  the  election 
nor  the  subscription  had  been  authorized 
by  the  legislature  ;  and  that  bonds  issued 
under  authority  of  the  pretended  act  of 
ratification  were  void  for  want  of  power  to 
issue  them.  Hayes  v.  Holly  Springs,  114 
U.  S.  120.  This  provision  recpiires  the 
assent  of  only  two-thirds  of  those  actually 
voting,  not  two-thirds  of  all  those  qualified 
to  vote.  Carroll  County  v.  Smith,  111 
U.  S.  556. 

1  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  16  Wall.  678 
(1872)  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Otoe  County,  16 
Wall.  667  (1872)  ;  s.  c.  reprinted,  2  Neb. 
496;  St.  Joseph  Township*.  1!>>l,vis,  1'i 
Wall.  664  (1872)  ;  s.  c.  7  Albany  Law 
Journal,  362  ;  Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3 
Wall.  654  ;  Mitchell  v.  Burlington,  4 
Wall.  270. 


MUNICIPAL  coupuuatiuns.  §  159 

rs,  although  owned  by  Individuals  under  public  grants  or  by 
private  corporations,  are  publici  juris  ;  that  they  have  always  been 
governmental  affairs,  and  their  establishment  and  main- 
tenance recognized  as  among  the  most  important  duties  of  the  State, 
;n  order  to  facilitate  transportation  and  easy  communication  among 

different  parts ;  and  hence  the  State  may  put  forth,  in  favor  of 
such   improvements,  both  its  power  of  eminent  domain  (as  it  con- 

itly  does)  and  its  power  to  tax,  unless  there  be  some  special  re* 

Lion  in  the  Constitution  of  the  particular  State.     These  powers 

may,  in  the  judgment  of  the  court,  he  lawfully  exerted,  because  the 

Is  in  its  nature  a  public  use,  and  these  works  are  subject  to  pub- 
lic eont ml  and  regulation  (except  so  far  as  this  right  has  been  law- 
fully parted  with  by  valid  Legislative  contract),  notwithstanding  they 
may  be  exclusively  owned  by  private  persons  or  corporations.  It 
must  be  admitted  that  compulsory  taxation  in  favor  of  railways  and 
like  public  improvements  owned  by  individuals  or  companies  is  an 
of  power  going  quite  to  the  verge  of  legislative  authority. 
Although  it  is  a  doctrine  that  must  now  be  considered  as  judicially 

tied,  still  it  is  one  which  has,  as  we  think  justly,  encountered  a 

orous  opposition,  both  on  the  ground  of  expediency  and  of  power; 
and  the  exercise  of  authority  has,  as  before  noticed,  been  so  disas- 
trous  as  already,  in  some  of  the  States,  to  have  led  to  constitutional 
provisions  for  the  protection  of  the  citizen. 

sj  L59  I11"1  b  .  Principle  does  not  extend  to  Compulsory  Taxation 
for  Private  Enterprises.  —  It  is  obvious,  irom  the  foregoing  statement 
of  the  grounds  upon  which  the  validity  of  such  legislation  is  made 
to  rest,1  thai  it  furnishes  no  support  for  the  validity  of  taxation  in 
favor  of  enterprises  and  objects  which  are  essentially  private.  We 
consider  the  principle  equally  sound  and  salutary,  that  the  mere 
incidental  benefits  to  the  public  or  the  State,  or  to  any  of  its  munici- 
palities or  divisions,  which  result  from  the  pursuit  by  individuals  or 
corporations  of  ordinary  branches  of  business  or  industry,  do  not 
i  onstitute  a  public  usi  in  the  legal  sense,  which  justifies  the  exercise 
either  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  or  of  taxation.  It  would 
have  hem  well,  in  our  judgment,  if  this  doctrine  had  been  extended 
u  its  application  to  railway  companies;  but  the  doctrine  that  pri- 
enterprises  or  objects  cannot  be  aided  by  taxation  is  so  funda- 
mental that  it  cannot  be  denied  or  disregarded  without  unsettling 
the  foundations  of  individual  rights,  without  recognizing  legislative 
omnipotence  over  private  property,  or  the  irresponsible  despotism 
of  a  local  majority,  and   unwisely  opening  the  way  for  frauds  and 

1  Supra,  see.  157. 


§159 


NEGOTIABLE   BONDS  ;     PRIVATE    ENTERPRISES. 


233 


abuses  which,  in  view  of  the  past,  cannot  be  contemplated  without 
deep  anxiety.1 


1  The  doctrine  of  the  text  finds  inter- 
esting illustrations  and  authoritative  sup- 
port in  several  adjudged  cases  determined 
by  courts  of  great  respectability.  One  is 
Lowell  v.  Boston,  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts  in  1873. 
Ill  Mass.  463;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  39. 
After  the  great  fire  in  Boston,  in  1872,  the 
legislature  enacted  that  the  city  might 
issue  its  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $20,000,- 
000,  the  proceeds  of  which  three  commis- 
sioners, appointed  by  the  mayor,  were 
authorized  to  loan  in  a  safe  and  judicious 
manner  "  in  such  sums  as  they  shall  de- 
termine to  the  owners  of  land,  the  buildings 
upon  which  were  burned  by  the  fire  in  said 
Boston  on  the  ninth  and  tenth  days  of 
November,  1872,  upon  the  notes  or  bonds 
of  said  owners  secured  by  first  mortgages 
of  said  land  ;  said  mortgages  to  be  con- 
ditioned that  the  rebuilding  shall  be  com- 
menced within  one  year  from  the  first  day 
of  January,  1873,  and  said  commissioners 
to  have  full  power  to  apply  the  proceeds  of 
said  bonds  in  making  said  loans  in  such 
manner,  and  to  make  such  further  pro- 
visions, conditions,  and  limitations  in 
reference  to  said  loans,  and  securing  the 
same,  as  shall  be  best  calculated,  in  their 
judgment,  to  ensure  the  employment  of 
the  same  in  rebuilding  upon  said  land 
burned  over,  and  the  payment  thereof  to 
the  said  city." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  object  of  this 
act,  as  shown  by  its  provisions,  was  "  to 
ensure  the  speedy  rebuilding  on  land  the 
buildings  upon  which  were  burned "  by 
the  great  fire  ;  and  the  question  was  as 
to  the  right  of  the  State  to  impose  any 
taxes  for  this  object,  and  this  depended 
upon  the  further  question,  whether  this 
object  was,  in  a  legal  sense,  a  public 
object. 

The  court  distinctly  held,  to  use  the 
language  of  the  rescript  sent  down  in  the 
case,  that  taxes  can  only  be  laid  "for 
some  public  service  or  some  object  which 
concerns  the  public  welfare  ; "  that  "the 
preservation  of  the  interests  of  individuals, 
either  in  respect  of  property  or  business, 
although  it  may  result  incidentally  in  the 
advancement  of  the  public  welfare,  is,  in 


its  essential  character,  a  private  and  not 
a  public  object.  .  .  .  That  tin:  Incidental 
advantages  to  tin-  public  or  to  tin-  State 
which  result  from  the  promotion  of  pri- 
vate interests,  or  the  prosperity  of  private 
enterprise's  or  business,  does  not  justify 
their  aid  by  taxation.  .  .  .  That,  as  a  judi- 
cial question,  the  ease  is  not  changed  by 
the  magnitude  of  the  calamity  which  has 
created  the  emergency."  And  finally  the 
court  say,  "The  expenditure  authorized 
by  this  statute  being  for  private  and  not 
for  public  objects,  in  a  legal  sense,  it  ex- 
ceeds the  constitutional  power  of  the  legis- 
lature, and  the  city  cannot  legally  issue 
the  bonds  for  the  purposes  named  in  the 
act."  Ill  Mass.  463.  This  case  is  fol- 
lowed and  approved  in  State  v.  Osawkee 
Township,  14  Kan.  418  (1875),  and  the 
"relief  bonds"  which  the  township  was 
authorized  to  issue  were  held  not  to  be  for 
a  public  purpose,  and  therefore  void.  s.  C. 
19  Am.  Rep.  99  ;  McConnell  v.  Hamrn, 
16  Kan.  228  ;  C.  B.  U.  P.  Railroad  Co. 
v.  Smith,  23  Kan.  745. 

Another  case  is  Allen  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Jay,  60  Me.  124  (1871);  12  Am.  Law 
Reg.  (n.  s.)  481.  The  legislature  author- 
ized the  town  of  Jay  to  lend  $10,000 
to  enable  the  borrowers  to  build  a  saw- 
mill and  grist-mill,  and  to  exempt  the 
mills  from  taxation  for  ten  years.  On  the 
ground  that  the  purpose  was  not  a  public 
one,  the  act  was  adjudged  unconstitu- 
tional. See  opinions  of  the  judges,  58 
Me.  Appendix,  590  et  seq.,  given  to  the 
House  of  Representatives.  The  doctrine 
was  adhered  to  in  Brewer  Brick  Co.  v. 
Brewer,  62  Me.  62  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  16  Am. 
Rep.  395,  and  ably  vindicated  by  Applefon, 
C.  J.;  Bissell  v.  Kankakee,  64  111.  249 
(1872)  ;  Mather  v.  Ottawa,  114  111.  659, 
noted  supra,  sec.   127,  note. 

Another  case  is  The  Commercial  National 
Bank  v.  City  of  Iola,  decided  by  the  U.  S. 
Circuit  Court  for  the  district  of  Kansas, 
June,  1873,  reported  in  2  Dillon,  C.  C. 
353,  affirmed  20  Wall.  655  (1874).  For 
the  same  reasons  the  act  of  the  legislature 
which  authorized  the  city  of  Iola  to  ap- 
propriate $50,000  to  aid  private  persons 
in  the  erection  and  equipment  of  buildings, 


23  1  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  1G0 

§  160.  The  Field  reviewed;  The  Lessons  it  teaches.  — Hundreds 
of  municipal  and  public  corporations  in  the  country  have  rendered 
themselves  bankrupt  by  the  mania  to  aid  railways,  and  hundreds  of 

srs  are  groaning  under  oppressive  burdens  thereby  occasioned. 
In  looking  over  the  field,  it  is   now  plain  that   most  of  the  evils 

mating  from  this  source,  and  from  which  the  municipalities  are 
suffering,  have  sprung  not  so  much  from  the  mere  power  to  aid  rail- 
ways, as  from  the  manner  in  which  the  power  has  usually  been  con- 
ferred. It'  municipalities  had  been  forbidden  to  issue  their  bonds, 
and  permitted  to  give  such  aid  only  to  the  extent  of  taxes,  to  be 
levied  within  a  short  limited  period  of  time,  this  pay-as-you-go  policy 
would  have  been  an  effectual  restraint  upon  extravagance  in  this 
direction.  But  the  power  to  give  the  aid  was  usually  accompanied 
with  express  authority  to  issue  bonds,  payable  twenty  or  thirty  years 
distant,  in  general  without  limit  as  to  amount;  and  thus  those  who 
created  the  debt  were  almost  indifferent  as  to  the  amount  of  it,  since 
the  main  burden  was  expected  to  fall  on  posterity.  This  led  to  the 
wildest  extravagance.  Bonds  thus  issued  have  been  treated  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  possessing  all  the  attributes 
of  commercial  paper,  and  unimpeachable  in  the  hands  of  innocent 
holders  for  value,  notwithstanding  the  frauds  of  the  municipal  offi- 
cers, or  non-compliance  with  the  conditions  upon  which  the  bonds 
were  authorized  to  be  issued.  Under  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme 
Court  the  usual  restraints  and  checks  upon  the  power  have  proved 

at  or  near  tbe  city,  to  be  used  for  manu-  paid  by  taxation,   to  aid  in  the  improve- 

facturing  purposes,  was  held  unconstitu-  merit   of  a  water-power,   and,    connected 

tional,  and  the  bonds  vroid  which  had  been  therewith,  authorizing  the  council  of  the 

ed  to  raise  the  money  thus  appropri-  municipality   to  secure  such   water-power 

ated.     Tl wa     distinguished  from  as  might  be  deemed  needful  for  the  use  of 

those  relating  to  railway  aid  bonds,  and  the  fire  department,  held  to  be  unconsti- 

also  consl  rues  the  provision  of  the  <  kmsti-  tutional,  as  authorizing  a  debt  and  tax  for 

tution  of  the  State  thai    "the  Legislature  a   private  purpose.     Coates  v.  Campbell, 

shall p  '  conferring  rur/iorutc  37  Minn.  498. 

,    sec.    46.     And  more   re-  Further,  as  to  extent  and  nature  of  the 

cently  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New    York  taxing   power,    and    distinction   between 

have  de<  ided  in  the  same  way,  holding  an  public  and  private  use,  aeepost,  sees.  735, 

act  to  authorize  municipal   bonds  to  pay  736  ;  Bloodgood  v.  Railroad  Co.,  18  Wend. 

for  stock  in  a  privati    corporation  to  con-  65  ;  Jenkins  v.  Andover,    103   Mass.   94, 

struct  a  w '/'  r  privilege  and  to  manufacture  holding  invalid  a  statute  authorizing  tax- 

lumber,  to  be  void.     Weismer  v.  Village  ation  in  favor  of  a  private   incorporated 

of  Douglass,  64  N.  Y.  91  (1876).    Textap-  academy.      Same    principle:     Curtis    v. 

proved  in  Feldman  v.  Charlesl 23  S.  C.  Whipple,  24  Wis.  350  ;  People  v.  Salem, 

57,  where  bonds  issued   by  a  city,  under  20  Mich.  452;  Freeland  v.  Hastings,  10 

legislative  authority,   for  the   purpose  of  Allen,  570;    Tyson  v.  School  Directors, 

lending  them  to  individuals  to  assist  them  in  51    Pa,   St.   9;   Thompsons.   Pittson,  59 

rebuilding  the  edifices  destroyed  by  a  great  Me.   545  (1871);    Savings  Assoc,  v.  To- 

were  held  void.     A  statute  authoriz-  peka,   3  Dillon,  376;     note  15,    Am.   & 

lity  to  issue  bonds,  to  be  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  356. 


§  161  EXPRESS   POWER   ESSENTIAL.  235 

practically  valueless,  since  if  they  were  disregarded  or  evaded  and 
the  bonds  issued  and  negotiated,  they  became  valid  and  enforceable 
obligations.  The  result  of  legislative  authority  thus  conferred  and 
thus  construed  is  seen  in  the  vast  municipal  debt  of  the  country, 
largely  created  in  aid  of  railways,  and  in  our  municipalities,  blighted 
and  burdened  with  debt.  This  retrospect  after  the  battle  bus  been 
lost  will  tend  to  confirm  the  dissenting  judges  in  their  opinions, 
although  they  are  compelled  to  acknowledge  the  law  to  be  otherwise 
settled.1 

§  161  (106).  Express  Power  essential.  —  The  courts  concur,  how- 
ever, with  great  unanimity,  in  holding  that  there  is  no  implied 
authority  in  municipal  corporations  to  incur  debts  or  borrow  money 
in  order  to  become  subscribers  to  the  stock  of  railway  companies,  and 
that  such  power  must  be  conferred  by  express  grant.2  To  become 
stockholders  in  private  corporations  is  manifestly  foreign  to  the 
purposes  intended  to  be  subserved  by  the  creation  of  corporate 
municipalities ;  the  practice  of  bestowing  such  an  abnormal  power 
is  of  modern  origin,  and  hence  the  rule  that  the  authority  must  be 
specially  conferred,  and  cannot  be  deduced  by  inference  or  implica- 
tion from  the  ordinary  municipal  grants.3 

1  See  further,  chapter  xiv.  on  Con-  tonic  Railway  Co.,  15  Conn.  475  ;  Marsh 
tracts,  post.  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676  (1870)  ;  Cook 

2  The  power  to  become  a  stockholder  v.  Manufacturing  Co.,  1  Sneed  (Teim.), 
in  a  railroad  company  must  be  expressly  698  (1854)  ;  Gaddis  v.  Richland  Co.,  92 
conferred  upon  a  municipal  or  public  cor-  111.  119  ;  Pitzman  V.  Freeburg,  92  111. 
poration,  Kelley  v.  Milan,  127  U.  S.  139;  111  ;  McCoy  v.  Brant,  53  Cal.  247  ;  Lewis 
Norton  v.  Dyersburg,  127  U.  S.  160  ;  v.  Shreveport,  3  Woods  C.  C.  205  ;  Nichol 
Wells  v.  Supervisors,  102  U.  S.  625;  v.  Nashville,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  252; 
Concord  v.  Robinson,  121  U.  S.  165  ;  Kelly  City  and  County  of  St.  Louis  v.  Alex- 
v.  Town  of  Milan,  21  Fed.  Rep.  842  ;  ander,  23  Mo.  483  (1856)  ;  Jones  v. 
Wetumpka  v.  Wetumpka  Wharf  Co.,  63  Mayor,  &c,  25  Ga.  610  (1858)  ;  Oebricke 
Ala.  611;  Welch  v.  Post,  99  111.  471;  v.  Pittsburg,  U.  S.  C.  C.  (1859)  ;  7  Am. 
Katzenberger  v.  Aberdeen,  16  Fed.  Rep.  Law  Reg.  725  ;  Duanesburg  v.  Jenkins, 
745.  Authority  "to  obtain  money  on  40  Barb.  574;  French  v.  Teschemaker, 
loan  on  the  faith  and  credit  of  a  city  24  Cal.  518  (1864)  ;  People  v.  Mitchell, 
for  the  purpose  of  contributing  to  works  35  N.  Y.  551  (1866)  ;  St.  Joseph  Town- 
of  internal  improvement"  held  to  au-  ship  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644  (1872); 
thorize  the  city  to  guarantee  payment  of  the  English  v.  Chicot  County,  26  Ark.  454 
bonds  of  a  railroad  company.  Savannah  (1871)  ;  Thompsons.  Lee  County,  3  Wall. 
v.  Kelly,  108  U.  S.  184.  See  post,  sec.  327  ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Iola,  2  Dillon 
507  et  sea.  C.  C.  R.  353  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  20  Wall.  655. 

8  Aurora  v.    West,    22   Ind.    88,    508  "  It  is  well  settled,  that  a  municipal  eor- 

(1864)  ;   Starin  v.   Genoa,  23   N.  Y.  439  poration,  in  order  to  exercise  the  power 

(1S69)  ;  Gould  v.  Sterling,  lb.  439,  456  ;  of  becoming  a   stockholder  in  a  railroad 

Atchison  v.  Butcher,  3  Kan.  104  (1S65)  ;  corporation,  must  have   such    power 

Burnesi).  Atchison,  2  Kan.  454  ;  Bank  v.  prmly  conferred  upon  it  by  a  grant  from 

Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38  ;  Bridgeport  v.  Housa-  the  legislature  ;  and  that  even  the  power 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  1G1 


Accordingly,  where  a  city  was,  by  charter,  specifically  authorized 

instruct  wharves,  docks,  piers,  water-works,  works  for  lighting 

the  city,  &c,  and  was  also  authorized   upon  certain  conditions  to 

create  a  debt,  tins  was  considered  to  mean  a  debt  for  some  of  these 

[fied  purposes,  and  not  to  empower  the  corporate  authorities  to 

issue  bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad.1     So  there  is  no 


/.  /•  mch  stock  does  not  carry 
with  ii  lie  pom  rtoisi 
in  payment  for   the  subscription,    unless 
the  power  t'>  issue  such  bonds  is  expressly 
or  by  reasonable  implication  conferred  by 
vford,i.,  in  Krllrv  v.  Milan, 
1-27  l'.  S.  lo'.',  citing  Pulaski  v.  Gilmore, 
21   Fed.    Rep.   870;    Milan   v.    Tennessee 
Central   R.    II.,   11   Lea,   330  ;    Marsh   v. 
Fulton  County,   10  Wall.  676  ;  Wells  v. 
Supervisors,    102   I'.   S.   625;  Ottawa  v. 
,   L08  U.  S.  110  ;  Daviess  County  v. 
ason,  117  U.  S.  657. 
It  i>  also  held  in  this  rase  (Kefley  v. 
Milan,  supra)  that   where  the    power   to 
subscribe  tor  railroad  stock  and  to  issue 
bonds  therefor  is  wanting,  an  agreement 
made  by  tin-  mayor  of  the  municipality, 
by  which  a  de<  r<  ilidity 

of  the  bonds  is  entered,  is  ineffectual  for 
that  i>urpose.     More  fully  on  this  point 
see  post,  chap.  xiv.     "No  lawyer  doubts 
that   a  borough  ran  only   subscribe  to  a 
railroad    when    expressly    authorized    by 
law."     Black,   C.  J.,  in  Sharpless'  <  'ase, 
Cited  Pennsylvania  Railway  Co.  v.  Phila- 
delphia,  47  Pa.   St.   189.     A  railroad  is 
such  a    "road"    as    is  embraced   in   the 
terms  of  a  charter  by  which  the  common 
council  of  a  city  Were  authorized  "  to  take 
stock  in  any  chartered  company  for  mak- 
ing mad-  to  said  city."     Railroad  Co.  v. 
naville,   15  Ind.   395  (1860)  ;    Aurora 
v.    West,    9  Ind.   74  :    post,    chap,    xiv., 
Contract  i.     The   legislature   may,    before 
(Aspinwall    t.    Daviess  County,  22    How. 
864),  if  not,  indeed,  after  the  subscription 
is  made,   but    before  it  is  paid  for,  annul 
the  proceeding  and  authorize   tie-   muni- 
cipal corporation   to  withdraw   the  sub- 
iption  and  release  its  righl  to  the  stock. 
Peop]     v.  Coon,  26  CaL  685.     Extent  of 
lative  power.     Ante,  chap.  iv.     Text 
roved.      Jacksonport   v.    Watson,    33 
Ark.  704. 

Authority    to    suhscrihr  for   stock  in   a 
oad  company  held  not  to  carry  with 


it  the  implied  power  to  issue  bonds  there- 
for. Wells  v.  Supervisors,  102  l.  S. 
625;  Claiborne  County  v.  Brooks,  111 
I'.  s.  400;  Norton  v.  Dyersburg,  127 
r.  S.  160  ;  Kelley  v.  Milan,  127  U.  8. 
139  (but  holding  thai  the  power  to  i 
bonds  may  be  conferred  by  a  reasonable 
implication  from  the  power  granted),  ante, 
sees.  12:3,  124,  127  ;  post,  sec.  507  et  seq. 
Nor  does  a  grant  of  power  to  appropriate 
money  to  aid  a  railroad,  with  a  provision 
directing  a  levy  of  taxes  to  meet  the  ap- 
propriation, include  power  to  issue  bonds. 
Concord  v.  Robinson,  121  U.  S.  165  ; 
Wells  r».   Supervisors,  102  U.  S.  625. 

i  Lafayette  v.  Cox,  5  Ind.  (Port.)  38 
(1854).  As  to  rights  of  bondholders,  how- 
ever,  see  post,  ch.  xiv.  on  Contracts,  and 
derisions  in  the  national  and  State  courts, 
there  cited.  Power  in  general  to  the  city 
council  of  Charleston,  by  the  charter  of 
1783,  to  pass,  inter  alia,  "every  other  by- 
law as  shall  appear  to  the  city  council 
requisite  and  necessary  for  the  security, 
welfare,  and  convenience  of  said  city,"  was 
held  by  the  Court  of  Errors  to  authorize 
the  city  to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  rail- 
road companies  within  or  without  the 
State.  Copes  v.  Charleston,  10  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  491  (1857)  ;  see  City  Coun- 
cil v.  Baptist  Church,  4  Strob.  Law, 
306,  308,  for  preamble  to  the  charier  of 
Charleston.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  this  is  pressing  the  constructive  pow- 
ers of  the  corporation  to  an  unwarrantable 
nt. 
Construction  of  special  nets  or  charters 
held  to  give  power  to  take  stock  and  issioe 
bonds,  Meyer  r.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  384 
(1863)  ;  Curtis  v.  Butler  County.  21  How. 
435  ;  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  220  ; 
City  and  County  of  St.  Louisa.  Alexan- 
23  Mo.  483  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Otoe 
County,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  338  (1871)  ;  Rog- 
ers v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654  (compare 
Chamberlain  v.  Burlington,  19  Iowa,  395)  ; 
Fosdiek  v.   Perrysburg,  14  Uhio  St.  472  ; 


§162 


SPECIAL    POWER   AND   TAXING    POWER. 


237 


power  in  a  municipal  corporation  (even  supposing  it  to  be  competent 
for  the  legislature  tu  confer  such  power),  as  incidental  to  the  usual 
grants  of  municipal  authority,  to  take  stuck  in  a  manufacturing  com- 
pany located  in  or  near  the  corporation,1  or  to  aid  or  engage  in  othei 
enterprises,  essentially  private.2 


§  102  (107).  Effect  of  Special  Power  on  existing  Charter  Limita- 
tions of  the  Taxing  Power.  —  Whether  special  authority  to  a  munici- 
pality to  borrow  money  to  pay  for  stock  subscribed  to  a  railway 
Gompany  will  imp! Lull;/  Tipcat, pro  tanto,  existing  charter  limitations 
upon  the  rate  of  taxation,  is  a  question  depending  upon  construction, 
and  in  relation  to  which  the  courts  have  differed.  But  the  strong 
inclination  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  seems  to  be  in 
favor  of  that  construction  which  restricts  such  limitations  to  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation  in  the  ordinary  course  of  municipal 
action.3 


Goshorn  v.  County,  1  West  Va.  308  ; 
Taylor  v.  Newberne,  2  Jones  (N.  G.) 
Eq.  141  ;  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  4  lb.  323  ; 
People  v.  Spencer,  55  N.  Y.  1  (1873)  ; 
Decker  v.  Hughes,  68  111.  33  (1873)  ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Pueblo  Co.,  2  Col.  360  (1875)  ; 
English  v.  Chicot  Co.,  26  Ark.  454  (1871)  ; 
distinguishing  Seybert  v.  Pittsburgh,  1 
"Wall.  272  ;  Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis. 
280  (1865).  The  opinion  of  Dixon,  C.  J., 
contains  an  interesting  discussion  of  the 
(juestions  presented  by  that  case. 

Const ncclion  of  acts  held  not  to  grant 
power  to  subscribe  for  stock  uml  i*sut  /"mils. 
Kelley  v.  .Milan,  127  U.  S.  139  ;  Norton 
v.  Dyersburg,  lb.  160. 

1  Cook  v.  Manufacturing  Co.,  1  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  698  (1854)  ;  Com.  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Iola,  2  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  353  (1873). 

2  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199 
(1865)  ;  Hanson  v.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28  ; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  212.  A  city  corpora- 
tion cannot  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  steam- 
ship line  without  express  legislative  au- 
thority. Pennsylvania  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia,  47  Pa.  St.  189  ;  and  since 
the  new  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania  (art. 
xi.  sec.  7,  Amendment  to  Constitution, 
1857,  supra,  sec.  157,  note),  the  legislature 
cannot  give  that  power.  Where  a  charter 
recited  its  purpose  to  delegate  to  the  city 
authorities  power  to  make  such  ordinances 
as  the  "contingencies,  or  the  local  cir- 
cumstances" of  the  corporation  might  re- 


quire, and  gave  "  full  power  and  authority 
to  make  such  assessments  on  the  inhab- 
itants of  the  city,  or  those  who  hold  tax- 
able property  therein,  for  the  safety,  bene- 
fit, and  advantage  of  the  city,  as  shall 
appear  to  them  expedient,"  the  court 
were  of  opinion  that  the  city  might  assess 
a  tax  upon  the  real  estate  within  the  cor- 
poration for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a 
canal  "  for  manufacturing  ])urposes,  and 
for  the  better  securing  an  abundant  sup- 
ply of  water  for  the  city,"  and  if  it  could 
not,  yet  that  it  was  competent  for  the 
legislature,  as  it  did  by  a  subsequent  act, 
to  adopt  and  confirm  the  action  of  the 
city  in  passing  such  an  ordinance.  Fred- 
erick v.  Augusta,  5  6a.  561  (1848);  Aside 
from  the  curative  act,  the  correctness  of 
the  view  taken  by  the  court  is  by  no 
means  clear.     Ante,  sees.  79,  158,  159. 

8  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575 
(1869).  Contra,  Clark  v.  Davenport,  14 
Iowa,  494  ;  Learned  v.  Burlington,  2 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  8.)  394,  and  Dote  ; 
Leavenworth  v.  Norton,  1  Kan.  432  ; 
Humes  v.  Atchison,  2  Kan.  454.  And 
see  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  34 
Pa.  St.  496  ;  Amey  r.  Allegheny  City.  24 
How.  (U.  S.)  364;  Fosdick  r.  Perry* 
burg,  14  Ohio  St.  472  ;  Cumberland  v. 
Magrader,  34  Md.  381  (1871)  ;  see  Asses- 
sors v.  Commissioners,  3  Brews.  (Pa.) 
333  ;  State  v.  Guttenhurg,  39  N.  .1.  L. 
660.     In   Quincy   v.   Jackson,    113   U.  S. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§103 


§    L63      L08).    Power   to  issue   Bonds  absolutely  essential  ;     Condi- 
tions   precedent   to    its  Exercise    must   be    complied    •with.  —  If    the 

power  to  issue  bonds  in  aid  of  railway  and  other  like  public  enter- 
prises  does  not  exist,  they  are  void  into  whosesoever  hands  they  may 
coine.1  The  power,  when  it  has  been  conferred,  to  aid  or  engage  in 
extra-municipal  enterprises,  being  extraordinary  in  its  nature  and 
burdensome  to  the  citizen,  mvst  (except  as  modified  by  the  doctrine 
stoppel  in  favor  of  the  bona  fide  holders  of  the  securities)  fo 
strictly  pursued  according  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  grant 
conferring  it.  Thus,  under  an  act  authorizing  town  officers  to  bor- 
row money  upon  the  credit  of  the  town,  and  to  pay  it  over  to  a  rail- 
road corporation,  to  be  expended  by  it  "  in  grading  and  constructing 
a  railroad,"  taking  in  exchange  its  stock  at  par,  it  is  not  within  the 
power  of  municipal  officers  to  make  a  direct  exchange  of  the  bonds 
of  the  town,  even  for  an  equal  nominal  amount  of  stock,  as  this 
leaves  it  in  the  power  of  the  railroad  corporation  to  sell  such  bonds 
at  a  discount.2  So  in  a  case  where  a  county  had  by  the  legislative 
acl  no  authority  to  issue  its  bonds  to  the  railroad  company  unless 
upon  the  sanction  of  a  previous  vote  after  thirty  days'  notice  of  the 
tion  Lobe  held  for  that  purpose,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois 


332,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
Si  itea  held  thai  a  power  to  levy  taxes,  to 
pay  debts,  and  for  general  expenses,  not 
ing  fifty  cents  on  each  hundred 
dollars,  n  I  ited  only  to  debts  and  expenses 
for  the  ordinary  purposes  of  the  city,  and 
qoI  to  such  as  were  incurred  under  a  special 
authority,  — as,  a  debt  incurred  by  sub- 
scribing to  the  stock  of  a  railroad  under 
authority  of  a  statute  which  was  con- 
•  i  ned  t.i  confer  authority  to  make  a  li  w, 
for  the  payment  of  the  debt,  in  excess  of 
the  limi1  rtion  above  n  cited.  Tins  ease 
,;  h<  d  from  Dnited  States  v.  Macon 
County,  99  IT.  S.  582  ;  for  a  statement  of 
which  Bee  post,  see.  851. 

1   Marsh    v.     Fulton    County,    supra; 
Allen  r.   Louisiana,   1"::  I'.  S.  80 
Bank  v.  Iola,  2  Dillon,  353   (1873),   af- 
firmed in  Supreme  Court,  20  Wall.  655; 
Sav.    Assoc,    v.   Topeka,    3    Dillon,    376 
(1874);  Weismer  v.  Village  of  Douglass, 
64   N.  V.  91   (1876)  :  Clay  v.  County,    1 
[  Ky. ),    15 1.     S  e    further,  chapter 
xiv.  on  Contracts,  post,  where  the  rights  of 
i  t  such  instruments  are. 
il  length.     Mum, van  ».  < treen, 
57  111.  63  ;  Lynde  v.  Winnebago  County, 


16  Wall.  6  (1873)  ;  James  v.  Milwaukee, 
16  Wall.  159  (1872);  post,  sec.  553; 
Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  566  ; 
Gould  v.  Paris,  68  Tex.  511. 

2  Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439  ; 
Gould  v.  Sterling,  lb.  439,  456.  In  the 
case  last  cited,  Scldcn,  J.,  p.  460,  remarks  : 
"In  the  present  case  the  only  authority 
given  (to  the  town)  by  the  act  is  to  bor- 
row upon  the  bonds  of  the  town.  No 
express  power  to  sell  the  bonds  is  given, 
and  no  such  power,  can,  I  think,  be  im- 
plied. To  borrow  money,  and  give  a  bond 
oi  obligation  for  it,  and  to  sell  a  bond  or 
obligation  for  money,  are  by  no  means 
identical  transactions.  In  the  one  case 
the  money  and  the  bond  would,  of  course, 
be  equal  in  amount  ;  in  the  other  they 
might  or  might  not  be  equal."  Whether 
such  a  defence  would  be  available  against 
a  bona  ficU  holder  of  the  bonds  was  not 
determined.  See  post,  sec.  526.  As  to 
these  eases,  see  chapter  xiv.  on  Contracts) 

post.       See    Woods    V.     bawi'eliee    (  'ollllty,    1 

Black,  386  ;  Moran  v.  Miami  County,  2 
Black,  722.  That  such  a  defence  is  not 
available  against  a  holder  for  value,  see 
post,  sec.  515  et  scq. 


§  164 


bona  fidi:  holder:    i:stoi'Pi:l. 


239 


held,  in  a  direct  'proceeding  against  the  county  to  enjoin  it  from 
ing  its  bonds,  that  although  there  was  an  election  al  which  a  majority 
voted  in  favor  of  the  subscription,  yet  the  failure  to  give  the  thirty 
Jays'  notice  was  a  fatal  defect,  and  the   Issue  of  the  bonds  was 

restrained.1 


§    1  T>4.      Estoppel    in    favor    of    bona    fide    Holder    of    Negotiable 

Bonds.  —  It  may  be  observed  in  conclusion  thai  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  the  municipal  railway  aid  bond  cases  referred 
to  in  a  subsequent  chapter,2  have  held  the  doctrine,  in  favor  of  the  in- 
nocent holders  for  value  of  such  securities,  that  the  municipality  may 
be  estopped  by  recitals  in  the  bonds,  by  the  subsequent  levy  of  taxes  to 
pay  interest  thereon,  and  by  retaining  the  stock  which  was  received 
in  exchange  for  the  bonds  or  purchased  with  their  proceeds,  to  set 
up  in  defence  a  non-compliance  with  preliminary  conditions.3  This 
is  a  doctrine,  however,  which  is  asserted  for  the  protection  of  such 
holders,  and  has  ordinarily  no  place  in  controversies  which  arise 
before  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  between  the  taxpayers  or  municipality 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  company  on  the  other.  In  such  cases  the 
sound  doctrine  is  that  compliance  with  all  substantial  or  material 
conditions  is  essential.4 


1  Harding  v.  Rockford,  &c.  Railroad 
Co.,  65  111.  90  (1873). 

In  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
Thornton,  J.,  remarks  :  "Such  municipal- 
ities were  not  created  with  the  view  to  en- 
gage in  commerce,  or  to  aid  in  the  con- 
struction of  railways,  but  for  govern- 
mental purposes  only.  When  they  exer- 
cise the  functions  given  by  the  statutes 
under  consideration,  the  powers  granted 
must  not  only  be  clearly  conferred,  but 
strictly  pursued.  If  the  mode  prescribed 
for  carrying  into  effect  the  right  to  issue 
bonds  is  not  complied  with  in  all  material 
matters,  then  the  bonds  should  not  bo 
issued,  and  thus  the  taxpayer  will  be  ex- 
empt from  the  imposition  of  illegal  taxes, 
and  a  grievous  burden  upon  his  property. 
These  principles  have  been  so  elaborately 
discussed  and  fully  settled  by  this  court, 
that  we  need  only  refer  to  some  of  the 
cases.  The  People  v.  Tazwell  County,  'I'l 
111.  147  ;  Fulton  County  v.  The  Missis- 
sippi ,v.  Wahash  Railroad  Co.,  21  111.  338  ; 
Middleport  v.  iEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  82  111. 
562  ;  People  v.  Logan  Co.,  63  111.  384  ; 
Williams  v.  Roberts,  88  111.  11  ;  People  v. 
Oldtown,  88    111.    2UU;   Clarke  v.  Board, 


&c,  27  111.  307  ;  Force  v.  Batavia,  61  111. 
99  ;  Harding  v.  R.  P.  I.  k  St.  L.  R.  K. 
Co.,  65  111.  90  ;  Lippiucott  v.  Pana,  92  111. 

24  ;  Gaddis  v.  Richland  Co.,  92  III.  119  ; 
Supervisors  of  Schuyler  Co.  v.  The  People, 

25  111.  181  ;  Supervisors  of  Hancock 
County  v.  Clark,  27  111.  305  :  Marshall 
County  v.  Cook,  38  111.  44  ;  Wiley  v.  The 
Town  of  Brimfield,  59  111.  306  ;  Peoples 
Cass  Co.,  77  111.  438  (1875)." 

If  aid  has  been  conditionally  voted,  the 
condition  must  be  complied  with  before 
the  company  can  demand  the  aid.  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Hartford,  58  Me.  23;  Cow- 
drey  v.  Town  of  Canadea,  16  Fed.  Rep. 
532  ;  Rich  v.  Town  of  Mentz,  19  F 
Rep.  725. 

2  Post,    chap.    xiv.  on    Contracts,  sec. 
511  et  scq. 

8  Post,  sec.  519  et  scq. 

4  Jackson   Co.    v.    Brush,    77    111.    59 
(1875). 

The    Supreme    Court  of    Connecticut, 

under   peculiar    circumstances,     held  tho 

town    voting    aid   to    a    railroad  company 

I  to  show,  as  against  the  r 

!  '  (equitable  rights  of  material-men 

and  contractors  having  intervened),   that 


■V-     f 


240 


HTJNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§164 


the  vote  at  the  town  meeting  had  nol 

d  by  ballot  as  required  by  the  act  of  the 
Lature,  but  by  a  division  of  the  hi 
out    ballot.      New   Haven,   &e.    Rail- 
.  Chatham,  12  Conn.  165  (1875). 
This  case  pronounced  exceptional,  Bloom- 
field  r.  i  harter  Oak  Hank,  121  U.  S.  121, 
citing  the  foregoing.     See  also  Doug] 
Chatham,  il   Conn.  211.     In  submitting 
the  vote  whether  a  township 

will  take  stock  in  a  railroad  company,  the 
township  has  the  right  to  impose  such 
: it ii his  in  regard  then-;"  as  it  deems 
proper  ;  and  such  conditions  when  im- 
I  are  binding,  and  the  company  will 
have  no  right  to  the  subscription,  or  to 
compel  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  until  the 
conditions  are  fully  performed  on  its  part, 
if  tli''  authorities  have  a  discretion.  Peo- 
pli  v.  Bolden,  91  111.  446.  [fthe  county 
authorities  have  a  discretion  to  subscribe 
•  Hi  a  vote  without  conditions,  the  annex- 
ing of  conditions  will  not  deprive  them 
of  its  exercise.  People,  ex  rcl.,  &c.  v. 
County  Board  of  Cass  County,  77  111.  438 
(187! 

Except  in  controversies  with  bonafide 
bondholders  for  value,  the  Slate  courts 
have  generally  and  properly,  held,  that 
the  power  of  a  municipality  to  issue  rail- 
I  aid  bonds  is  dependent  upon  a  strict 
pliance  with  the  statute  authorizing 
the  issue  of  such  bonds;  and  that  when 
the  power  is  conditional  on  a  prior  vote  of 
the  electors  the  statutory  notice  must  be 
given.  People  v.  Jackson  County,  92  III. 
Hi  :  Harding  v.  R.  R.  1.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  65  Hi.  90  (18/2);  People  u.  Waynes- 
ville,  88  111.  469,  in  which  it  is  held  thai 
one  submission  exhausts  the  power,  and  a 


subsequent  one  is  ultra  vires:  quaere.  A 
subscription  cannot  be  made  to  a  div\ 
ol  a  road.  McWhorter  v.  People,  65  111. 
290  (1872).  Power  to  issue  upon  complv 
ance  with  conditions  cannot  be  delegated. 
Jackson  County  v.  Brush,  77  111.  59 
(1875);  People  o.  Waynesville,  supra; 
People  v.  Harper  (vote  need  not  fix  time 
for  bonds  to  run),  67  111.  62  (1873).  Can- 
iki  a  contract  with  railroad  company 
for  subscription  be/ore  election.  People  v. 
<a>s  County,  77  111.  438  (1875).  Submit- 
ting two  propositions  at  same  election.  Mar- 
shall v.  Silliman,  61  111.  '218  (1871)  ;  see 
also  Garrigus  v.  Park  County,  39  Ind.  66 
(1872);  State  v.  Roggen,  22  Neb.  118. 
( Conditions,  effect  of  non-observance.  Alley 
v.  Adam  County,  7*5  111.  101  (1875).  Vo- 
ting  on  unauthorized  proposition.  Cairo, 
&c.  Co.  17.  Sparta,  77  111.  505  (1875). 
Election  must  be  held  according  to  the  law 
governing  it.  The  People,  &c.  v.  Super- 
visor, &c.,  67  111.  57  (1873).  See  also  the 
following  eases  :  Wright  v.  Bishop,  88  111. 
302  ;  Edwards  v.  People,  88  111.  340  ;  Wil- 
liams v.  Roberts,  88  111.  11  ;  People  v. 
Clayton,  88  111.  45;  People  v.  Oldtowu, 
88  111.  202  ;  Yarisli  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Iowa, 
556.  What  is  a  majority  vote.  McDowell 
v.  Const.  Co.,  96  N.  C.  514  ;  State  v. 
Bechell,  22  Neb.  158  ;  ante,  sec.  44,  note 
and  eases. 

The  reader  is  referred  to  chap.  xiv.  on 
Contracts,  post,  where  the  subject  of  Mu- 
nicipal Bonds  is  considered  at  large,  with 
special  reference  to  the  decisions  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  which, 
generally  speaking,  are  more  favorable  on 
certain  points  to  the  bona  fid  holders  of 
such  bonds  than  those  of  the  State  courts. 


§  165 


DISSOLUTION. 


241 


CHAPTER   VII. 

DISSOLUTION  OF   MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  AND   RErEAL  OF   CHARTERS. 

Li  England. 

§165  (109).  How  dissolved.  —  Iii  England,  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration may  be  dissolved,  — 

1.  By  an  act  of  parliament,  this  power  being  a  necessary  con- 
sequence of  the  omnipotence  of  that  body  in  all  matters  of  political 
institution.1  The  Icing  may,  by  his  prerogative,  create,  but  can  ant 
dissolve  or  destroy  a  corporation ;  may  grant  privileges,  but  when 
vested,  cannot  take  them  away.2 

It  has  there  often  been  declared  that  a  municipal  corporation  may 
also  be  dissolved,  — 

2.  By  the  loss  of  an  integral  part,  or  the  loss  of  all  or  of  the 
majority  of  the  members  of  any  integral  part,  without  which  it 
cannot  transact  its  business,  unless  the  parts  that  remain  have  the 
right  to  act  or  to  restore  the  corporate  succession.3 


1  Co.  Litt.  176,  note  ;  2  Kyd,  417  ; 
Rex  v.  Amery,  2  Term  R.  515  ;  Glover, 
408  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  chap,  xxii.  sec.  767  ; 
2  Kent  Corn.  305  ;  County  Comm'rs  v. 
Cox,  6  Ind.  403  ;  State  v.  Trustees,  &c, 
5  Ind.  77  ;  ante,  sec.  32,  as  to  distinction 
between  Royal  and  Parliamentary  Corpo- 
rations. 

2  Ante,  sees.  32,  35  ;  Rex  v.  Amery, 
supra  ;  Regents  of  University  v.  Williams, 
9  Gill  &  Johns.  365,  409  (183S).  In  this 
case,  Buchanan,  J.,  in  substance,  observes  : 
The  crown  may  create,  but  cannot,  at 
pleasure,  dissolve  a  corporation,  or,  with- 
out its  consent,  alter  or  amend  its  charter. 
Parliament  may  do  this;  but,  restrained 
by  public  opinion,  it  has  not  undertaken 
to  dissolve  any  private  corporation  since 
the  time  of  Henry  VIII.,  so  that  the  power 
to  do  so  rests  wholly  in  theory.  In  1783 
a  bill  was  proposed  to  remodel  the  East 
India  Company.  Lord  Thurlow  opposed 
it  as  subversive  of  the  law  and  constitu- 
tion,   and,   in    strong,    nervous    language, 

VOL.  I.  —  16 


declared  it  to  be  "an  atrocious  violation 
of  private  property,  which  cut  every  Eng- 
lishman to  the  bone." 

3  Willc.  on  Corp.  325,  chap.  vii.  This 
chapter  contains  an  interesting  discussion 
of  the  question  of  dissolution,  and  it  would 
seem  that  the  author,  notwithstanding  the 
occasional  judgments  and  the  man}-  and 
broad  dicta  in  the  books,  doubts  whether 
in  be  an  actual  and  total  dissolution 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  either  by  the 
loss  of  an  integral  part,  or  by  surrender,  or 
by  forfeiture.  But  see  2  Kyd,  chap.  v.  ; 
Glover,  chap.  xx.  ;  Angell  &  Am 
769;  and  particularly  Rex  v,  Morris  and 
Hex  v.  Stewart,  3  East,  213;  4  East.  17. 
Integral  parts  defined.  Ante,  sec.  35.  In 
Rex  v.  Passmore,  3  Term  R.  241,  where 
the  subject  wi-  much  considered,  I.  >rd 
Kenyan  observed,  "  When  an 
of  a  corporat  .  without  wh 

istence  the  functions  of  the  corporation 
cannot  be  exercised,  and  the  corporation 
has  no  manner  of  supplying  the  a 


242 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOBATIONS. 


§105 


3     By  a  surrender  of  the  franchise  of  being  a  corporation  to  the 

:,  whose  acceptance  is  necessary;  and  to  be  effectual  the  sur- 

•r  must  be  enrolled  in  chancery.     The  power  to  surrender  has 

,  much  questioned  ;  the  argument  in  favor  of  it  being,  that  since 

iyal  grant  and  acceptance  a  corporation  may  be  created,  so  by 

ender  and  acceptance  it  may  be  annulled.     It  is  admitted,  how- 

that  a  corporal  ion  created  or  confirmed  by  parliament  or  statute 

cannot  dissolve  itself  by  a  surrender  of  it-  charter  or  franchise.1 

;.  By  forfeitun  of  its  charter,  through  negligence  or  abuse  of  its 
franchise,  judicially  ascertained  by  proceedings  in  quo  warranto  or 
scirefacias.  This  mode  of  dissolution  proceeds  upon  the  doctrine, 
well  settled  as  to  privati  corporations,  both  in  England  and  in  this 
country,  and  perhaps  settled  in  that  country,  also,  as  respects  the 
old  municipal  corporations  when  created  by  royal  charter,  that  there 
l-  a  tacit  or  implied  condition  annexed  to  the  grant  of  every  act  or 
charter  of  incorporation  that  the  grantees  shall  not  neglect  to  use 
and  shall  not  misapply  the  powers  granted,  and  that  if  they  do,  the 
condition  is  broken  upon  which  the  corporation  was  created,  and  the 
corporation  thereupon  ceases  to  exist.  And  in  the  cases  in  the  time 
of  Charles  II.  it  was  held  that  the  corporation  might  forfeit  its 
franchise  by  reason  of  the  neglect  or  misconduct  of  ■its,  officers?' 


part,   the   corporation   is  dissolved  as  to 

I'.ut  the  king  may  ren- 

ither  with  the  old  or  new  corpor- 

The  leading  authorities  respecting  the 

effeel  of  tli.-  loss  of  <m  vri  are,  1 

]■:  .1.  Abr.  51  t  ;  Regina  v.  Bewdley,  1  P. 

Wins.    207  ;    Banbury's   Case,    1"    M    l. 

346;   Rex   v.  Tregony,   8  Mod.  129;  Col- 

-  ibi  i.  3   Burr.  1870  ;  s.  C.    1 

Win.  Bl.  r>'.'l,  which,  however,  is  said  not 

t>.  !.!•  :i   case  of  tin-  I'--  of  an   integral 

part,    but    ol  tes.      Grant  ( lorp. 

ite  ;   Rex  <•.   Passmore,  3  Term   II. 

•j il.     The  foregoiii  ire  succinctly 

stated  by  Mr.  Kyi,  2  Corp.  chap.  v.    See, 

I  Brooke, 

.    383,  and   Mr.  Justit  e 

In  It's  \e  ii  ned  opinion  in  Bacon  *•    I 

son,  18  Bow.   (U.  S.)  4  ;  infra, 

sec.    169,   note  ;  People  v.  Wren,    I 

(.'i  111.)  275,  citing  and  relying  on  Colches- 

:  Smith's  Case,  1  Mod. 

ith,    -   Di  sans.  (S.  C.) 

557;    Welch  v.  Ste.   Genevieve,  t   Dillon 

C   C.  ]  3  i  :  i  ha]  ter    on  '  !orporate  ( Ifficers 

and  » tap  igs,  post. 


1  Rex  v.  Osbourne,  4  East,  326  ;  Rex 
i>.  Miller,  6  Term  R.  277  ;  Willc.  332,  pi. 
861  ;  Howard's  Case.  Ilutt.  87  ;  Grant  on 
Corp.  306,  308;  Thicknesses.  Canal  Co., 
4  M.  &  W.  472. 

2  Black.  Com.  485  ;  2  Kyd,  447  ; 
Willc.  chap.  vii.  325  ct  seq.;  Taylors  of 
Ipswich,  1  Rol.  5  ;  Rex  v.  Grosvenor,  7 
Mod.  199  ;  Smith's  Case,  4  Mod.  55,  58  ; 
s.  c.  12  Mod.  17;  Skin.  311;  1  Show. 
278  :  Rex  v.  Saunders,  3  Hast,  11  it  ;  Mayor, 
&c.  of  Lyme  v.  Henley,  2  CI.  &  F.  331  ; 
I;  i  r.  Kent,  L3  East,  220  ;  Priestly  v. 
Fonlds,  2  Scotl  N.  R.  205,  225  ;  Attorney- 
General  v.  Shrewsbury,  C>  Beav.  220.  See 
reference  arguendo  to  subjed  of  forfeiture 
of  municipal  charter,  in  Whalen  c.  Macomb, 
76  ill.  49  (1875).     The  earlier  American 

relating  to  the  dissolution  ofpri\ 
rations  by  forfeiture  of  their  charters  ; 
what  will  constitute  sufficient  ground  of 
forfeiture  ;  ami  the  mode  of  proceeding 
to  ascertain  and  enforce  the  forfeiture,  are 
collected,  and  the  result  very  clearly  and 
i  ictorily  stated,  iii  Angell  &  Ames  on 
Corporations,  chap.  xxii.  See,  also,  2 
Kent  Coin.  305. 


§166 


HOW    DISSOLVED. 


243 


In  the  United  States. 

§  106(110).  How  dissolved.  —  These  virions  modes  <>f  dissolu- 
tion, except  the  first,  are  believed  by  the  author  to  be  inapplicable 
to  municipal  corporations  in  this  country  as  they  are  generally 
created  and  constituted.  Here  it  is  the  people  of  the  locality  who 
are  erected  into  a  corporation,  not  for  private,  but  for  public  or  re- 
public purposes.  The  corporation  is  mainly  and  primarily  if  not 
wholly  an  instrument  of  government.  The  officers  do  not  consti- 
tute the  corporation,  or  an  integral  part  of  it.  The  existence  of  the 
corporation  does  not  depend  upon  the  existence  of  officers.  The 
qualified  voters  or  electors  have,  indeed,  the  right  to  select  officers, 
but  such  officers  are  the  mere  agents  or  servants  of  the  corporation, 
and  hence  the  doctrine  of  a  dissolution  by  the  loss  of  an  integral 
part  has,  in  such  cases,  no  place.  If  all  the  people  of  the  defined 
locality  should  wholly  remove  from  or  desert  it,  the  corporation 
would,  from  necessity,  be  suspended  or  dormant,  or  perhaps  entirely 
cease ;  but  the  mere  neglect  or  mere  failure  to  elect  officers  will  not 
dissolve  the  corporation,  certainly  not  while  the  right  or  capacity  to 


Private  corporations  may  lose  their  legal 
•  ,  1.  By  the  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture ;  2.  By  tin-  death  of  all  their  mem- 
bers ;  3.  By  a  forfeiture  of  their  franchises, 
and  4.  By  a  surrender  of  their  charter.  No 
other  mode  of  dissolution  is  anywhere  al- 
luded t<>.  Boston  Glass  Manuf.  v.  Lang- 
don,  24  Tick.  49,  52,  per  Mori  m,  J.;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  5  Mass.  230, 
23-2  :  Riddle  v.  Locks  and  Canals,  7  Mass. 
169;  School  v.  Canal,  &c.  Co.,  9  Ohio, 
203  ;  Canal  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Gill  & 
Johns.  1  ;  Vinceunes  University  v.  Indi- 
ana, 14  How.  263.  Legislative  power 
under  the  head  of  various  constitutional 
us  concerning  the  division,  annex- 
ation and  consolidation,  modification  of 
charter,  dissolution,  and  nature  of  corpo- 
rate property  as  affecting  the  rights  of 
creditors  and  others.  See  21  American 
Law  Review,  14.  The  dissolution  of  a 
privati  corporation  by  authorized  legisla- 
tive acl  or  judicial  sentence,  does  not  im- 
pair the  obligation  of  a  contract  any  more 
than  the  deatb  of  n  private  person  impairs 
the  obligation  of  ins  contract.  This  doc- 
trine was  based  by  the  court  (8  Pet. 
231,  cited,  infra),  upon  two  grounds  : 
First,    the     obligation    survives,    and    the 


creditors  may  enforce  their  claims  against 
any  property  belonging  to  the  corporation 
which  has  not  passed  into  the  hands  of 
bona  fide  purchasers  ;  second,  every  credi- 
tor is  presumed  to  contract  with  reference 
to  a  possibility  of  the  dissolution  of  a  cor- 
porate body.  Mamma  v.  Potomac  Co. 
(holding  that  on  sci.  fa.  a  judgment  could 
not  be  revived,  or  costs  adjudged,  against 
a  corporation  legislatively  annulled),  E  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  281  (1834).  Of  dissolution  by  act 
qfthi  legislature  and  it-  elicit  on  the  cor- 
poration, its  property  and  creditors,  see 
the  recent  case  decided  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals  of  New  York,  in  refereno 
surface  railway  on  Broadway  in  New  York 
city.  People'  i>.  O'Brien,  111  X.  Y.  1 
(1SS8).     Ante,  chap,  iv.,  sec.  68a  et  seq. 

Mr.    Grant,    in   his  work    on   Corpora- 
tions,   considers    it    doubtful    whether    an 

r     Uion  in  the  nature  of  7//.-  ,  ■ 
will  lie,   in    England,   against   pari 
tary  or  statute  corporations,  lor  usurping 
powers  not  given,  or  misusing  thos 
ferred  (Corp.  Re  1    •  N  cholson, 

1  Str.  299)  :  but   in  this  country.  I 
as  to  private  corporations  i-;  indis] 

□  information 
of  this  kind  may  be  brought. 


244 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§107 


diet  remains.1  In  this  respect  municipal  corporations  resemble 
ordinary  private  corporations,  which  exist  per  se,  and  consist  of 
the  stockholders  who  compose  the  company.  The  officers  are  theii 
ir  servants,  but  do  not  constitute  an  integral  pari  of  their  cor- 
•  n ui,  the  failure  to  elect  whom  may  suspend  the  functions,  but 
will  not  dissolve  the  corporation*2 

§  167  (HI)-  Surrender  of  Charter.  —  Since  all  of  our  charters 
of  incorporation  come  from  the  Legislature,8  a  municipal  corporation 
cannot  dissolve  itself  by  a  surrender  of  its  franchise.  The  State 
creates  such  corporations  for  public  ends,  and  they  will  and  must 
continue  until  the  legislature  annuls  or  destroys  them,  or  authorizes 
it  to  be  done.  If  there  could  be  such  a  thing  as  a  surrender,  it 
would,  from  necessity,  have  to  be  made  to  the  legislature,  and  its 
acceptance  would  have  to  be  manifested  by  appropriate  legislative 
action.4 


1  Willc.  chap.  vii.  and  ohservations  at 
pp.  325,  326,  327,  pi.  852  ;  Colchester  v. 
Seaber,  3  Burr.(lSt;<;);  Colchester  r.  Brooke, 
7  Queen's  15.  y.s;J  ;  Rex  v.  Passmore,  3 
T(  on  R.  '241  ;  Gram  on  Corp.  308  ;  Ba- 
con v.  Robertson,  18  How.  480;  Lowber 
r.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  5  Abb.  Pr. 
325  ;  Clarke  o.  Rochester,  5  Abb.  Pr.  107  ; 
Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
130  (1S71).  That  the  failure  to  <  l  ct  offi- 
errs  a  .  '.'■  hilc  the  capacity  to 

eleel  remains,  Bee,  also,  Philips  v.  Wick- 
I    Paige  ('h.   fi'.Mt  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Cullen,  1  Karris  (Pa.),  133;  Presidents. 
Thompson,  20  111.  L97  ;    Ro  le  v   Turn]  ike 
Co.,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  16  ;  People  v.  Wren,  1 
Scam.  (5  111.)  27.".;  Brown  v.    Insurance 
Co.,  3  La.  An.  177  ;  Welch  v.  Ste.  Gene 
vieve,  supra  ;  Green  Township,  9  Watts  & 
S.  (Pa.)  22;  Vincennes  University  v.  In- 
diana,  11   How.  268;  Muscatine  Tnrnve- 
rein  v  Funck,  is  [owa,  469 ;  Schriber  v. 
.   66  Wis.  616.     In  Lea  v.  Her- 
lez,  10  Tex.  137  (1853),  it  appeared 
thai  a  place  was  incorporated  as  a  town 
prior  to  1 S  is,  thai  in  the  year  jusl  named 
the  legUlatui  ■  passed  an  ad  to  incorporate 
the  town,  and  thai   no  eled  ion  foi  i  ffieers 
nor  any  organization  was  had  thereunder 
for  three  years  and  dov  n  to  the  commence- 
of  the  action,  nor  were  i  here  any  offi- 
cio acting.      The  court  held  that 
the  failure  to  elect  officers  operated  to  dis- 


solve the  corporation,  there  being  no  ex- 
press provision  of  the  charter  to  the  con- 
trary. But  Tin  authorities  are  cited  and  no 
reasons  given,  and  the  conclusion  that  an 
actual  dissolution  of  the  corporation  re- 
sulted from  a  failure  to  elect,  is  believed  to 
be  unsound. 

The  existence  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  not  considered  to  be  interrupted  in 
consequence  of  a  change  in  the  council. 
Elmendorf  v.  Ewen,  2  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  85  ; 
Elmendorf  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  25 
Wend.  693.  Further,  see  chapters  relating 
to  Corporate  Officers  and  Corporate  Meet- 
ings, y 

2  Angell  &  Anus  on  Corp.  sec.  771,  and 
cases  there  cited  ;  People  v.  Fairbury,  51 
111.  149  (1869). 

8  Ante,  sees.  37,  43,  54. 

4  "Tic  creation  of  a  corporate  fran- 
chise is  an  attribute  of  sovereignty  to  be 
exercised  solely  by  the  supreme  power  of 
the  State.  Such  franchise  being  amenable 
only  to  the  power  of  its  creation,  it  follows 
thai  this  power  alone  can  question  the  le- 
gality of  its  existence,  by  such  proceedings 
as  in  its  wisdom  it  may  adopt."  Bonner, 
J.  Brennan  v.  Bradshaw,  53  Tex.  330. 
Municipal  corporations  incorporated  under 
a  general  act,  containing  provisions  for 
their  dissolution,  can  be  disincorporated  in 
the  method  prescribed  in  the  act.  Ham- 
bleton   v.   Town  of  Dexter,    89   Mo.   188 


§  168  FORFEITURE   OF   CORPORATE    EXISTENCE.  245 

§  1G8  (112).    Forfeiture  of  Corporate  Existence.  — The  doctrine  of 

a  forfeiture  of  the  right  to  be  a  corporation  has  also,  it  is  believed  by 
the  author,  no  just  or  proper  application  to  our  municipal  corpora- 
tions.1 If  they  neglect  to  use  powers  in  which  the  public  or  indi- 
viduals have  an  interest,  and  the  exercise  of  such  powers  be  not 
discretionary,  the  courts  will  interfere  and  compel  them  to  do  their 
duty.2  Ou  the  other  hand,  acts  done  beyond  the  powers  granted 
are  void.3  If  private  rights  are  threatened  or  invaded,  the  courts 
will,  as  hereafter  shown,  restrain  or  redress  the  injury.4  With  what 
surprise  would  we  hear  of  a  proceeding  to  forfeit  the  charter  of  the 
city  of  New  York  or  Chicago  because  of  the  misconduct  of  its  offi- 
cers, or  because  the  common  council,  as  in  the  famous  case  against 
the  city  of  London,  were  assuming  to  exercise  unauthorized  powers 
by  ordaining  an  oppressive  by-law.  In  short,  unless  otherwise  spe- 
cially provided  by  the  legislature,  the  nature  and  constitution  of  our 
municipal  corporations,  as  well  as  the  purposes  they  are  created  to 
subserve,  are  such  that  they  can,  in  the  author's  judgment,  only  be 
dissolved  by  the  legislature,  or  pursuant  to  legislative  enactment.5 
They  may  become  inert  or  dormant,  or  their  functions  may  be 
suspended,  for  want  of  officers  or  of  inhabitants  ;  but  dissolved,  when 
created  by  an  act  of  the  legislature,  and  once  in  existence,  they  can- 
not be,  by  reason  of  any  default  or  abuse  of  the  powers  conferred, 
either  on  the  part  of  the  officers  or  inhabitants  of  the  incorporated 
place.  As  they  can  exist  only  by  legislative  sanction,  so  they 
cannot  be  dissolved  or  cease  to  exist  except  by  legislative  consent  or 
pursuant  to  legislative  provision. 


It  is  also  held,   in   accordance   with   the  "  It  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  a  mu- 

text,    that  franchises  granted  to  niunici-  nicipal  corporation   can,   by  a  mere  dis- 

pal  corporations  cannot  be  surrendered  by  claimer,  surrender  a  franchise   in    which 

them.      A  city  owning  the  franchise   of  not  only  the  corporation,  but  a  large  por- 

collecting  toll  on  freight  passing  through  lion   of    the    State's   population   residing 

tlic    channel  of  a  river,  contracted   with  within  the  city's  limits,  as  well  as  of  the 

a    firm    that,     in    consideration    of    city  commercial  world,  are  interested."    Morris 

bonds  delivered,  the  firm  should  construct  v.  State,  65  Tex.  53. 

and    maintain   the  channel,  collect  tolls,  1  See  Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Inl- 
and, with  the  proceeds,  pay  off  the  bonds.  Ion  C.  C.  130  (1871),  arguendo. 
In  answer  to  an  information  in  the  na-  2  Ante,  chap.  v.  sec.  98  ;  post,  chapter 
ture  of  quo  warranto  requiring   the   city  on  Mandamus. 
and  the  firm  to  show  cause  why  they  as-  8  Ante,  sec.  89,  and  notes. 
sunuil  authority  to  collect  tolls,  the  city  *  See  chapter  xxii.  on  Remedies  to  pre- 
disclaimed  all  right  to  collect  them,  and  vent,  correct,  and  redress  Illegal  Corporate 
asked  that  the  proceeding  be  dismissed  as  Acts,  post,  sees.  906-934. 
to  it.    Held,  that  the  city  could  not  be  di-  5  Meriwether    v.   Garrett,    102    0".   S. 
vested  of  so   valuable  a  right  without  a  472  (1880)  ;  Mobile  v.  Watson,  116  U.  S. 
hearing  in  court,  and  was  a  necessary  party  289(1885).   More  fully  see,  ante,  chap.  iv. 
to  the  proceeding.      Willie,  C.  J.,   said  :  sees.  57-69,  and  post,  sees.  169  a,  170. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  169 

§  1  69  (113).  Effect  of  Dissolution  at  Common  Law.  —  At  common 
law,  a  corporation,  of  whatever  kind,  which  was  wholly  dissolved, 
considered  to  be  civilly  dead;  and  th-e  effect  was  tJiai  their  lands 
r<  verted  to  the  grantor  or  his  heirs,  and  the  debts  of  the  corporation, 
whether  owing  to  or  by  it,  were  extinguished.  Leases  made  by  the 
corporation  would  cease  because  of  the  reversion  of  the  lands  to  the 
original  owners;  and,  for  the  same  reason,  lands  given  to  or  held  by 
the  corporation  for  charitable  purposes  would  be  lost.1  These  in- 
conveniences and  results  are  so  disastrous  that  the  English  courts, 
as  the  more  recent  cases  before  cited  will  show,  have  doubted  and 
limited,  although  they  may  not  have  overthrown,  the  doctrine  that 
municipal  corporations  may  be  totally  dissolved.  These  consequen- 
ces of  a  dissolution  of  a  corporation  attached  to  all  corporations, 
eleemosynary,  municipal,  and  private ;  and  since  this  doctrine  has, 
in  this  country,  been  generally  rejected  as  to  private  corporations 
organized  for  pecuniary  profit,  and  rests  upon  no  foundation  ill 
reason  or  justice,  it  may  perhaps  safely  be  affirmed  that  it  would  not, 
on  full  consideration,  be  applied  to  the  dissolution  of  a  municipal 
corporation  by  an  absolute  and  unconditional  repeal  of  its  charter, 
or  to  the  case  where  the  charter  of  such  a  corporation  is  forfeited,  if 
that  may  be  done,  by  judicial  sentence.  Therefore,  the  leases  of 
a  corporation  would  not  be  disturbed  by  its  dissolution,  nor  would 
its  lands  held  in  fee  revert,  nor  would  those  held  in  trust  for 
charitable  purposes  be  lost,  since  equity  would  supply  trustees.2 

1  Co.  Litt.  13  ;  1  Lev.  237  ;  Knight  V.  of  New  York,   18S8.     People  v.  O'Brien, 

W,-lls,  1  Lut.  519  ;  Rex  v.  Sanders,  3  East,  111  N.  Y.  1.     Ante,  see.  68  a. 

11'.'  ;  Attorney-General  r.  Gower,  9  Mod.  The  general  subject  of  the  effect  of  a 

226  :  1  Rol.  Abr.  816  ;  Colchester  v.  Sea-  dissolution  of  a  private  corporation  is  ex- 

ber,  3  Burr.  (1866);  Willc.  330,  pi.  858;  2  tensively  discussed  by  Mr.  Justice  Camp- 

Kyd,   516;  Rex  '•.    Passmore,  3  Term  R.  bell,  in  Bacon  v.  Robertson,  supra.     The 

247  ;    Grant,    Corp.    305  ;    Colchester    v.  case  was  a  bill  in  chancery  by  the  stock- 

Brooke,  7  Queen's  B.  383  ;  Commonwealth  holders  of  a  bank,  whose  charter  had  been 

v.  Roxbury,  9  Gray,  510,  note.  judicially  forfeited,    tor  a  distribution  of 

-  ./-///•,  sees.  64,  80  ;  chapters  on  Cm--  the  .surplus  after  the  payment  of  the  debts, 

porate  Boundaries  and  Property,  post.  Ba-  and  the  relief  was  granted.     The  Supreme 

con  v.    Robertson,  18  How.   (U.  S.)  480  Court  of  the  United  states  seemed  to  be 

(1^5.".>:  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1  of  opinion  that,  upon  the  general  princi- 

-):  Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet.  pies  of  equity  jurisprudence,  and  urithoui 

281  (1834);  Curran  v.  Arkansas,  15  How.  statutory  aid,  the  surplus  of  the  assets  of  a 

(TJ.  S.)  312;   2  Kent,  307,  note;    Angel]  corporation  for  pecuniary  profit,  after  the 

&  Ames,  Corp.  779".-  Coulter  r.  Robert-  payment  of  debts  and  expenses,  belonged 

son,  21    Miss.   27s;    County   Comm'rs  v.  to  the  shareholders;  that  the  creditor  of 

Cox,  6  1  nd.    103  j   State  v.  Trustees,  &c.  such  a  corporation,  dissolved  or  declared 

5  Ind.  77  ;   Vincennes  University  v.  [ndi-  forfi  ited  by  judgment  upon  quo  warranto 

ll    How.    268;  Owen  v.  Smith,    31  or  judicial  sentence,  has,  without  a  statute 

I',    b.  641  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury,  9  to  thai  effect,  a  claim  in  equity  upon  the 

Gray,  510,  note.    See  also  Broadway  Rail-  corporate  property  for  the  satisfaction  of 

ifij  Case,  deeided  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  his  debt ;  that  lands  conveyed  to  the  cor- 


169  a 


EFFECT   OF    DISSOLUTION    IN    THIS    COUNTRY. 


247 


§  1G9  a.    Effect  of  Dissolution  in  this  Country.  —  The   COrrectnes  - 

of  the  prediction  which  the  author  ventured  in  the  last  section  to 

make,  that  the  common-law  consequences  of  the  dissolution  of  a  co, 
ration  would  not  be  applied  in  this  country  to  the  dissolution  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  has  since  been  adjudged  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  and  by  other  tribunals.  The  Legi  lature 
absolutely  repealed  the  charter  of  an  indebted  city,  abolished  all  of 
the  municipal  offices  therein,  and  established  in  the  place  of  the  late 
city  government,  a  new  local  organization  with  the  means  of  self- 
government.  The  acts  which  abolished  the  old  and  established  the 
new  organization  made  no  provision  for  the  payment  of  debts  oi  the 
annihilated  city  corporation,  and,  in  fact,  provided  that  the  succes- 
sor organization  should  not  be  liable  therefor,  and  that  any  taxes 
raised  within  the  new  organization  should  not  be  applied  for  the 
payment  of  the  debts  of  the  late  corporation. 


poration  in  fee  and  for  a  full  price  do  not 
revert,  and  that  the  stockholder,  as  to  the 
surplus  after  paying  the  debts,  stands 
upon  grounds  as  high  and  has  claims  as 
irresistible  as  the  creditor  before  had. 
The  usual  consequences  of  a  dissolution, 
as  stated  by  the  text-writers,  if  correct, 
which  was  doubted,  were  deemed  inap- 
plicable to  moneyed  or  trading  corpora- 
tions. 

In  the  course  of  his  admirable  opinion, 
the  learned  justice  observed  :  "The  com- 
mon law  of  Great  Britain  was  deficient 
in  supplying  the  instrumentalities  for  a 
speedy  and  just  settlement  of  the  affairs  of 
an  insolvent  corporation  whose  charter  had 
been  forfeited  by  judicial  sentence.  The 
opinion  usually  expressed  as  to  the  effect 
of  such  a  sentence  was  unsatisfactory  and 
questioned.  There  had  been  instances  in 
Great  Britain  of  the  dissolution  of  public  or 
ecclesiastical  corporations  by  the  exertion 
of  public  authority,  or  as  a  consequence  of 
the  death  of  their  members ;  and  parlia- 
ment  anil  the  courts  had  affirmed,  in  these 
instances,  that  the  endowments  they  had 
received  from  the  prince  or  pious  founders 
would  revert  in  such  a  case."  Stat,  dc 
Terris  Templariorum,  17  Edw.  II.;  Dean 
and  Canons  of  Windsor,  Godb.  211  ;  John- 
son v.  Norway,  Winch.  37  ;  Owen,  73  ;  6 
Yin.  Abr.  280.  What  was  to  become  of 
their  personal  estate,  and  of  their  debts 
and  credits,  had  not  been  settled  in  any 
adjudicated  case,  and,  as  was  said  by  Pol- 


lexfen  in  the  argument  of  the  quo  warranto 
against  the  city  of  London,  was,  perhaps, 
"non  definitur  injure."  (See  ante,  Intro- 
ductory Chapter,  sec.  8.)  Solicitor  /•' 
who  argued  for  the  crown  in  that  ci 
admitted:  "I  do  not  find  any  judgment 
in  a  quo  w<i/t</,i/i>  of  a  corporation  being 
forfeited."  Treby,  on  behalf  of  the  city, 
said:  "The  dissolving  a  corporation  by  a 
judgment  in  law,  as  is  here  sought,  I  be- 
lieve is  a  thine;  that  never  came  within  the 
compass  of  any  man's  imagination  till 
now  ;  no,  not  so  much  as  the  putting  of  a 
case.  For  in  all  my  search  (and  upon  this 
occasion  I  have  bestowed  a  great  dea 
time  in  searching),  I  cannot  find  that  it 
even  so  much  as  entered  into  the  concep- 
tion of  any  man  before  ;  and  I  am  the 
more  confirmed  in  it  because  so  learned  a 
gentleman  as  Mr.  Solicitor  has  not  cited 
any  one  such  case  wherein  it  has  been  (1 
do  not  say  adjudged,  but)  eveu  so  much  as 
questioned  or  attempted  ;  and,  therefore,  I 
may  very  boldly  call  this  a  case  pr 
pressionis."  The  argument  of  Pollexfen 
was  equally  positive. 

The  power  of  courts  to  adjudge 
feiture    so    as    to  dissolve    a    corpot 
was  affirmed  in  that  case,bul   the  i 
of  that  judgmenl   was  not   illustrated  by 
any   execution,    and    the    emits    w  r 
Lieved  from  their  embarrass]  :i  act 

of  parliament  annulling  it.     Smith's  case, 
•1  Mod.  53  :  Sk  St.  T  1342. 

See  ib.  L042.      Nor    have    the    diacussioi-3 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  lG9a 


Tl      Supreme  Court  of  the   United  States  dismissed  a  bill  iu 
>f  a  creditor  seeking  for  relief.     It.  decided  that  the  property 
held  by  the  repealed   corporation  for  public  uses,  such  as  public 
buildings,  wharves,  fire   i  and,  generally,  all   property   held 

overnmental  pur]  mid  not   be  subjected  to  the  payment 

of  the  debts  of  the  city.  It  further  derided  that  upon  a  repeal  of 
its  charter  such  property  passed  under  the  immediate  control  of 
the  State,  since  the  power  delegated  to  the  city  in  that  respect  had 
been  withdrawn.1  It  also  decided  that  the  private  property  of  in- 
dividuals could  not  be  subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of 
the  city,  except  through  taxation,  and  that  the  power  of  taxation 
being  legislative  it  could  not  be  exercised  otherwise  than  under 
the  authority  of  the  legislature.2  As  to  private  property  —  that 
is,  such  as  was  owned  by  tbe  municipality,  not  for  public  or  mu- 
nicipal uses  —  it  would  of  course  be  liable  to  the  claims  of  cred- 
itors but  subject  thereto,  it  would  be  under  the  control  of  the 
legislature. 


<ei >■'•  tlu-  Involution  extended  our  knowl- 
edge upon  this  intricate  Bubject.  Tin' 
case  of  Rex  v.  Amery,  '-'  Term  R.  515, 
.  rted  much  influence  upon  text- 
writers.  The  'pit  stums  were,  whether  a 
judgment  of  seizure  quosque  upon  a  de- 
fault was  tiual,  ami  if  so,  whether  the 
kind's  grant  of  pardon  and  restitution 
would  overreach  and  defeat  a  charter 
granting  to  a  new  body  of  men  the  same 
liberties,  intermediate  the  seizure  and  the 
pardon.     Tin-  kind's  bench,  relying  upon 

r-Bo  I.  discovered  thai  it  did  not 
support  the  conclusion  drawn  from  it,  ami 
Chief  Karon  Eyre  says  that  "Lord  Coh 
had  adopted  the  doctrine  too  hastily." 
■us>ions  npon  this  case  show  how 
much  the  knowledge  of  the  writ  of  quo 
warranto,  as  it  hail  been  used  ami  applied 
under  tin-  Plantagenets  and  Tudors,  hail 

■mi  the  memories  of  courts  and  law- 

I  Trim  II.  122  :  Tin.  on  Quo  Jr.*,-. 

24.      In   Col  Seaber,   3    Burr. 

where  the  suit  was  upon  a  bond, 
an  1   the   defence  was   that   certain    farts 

urred  to  dissolve  the  corpoi 
and  that  the  creditor's  claim  was  extin» 
guished  on  the  bond,  Lord  Mansfield  said, 
'•  Without  an  express  authority,  so  strong 
as  not  ■  ten  over,  we  ought  no1  to 

determine  bo  much  against  reason 
parliament  Bhould  be  obliged  to  interfere. 


The  question  occurs  here,  Could  parlia- 
ment  interfere?  And  the  answer  would 
be  by  their  authorizing  a  suit  to  bo 
brought,  notwithstanding  the  dissolution. 
These  are  all  cases  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions where  the  corporators  had  no  rights 
in  tin-  property  of  the  corporation  iu 
severalty." 

1  Substantially  the  same  principles  as 
to  the  effect  of  the  dissolution  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  by  a  repeal  of  its  charter 
upon  its  property  rights,  are  laid  down  in 
the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Field  in 
Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266 
(1876),  at  pp.  268,  269  ;  noted  infra,  sec. 
170,  note. 

2  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S. 
•17'.'  (1880).  Precisely  what  the  court 
means  by  the  statement  "that  the  power 

of  taxation    is    legislative   and  cannot    be 

exercise. 1  otherwise  than  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  legislature"  remains  to  be  de- 
termined  in  that  tribunal.  It  certainly 
meant  in  that  ease  that  the  power  could 
not  he  ael  in  motion  by  a  bill  in  equity. 
Whether  it  meant  that  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion as  a  means  of  paying  the  debts  of  the 

repeal., i  corporation  did  not  survive  such 
repeal  ami  the  legislative  prohibition  of 
the  exercise  of  such  power,  can  only  be 
known  when  this  precise  question  arises 

for  judgment. 


§  170  RIGHTS   OF    CREDITORS   ON   A    DISSOLUTION.  249 

§170    (114).    Rights  of  Creditors   on  a  Dissolution.  —  The   rights 

of  creditors  of  municipal  corporations  are  elsewhere  more  fully  con- 
sidered.1 The  doctrines  of  the  Supreme  <  iourt  of  the  United  States 
may  be  thus  briefly  summed  up :  — 

1.  The  rights  of  creditors,  based  upon  the  obligation  of  their  con- 
tracts, are  protected  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  against 
subsequent  legislation  impairing  the  same. 

2.  It  has  often  been  decided,  and  is  the  settled  doctrine  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  that  the  remedies  subsisting  in  a  Stub'  when  and 
where  the  contract  is  made  and  is  to  be  performed,  are  a  part  of  its 
obligation,  and  that  any  subsequent  law  of  the  State  which  so  affects 
those  remedies  as  substantially  to  impair  and  lessen  the  value  of  the 
contract,  is  forbidden  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  Slates,  and  is 
therefore  void.  Applying  this  principle,  it  is  held,  that  if  the  muni- 
cipality agrees,  as  a  part  of  its  contract,  that  the  creditor  shall  have 
the  right  to  a  special  tax,  the  statute  giving  this  right  cannot  as  to 
such  creditor  be  repealed,  unless  there  be  substituted  in  its  place  a 
remedy  legally  equivalent  in  value  and  efficacy.2 

3.  The  legislature  in  its  sympathy  with  insolvent  and  repudiat- 
ing municipalities  has  sometimes  gone  so  far  as  absolutely  to  repeal 
their  charters,  and  in  some  form  to  substitute  or  authorize  new 
municipal  organizations  in  their  place.  Instances  of  such  legisla- 
tion in  respect  of  the  cities  of  Memphis,  of  Brownsville,  of  Mobile, 
and  of  some  other  places,  are  given  in  the  notes  to  this  section. 
The  State's  plenary  power  over  its  municipal  corporations  to  change 
their  organization,  to  modify  their  method  of  internal  government, 
or  to  abolish  them  altogether,  is  not  restricted  by  contracts  entered 
into  by  the  municipality  with  its  creditors  or  with  private  persons. 
An  absolute  repeal  of  a  municipal  charter  is  therefore  effectual  so 
far  as  it  abolishes  the  old  corporate  organization ;  but  where  the 
same,  or  substantially  the  same  inhabitants  are  erected  into  a  new 
corporation,  whether  with  extended  or  restricted  territorial  limits, 
such  new  corporation  is  treated  as  in  law  the  successor  of  the  old, 
entitled  to  its  property  rights,  and  subject  to  its  liabilities. 

4.  As  to  the  mode  of  enforcing  such  liabilities  difficult  questions 
have  arisen,  some  of  which  cannot  at  this  time  be  said  to  be  clearly 
settled.  It  may,  however,  we  think,  be  considered  as  definitively 
determined  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  the  levy  and  collection  of 

1  An (r,  chart,  iv.  ;  post,  sees.  853  ct  seq.,  the  indebted  municipality  is  l«-ft  un- 
861  «-861  c.  touched  by  the  legislature,  bul  the  snibse- 

2  Seibert  v.  Lewis,  122  U.  S.  284  quent  legislation  impairs  the  creditor's 
(188(5),  noted  more  fully  post,  sec.  854,  remedy  as  it  existed  at  the  date  of  the 
stands  as  the  type  of  this  class  of  cases, —  contract.  Many  other  cases  to  the  same 
that  is,  where  the  corporate  existence  of  effect  are  cited  in  the  note.-,  to  this  section. 


250 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


quoI  be  enforced  in  or  by  the  I  lircuit  Courts  exercising  equity 
jurisdiction,  but  only  by  appropriate  remedies  in  the  court  of  law, 
chief  among  which  is  the  remedy  by  mandamus.1 

5.  If  the  legislature  repeals  the  charter  of  the  debtor  corporation 
.mi  i  dissolves  it,  and  makes  no  provision  for  its  debts,  and  it  has  no 
private  property  subject  to  execution,  and  there  is  no  resource  for 
payment  of  such  indebtedness  but  taxation,  then  it'  no  new  or 
essor  corporation  be  organized,  and  if  do  instrumentalities  of  the 
taxing  power  remain  subject  to  the  process  of  the  courts,  the  rights 
of  creditors  arc,  in  fact,  impaired  or  destroyed,  and  it  would  seem 
that  the  courts  arc  in  such  case  practically  powerless  to  prevent  this 
result;  and  that  the  creditor's  only  remedy,  which  lie  would  be  very 
apt  under  the  circumstances  to  consider  illusory,  is  to  appeal  for  re- 
lief to  the  legislative  department  of  the  government,  that  is  to  say, 
to  the  very  department  that  of  set  purpose  adopted  the  hostile  en- 
actments that  cut  down  and  destroyed  his  rights  and  remedies.2 


1  Thompson  v.  Allen  County,  115  U. 
S.  550  (1885).  Mr.  Justice  Miller  here 
reviews  the  previous  cases  on  the  point, 
and  re-affirms  the  want  of  any  jurisdiction 
in  equity  to  levy  and  colled  taxes  for  the 
satisfaction  of  judgments  against  munici- 
palities. The  doctrine  of  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion in  equity  is  maintained,  although 
the  remedy  al  law  by  mandamus  has 
proved  ineffectual,  and  no  officers  can  be 
found  to  perform  the  duty  of  levying  and 
collecting  the  taxes.     See,  further,  cases 

1  in  the  note  to  this  Bection  ;  also  post, 
chaps,  xx.  and  xxii. 

-  II.  ine  o.  Li  tree  I  lommissioners,  19 
Wall.  655  ;  Bees  ».  Watertown,  L9  Wall. 
107  ;  Barkeley  v.  Levee  Commissioners, 
93  U.  S.  258;  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102 
U.  S.  472  ;  Thompson  v.  Allen  County, 
115  I'.  S.  550  ;  Amy  v.  Watertown,  130 
V.  S.  301  (1888). 

Mr.  Bare  regards  such  legislation  as  a 
fraud  upon  the  constitutional  prohibit  Lon 
against  th  e  impaii  menl  of  con- 

-    [Uently    invalid.      1     Am. 

Const.  Law,  6  10.  But  the  view  thai  such 
legisl  ttion  is  invalid  does  not  seem  to  be 
consistent  with  the  decisions  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  "ii  the  precise  point.  The 
iwever,  of  legislative  power, 
in  respect  of  depriving  the  creditors,  even 
by  a  general  repeal  of  the  chai  ter  and  in 
connection  therewith  by  prohibitions  of  the 
of  the  taxing  power  in  behalf  of 


existing  creditors,  of  the  remedies  in  force 
when  their  contracts  were  entered  into,  or 
of  others  legally  equivalent  thereto,  may, 
we  think,  be  regarded  as  yet  open  to 
further  discussion  and  more  definite  ascer- 
tainment. 

On  the  general  subject  of  the  right  of 
creditors  of  indebted  and  dissolved  muni- 
cipalities, see  :  Ante,  chap.  iv.  passim  ; 
particularly,  sees.  69,  70,  71 ;  post,  sees.  171, 
186-189;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  290,  292; 
Cooley,  Taxation  (2d  ed.)  75;  Curran  v. 
Arkansas,  15  How.  (U.S.)  312;  Bacon 
r.  Robertson,  supra  ;  2  Kent,  307,  note  ; 
Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266 
(1876)  :  Observations  of  Field,  J.,  p.  269; 
Milner's  Adnix.  v.  Pensacola,  2  Woods,  C.C 
642  (1875)  ;  Laird  v.  City  of  De  Soto,  22 
Fed.  Rep.  421  ;  Ross  v.  Wimberly,  60 
Miss.  3-15;  Brewis  v.  Duluth,  13  Fed. 
Rep.  334  ;  s.  c.  9  Fed.  Rep.  717  ;  Garrett 
v.  Memphis,  5  Fed.  Rep.  860;  Indianapo- 
lis v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396, 
approving  text  ;  County  Comm'rs  v.  Cox, 
6  Ind.  103  :  State  v.  Trustees,  5  Ind.  77  ; 
Coulter  v.  Roberson,  24  Miss.  278;  Gel- 
peke  v.  Dubuque,]  Wall.  175(1865); 
Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535; 
Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C  C. 
L30;  Thomson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall. 
327  ;  Havemeyer  v.  Iowa  County,  3  Wall. 
294;  Btitz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575; 
Lansing  v.  Treasurer,  &c,  1  Dillon  C. 
C.  522  :  Sunt  ter  v.  Madison,   15  Wis.  30; 


§171 


CHANGES   NOT    AMOUNTING   TO    A    DISSOLUTION. 


251 


§  171    (1 13}.    Changes    not    amounting    to    a    Dissolution.  —  The 

name  of   an    incorporated    place  may    be   changed,  its   boundary  ■ 


Smith  v,  Appleton,  19  Wis.  468  ;  Blake 
v.  Railroad  ( !o.,  39  N.  II.  185  ;  compare 
Richmond  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Middletown, 
59  N.  V.  228  (1874)  ;  post,  692;  Wolff*. 
New  Orleans,  L03  U.  S.  358  ;  Beatty  v. 
The  People,  6  Col.  538. 

Memphis  City  Case:  The  city  of  Mem- 
phis, in  Tennessee,  having  become  insol- 
vent and  unable  to  meet  its  obligations, 
the  legislature  of  that  State  in  L879  re- 
pealed all  laws  by  which  it  had  bt  i  n  incor- 
porated, and  passed  a  general  act  estab- 
lishing what  were  termed  "Taxing  Dis- 
tricts" as  a  "means  of  local  government 
for  the  peace,  safety,  and  general  welfare  " 
of  "communities  embraced  in  the  territo- 
rial limits  of  all  such  municipal  corpora- 
tions "  as  had,  or  might  have,  their  charters 
abolished  or  might  surrender  them  under 
the  act.  In  1881  a  similar  act  established 
"taxing  districts  of  the  second  class  "  for 
communities  having  a  population  of  less 
than  30,000.  They  were  invested  with 
practically  all  the  powers  usually  conferred 
upon  municipal  corporations,  except  that 
of  levying  taxes,  which  was  expressly  re- 
served to  the  legislature,  and  that  of  issu- 
ing evidences  of  indebtedness.  It  was 
also  expressly  provided  that  the  taxing 
districts,  so  created,  should  not  pay,  or  be 
liable  for,  any  debt  created  by  the  extinct 
corporations,  and  that  no  taxes  collected 
under  the  act  should  ever  be  used  to  pay 
such  debts.  (For  a  succinct  statement  of 
the  principal  features  of  this  legislation, 
see  Meriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472, 
by  Mr.  Justice  Field.  Ante,  sec.  169  a.) 
The  organizations  formed  under  these 
acts  are  uniformly  held  to  be  municipal 
corporations.  State  v.  Taxing  District  of 
Shelby  Co.,  16  Lea  (Tenn.),  240;  Lea 
v.  State,  10  Lea  (Tenn.),  478  (districts 
Of  the  second  class)  ;  l.uclirman  17.  Taxing 
District,  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  425;  O'Connor 
r.  Memphis,  6  Lea  (Tenn.),  730  ;  (holding 
also,  that  a  suit  against  the  old  corpora- 
tion may  be  revived  against  the  taxing 
district ).  They  may  be  sued  as  any  other 
municipality.  Uhl  V.  Taxing  District, 
6  Lea  (Tenn.),  610.  As  to  who  may  rote 
on  proposition  to  organize  under  the  act 
see    Pepper   v.    Smith,    15    Lea    (Tenn.), 


551.  The  prohibitions 
the  taxing  power  held  to  be  void  so  far  as 
they  affect  the  taxing  powers  of  the  former 
corporations,  which  became  a  part  of  the 
contracts  entered  into  by  them.  Dever- 
eaux  v.  City  of  Brownsville,  29  fed.  Rep. 
742  (mandamus  issued  to  the  taxing 
district  to  enforce,  by  taxation,  the  pay- 
ment of  judgments  against  the  old  corpo- 
rations). Compare  with  Meriwether  v. 
Garrett,  Heine  v.  Levee  (  omm'rs,  and 
other  like  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  as  to  the  power  to  com- 
pel the  levy  of  taxes,  notwithstanding  tin- 
repeal  of  the  charter  aud  the  prohibition 
by  the  legislature  to  the  new  officers  to 
levy  ami  collect  taxes  for  the  payment  of 
the  debts  of  the  dissolved  municipality. 

Mobile  City  Case  :  The  City  of  Mobile 
being  largely  in  debt,  the  legislature- 
passed  an  act  repealing  the  charter  of  the 
city  and  declaring  that  the  corporation  was 
thereby  dissolved  and  abolished.  The  act 
provided  for  the  appointment  by  the  Gov- 
ernor of  three  commissioners  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  property  and  assets  of  the 
city,  except  property  held  for  the  public 
use  and  governmental  purposes,  and  apply 
the  same  under  the  orders  of  the  Court  of 
Chancery  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of 
the  city,  giving  preference  to  the  floating 
debt.  On  the  same  day  the  legislature  in- 
corporated the  Port  of  Mobile,  which  in- 
cluded all  the  thickly  settled  and  closely 
built  portion  of  the  former  City  of  Mobile  ; 
and  all  of  the  $16,000,000  of  the  taxable 
property  of  the  city  but  8900,000  was 
included  within  the  limits  of  the  Port 
of  Mobile,  and  fourteen-fifteenths  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  City  were  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Port  of  Mobile.  It  limited 
the  powers  of  the  Port  of  Mobile  to  the 
levy  of  a  tax  of  six-tenths  of  one  per  cent, 
and  prohibited  its  authorities  from  exer- 
cising any  other  powers.  Two  questions 
arose,  namely  :  Whether  a  preceding  cred- 
itor was  entitled  to  a  judgment  against 
the  Port  of  Mobile  on  tin-  obligations  of 
the  City  of  Mobile  ;  and  second,  whether 
the  powers  of  taxation  in  existence  at  the 
date  of  the  creation  of  the  debt  by  the 
City  of  Mobile  could  be  enforced  in  favoi 


■' 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§171 


enlarged   or  diminished,  and   its   modi    of  government  altered,  and 
yet  the  corporation  not  fa  ltbut  in  law  remain  tfa  same} 


of  the  creditor.      Both  of  these  proposi- 
tions wi  Led  in  favor  oi  the  creditor. 
1          purt  stated  the  general    prop 
involved  as  fellows  :  — 

••  We  are  of  opinion,  upon  this  statu 
itatutes   and  fai  ts,    that  the  Port 

Biol  ile    is  the   Legal  successor  of   the 
City  of  Mobile,  and  liable  for  its  debts, 
rporations   were  composed  of 
utially  the    same    community,    in- 
cluded  within   their   limits  substantially 
the  same  taxable  property ,  and   wi  re  or- 
ime  genera]  purposes. 

"Where  the  legislature  of  a  State  has 
given  a  local  community,  living  within 
:  >1  boundaries,  a  municipal  or- 
ganization, and  by  a  subsequent  act,  or 
series  of  arts,  repeals  its  charter  and  dis- 
solves the  corporation,  and  incorporates 
substantially  the  same  people  as  a  muni- 
cipal body  under  a  new  name  for  the  same 
general  purpose,  and  the  great  mass  of 
the  taxable  property  of  the  old  corpora- 
tion is  included  within  the  limits  of  the 
new,  and  the  property  of  the  old  corpora- 
tion used  for  public  purposes  is  trans- 
ferred without  consideration  to  the  new 
corporation  for  the  same  public  uses,  the 
latter,  notwithstanding  a  great  reduction 
of  its  corporate  limits,  is  t he  successor  in 
law  of  the  former,  and  liable  for  its  debts  ; 
and  if  any  part  of  the  creditors  of  the  old 
corporation  are  left  without  provision  for 
the  payment  of  their  claims,  they  can  en- 
force satisfaction  out  of  the  new." 

Tie-  court  considered  this  conclusion  to 
be  supported  by  Girard  v.  Philadelphia, 
7  Wall.  1  ;  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93 
0  S.  266,  270  ;  Mounl  Pleasant  v.  Beck- 
with,  100  U.  8.  51  I  ;  O'Connor  v.  Mem- 
•  Lea  (Tenn.),  730 ;  and  Amy  i>. 
Selma,  77  Ala,  103. 

It  held  that  the  remedies  in  exi 
for  the  enforcement  of   the    obligations 
could   not    be    impaired    by    subsequent 


legislation,  or  if  changed,  a  substantial 
equivalent  must  be  provided;  that  no 
such  equivalent  was  here  provided.  The 
court  enforced  the  contract  by  which  the 

City  of  Mobile,  in  issuing  the  bonds, 
agreed  to  levy  a  special  tax  for  the  pay- 
ment   of  the   principal    and    interest,    and 

held    that    as    to  the    holder  of    SUCh    bonds 

the  obligation  to  levy  such  special  tax 
was  in  force,  and  rested  upon  the  Port  of 
Mobile,  ami  accordingly  directed  a  per- 
emptory mandamus  to  issue  for  the 
faction  of  the  judgment  in  accordance 
with  tin'  provisions  in  that  behalf  in  force 
when  the  obligation  was  created.  Mobile 
v.  Watson,  116  U.  S.  289  (1885). 

City  of  Selma  Cast  :  In  Amy  v.  Selma, 
77  Ala.  103,  it  was  held  that  a  new  corpo- 
ration named  "  Selma,"  erected  to  replace 
one  named  "  City  of  Selma,"  which  had 
been  dissolved,  was  its  successor,  and 
liable  for  its  debts — as  here  in  an  action 
upon  a  judgment  recovered  against  its 
predecessor.  See,  also,  Meyer  v.  Porter, 
05  Cal.  67. 

Toum  of  Kahoka  Case:  In  Hill  v. 
Kahoka,  35  Fed.  Kep.  32  (1888),  it  ap- 
peared that  the  Imi-i,  of  Kahoka  was  duly 
incorporated  under  the  general  statute  of 
Missouri,  in  1869,  and  pel-formed  various 
corporate  act.-,,  among  others  issuing  cer- 
tain railroad  aid  bonds.  In  18S6,  its 
charter  was  forfeited  for  non-user  in  a  pro- 
ceeding by  quo  warranto,  and  thereupon 
the  city  of  Kahoka,  embracing  practically 
the  same  territory  and  population,  was 
incorporated  under  existing  laws  as  a  city 
of  the  fourth  class.  Held,  in  an  action 
upon  the  coupons,  that  the  city  of  Kahoka 
was  liable  for  the  bonds.  "Municipal 
corporations  cannot  extinguish  their  debts 
by  changing  their  names  or  organizing 
under  new  charters.  A  debt  once  con- 
tracted by  a  municipal  corporation  will 
survive  as  a  debt  against   whatever  corpo- 


1  AtU  .  BeC.  85,  and  cases  cited;  post, 
chap.  viii.  sees.  176,  177;  and  see  ante, 
••hap.  iv.,  where  thi  exti  nl  of  the  legisla- 
tive authority  over  municipal  corporations 
is  considered.     Girard  v.  Philadelphia,   7 


Wall.  1  (1868),  noted  fully,  ivfra,  sec. 
172,  note.  Broughton  V.  Pensacola,  93 
U.  S.  266  (1876)  ;  and  see  notes  to  sec. 
170,  supra,  and  cases  there  cited. 


5  172 


CHANGES   NOT    AMOUNTING    TO    A    DISSOLUTION. 


258 


§  172.    Same  subject.  —  Accordingly,  the  substitution  of  a   new 
municipal  charter  in  the  place  of  a  previous  charter,  or  a  change  in 


rate  entity  is  subsequently  created  to  take 
its  place  ami  exercise  its  power  of  local 
government  over  substantially  the  same 
people  and  territory,"  citing  Broughton 
o.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266  ;  Mobile  v. 
Watson,  116  U.  S.  289  ;  Laird  v.  De  Soto, 
22  Fed.  Rep.  421  ;  People  v.  Murray,  73 
N.  V.  535.     /'•'   Thayer,  J. 

City  of  Broionsville  Case:  In  Dever- 
eaux  v.  City  of  Brownsville,  29  Fed.  Rep. 
742,  the  ruling  in  Mobile  v.  Watson, 
supra,  was  followed  and  extended,  it 
being  declared  not  only  that  the  succeed- 
ing corporation  was  liable  for  the  existing 
debts  of  its  predecessor,  but  that  all  the 
powers  of  taxation  possessed  by  such  pre- 
decessor, which  had  been  conferred  as  a 
part  of  the  remedy  to  which  its  creditors 
were  entitled,  survived  to  the  new  corpo- 
ration, and  that  their  exercise  could  he 
compelled  by  mandamus.  It  was  also  held 
that  statutes  which  prohibited  the  exer- 
cise of  these  powers  of  taxation  were  void, 
as  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts. 

Pensacola  City  Case  :  In  Broughton  v. 
ola  (City  of),  93  U.  S.  266  (1876), 
an  indebted  city  which  had  contracted 
with  the  creditor  to  levy  a  special  tax 
upon  real  estate  within  its  limits  to  pay 
his  debt,  surrendered  its  charter,  and  tlie 
inhabitants  /•/•sitting  within  th'  limits  of the 
city  organized  themselves  into  a  municipal 
government  under  the  general  incorpora- 
tion act  of  the  State,  in  the  same  way  that 
inhabitants  might  do  who  had  not  been 
previously  incorporated.  The  creditor  filed 
a  bill  in  equity  asking  for  a  decree  for 
the  amount  of  his  debt,  and  that  the  city 
be  compelled  to  levy  a  tax  to  pay  the 
same.  The  bill  was  dismissed  by  the 
Circuit  Court,  and  its  decree  was  affirmed 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  The  court  held  that  the  new 
organization,  embracing  substantially  the 
same  corporators  and  the  same  territory, 
although  different  powers  were  possessed 
under  the  new  charter  and  different  offi- 
cers administered  its  affairs,  was  in  law  to 
be  deemed  the  successor  of  the  previous 
corporation  and  entitled  to  its  rights. 
Mr.  Justice  Field,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  said  :  — 


"The  ancient  doctrine,  that,  upon  the 
(■•peal  of  a  private  corporation,  its  debts 
were  extinguished,  and  its  real  property 
reverted  to  its  grantors,  and  its  personal 
property  vested  in  the  State,  has  been  bo 
far  modified  by  modern  adjudi 
a  court  of  equity  will  now  lay  hold  of  the 
property  of  a  dissolved  corporation,  and 
administer  it  for  the  benefit  of  its  credit- 
ors and  stockholders.  The  obligation  of 
contracts,  made  whilst  the  corp 
was  in  existence,  survives  its  dissolution  ; 
and  the  contracts  may  be  enforced  by  a 
court  of  equity,  so  far  as  to  subject  for 
their  satisfaction  any  property  possessed 
by  the  corporation  at  the  time.  In  tin- 
view  of  equity,  its  property  constitutes 
a  trust  fund  pledged  to  the  payment  of 
the  debts  of  creditors  and  stockholders  ; 
and,  if  a  municipal  corporation,  upon  tin- 
surrender  or  extinction  in  other  ways  of 
its  charter,  is  possessed  of  any  property 
fnot  of  a  public  nature,  see  Meriwether  v. 
Garrett,  supra],  a  court  of  equity  will 
equally  take  possession  of  it  for  the  benefit 
of  the  creditors  of  the  corporation.  In 
this  case,  it  is  averred  in  the  bill  that  the 
city  of  Pensacola,  upon  the  surrender  of 
its  original  charter,  did  not  possess  any 
property.  It  is  not  necessary,  however, 
in  the  view  we  take  of  the  proceedings  for 
the  reorganization  of  the  city  government, 
to  consider  the  effect  of  an  absolute  repeal 
of  the  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation 
upon  its  obligations.  It  is  sufficient  that 
here,  in  our  judgment,  there  was  a  contin- 
uation of  the  corporation  of  Pen 
with  its  original  rights  of  property  and 
obligations,  not  a  new  and  distim 
tion  or  corporate  capacity  and  liability." 

Case  of  Mount  Pleasant  v.  /.'•  ckwith  : 
Here  an  indebto  d  municipal  or  public  cor- 
poration was  legislated  out  ofi 
its  territory  was  annexed  to  similar  corpo- 
rations. In  tin-  al^  nee  of  legislative  pro- 
vision otherwise,  it  was  held  that  the 
latter  corporations  became  entitled  to  all 
the  property  of  the  abrogated  corporation, 
and  severally    liable   for    a    proportionate 

share    of   its    then    Subsisting     legal     debts, 
an  1  that    they  were  vested  with  th     pOWl  r 

to  raise  revenue  with  which  to  pay  such 


254 


Ml'NK'H'AL    C'ORl'OUATIONS. 


§172 


ter  in  who],'  or  in  part,  where  substantially  the  same 

.  and  the  same  inhabitants  are  concerned,  will  not  be  pre- 

Bume  I.  or  l"'  held  to  be  the  creation  of  a  new  corporation,  lmt  the 


3  by  levying  taxes  upon  the  property 
nl  the    persona    resi  I 
and   a   bill    in   equity    by    the 
of  the  extinguished  corporation 
the  corporation     thus 
-  property  and  powers  was  sustained 
at  that  the  amount  of  the  debt 
lacertained,  and  the  sum  apportioned 
among  the   corporations  to  which  the  ter- 
ritory  of    the   indebted    corporation   had 
been  annexed,  and  a  decree   rendered  for 
the  amounts  thus  apportioned  to  be  col- 
I    in    the   manner   provided   by  law. 
Mount    Pleasant  v.  Beck  with,  100   U.  S. 
(1879).    There  is  no  intimation  in  later 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  that  they 
are,  in  any  respect,  inconsistent  with  this 
Si  b    Meriwether   v.    <  larrett, 
i  .    s.    172  :  Barkley  '••  Levee  <  Com- 
missi                 U.  S.  258  ;   Broughton  v. 
Pensacola,  93   U.   S.    266  ;   Thompson  v. 
Allen    County,    115   U.    S.  550  ;    Amy  v. 
Watertowu,  L30  U.  S.  301  (1888).  Thi 
ual  judgments  in  all  these  cases  maynol  be 
in  conflict  with  each  other,  bu1  it  seema  diffi- 
cult to  the  author  to  rei jile  all  of  the 

oning   by   which    the  different   judg- 
ments are  supported.     S<  e,  also,  Beckwith 
••.    R  icim  .    7    Bias.    1  12    (1876),    Drum- 
■■,  .1.1.      The  poinl  decided 
be   briefly   stated    thus  :      Where  a 
muni  iwing    railroad    aid    bonds, 

which  it  was  provided  by  statute  should  be 
j>:ii .  1  by  an  annual  tax  upon  the  property 
within  it.  was  legislated  oul  of  existence, 
and  the   territory   was  included  in   three 
r  municipalities  withoul  any  provision 
le  in  respecl   to  the  paymenl  of 
Id  that  the  legislature 
had  the  power  to  make  these  changes,  but 
the  obligations   of  the  contract   and 
the  power  of  ta  11  rem  lined.     It 

was  further  held  thai    in  consequence  of 
i  he  creditor  could  nol  sue 
at   law,  as  service  of  process    on   the  old 
corporation  could  no  .  but  thai 

equity  would  give  the  creditor  a  remedy 
by  requiring  the  existing  corporations, 
within  who--  boundaries  the  property  in- 
cluded in  the  old  is  situate,  to  levy  I  he 
to  pay  the  debt  in  propor- 


tion to  the  amount  of  territory  each  ob- 
tained. See  Mount  Pleasanl  v.  Dee]. with, 
supra  :  post,  see.  186. 

In  Nelson  v.   Newark  &  Belleville,  49 
N.  J.  L.  246,  where  by  statute,  the  terri- 
umship  h  id  !  !  between 

a  city  and  another  township,  with  a  direc- 
tion that  it  -  debts  should  be  paid  propoi  - 
tionately  by  the  city  and  the  township 
acquiring  its  territory,  it  was  held  thai 
the  duty  of  paying  the  debts  waa  impo  ed 
upon  them,  and  that  the  creditora  cou  I 
enforce  the  duty  by  suit  against  them 
directly.  See  also  Canova  v.  Commission- 
ers, 18  Fla.  512;  case  of  Elizabeth  City 

N.   J.      Post,   Chap.    xix.   see.    To'1". 

Iii  the  case  of  the  town  of  Porl  Gibson 
v.  Moore,  13  Sim.  &  Marsh.  ("Jl  Mis^.)  157 
1 1  - 1'.'),  it  was  held,  indeed,  that  the  re- 
peal of  the  charter  of  an  indebted  muni- 
cipal corporal  ion  dissoh  ed  it  ;  that  such 
dissolution  extinguished  debts  to  andfrom 
th>  corporation,  and  that  a  subsequent  act 
re-incorporating  the  place  did  no!  make  it 
liable  for  a  debl  existing  anterior  to  the 
ad  repealing  its  charter.  The  courl  over- 
looked the  constitutional  provision  pro- 
tecting contracts,  and  the  ease  as  to  the 
effect  of  a  dissolution  upon  the  rights  of 
creditors  seems  to  conflict  witli  those 
above  cited.  Contra,  Broadway  Railway 
Case,  decided  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
New  York  ;  People  v.  O'Brien,  111  N.  V. 

1    (1888),    and    see    eases    cited   ill   this  note. 

See  further,  as  to  extinguishment  of 
debts  by  dissolution  of  corporation,  Mal- 
lory  v.  Mallett,  6  Jones  Eq.  345;  Hop- 
kins v.  Whitesides,  1  Head  (Tenn. ),  31 ; 
B  ok  v.  Lockwood,  'J  Barring.  ( Del. )  8  ; 
Robinson  v.  Lane,  19  Ga.  '.V-'>7 ;  Muscatine 
Turnverein  ''.  Funck,  18  Iowa,  469  ;  Owen 
r.  Smith,  :il  Barb.  641  ;  Welch  o.  Ste. 
Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  130  ;  Thompson 
r.  Abbott,  61  Mo.  17»;  (1875)  ;  post,  chap, 
xiv.  ;  Louisville  Bridge  Co.  v.  Louisville, 
Bl  K\.  189  ;  St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  East 
St.  Louis,  121  111.  238  :  State,  ..,  rel. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Columbia,  27  S.  C.  137  ; 
post,  see.  78G  ;  Brooklyn  v.  Smith,  104 
111.  429. 


CHANGES   NOT    AMOUNTING    TO    A    DISSOLUTION. 


255 


assumption  by  the  old  one  of  new  powers  and  privileges.1  And 
where  the  rights  of  creditors  are  involved,  the  presumption  is  ex- 
tremely strong  that  tlic  identity  of  the  corporation  continues,  not- 
withstanding different  powers  are  possessed  by  the  new  organization, 
and  different  officers  administer  its  affairs.2 


1  State  v.  Natal,  39  La.  An.  139,  where 
it  was  said,  "The  city  of  New  Orleans 
founded  by  Bienville  about  171s  has  never 
ceased  to  exist  as  an  agglomeration  of  hu- 
man beings  for  social,  commercial,  and 
industrial  purposes.  ...  In  1805  those 
inhabitants  were  given  a  charter,  for  the 
first  time  since  the  cession  of  16< »o,  and 
that  charter  has  been  altered  and  amended 
sonic  way  or  other,  in  subsequent  years, 
viz.:  1812,  1818,  1833,  1835,  1837,  1846, 
185(1.  1852,  1870,  and  L882  ;  but  the  city, 
the  existence  of  which  was  generally  recog- 
nized by  the  various  Constitutions,  has 
retained  its  identity,  not  only  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  but  also  as  a  matter  of  legal 
necessity."  See  supra,  see.  170,  and  cases 
in  note. 

Mr.  Girard's  will  of  1831  gave  the  resi- 
duum of  his  estate  by  its  corporate  name  to 
the  old  city  of  Philadelphia  in  trust  for 
certain  objects,  the  primary  one  being  the 
college,  and  the  secondary  ones  "to  enable 
the  city  to  improve  its  police,  to  improve 
the  city  property  and  the  appearance  of 
the  city  itself,  and  to  diminish  taxation." 
The  old  city  accepted  the  trust.  By  1854 
twenty-eight  distinct  suburban  municipal- 
ities had  grown  up  around  the  old  city,  and 
by  an  act  of  that  year  all  of  their  charters 
and  that  of  the  old  city  itself  were  abol- 
ished, and  their  rights  of  property  trans- 
ferred to  the  new  consolidated  corporation 
of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  which  instead  of 
being  two  miles  square  has  about  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-nine  square  miles.  The 
heirs  of  Mr.  Girard  claimed  that  the  anni- 
hilation of  the  old  city  and  its  merger  into 
the  immense  consolidated  corporation  de- 
feated the  object  of  the  testator.  But  the 
court  held  that  "the  identity  of  the  cor- 
poration was  not  destroyed,  and  that  the 
change  in  its  name,  the  enlargement  of  it- 
area,  &c,  lid  not  affect  its  title  to  prop- 
erty held  at  the  time  of  such  change,  or  its 
capacity  to  execute  the  trusts  of  the  will." 
Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1  (1868). 
The  essential  point  in  this  case  is  that  it 


establishes  notwithstanding  the  change  of 
charter  the  continuous  legal  identity  of  the 
new  city  corporation  with  tie-  old. 

-  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266 
(1S7(>);  approving  Milner's  Admx.  v.  Pen- 
sacola, 2  Woods,  632  ;  Walnut  Township 
v.  Jordan,  38  Kan.  i>G2  ;  ante,  sec.  85,  and 
cases  cited,  sec.  170,  note  ;  post,  sees.  173, 
176,  177. 

In  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  court 
in  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  Mr.  Justice 
Fu  lil  observes  :  — 

"  Although  a  municipal  corporation,  so 
far  as  it  is  invested  with  subordinate 
legislative  powers  for  local  purposes,  is  a 
mere  instrumentality  of  the  State  for  the 
convenient  administration  of  government  ; 
yet,  when  authorized  to  take  stock  in  a 
railroad  company,  and  issue  its  obligations 
in  payment  of  the  stock,  it  is  to  that  ex- 
tent to  be  deemed  a  private  corporation, 
and  its  obligations  are  secured  by  all  the 
guaranties  which  protect  the  engagements 
of  private  individuals.  The  inhibition  of 
the  Constitution,  which  preserves  against 
the  interference  of  a  State  the  sacreduess 
of  contracts,  applies  to  the  liabilities  of 
municipal  corporations  created  by  its  per- 
mission ;  and  although  the  repeal  or  modi- 
fication of  the  charter  of  a  corporation  of 
that  kind  is  not  within  the  inhibition,  yet 
it  will  not  be  admitted,  where  its  legisla- 
tion is  susceptible  of  another  construction, 
that  the  State  has  in  this  way  sanctioned 
an  evasion  of  or  escape  from  liabilities  the 
cirat  ion  of  which  it  authorized.  When, 
therefore,  a  new  form  is  given  to  <m  old 
muni  ,   or  such  a  corpora- 

tion is  reorganized  under  a  new  charter. 
taking  in  its  new  organization  the  place  of 
the  old  one,  embracing  substantially  the 
same  corporators  and  the  same  territory,  it 
will  be  presumed  that  the  legislature  in- 
tended a  continued  existence  of  the  same 
corporation,  although  different  powers  an' 
possessed  under  the  new  charter,  and  dif- 
ferent officers  administer  its  affairs;  and 
in    the    absence   of  express   provision  for 


256  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  173 

$  1  7.°..  Same  subject.  —  The  case  contemplated  in  the  preceding 
■us,  in  winch  the  continuous  legal  existena  and  identity  of  a 
dity  will  be  held  to  exist,  when:  substantially  the  same  in- 
habitants and  the  same  territory  are  concerned,  notwithstanding  a 
change  in  boundaries  and  form  of  organization  has  taken  place,  is 
one  of  quite  common  occurrence  and  of  easy  solution.  But  suppose 
the  Legislature  absolutely  repeals  the  charter  or  constituent  act  of  an 
indebted  municipality,  and  makes  no  provision  for  the  payment  of 
its  del'ts,  or,  instead  of  an  absolute  repeal,  it  makes  such  changes  as 
do  not  relate  substantially  to  the  same  inhabitants  and  the  same 
territory,  as  for  example  supersedes  or  dissolves  the  indebted  muni- 
cipality, and  annexes  what  constituted  its  territory  and  people  to 
other  municipalities,  and  makes  no  provision  for  its  debts  or  their 
mode  of  payment.  Is  the  creditor  remediless  except  by  an  appeal 
to  the  legislature?  This  is  a  difficult  inquiry,  and  we  have  endeav- 
ored to  answer  it  in  the  preceding  sections  and  in  the  cases  referred 
to  in  the  notes,  as  far  as  it  has  been  possible  to  do  so  in  the  existing 
state  of  the  adjudications  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
whose  determination  of  such  questions  is  final  and  authoritative. 

The  author  ventures  the  suggestion  that  the  true  solution  of  the 
many  difficulties  may  possibly  be  found  in  the  consideration  that 
the  power  of  a  municipality  to  levy  taxes  to  pay  its  debts  as  the 
power  existed  at  the  time  when  the  debts  were  created,  is  in  its  es- 
sence not  the  grant  of  a  power  to  the  incorporated  body,  but  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  incorporated  territory.1  In  this  view  the  power  or 
the  contract  obligation  and  duty  of  its  exercise  survives  the  repeal 
of  the  charter  and  the  dissolution  of  the  old  corporation,  and  passes, 
equally  with  the  obligation  to  pay  the  debt,  to  the  inhabitants  who 
continue  to  reside,  under  any  form  of  organization,  within  the  muni- 
cipal ana  in  behalf  of  which  the  debt  was  created;  the  exercise  of 
which  power  and  consequent  duty  may  be  compelled  by  the  judicial 
process  of  mandamus  whenever  there  are  officers  in  existence  who, 
nnder  the  genera]  legislation  of  the  State,  have  the  power  to  levy 
and  collect  taxes. 

t'l,,;,    paym  u1    otherwise,   it   will  also  1»'  portion  ami  placing  tin'  other  under  the 

amed  in  such  case  thai  the  legislature  charge  of  tin-  local  authorities,  and  where 

the  Liabilities  as  well  as  the  under  the  circumstances  a  judgment  cred- 

rightsofp               !  the  corporation  in  its  itor  was  held  to  he  withoul  legal  remedy. 

Form  should  accompany  the  corpora-  See  also  cases  of  the  city  ol  Memphis,  city 

tion  in  its  reorganization."     See  ami  '•"in-  of  M, >!,;/,,  and  city  of  Brownsville,  ante, 

pare  Barklej  <\  Levee  Comm'rs,  93  I'.  S.  Bee.  L70,  note. 

258,  where  a  1'  •                 I  —a  quasi  pub-  1  Ante,  sees.  S  a,  170-17?,  and  cases  as 

lie  i                 ,    -was    superseded    in    its  to  the  nature  of  incorporated  municipal" 

functions  by  a  law  dividing  the  district,  ities. 

and  creating  a  new  corporation  for  one 


§174 


REVIVAL   BY   NEW    CHARTER    AND    ITS    EFFECT. 


257 


It  is  usual,  however,  for  the  legislature,  on  the  change  or  division 
of  municipal  and  public  corporations,  to  make  provision  concerning 
existing  indebtedness;  and  its  power  to  do  so,  unless  restrained  by 
special  constitutional  provision,  is  clear  and  ample.1 

§  174  (110).  Revival  by  new  Charter  and  its  Effect.  —  Tt  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  English  courts  that  where  the  functions  of  an  old 
corporation  arc  suspended,  or  where  the  corporation,  by  loss  of  all  its 
members,  or  of  an  integral  part,  is  dissolved  as  to  certain  purpo 
it  may  he  revived  by  <>  new  charter,  and  the  rights  of  the  old  corpora- 
tion be  granted  over  to  the  same,  or  a  new  set  of  corporators,  who  in 
such  case  take  all  the  rights  and  are  subject  to  all  the  liabilities  of 
the  old  corporation,  of  which  it  is  but  a  continuation.2 


1  Ante,  chap.  iv. ;  post,  sees.  185,  187, 
188,  189  ;  ante,  see.  170  and  notes,  172, 
173.  When  two  municipal  corporations 
(St.  Anthony  and  Old  Minneapolis)  were 
merged,  by  legislative  act,  into  a  new  cor- 
poration, it  was  held  that  the  new  corpo- 
ration, by  force  of  provisions  in  the  act,  was 
liable  for  a  tort,  for  which  one  of  the  con- 
stituent corporations  would  have  been  re- 
sponsible if  the  merger  had  not  taken 
place.  Adams  v.  Minneapolis,  20  Minn. 
484  (1874). 

2  Rex  v.  Passmore,  3  Term  R.  119, 
247  ;  Regina  v.  Bewdley,  1  P.  Wins.  207  ; 
Colchester  v.  Brooke,  7  Queen's  Bench, 
383  ;  Colchester  v.  Seaber,  3  Burr.  1866  ; 
Grant  on  Corporations,  304  and  note  ;  2 
Kyd,  516.  Whether  a  statute  or  legisla- 
tive charter  will  operate  to  revive  or 
continue  an  old,  or  to  create  a  new  and 
distinct  corporation,  depends  upon  the  in- 


tention of  the  legislature.  Ante,  chap,  v. ; 
Bellows  v.  Bank,  &c,  2  Mason  C.  C.  43, 
per  Story,  J.;  Angell  k  Ames,  sec.  7~!  . 
Grant  on  Corporations,  304,  305  ;  Hoffman 
v.  Van  Nostrand,  42  Burl).  174  ;  Girard  v. 
Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1  ;  Olney  v.  Harvey, 
50  111.  453  (1869);  supra,  sees.  170,  171, 
172,  173;  post,  sees.  176,  177;  Neely  <■. 
Yorkville,  10  S.  C.  141.  Approving  text, 
as  to  whom  the  revenue  is  to  be  paid  on 
the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  in  New 
Jersey.  See  Heckel  v.  Sandford,  40  N.  J. 
L.  ISO.  The  late  civil  war  did  not  sus- 
pend the  right  to  the  exercise  of  the  fran- 
chises of  an  incorporated  town  within  the 
lines  of  the  insurrectionary  forces,  and  it 
might  still  make  valid  contracts,  notwith- 
standing it  was  under  the  control  of  the 
insurgent  power.  Selma  v.  Mullen,  46 
Ala.  411  (1S71). 


VOL.  I.  — 17 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  176 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

CORPORATE   NAME,  BOUNDARIES,   AND   SEAL. 

§  175  (117).  Name  by  Grant,  by  Implication,  and  by  Prescrip- 
tion ;  Power  to  change.  —  Every  corporation  must  have  a  name. 
This  is  essential  to  distinguish  it  from  other  corporations.  In  Eng- 
land, before  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Will.  IV. 
ch.  lxxvi.,  1835,1  such  corporations  obtained  their  name  by  having  it 
expressed  in  their  charter  (whether  royal  or  parliamentary),  or  by 
usage  or  by  implication.2  If  a  particular  name  be  given  to  a  corpo- 
ration in  its  charter,  the  corporation  can  no  more  change  it  at  its 
pleasure  than  a  man  can  at  pleasure  change  his  baptismal  name. 
If  no  name  be  given  to  a  corporation  by  its  charter  or  by  statute, 
it  may  obtain  one  by  implication.  Where  a  corporation  exists  by 
prescription,  it  may  have  more  than  one  name,  but  the  names,  to  be 
recognized  as  valid,  must  be  prescriptive,  and  cannot  be  acquired  by 
usage  within  the  time  of  memory.  It  has  been  decided,  in  England, 
thai  a  corporation  may  have  one  name  by  prescription  and  another 
by  grant;  but  it  is  said  that  the  same  corporation  cannot,  at  the 
same  time,  have  two  different  names  by  different  grants,  for  the 
name  in  the  last  grant  will  take  the  place  of  the  other.3 

§  17G  (US).  Name  under  English  Municipal  Corporations  Act. 
—  But  the  English  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  just  mentioned, 
which  changed  the  corporate  constitution  of  the  cities,  towns,  and 
boroughs  of  England  and  Wales,  and  reduced  them  to  a  uniform 
model,  made  this  provision  as  to  the  name  of  the  corporation,  under 
the  new  act :  "  Said  body,  or  reputed  body,  corporate  shall  take  and 
bear  the  name  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  burgesses  of  such 
borough,  and  by  that  name  shall  have  perpetual  succession,  and 
shall  be  capable,  in  law,  by  the  council  hereinafter  mentioned  of 
such  borough,  to  do  and  suffer  all  acts  which  now  lawfully  they  and 

i  Ante,  sec.  36,  and  note.  1   Str.   614  ;    Smith  v.  Tal.  PI.  R.  Co.,  30 

-'  Clover,  52,  53;  Willo.  35;  Grant,  50;  Ala.    650   (1857).      See   also,   All   Saints 

ante,  Bee   12.    As  to  usage,  see  ante,  chap.  Church  v.  Lovett,   1  Hall  (N.  Y.),   191  ; 

v.  sec.  92.  Manufacturing  Co.  v.   Davis,    14   Johns. 

Knight  r.  Wells,   1   Ld.   Raytn.  80;  238  ;  Middlesex,  &c.  v.  Davis,  3  Met.  133; 

Physicians  v.  Salmon,  3  Salt  102  ;  Com.  Trustees  v.  Peaslee,  15  N.  H.  317  ;  Soci- 

I  ii      French.  F.  'J  ;  per  Holt,  1  3alk.  191;  ety,  &c.  v.  Young,  2  N.  H.  310. 


§  177  CORPORATE   NAME.  259 

their  successors  may  do  and  suffer,  by  any  name  or  title  of  incorpo- 
ration, so  far  as  not  altered  or  annulled  by  the  provisions  of  tins 
act."  1  It  is  settled  by  the  decisions  under  this  act  that  the  true  or 
proper  corporate  name  for  boroughs  mentioned  in  it  is  "  mayor,  alder- 
men, and  burgesses  of  the  borough  of ,"  and  (under  the  inter- 
pretation clause,  sec.  142  of  the  act)  for  cities,  "  mayor,  aldermen, 

and  citizens  of  the  city  of ."  2     It  may  also  be  here  observed 

that  the  courts  have  determined  that,  though  this  act  changed  the 
name  and  made  new  and  important  alterations  in  the  constitution 
of  the  corporations,  yet  that  its  effect  was  not  in  any  case  to  create  a 
new  corporation,  but  to  continue  the  old,  with  all  its  rights,  privi- 
leges, and  franchises,  except  so  far  as  inconsistent  with  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act.3  But  the  name  mentioned  in  the  act  would 
doubtless  govern,  and  by  that  they  would  have  to  sue  and  be 
sued. 

§  177  (119).  Name  under  Charter  or  Legislative  Act  in  this 
country. — Municipal  Charters  granted  by  legislative  enactment  in 
this  country  almost  invariably  prescribe  the  name  of  the  corporate 

body   thus :   "  The   inhabitants   of  the   city   or   town   of are 

hereby  constituted  a  body  politic  and  corporate,  by  the  name  and 
style  of  '  city  of '  or  '  town  of .'  "  4  So  the  general  muni- 
cipal incorporation  acts  usually  contain  a  provision  to  the  effect 
that  "  cities  and  towns  organized  or  to  be  organized  thereunder  are 
declared  to  be  bodies  politic  and  corporate,  under  the  name  and 
style  of  the  city  of ,  or  town  of ,  as  the  case  may  be,"  &c. 

1  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  chap,  lxxvi.,  sec.  of  electing  members  were  changed,  the 
6  ;  ante,  sec.  35,  and  note.  By  the  Con-  identity  of  the  body  itself  was  not  affected." 
Bolidated   Municipal  Corporations  Act  of    Ante,  chap.  vii.  sees.  171,  176. 

1882,  sec.  8,  it  is  provided  that  "  the  Mu-  4  Ante,  sec.  39.    Harrison,  Munic.  Man- 

nicipal  Corporation  of  a  borough  shall  bear  ual,  4th  ed.  11. 

the  name  of  the    mayor,    aldermen,    and  The  proper  corporate  name  of  a  muniei- 

burgesses  of  the  borough,  or  in  the  case  of  pal  corporation  ought  always  to  be  used, 

a  city,  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  citizens  But  it  has  hen  derided  in  Canada  that  a 

of  the  'it y. "  by-law  of  a  municipal  council  is  valid  if  it 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Corporation  of  appear  on  the  face  of  it  to  have  been  en- 
Worcester,  2  Phillips,  3;  Corporation  of  acted  by  a  municipal  body  having  author- 
Rochester  v.  Lee,  15  Sim.  376 ;  Grant,  ity  to  make  the  by-law  under  the  muni- 
342;  Kawlinson,  13.  cipal  laws.     Flewellvn  r.  Webster,  6  IT.  C. 

8  Corporation  of  Ludlow  v.  Tyler,  7  Q.  B.  586;  Hawkins  v.  Huron,  Perth  and 
Car.  &  P.  537  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Wil-  Bruce,  in  re,  2  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  72: 
son,  9  Sim.  30,  48  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Fisher  v.  Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
Kerr,  2  Beav.  420,  429  ;  Attorney-General  492  ;  Barclay  and  Darlington,  In  re,  1 1 
v.  Corporation  of  Leicester,  9  Beav.  546  ;  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  470  ;  Brophy  and  Gran- 
Doe,  &c.  v.  Norton,  11  M.  8c  W.  913,  928.  anoqne,  26  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  290  ;  see 
Parke,  B.,  there  said,  "Though  the  name  also  Gwynne  v.  Bees,  2  Upper  Can.  P.  R. 
and  style  of  the  corporation,  and  the  mode  2S2. 


2G0 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATION-. 


§179 


Where  such  an  act  authorized  any  existing  town  or  city  to  adopt 
its  provisions  Ln  place  of  its  special  charter,  and  was  silent  as  to 
irporate  name  after  the  change  was  made,  it  was  held  that  the 
former  name  was  retained.1 

£  L78  (120).  Change  of  Name;  Name  by  Reputation. — Where 
(:  : .-, „  to  a  municipal  corporation  by  charter  or  statute,  this 
cannot  be  changed  by  the  act  of  the  corporation.2  But  in  this  coun- 
try, general  statutes  are  uot  unfrequent,  authorizing  the  creation  of 
quasi  corporations,  without  making  it  necessary  to  designate  the 
name  by  which  a  particular  district  shall  be  called;  in  such  case  it 
may  acquire  a  nana  by  reputation,  and  sue  and  he  sued  by  such 
name.8 

§  170  (121).  Misnomer  and  Effect  thereof.  —  A  misnomer,  or 
variation  from  the  precise  name  of  the  corporation,  in  a  grant  or 
obligation  by  or  to  it,  is  not  material,  if  the  identity  of  the  corpora- 
tion is  unmistakable,  cither  from  the  face  of  the  instrument  or  from 
the  averments  and  proof.4 


1  Johnson  v,  Indianapolis,  16  Ind.  227 

( Jorporate  name  of  the  city  or- 

ed  under  a  general  acl  not  judicially 

noticed,     lb.      Limits  of  Indianapolis  are 

tixed  by  public  law,  and   public  records 

open  to  all.   Newman  v.  Sylvester,  42  Ind. 

I  373)  ;  ante,  sees.  11,  83. 

2  Willcock,  34,  37,  38  ;  Regina  v.  Re- 
gistrar Joint  Si.,.!,  Co  ..  LOQ.  B.  839.    See 

pal,  &c.Society  v.  Episcopal  Church, 
1   Pick.   372.     Change  of  name  does  not 
aarily  involve  a  change  of  identity. 
Girard   v.   Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1 ;  a 
p.  vii.  see.  174. 
-  qooI  Districl  v.  Blakeslee,  L3  Conn. 
227  (1  339);  The  Qui  en   v.   The  Registrar 
of  Joint  Stcck  Cos.,  10  Q.  B.  839  ;  Episco- 
pal Charitable  Society  v.  Episcopal  Church, 
1   Pick.  372 ;   see   further,   The    King  v. 
Norris,  l    Ld.   Raym.  337  ;  Th 

liffa  of  [pswich,  2   Ld.  Raym.    1232, 

1238,   1239.      As  to  quasi  corporations, 

.   see.   22,  and  note  ;  post,  chapter  on 

IIS. 

'   Inhabitants*.  String,  5  Halst.  (N.  J.) 
!9);    Neely    v.    Yorkville,    10  S. 
('.  in,   approving  text;  Kentucky  Sem- 
inary d.  Wallace,   L6  B.   Mon.  35  (1854); 
New     Yoik    Conference    v.   Clarkson,    4 


Halst.  Ch.  (N.J.)  541  (1851);  Angell  & 
Ames,  sec.  185;  Pendleton  v.  Bank  of 
Kentucky,  1  -Mon.  177  ;  Medway  Cotton 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Adams,  10  .Mass. 
360  ;  People  v.  Love,  19  Cal.  676  ;  African 
Society  v.  Varick,  13  Johns.  3S  ;  Woolrich 
v.  Forrest,  1  Pa.  115  ;  Bower  v.  State 
Bank,  5  Ark.  234  ;  Pierce  v.  Somerworth, 
10  N.  H.  369;  Pittsburgh  v.  Craft,  1 
Pitts.  (Pa.)  158  (1871);  Douglas  v.  Branch 
Bank,  &c,  19  Ala.  659.  Slight  varia 
in  the  use  of  corporate  names,  where  sub- 
stantially correct,  have  been  held  immate- 
rial even  in  matters  of  contract.  Brock 
Districl  v.  Bowen,  7  Upper  Can.  Q.  I!. 
171  ;  The  Trent  and  Frankford  Road  Co. 
v.  Marshall,  10  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  336  ; 
Whitby  i>.  Harrison,  18  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
603  ;  Bruce  v.  Cromar,  22  Upper  Can. 
Q.  15.  321.  See  also  Mayor  and  Bur- 
3  of  l.ynne  Regis,  10  Coke  Rep.  120, 
122;  Mayor  of  Carlisle  v.  Blamire  et  al., 
8  East,  487  ;  The  King  v.  Croke,  Cowp. 
>j!i  ;  Beveilcy  r-  Harlow,  10  Upper  Can. 
C.  P.  178  ;  Goodwin  and  The  Ottawa  and 
Prescott  Railway  Co.,  In  re,  13  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  254.  It  was,  however,  held 
differently  as  to  the  entitling  of  a  rule  in 
a  proceeding  against  a  municipal  corpora- 


180 


MISNOMER    AND    EFFECT   THEREOF. 


261 


§  180  (122).  Same  subject.  —  Where  the  intention  of  th e  testator 
is  clear,  a  mistake  in  the  name  or  description  of  the  object  of  las 
bounty  will  not  make  the  devise  void.  This  general  principle  is 
applicable  to  all  corporations,  private  and  public.    But  the  intention 

must  be  so  clear  as  to  remove  all  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  cor- 
poration meant.  This  rule  may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  exampl 
Thus,  a  devise  to  a  college  by  its  common  name,  though  not  the 
true  corporate  name,  is  good.1  So  where  the  devisees  were  called 
by  their  popular  name,  "  The  South  Parish  in  Sutton"  their  legal 
name  being  "  The  First  Parish  in  Sutton,"  the  devise  was  sustained.2 
So,  also,  the  "Mayor,  Jurats,  and  Commonalty  of  the  Town  of 
Rye,"  that  being  the  corporate  name,  were  held  entitled  to  lands  by 
a  devise  to  "The  Right  Worshipful  the  Mayor,  Jurats,  and  Town 
Council  of  the  Town  of  Eye,"  although  there  was  no  town  council 
in  the  town,  and  although  the  court  admitted  the  proposition  of 
counsel  against  the  will,  that  if  the  "  intent  appeai-s  to  give  to  a 
part  of  the  corporation,  although  that  intent  fails  of  effect,  the 
whole  corporation  cannot  take." 3  So,  also,  a  devise  to  the  Mayor, 
Chamberlain,  and  Governors,  is  valid  to  a  corporation  whose  true 
name  is  Mayor,  Citizens,  and  Commonalty*    So,  a  legacy  may  be  given 


tion.  Sains  v.  Toronto,  9  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  181  ;  Harrison,  Munic.  Manual,  4th 
ed.  11. 

"  The  general  rule  to  be  collected  from 
the  cases  is,"  says  Chancellor  Ki  nt,  "  that 
a  variation  from  the  precis<  name  of  the 
corporation,  when  the  true  name  is  neces- 
sarily to  be  collected  from  the  instrument, 
or  is  shown  by  proper  averments,  will  not 
invalidate  a  grant  by  or  to  a  corporation, 
or  a  contract  with  it,  and  the  modern 
bOw  an  increased  liberality  on  this 
subject."  2  Kent  Com.  292;  approved, 
St.  Louis  Hospital  v.  Williams,  Adminis- 
trator, 19  Mo.  609  (1854).  "We  adopt 
the  more  reasonable  rale  laid  down  by  Mr. 
Kyd  (Corp.  Vol.  I.  pp.  286,  288),  that 
the  variance  must  be  materially  different 
in  substance,  to  injure."  Per  Curiam, 
People  v.  Rankle,  9  Johns.  117,  157. 

"1  take  the  law  of  the  present  day  to 
be,  that  a  departure  from  the  strict  style 
of  the  corporation  will  not  avoid  its  con- 
tracts, if  it  substantially  appear  that  the 
particular  corporation  was  intended,  and 
that  a  latent  ambiguity  may,  under  proper 
averments,  be  explained  by  parol  evidence 
in  this  as  in  other  cases,  to  show  the  in- 
tention."     Per  Gibson,   J.,    in   President, 


&e.  v.  Myers,  6  Serg.  &  Rawle,  12  ;  s.  P. 
Milford,  &e.  Co.  v.  Brush,  10  Ohio,  111. 

When  an  act  of  parliament  makes  a 
grant  to  a  corporation,  it  takes  effect 
though  the  true  corporate  name  be  not 
used,  provided  the  corporation  intended 
be  sufficiently  identified  or  described.  1 
Kyd,  256  ;  Chancellor  of  Oxford's  Case,  L0 
Co.  44,  bib. 

1  Chancellor  of  Oxford's  Case,  10  Co. 
876. 

-  First  Parish  in  Sutton  v.  Cole,  3  Pick. 
232  (1825),  and  eases  there  cited. 

:  Attorney-General  v.  Mayor  of  Rye, 
7  Taunton,  546;  2  Eng.  Com.  Law,  213 
(1817). 

4  Owen,  35  (14  Eliz.).  "The  devise 
held  good  by  Dyer,  Weston,  and  Jfi a 
for  it  shall  be  taken  according  to  the  in- 
tent of  the  devisor."  See  also  Counden  v. 
Clerke,  Hobart,  32;  Croydon  Hospital  v. 
Farley,  6  Taunton,  467  :  1  Eng.  I 
Law,  457  (1816).  wl  ,  C.  J.,  justly 

condemns  the  absurd  nicety  of  many  of 
the  decisions  from  the  reign  of  Edward 
VI.  tn  the  end  of  James  I.,  on  the  subject 
of  the  names  ami  description  of  corporate 


262 


Ml/NICIl'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


§182 


or  a  devise  made  to  a  corporation  either  by  its  corporate  name  or  by 
a  description  which  clearly  distinguishes  and  identifies  the  legatee.1 

§181     (123).      Corporate   Name  in   Suits.  —  Where    the  name  of 

the  corporation  is  expressly  defined  by  charter  or  statute,  it  is  usu- 
ally provided  in  terms  that  by  such  name  it  may  site  and  be  sun/. 
[n  such  case  the  true  corporate  name  should  be  used  both  in  suits 
by  and  against  the  corporation.  A  name  in  a  grant  or  obligation  to 
or  by  a  corporation  may  be  sufficient  to  enable  the  corporation  to 
enjoy  or  to  make  it  liable,  which  would  not  be  sufficient  in  an  action 
by  or  against  it.2  If  the  name  of  a  corporation  is  lawfully  changed, 
not  the  identity  of  the  corporation  itself,  suit  should,  in  general, 
unless  provision  be  otherwise  made,  be  in  the  new  name.3  If  a 
note,  bond,  or  other  promise  be  made  to  a  corporation  by  a  name 
differing  from  the  corporate  name,  the  corporation  may  sue  in 
its  true  name,  and  allege  that  it  is  the  party  to  whom  the  promise 
or  obligation  was  made.4 

§    182     (124).      Corporate    Boundaries    must   be    definite. — Since 
the  leading  object  of  an  American  municipal  corporation  is  to  invest 


1  New  York  Institute  v.  How,  10  N.  Y. 
(6  Seld.)  84  (1854).  In  this  ease  the 
plaintiff,  whose  corporate  name  was  "The 
New  York  Institution  for  the  Blind,"  was 
decided  to  he  entitled  to  a  legacy  given  to 
the  "Trusters  of  the  Institution  for  the 
Maintenance  and  Instruction  of  the  Indi- 
gent Blind,"  there  being  no  other  institu- 
tion  in  the  city  of  New  York  for  the  blind, 
dso  Vansant  v.  Roberts,  3  Md.  L19; 
Preachers'  Aid  Society,  45  Me.  552  ;  Cha- 
pin  v.  School  District,  &c,  35  N.  H.  445  ; 
Minot  v.  Boston  Asylum,  7  Met.  416. 
Parol  evidence  may,  in  proper  cases,  be  re- 
ceived to  identify  the  corporation  Intended. 
Trustees  v.  Peaslee,  15  X.  H.  317  ;  Bod- 
man  i'.  American  Tract  Society,  9  Allen, 
117. 

-  Cambridge  University  v.  Crofts,  10 
Mod.  208  :  LKyd,  253  ;  Willc.  37  ;  Brit- 
tan  v.  Newland,  •_'  Dev.  k  Bat  (N. 
C.)  863 ;  Insane  Asylum  /•.  Higgins,  L5 
111.  185  ;  Berks  Co.,  &c.  u.  Myers,  6  Serg. 
&  Rawle  (Pa.),  12  ;  Clarke  v.  Potti  i  Co.,  1 
B  in  (Pa  (,  I'-;  ;  Port<  r  v.  Blakely,  1  Roo1 
(i  Mini.),  44o  ;  Kentucky  Seminary  v. 
Wall  i  ■• ,  i:,  B.  Mon.  •■',:<  ;  Romeo  *•.  <  Ihap- 
inin,  'J  Mich.  17'.'.  County  Court  v. 
Griawold,  58  Mo.   170   (1874);  Cardei   v. 


Comm'rs,   16  Ohio    St.   353  ;   Trustees  v. 
Campbell,  16  Ohio  St.  11. 

3  Colchester  v.  Seaber,  3  Burr. 
1866  ;  Itegina  v.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Baym. 
1232,  1238  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  sec.  644  ; 
Glover,  63.  Mr.  Kyd  says  :  "  Where  a 
corporation  becomes  liable  to  any  duty, 
and  then  its  name  is  changed,  the  writ 
brought  against  it  should  be  in  the  new 
name."  1  Corp.  288.  On  a  merger,  by 
statute,  of  a  tmrn  intoac%  corporation,  it 
was  provided  that  all  of  the  hooks,  papers, 
moneys,  and  ell'ects  of  the  former  should 
vest  in  the  latter.  Held,  thai  a  suit  on  a 
bond  made  to  a  town  before  the  transfer 
could  not  afterwards  he  instituted  in  the 
name  of  the  town,  but  should  be  brought 
in  the  corporate  name  of  the  city.  Fort 
Wayne  v.  Jackson,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  36 
(1843). 

*  10  Co.  125/-.-  1  Kyd,  287;  African 
Society  >:  Vaiiek,  13  Johns.  38  (1816); 
Trustees  r.  1,'eiieau,  2  Swan  (Tetlll.),  i»4 
(1852);  Fori  Wayne  v.  Jackson,  7  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  36  (1843).  An  allegation  that  the 
defendants  acknowledged  themselves  to  be 
bound  unto  the  plaintiff's,  by  the  descrip- 
.  &c,  is  equivalent  to  such  an  aver- 
ment.    13  Johns.  38,  supra. 


§182 


BOUNDARIES   MUST    BE    DEFINITE. 


203 


the  inhabitants  of  a  defined  locality  or  place  with  a  corporate  ex- 
istence, chiefly  for  the  purposes  of  local  government,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  geographical  limits  or  boundaries  of  the  corporation  ought 
to  be  defined  and  certain.  These  boundaries  are  usually  described  in 
the  charter  or  constituent  act,  or  a  method  is  prescribed  therein,  by 
which  they  may  be  ascertained  and  settled.  Because  residence 
within  the  corporation  confers  rights  and  imposes  duties  upon  the 
residents,  and  the  local  jurisdiction  of  the  incorporated  place  is,  in 
most  cases,  confined  to  the  limits  of  the  corporation,  it  is  necessary 
that  these  limits  be  definitely  fixed.1     They  are  established  by  legis- 

1  Cutting  v.  Stone,  7  Vt.  471  ;  Gray  v. 
Sheldon,  8  Vt.  402  ;  Pierce  v.  Carpenter, 
10  Vt.  480.  The  general  ride  is  that  mu- 
nicipal corporations  cannot  exercise  their 
powers  beyond  their  own  limits,  but  there 
are  some  exceptions,  as  for  example  to  pro- 
vide for  the  discharge  of  sewage.  Cold- 
water  v.  Tucker,  36  Mich.  474  (1877)  ; 
s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  601  ;  Gilchrist's  Ap- 
peal, 109  Pa.  St.  600.  Whether  particular 
property  is  within  the  boundaries  of  a  city 
is  a  question  of  fact.  Indianapolis  v.  Mc- 
Avoy,  86  Ind.  587. 

As  to  boundaries  generally,  and  con- 
struction of  acts  relating  thereto,  see  Ham- 
ilton v.  McNeil,  13  Gratt.  (Va.)  389; 
Raab  v.  Maryland,  7  Md.  483  ;  Green  v. 
Cheek,   5  Ind.  105  ;  People  v.  Carpenter, 

24  N.  Y.  86  ;   Elmendorf  v.   Mayor,  &c, 

25  Wend.  693  ;  post,  sees.  562,  634.  A 
municipal  corporation  cannot  usually  ex- 
ercise its  powers  beyond  its  own  limits. 
Considerations  of  public  policy  sometimes 
induce  the  legislature  to  grant  authority 
to  do  so,  as  where  a  water  supply  must  be 
obtained  from  a  distance.  Coldwater  v. 
Tucker,  36  Mich.  474  (1877). 

Places  bounded  on  rivers :  The  following 
cases  relate  to  questions  which  have  arisen 
with  respect  to  places  bounded  on  rivers. 
An  act  extending  the  bounds  of  a  town 
over  the  adjacent  navigable  waters  does 
not  thereby  grant  to  the  town  the  land 
covered  by  the  water,  and  consequently 
confers  no  right  to  make  rules  to  regulate 
the  use  of  such  land,  although  such  an  act 
will  bring  the  territory  within  the  limits 
of  the  town  for  the  purpose  of  civil  and 
criminal  jurisdiction.  Palmer  v.  Hicks,  6 
Johns.  133  (1810). 

In  X>  it-  Hampshire,  towns  bounded  by 
or  on  rivers  not  navigable,  or  by  lines  up 


and  down  the  river,  extend  to  the  centre 
of  the  river,  and  this  principle  is  held  to 
apply  to  the  great  streams,  the  Connecti- 
cut and  the  Merrimack.  State  v.  Canter- 
bury, 8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  195  (1854); 
State  v.  Gilmanton,  14  N.  H.  467.  See, 
also,  Cold  Springs,  &c.  v.  Tolland,  9  Cush. 
492. 

In  Connecticut,  towns  bounded  on  riv- 
ers in  some  instances  take  the  land  on 
each  side  of  the  river,  in  which  case  the 
whole  river  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  town.  In  other  instances,  where 
towns  are  bounded  on  rivers,  the  jurisdic- 
tion thereof  is  construed,  without  any  ex- 
press provision  to  that  effect,  and  in  vir- 
tue of  ancient  usage  to  that  effect,  to 
extend  to  the  centre  of  the  stream.  Op- 
posite towns  have  each  political  and  civil 
jurisdiction  to  the  centre,  though  the 
charter  limits  extend  only  to  the  stream 
or  margin  or  channel  thereof.  Pratt  v. 
State  (assault  on  officer  on  the  river  Con- 
necticut), 5  Conn.  388  (1824);  Hayden  v. 
Noyes  (oyster  fishery  on  the  Connecticut 
River),  5*  Conn.  391,  395.  Hosiaer,  C.  J. 
(5  Conn.  395),  remarks  :  "  Every  part  of 
the  Connecticut  River,  so  far  as  it  relates 
to  jurisdiction,  is  within  some  town  in  the 
State  ;  or  these  waters  would  be  a  sanctu- 
ary for  debtors  or  criminals.  Such  has 
been  the  invariable  usage." 

The  jurisdiction  of  Brooklyn,  for  police 
purposes,  extends  to  low-ieater  line  whether 
formed  naturally  or  artificially.  Furman 
Street,  17  Wend.  649.  661.      See   I'dall  r. 

Trustees,  19  Johns.  175;  Strykerw.  Mayor, 

19  Johns.  17i»  ;  as  to  boundary  of  New 
York  City.  By  statute,  the  bounds  of 
extend  to  the  middle  of  the  Hud- 
son Piver.  9  Wend.  602.  Eastern  boun- 
dary line  o(  St.  Louis  was  defined  by  the 


264 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§183 


lative  authority.     The  power  to  incorporate  a  place  necessarily  in- 
cludes the  power  to  fix  its  boundaries.1 

^   L83.    Legislative  Power  to  fix  and  determine  Geographical  Limits; 
Delegation  of  such  Power. —  The  fundamental  idea  of  a  municipal 
ration  proper,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  is  to  invest 
■  or  densi  populations  with  the  power  of  local  self-government. 
Indeed,  the  necessity  for  such  corporations  springs  from  the  exist- 
of  centres  or  agglomerations  of  population,  having,  by  reason 
of  density  and  numhers,  local  or  peculiar  interests  and  wants,  not 
common  to  adjoining  sparsely  settled  or  agricultural  regions.     It  is 
necessary  to  draw  the  line  which  defines  the  limits  of  the  place  and 
people  to  be  incorporated.     This  is  with  us  a  legislative  function.2 
And,  therefore,  in  a  special  charter  incorporating  a  place,  the  boun- 
daries are  expressly  defined  in  the  charter  itself,  and  the  power  of 
the  legislation  by  its  direct  action  thus  to  determine  the  extent  of  the 
geographical  limits  of  the   corporation  is  very  broad,   and  in  fact 
unlimited,  except  where,  the  provisions  of  the  charter  are  such  as 
would    contravene    constitutional    limitations,    express    or    implied. 
But   where   municipalities  are   organized   under  general  statutes  no 


charter  to  be  the  Mississippi  River,  and  it 
held  to  extend  to  the  middle  of  the 
in,  and  doI  simply  to  the  bank.    Jones 
v.  Soulard,  24  How.  11  (1860). 

In  P  ■  if  a  municipal  corpo- 

ration is  bounded  by  a  uavigable  river  its 
low-water  mark  is  the  limit.  Gilchrist's 
Appeal,  L09  Pa.  St.  600. 

Where  the  riparian  proprietor  only 
owns  to  high-water  mark,  and  all  below 
belongs  to  the  State,  a  city  cannot  tax 
lots  covered  by  water  beyond  high-water 
mark       -  \    Jersey    City,    1   Dutch. 

(X.  J.)  525  ;  1  Dutch.  530. 

s  of  adjacent 
towns  bounding  on  a  river  running  be- 
n  them.  Brookline  v.  Westminster, 
J  Vt.  224  ;  Granby  v,  Thurston,  23  Conn. 
416.  Thi  -  ii  construction  that  is  given 
v  Inch  pre- 
scribe the  boundary  of  incorporated  terri- 

Tlnis,  where  a  >1  ream  not  ic- 
hie  is  made  the  boundary,   the  centre  of 
line.    <  'old  Spi  ■ 
:  i2)  (action 

ive  bridge);  Inhabitants  of  Ips- 
.  13  Pick.  431  :  Granger  v.  Avery,  64 
174). 


1  Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  156; 
Kelly  r.  Pittsburgh,  104  U.  S.  78.  The 
power  to  change  the  territorial  limits  of  a 
municipal  corporation  cannot,  in  Tennes- 
see, lie  delegated  to  a  court.  Willett  v. 
Bellville,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),  1.  "It  is  cer- 
tainly not  within  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  give  to  a  municipal  corporation  the 
power  of  absorbing  as  much  of  the  property, 
and  as  many  of  the  people,  of  a  county,  as 
it  may  suit  the  wishes  of  the  municipal 
authorities  to  make  subjects  of  their  taxa- 
tion and  ordinances."  Irving,  J.,  County 
Commissioners  v.  Bladensburg,  51  Md. 
465.  The  legislature  may,  in  Arkansas, 
vest  in  a  court  the  power  to  determine 
when  the  limits  of  a  town  may  be  ex- 
tended. Foreman  v.  Town  of  Marianna, 
4:?  Ark.  324.  A  petition  praying  for  a 
vri  t"  bring  up  the  record  of  such  a 
court,  must  show  that  the  petitioners  are 
interested  in  the  question  as  residents  or 
■■■  .  either  in  the  old  town  or 
in  the  district  sought  to  In-  annexed.  Per- 
kins v.  Holman,  13  Ark.  219. 

3.  '.»,   19,  22,   28,  29,   32,  37, 
41,  44,  54,  58,  72,  73. 


§183 


POWER    TO    FIX    LIMITS. 


L't;r, 


expression  of  the  legislative  will  as  to  the  exact  boundaries  of  any 
particular  place  proposing  to  become  incorporated  can  be  made.  The 
vital  question  of  boundaries  must  then  be  determined  in  some  other 
mode.  The  legislation  of  the  different  States  in  which  this  system  of 
organizing  municipal  corporations  has  been  adopted,  is  not  uniform 
in  its  details ;  but  the  authority  to  incorporate  has  usually  been 
restricted  as  in  England  to  cases  in  which  communities  more  or 
less  dense  and  populous  already  exist,  and  who  desire  to  take  on 
u  corporate  diameter  in  order  to  exercise  the  powers  of  local  gov- 
ernment.1 When  duly  organized  their  powers  are  prescribed  and 
defined  by  the  general  incorporating  statutes.  But  how  and  by 
whom  is  the  extent  of  territory  to  be  included  within  the  corporate 
limits  (which  necessarily  settles  what  property  and  what  persons 
will  become  subject  to  municipal  rule)  to  be  determined?  Unless 
specially  restrained  by  the  State  Constitution,  the  legislature  may 
delegate  this  power  to  appropriate  local  bodies  or  boards  or  officers  ; 2 
but  it  has  in  several  cases  been  made  a  question  how  far  this  power, 
which  is  essentially  political  or  administrative,  may  be  conferred 
upon  the  judicial  courts.  This  depends  somewhat  upon  local  con- 
stitutions, laws,  and  usages ;  and  the  principal  cases  on  the  subject 
are  referred  to  in  the  note.3 


1  People  v.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451 
(1874)  ;  S.  c.  18  Am.  Rep.  107,  where 
this  subject  is,  with  his  usual  ability, 
learnedly  examined  by  Campbell,  J.,  from 
whose  opinion  the  doctrines  of  the  text 
have  mainly  been  deduced. 

2  People  v.  Bennett,  supra ;  Blanchard 
v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96  (1860)  ;  People 
v.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86  (1861);  Devore'3 
Appeal,  56  Pa.  St.  163  ;  Borough  of 
Blooming  Valley  ;  lb.  66  ;  Osgood  v. 
Clark,  6  Fost.  (26  N.  H.)  307.  "Acts 
of  the  legislature  conferring  upon  muni- 
cipal corporations  the  power  to  extend  their 
limit*  have  been  generally  upheld  ;"  per 
Henry,  C.  J.  Kelly  v.  Meeks,  87  Mo. 
396,  citing  Stilz  v.  Indianapolis,  55  Ind. 
515  ;  Taylor  v.  Fort  Wayne,  47  Ind.  274  ; 
People  v.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451  ;  Blan- 
chard v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96;  Peoples. 
Carpenter,  '21  N.  Y.  86  ;  Devore's  Appeal, 
56  Pa.  St.  163,  and  the  text. 

In  The  People  v.  Bennett,  supra,  aris- 
ing under  the  Michigan  Statute  of  1873, 
for  the  general  incorporation  of  villages 
within  any  two  square  miles  of  territory, 
an  attempt  was  made  to  incorporate  as  one 


two  village  settlements  separated  by  in- 
tervening farms.  It  was  held  that  the 
statute  was  unconstitutional,  because  it 
allowed  the  petitioners  for  incorporation 
to  decide  upon  extent  of  territory  to  be  in- 
corporated, and  because  the  legislature  had 
attempted  to  delegate  legislative  powers  in 
this  respect  to  private  citizens,  instead  of 
legal  bodies,  boards,  or  officers,  no  notice, 
no  hearing,  and  no  right  to  a  hearing 
being  provided. 

3  People  v.  Bennett,  supra,  and  cases 
cited  in  last  note.  But  compare  with 
People  r.  Nevada,  6  Cal.  143,  in  which  it 
was  held  that  the  judicial  courts  could  not 
be  empowered  to  act  in  the  incorporation 
of  towns,  because  it  was  not  a  judicial  ict. 
Contra,  Kayser  v.  Trustees,  &c,  16  Mo. 
88  ;  mite,  see.  41,  note  ;  sec.  18'2,  note 
and  cases.  In  Illinois  it  lias  been  decided 
that  the  legislature  cannot  constitution- 
ally confer  upon  the  judicial  courts  the 
power  to  change  the  boundaries  of  muni- 
cipalities by  annexing  or  disannexing  terri- 
tory, as  such  acts  are  legislative  and  not 
judicial.  Galesbnrg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111. 
152.     See,  however,  Blanchard  r.  Bissell, 


266 


MUNICIPAL    COUPOUATIUNS. 


§184 


§   184     1  25      Only  one  Corporation  of  Same  Kind  in  Same  Area.  — 

T  ,  at  the  same  time,  within  the  same  territory,  two  dis- 

•  municipal  corporations,  exercising  the  same  powers,  jurisdictions, 
and  privileges.1 


11  Ohio  St.  96  (1SG0)  ;  post,  sec.  185, note. 
In  Arkansas  the  determination  of  what 
the  boundaries  are  is  within  the  power  of 
the  courts.  Little  Rock  v.  Parish,  36 
Ark.  L66. 

1  Wille.  on  Corp.  27  ;  Patterson  v. 
s,„  iety,  &c,  I  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  385, 
399,  per  0  een,  C.  J.  (1854)  ;  Hex  v. 
Paasmore,  3  Term  R.  '213  ;  Rex  v.  Amery, 
2  Bro.  P.  C.  336;  Grant  on  Corp.  18. 
"This,"  Bays  Osborn,  J.,  "is  a  self-evi- 
dent proposition."  Taylor  v.  Fort  Wayne, 
47  I  nd.  281  (1874)  ;  Strosser  v.  Fort 
Wayne,  100  ind.  443  ;  Drain  Commis- 
sioner v.  Baxter,  ."'7  Mich.  127. 

The  city  of  Chicago  adopted  an  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  any  person,  company,  or 
corporation  within  the  city,  or  within  a 
mile  of  the  city  limits,  from  engaging  in 
the  business  of  slaughtering  animals  for 
food,  or  packing  them  for  market,  or  ren- 
dering the  offal,  bones,  &c,  of  any  dead 
animal  matter,  &c,  .  .  .  until  they  shall 
have  obtained  a  license  therefor.  The 
defendant  was  a  corporation,  organized 
under  the  laws  of  the  State,  and  when  the 
suit  was  instituted  against  the  company  it 
was  carrying  on  the  kind  of  business  men- 
tioned in  the  ordinance.  Its  factory  was 
in  Cook  County,  outside  of  the  city  limit*, 
anil  within  the  town  of  Lake,  in  that 
county,  and  it  had  then  a  license  from 
the  town  of  Lake  to  carry  on  the  kind 
of  business  it  was  engaged  in,  but 
had  no  license  from  the  city  of  Chi- 
It  was  urged  that  the  city  of  < 'hi- 
o  had  no  power  to  pass  oi  enforce  the 
ordinance.  Walker,  J.,  who  delivered  the 
opinion,   after  a  careful   discussion   of  the 

questions,  viz. :  1.  Whether  the  General 
A  embly  had  granted  the  power  to  the 
city  of  Chicago  to  pass  an  ordinance  of 
ter  ;  2.  Whether  the  power 
was  also  granted  to  exercise  police  restraint 
outside  of  the  city  limits,  and  within 
ither  municipality,  Bays:  "We  must 
conclude  that  tie-  General  Assembly, 
rather  than  Bubject  one  large  city  to  such 
hazards    from   smaller    municipalities    in 


their  immediate  vicinity,  would  have  re- 
pealed the  charter  of  the  latter,  or  at  least 
curtailed  their  power.     What  in  the  open 
and  thinly  settled  country  would  not  be  ob- 
noxious as  a  nuisance,  would  in  the  heart 
of  a  city  be  a  terrible  nuisance.     Persons 
then  desiring  to  engage  in  particular  avoca- 
tions in  or  near  to  cities,   must  submit  to 
have  their  pursuits  limited  and  contracted. 
Whilst  trade,  manufactures,  and  commerce 
have  large  claims  on  the  laws  for  protection, 
theirs  is  not  the  only,  nor  have  they  the 
highest  claims.  .  .  .  To  accomplish   this 
purpose    (protect  health  and    lives),   the 
power    was    conferred    by    the    legislature 
upon  cities  and  villages  to  regulate  these 
establishments  for  the  distance  of  one  mile 
beyond  their  corporate  limits,  even  if  that 
should  lap  over  and  embrace  a  portion  of 
territory  embraced    in    the   boundaries  of 
another  municipality."     Chicago  Packing 
Co.  v.  Chicago,  88  111.  221  (1879).  Where 
the   boundary  line   of  a   corporation  was 
vague  and  indefinite,   the  practical  inter- 
pretation   which    had    been    given    to  the 
statute   by   the   citizens  of  the   disputed 
district  in  exercising  municipal  privileges, 
such  as  voting,  &c.,  was  adopted  by  the 
court.     Milne  v.    Mayor,    &c,    13  La.   69 
(1838).     See,   also,   Hamilton  v.   McNeil, 
13  Gratt.  (Va.)  389  (1856);  post,  sec.  420 
note.     Where  the  middle  of  a  road  is  tlie 
dividing  line  between  two  towns,  each  is 
bound  for  defects  within  its  own  limits. 
Tiny  cannot  be  jointly  indicted   for  a  de- 
fect  within    the  jurisdiction    of  one.       In 
this  case   the  defect  was   iii  a  bridge  form- 
ing pari  of  the  road.     State  v.  Thomaston 
and    Rockland,   74  Me.   198.     Boundaries 
may  be  defined  by  lima  use,  confirmed  by 
a  legislative  recognition.     People  v.  Farn- 
ham,  35  111.  562.     If  a  dwelling-house  is 
divided  by  tin-  boundary  line  between  two 
towns,    that    portion    of  the  house   which 
the    occupant     mainly    and    substantially 
makes  Ids   home    (as   by  sleeping,   eating, 
&c. )    fixes   his   residence,    and    lie    cannot 
elect    to   reside    and    be    taxed    ill  the  other 
town.     Chenery  v.  Waltham,  8  Cush.  327. 


§185 


ENLARGEMENT   OP   BOUNDARIES. 


2G7 


§185  (12G).  Enlargement  of  Boundaries. —  Not  only  may  the 
legislature  originally  fix  the  limits  of  the  corporation,  but  it  may, 
unless  specially  restrained  in  the  Constitution,  subsequently  annex,  or 
authorize  the  annexation  of,  contiguous  or  other  territory,  and  this 
without  the  consent,  and  even  against  the  remonstrance,  of  the 
majority  of  the  persons  residing  in  the  corporation  or  on  the  annexed 
territory.  And  it  is  no  constitutional  objection  to  the  exercise  of 
this  power  of  compulsory  annexation  that  the  property  thus  brought 
within  the  corporate  limits  will  be  subject  to  taxation  to  discharge 
a  pre-existing  municipal  indebtedness,  since  this  is  a  matter  which, 
in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restriction,  belongs  wholly  to 
the  legislature  to  determine.1 


In  Indiana  the  qualified  voters  of  a 
city  within  the  limits  of  a  township  are 
held  to  he  voters  of  the  township  for  the 
purpose  of  a  township  tax  in  aid  of  a  rail- 
road, and  their  property  taxable  within 
the  township  for  that  purpose.  Scott  v. 
Hausheer,  94  Iud.  1. 

i  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96 
(1860),  defining  contiguity  and  construing 
statute  authorizing  county  commissioners 
to  annex  ;  following  and  approving  Pow- 
ers v.  Wood  County,  8  Ohio  St.  285 
(1858).  Ante,  sec.  63  and  cases.  See 
also  Laramie  County  v.  Albany  County, 
92  U.  S.  307  (1875)  ;  Queen  v.  Local  Gov- 
erning Board,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  227  ;  Woods 
v.  Henry,  55  Mo.  560  ;  Giboney  v.  Girar- 
deau, 58  Mo.  141  ;  State  v.  McReynolds, 
61  Mo.  203  (1875)  ;  Layton  v.  New 
Orleans,  12  La.  An.  515  (1857)  ;  Arnoult 
v.  New  Orleans,  11  La.  An.  54  ;  Cheany  v. 
Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330  ;  Gorham  v. 
Springfield,  21  Me.  59  ;  Morford  v.  linger, 

8  Iowa,  82  (1859)  ;    St.  Louis  v.  Russell, 

9  Mo.  507(1845)  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Allen,  13 
Mo.  400  (1850) ;  Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56 
Pa.  St.  359  ;  Chandler  v.  Boston,  112 
Mass.  200  (1873)  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Spear- 
man, 12  Iowa,  112;  Wade  r.  Richmond, 
IS  Gratt.  (Va.)  583  (186S)  ;  Norris  v. 
Mayor,  &c.,  1  Swan  (Tenn.),  164  ;  Elston 
v.  (rawfordsville,  20  Ind.  272;  Edmunds 
v.  Gookins,  lb.  477  ;  Girard  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 7  Wall.  1  (1868)  ;  Covington  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548  ;  Graham  v. 
Greenville,  67  Tex.  62  (citing  text)  ; 
Board,  &c.  of  Chickasaw  Co.  v.  Board,  &c. 
of  Sumner  Co.,  58  Miss.  619  ;  Washbuni 
v.  Oshkosh,  00  Wis.  453.      "  It  would  re- 


quire," says  Sivan,  J.,  in  Powers  v.  Wood 
County,  8  Ohio  St.  285,  290,  "a  very 
artificial  and  unsound  mode  of  reasoning 
to  hold  that  territory  could  not  be  an- 
nexed to  a  town  which  owed  debts,  until 
the  owners  of  such  territory  were  paid  a 
compensation  in  money  for  a  proportional 
part  of  such  debts,  on  the  ground  that  the 
property  annexed  was  condemned  for  pub- 
lic use.  It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  a 
municipal  corporation  has  contracted  a 
debt  without  being  correspondingly  bene- 
fited." The  doctrine  of  the  text  approved. 
United  States  v.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  284 
(1877)  ;  noted,  ante,  sec.  63.  In  Michi- 
gan there  are  constitutional  limitations  on 
the  right  of  the  legislature  to  change, 
except  as  provided  in  the  Constitution, 
municipal  boundaries  so  far  as  to  interfere 
with  representative  districts.  Attorney- 
General  r.  Bradley,  36  Mich.  447  (1877)  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Holihan,  29  Mich. 
116. 

The  tenacity  with  which  the  people 
of  New  England  cling  to  the  popular  or 
town  form  of  government  has  been  before 
noticed  (ante,  sees.  28,  29)  ;  and  the  Con- 
stitution of  Massachusetts  in  the  second 
amendment,  accepted  in  1821,  contains 
the  provision  that  the  legislature  "  shall 
have  full  power  and  authority  to  erect  and 
constitute  municipal  or  city  governments, 
in  any  corporate  town  or  towns  in  this 
commonwealth,  .  .  .  provided,  that  no 
such  government  shall  be  erected  or  con- 
stituted in  any  town  not  containing  12,000 
inhabitants,  nor  unless  it  be  with  the  con- 
sent and  on  the  application  of  a  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  of  such  town  present 


MUNICIPAL    CORPOEATIONS. 


§186 


Property  and  debts  on  Legislative  Extinction. — "Where  no 

,  restrict  ,  the  corporaU   em  nd  powers  of 


and   voting    thereon  ting  duly 

warn  holden    for   thai    purpose." 

iture,  without  any  application 
by  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town  of  Brookline,  which  contained  a 
population  of  about  6,500,  annexed  it  to 
the  city  of  Boston,  the  act  to  take  effect  if 
accepted  by  a  majority  of  voters  voting  at 
i  eld  for  that  purpose.  In 
the  case  ol  Chandler  v.  Boston,  1 12  M 

I),    the  question   was  presented 

ther   an    enti  with    less    than 

L2.000  inhabitants  can  be   annexed   to   a 

.  md  ilso  «  nether  a  pri  vious  applica- 
tion of  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town  is  not  essential  to  thi 

ity  government  therein  or 
over  the  inhabitants  thereof.  The  validity 
of  the  act  providing  for  such  annexation 
was  sustained.  Sei  opinion  of  Justices,  6 
Cush.  580;  Warren  v.  Charlestown,  2 
Gray,  L04,  as  to  general  power  of  the 
Legislature  to  change  the  boundaries  of 
towns  and  cities.  Owners  of  property  in 
a  territory  proposed  to  be  annexed  have 
such  an  interest  in  the  matter  of  annexa- 
tion as  will  entitle  them  to  resort  to  the 
courts  to  question  the  validity  of  an  elec- 
tion to  determine  it.  Morris  v.  Nashville, 
6  Lea  (Tenn.  I,  337. 

It  is  held  in  Pennsylvania  that  under 
the  terms  of  the  act  ol  the  legislature  au- 
thorizing the  incorporation  of  villages,  the 

:.  laries  cannot  he  extended  so  as  to  in- 
clude a  largi  body  of  farm  lands;  hut  the 
district  to  he  incorporated  should  he  re- 
stricted  by  the  courts  in  which  the  pro- 
ceeding  is   had,    so   ;is    to    include   no  lnol'e 

than  the  village  itself  and  it-  proper  ti  rri- 
Borough  ol  Little  Meadows,  35  Pa. 
1 360)  :  Devore's  Appeal,  56  Pa. 
163  ;    Blooming    Valli  y,    56   Pa.    St. 
■  immented  on  by  ( ' 
bell,  .1.      People  v.  Bennett,  29  Mich.   i:.l 
(1-71);  s.   c.    is   Am.    Rep.    107.     A-   to 
aeral  municipal  purposes, 
i        rty  within  corporaU   limits, 
I  ions  on  the  right,  see  chap- 
Taxation,  post,  sees.  7'.'  l.  7'.'."'. 

i,  under  act  of  June  1 8,  1  B52, 

lot I  i    'i    City,     which    are    laid  off, 

platt.-d,    and    recorded,    may    he    included 


within  the  city  limits  by  resolution  of 
tie-  common  council.  Contiguous  territory 
not  thus  hud  off,  >vc  can  only  he  an- 
U(  -.'  d  bj  pi  i  :t  ion  to  t  he  board  of  county 
commissioners.  Jeffersonville  v.  Weems, 
:,  [nd.  (Porter)  547  (1854).  Annexed 
,  under  this  act,  //. .  ,i  not  all  be  con- 
tiguous  to  the  city  ;  if  they  are  contiguous 
to  each  other  and  one  is  contiguous  to  the 
city,  it  is  sufficient.  Hull  v.  Lafayette, 
108  Ind.  14.  One  or  more  citizens  of  the 
territory  SOUghl  to  he  annexed  may  main- 
tain injunction  to  prevent  tin  illegal  an- 
nexation (Delphi  f.  Startzman,  104  Ind. 
343),  hut  he  is  cstupih-.d  from  objecting  if  he 
delays  taking  action  when  lie  knows  the 
city  is  spending  large  sums  of  money  upon 
the  annexed  district,  even  though  its  pro- 
ceedings an-  void  by  reason  of  mistake 
of  fact  by  its  officers.  Strosser  v.  Fort 
Wayne,  100  Ind.  443.  See  also  as  to 
laches,  Logansport  v.  La  Rose,  99  Ind. 
117.  Where  there  is  jurisdiction  in  the 
annexation  proceedings,  irregularities  and 
errors  will  not  render  them  void  so  that 
they  may  be  attacked  in  collateral  pro- 
ceedings. Terre  Haute  v.  Beach,  96  Ind. 
143  ;  S.  P.  Cicero  v.  Williamson,  91  Ind. 
541.  An  individual  cannot  question  the 
right  of  the  corporation  to  exercise  tho 
functions,  powers,  and  authority  of  an  in- 
corporated city.  This  can  only  be  done 
by  quo  warranto  in  behalf  of  the  State. 
Mullikin  v.  Bloomington,  72  Ind.  161, 
(application  for  injunction  to  resl  rain  col- 
lection of  taxes  on  the  ground  that  the 
corporate  existence  was  unlawfully  chan,  ;i  d 
from  that  of  a  town  to  that  of  a  city,  re- 
fused). Construction  of  existing  laws  mi 
subject  of  annexation  of  Platte  Territory. 
Taylor  v.  Fort  Wayne,  47  Ind.  274  (1874). 

Effect  of  extension  of  corporate  limits 
on  ho  rht,  where  different  proi  is- 

Lons  are  made  for  country  and  town  home- 
steels.  Taylor  v.  Boulware,  17  Tex.  71  ; 
Finley  v.  Dietrick,  12  Iowa,  516;  Truax 
r.  Pool,  16  Iowa,  256. 

Ordinances    or   contracts  designed   to 

operate  throughout  the  city  at  !.:i  :  ,  I  v- 
tend  to  and  "/urate  within  swltsequeiit  en- 
larged municipal  limit*.  St.  bonis  Oas 
Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  46  Mo.  121  (1870). 


§  187  PROPERTY    AND    DEBTS   ON    DIVISION    OF   TOWN.  209 

counties,  cities,  and  towns  are  subject  to  legislative  control.  Where 
a  municipal  or  public  corporation  is  legislated  out  of  existence  and  its 
territory  annexed  to  other  corporations,  tlii:  latter,  unless  the  legis- 
lature otherwise  provides,  are  entitled  to  its  property,  and  severally 
liable  for  a  proportionate  .share  of  its  then  subsisting  legal  debts,  and 
vested  with  the  power  to  raise  revenue  wherewith  to  pay  them  by 
levying  taxes  upon  the  property  transferred  and  the  persons  residing 
therein.  The  creditors  of  the  extinguished  corporation  were  held  in 
the  case  cited  in  the  note  to  have  a  remedy  in  equity  against  the  cor- 
porations succeeding  to  its  property  and  powers,  to  have  the  amount 
ascertained,  apportioned,  and  adjudged  to  be  paid.1 

§  187  (127).  Property  and  debts  on  Division  of  Town.  —  In  con- 
nection with  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  create  municipal 
corporations  and  to  determine  their  territorial  extent,  reference 
may  be  made  to  the  division  of  towns  or  public  corporations  by  legis- 
lative act  or  authority.  There  is  no  restriction  on  the  general  power, 
unless  it  be  found  in  the  Constitution  of  the  State.2  In  case  of 
division,  the  legislature  may,  as  we  have  already  seen,  apportion  the 
burden  between  the  two,  and  determine  the  proportion  to  be  borne 
by  each.3    In  Connecticut, "  the  legislature,"  says  the  Supreme  Court, 

Recording  town  plats.  Bern  is  v.  Becker,  ville,  1  Boot  (Conn.),  184;  North  Yar- 
1  Kan.  226  ;  Mason  v.  Pitt,  21  Mo.  391  ;  mouth  v.  Shillings,  45  Me.  133;  Lakin  v. 
Strong  v.  Darling,  9  Ohio,  201  ;  post,  see.  Ames,  10  Cush.  198  ;  Brewster  v.  Har- 
628.  Where  the  power  to  alter  boundaries  wich,  4  Mass.  278;  Randolph  v.  Brain- 
is  committed  to  local  tribunals  their  acts  tree,  4  Mass.  315  ;  Blackstone  v.  Taft,  4 
must  he  strictly  within  the  powers  granted,  Gray,  250;  Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  East 
otherwise  they  will  be  void.  Jacksonville  Hartford,  16  Conn.  149  ;  East  Hartford  v. 
v.  L'Engle,  20  Fla.  344.  Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  17  Conn.  80  ;  Craw- 
Locality,  under  the  Canadian  system  of  ford  County  v.  Iowa  County,  2  Chand. 
municipal  government,  is  subject  to  taxa-  (Wis.)  14. 

tion.     Each  portion  of  a  county  therefore  i  Mount    Pleasant    v.    Beckwith,    100 

should  bear  its  proper  proportion   of  the  TJ.  S.  514  (1879);  noted  more  fully  ante, 

taxation  of  the  whole  county.     Where  a  sec.  170,  note. 

portion  is  detached  from  one  and  added  to  2  jin(,C)  chap.  iv.  sees.   54    63  ;  supra, 

another  county,  some  mode  of  adjustment  sec.  186.     Where  part  of  a  township  is  set 

of  existing  liabilities  becomes  indispensa-  off  to  form  another,  the  two  townships  are 

hie.     See  McKee  v.  Huron  District  Court,  not  both  new  corporations,  the  old  corpo- 

1  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  368  ;  North  Dumfries,  ration  continues  as  before,   and   remains 

v.  The  County  of  Waterloo,  12  Upper  Can.  chargeable    with    its   former  obligations. 

Q.    B.    507  ;    County    of    Wellington    v.  Courtright  v.  Brooks  Township,   54  Mich. 

Township  of  Waterloo,  8  Upper  Can.  C.  182. 

P.  358;  County  of  Wellington  v.  Town-         3  Ante,  sec.  63,  et  seq.;  Londonderry  v. 

ship  of  Wilmot,    17  Upper  Tan.    Q.   B.  Derry,  8  N.  H.  320  (1836);  Bristol  v.  New 

82.     See,  also,   Windham  v.   Portland,  4  Chester,  3  N.  H.  532;  Sill  v.  Coming,  15 

Mass.  384  ;    Hampshire   ».    Franklin,    16  N.  Y.  297  ;  People  ».    Draper,  15  X.   Y. 

Mass.  76  ;  Plunkett's  Creek  v.   Crawford,  532  ;  Smith  v.  Adrian,  1  Mich.  495  ;  War- 

27  Penn.  St.  107 ;  New  London  v.  Mont-  ing   v.   Mobile,    24  Ala.    701  ;    Mayor   v. 


270 


MUNICIPAL   C50RPOBATIONS. 


§188 


"have  immemorially  exercised  the  power  of  dividing  towns  at  its 
pleasure,  and  upon  such  division,  apportioning  the  common  property 
and  common  burdens  in  such  manner  as  to  it  shall  seem  reasona- 
ble and  equitable."1  Accordingly,  it  may  impose  on  one  town,  upon 
such  division,  the  entire  expense  of  erecting  and  maintaining  a 
bridge  across  a  river  which  is  the  dividing  line  between  the  two 
towns.2 

§  L88  (128).  Property  on  Division.  —  On  the  division  of  a  town 
or  public  corporation  possessing  corporate  property,  into  two  separate 
towns  or  communities,  each,  in  the  absence  of  a  different  provision 
by  the  legislature,  was  considered  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
York  to  be  entitled  to  hold  in  severalty  the  public  property  which  fell 
within  its  limits.3    In  Connecticut,  it  is  declared  to  be  "  well  settled 


State,  15  Md.  376  ;  Love  v.  Schenck,  12 
Ire.  Law,  304  (1851);  Love  v.  Kamsour, 
12  lie.  Law,  328  (1855);  Olney  v.  Harvey, 
50  111.  453  ;  Sedgwick  Co.  v.  Bailey,  11 
Kan.  631  ( 1  s 7 o ) ;  Sangamon  County  v. 
Springfield,  68  111.  66  (1873);  Dunmore's 
Appeal,  5"J  Pa.  St.  374  ;  Barklev^.  Levee 
Comm'rs,  93  U.  S.  258  (1876);  Broughton 
v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266  (1876);  County 
Court,  v.  County  Court,  2  Bush  (Ky.),  93  ; 
Schriberw.  Langdale,  66  Wis.  616  ;  Knight 
v.  Town  of  Ashland,  61  Wis.  233.  The 
parent  town,  being  liable  for  the  whole 
di 'lit,  is  the  agent  of  the  new  town  in  de- 
fending an  action  on  the  liability,  and 
when  it  arts  in  good  faith  and  with  dili- 
gence and  skill,  the  new  town  is  bound  by 
the  result  of  the  action.  Mt.  Desert  v. 
Monmouth,  72  Me.  348.  And  see  ante, 
chap.  iv.  for  a  general  view  of  the  extent  of 
the  legislative  aMthority  over  public  and 
municipal  corporations  and  their  rights, 
liabilities,  property,  and  contracts;  and 
chap.  vii.  as  to  the  dissolution  of  munici- 
pal corporations  and  its  effect  upon  their 
creditors  and  property. 

1  Granby  v.  Thurston,  23  Conn.  416, 
419,  per  JFaile,  C.  J.;  YVilliinantic  Society 

v.  Scl 1   Society  (division  of  school  so- 

cieties  and  funds),  14  Conn.  457;  Hart- 
foil  Bridge  Co.  v.  East  Hartford  (ferry 
franchise),  16  Conn.  149;  affirmed,  10 
How.  (U.  S.)  511,  541  ;  Laramie  County 
v.  Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307  (1875). 
Legislature  cannot  control  an  educational 
fuud  raised  by  individual  bounty  and  not 


by  taxation  (Plymouth  v.  Jackson,  15  Pa. 
St.  44),  or  direct  a  division  of  the  funds 
between  two  towns  different  from  that 
which  is  prescribed  in  the  will  of  the 
donor.  Greenville  v.  Mason,  53  N.  H. 
515  (1873).  See,  also,  Moutpelier  v.  East 
Montpelier,  27  Vt.  704  ;  29  Vt.  12  ;  ante, 
sees.  64,  80,  85,  171. 

a  Granby  v.  Thurston,  supra;  ante,  sec. 
71. 

8  North  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2 
Wend.  109  (1828).  "  Suppose,"  says  Sav- 
age, C.  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court  in  this  case,  "the  State  to  be  divided 
into  two  States :  without  some  special 
agreement,  each  would  own  the  public 
property  within  its  limits.  So  of  coun- 
ties :  the  public  buildings  remain  the 
property  of  the  old  county  ;  yet  public 
buildings  are  as  much  public  property  as 
public  lands.  So  as  to  the  plains,  mead- 
ows, and  marshes  which  are  the  subject  of 
this  suit.  A  bill  filed  by  a  new  county  for 
the  partition  of  the  gaol  and  court-house, 
which  had  been  common  property,  would 
be  the  same  in  principle  as  the  bill  in  this 
suit.  Would  not  such  a  suit  be  consid- 
ered preposterous  ?  Suppose  a  religious 
corporation  possessed  of  a  church  and  par- 
sonage ;  it  becomes  expedient  to  erect  part 
into  a  new  corporation  :  would  not  the  old 
corporation  retain  the  property,  unless  an 
agreement  was  made  as  to  the  partition  of 
it  ?"  2  Wend.  109,  135  ;  Laramie  County 
v.  Albany,  92  U.  S.  307  (1875);  West 
Carroll  v.  Gaddis,  34  La.  An.  928.     Incor- 


^ 


$  189  APPORTIONMENT  BY  LEGISLATURE.  271 

that  when  part  of  the  inhabitants  and  territory  of  an  older  town  are 
erected  into  a  new  corporation,  the  old  town  retains  all  of  the  prop- 
erty, rights,  and  privileges  formerly  belonging  to  it,  and  is  subject 
to  all  its  former  duties  and  liabilities,  at  least  as  it  regards  property 
which  has  no  fixed  location  in  the  new  town,  as  lands,  buildings, 
etc."  Accordingly,  "upon  the  division  of  Hartford,  ao  part  of  the 
ferry  franchise  would  pass  to  the  new  town  of  East  Hartford,  except 
by  virtue  of  a  legal  provision  to  that  effect."1  So  it  has  been  fre- 
quently held  that  if  a  new  corporation  is  created  out  of  the  territory 
of  an  old  corporation  or  if  part  of  its  territory  or  inhabitants  is 
annexed  to  another  corporation,2  unless  some  provision  is  made  in 
the  act  respecting  the  property  and  existing  liabilities  of  the  old 
corporation,  the  latter  will  be  entitled  to  all  the  property,  and  be 
solely  •  answerable  for  all  the  liabilities.3 

§  189  (129).  Power  of  Legislature  to  apportion  Debts  and  Prop* 
erty. —  But  upon  tJie  division  of  the  old  corporation,  and  the  creation 
of  a  new  corporation  out  of  part  of  its  inhabitants  and  territory,  or 
upon  the  annexation  of  part  to  another  corporation,  the  legislature 
may  provide  for  an  equitable  appropriation  or  division  of  the  prop- 
erty, and  impose  upon  the  new  corporation,  or  upon  the  people  and 
territory,  thus  disannexed,  the  obligation  to  pay  an  equitable  pro- 
portion of  the  corporate  debts.4     The  charters  and  constituent  acts  of 

poration  of  a  part  of  a  town  into  a  city,  250  (1855);  North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings, 

held  not  to  divest  the  title  of  the  town  to  45  Me.  133,   142  (1858);  Cobb  v.  King- 

a  tract  of  land  owned  by  it  in  fee  simple,  man,   15  Mass.    197  ;  Minot  v.   Curtis,  7 

"  in  trust,   for  the  use  of  the  town  for-  Mass.     441,     445  ;    Opinion   of   Supreme 

ever."     Milwaukee  v.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  Judges,   6  Cush.  575  ;  lb.  578  ;  Laramie 

93.  County  v.  Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307 

In  Michigan,  it  is  held  that  when  a  city  (1875),  where  the  cases  are  cited,  and  the 

is  incorporated  from  part  of  the  territory  subject  learnedly  discussed  by  Clifford,  J. 

of  a  township  the  property  lights  of  the  Greenville  v.  Mason,  53  N.  H.  515  (1873); 

township  are  not    atfected    unless   provi-  Depere  v.   Bellevue,   31  Wis.  120  (1872)  ; 

sion  is  made  therefor  by  statute.     Board  of  s.  c.  11  Am.  Rep.  602. 

Health  v.  East  Saginaw,  45  Mich.  257.  8  Text   cited    and   approved.       Mount 

1   Par  Church,  J.,  in  Hartford  Bridge  v.  Pleasant   v.    Beckwith,    100    IT.   S.   514; 

East  Hartford,  16  Conn.  149,  171  (1844)  ;  Turnbull  v.  Alpena  School  Dist.,  45  Mich. 

affirmed  by  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  496. 

States,   10*  How.   (IT.  S.)  511,  541.     Ap-  *  Gorham  v.  Springfield,   21  Me.  61; 

proving  Windham  v.    Portland,   8    Mass.  North  Yarmouth  v.   Skillings,  45  Me.  133 

384;  Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76;  (1858);  Brewster  v.  Harwich,  4  Mass.  278; 

North  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2  Wend.  lb.   315  ;  lb.  384  ;  Harrison  v.  Bridgton, 

109;  ante,  sec.  9.  16   Mass.    16;    lb.    76    (1819);    Lakin    v. 

-  Windham  v.  Portland,   4  Mass.  384  Ames,  10  Cush.   198  (1852).     See  School 

(1808);  Richards  v.  Daggett,  4  Mass.  539;  District  v.  Richardson,  23  Pick.  62  (1S39), 

Hampshire    v.     Franklin,     16    Mass.    76  as  to  the  effect  in  Massachusetts  upon  the 

(1819);  Richland  County  v.  Lawrence,  12  title  to   property  of  the  abolition   of  old 

111.  1  (1850);  Blackstone  v.  Ta.it,  4  Gray,  school  districts  and  the  formation  of  new 


_7-J 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§189 


public  and  municipal  corporations  are  not,  as  we  have  before  seen, 
contracts,  and  they  may  be  changed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature, 


;  followed  by  School  Districl  v.  Tap- 
ley,  1  Allen,  49  ;  but  a  dictum  then  in 
questioned  by  //<«<;■,  .).  Simmons  v.  Na- 
hant,  3  Allen,  316,  as  to  necessity  of  a 
deed  of  conveyance  for  real  estate.  San- 
bomton  v.  Tilton,  55  N.  II.  603  (1875)  ; 
.  '  I  ;  .-  .  I  to  v.  S  uboruton, 
I !  Note  n  tating  to  division 

of  property  under  legislative  act.  South- 
ampton v.  Fowler  (Little  Islands  on  divi- 
sion of  town),  52  N.  II.  225  (1872);  Tile- 
son  v.  Newman,  23  Vt.  i-l  ;  Richards  v. 
Daggett,  1  Mass.  534  ;  Waldron  v.  Lee,  5 
Pick.  32 J.  In  Pennsylvania  it  was  held 
that  on  a  division  of  a  township,  each 
fraction  remains  liable  for  the  whole  debt 
due  by  the  old  township  ;  if  one  pays  the 
whole  amount,  it  lays  the  foundation  for 

ribution.  Plunketl  Township  v.  Craw- 
ford, 27  Pa.  St.  107  (1856).  See  New 
London  v.  Montville,  1  Root  (Conn.), 
184  ;  Hughes  v.  School  District,  72  Mo. 
643.  On  annexation  of  a  portion  of  a 
township  to  a  city,  the  residue  retains  all 
its  property,  real  and  personal,  unless  a 
different  disposition  has  been  made  by  the 
terms  of  the  division.  People  v.  School 
Trustees,  86  111.  613.  As  to  right  to  col- 
lect taxes  on  such  division,  see  Barnett 
Township  v.  Jefferson  County,  9  Watts, 
166  ;  Devor  v.  McClintock,  9  Watts  &  S. 
80  ;  Police  Jury,  &c  v.  McCormack,  32 
La.  An.  »)■_'!  :  sustaining  text,  Board,  &c. 
r.  Board,  &c.,  30  W.  Va.  -124  (1887).  In 
Morgan  v.  Town  of  Waldeck,  17  Fed.  Rep. 
286,  it  appeared  that  the  town,  which  had 
been  carved  out  of  another,  had,  through 
its  officers  and  people,  repeatedly  recog- 
nized its  liability  for  its  portion  of  the 
debt  of  the  town  out  of  which  it  was 
created,  and  it  was  decided  that  it  was  lia- 
ble for  its  proportion  of  the  debt,  although 
there  was  doubl  whether  the  proceedings 
in  Betting  it  off  were  legal. 

As  to  support  of  poor  in  case  of  division. 

North   Whitehall  v.   South   Whitehall,  3 

&  Rawle  (Pa.),  117:  Overseers,  &c. 

v.  Overseers,  &c,  2  lb.  422  ;  Stillwater  v. 

\".  .1.)  59. 

Where  there  has   been  an    insufficient 

legal  division  and  organization  of  anew 

district,   this   may   be   afterwards  ratified 


and  made  binding.  Sawyer  V.  Willi'!  , 
25     Vt.    31  1    ;    Pil  ice    0.     I   aipenter,    111   \'t. 

480  ;  Alden  v.  Rounsville,  7  Met.  219. 

otherwise  provided  by  legisla- 
tion tin  detachment  of  territory  from  a 
township  does  not  affect  its  ownership  of 

anything  but  lands  ;  debts  and  other  in- 
corporeal rights  — as  here,  liquor  taxes 
previously  due  — still  belong  to  the  town- 
ship. Springwells  v.  Wayne  County,  58 
Mich.  240. 

The  mode  of  proceeding,  under  the  stat- 
ute of  New  York,  in  the  division  of  old 
and  the  erection  of  new  towns,  the  direc- 
tory nature  of  the  statute  as  to  mode  of 
proceeding,  and  the  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings,  are 
clearly  set  forth  in  the  case  of  The  People 
v.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86. 

As  illustrating  the  '//rectory  nature  of 
such  statutes,  see  Elmendorf  v.  Mayor, 
25  Wend.  693;  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  9.  But  an  agreement  in  such 
division,  transcending  the  powers  of  the 
officers  who  make  it,  is  not  binding  on 
th-  town.  Overseers  v.  Same,  18  Johns. 
382.  Effect  of  erection  of  a  new  out  of  a 
portion  of  an  old  county  on  the  terms  of 
officers  wdio  respectively  reside  in  the  new 
and  old  portions,  see  People  v.  Morrell,  21 
Wend.  563  (1839),  and  authorities  cited 
by  Cowcn,  J.,  p.  580.  County  commis- 
sioners must,  by  law,  reside  in  the  county, 
and  on  the  erection  of  a  new  county  in 
which  their  residence  is  included  they 
become  fi-siilenls  of  the  new  county  and 
non-residents  of  the  old  county,  and  can- 
not legally  act  for  it,  unless  they  remove 
within  it  ;  though  if  they  continue  to  act 
without  such  removal  their  acts  are  valid, 
being  officers  de  facto.  State  v.  Harts- 
horn, 17  Ohio,  !."»:">;  State  v.  Jacobs,  lb. 
143.  A  bill  in  equity  will  not  lie  to  set 
aside  a  s,  III,  in,  nl  ,,f  iirr,, nuts  niade  by  two 
boards  of  supervisors  upon  the  division  of 
a  township  by  creating  a  new  one,  on  the 
ground  that  one  of  the  boards  was  inferior 
to  the  other  in  ability  and  experience,  or 
that  it  was  misled  as  to  the  financial  con- 
diti f  its  own  township.  The  law  pre- 
sumes such  a  board  to  be  competent  to 
transact     the     business    entrusted    to    it. 


§190  CORPORATE   SEAL;    POWER   TO    ADOPT    AND    ALTER. 

subject  only  to  the  restraints  of  special  constitutional  provisions,  if 
any  there  be.     And   it  is  an  ordinary  exercise  of  the  legislative 
dominion  over  such  corporations  to  provide  for  their  enlargement 
or  division;  and,  incidental  to  this,  to  apportion  their  property  and 
to  direct  the  manner  in  which  their  debts  or  liabilities  3hall  be  mi  t, 
and  by  whom.     The  opinion  has  been  expressed  that  the  partiti 
of  the  property  must  be  made  at  the  time  of  I'm  division  of,  or  chai 
in,  the  corporation,  since   otherwise   the  old   corporation   becom 
under  the  rule  just  before  stated,  the  sole  owner  of  the  property, 
and  hence  cannot  be  deprived  of  it  by  a  siibsequt  nt  act  of  the  le<: 
latum1     But,  in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  limitations 
upon  the  legislature,  this  view  cannot,  perhaps,  be  maintained,  ns 
it  is  inconsistent  with  the  necessary  supremacy  of  the  legislature 
over  all  its  corporate  and  unincorporate  bodies,  divisions,  and  parts, 
and  with  several  well-considered  adjudications.2 

§  190    (130).      Corporate  Seal;   Power  to  adopt  and  alter. — The 
charters  of  municipal  corporations  usually  contain  a  clause  authoi 
ing  them  to  have  and  use  a  common  seal,  and  to  alter  the  same  at 
pleasure.    Without  an  express  grant  it  is,  however,  incident  to  every 
corporation  to  adopt  and  use  a  corporate  seal.     The  essential  impor- 
tance which  the  common  law  anciently  attached  to  seals,  and 
modern  relaxation  of  the  rule,  are  well  known.     Respecting  sea!  , 
the  same  general  principles  apply  to  private  and  to  municipal  corpor- 
ations.    Thus,  a  corporation  of  the  latter  class  would  doubtless 
bound  equally  with  a  private  corporation  by  any  seal  which  has  been 
authoritative/ y  affixed  to  an  instrument  requiring  it,  though  it  be  not 
the  seal  regularly  adopted.3     On  the  other  hand,  it  would  not  be 

Township  of  Churchill    v.    Township   of  vide  far  an  equitable  adjustment  of  the  in- 

Cummings,  51  Mich.  446.  debtedness  among  them   all,   by  couimis- 

1  Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76;  sioners  to  be  appointed  by  a  designated 
Windham  v.  Portland,  4  Mass.  390  ;  Bow-  court,  and  from  whose  determination  o  i 
doinham  v.  Richmond,  6  Greenl.  (Me.)  appeal  was  allowed.  As  to  extent  of  legis- 
112,  holding  that  subsequent  legislation  lative  control  over  public  and  municipal 
could  not  change  the  apportionment  of  corporations,  and  their  rights,  liabili 
the  debts  between  an  old  town  and  one  property,  and  contracts,  bi  e  anU  .  chap.  iv. 
created  from  it,  since  such  an  apportion-  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim. 
ment    was    in   the   nature   of  a  contract.  193,  231,  232  ;  172,  173  ; 

But  see,  ante,  chap.  iv.  sees.  64,  75.  chapter  on  Taxation. 

2  Layton  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.         8  Bank,  &c  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Vt.  L59 
515  (1857),  cited,  ante,  Bee.  63;  Laramie  (1858),  per   R  Ifield,    C.   J.  ;    Tenney    v. 
County  v.  Albany  County,   92  U.  S.  307  Lumber  Co.,    43   X.  II.    343;  Mill 
(1875);     Dunmore's  Appeal,    52   Pa.  St.  Foundry  v.  Hovey,  21  Pick.  417 ;    P 
374.     In  this  last  case  one  borough  was  v.   Railroad  Co.,    87    M  .■  11  & 
divided  into  four,  and  the  legislature  was  Amos,  drp.  sec.    -217  ;   Phillips 

held  to  have  the  power  afterwards  to  pro-     17  111.  154  ;  Stebbins  v.  Merritt,  1"  Cush. 
VOL.  I.  —  18 


•_7  1 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  191 


bound  by  the  affixing  of  either  the  regular  or  temporary  seal  by  a 
person  uot  legally  and  duly  authorized.1  So,  under  the  modern 
doctrine,  a  corporation  can  do  an  act  in  pais  by  an  attorney  in 
and  such  attorney  need  not  necessarily  be  appointed  under 
seal.2 


£  I '.il  (131).  Seal,  how  proved.  —  The  seal  of  a  private  corpo- 
ration attached  to  an  iustrumenl  does  not  prove  its  own  a  uth <  nt  ic it y  ; 
but  it  should  be  shown  by  evidence  aliunde  to  be  really  the  seal  of 
•  orporation.8  The  same  doctrine  is,  probably,  applicable  to  the 
seal  of  a  municipal  corporation,  except  where  changed  by  charter  or 
statute,  although  ii  seems  that  it  is  usual  in  England  to  allow  deeds 
and  other  instruments  relating  to  real  estate  to  go  to  the  jury  when 
authenticated  by  the  corporate  seals  of  London,  Edinburgh,  or 
I  >ublin, —  these  being  corporations  of  great  antiquity,  or  recognized 
by  the  legislature.4  The  corporate  seal  attached  to  an  instrument, 
attested  by  the  signatures  of  the  proper  officers,  is  prima  facie  but 
not  conclusive  evidence  that  it  was  lawfully  placed  there,  and  that 
the  instrument  is  the  act  of  the  corporation.5 


27  ;  City  Council  v.  Moorehead,  2  Rich. 
Law,  430;  Grant  on  I  orp.  59,  and  cases; 
and   uote  author's  opinion  ami  his  doubt 
the   existence  of  any  common  law 
right  to  change  the  common  seal.     An  im- 
pression of  a  corporate  seal  stamped  upon 
and  into  th  substance  ofth  paper  contain- 
instrument    is  sufficient,  without 
tfer  or  wax.     Hendee  v.  Pinkerton,  14 

.  381. 
1   Koehler  v.    Iron    Co.,    2  Black,   715 
(1862);    Bank    of    Ireland   v.    Evans,   32 
Law  &  Eq.  23.      "  But  where  a  cor- 
poration is  created  by  an  act  for  particular 
with  special  powers,  then  another 
qui  ution  arises  ;  their  deed,  though  under 
their  corporate   seal,  and    thai    regularly 
affixed,  lines  not  bind  them  if  it  appear  by 
the  express  provisions  of  the  statute  cre- 
ating the  corporation,  or  by  necessary  or 
i  ile  inference  from  its  enactments, 
be  deed  was   ultra   vires;   that    is, 
legislature  meant  that  such  a  deed 
ould  not  be  made."      Per  Parke,  B.,  in 
South   Yorkshire    Railway   Co.   v.   Great 
in    Railway   Co.,    9   Ex.   55,   84; 
adopted  by  Martin,  B.,  in  Payne  v.  Bre- 
II.  &  X.  579.    See  also  Bold  worth 
tmouth,  11  A.  &  E.  490  ;  Regina  v. 
Id,  1  Q.  II.  893  ;  Palliater  v.  Graves- 


end,  9  C.  B.  774  ;  Nowell  et  al.  v.  "Wor- 
cester, 9  Kx.  457  ;  Kendall  v.  King,  17 
C.  B.  483. 

-  Curry  v.  Bank,  8  Porter  (Ala.),  361 
(1839);  Lathrop  v.  Bank,  8  Dana,  114; 
Abby  v.  Billups,  35  Miss.  618. 

::  Den  v.  Vreelandt,  2  Halst.  (N.J.) 
352  (1800);  Gilbert,  Ev.  19  ;  Jackson  v. 
Pratt,  10  Johns.  381  ;  Moises  v.  Thorn- 
ton, 8  Term  I!.  303;  City  Council  v. 
Moorehead,  2  Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  430  ; 
Foster  v.  Shaw,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.), 
163;  lb.  318;  Mann  v.  Pentz,  2  Sandf. 
Ch.  257. 

4  Per  Kinney,  C.  J.,  Den  v.  Yrcelandt, 
2  Halst.  (N.J.)  352. 

6  Levering  v.  Mayor,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
553  (1817)  ;  Memphis  v.  Adams,  9  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  518  (1872)  ;  Abbott,  Corp.  Digest, 
tit.  Seal,  p.  725,  sec.  56,  and  the  many 
cases  there  cited  ;  Benedict  v.  Denton 
Walk.  Ch.  336  ;  Railway  Co.  v.  Railway 
Co.,  9  Exchq.  55,  84  ;  Musser  v.  Johnson, 
4_'  Mo.  7  t.  In  Iowa,  the  county  seal  held 
to  be  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  county 
warrant.  Prescott  v.  Gouser,  34  Iowa, 
178  ;  Springer  v.  Clay  Co.,  35  Iowa, 
243  ;  Smeltzcr  v.  White,  92  U.  S.  390 
(1875). 


§192 


SEAL,   WHERE   NOT   NECESSARY. 


275 


§  192  (132).  Seal,  where  not  necessary. — The  modern  rule  is 
that  corporations  may  be  bound  by  contracts  not  under  seal,  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  will  be  hound  have  been  stated  by 
Story,  J.,  in  terms  which  have  been  approved  by  the  courts  of 
nearly  every  State  in  the  Union.  "Wherever  a  corporation  is  acting 
within  the  scope  of  the  legitimate  purposes  of  its  institution,  all 
parol  contracts  made  by  its  authorized  agents  are  express  promises 
of  the  corporation  ;  and  all  duties  imposed  on  them  by  law,  and  all 
benefits  conferred  at  their  request,  raise  implied  promises,  for  the 
enforcement  of  which  an  action  lies."  * 


1  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson,  7 
Cranch  (U.  S.),  299,  306  (1813)  ;  Bank 
v.  Wister,  2  Pet.  318;  Davenport  o.  In- 
surance Co.,  17  Iowa,  276  ;  Ring  v.  John- 
son County,  6  Iowa,  265  ;  Over  v.  Green- 
field, 107  In.  1.  231.  See  further,  Chaps. 
on  Contracts  and  Property,  post,  sees. 
459,  936.  Corporate  seal  affixed  to  the 
note  of  the  corporation  makes  it  a  spe- 
cialty, having  in  this  respect  the  same 
effect  as  the  seal  of  a  natural  person. 
Clarke  v.  Farmers',  &c.  Co.,  15  Wend. 
256  ;  lb.  265  ;  Benoist  v.  Carondolet,  8 
Mo.  240  ;  Sturtevant  v.  Alton,  3  McLean, 
393.  But  corporate  seals  attached  to 
municipal  bonds  payable  to  order  or  bearer 
do  not  destroy  or  affect  their  negotiability. 
See  post,  chap.  xiv.  on  Contracts.     Lease 


held  void  for  want  of  the  corporate  seaL 
Kin/ie  v.  Chicago,  2  Scam.  (111.)  188. 
But  otherwise  of  an  authorized  agreemenl 
by  an  agent  of  a  corporation  to  sell  lands 
(Legrand  v.  The  College,  5  Munf.  (Va.) 
324),  or  authorized  assignment  of  a  lease. 
Sanford  v.  Tremlett,  42  Mo.  384.  Corpo- 
rate seal  to  conveyance  by  county  commis- 
sioners. Bestor  v.  Powell,  2  Gilm.  (7  111.) 
126.  Further,  see  Index —  "  Seal."  Mr. 
Broom  gives  an  excellent  view  of  the  ex- 
ceptions to  the  rule  that  corporations 
must  contract  by  deed,  as  recognized  and 
established  by  the  modern  English  deci- 
sions. Broom,  Com.  on  Com.  Law,  562- 
569.  Seals  in  connection  with  municipal 
bonds.  See  chapter  xiv.  on  Contracts, 
post. 


MUNICIPAL  COBPOEATIONS.  §  194 


CHAPTER   IX. 

MUNICIPAL   ELECTIONS   AND   OFFICERS. 

§193  (133).  Subject  outlined.  —  Iii  considering  the  Creation 
and  Constitution  of  Municipal  Corporations,  we  have  now  reached, 
in  its  order,  the  subject  of  municipal  elections  and  officers.  It 
will  be  treated  under  the  following  heads  :  — 

1.  Municipal  Popular  Elections  —  sees.  195-199. 

2.  Special  Tribunal  to  determine  Election  Contests  for  Muni. 
cipal  Offices  —  sees.  200-205. 

3.  Power  to  create  and  appoint  Municipal  Officers  —  sees.  206- 
213. 

4  Oath  and  Official  Bond  of  Municipal   Officers  —  sees.  214- 
216. 

5.  Duration  of  Official  Term  of  Municipal  Officers  —  sees.  217- 
221. 

6.  Vacancies  in  Municipal  Offices  —  sec.  222. 

7.  Refusal  to  serve  in  Municipal  Offices  —  sec.  223. 

8.  Resignation  of  Municipal  Officers  —  sees.  224-228. 

9.  Compensation  of  Municipal  Officers  —  sees.  229-234. 

10.  Liability  of  the  Corporation  to  the  Officer.  Right  of  Officer 
to  salary —  sec.  235. 

11.  Liability  of  the  Officer  to  the  Corporation  and  to  Others  — 
sec.  236. 

12.  Amotion  and  Disfranchisement — sees.  238-256. 

§  194.  Municipal  Popular  Elections.  —  Elections:  must  be  held  at 
tin  linn  and  plact  provided  by  the  charter  or  by  statute.  Where  the 
law  fixes  no  time,  but  leaves  the  time  and  place  to  be  fixed  by  some 
authority  named  therein,  it  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  election 
thai  it  be  called  and  the  time  and  place  thereof  fixed  by  the  agency 
designated  by  law,  and  none  other;  as  where  the  mayor  and  city 
council  are  the  designated  authority,  neither  the  mayor  alone  nor  the 
council  alone  has  power  to  call  such  an  election;  if  either  neglect  its 
duty,  mandamus  is  the  remedy.1 

1   Stephens    v.    People,    89    111.    337  ;     15  Cal.  221  ;  People  v.  Harvey,  58  Cal. 

Gleni v.  People,  78  111.  382  ;  Dickey  v.     337  ;  Juker  v.  Commonwealth,  20  Pa.  St. 

Hurlbut,  ..  .  Peopli    o.  Murray,     184  ;    Chadwick  v.    Melvin,    68    Pa.   St. 


§  105  BALLOT  ;    QUALIFICATION    OF   VOTERS  ;    RESIDENCE. 


277 


§  195  (1'34).  Ballot;  Qualification  of  Voters;  Residence.  —  Elec- 
tions by  the  people,  with  exceptions  in  a  few  States,  are  by  folded 
or  secret  ballot,  and  not  open  or  viva  voce.1  The  qualifications  of 
rfn- tors  or  voters  are  fixed  by  the  Constitution  and  laws,  and  cannot 
be  changed  by  any  ordinance  or  act  of  the  corporation.2  Residence 
for  a  certain  period  within  the  municipality  is  almost  invariably  re- 
quired in  express  terms,  as  one  of  the  qualifications  of  the  right  to 
vote  at  elections  therein  and  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  eligibility 
to  hold  a  municipal  office.  Non-residents  of  the  corporation  have, 
however,  been  held  competent  to  be  elected  to  office  when  residence 
was  not  expressly  required,  but  the  decisions  cannot,  perhaps,  be 


333  ;  Knowles  v.  Yates,  31  Cal.  82  ; 
Clarke  v.  Board,  &<•.,  27  111.  310  ;  Miller 
v.  English,  1  Zabr.  (21  X.  J.  L.)  317; 
Marsh,!  11  v.  Cook,  38  111.  44  ;  Marshall  v. 
Kerns,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  68  ;  Force  v.  Ba- 
tavia,  61  111.  99  ;  Foster  v.  Scarf,  1.-  Ohio 
St.  535.  As  to  mandamus  to  compel  the 
holding  of  an  election,  see  post,  sees. 
197,  838,  839.  If  such  an  election  is  held 
it  is  vroid,  ami  cannot  he  ratified  by  the 
municipal  authorities.  Stephens  v.  Peo- 
ple, supra.  An  election  is  not  complete 
ami  I hr  candidate  is  not  qualified  to  serve 
unless  ih'-  requirements  of  the  statutes  pro- 
viding a  mode  for  determining  ami  de- 
claring the  result  of  the  election  have 
been  complied  with.  People  v.  Crissey, 
91  N.  Y.  616  ;  People  v.  North,  72  N.  Y. 
124(1878). 

1  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  chap.  xvii.  598, 
where  the  subject  of  popular  elections,  the 
right  to  participate  therein,  the  conditions 
necessary  to  the  exercise  of  the  right, 
the  manner  of  voting,  the  conduct  and 
sufficiency  of  elections  are  satisfactorily 
presented.  The  rules  and  doctrines  de- 
duced from  (he  cases  are,  in  general,  appli- 
cable to  popular  municipal  elections. 
Ante,  see.  39.  A  ballot  implies  absolute 
secrecy,  and  where  the  Constitution  of  a 
State  declares  that  "all  elections  by  the 
people  shall  be  by  ballot,"  the  legislature 
cannot  by  law  require  the  outside  of  the 
ballot  to  be  numbered  so  as  to  correspond 
with  the  number  placed  opposite  the 
name  of  the  voter  on  the  poll  list.  "Wil- 
liams o.  Stein,  38  Ind.  89  (1871)  ;  S.  C. 
10  Am.  Pep.  '.'7. 

In  1^72,  Parliament  passed  a  Ballot 
Act,  which  with  modifications  is  embraced 


in  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
1882,  45  and  46  Vic.  chap.  50,  refi  rred  to 
in  a  previous  chapter.  In  1SG1>,  it  passed  a 
Municipal  Corporations  Election  Art,  an  1 
in  1872  the  Corrupt  Practices  (Municipal 
Flections)  Act,  and  in  1.S77  tin'  Municipal 
Corporations  New  Charters  Act.  and  in 
1878  the  Registration  Act,  by  which  the 
subject  of  elections  is  minutely  regul  ited. 
These  Acts  contain  many  provisions  which 
are  worth  the  study  of  the  American  le- 
gislator. Pol.  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  iii. 
664-676  (Deer.,  1S88)  ;  lb.  vol.  iv.  p.  204 
et  seq.  (June,  1889). 

2  Petty  v.  Tooker,  21  X.  Y.  267  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Wbelper,  3  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  29;  People  v.  Phillips,  1  Denio 
(X.  Y.),  3S8  ;  Hex  v.  Spencer,  3  Burr. 
1827  ;  Rex  v.  Mayor  of  Weymouth,  7 
Mod.  371  :  Newling  v.  Francis,  3  T.  R. 
189  ;  Rex  v.  Chitty,  5  Ad.  ,v  E.  609  ; 
i;  r.  Bumstead,  2  B.  &  Ad.  699.  The 
provision  of  the  Constitution  that  "i 
male  person  twenty-one  years  old,  resident 
in  the  State  twelve  months  and  in  the 
county  thirty  days,  shall  be  an  elector," 
applies  in corporated  cities,  and  disables  the 
legislature  from  requiring  ninety  days  resi- 
dence in  a  city  as  a  qualification  for  voting 
for  city  others.  People  v.  Canaday  (char- 
ter of  Wilmington),  73  X.  c.  198  (1875)  . 
s.  U.  21    Am.    Rep.    465.  .    39, 

note  ;  post,  sec.  207.  A  charter  provision 
requiring  the  registration  of  the  voters  in  a 
city  held  constitutional.  UcMahon  V. 
Savannah,  66  Ga.  217.  As  to  the  qualifi- 
cation-, of  voters  lor  city  officers  inch 
i  'onstitution    of   i;h  .  see  In  re 

the  Newport  Charter,  14  B.  I.  6,">j. 


278 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


said  to  conclude  the  point,1  and,  if  extended  to  the  higher  offices, 
are  hardly  consistent  with  the  fundamental  idea  of  municipal  or 
local  eminent 


1  Municipal  officers  may  be  elected 
from  non-residents  of  the  corporation 
when  there  is  no  statute  or  Constitution 
prohibiting  it,  particularly  when  the  office 
to    be  filled  is  one  requiring  professional 


paying  scot  and  lot.  Willcock  on  Munlc. 
I  38,  pi.  172  ;  Tb  L91,  pi.  181  ;  lb. 
L93,  188;  Rex  v.  .Men. lay,  Cowp.  539  ; 
Rex  v.  .Mallet,  2  Barnard.  408  ;  Rex  v. 
Cambridge,  1  Burr.  2008  ;  Rex  v.  Heath, 


skill,  and  not  representative  or  legislative  1  Barnard.  117.      These  rules  seem  to  the 

ubaracter.     State  v.  Blanchard  (city  author  of   very    doubtful    application   in 

surveyor),   6  La.    An.  515   (1851).      The  tins   country,  since  here  all  of  the  inhab- 

conclusion  was   reached   with  hesitation,  itants  are  members  of  the  corporation,  and 

bul  the  whole  court  concurred.     Tb.  State  non-residents  cannot  become  such.      See 

,85  (1887).     So  in  The  on  this  point  opinion  of  Read,  J.,  in  Peo- 

Swearingen,  12  Ga.  23  (1852),  it  pie   v.   Canaday,    supra.    Ante,   chap.    1. 

was  decided  where  the  charter  of  the  town  And,   in  general,  it  may   be  said  that  a 

provided  "  for  the  election  of  city  officers  person  is  an  inhabitant  or  resident  who 

by   the   people  of   the   city   qualified   to  has   his  domicile  or  home  in  the  place  ; 

vote,"  and  was  silent  as  to  requiring  the  but    it  is  foreign  to   the  purpose  of  this 

officers    to    be    residents,    thai    a    person  work  to  enter  into  the  difficult  questions 

might  legally  be  elected  and  qualified  who  which   have  arisen   with    resped    to  resi- 

was  not  a  resident  of  the  place.   Residence  dency  and  domicile.     Hinds  o.   Hinds,  1 

as  a  qualification  for  municipal  office.    See  Iowa,  3(5  ;    Story,  Confl.   haws,  sec.    43; 


Commonwealth  v.  Jones,  12  Pa.  St.  365. 
■   n  nd(  ncy  and  inhabitancy,  and 

■■  residents.  Cohen  v.  Wigfall,  8 
Rich,  haw,  237  ;  -1  Tb.  189  ;  Gilder  Leeve 
p.  Alexander,  2  Speer  (S.  ('.),  298  ;  Seay 
v.  Hunt,  55  Tex.  545.  In  England  by 
the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  (sec.  9), 
inhabitant  householders  residenl  within 
the  borough,  or  within  seven  miles  of  the 

n,  and  rated  to  the  relief  "f  the 
poor,  are  made  burgesses  or  citizens. 
Before  that  acl  was  passed,  residence  in 
the  freeman  or  citizen  was  sometimes  re- 
quired to  render  him  eligible  to  office, 
although  non-residents,  wherever  residing, 
might,  by  a  similar  perversion  of  the  pur- 
poses of  a  municipal  corporation,  be  ad- 
mitted to  freedom  or  membership,  unless 
.    pri     [j    r<  strained  by  the  charter  ;  and 


Putnam  p.  Johnson,  10  Mass.  488  ;  Thorn- 
dike  r.  Boston,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  245.  Pub- 
lic officers  vacate  their  office  by  perma- 
ih  nt  n  inoval  from  territorial  limits  of  the 
corporation.  Barre  v.  Greenwich,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  L20 ;  Rumsey  v.  Campton,  16 
N.  H.  567;  (dies  v.  School  District,  11 
Fost.  (31  N.  H.)  304;  infra,  sec.  228. 
But  a  temporary  removal  with  an  inten- 
tion to  return,  will  not,  of  itself,  have  this 
effect.  Van  Orsdall  V.  Hazard,  3  Hill 
(N.  V.),  243  (1842)  ;  Peo]  le  v.  Metropol- 
itan 1'nlice  Board,  19  N.  Y.  201  ;  Lyon  v. 
Commonwealth,  3  Bibb  (Ky. ),  430;  Rex 
r.  E  Leter,  Comb.  197  ;  Harmon  v.  Grizzard, 
89  N.  C.  115. 

"Nice  questions,"  says  Mr.  Harrison 
(Munic.  Manual  for  Upper  Canada,  2d 
ed.   60,  note),  "arise  as  to  when  a  party 


if  residence   was   expressly  required  as  a  can  or  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  resident  of  a 
condition  of  eligibility,  ii   was  nol   neces-  municipality."     Attorney-General  v.  Par- 
thai    the   officer  should   continue   to  ker,  3  Atk.  576  ;    Etherington  v.  Wilson, 
place  while  holding  the  office.  L.  II.  1  Ch.   Div.   160;  King  v.  Foxwell, 
Nol  only  so,  bul  it  was  held  thai   "here  L.    R.    3   Ch.    Div.  518.     A  man  cannot, 
residence  was  necessary  as  a  qualification  within  the  meaning  of  the  municipal  laws 
during  office,  it  was  not,  by  implication,  of  Canada,  be  said  to  be  residenl  in  two 
:i    ■    the  person  elected     hould  municipalities  at  the  same  time.      Marr  v. 
dml    a!    ;le    time  of  the  Vienna,    10    Upper    Can.     L.    J.    275.      A 
Aiel    when    inhabitancy    was  man's  residence  is  where  his  home  is  situ- 
ite,  i1   meant  nol   merely  residence,  ate, — where  his  Can,  ily  live.     TheKingu. 
but  keeping                within  the  place,  and  Inhabitants  of  2s'oith  Curry,   4  D.  i  C, 


§196 


ELECTING    DISQUALIFIED    PERSON'. 


279 


§  196  (135).  Electing  disqualified  Person.  —  The  choice  of  a 
disqualified  person  is  ineffectual.  Thus,  if  the  law  requires  free- 
holders to  be  chosen  for  certain  offices,  the  election  of  a  person  not 
a  freeholder  is  void.1  But  unless  the  votes  for  an  ineligible  person 
are  expressly  declared  to  be  void  the  effect  of  such  a  person  receiv- 
ing a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  is,  according  to  the  weight  of  Ameri- 
can authority,  and  the  reason  of  the  matter  (in  view  of  our  mode 
of  election,  without  previous  binding  nominations,  by  secret  ballot, 
leaving  each  elector  to  vote  for  whomsoever  he  pleases),  that  a  new 
election  must  be  held,  and  not  to  give  the  office  to  the  qualified 
person  having  the  next  highest  number  of  votes.2 


959.  An  occasional  absence  from  his 
home  to  attend  to  business  in  another 
municipality  does  not  make  his  home  less 
his  residence.  YVithorn  v.  Thomas,  7 
M.  &  G.  1.  Where  A.  had  a  dwelling- 
house  at  Bowmanville,  where  his  wife  and 
family  lived,  but  had  a  saw-mill  and  store 
and  was  postmaster  in  the  township  of 
Cartwright,  which  occasioned  him  fre- 
quently to  visit  that  place,  and  who, 
while  there,  used  to  board  witli  one  of  his 
men  in  a  house  owned  by  himself, —  Held, 
that  after  voting  in  Bowmanville,  he  had 
no  right  to  vote  in  Cartwright.  The  Queen, 
ex  rel.  Taylor  v.  Ca-sar,  11  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  461.  Infra,  sec.  198,  note.  Mere 
colorable  residence  is  in  no  case  sufficient. 
The  King  v.  Duke  of  Richmond,  6  T.  It. 
560.  Each  case  must,  to  a  great  extent, 
depend  on  its  own  circumstances.  As  to 
what  is  sufficient,  see  The  King  v.  Sar- 
geant,  5  T.   1L    466  ;   Bruce  v.   Bruce,  2 

B.  &  P.  229  ;  The  King  v.  Mitchell,  10 
East,  511  ;  Withorn  V.  Thomas,  7  M.  & 
G.  1  ;  The  Queen,  ex  rel.  Forward  v.  Bar- 
tels,  7  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  533  ;  Queen  v. 
Boycott,  14  L.  T.  n.  s.  599  ;  Queen  v. 
Exeter,  L.  R.  4  Q.  P».  110  ;  Manning  v. 
Manning,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  223;  Taylor 
r.  Parish,  &c,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  309  ;  Bond 
v.  St.  George,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  312  ;  Queen 
v.  St.  Ives,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  467  ;  Durant  v. 
Carter,  I..  R.  9  C.  P.  261  ;  Ford  v.  Pye, 
L.  R.  9  C.  P.  269  ;   Ford  v.  Hart,  L.  R.  9 

C.  P.  273  ;  Wilton  v.  Falmouth,  3  Shep. 
479  ;  State  v.  Decasinova,  1  Tex.  401  ; 
State  v.  Frost,  4  Hairing.  558  ;  Fry's 
Election,  71  Pa.  St.  302  ;  s.  c.  10  Am. 
Rep.  698. 

1    Spear    V.     Robinson,     29     Me.     ,":',] 


(1849)  ;  State  v.  Swearingen,  12  Ga.  23 
(1852)  ;  Stat.-  r.  Gastinel,  20  La.  An.  114 
(186a)  ;  see  also,  State  '-.  Newman,  91 
Mo.  445  ;  State  v.  Trumpf,  50  Wis.  In:;. 

-  State  r.  Swearingen,  L2  Ga.  23 
lett  v.  Bedwell,  47  Miss.  266;  s.  <•.  12 
Am.  Rep.  338  ;  State  v.  Giles,  1  Chand. 
(Wis.)  112  ;  State  v.  Smith,  14  Wis.  197  ; 
Saunders  v.  Haynes,  13  Cal.  145;  State  v. 
Gastinel  (under  charter),  20  La.  An.  114; 
Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  620  ;  Commonwealth 
ex  rel.  McLaughlin  v.  Cluley  (Sheriff),  56 
Pa.  St.  270  (1868)  ;  People  v.  Clui  . 
X.  Y.  451  (1S72)  ;  s.  c.  10  Am.  hep.  508  ; 
Wood  v.  Bartling,  16  Kan.  109,  111 
(1876).  Infra,  sees.  198,  note,  199,  i*  te. 
The  following  points  are  ruled  in  People 
v.  Clute,  supra.  Where  a  majority  of  the 
electors,  through  ignorance  of  the  law  or 
the  fact,  vote  for  one  ineligible  to  the 
office,  the  votes  are  not  nullities  ;  but 
while  they  fail  to  elect,  the  office  cannot 
be  given  to  the  qualified  person  having 
the  next  highest  number  of  votes.  The 
election  is  a  failure,  and  a  new  eh- 
must  be  had.  A  minority  of  the  whole 
body  of  qualified  electors  may  elect  to  an 
office  where  the  majority  decline  to  vote, 
or  where  they  vote  for  one  who  is  ineligi- 
ble to  the  office,  knowing  of  the  disqualifi- 
cation. Notice  of  the  disqualifying  fact, 
and  of  its  legal  effect,  may  he  givi  i 
directly  to  the  voter  as  to  charge  him 
with  actual  knowledge  of  the  disqualifica- 
tion ;  or  the  disqualifying  fact  may  1 
patent  or  notorious  as  thai  his  knowledge 
of  the  ineligibility  may  he  presumed  as 
matter  of  law.  But  not  only  the 
which  disqualifies,  hut  also  the  rule  or 
enactment  of  law  which   makes   it    thus 


Mr.Nh  [PAL    (  CORPORATIONS. 


§197 


^    L97       136  .      Unauthorized  Election;  Notice.  —  Where  it   IS    dis- 

:v  with  the  municipal  authorities  whether  they  will  hold 
an  election  or  not,  votes  at  an  unauthorized  election  are  simply  nul- 
lities.1    Elections  fixed  by  law  at  a  c  rtain  time  and  plact    maybe 

lly  holden,  although  notice  lias  not  heen  published  or  given; 
but  if  the  time  be  not  defined  by  statute,  ami  is  to  be  fixed  by  no- 

the  aotice  required  is  imperative.2  Time  and  place  are  gener- 
ally essential,  but  many  of  the  details  as  to  the  conduct  of  elections 
are  usually  regarded  as  directory.3 


effectual,  must  be  brought  home  so  clearly 
knowledge  or  notice  of  the  elector 
ol    therewith  Lndicato  s 
an  intent  to  waste  it  in  order  to  render  his 
■  nullity. 
Bui  in  Indiana  the  view  is  taken  that, 
■  ':,  1 anse  of  the  ineli- 
gibility  of   the    candidate   receiving    the 
number  of  ballots,  is  a  failure, 
and   musl   be   held  over,  or  whether  the 
■   eligible  candidate   is   elected,  de- 
pends upon  circumstances:  1.   Iftl 
didate   receiving  the    highest   number   of 
ineligible,  but  from  a  '-use  un- 
to the  voters,  and  which  thej  were 
know,       as,  for  example,  in- 
want  of  naturalization,    and    the 
•lie   result    is  a  failure,   and  there 
another  election.    2.    If  thi 
know,    or  are  bound  to  know,  the  ineligi- 
of  a  candidal  :tion  is  not  a 

failure,  as  the  eligible  candidate  receiving 
the    highest    number   of  votes   is   legally 
3.    Where  the  ineligibility   of  a 
candidate  arisi  9  from  his  holding,  or  hav- 
1,  a  public  office,  the  people  within 

ion   Ol  ;i    office    are  held  ill 

law  to  know  —  are  chargeable  with  notice 
of  —  such   ineligibility,    and    votes   given 
h  a  candidate  are  of  no  effect,  and 
his  highest  eligible  competitor  is  elected. 
1  '.    tnd.   93,   102  (1860), 
■  /'  ,  J.  ;  commenting  on  S 

Swearii  idency),    11 

i.    41     Fhd.    572 
13  Am.  Rep.  346,  wl 
t  this  mli 

Me.,   appendix, 

■  '.,n  of  the  people  voted  for  a 

■    in    being.      State  v.  <  riles,    1 

1.  (Wis.)  112. 

In  I  !■■  previously 

ited  and  known,  and  the  votes,  un- 


til recently,  have  been  open,  and  there  are 
eases  there  which  decide  or  favor  the 
proposition,  thai  votes  for  a  disqualified 
person,  given  after  notice  of  disqualifica- 
tion, are  thrown  away,  and  the  other  can- 
didate is  elected.  Grant  on  Corporations, 
203-208,  and  cases  cited.  Hut  see,  as  to 
disqualification  and  notice,  Regina  v. 
II  orn  .  7  Ad.  &  K.  960  ;  R  gina  v.  Coun- 
cillors of  Derby,  7  Ad.  &  E.  419  ;  and 
particularly  Regina  v.  Mayor  of  Tewkes- 
bury, Law  Rep.  3  Q.  B.  629  (1868)  ; 
R  in  :  •-.  Ledyard,  8  Ad.  &  K.  537.  ;  Raw- 
linson  on  Corporations  (5th  ed.),  64,  note, 
and  authorities.  "The  principle  of  these 
decisions,"  says  the  London  Law  Times, 
January  25,  1S73,  "  must  be  materially 
affected  by  secret  voting."  This  subject 
was  much  discussed  in  the  debates  before 
the  Electoral  Commission  created  by  Con- 
gress to  decid  ""he  presidential  contest  of 
1876.  In  1872  Parliament  passed  a 
Ballot  Act,  applicbole  to  municipalities. 
Ballol  papers  are  to  be  provided  by  the 
mayor,  and  the  form  thereof  is  prescribed. 
1  Opinions  of  Judges,  7  Mass.  525; 
Same,  15  Mass.  537  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim. 
603;  People  v.  Mathewson,  47  Cal.  442 
(1874);  George  i\  Oxford  Township,  16 
Kan.  72,  Ji  Force  v.  Batavia,  61 

111.  99  ;  Marshal]  v.  Silliman,  61  111.  218; 
Wiley  V.  Silliman,  62  111.  170  ;  Harding 
r  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  111.  90  ; 
Pi  ople    V.    Santa    Anna,   67   111.  57. 

sec.     194. 

'-'  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  303,  and  cases 
cited;  People  v.  Brenham,  3  Cal.  177 
(1851);  People  v.  Fairbury,  51  111.  149 
(1869 

Queen  v.  Justices,  8  Ad.  &  E.  173  ;  Mitch- 
ell v.  Foster.  9  Dowl.  P.  C.  527  :  Wa 
v.  Hastings,  22  Minn.   137. 

:  Dii  ;.•;.  v.  Hurlbut,  5  Cal.  343;    Peo« 


§197 


NOTICE   OF    ELECTION. 


281 


Courts  are  anxious  rather  to  sustain  than  to  defeat  the  popular 

will.1 


pie  v.  Knight  (essentialness  of  place),  13 
Mich,  i-i  ;  Ga  is  v.  Si  iti .  34  [nd.  4-J5 
(l  570).  Where  the  Legislature  provided 
thai  the  polls  of  the  different  wards  sh 
be  kept  open  until  10  o'clock  r.  m.  and 
they  were  closed  at  8  o'clock,  the  election 
was  set  aside.  Pennsylvania  District 
Election,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  526  ;  Clark's  Ca  , 
lb.  521.  Illegal  adjournment  of  election 
to  a  diffi  rent  place  from  the  one  designati  '1 
in  the  Dotice.  Commonwealth  v.  Com- 
missioners, &c,  5  Elawle  (Pa.),  75.  Where 
an  election  is  held  on  a  day  subsequent  to 
that  named  in  the  charter,  the  arts  of 
officers  thus  elected  are  valid,  as  respects 
the  public  and  third  persons,  and  cannot 
be  collaterally  inquired  into.  Coles 
County  v.  Allison,  23  111.  437,  dis- 
tinguished from  Haynes  v.  Washington 
County,  19  III.  G6,  and  approved  in  Peo- 
ple v.  Fairbury,  51  111.  149  (1869).  A 
election  held  on  a  day  prior  to  the  date 
provided  by  law,  see  People  p.  Keeling, 
4  Col.  1'29.  Title  of  officers  elected  before 
the  legal  incorporation  of  a  place  may  be 
validated  by  the  legislature.  State  v. 
Kline,  23  Ark.  587  ;  post,  sees.  256,  276, 
892,  note. 

It  is  a  canon   of  election  law  that  an 
election  is  not  to  be  set  aside  for  a 

nality  or  irregularity  which  cannot 
be  said  in  any  manner  to  have  affected  the 
result  of  the  election.  Commonwealth  v. 
Smith,  132  Mass.  289  ;  Walker  v.  West 
Boylston,  12S  Mass.  550;  The  Queen  v. 
The  Rector  of  St.  Mary,  Lambeth,  8  Ad. 
&  E.  356  ;  Regina,  ex  rel.  Walker  v.  Mitch- 
ell et  "■'.,  4  Upper  Can.  P.  R.  218  ;  .Monk 
Election,  Li  re,  32  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  147  ; 
The  Queen  v.  Plenty,  L.  R.  I  Q.  B.  346  ; 
The  Queen  v.  Ward,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  210  ; 
Regina  v.  Cousins,  28  L.  T.  N.  S.  116;  Re- 
gina, ex  rel.  Harris^.  Bradburn,  6  Upper 
Can.  P.  R.  308  ;  Regina,  ex  rel.  Preston  v. 
Touchburn,  //'.  344  ;  Shaw  v.  Thompson, 
L.  R.  3  Ch.  Div.  233  ;  People  v.  I 
14  Earl..  (N.  Y.)  259  ;  C!ift..n  v.  Cook,  7 
Ala.  114;  Truehart  v.  Addieks,  2  Tex. 
217;  Dishon  o.  Smith,  10  Iowa,  212:  Atty. 
Gen.  r.  Ely.  4  Wis.  120  ;  State  \  J 
19  Ind.  356  :  People  v.  Higgins,  3  Mich. 
233  ;  Gorham  v.   Campbell,  2  Cal.   135  ; 


Taylor  v.  Taylor,  10  Minn.  112;  Bourland 
.  Hildretli,  26  Cal.  161  ;  Day  v.  K< 
Oreg.  123  ;  Piatt  v.  People,  29  111.  54  ; 
Ewing  v.  Filley,  13  Pa.  St.  384  ;  Boward 
v.  Shields,  L6  Ohio  St.  184  ;  McKinney  v. 
O'Connor,  26  Tex.  5  ;  Sprague  v.  Norway, 
31  Cal.  173;  Fry  v.  Booth,  19  I  Ihio  8t  25. 
But  where  it  appears  that  the  irregularity 
is  of  such  character  and  of  such  magni- 
tude thai  it  may  have  affected  the  result, 

.  Hack- 
ney Election,  31  L.  T.  .\.  s.  69  ;  Wood- 
ward v.  Sarsons,  L.  R.  1"  C.  P.  7 
Mathn  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div. 
596;  Johnson  v.  Lambton,  40  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  297  ;  Harrison's  Municipal  Manual, 
4th  ed. 

"  If  rioting  takes  place  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  ordinary  men,  having  the  ordi- 
nary nerve  and  courage  of  men,  are  there- 
in prevented  from  recording  their  votes, 
the  election  is  void  by  the  common  law, 
for  the  common  law  provides  that  an  elec- 
tion should  be  free  in  the  sense  that  all 
persons  shall  have  an  opportunity  of  com- 
ing to  the  poll  and  voting  without  fear  or 
mol  sti  tion."  Nottingham,  In  re,  1  O'M. 
&  11.  -J  15  ;  Stafford,  In  re,  lb.  234  ;  Drogh- 
eda,  In  re,  lb.  252.  The  freedom  of  elec- 
tions is  of  the  utmost  importance.  Any 
attempt  to  interfere  with  the  electors 
in  the  peaceable  and  quiet  exercise  of 
their  rights  or  to  improperly  influence 
them  against  their  judgment  or  desire 
is  a  crime  ;  and  in  addition  to  the  ordi- 
nary punishment  of  the  crime  of  bribery 
of  an  elector  it  is  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision in  many  States  that  whoever 
shall  be  convicted  of  the  crime  shall  for- 
feit the  right  to  any  office  of  profit  or 
trust  under  the  State.  McCrary,  Elec- 
tions, sec.  432. 

i  Skerritt's   Case,    2   Par.    (Pa.)    516; 
Boileau's  Case,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  505  ;  Carpen- 
ter's Case,  '2  Par.  (Pa.)  537  :   New  Orleans 
v.    Graihle,    9    La.    An.    573  ;   Clifton    v. 
Co  k,  7   Ala.    11  t  ;    People   v.    Cook,   14 
Barb.   (N.  V.)  259  ;8N.  V.  67  ;  1: 
v.  Touchburn,  6   Upper  Can.    P.  R. 
United  States  v.   Memphis,  97  U.  S.  28  1, 
approving  text.    The  rule  as  therein  si 
is  regarded  by  Mr.  Justice  Cooky,  as  "an 


282 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  198 


6  198  (137).    Subject  illustrated.  —  Thus,  an  inaccurate  designa- 

h    nana   of  th   offt&  voted  for,  —  as,  for  example,  "Police 

.1  ,         "   instead  of  "Police    Magistrate"  (the   term    used   in   the 

statute),  —  will    not   render    the    votes    invalid,   where    the   legis- 

lative    provisions    make  clear  the  intention  of   the  voters  in  thus 

ting  their  ballots,  —  to  which  intention  effect  should  be  given.1 
But  if  a  specific  number  of  officers  only  can  be  chosen, —  for  ex- 
ample, four, —  ballots  containing  the  names  of  more  than  four 
ons  for  the  office  in  question  must  be  rejected.  Any  other 
doctrine  might  result  in  giving  the  elector  two  votes.  There 
an-  usually  two  competing  tickets,  and  if  an  elector  can,  in  the 
case  supposed,  cast  a  ballot  containing  five  names,  he  may  one  of 
eight,  and  thus  vote  (if  he  chooses  to  insert  the  names)  for  both 
tickets.2 


eminently  proper  one,  and  to  furnish  a 
iatisfactory  tesl  of  what  is  essential, 
and  what  not,  in  election  laws."  Const. 
],im.  618.  See,  also,  as  to  charter  elec- 
tions and  returns,  Heath,  In  re,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  12,  53;  People  v.  Stevens,  5  Hill, 
616  ;  Morgan  v.  Quackenbush,  22  Barb. 
(N.  V.)  72.     Courts  will  nol  enjoin  n 

•  i  unless  the  power  and  right 
to  do  so  plainly  exist.     Smith  v.  McCar- 
thy, 56   Pa.  St.   359  ;  post,  sec.  308,  note. 
tture  may  ratify  the  title  t 
.  in  which  ease  it  cannot  be  questioned 
on  quo  warranto.     People  <\  Flanagan,  66 
N.  V.  237  (1876).   Acts  of  officers  de  facto, 
p    \  *  cs.  221,  note,  256,  276,  763,  note, 
note;  compensation  or  salary  of  offi- 
Samis  v.   King,  40  Conn. 
208  (1873). 

1  People    v.    Matteson,    17    111.    167 
(1855). 

I1   .pi-  r.  Loomis,  8  Wend,  i  X.  Y.) 

896   1 1 332);    People  o.   Seaman,   5   Denio 

(X.  Y.),  1  t9  :  state  p.  Griffey,  5  N        L61 

J6).      Where  only  one  vacan cy       i  rs, 

given    for    two  persons  jointly  are 

thrown  away.     I.'1  i   v.  Mayor  of  Leeds,  7 

Ad.   .V:    E.    963  J   ami    in    this   case    it    wis 

held  that  a  third  candid  i  by  a 

single  regular  vote  was  elected  ;  but  as  to 

g  thrown  away,  see  supra,  sec. 

Where,  by  an  erroneous  construction 

of  t!  on  has  b  en  held  for 

but   one   councillor,  instead    of  two,    tha 

id  -ii  th.'  poll  cannot  have 

it  him  to  the  office. 


Regina  v.  Hoyle,  H.  L.  1855,  cited  in 
Rawl.  on  Corp.  65,  note.  Hi-  remedy  is, 
by  mandamus,  to  have  a  new  election  held 
for  councillor,  or  (if  the  office  be  filled)  by 
a  quo  warranto  I/>.  The  voting  papers 
(corresponding  in  function  to  the  Ameri- 
can ballot,  except  that  it  is  to  be  signed 
by  the  voter  ami  openly  voted)  must  dis- 
tinguish between  different  classes  of  candi- 
dates ;  ami  hence  where  an  election  of 
four  councillors  had  taken  place  on  the  1st 
of  November,  three  of  whom  were  to  sup- 
ply ordinary  vacancies,  ami  one  an  extra- 
ordinary vacancy,  but  no  distinction  had 
been  made  between  them  in  the  noli-'  of 
election,  in  the  voting  papers,  or  in  pub- 
lishing the  names  of  the  persons  elected, 
the  election  was  irregular  and  void.  Re- 
gina  v.  Rowley,  3  Q.  B.  143  ;  s.  c.  in  Ex- 
chequer Chamber,  6  Q.  I'..  668.  See  sec. 
■17.  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  and  also 
7  Will.  IV.  and  1  Vict.  chap,  lxxviii.  sec. 
11.       /  .    .1.,    says  :     "  There    is   no 

objection  to  the  votes  all  being  given  on 
the  same  paper,  it'  a  proper  distinction  were 
made."  Regina  v.  Rowley,  supra  ;  and 
I;  .  v.  Winchester,  7  Ad.  &  E.  215. 
B .  tic  English  .Municipal  Corporations 
A.ct  of  L835,  sec.  82,  the  voting  paper  is 
required  to  contain  "the  Christian  and 
surnames  of  tin-  persons  for  whom  the 
burgess  votes,  with  their  respective  p 
of  abode,  such  voting  paper  being  previ- 
ously signed  with  the  name  of  the  burgi  99 
voting  and  the  name  of  the  street  in  which 
the   property  fur  which  he  appears  to  be 


§  200 


ILLEGAL    VOTES  ;     ELECTION    CONTESTS. 


283 


§  109   (138).    Effect  of  Illegal   Votes  being  received.  —  Receiving 

illegal  or  improper  votes  will  oot  alone  vitiate  an  election.  It  must 
be  shown  affirmatively,  in  order  to  overturn  the  declared  result,  that 
the  wrongful  action  changed  it.  This  rule  applies  to  corporation 
elections  as  well  as  others.1 


§  200    (130).    Special   Tribunal    to    decide    Election    Contests   for 
Municipal  Offices.  — A  constitutional  provision  that  the  judicial  power 

of  the  State  shall  be  vested  in  a  supreme  court  and  interior  courts, 
does  not  disable  the  legislature,  in  creating  municipal  corporations, 
from  providing  that  the  city  council  shall  be  the  judge  of  the  election 
of  its  mayor,  members,  and  other  officers,  and  from  prohibiting  the 
ordinary  courts  of  justice  from  inquiring  into  the  validity  of  the 
determination  of  the  city  council.2 


rated  is  situate."  In  construction  of  this 
section,  it  is  held  that  the  Christian  name 
of  the  person  voted  for  need  not  be  writ- 
ten out  in  full  ;  the  contraction  ordinarily 
used  is  sufficient.  Regina  v.  Bindley,  3 
E.  &  E.  634.  But  it  seems  that  an  initial 
letter  only  would  not  be  sufficient.  lb. 
Though  it  would  he  in  the  signature  of  the 
voter.  Regina  v.  Avery,  18  Q.  B.  576  ; 
Regina  v.  Tart,  1  E.  &  E.  618.  "Places 
of  abode  "  held  to  mean  places  of  resi- 
dence, not  of  business.  Regtha  v.  Ham- 
mond, 17  Q.  B.  772  ;  ante,  sec.  195  ;  Re- 
gina v.  Deighton,  5  Q.  B.  896  ;  Dav.  & 
M.  682. 

The  Ballot  Act  of  1872,  now  embraced 
in  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882, 
prescribes  the  form  of  the  ballot  papers, 
and  these  are  required  to  be  furnished  by 
the  Mayor. 

1  Murphy,  In  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y. )  153 
(1827);  People  v.  Cicotte,  16  Mich.  283 
(1868);  First  Parish?-.  Stearnes,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  148  ;  Judkins  v.  Hill,  50  N.  H. 
140  (1870)  ;  Johnston  v.  Charleston,  1 
Bay  (S.  C.j,  441  (1795).  In  this  last  ease 
the  city  council  was  .specially  authorized 
to  judge  of  elections  of  corporation  officers, 
and  the  court,  respecting  a  contest  before 
the  council,  said  :  "  If  the  bad  votes  be  de- 
ducted from  the  highest  candidate,  and  he 
still  has  a  majority,  Ins  election  is  good  ; 
but  if,  after  such  deduct  ion,  the  next  can- 
didate has  an  equal  or  greater  number  of 
votes  than  the  other,  and  it  is  doiibtful 
which  candidate  had  the  greatest  number 


of  valid  votes,  the  council  should  send  the 
matter  back  to  the  people."  Ante,  sec. 
196,  and  note. 

2  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Morgan,  7  Martin,  La. 
(N.s.)  1;  9  lb.  (k.  s.)  381  (1828);  in/m, 
sees.  202,  note,  235,  note,  244,  250,  note. 
While  the  duty  and  power  in  the  city 
council  to  adjudicate  or  decide  cannot  be 
delegated  to  a  committee,  it  is  competent 
for  the  council  to  appoint  a  committee  to 
take  testimony  and  to  report  the  same  and 
the  facts  to  the  council  for  its  action  there- 
on. Salmon  v.  Haynes,  50  N.  J.  L.  97 
(1888).  In  Wammacks  v.  Holloway,  2 
Ala.  31  (1841),  a  shrievalty  contest,  it  was 
denied  that  it  was  within  the  constitu- 
tional power  of  the  legislature  to  deprive  a 
party  claiming  a  public  office  of  the  right 
to  a  jury  trial  by  making  the  summary  or 
extra-judicial  method  conclusive.  And  to 
this  effect  was  the  opinion  of  two  of  the 
judges  in  The  People  v.  Cicotte,  16  Mich. 
283.  Since  elections  to  offices  are  not  in 
the  nature  of  contracts,  there  does  not 
seem  to  be  any  substantial  reason,  in  view 
of  the  plenary  authority  of  the  legislature 
over  offices  and  officers,  to  doubt  it-  power, 
in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  re- 
striction, to  provide,  prospectively,  by  a 
general  act,  the  mode  in  which  contests 
shall  be  determined.  See  Govan  o.  Jack- 
son, 32  Ark.  553  (1877);  State  r.  Fitzger- 
ald, II  Mo.    125  (1869);  Ewing  v.  Filley, 

43  Pa,  St.  384  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Leech, 

44  Pa.  St.  332  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  276  ; 
lb.  623,   624,    note  ;  Smith  v.  New  York, 


284  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §202 

§201  (MO).  Same  subject.  —  Where,  by  the  charter,  the  council 
art  authorized  to  provide,  by  ordinance,  a  special  tribunal  before 
which  contested  municipal  elections  shall  be  tried,  and  to  provide 
the  mode  of  procedure,  it  may  pass  such  ordinance  af/,r  an  election 
has  been  held,  and  authorize  it  to  determine  contests  arising  out  of 
a  previous  election.  Alter  such  determination,  q»<>  irarrnntu  will 
lie  against  the  party  who  was  unsuccessful  before  the  local  tribunal, 
if  he  continue  to  claim  and  exercise  the  office.1 

£  202    (141).    Jurisdiction  of  the   Courts   of  Law.  —  Common  law 

ral  and  original  jurisdiction  have  the  admitted  power 

to  inquire  into  the  regularity  of  elections,  corporate  and  others,  by 
quo  warranto,  or  an  information  in  that  nature,  and,  in  certain  cases, 
by  mandamus.  It  is  not  unusual  for  charters  to  contain  provisions 
to  the  effect  that  the  common  council  or  governing  body  of  the  muni- 
cipality "shall  be  the  judge  of  the  qualifications"  or  " of  the  qualifica- 
tions and  election  of  its  own  members"  and  of  those  of  the  other 
officers  of  the  corporation.  What  effect  do  such  provisions  have 
upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the  superior  courts?  The  answer  must 
depend  upon  tlie  language  in  •which  these  provisions  are  couched, 
viewed  in  the  light  of  the  general  laws  of  the  State  on  the  subjects 
of  contested  elections  and  quo  warranto.2  The  principle  is,  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  tin,  court  remains  unless  it  appears  with  unequivocal 
certainty  that  the  legislature  intended  to  take  it  away.  Language 
like  that  quoted  above  will  not  ordinarily  have  this  effect,  but  will 
be  construed  to  afford  a  cumulative  or  primary  tribunal  only,  not  an 
exclusive  one.     A  provision  that  no  court  should  take  cognizance  of 

37  N.  Y.   518;    People  v.   Mahaney,  13  the  charter  makes  the  council  the  judges  of 

Mich.  481;  Steele  v.  Martin,  6  Kan.  430;  the  election  or  qualification  of  its  mem- 

v.  Lewis,  51  Conn.  113;  William-  bers,   the  power  expires  with  the  council 

son  v.  Love,  52  Tex.  335;  Seay  v.  Hunt,  which  admits  the  member;   the  question 

55  Tex.  545.     [fthe  charter  provides  that  cannot  be  opened  by  a  subsequent  council, 

"the  common  council  shall  be  tbe  judge  Doran  v.  De  Long,  48  Mich.  552;  infra, 

of  the  election  and  qualifications  of  its  own  sec.  204,  note.      Quorum  of  council,  post, 

members,  and  shall  have  the  power  to  de-  sec.  278  ct  scq. 

termii                                  •■>."    its   action  '  State  v.  Johnson,  17  Ark.  407  (1856), 

under  and  pursuant  to  this  power  is  final  (mayoralty  contest).     See  post,  chap,  xxi., 

and    no1    Biibjecl    to   review.      People  v.  quo  warranto. 

Hi  haw,  60  Mich.  200.  -  Text  quoted  and  approved  in  Kendall 

When  a  city  charter  makes  the  common  v,  Camden,  47  N.  J.   L.   (18  Vroom)  64. 

7  //..  final  judges  of  the  election  of  The  decision  of  a  city  council  as  to  the 

aldermen,  mandamus  will  not  lie  to  com-  eligibility  of  a  member  is  not  reviewable  in 

pel  them  to  reinstate  one  whom  they  had  a  proceeding  by  quo  warranto,     Seay  u. 

excluded  without  a  proper  bearing  on  tlie  Hunt.  55  Tex.  545.     See  ante,  sees.  2U0, 

merits.     People  v.  Fitzsjerald,   11  Mi'  li.  "2;  201  ;  post,  sees.  255,  note,  892. 
Alter  v.  Simpson,  46  Mich.  L38.      Where 


§  202 


JURISDICTION    OF   THE    COURTS    OF   LAW. 


285 


election  cases  by  quo  warranto,  etc.,  would  doubtless  be  sufficient  to 
divest  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judicial  tribunals.  And  so,  in  general, 
of  a  provision  that  the  council  should  have  the  sole  or  the  Jmal  power 
of  deciding  elections.1 


i  Heath,  In  re,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  42,  52, 
and  cases  cited  by  Cowen,  J.,  who  is  of 
opinion  that  no  mere  negative  words,  and 
thai  nothing  less  than  express  words,  will 

oust  the  supervisory  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts.  Infra,  sees.  204,  note,  205,  note. 
The  amended  charter  of  a  city  provided 
"that  the  board  of  councilmen  shall  be 
the  final  judges  of  the  election  returns, 
and  of  the  validity  of  elections  and  quali- 
fications of  its  own  members."  Pari.-,  J., 
says  :  "  The  statute  in  question  was  clearly 
intended  to  apply  to  eases  of  this  kind. 
It  makes  the  common  council  of  tin- city 
final  judges  of  the  election  return^  and 
qualifications  of  its  members.  By  the  use 
of  the  word  '  final '  the  legislature  intended 
to  divest  the  superior  court  of  jurisdiction 
in  such  cases,  and  make  the  common  coun- 
cil the  sole  tribunal  to  determine  the  legal- 
ity of  the  election  of  its  members."  Sel- 
lirk  v.  Common  Council,  &c,  40  Conn.  359 
(1^7:'.):  citing,  inter  alia,  Commonwealth 
v.  Baxter,  35  Pa.  St.  263  ;  Commonwealth 
v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St.  332  ;  Lamb  v.  Lynd, 
44  Pa.  St.  336  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Meeser, 
44  Pa.  St.  341  ;  People  v.  Witherell,  14 
Mich.  48  ;  O'Docherty  v.  Archer,  9  Tex. 
295.  In  Linegar  v.  Rittenhouse,  94  111. 
208,  and  Oregon  v.  McKennon,  8  Oreg. 
485,  the  rule  referred  to  in  the  text  is 
cited  and  applied.  In  California,  when 
the  charter  of  a  city  provides  that  the 
common  council  "  shall  judge  of  the  qual- 
ifications, elections,  and  returns  of  their 
own  members,"  the  council  possesses  the  ex- 
clusive authority  to  pass  on  the  subject, 
and  the  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  in- 
quire into  the  qualifications,  elections,  or 
returns  of  members  of  the  council.  |Vnp]e 
v.  Metzker,  47  Cal.  524  (1874).  See,  in 
support  of  the  text,  Grier  v.  Shackelford, 
Const.  Rep.  642  ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  4  4 
Mo.  425  (1869);  Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
Closkey,  2  Rawle  (Pa.),  369  (two  judges 
dissenting);  Strahl,  In  re,  16  Iowa,  869 
(1864);  State  v.  Funck,  17  Iowa,  365 
(1864);  Kane  v.  People,  4  Neb.  509 
(1876)  ;    Bateman   v.    Megowan,     1    Met. 


(Ky.)  533  ;  Wammacks  v.  Holloway,  2 
Ala.  31  (1841)  (shrievalty  contest);  Hum- 
mer v.  Hummer,  3  <■•  Greene  (Iowa),  42; 
Macklot  v.  Davenport,  17  [owa,  :;7'.' ; 
Cass  v.  State,  34  hid.  424  (1870);  State  v. 
Marlow,  15  Ohio  St.  114  ;  distinguished, 
Kane  v.  People,  4  Neb.  509  (187-.);  post, 
chapters  on  Quo  Warranto,  Mandamus, 
and  Remedies  against  Illegal  Corporate 
Acts.  Action  of  board  of  canvassers  is  not 
conclusive  of  the  right  of  the  party  to  an 
office,  though  it  may  deprive  him,  in  the 
first  instance,  of  a  commission  or  certifi- 
cate. Quo  ic-arranto  lies  notwithstanding 
the  determination  of  the  board  of  canvas- 
sers, on  which  full  investigation  may  be 
had.  State  v.  Governor,  1  Dutch.  (K.  J.) 
331  (1856);  State  v.  The  Clerk,  Ih.  354; 
People  v.  Kilduff,  15  111.  492  ;  Cooley, 
Const.  Lim.  623,  and  cases  cited  ;  Hadley 
v.  Mayor,  33  N.  Y.  603  (1865);  Anthony 
v.  Halderman,  7  Kan.  50  (1871). 

Conformably  to  the  views  expressed  in 
the  text  it  has  been  decided  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Pennsylvania,  that  the 
right  given  to  city  councils  to  be  the  judges 
of  the  qualification  of  their  own  members 
"in  like  manner  as  each  branch  of  the 
legislature,"  does  not  preclude  the  juris- 
diction of  the  courts  to  try  the  question  of 
qualification  by  quo  warranto,  though  the 
opinion  of  the  profession  seems  to  be  other- 
wise, and  it  was  otherwise  held  in  the 
court  below.  Commonwealth  v.  Allen,  70 
Pa.  St.  465  (1872). 

A  special  remedy  given  by  statute  is  cu- 
mulative, and  not  exclusive  of  tlic  ordinary 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  unless  such  be 
the  manifest  intention  of  the  statute.  At- 
torney-General v.  Corporation  of  Poole,  4 
Mylne  &  Cr.  17,  overruling  2  Keen,  190  ; 
see,  also,  Attorney-General  v.  Aspinwall, 
2  Mylne  &  Cr.  613.  And  hence  a  breach 
of  a  public  trust  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  held,  in  England,  to  be  cognizable 
in  chancery,  notwithstanding  a  special  ap- 
peal be  given  in  the  particular  matter 
to  the  lords  of  the  treasury.  Tb.  Parr  v. 
Attorney-General,  8  CL  &  F.  409  ;  Attor- 


:>»; 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  203 


§  203  (142).  Same  subject.  —  Agreeably  to  the  rule  just  stated,  a 
clause  in  tin;  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation,  that  the  city  coun- 
cil "shall  be  the  judges  of  the  election,  returns,  and  qualifications  of 
their  nun  members,  and  of  all  other  officers  of  the  corporation,"  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Delaware  not  to  oust  the  Sujwrior  Court 
of  the  State  (invested  with  the  usual  powers  of  the  King's  Bench)  </ 
its  superintending  jurisdiction  over  corporations,  and  it  was  declared, 
if  the  council  should  erroneously  decide  that  a  person  duly  elected 
by  the  people  to  an  office  was  not  qualified  to  hold  it,  a  mandamus 
might  issue  commanding  them  to  admit  him  to  the  oilice.1 


ney-General  v.  Corporation  of  Litchfield, 
11  Beav.  120  ;  see  chapter  on  Remedies 
against  Illegal  Corporate  Acts,  post,  sec. 
910. 

Jurisdiction  and  powers  of  courts  of 
chancery.  A  court  of  chancery  has  no  ju- 
risdiction to  enjoin  the  holding  of  an  elec- 
tion hy  tlie  people,  ami  a  writ  issued  for 
that  purpose  is  void,  and  disobedience 
thereof  will  not  subject  a  party  to  punish- 
ment as  for  a  contempt  of  court.  Darst  v. 
People,  62  111.  306  (1872);  Walton  v. 
1  li  \  cling,  61  111.  201  (1871).  As  to  juris. 
il.ii-Hon  of  federal  courts  of  equity  in  re- 
spect of  State  or  municipal  oflices,  see  lie 
Sawyer,  124  IT.  S.  200;  post,  sees.  205, 
255,  275,  890,  906,  note.  Courts  of  equity 
have  no  inherent  power  to  try  contested 
elections,  and  have  never  exercised  it  ex- 
cept in  cases  where  it  has  been  conferred 
by  express  enactment  or  necessary  impli- 
cation therefrom.  Dickey  v.  Reed,  78  111. 
261  (1875).  Where  an  election  was  held 
in  a  city  on  the  (juestion  of  whet  her  the 
municipality  should  become  incorporated 
under  the  general  incorporation  act  for 
cities  and  villages,  and  a  writ  of  injunction 
was  issued  nut  of  the  Circuit  Court  enjoin- 
ing the  board  of  canvassers  from  canvassing 
tli.  returns  and  declaring  the  result,  it  was 
held  thai  the  Circuit  Court,  unaided  by 
:  tatute  and  exercising  jurisdiction  only  ac- 
cording to  the  general  usage  and  practice 
of  courts  of  equity,  had  no  power  to  issue 
the  writ  ;  that  it  was  utterly  void  ;  that 
the  canvassers  were  not  bound  to  obey  it, 
and  could  not  be  punished  for  contempt 
for  refusing  to  do  so.  lb.  An  injunction 
restraining  a  board  of  canvassers  from  pro- 
ceeding to  canvass  and  certify  the  result  of 
an  election  until  the  further  order  of  the 
judge  granting  the  same,  where  the  statute 


requires  the  board  to  proceed  by  a  certain 
day,  is  unauthorized.  State,  cxrel.  Blox- 
ham  v.  State  Board  of  Canvassers,  13  Fla. 
55  (1869).  Equity  will  not  interfere,  by 
injunction,  to  restrain  persons  from  exer- 
cising the  functions  of  public  offices  on  the 
ground  of  the  want  of  binding  force  in  the 
law  under  which  their  appointments  were 
made,  but  will  leave  that  question  to  be 
determined  at  law.  Sheridan  v.  Colvin, 
78  111.  237  (1875).  In  this  case  it  was 
sought  to  enjoin  the  city  council  from  en- 
forcing an  ordinance  on  the  sole  ground 
that,  if  the  ordinance  was  enforced,  it 
would  deprive  the  complainants  of  the 
functions  of  offices  which  they  held  in  the 
city  ;  and  it  was  held  that  a  court  of 
chancery  had  no  jurisdiction.  lb.  Infra, 
sees.  245,  255,  275,  and  note.  Jurisdiction 
in  equity  over  contested  county  seed  elec- 
tions in  Illinois.  Dickey  v.  Reed,  78  111. 
261  (1S75);  Shaw  v.  Hill,  67  111.  455 
(1873). 

The  expenses  of  a  municipal  election 
must  be  borne  by  the  municipality,  and 
not  in  whole,  or  in  part,  by  the  county  ; 
but  to  a  bill  by  resident  taxpayers  to  re- 
strain the  city  from  paying  the  election 
officers  for  their  services,  such  officers  are 
necessary  parties.  Bingham  v.  Camden, 
29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2  Stew.)  464  (1878);  Butcher 
v.  Camden,  lb.  478  ;  post,  sec.  911  et  seq. 

1  State  v.  Wilmington,  3  Hairing. 
(Del.)  294  (1840);  s.  P.  State  v.  Fitzger- 
ald, 44  Mo.  426  (1869).  So  in  Iowa, 
where  the  city  charter  provided  that  the 
council  should  be  "  the  judge  of  the  elec- 
tion and  qualifications  of  its  own  mem- 
bers," but  no  ordinance  had  been  passed 
prescribing  any  method  of  trial,  it  was 
held  that  the  mere  provision  in  the  charter 
did  not  preclude  a  contestant  from  a  resort 


§205 


STATUTORY   JURISDICTION  ;    QUO    WARRANTO. 


287 


§  204  (143).  Same  subject.  —  Where  the  legislative  intent  Is  clear 
that  the  action  of  the  council  in  contested  election  cases  shall  be  final, 
the  court  will  not  inquire  into  election  frauds,  since  the  council  is 
the  judge  of  this  matter  as  of  others  pertaining  to  the  election; 

but  the  courts  xoill  inquire  whether,  in  point  of  law,  there  was  an 
office  or  vacancy  to  be  filled.1 

§  205  (144).  Special  Statutory  Jurisdiction  held  to  exclude  Quo 
Warranto. — Where,  by  statute,  the  returns  of  all  municipal  elections 


to  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo 
warranto.  State  v.  Funck  (mayoralty 
contest),  17  Iowa,  365  (1864).  In  a  pre- 
vious case  the  same  court  decided  that 
under  a  charter  making  the  council 
"judges  of  the  election,  returns,  and 
qualifications  of  their  own  members,"  it 
was  competent  for  the  council  to  pass  a 
general  ordinance  providing  for  the  trial 
of  contested  elections  of  city  officers,  and 
making  the  council  the  tribunal  for  the 
trial  of  the  same,  such  an  ordinance  being 
consistent  with  the  general  laws  of  the 
State,  which,  in  providing  special  tribu- 
nals for  contesting  State,  county,  and 
township  offices,  omitted  to  make  any 
special  provision  for  contested  elections  to 
municipal  offices.  Strahl,  In  re,  16  Iowa, 
369  (1864)  (mayoralty  contest).  See  sec. 
202,  note.     Be  Sawyer,  124  U.  S.  200. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St. 
332  (1863);  Commonwealth  v.  Meeser,  lb. 
341.  Construction  of  words  making  the 
number  of  members  of  the  council  from 
a  ward  depend  upon  "the  list  of  the  taxa- 
ble inhabitants."  lb.;  People  v.  With- 
erell,  14  .Mich.  48;  Tompert  v.  Lithgow, 
1  Bush  (Ky.),   176  (1866). 

Pending  legal  proceedings,  the  court, 
in  favor  of  the  officer  apparently  entitled, 
enjoined  the  adverse  claimant  from  at- 
tempting to  take  possession  of  the  office. 
Ewing  v.  Thompson,  43  Pa.  St.  384  (1862) ; 
KerrV  Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  16,  292  (1864), 
noted,  infra,  sec.  275.  Ante,  sec.  202, 
note  ;  infra,  sec.  255,  note.  Certificate  of 
election  is  the  prima  facie  written  title  to 
office,  and  remains  so  until  regularly  set 
aside  or  annulled.  Ih. ;  post,  sec.  275  ; 
People  v.  Thatcher,  55  N.  Y.  525  (1874). 

The  council,  as  board  of  canvassers,  can- 
not investigate  the  legality  of  an  election, 
but  are  concluded  by  the  returns  of  the 


judges  ;  but  the  council,  when  sitting  as  a 
tribunal  to  judge  of  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  their  body,  may  go  behind  the  re- 
turns and  inquire  into  the  fact  as  to  who 
is  elected.  State  v.  Railway,  33  N.  J.  L. 
Ill  (1868).  Under  special  charter  the 
declaration  and  decision  of  the  council  as 
to  who  are  elected,  held  essential  to  a 
complete  election.  People  v.  North,  72 
N.  Y.  124  (1878);  People  v.  Crissey,  91 
N.  Y.  616.  A  charter  provision  making 
the  board  of  aldermen  the  judge  of  the 
election,  &c,  of  its  own  members,  "subject, 
however,  to  the  review  of  any  court  of  com- 
petent  jurisdiction,"  held  not  to  oust  the 
courts  of  jurisdiction  or  prevent  them 
from  entertaining  original  proceedings. 
People  v.  Hall,  80  N.  Y.  117  ;  McVeany 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  80  X.  Y.  185, 
where  the  charter  provided  that  the  city 
council  should  "  be  the  judges  of  the  elec- 
tion and  qualification  of  their  own  mem- 
bers," without  indicating  an  intention  to 
make  their  action  final,  it  was  held  that 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  to  try  the 
question  of  such  an  election  was  not  ex- 
cluded. State  v.  Gates,  35  Minn.  385  ; 
ante,  sees.  202,  and  note,  255,  note.  When 
a  council,  being  by  charter  the  sole  judge 
of  the  election  of  its  members,  has  investi- 
gated and  seated  a  member,  it  cannot  re- 
open the  matter  and  orders  second  investi- 
gation. Kendell  v.  Camden,  17  X.  J.  L. 
(18  Vroom)  64;  supra,  sec.  200,  note; 
infra,  sec.  205,  note.  And  where  the 
charter  provided  for  contesting  elections 
before  the  judge  of  the  Circuit  Court,  who 
was  empowered  "to  pronounce  judgment 
in  the  case  according  to  the  facts,"  it  was 
held  that  his  judgment  was  conclusive, 
and  admissible  in  evidence  in  an  action  to 
recover  the  office.  Davidson  v.  Wood- 
ruff, 68  Ala.   356. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§205 


were  declared  to  be  "subject  to  the  inquiry  and  determination  of 
the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  upon  the  complaint  of  iifteen  or  more 
voters  tiled  in  said  court  within  twenty  days,  and  the  court,  in 
judging  of  such  elections,  was  directed  to  proceed  upon  the  merits 
thereof,  and  determine  finally  concerning  the  same  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  Commonwealth,"  this  was  held  to  exclude  the  remedy 
by  quo  warranto  and  all  common-law  remedies  as  to  matters  which 
miuht  have  been  investigated  in  the  special  mode  prescribed  by 
the  statute.  The  opinion  was  expressed  that  the  judgment  of  the 
Common  Pleas  was  final;  that  it  could  not  be  reversed  by  quo 
warranto  or  in  any  other  collateral  manner;  and  that  even  a 
certiorari  would  enable  the  appellate  court  to  examine  only  the 
regularity  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Common  Pleas,  but  not  to 
examine  the  ease  on  its  merits  as  disclosed  in  the  evidence.1 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Garrigues,  28  Pa. 
St.  9  (1857);  Commonwealth  v.  Baxter, 
35  Pa.  St.  263  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Leech, 
II  Pa.  St.  332;  followed  and  approved, 
State  v.  Mailow,  15  Ohio  St  114;  see 
Ewing  v.  Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  386  ;  Lamb  v. 
Lynd,  44  Pa.  St.  336.  Ellis.)!),  Lira,  20 
Gratt.  (Va.)  10,  29  (1870),  commenting 
on  Commonwealth  v.  Garrigues,  supra. 
Function  and  powers  of  common  council 
as  election  canvassers.  Morgan  v.  Quack- 
enbush,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  72.  A  city 
council,  under  authority  "to  canvass  re- 
turn-, and  determine  and  declare  the  re- 
sult" of  elections  to  municipal  offices, 
exhausts  its  power  when  it  has  once  legally 
canvassed  the  returns  and  declared  the 
result,  and  it  cannot  at  a  subsequent  meet- 
ike  a  re-canvass  and  reverse  its 
prior  determination.  Hadley  v.  Mayor, 
33  X.  Y.  603  (1865),  supra,  sec.  204,  note. 
The  rule  stated  in  the  text  (sec.  202),  that 
the  original  or  superintending  jurisdiction 
of  the  superior  courts  should  not  be  held 
to  be  taken  away  by  any  language  which 
does  not.  expressly,  or  by  unequivocal  im- 
plication, show  this  to  have  been  the 
Lve  intention,  is  a  salutary  one, 
ms  in  some  eases  not  to  have  been 
very  strictly  observed.  In  Texas,  where 
the  statute  conferred  upon  the  county 
co nit  the  power  to  determine  contested 
as  of  county  officers,  and  gave  no 
il.it  was  considered  to  be  I  he 
policy  of  t]  re  an  early 

determination  of  such  disputes,  and  it  was 


held  that  the  judgment  of  the  county  court 
could  not  be  revised  either  upon  appeal  or 
certiorari,  and  was  final.  O'Docherty  v. 
Archer,  9  Tex.  295  (1852).  The  special 
mode  provided  by  law  for  contesting  elec- 
tions must  be  followed.  Dickey  v.  Keed, 
78  111.  261  (1875)  ;  post,  chap.  xxii. 

The  Constitution  of  Ohio  requires  the 
General  Assembly  "to  determine  by  law 
before  what  authority,  and  in  what  man- 
ner, the  trial  of  contested  elections  shall 
be  conducted  ; "  and  accordingly  a  specific 
mode  of  contesting  elections  in  that  State 
was  provided  by  statute  ;  and  this  mode 
was  held  to  exclude  the  common-law  mode 
hi/  2>rt>cerdiiitjs  i)i  quo  warranto,  and  the 
result  to  bind  the  State  as  well  as  individ- 
uals. State  v.  Maxlow,  15  Ohio  St.  114 
(1864). 

In  South  Carolina  it  was  held,  where 
the  legislature  had  authorized  managers 
of  elections  "to  hear  and  determine" 
of  contested  elections,  without  mak- 
ing any  provision  for  an  appeal,  or  any 
reference  in  the  act  to  proceedings  by  quo 
warranto,  that  their  decision  was,  with- 
out any  express  statutory  declaration  to 
thai  effect,  final  and  conclusive,  and  that 
courts  had  no  control  over  it.  Grier  v. 
Shackelford,  3  Brevard  (S.  C),  491 
(1814)  (Nott,  J.,  dissenting)  ;  followed 
in  The  State  v.  Deliesseline,  1  McCord 
(S.  C),  52  (1821)  (two judges  dissenting).' 
See  State  v.  Hnggins,  Harper,  Law,  94 
(1824).  But  note  remarks  of  Evans,  J., 
iu  State  v.  Cockrell,  2  Rich.  Law  (S.  C), 


§  207 


POWER    TO    CREATE    OFFICES. 


§  206    (145).      Power  to  create  and  appoint  Municipal  Officers.  — 

At  common  law,  municipal  corporations  may  appoint  officers,  but 
only  such  us  the  nature  of  their  constitution  requires.  The  right  of 
electing  such  officers  as  they  arc  authorized  to  have  is  incidental  to 
every  corporation,  and  need  not  be  expressly  conferred  by  charter. 
The  power  of  appointing  officers  is,  at  common  law,  to  be  exercised 
by  the  corporation  at  large,  and  not  by  any  select  body,  unless  it  is 
so  provided  in  the  charter.  The  powers  of  corporate  officers  proper 
at  common  law  are  very  limited,  extending  only  to  the  administra- 
tion of  the  by-laws  and  charter  regulations  of  the  corporation.1 

§  207  (146).  Power  to  create  Offices.  —  In  this  country  the 
charter  or  constitution  of  the  corporation  usually  provides  with  care 
as  to  all  the  principal  officers,  such  as  mayor,  aldermen,  marshal, 
clerk,  treasurer,  and  the  like,  and  prescribes  their  general  duties. 
This  leaves  hut  little  necessity  or  room  for  the  exercise  of  any  im- 
plied power  to  create  other  offices  and  appoint  other  officers.2     It  is 


6,  who,  speaking  of  the  subsequent 
act  of  1839  (requiring  the  managers  to 
hear  and  determine  the  validity  of  the 
election,  and  providing  that  their  "de- 
cisions shall  be  final  "),  says:  "I  take  it 
to  be  clear  that  the  validity  of  an  election, 
in  all  cases,  must  (under  the  act),  in  thefirst 
instance,  be  decided  by  the  court  of  manag- 
ers duly  authorized  according  to  law. 
All  questions,  whether  of  law  or  fact,  must 
be  submitted  to  this  tribunal.  Their  deci- 
sions, on  questions  of  fact,  must  neces- 
sarily be  final,  as  no  appeal  is  given  ;  but 
I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  their  errors  of 
law  may  not  be  corrected  by  certiorari,  or 
such  of  the  prerogative  writs  as  may  be 
best  suited  to  the  case."  Accordingly, 
where  an  election  within  the  act  had  not 
been  contested  before  the  managers,  the 
court  refused  leave  to  file  an  information 
in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto.  It  was 
afterwards  stated,  by  a  distinguished  judge 
in  that  State,  that  the  scrutiny  of  muni- 
cipal elections,  as  an  incidental  power, 
belongs  in  the  first  place  to  the  city  coun- 
cil ;  and  if  they  abuse  that  power,  the 
correction  of  that  abuse  devolves  upon  the 
courts  by  information  in  the  nature  of  a 
quo  warranto.  Per  O'Neall,  J.,  in  State 
v.  Schnierle,  5  Rich.  Law  (S.  C),  299, 
301  (1852)  (quo  war.  to  test  validity  of 
defendant's  election  as  mayor  of  Charles- 
ton),     s.  p.  Johnston   v.    Charleston,    1 

VOL.  I.  —  19 


Bay  (S.  C),  441  (1795).  But  the  city 
council,  in  order  to  determine  a  i 
for  a  municipal  office,  cannot  swear  the 
individual  voters  to  compel  them  to  de- 
clare for  whom  they  voted.  This  is  an  in- 
quisitorial power  unknown  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  government,  and  of  danger- 
ous tendency.  lb.  See,  also,  People  v. 
Pease,  27  N.  Y.  81  ;  People  v.  Thaoher, 
55  N.  Y.  525  (1874);  People  v.  Cicotte, 
16  Mich.  2S3  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  604- 
606.  Election  contests  for  office  will  not 
be  determined  on  habeas  corpus  i 
In  re,  16  Iowa,  369),  nor  in  general  on 
bill  in  equity.  Hagner  v.  Heybei 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  104;  but  see  Ken  v. 
Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  292;  supra,  see.  202, 
note  ;  post,  sec.  275  ;  Hughes  v.  Parker, 
20  N.  H.  58;  Cochran  i:  McCleary,  22 
Iowa,  75  (1S67)  ;  Re  Sawyer,  124  V.  S. 
200,  and  chapter  on  Corporate  Meetings, 
post,  also  chap.  xxii.  post.  But  as  to 
county  seat  contest,  when'  fraud  is  alleged, 
see  Boren  v.  Smith,  47  111.  482. 

1  Willc.  234,  pi.  598  ;  lb.  297,  pi.  767; 
lb.  298,  pi.  769  ;  Clover.  220  ;  V 

v.  Passey,  1  Burr,  237  :  Hastings'  I       .  I 
Mod.  24  ;  Rex   v.  Barnard,  Comb.  416. 

2  Where  it  was  manifest,  from  the 
whole  tenor  o['  a  city  charter,  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  legislature  itself  to 
specify  therein  all  the  offices,  and  desig- 
nate all  the  officers  to  be  elected  or  chosen. 


2    I 


Ml'Mcji'AL   CORPORATIONS. 


207 


supposed,  however,  when  not  in  contravention  of  the  charter,  that 
municipal  corporations  may,  to  a  limited  extent,  have  as  incidental  to 
\wers  the  right  to  create  certain  minor  offices  of  <>  ministerial 
iv(  nature.  Thus,  it  power  be  conferred  to  provide  for  the 
health  of  the  inhabitants,  this  would  give  the  corporation  the  right 
to  pass  ordinances  to  secure  this  end,  and  the  execution  of  such 
ordinances  might  be  committed  to  a  health  officer,  although  nu  such 
officer  be  specifically  named  in  the  organic  act,  if  this  course  would 
not  conflict  with  any  of  its  provisions.  But  the  power  to  create 
offices  even  of  this  character  would  be  Limited  to  such  as  the  nature 
of  the  duties  devolved  by  charter  or  statute  on  the  corporation 
naturally  and  reasonably  required.  The  provisions  of  the  charter  as 
to  time  and  mode  of  election,  the  appointment,  qualifications,  and 
duration  of  the  terms  of  officers,  must  be  strictly  observed.1    Therefore, 


and  to  i  mode  of  appointment, 

it  was  held  thai  thecitj  council  could  not, 
by  virtue  of  an  inherent  or  implied  power, 
-,  fix  his  term,  provide 
for  his  appointment,  and  clothe  him  with 
the  powers  of  a  municipal  officer.  Hoboken 
v.  Harrison,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  73 
(1862).  It  is  said,  in  the  opinion,  that 
thi  power  to  create  municipal  officers 
should  be  expressly  conferred.  In  N(  w 
.  pound-keepers,  from  a  very  early 
period,  had  been  public  township  officers, 
elected  in  the  same  way  as  other  officers 
of  the   township.      Under  these  circum- 

a  was  held  that  a  municipal  coi  po- 
ration  other  than,  bul  situate  within  the 
township,  could  not,  without  express  au- 
thority therefor,  establish  another  public 
pound  within  the  limits  of  the  township, 
and  prescribe  regulations  and  fees  varianl 
from  those  prescribed  by  the  general  law; 
and  it  was  further  held,  that  the  office  of 
pound-keeper  could  not   be  considered  as 

mial  to  the  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion :  nor  is  a  pound-keeper  one  of  those 
subordinate  officers  which  all  municipal 
corporations  may,  as  of  course,  appoint. 
It  was,  however,  admitted  by  the  courl 
that  whi  ioration  has  power 

to  '1"  an  act,  it  has  the  incidental  power 
I  on  to  carrj  it  into  effect. 
Ilman,  2  Dutch.  (X.  J.)  67 
.  210,  ic.:-.  ( '(instruc- 
tion of  power  to  appoint  weigh-master. 
'  I  (34  N. 

J.  I..),  17'-'.     Powei  to  appoint  when  office 


is  vacated  "  by  death  or  disability,"  held 
to  authorize  appointment  where  a  vacancy 
i^  caused  by  resignation.  State  v.  New- 
ark, 3  Dutch.  (X.  .1.)  1S5.  Authority  to 
a  municipal  corporation  to  appoint  cm 
officer  t>->is  inferred  from  the  frequent 
mention  of  the  office  and  its  duties  in  the 
charter.  People  o.  Bedell,  2  Hill  (X.  V.), 
L96 ;   see,  also,  Field  v.   Girard   College, 

54  Pa,  St.  233.  Legislative  prohibition 
to  common  council  against  creating  new 
offices  extends  to  clerks,  hut  not  to  janitors 
and  ordinary  servants.  Costello  v.  Mayor, 
&c.  of  N.  Y.,  63  X.  V.  is  (1875)  ;  Sulli- 
van v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.,  53  N.  Y.  652. 
Power  to  appoint  marshal  under  charter  of 
East    St.    Louis.     See   People  v.    Canty, 

55  111.  33.  A  police  judge  is  held  to  be  a 
municipal  officer  in  Californ i".  People  v, 
Ih  ary,  62  Cal.  557.  Police  officers  and 
power  to  appoint.  Infra,  sec.  210,  and 
note.  Where  an  appointment  is  to  he  made 
by  a  city  council,  if  a  quorum  be  pi-escnt,  a 
person  win,  receives  a  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  will  he  elected  although  a  majority 
of  the  council  may  abstain  from  voting. 
Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137;  post, 
sec.  'J7s  1 1  seq. 

1  Quoted  with  approval  in  Trow- 
bridge v.  Newark,  46  N.  ,1.  L.  (17 
Vroom)  1  in,  \\ here,  by  charter,  the  ap- 
pointmenl  of  a  prosecuting  attorney  was 
committed  to  a  common  council,  but 
there  was  no  direction  as  to  the  ,,mdc  of 
app  rintnu  ■  •',  held,  by  a  divided  court, 
that  having  chosen  one  person    by    ballot 


§  208  THE    MAYOR.  201 

an  ordinance  which  makes  eligible  those  who,  by  the  charter,  are 
not  so,1  or  which  abridges  the  term  of  officers,  as  fixed  by  the 
charter,  is  unauthorized  ami  void.2  Where  provisions  for  the  elec- 
tion of  municipal  officers  are  made  by  ordinance  in  pursuance  of 
charter  powers,  they  must  also  be  strictly  observed.8 

§  208  (147).  The  Mayor.  —  Every  municipal  corporation  is  pro- 
vided with  an  executive  head,  usually  styled  the  mayor.  In  the 
chapter  on  Corporate  Meetings  we  will  point  out  the  difference,  in 
some  respects,  between  the  mayor  of  an  old  corporation  in  England 
and  the  officer  known  by  that  name  in  this  country.4  In  both  coun- 
tries the  mayor  is  the  head  officer  or  executive  magistrate  of  the 
corporation ;  but  with  us  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  all  his 
powers  and  duties  depend  entirely  upon  the  provisions  of  the  charter 
or  constituent  act  of  the  corporation,  and  valid  by-laws  passed  in 
pursuance  thereof,  and  these  vary,  of  course,  in  different  munici- 
palities. It  is  usually  made  his  duty,  however,  to  see  that  muni- 
cipal ordinances  are  executed,  and  to  preside  at  corporate  meetings  ; 
and  he  is  frequently  expressly  declared  to  be  a  member  of  the 
council  or  local  legislative  body.  Properly  and  primarily  his  duties 
are  executive  and  administrative,  and  not  judicial  or  legislative. 
But  judicial  duties   are  often  superadded  to  those  which  properly 

the  council  had  exl    listed    its  power,  and  (1365);    Vason   v.  Augusta,  38   Ga.  542 

that   a    subsequent    resolution    declaring  (1868).      chapter    on    Ordinances,    post. 

another  person    to   be  elected    was  of  no  The  office  of  treasurer  of  a  municipal  cor- 

eil'eet.      State,    ex   rcl.    v.    Barbour,    53  poration  is  not  a  "  civil  office "  within  the 

Conn.   76.  meaning  of  the  provision  of  the  Const  it  u- 

1  Rex  V.  Mayor  of  Weymouth,  7  Mod.  tion  excluding  the  clergy  from  "  holding 

373  ;  Rex  v,  Bumstead,  2  B.  &  Ad.  699  ;  any  civil  office  in  this  State,  or  from  being 

Rex  v.   Spencer,  3    Burr.    1827    ;   Rex    v.  memhers   of    the    legislature."      State    r. 

Chitty,  5  Ad.  &   E.  609.      Ante,  sec.  195.  Wilmington,     3     Hairing.     (Del.)      294 

A  city  council  cannot  elect  its  own  mem-  (1840);  see  Commonwealth    v.   Dallas,   3 

bers  when  the  law  provides  that  they  shall  Yeates  (Pa.),   300.      "  Lucratw 

be  elected   by  ballot  by  the    electors  of  in  the  constitutional  sense,  denned  to  em- 

the  city.    Kearney  v.  Andrews,  2  Stockt.  brace  county  recorder,  commissioner,  town- 

(N    J.)  70      Majority  of  council  essential  ship   trustee,    and  supervisor.      Daily  v. 

to   valid   appointment   of    city  treasurer.  State,  8  Blackf.  329;  Creighton  v.  Piper, 

State  v.  Patterson,  6  Vroom  (35  N.  J.  L.),  14   Ind.   1S2  ;    Howard  V.  Shoemaker,  3o 

190.     See   Douglass  v.    Essex,    9   Vroom  Ind.  111.     The  office  of  city  councilman 

(38  N   J.  L.),  214  ;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  is  not  "lucrative  "  within  the  prohibition 

2  Dutch    (N.  J.)  444,  447.     The  appoint-  of  the  State  Constitution  against  the  .same 

ment   of  a  person    to  a    city   office  by  a  person  holding  more  than  one   lucrative 

mayor  under  a  law   which  requires  con-  the  same  time.     Mate  v.  Kirk,  44 

firmation    by    the   council    gives    the   ap-  Ind.  101  (1873);  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  239.    As 

pointee  no  right  to  the  office  without  such  to  office  i                  fc,  Mohan  v.  Jackson, 

confirmation  by  the  proper  and  legal  city  52  Ind.  59! 

council.     People  v.  Weber,  89  111.  347.  8  Saunders  p.  Lawrence,  141  Mass.  380, 

a  Stadler  v.    Detroit,    13    Mich.    346  *  Post,  sec.  270  et  seq. 


292 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  209 


appertain  to  the  office  of  mayor,  and  he  is  invested  by  legislative 
enactment  with  the  authority  to  administer  doI  only  the  ordinances 
of  the  corporation,  but  also  judicially  to  administer  the  laws  of  the 
State.1 

£  2' i!)  (148).   Same  subject.  —  The  office  of mayor has  long  existed 
in  England,2  and  many  of  its  general  features  have  been  adopted  in 

i   Waldo    r.    Wallace,    12    Ind.    569 
(1859),  and  growing  out  of  it.  Bee,  also, 


k  v.  New,  11  Ind.  93  (1860)  ;  How- 
ard r.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind.  Ml  (1871)  ; 
Reynolds    v.    Baldwin,    1    La.    An.    162 

!)  ;  Muscatine  v.  Steck,  7  Iowa,  505  ; 
2  Iowa,  220  :  Strahl,  In  re,  L6  Iowa,  369; 

r  v.  Mamma,  17  Md.  331  ;  Luehrman 
v.  Taxing  Distri  it,  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  125. 
Approving  text.  Slater  v.  Wood,  9  Bosw. 
(N.  Y.)  15  ;  anti ,  chap.  iii.  Morrison  v. 
McDonald,  21  Me.  550  (1842)  ;  State  v. 
Maynard,  14  111.  419;  Commonwealth  v. 
Dall  (Pa.),  300  (1801)  ;  State 

v.  Wilmington,  3  Harring.  (Del.)  294 
(!  539)  :  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426 
(1871).  This  section  of  the  text  cited 
and  followed.  Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52 
Ind.   ill  (1876). 

i  of  mayor,  in  his  official  name,  to 
bring  suit  to  prevent  or  restrain  violations 

iw  l>y  other  municipal  officers,  de- 
clared. Genois,  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Lockett, 
13  La.  545  (1838).  But  qucere.  The 
mayor  of  a  city  has  no  inddt  ntal  power  to 

Lte  an  appeal  bond  foT  the  corpora- 
tism ;  and  such  a  bond  was  regarded  as 
not  even  incidental  to  the  power  of  taking 
an  appeal,  but  must  be  authorized  by  the 
council.  Baltimore  v.  Railroad  Co.,  21 
Md.  50  (1863).  A  precept  to  collect  a 
nt,  signed  by  a  member  of 
the  council  acting  temporarily  as  president 
thereof,  is  void,  when  the  statute  requires 
the  signature  of  the  mayor.  Jeffersonville 
>-.  Patterson,  82  Ind.  1  10  (1869).  Injunc- 
tion will  lie  to  restrain  a  sale  on  Biicb  a 
precept.  Tb.  See  chapter  on  Remedies 
against  Illeg  J  Coi  porate  Acl  3,  po  it. 

re  and  extenl  of  authority  of 
otl    i     ivil  officers  to  employ 
force  for  the  prevention  or  snpi 

lots,  &    ,     e  Ela  v.  Smith,  5  i 
|M  iss.),    l-l   (1855),    arising  ou1   oi 

Anthony    Burns    as  a   fugitive 
tlavi .     I'  ayor  to  order  demoli- 


tion of  works  and  buildings  in  public 
places.     Henderson  v.   Mayor,  3  La.  563. 

.Mayor  may  sanction  an  ordinance  passed 
by  a  common  council,  whose  term  has  ex- 
pired. Elmendorfu  Ewen,  2  N.  Y.  Leg. 
Obs.  85.  Notice  to  mayor.  Nichols  v. 
Boston,  98  Mass.  39.  Police  and  execu- 
tive power  of  mayor.  Shafer  v.  Mumma, 
17  Md.  331  ;  Slai.r  v.  Wood,  9  Bosw. 
(N.Y.)  15;  Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray 
(Mass.),  161  ;  Nichols  v.  Boston,  98 
Mass.  39.  Alderman  acting  as  mayor. 
State  v.  Buffalo,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  434. 
Judicial  power  of  mayor.  See  Municipal 
Courts,  [>nst ;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan. 
426;  Howard  v.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind.  Ill 
(ls71).  Presence  and  functions  of  mayor 
at  meetings  of  the  council.  See  chapter 
on  Corporate  Meetings,  post. 

Liability  of  mayor  in  Upper  Canada  to 
private  actions  in  respect  to  his  official 
acts.  Fair  v.  Moore,  3  Up.  Can.  ( '.  P.  4S4  ; 
Moran  v.  Palmer,  13  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  450, 
528.  Fraud  of  mayor  restrained  and  re- 
lieved against.  Patterson  v.  Bowes,  4 
Grant,  170  ;  lb.  489  ;  post,  sec.  910,  note. 

'-'  History  and  nature  of  office  of  mayor. 
Consult  I  Jacob's  Law  Diet.  264,  265  ; 
2  Toml.  Law  Diet.  540;  2  Bonv.  150; 
Spclm.  Gloss.  "Mayor";  Ela  v.  Smith, 
5 Gray  (Mass.),  121  "(1855);  Achley's Case, 
1  Abb.  Pr.  Rep.  35  (1856);  Cochran  v. 
McCleary,  22  [owa,  75,  82  (1867)  ;  Nich- 
ols v.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39  ;  Fletcher  v. 
Lowell.  15  Gray  (Mass.),  103;  ante,  sees. 
13,174  \post,  sees.  2:,:;,  260,  271,  331,428. 
The  office  in  England  is  quite  ancient.  In 
1204  King  John  made  the  bailiff  of  King's 
Lynn  a  mayor,  with  administrative  pow- 
ers. The  title  was  a  common  one  as 
early  as  tin-  time  of  Bracton. 

Mr.    Norton,    in    his  valuable  "Com- 
mentaries on    the    History,   Constitution, 
and   Chartered   Franchises  of  the  City  of 
'■■n,"  says,  that  the  lirst  special  grant 
of  the  mayoralty  to  the  city  of  London 


§210 


POLICE   OFFICERS  ;     ARREST    UPON    VIEW. 


293 


this  country.  In  a  former  page,  suggestions  have  been  made  in  favor 
of  increasing  the  powers,  dignity,  and  responsibility  of  this  office  as 
a  means  of  ensuring,  under  existing  conditions  in  this  country,  more 
satisfactory  municipal  rule;  but  the  subject  is  not  sufficiently  con- 
nected with  practical  law  to  warrant  a  more  extended  reference  to  it 
in  a  work  of  this  character.1 


§  210   (149).     Police  Officers  ;   Power  to  make  Arrests  upon  View. 

—  The  office  of  a  police  officer  is  not  known  to  the  common  law  ;  it 
is  created  by  statute,  and  such  an  officer  has,  and  can  exercise,  only 
such  powers  as  he  is  authorized  to  do  by  the  legislature,  expressly 
or  derivatively.2     He  is  an  officer  of  the  State  rather  than  of  the 


was  made  by  King  John  in  a  charter  dated 
on  the  ninth  day  of  May,  in  the  sixteenth 
year  of  his  reign,  A.  d.  1215.    This  charter 
declares  that  the  king  has   granted   and 
confirmed  to   the  barons   of  London   the 
right  of  choosing  a  mayor  every  year,  and 
at  the  end  of  the  year  of  removing  him 
and  substituting  another,  if  they  will,   or 
electing  the  same  again.     He  is  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  king,  and  swear  to  be  faith- 
ful  to   him.     The  use   of  the  word  con- 
firmed,   in   this  charter,    shows  that  the 
name  and  officer  existed  before.     The  first 
civic  magistrate  had  begun  to  be  called  by 
the  name  of  mayor  toward  the  end  of  the 
reign    of   King  Richard.     The  denomina- 
tion of  mayor,  it  is  said  on  the  authority 
of  legal  antiquaries,  can  be  traced  to  a  very 
far  date  among  the  German  and   French 
nations  of  Europe.     The  chief  governor  of 
the    town  communities  which    arose     in 
France  in  the  eleventh    century  was  often 
styled  the  mayor.     It  is  a  matter  of  his- 
tory that  in  France,  the  mayor  of  the  pal- 
ace was  the  governor  of  Paris,  often  hold- 
ing sovereign  power,  and,  indeed,  in  time 
usurping  it,  since  it  was  from  one  of  the 
mayors  of  the  palace  that  the  family  of 
Charlemagne   descended.     And  it  is  sug- 
gested   by   Mr.    Norton    that    the    term 
"  mayor,"  familiar  to  the  Normans,  may 
have  been  originally,    though    remotely, 
derived  from  the  same  source.     Norton's 
Com.,  pp.  90,   402,  403  ;  see,  also,  Pull- 
ing's  Laws,    Customs,    &c,    of   London, 
chap.  ii.  16  m.     The  powers  and  duties  of 
mayor  are  prescribed  with  particularity  in 
the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1882, 
sees.   15,  16,   53,   60,  61,  66,  67,  68,  148, 


244,  and  elsewhere.  He  is  ex  officio  "  a 
justice  for  the  borough,"  sec.  155.  Mr. 
Shaw  in  describing  the  workings  of  the  mu- 
nicipal system  of  Great  Britain  points  out 
the  great  difference  between  the  functions 
and  duties  of  an  English  and  American 
mayor.  Pol.  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  IV. 
p.  209,  June,  1889. 

1  Ante,  chap.  i.  sec.  13,  and  notes. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Dugan,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  233  (1847)  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hastings,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  259  ;  ante,  sees. 
58,  60.  Where  a  policeman  is  duly  ap- 
pointed under  charter  authority  to  or- 
ganize and  regulate  a  city  watch  and  the 
general  police  of  the  city,  the  presump- 
tion is  that  he  possesses  the  powers  of 
ordinary  peace  officers  at  common  law. 
Doering  v.  State,  49  Ind.  56  (1874).  In 
.Massachusetts  policemen  are  peace  officers, 
and  a  person  who  assaults  or  obstructs 
them  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  is 
indictable,  though  they  have  not  been 
sworn,  the  statute  not  requiring  this. 
Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  172  ; 
Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  52  Me.  118,  122. 
In  The  People  v.  Metropolitan  Police 
Board,  19  N.  Y.  188  (1859),  growing  out 
of  the  act  to  establish  a  Metropolitan  Po- 
lice District,  it  was  decided  by  a  majority 
of  the  Court  of  Appeals  that,  although  the 
office  was  a  new  one,  yet  the  mode  of  fill- 
ing it  not  being  provided  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, it  was  in  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  confer  it  upon  persons  discharging  sub- 
stantially the  same  duties  within  a  more 
limited  territorial  jurisdiction,  and  to  dis- 
pense with  an  oath  of  office.  See,  also, 
People  v.   Draper,   15   N.  Y.  532   (1857), 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATION'S. 


§210 


municipality  in  which  he  exercises  his  office.1     Where  police  olli- 

statute,  invested  with  all  the  powers  of  constables,  as 

ervators  of  the  peace,  this  gives  them  authority  to  arrest  upon 

intoxicated  persons  while  guilty  of  disorderly  conduct,  or  other 

violating  the  laws,  and  to  detain  them   until  they  can  be 

brought  before  a  magistrate.2     11'  such  an  officer  releases  an  intoxi- 


where  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  the  "  Acl 

lish  a  Metropolitan  Police  I  tistrict  " 
valid  ;    approved,   Metropolitan    Bo 
Health  v.  Heister,  37  N.  V.  661   (1868)  ; 

motl  v.  Metropolitan  Police  Board, 
6  Abb.  Pr.  422  ;  Police  Commissioners  v. 
Louisville,  3  Bush  (Ky. ),  .".'.'7  (1868)  ; 
.  58,  and  notes.  See  People  v. 
Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50  (1873),  where 
Peoples.  Draper,  supra,  is  limited,  ques- 
tioned, and  distinguished.  Extent  oflegis- 
a  I  i  -hi  rol  over  appointment, 

.  &c.   of  police,    health,  and  other 

Baltimore    v.    Board    of 

Police  (Baltimore  Police  Act),  15  Md.  376 

.  Metropolitan  Board  of  Health  v. 
I  .  37  N.  V.  661  (1868)  ;  People  v. 

Hurlbut,  21  Mich.  -11  (1871)  ;  Police 
Comm'rs  v.  Louisville,  above  cited  ;  ante, 
sec.  58,  note.   Mode  of  compensation.   Wor- 

9.  Walker,  9  Gray  (Mass.),  78. 
Under  authority  to  make  rules  necessary 
to  g 1  order  and   public  peace,  the  power 

int  policemeu  is  implied.  State  v. 
Sims,  L6  s.  C.   186  ;  ante,  sec.  207. 

1   Burch   v.   Hardwicke,  30  Gratt.  24. 
While    a   mayor   under  the  Constitution 
ra  of  a  municipality,  he 
cannot    remo1  31         officer     though 

elected  or  appointed  by  the  people  of  the 
municipalil  \  and    paid   by  them  :   if  the 

removes  him  from  office  ho  ex- 
c Is  his  authority  and  is  responsible  to 

si  r  in  a  civil  action  for  damages. 
lb.  kpolia  judgt  held  to  be  a  municipal 
officer.  People  o.  Hi  nry,  62  <  !aL  557. 
is  a  public  officer, 
holding  his  office  as  a  trust  from  the  State, 
and  nol  as  a  matter  of  contract  between 
himself  and  the  city.  Farrell  v.  Bridge- 
15  Conn.  191. 

Strong,  8  Wend.  (X.  V.) 
884  (1829);  Bacon,  Ab.  Constable,  C.; 
' '         onwealth  v.  I  Met.  (Mass.) 

18);  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  126 
(1  B71 ).     A^t'i  power  of  constables  in  such 


ei  1  Hi'.  P.  C.  587  ;  Hawkins  P. 
(  .  Book  1 1,  chap.  siii.  sec.  8. 

Authority  toarrest  upon  wi  w,  and  with- 
out warrant.  Where  such  a  course  is  not 
repugnanl  to  the  general  law  of  the  State, 
the  proper  officers  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion maybe  authorized  to  arrest  without 
t,  oi  upon  view,  offenders  who 
violate  ordinances  in  the  presence  of  such 
officers.  Bryan  v.  Bates,  15  111.  87(1853)  ; 
Main  v.  McCarty,  15  111.  412  ;  state 
v.  Lafferty,  5  Harring.  (Del.)  I'.'l  ;  state  ,-. 
Sims,  16  S.  C.  486,  post,  sec.  414,  note.  If 
an  offence  is  committed  in  view  of  the 
offieer,  he  may  arrest  immediately,  or  as 
soon  thereafter  as  he  can.  Boaz  i>.  Tate, 
43  Ind.  60  (1873).  See  chapter  on  Muni- 
cipal Courts,  post. 

Power  to  a  city  corporation  to  mako 
ordinances  for  the  security,  or  good  order, 
or  government  of  the  place,  and  to  appoint 
or  elect  officers  to  cany  out  ordinances, 
authorizes  the  appointmenl  of  city  guards, 
or  police  officers,  or  peace  officers  ;  and 
such  officers  may  arrest,  without  a  warrant, 
persons  engaged  in  breaches  of  the  peace. 
City  Council  v.  Payne,  2  Nott  &  Met  ord 
(S.  C),  475  (1820).  A  city  council  may 
authorize  arrests  upon  view,  without  war- 
rant, for  violation  of  its  by-laws,  when 
not  inconsisti  nl  u-ith  tin  iji-m-ml  statutes  or 
policy  of  the  State  (White  v.  Kent,  11 
Ohio  St.  550(1860);  Thomas  v.  Ashland, 
12  Ohio  St.  127),  but  not  otherwise. 
Tims,  where  the  city  charter  declared  all 
by-laws  inconsistent  with  the  general  law 
to  be  void,  and  where  the  general  law  did 
not  allow  an  officer  to  arrest  for  a  misde- 
meanor not  committed  in  his  presence, 
without  a  warrant,  it  was  held  that  an 
ordinance  authorizing  police  officers  to 
make  arrests,  without  a.  warrant,  for  vio- 
lation  of  ordinances  not  committed  in 
their  presence,  was  void,  and  would  not 
protect  the  officer  againsl  a  suit  for  fcres- 
I  i    .     Pesterfield    v.    Vickers,    3   ( loldw. 


ARREST   UPON   VIEW  ;   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


295 


cated  person,  whom  he  had  arrested  while  conducting  himself  in  a 
disorderly  manner,  upon  his  promise  to  go  directly  home,  he  may 
lawfully  retake  him,  on  his  going  into  a  bar-room  before  he  is  out 
of  the  officer's  sight;  and  such  arrest  is  justified,  whether  it  be  re- 
garded as  a  recaption  for  the  original  purpose,  or  as  a  new  arrest  for 
disorderly  conduct  still  continuing.1 

§  211  (150).  The  Subject  illustrated.  —  Charters  authorizing 
municipal  officers  to  make  arrests  upon  view  and  ivithout  'process,  are 
to  be  viewed  in  connection  with  the  general  statutes  of  the  Statu,2 
and  being  in  derogation  of  liberty,  are  strictly  construed  ;  hence  an 
officer  making  such  an  arrest,  though  on  the  Sabbath  day,  should,  in- 
stead of  imprisoning,  take  without  unreasonable  delay  the  person 
arrested  before  the  proper  tribunal  and  prefer  a  complaint  against 
him,  as  provided  by  the  statutes  of  the  State.3 


(Term.)  205  ( 1 866).  Further  as  to  arrests, 
on  view,  without  information,  and  the 
duty  of  the  officer,  see  Doering  v.  State, 
49  Ind.  56  (1874);  Johnson  v.  Americus, 
4q  Ga.  80  (1872)  ;  Nealis  v.  Hayvvard, 
48  Ind.  19  (1874);  Boaz  v.  Tate,  43  Ind. 
60  (1873);  Smith  v.  Donelly,  66  111.  464 

(1873)  ;    Scirele   v.    Nevis,   47    Ind.    289 

(1874)  ;  Galliard  v.  Laxton,  2  B.  &  S. 
363;  Codd  v.  Cabe,  L.  R.  1  Ex.  Div.  3)2; 
s.  c.  13  Cox,  202  ;  Regina  v.  Chapman, 
12  Cox,  4.  If  a  private  individual  state 
facts  to  an  officer,  who  thereupon,  on  his 
own  responsibility,  arrests  a  person,  or  if 
a  private  person  procure  a  magistrate  to 
issue  a  warrant  for  taking  a  person,  the 
imprisonment  is  not  his  act,  and  he  may 
show  this  under  the  plea  of  not  guilty. 
Barber  v.  Rollinson,  1  C.  &  M.  330  ; 
Stonehouse  v.  Elliott,  6  T.  R.  315  ;  Brandt 
v.  Craddock,  27  L.  J.  Ex.  314  ;  Grinham 
v.  Willey,  4  H.  &  N.  496.  An  officer  is 
justified  in  arresting  without  a  warrant 
upon  a  reasonable  snsjncion  of  a  felony 
having  been  committed,  and  of  the  per- 
son being  guilty  of  it,  although  no  felony 
has  in  fact  been  committed,  and  whether  the 
reasonable  grounds  for  suspicion  are  mat- 
ters within  his  own  knowledge  or  facts 
stated  to  him  by  another.  Lawrence  v. 
Hedger,  3  Taunt.  14  ;  Davis  v.  Russell,  5 
Bing.  355  ;  Beckwith  v.  Philby,  6  B.  & 
C.  635  ;  Hogg  v.  Ward,  3  H.  &  N.  417. 
But  an  officer  is  not  in  general  justified  in 
arresting  a  person  who   frequents  a  high- 


way with  intent  to  commit  a  felony  (Tim- 
son,  In  re,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  257  ;  see,  also, 
Jones,  In  re,  7  Ex.  586),  or  in  arrest- 
ing a  person  for  a  misdi  meanor  without  a 
warrant  (Mathews  r.  Biddulph,  3  M.  & 
G.  390  ;  Griffin  v.  Coleman,  4  H.  &  X. 
265) ;  unless  there  be  a  breach  of  the  peace 
in  his  presence  (Timothy  v.  Simpson,  1  C. 
M.  &  R.  757  ;  Derecourt  v.  Corbishley, 
5  El.  &  B.  188),  or  danger  of  a  renewal  of 
it.  The  Queen  v.  Light,  27  L.  J.  Mag. 
Cas.  1  ;  The  Queen  v.  Walker,  23  L.  .!. 
Mag.  Cas.  123  ;  Pesterfield  v.  Vickers,  3 
Coldw.  (Tenn.)  205.  It  would  seem  that 
a  constable  having  a  warrant  to  arrest  is 
not  bound  to  accept  a  tender  of  the  fine 
and  costs.  See  Arnott  v.  Bradley,  23 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  1.  Although  police 
officers  may  arrest  without  warrant  for 
crimes,  it  does  not  follow  that  they  have 
the  power  to  do  so  in  the  case  of  lesser 
offences.  Galliard  v.  Laxton,  2  B.  &  S. 
361  ;  Regina  v.  Chapman,  12  Cox,  4  ; 
Coddw.  Cabe,  13  Cox,  202  ;  s.  c.  L.  R.  1 
Ex.  Div.  352. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Hastings,  supra. 
It  follows  that  an  obstruction  offered  by  a 
third  person  to  the  officer  in  making  such 
an  arrest  would  be  unjustifiable.     lb. 

2  Supra,  sec.  210,  note. 

3  Low  v.  Evans,  16  Ind.  486  (1868), 
(action  for  false  imprisonment)  ;  Pow  v. 
Becker,  3  Ind.  475  (1852);  Vandever  v. 
Mattock,  3  Ind.  479.  The  delay  in  taking 
the  person  arrested  before  a  magistrate  must 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§213 


i   212      151  .      Mode    of    Election;    Power   over   its  own   Officers. 

—  A  uncil  authorized  to  elect  certain  officers,  may,  where  no 

tion  is  prescribed,  appoint  them  by  r<  solution,  and  is  not 

to  eleel  them  by  ballol  .'  and  the  corporation  has  full  con- 

peci  ill)  restricted,  over  all  offices  and  officers  existing 

only  under  by-law  -.-     A  vote  of  an  authorized  committee  of  a  city, 

ting  their  clerk  to  be  the  city  engineer  for  a  year  from  a  sub- 

uent  day,  duly  recorded,  and  signed  by  him  as  their  clerk,  is 

sufficient  to  take  bis  appointment  out  ut"  the  statute  uf  frauds.8 

§213      152).    Presumption  of   due  Appointment.  —  The  same  pre- 

sumptions  which  are  applicable  to  acts  of  individuals  are,  in  general, 
applicable  to  acts  of  corporations.  Thus,  if  a  person  acts  notoriously 
as  the  officer  of  a  corporation,  and  is  recognized  by  it  as  such  offi- 
cer,  a  regular  appointment  will  be  presumed,  and  his  acts  will  bind 
the  corporation,  although  no  written  proof  is  or  can  be  adduced  of 
his  appointment.4 


i    ble.     Johnson  v.   Ameri- 
$72).     In  Low  r.  Evans, 
held  that  there  was  no  authority  in 
the  officer  making  the  arresl  to  imprison 
I   for  an  indefinite  time 
(•.  g.,  from   Sunday  until   the  next  day) 
because   he   might  be  subject  to  a    pi  n- 
be  recovered  in  a  suit  in  the  nature 
of  an  action  of  debt.     If  the  court  is  not 
ion  the  officer  may  confine  the  per- 
son arrested  until  he  can   lie  brought   be- 
■  court,  which  should  he  done  at 
liesl  period.     Boaz  <■.  Tate,  (•">  lie!. 
60  (1-7-;)  ;  State  --.    Freeman,  86    N.  < '. 
683.     Aii  intoxicated  person,  arrested  late 
al  night,  may  h  di  tained  until  the   nexi 
day    before    being    taken    to    the   court. 
17   End.  289  (1874). 
1   Low  v.  Comm'rs  of  Pilotage,  R.  M. 
I  harlt    (Ga.)  302  (1830),  per  Law,    J.; 
■  I     I'     i  i  ol  am  veil  to  appoint, 
and  when  it  may  delegate  this  power  to  a 
committee.     I  Bedell,  2  Hill  (X. 

I '  immonwealth    o.   Pittsburgh 
I      ■  '.     1  1     Pa.   St.    177    (1850)  ; 
Wilder  v.  Chicago,  26  HI.  L82  ;  K  i 

-    ■:  111.   285  ;  Trow- 
N    i  irk,  46  \.  .1.  L.  (17   Vroom) 
■ 

'•nary    power  and    control, 

when  n  ■  !.  of  a   municipal  cor- 

i  over  offices  and  officers  existing 

only  under  ordinal]  .    ople  v.  Con- 


over,  17  X.  V.  64  (1858)  ;  Waldraven  v. 
Memphis  (right  to  abolish  office),  4  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  4:31  (1867);  infra,  sec.  231; 
Madison  v.  Korbly,  :;'J  [nd.  71,  79(1869); 
Samis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298  (1873).  The 
powei  to  appoinl  implies,  in  general,  the 
powt  r  to  r<  i/r.n-  the  appnintees.  People  v. 
Hill,  7  Cal.  '.'7.  Tims  a  municipal  cor- 
poration appointing  commissioners  in 
cases  of  local  improvements,  may  remove 
them.  People  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
Vmk,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  43  (1848).  1  '. 
pec.  238  et  seq.  Bui  in  South  Carolina, 
Bee  Caulfield  v.  State,  1  S.  C.  461  ti- 
the exercise  of  the  power  to  appoint  to 
office  is  an  execute  e,  nol  a  legislative  ai  I . 
Achley's  Case,  1  Abb.  Pr.  35  (1856). 
Power  to  suspend  officer.  Post,  sec.  247, 
note.  A  provision  that  the  city  council 
"may"  by  ordinance  provide  for  the 
election,  by  the  qualified  voters,  of  any  of 

tl Hie,  is  named  in  the  act,  held  to  leave 

it  to  the  discretion  of  the  city  council 
whether  the  office  of  city  attorney  should 
be  elective  or  not.  Ball  v.  Fagg,  67  Mo. 
481. 

8  Chase  v.  Lowell,  7  Cray  (Mass.),  33 
(1856). 

4  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dandridge, 
12  Wheat.  (IT.  S.)  64,  70,  where  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Story  cites  many  cases,  establishing 
the  principle  "that  the  acts  of  artificial 
persons  afford  the  same  presumptions  as 


§214 


OATH    AND    OFFICIAL    BOND. 


297 


§  214  (153).  Oath  and  Official  Bond.  —  Public  officers  are  usu- 
ally required  to  take  an  oath  of  office,  and  those  entrusted  with  money 
or  property  are  also  generally  required  to  give  bond  and  sureties  for 
the  faithful  performance  of  their  duties.  In  England  it  is  said  that 
an  oath  of  office  cannot  be  required  to  be  taken  by  a  by-law  when 
none  is  required  by  the  charter.1  But  in  this  country  the  oath  of 
office  is,  in  substance,  only  that  the  officer  will  support  the  Consti- 
tution and  faithfully  perform  his  official  duties.  And  such  an  oath 
may,  doubtless,  be  required  by  ordinance,  to  be  taken  by  every  mu- 
nicipal officer  before  entering  upon  his  office.  Statutes  requiring  an 
oath  of  office  and  bond  are  usually  directory  in  their  nature ;  and 
unless  the  failure  to  take  the  oath  or  give  the  bond  by  the  time  pre- 
scribed is  expressly  declared,  ipso  facto,  to  vacate  the  office,  the  oath 
may  be  taken  or  the  bond  given  afterwards,  if  no  vacancy  has  been 
declared.2 


the  acts  of  natural  persons."  Infra,  sec. 
237,  note  and  cases.  The  doctrine  that 
not  only  the  appointment,  but  the 
authority  of  an  agent  of  a  corporation  may 
be  implied  from  the  adoption  or  recogni- 
tion of  his  acts  (Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec. 
284),  was  applied  in  Killey  v.  Forsee,  57 
Mo.  390  (1874),  to  municipal  corporations; 
and  it  was  held  that  the  failure  of  a  deputy 
city  engineer  to  file  a  certificate  of  his 
appointment,  as  provided  by  the  charter, 
did  not  vitiate  his  acts. 

1  Rex  v.  Dean,  &c,  1  Str.  539  ;  Glover, 
305  ;  Willc.  133  ;  Grant,  76.  It  is  the 
settled  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  that 
the  United  States,  being  a  body  politic, 
with  a  capacity  to  enter  into  contracts,  may 
within  the  sphere  and  in  the  execution  of 
its  appropriate  powers,  take  bonds  and 
securities,  which  are  not  prohibited  by  law, 
though  such  bonds  and  securities  may  not 
have  been  prescribed  by  any  pre-existing 
legislative  act.  These,  though  voluntary, 
—  that  is,  not  extorted  or  coerced, — if 
taken  for  a  lawful  purpose  and  upon  a 
good  consideration,  are  valid.  United 
States  v.  Tingey,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  114,  128 
(1831)  ;  approved,  Same  v.  Linn,  15  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  290  (1841);  and  see  Dugan  v. 
Uuited  States,  3  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  172  ; 
United  States  v.  Bradley,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
343.  Infra,  sec.  216.  Right  of  city  to  re- 
quire bond  of  indemnity  from  the  owner, 
who  proposes  to  excavate  sidewalk  to  make 
cellars,    vaults,  or    improvements.      Mc- 


Carthy v.  Chicago,  53  111.  38  (1870).  A 
prospective  appointment  to  public  office, 
made  by  a  body  which,  as  then  constituted, 
is  empowered  to  fill  the  vacancy  when  it 
arises,  was  held  to  be  legal  in  the  absence 
of  any  express  statutory  provision  to  the 
contrary,  and  to  vest  title  to  the  office  in 
the  appointee.  State  v.  Van  Buskirk,  40 
N.  J.  L.  463.  The  power  of  appointment 
to  office,  when  executed  by  the  perform- 
ance of  the  last  act  made  necessary  in  its 
execution,  is  not  revocable  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  appointee,  lb.  In  England 
the  oath  of  allegiance  and  the  judicial 
oath  are  imperative.  The  Mayor  is  re- 
quired also  to  take  an  oath  as  Mayor. 
Munic.  Corp.  Act  1882,  sec.  15;  31  and  32 
Vict.  chap.  72. 

2  Smith  v.  Cronkhite,  8  Ind.  134  ; 
State  v.  Findley,  10  Ohio,  51,  59,  and 
cases  cited ;  State  v.  Porter  (failure  to 
give  bond  by  city  marshal  in  time),  7  Ind. 
204  ;  Sprowl  v.  Laurence,  33  Ala.  674  ; 
Bank  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64  ;  United 
States  v.  Le  Baron,  19  How.  73  ;  s.  c.  4 
Wall.  642 ;  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1 
Cranch,  137  ;  Launtz  v.  People,  113  111. 
137  ;  Cawley  v.  People  (county  treasurer's 
bond),  95  ill.  249  (1880)  ;  Chicago  v. 
Gage  (city  treasurer's  bond),  95  111.  593 
(1880)  ;  Caskey  v.  Greensborough,  78  Ind. 
233  ;  St.  Helena  v.  Burton,  35  La.  An. 
521.  It  is  no  defence  to  an  action  upon  an 
official  bond  that  the  oath  required  bylaw 
was  not  taken  within  the  prescribed  time. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


^  215      154  .      Oath   when    a    Condition    Precedent;     Acts    of    de 

>  officer.  —  When  the  statute  requires  a  prescribed  oath  of 
iM\  person  elected  " sAa#  act  therein,"  a  person  cannot 

,:\  as  such  officer  unless  h  hastdken  an  oath  in  substantial,  not 
necessarily  literal,  compliance  with  the.  law.  Third  parties,  how- 
ever, acting  in  good  faith  with  him  as  such  officer,  are  protected, 
notwithstanding  his  failure  to  take  the  requisite  oath.1 


lb.     Charter  provision  that  oaths  of  office 
i  and  subscribed  within  U  n 

i  may  be  complied  with  after 
that  time.  Kearney  v.  Andrews,  -  Stockt. 
(N.  J.)  7".  In  M  w  York  it  is  held  that 
a  town  collector  elect,  in  order  to  qualify 
foi  the  office,  is  required  by  the  Constitu- 
tion to  take  and  subscribe  an  oath  of 
office,  and  until  he  has  thus  qualified,  the 
incumbent    may    hold    over.     People    v. 

2  N.  Y.  374  (1873).  But  as 
no  time  is  Limited  for  taking  such  oath  it 
may  be  taken  before  the  office  is  forfeited 
neglect  to  execute  the  required 
bond  lb.  A  town  may  lawfully  regain 
a  collector  of  taxes  or  other  officer  to  fur- 
nish sureties  for  the  faithful  discharge  of 
the  duties  of  his  office.  This  power  is  in- 
cidental, and  ueed  not  hi-  express.  If  the 
person  chosi  a  neglecl  s,  or  is  unable,  to 
furnish  sureties,  this  amounts  to  a  non- 
acceptance  of  the  trust,  although  he  has 
taken  the  oath  of  office.  Morrell  v.  Sylves- 
ter, 1  Greenl.  (Me.)  248.  While  it  is  the 
duty  of  an  officer  to  perfect  his  title  to  his 
office  by  complying  with  the  directions  of 
the  law  as  1"  taking  oath,  depositing 
bonds,  .V''.,  yel  his  failure  to  do  so  is  his 
own  wrongful  neglect,  and  is  no  defence  to 
:  ties  in  an  action  on  his  official 
bond.  Stati  v.  Toomer,  7  Rich.  (S.  C.) 
Law,   216    :  .  te    v.   Findley,    10 

Ohio,  61  ( 1840).  The  giving  of  a  bond 
and  having  it  approved  were  held  in  the 
case  in  judgment  to  be  conditions  p 
to  the  right  of  occupying  a  municipal 
office.  Howell  v.  Commonwealth,  '.'7  Pa. 
St.  332  :  /<  t,  sec.  235,  note.  Rule  in 
Virg  ,  220,  note. 

Acity  council,  whose  duty  it  is  to  decide 
upon  the  sufficiency  oftJu  sureties  of  a  city 
officer,  cannot  refu  e  to  do  o  or  post  pone 
it-  decision  I"  cause  the  title  to  the  office 
and  a  mandamus 
will  lie  to  compel  it  to  act  upon  the  suf- 
cuiities  offered.      '  !om- 


monwealth  v. '  !itj  Council  of  Philadelphia, 
7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s.)  362.  Effect  of 
signing  official  bonds  in  blank,  see  Chi 
v.  Gage  (bond  of  city  treasurer),  95  111. 
593  (188(»).  Mr.  Justice  Sheldon  cites 
and  reviews  many  of  the  cases  nil  this  sub- 
ject. Butler  v.  United  States,  21  Wall. 
272  ;  Dair  v.  United  States,  16  Wall.  1. 
Murfree  on  Official  Bonds,  sec.  20  et  seq., 
si  c.  12,  and  cases. 

1  Olney  v.  Pearce,  1  R.  I.  292  (1850), 
and  authorities  cited  by  Mr.  Angell  in 
note;  Riddle  v.  Bedford  County,  7  Serg. 
SRawle  (Pa.),  392;  Neale  v.  overseers, 
6  Watts  (Pa.),  638.  Where  an  officer, 
before  acting,  is  required  to  qualify  by 
taking  an  oath  of  ofiiee,  he  has  no  legal 
right,  until  he  qualifies,  to  recover  fees  of 
an  incumbent  received  after  the  plaintiffs 
appointment  or  election,  and  before  he 
qualifies.  Thompson  v.  Nicholson,  12 
Rob.  (La.)  326  (1845).  See  City  v.  Given, 
60  Pa.  St.  136;  supra,  sec.  214,  note; 
post,  sec.  235. 

If  members  of  a  common  council,  who 
are  required  by  the  charter  to  be  sworn 
before  they  enter  on  the  duties  of  their 
office, are  swot  ii  before  an  officer  not  author- 
ized to  administer  the  oath,  they  are  still 
officers  de  facto,  and  a  tax  levied  by  them 
is  not  invalid,  and  will  not  he  set  aside  even 
in  a  direct  proceeding.  State  v.  Perkins, 
4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L. )  409  (1854).  Infra, 
sees.  216,  note,  221,  note,  230,  note, 
237,  note.  Bond  of  &  facto  officer  bind- 
ing upon  him  and  his  sureties.  Green  v. 
Wardwell,  17  II!.  278;  infra,sec.  216,  note. 
Murfree,  Official  Bonds,  sees.  70,  71.  But 
this  principle  does  not  apply  where  there 
is  no  office  dc  jure.  Tinsley  v.  Kirby,  17 
S.  C.  1,  8.     Post,  sec.  276. 

An  act  of  ( 'one-ress  provided  that  pay- 
masters should,  "previousto  entering  upon 
the  duties  of  their  office,  give  good  mid 
sufficient  bonds,"  &c.  It  was  held  that  an 
appointment  as  paymaster  was  complete 


§216 


OFFICIAL   BONDS. 


299 


§  216  (155).  Conditions  of  official  Bond  ;  Voluntary  and  Com- 
mon-Law Obligations.  —  The  principle  is  well  settled,  that  official 
bonds  are  valid  if  the  condition  complies  substantially  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute.  The  exact  form  prescribed  is  not  essen- 
tial unless  made  so  by  the  charter  or  act.1  Duties  of  a  nature  and 
character  similar  to  those  belonging  to  the  office  may  be  added  to  it  or 
imposed  upon  an  officer;  and  these  are  held  to  be  within  the  contem- 
plation and  the  liability  of  obligors  upon  the  bond.2    As  such  bonds  are 


when  made  by  the  President  and  confirmed 
by  the  senate  ;  that  the  giving  of  the  bond 
was  a  mere  ministerial  act  for  the  security 
of  the  government,  and  not  a  condition 
precedent  to  his  authority  to  act  as  pay- 
master ;  and  that  a  recital  in  the  bond  of 
the  appointment  estops  the  principal  and 
sureties  to  deny  the  fact.  United  States 
w.Bradley,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  343  (1836)  ; 
and  see,  also,  United  States  Bank  v.  Dan- 
dridge,  12  Wheat.  64.  Sureties  of  muni- 
cipal treasurer  were  estopped  to  show  that 
the  election  of  the  treasurer  was  unauthor- 
ized because  the  time  of  the  election  had 
not  been  fixed  and  the  duties  of  the  of- 
fice prescribed  by  ordinance.  Paducah  v. 
Cully,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  323  (1873)  ;  and  see 
j>ost,  216  note. 

1  Allegheny   County  v.   Van  Campen, 

3  Wend.  49  (1829)  ;  People  v.  'Holmes,  2 
Wend.  281  ;  lb.  615  ;  Fellows  v.  Gilman, 

4  Wend.  414  ;  Lawton  v.  Erwin,  9  Wend. 
233  ;  Cornell  v.  Barnes,  1  Denio,  35. 

Bond  without  seals  held  valid  as  a  com- 
mon-law obligation.  Board  of  Education 
v.  Fonda,  77  N.  Y.  350  ;  s.  p.  U.  S.  v. 
Linn,  15  Pet.  290  ;  U.  S.  v.  Hodson,  10 
Wall.  395  ;  Skellinger  v.  Yendes,  12 
Wend.  306  ;  Morse  v.  Hodsden,  5  Mass. 
318  ;  Thomas  v.  White,  12  Mass.  369  ; 
Bank  v.  Smith,  5  Allen,  415.  So  a  bond 
without  any  specified  obligee.  Fellows  v. 
Gilman,  4  Wend.  414,  419. 

2  Board,  &c.  of  Auburn  v.  Quick,  99 
N.  Y.  138  ;  People  v.  Vilas,  36  N.  Y.  459, 
and  cases  cited.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York 
v.  Kelly,  98  N.  Y.  467.  See,  also,  Board 
of  Supervisors  v.  Clark,  92  N.  Y.  391.  It 
is  competent  for  the  legislature,  in  exact- 
ing official  bonds  and  prescribing  their  con- 
ditions, to  require  that  they  shall  be  con- 
ditioned for  the  faithful  performance  of  all 
duties  that  may  be  imposed  by  subsequent 
statutes  during  the  officer's  continuance  in 


office  ;  and  this  having  been  done  by  a 
general  statute,  the  sureties  on  an  official 
bond,  conditioned  as  required  by  the 
statute,  are  liable  for  their  principal's  de- 
fault in  reference  to  additional  duties  sub- 
sequently imposed,  unless  the  statute  im- 
posing such  duties  shows  an  intention 
that  they  shall  not  be  so  liable.  Morrow 
v.  Wood,  56  Ala.  1.  Infra,  sees.  230,  233. 

In  Orman  v.  Pueblo,  8  Col.  292,  Helm, 
J.,  enumerated  the  following  propositions 
concerning  the  liability  of  sureties  upon 
official  bonds  as  elementary  :  "  First,  that 
the  sureties  on  such  bonds  enter  into  con- 
tract thereof  with  reference  to  existing 
statutes  on  the  subject,  and  that  therefore 
the  law  becomes  a  part  of  the  contract. 
Second,  that  the  engagement  or  the  obli- 
gation of  the  surety  cannot  be  extended 
beyond  the  strict  terms  of  the  bond.  Third, 
that  when  a  breach  thereof  is  assigned 
and  an  attempt  is  made  to  hold  the  surety, 
such  breach  must  be  based  upon  some  of- 
ficial misconduct  on  the  part  of  the 
principal." 

So  under  the  laws  of  Indiana,  —  provid- 
ing for  the  issuance  and  sale  of  bonds  to 
complete  water-works, —  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  common  council,  and  not  of  the  city 
treasurer,  to  negotiate  and  sell  such  bonds; 
but  the  city  treasurer  is  liable  on  his  of- 
ficial bond  for  moneys  received  by  him 
from  the  sale  thereof,  by  whomsoever 
made.  Such  duty  cannot  be  delegated  by 
the  council,  by  ordinance  or  otherwise,  to 
the  treasurer  or  any  other  person.  Under 
an  ordinance  designating  the  city  treasurer 
hy  name  as  agent  for  the  sale  of  such 
bonds,  his  acts  in  negotiating  such  sales 
are  simply  those  of  an  agent  of  the  common 
council  ;  and  he  is  not  liable  on  his  official 
bond  for  the  mere  sale,  assignment,  and 
delivery  thereof  by  him  pursuant  to  such 
agency.     In  an  action  on  his  official  bond 


300 


MUNICIPAL    COKI'OKATIONS. 


§216 


intended  to  .secure  the  public  the  courts  do  not  favor  ware  technical 
Accordingly,  actions  have  been  sustained  on  bonds  nut 
dred  by  law,  when  executed  voluntarily,  and  with  proper  con- 
ditions, to  secure  the  performance  of  official  duty.1  And  when  re- 
quired  by  law,  bonds  an;  good,  as  common-law  obligations,  though 
they  do  not  conform  to  the  statute,  if  they  contain  no  condition  con- 
trary to  law.  In  3uch  case  the  obligor  voluntarily  agrees  to  make 
the  obligee  named  a  trustee  fur  the  persons  interested  in  the  due 
performance  of  the  condition.2  Thus,  an  action  may  be  maintained 
on  ;i  bond  given  to  the  "selectmen"  instead  of  to  the  "town,"  by 
a  town  treasurer,  cunditiuned  fur  the  faithful  performance  of  his 
dutii 


for  moneys  alleged  '<<  have  been  received 
by  him  as  such  treasurer,  an  answer  that 
bv  the  terms  of  the  negotiation,  which  was 
approved  by  the  common  council,  the  pro- 

remained  in  the  hands  of  tin-  pur- 
chaser,  t"  be  used  only  as  needed  in  con- 
structing tin-  water-works,  ami  that  the 
purchaser  had  become  insolvent  while  the 
funds  yet  remained  in  his   hands,  — Held, 

sufficient,  [n  such  case,  a  report  by 
the  treasurer  to  the  council,  as  to  the 
condition  of  the  fund,  charging  himself 
with  funds  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the 
purchaser,  //•/</,  not  to  estop  him  to 
deny  his  liability.  State  v.  Hauser,  63 
Ind.  155  :  as  to  liability  for  misapplica- 
tion of  funds,  sec  Robinson  v.  State,  60 
In  1.  26. 

^ec.  214,   note;   Postmaster- 
General  v.  Rice,    Gilpin,    554;    Montville 
v.  Baughton,   7    Conn.    543;    Common- 
wealth v.  Wolbert,  6  Binney,   292;  Baby 
v,  8  Upper  Can.  Q.  15.  76. 
-   lie. mas  v.  White,    12   Mass.  369  ;  5 
:;l  l  ;    Kavanaugh     v.    Sanders,    8 
:.l.    (Me.)    ii2;   Sweetzer  v.    Bay,    2 
Gray,    I'.',    and   cases     there   cited  ;   Smith 
r.  W  Tex.     5  t  ;    Sutherland    r. 

<       .  35  '•-   Y.    L05  ;  Barnel    v.    Abbott, 

63  Vt.  120  (bond  executed    near  the  , 

of  an  officer's  term  of  office,  but  antedated, 

to  cover  the  entire  term,  held   good).   See, 

.  Fond  du  Lie  o.  Moore,  58  Wis.  170. 

itzi  t  '■•  Bay,  2  Gray,   19  ;   Horn 

v.  Whittier,  6  X.  H.  88.     A  bond  given 

by  tl  r  of  a  county  for  the  faith- 

f  A  performance  of  his  official  duties,  to  the 

of  the  Bame  county, 

iiid  bond,  notwithstanding 


there  may  be  no  statute  requiring  one. 
Supervisors  u.  Coffinbury,  1  Mich.  355; 
People  v.  Johr,  22  Mich.  461  (1871)  ; 
Platteville  v.  Hooper,  63  Wis.  381.  The 
fact  that  there  is  already  a  valid  official 
bond  with  solvent  sureties  does  not  pre- 
clude a  county  court  from  taking  from  a 
delinquent  county  officer,  by  way  of  se- 
curity for  his  delinquency,  a  bond  and 
mortgage  on  real  estate.  Turner  v.  Clark 
Co.,  67  Mo.  243  (1878). 

Municipal  corporations  mdy  sue  on 
official  bonds  of  public  officers  when  inter- 
ested therein.  State,  &c.  v.  Norwood,  12 
Md.  177  (1S5S).  In  an  action  on  the 
official  bond  of  an  officer  appointed  by  a 
municipal  corporation,  reciting  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  principal  as  such  officer, 
neither  he  nor  his  sureties  can  set  up  the 
invalidity  of  his  appointment  as  a  defence 
to  an  action  hu  moneys  collected.  Hobo- 
ken  v.  Harrison,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.), 
73  ;  Seiple  v.  Elizabeth,  3  Dutch.  (X.  J.) 
407  ;  supra,  sec.  215,  note.  Sureties  on 
//  htm, I  of 'tli-  ftich)  municipal  officer  are 
liable  for  moneys  collected  by  him  ;  and 
this  though  he  held  an  office  which  in 
point  of  fact,  the  corporation  could  not 
create.  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.  ),'73,  supra. 
Supra, aec.  215,  note  ;  post,  sees.  221,  note, 
230,  note.  A  surety  in  an  official  bond  of  an 
officer  whose  term  is  limited  to  a  year,  is 
not  liable  beyond  the  year,  though  the 
officer  continues  by  law  until  a  successor 
is  provided.  Hover  v.  Twombly,  12  X.  H. 
59  (I860);  Chelmsford  Co.  v.  Demorest 
7  Cray  (Mas..),  1  (1856)  ;  Mayor  v.  Horn, 
2  Barring.  (Del.)  190  (1833)  ;  Regina  v. 
McRae,  5  Upper  Can.  P.  R.  S09j    Mont- 


§217 


OFFICIAL   TERM  ;     HOLDING    OVER. 


301 


§217(156).  Duration  of  Official  Term;  Power  to  hold  over; 
English  Statutes  and  Decisions.  —  It  was  a  settled  rule  of  law  re- 
specting the  old  corporations  in  England  that  the  office  of  the 
mayor  or  other  head  officer  was  annual,  and  absolutely  expired  at 
the  end  of  the  year;  and  that  without  an  express  clause  in  the 
charter,  he  could  not  hold  over  until  his  successor  was  provided. 
The  right,  in  such  case,  to  hold  over  did  not  exist  by  implication, 
and  was  not  an  incident  to  the  office.1     In  some  charters,  however, 


gomery  v.  Hughes,  65  Ala.  201.  A  change 
in  a  statute  by  which  the  time  for  the  an- 
nual settlements  of  county  collectors  is 
fixed  a  month  later,  and  additional  time 
is  allowed  in  which  to  pay  after  settlement, 
releases  the  sureties  on  a  collector's  bond 
executed  before  the  change.  The  effect  is  to 
postpone  the  State's  right  of  action  against 
the  collector.  The  rule  that  an  extension  of 
time  given  the  principal  releases  the  surety 
applies  between  the  State  and  an  individ- 
ual. State  v.  Roberts,  68  Mo.  234. 
Sureties  upon  an  official  bond  are  not 
liible  for  a  defalcation  of  their  principal, 
occurring  during  a  term  preceding  that  for 
which  the  bond  was  given.  Paducah  v. 
Cully,  9  Bush  (Ky),  323  (1872)  ;  Bissell 
v.  Saxton,  77  N.  Y.  191  ;  Myers  v.  IT.  S. 
1  McLean,  493  ;  Mahaska  v.  Ingalls, 
16  Iowa,  81  ;  Townsen.l  v.  Everett,  4  Ala. 
607  ;  U.  S.  v.  Boyd,  5  How.  50  ;  Bruce 
v.  U.  S.,  17  How.  437 ;  Mclntyre  v.  School 
Trustees,  3  111.  App.  77  ;  Arlington  o. 
Merrick,  2  Saund.  403  ;  Overacre  v.  Gar- 
rett, 5  Lans.  156  ;  Rochester  v.  Randall, 
105  Mass.  295  ;  Bamford  v.  lies,  3 
Exch.  380  ;  Austin  v.  French,  7  Met. 
126  ;  Kingston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker,  33 
Barb.  196  ;  Dedham  Bank  v.  Chickering, 
3  Pick.  335  ;  Blake  v.  Buffalo,  &c,  56  N. 
Y.  485  ;  McClusky  v.  Cromwell,  11  N.  Y. 
598  ;  Miller  v.  Stewart,  9  Wheat.  702  ; 
Stern  v.  People,  96  111.  475  ;  Goodwine  v. 
State,  81  Ind.  109,  where  a  city  treasurer 
.served  two  successive  terms  under  bonds, 
with  the  same  sureties  on  each  bond,  it  was 
presumed,  in  a  suit  upon  the  second  bond, 
that,  at  the  time  it  was  given,  he  was  in 
possession  of  all  the  money  which  he 
should  have  had,  if  an  accounting  had 
been  had,  and  he  and  his  sureties  were 
held  liable  therefor.  Bernhard  r.  Wyan- 
dotte, 33  Kan.  465  ;  and  see  Hartford  v. 
Francy,  47  Conn.  76.   And  where  a  collec- 


tor, holding  office  for  three  successive 
years,  and  giving  a  different  bond  each  year, 
was  delinquent,  and  there  was  no  evidence 
showing  the  time  when  the  deficit  occurred, 
it  was  held  that  the  loss  should  be  divided 
between  the  three  bonds  in  proportion  to 
the  sums  collected  during  the  time  for 
which  each  bond  was  given.  Phipsburg 
v.  Dickiuson,  78  Me.  457.  But  in  Cali- 
fornia, in  a  similar  case,  it  was  recently 
(1887)  held  that,  in  absence  of  evidence 
to  the  contrary,  the  presumption  is  that 
the  misappropriation  happened  at  the  end 
of  the  last  term,  for  which  the  sureties  on 
the  last  bond  are  liable.  Heppe  v.  John- 
son, 73  Cal.  265.  As  to  a  breach  of  an 
official  bond,  see  La  Poiute  v.  O'Malley, 
46  Wis.  35. 

It  is  no  objection  to  the  bond  that  it 
was  executed  before  the  appointment  to 
office  was  made.  Essex  v.  Strong,  8 
Upper  Can.  L.  J.  15  ;  s.  c.  21  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  149.  The  imposition  of  additional 
taxes  to  those  assessed  at  the  time  of  tak- 
ing the  security  and  the  increase  of  risk 
therehy  has  been  held  not  to  violate  a 
bond  given  for  the  general  performance  of 
duties  and  payment  of  moneys.  Beverley 
v.  Barlow  ct  al.,  10  Upper  Can.  C.  P. 
178  ;  s.  c.  7  Upper  Can.  L.  J.  117. 
Nor  is  it  a  defence  that  the  money 
received  by  the  treasurer  was  not  de- 
manded by  the  government,  which  was 
entitled  thereto.  Essex  v.  Park,  11  Up- 
per Can.  C.  P.  473.  Nor  are  irregularities 
in  the  mode  of  appointment  a  defence. 
Whitby  v.  Harrison,  18  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
603  ;  Whitby  v.  Flint,  9  Upper  Can.  C.  P. 
449  ;  Todd  v.  Perry  et  al.,  20  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  649. 

1  Rex  v.  Atkins,  3  Mod.  12  ;  Rex  v. 
Hearle,  IStr.  627;  Mayor  of  Durham's 
Case,  1  Sid.  33  ;  Rex  v.  Thornton,  4  East, 
308  ;    Foot  v.  Prowse,  1  Str.  625  ;  s.  c. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  219 

'i   terms  provided  that  the  mayor  or  other  chief  officer, 
thou  ■        pear,  should    hold   until    his    successor   was 

When   this   right  existed   it   was   frequently   abused,   by 
i  hold  an  election  on  the  charter  day,  by  which  means 
Linued  his  term.      It  was  this  abuse  thai   gave  rise 
ie  Statute  of  Anne,  which   enacted  "that   qo  person   in  such 
office  tor  uiif  whole  year  should  be  capable  of  being  chosen 
the  same  office  for  the  year  immediately  ensuing,"  and  imposed 
a  fine  upon  every  such  officer  who  "should  voluntarily  and  unlaw- 
fully obstruct  an  1  prevent  the  choosing  of  another  person  to  succeed 
into  such  office  at  the  time  appointed  for  making  another  choice."2 
I'ik  Municipal  Corporations  Act  the  provision  is  that  the 

..,r  shall  be  elected  each  year,  at  the  meeting  fixed  for  the  ninth 
uber.aud  shall  "continue  in  his  office  for  one  whole  year,"3 
and  by  an  amendment,  until  his  successor  shall  have  accepted  the 
office  of  mayor,  and  made  and  subscribed  the  requisite  oath;4  and 
jequently  the  Statute  of  Anne  above  mentioned   was  repealed, 
ing   ii"  longer  necessary.5 

§  218     L57).    Same  subject.  —  At  common  law,  the  office  of  an 

aldermn  i,  jurat,  capital  burgess,  or  other  member  of  a  select  body, 

is  a  franchise  for  life,  though  by  prescription  or  charter  it  may  be 

limited  to  a  definite  period,  but  the  office  was  so  much  in  the  nature 

freehold  thai  there  was  an  implied  right  to  hold  over,  unless  it 

was  otherwise  provided.6     So  with  respect  to  recorder,  town-clerk, 

and  the  like  officers,  the  duration  of  the  office  depended  upon  the 

particular  charter,  but  presumptively  it  was  not  limited,  and  their 

offices  were  go  much  in  the  nature  of  a  freehold  that  if  they  were 

iible  for  a  year"  and  were  constituted  in  general  terms,  they  did 

not  expire  with   the  year,  but  the  possessors  were  entitled  to  hold 

:   until  others  were  elected.     Bui  it   was  considered  that  if  they 

"eligible  tor  a  year  only,"  the  office  ipso  facto  determined  on 

the  expiration  of  a  year.7 

ij  219     158       American   Doctrine;    Right   to    hold    over.  —  In   this 

ntry,  however,  a  public  office  is  not  considered  as  being  in  the 
nature  of  a  ,/,•// ,,(  or  contract,  and  the  officer,  as  against  the  public, 

:'.   Bro.    P.  C.   L69  ;  Will,'.  293  ;  Glover,  *  fi  and  7  Win.  IV.  chap.  cv.  sec.  4. 

17::.  6  3  ami    I  Vict.  chap,  xlvii. 

1  P.     Res  p.  Phillips,  l  Str.  S94.  6  Res  v.  Doncasfer,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1564; 

Vnne,  chap.  Font  v.  Prowse,  supra. 

•'•    :.   IV.  chap,  lxxvi.  sec.  '  Willc.  296,  pi.  766;  Reg.  v.  Durham, 

Reg.    v.  10    Mod.    147;  Dighton'a  Case,    1   Vent. 

:  Ad.  &  I  82. 


§  220  OFFICIAL   TERM  ;     HOLDING    OVER.  303 

has  no  freehold,  or  property  in  the  office ;  and  it  is  almost  an  inva- 
riable provision  of  law  that  all  officers  shall  be  elected  or  appointed 
for  a  fixed  and  definite  period.  To  guard  against  lapses,  sometimes 
unavoidable,  the  provision  is  almost  always  made  in  terms  that  the 
officer  shall  hold  until  his  successor  is  elected  and  qualified.  But  even 
without  such  a  provision,  the  American  courts  have  not  adopted  the 
strict  rule  of  the  English  corporations  which  disables  the  mayor  or 
chief  officer  from  holding  beyond  the  charter  or  election  day,  but 
rather  the  analogy  of  the  other  corporate  officers  who  hold  over 
until  their  successors  are  elected,  unless  the  legislative  intent  to  the 
contrary  be  manifested.1  Thus  in  Vermont  it  is  held,  —  there  being 
no  statute  to  the  contrary,  and  such  having  been  the  practice,  — 
that  school  officers  elected  at  the  annual  meeting  hold  over  until 
others  are  elected  at  another  annual  meeting,  whether  more  or  less 
than  a  year  from  the  time  of  their  election.2 

§  220  (159).  Holding  over.  —  The  law  on  the  subject  of  holding 
over  by  corporate  officers  has  been  thus  stated  by  a  learned  American 
judge :  "  Where,  in  the  charter  or  organic  law  of  a  corporation,  there 
is  an  express  or  implied  restriction  upon  the  time  of  holding  office, 
as  that  the  officers  shall  be  annually  elected  on  a  particular  day,  and 
that  they  shall  hold  from  one  charter  (election)  day  till  the  next,  or 
that  they  shall  be  elected  '  for  the  year  ensuing  only,'  in  such  case 
they  cannot  hold  over  beyond  the  next  election  day  or  the  end  of 
the  year."  3     "  But  where,  by  the  constitution  of  the  corporation,  the 

1  People  v.  Runkel,  9  Johns.  147  ;  Slee  149  (1869).  So  in  Connecticut,  an  officer 
v.  Bloom,  5  Johns.  Ch.  366,  378  ;  2  Kent  elected  for  "the  year  ensuing"  is,  in  the 
Com.  238  ;  Kelsey  v.  Wright,  1  Root  absence  of  any  other  restrictive  provision, 
(Conn.),  83  ;  Smith  v.  Natchez  Steamboat  entitled  to  hold  beyond  the  year,  and  un- 
Co.,  1  How.  (Miss.)  479  ;  Lynch  v.  Laff-  til  he  is  superseded  by  the  election  of 
land,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96  ;  South  Bay,  another  person  in  his  place.  McCall  v. 
&c.  Co.  v.  Gray,  30  Me.  547;  Elmendorf  Byram  Manuf.  Co.,  6  Conn.  428  (1827), 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  25  Wend,  where  the  authorities  are  reviewed  and  com- 
(N.  Y.)  693  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  12  Lea  mented  on  by  Hosmer,  C.  J.  ;  s.  p.  Cong. 
(Tenn.),  246.  And  see  cases  infra.  For  Soc.  &c.  v.  S perry,  10  Conn.  200  ;  State  v. 
the  rule  when  officers  resign  to  avoid  service  Fagan,  42  Conn.  32  (1875);  Wier  v.  Bush, 
of  process,  see  post,  sec.  887.  4  Litt.  (Ky.)  433.     Where,  by  statute,  an 

2  Chandler  v.  Bradish,  23  Vt.  416  officer  holds  for  a  given  term,  and  "  un- 
(1851).  til  his   successor  is  elected  and  qualified," 

"  The  better  opinion,"  says  Shaw,  C.J.  he  continues  in  office  until  his  successor 

arguendo,   in  Overseers    of   Poor,    &c.  v.  is  duly  elected  and  qualified,  though  this 

Sears,   22  Pick.   122,   130,  "  is  that  town  (from    failure    to    elect,     or    from    other 

officers  annually  chosen  hold  their  offices  causes)  be  after  the  expiration  of  the  term, 

until  others   are   chosen  and  qualified  in  Stewart    v.    State,    4   Ind.    396    (1853)  ; 

their  place."     School  District  v.  Atherton,  Tuley  v.  State,    1  Ind.   500,    515;    Law- 

12  Met.  (Mass.)  105  (1846)  ;  Dow  v.  Bui-  home,  In  re,  18  Graft.  (Va.)  85. 
lock,   13  Gray  (Mass.),    136    (1859).     So  3  Tuley    v.  State,  1   Ind.    (Cart.)   500. 

in  Illinois.     People  v.   Fairbury,  51  111.  502    (1849),   per    Perkins,    J.  ;  King    v. 


I 


[I  [PAL    Cokl'uRATIONS. 


§221 


,  term,  and  until  their  successors  are  flirted 

1,  or  where  they  are  elected  '  for  the  year  ensuing,'  and 

the  »rganic  law  contains  uo  restrictive  clause,  the  officers 

'  and  exercise  their  offices,  after  the  expiration 

year,  until  they  arc  superseded   by  the  election  of  other 

as  in  their  place  .    ' 

^  22  1     L60).    Ri^ht  to  hold  over  as  against  the  State.  —  As  against 

the  public,  however,  officers  cannot  found  a  vain  I  title  or  right  to 


Mayor,  S  ..  6  Yin.  Al  r.  296  :  Corpora- 
tion of  Banbury,  10  Mod.  346  ;  Rex  v. 
Passmore,  8  Term  EL  199  ;  6  Petered. 
Abr.  738.  But  whether  a  provision 
thai  .-in  officer  shall  "  be  annually 
on  a  particular  day  "  is  an  implied 
i  ton  that  he  shall  not   hold   over, 

■    V 
x       V    ' .  I        ■  s,  and  '.  above 

The   weight  of   authority   in    this 
country  is  the  other   way.     Where  acity 
the  mayor  power  to  hold  until 
I  .  cessoi    «.is  elected  and   qualified, 

1  >n  t  denied  this  power  to  the  members  of 

.    council  by    providing  thai 
should   be   el  ■■!'  '1    foi    a     pecifii  d    term, 
."    and   that    their   seats 
should  be  vacated  al  the  end  of  such  term, 
in  not  h"l<l  over,   and  their  action, 
after  the  time  thus  fixed,  is  void,  and  docs 
not    hind   the  i  orporatiou.      Louis  ■ 
Higdon,  2  Met.  (Ky.j  526  (1859).     When 
.  is  silent  as  to  the  term,   but  re- 
i  to   be  held  every  two 
dds  over  until  his  suc- 
is    provided.     Cordiell  v.  Frizzell, 
L30. 
1  /'  State,  1  End. 

I  : 502  (1  J49)  (action  on  official 

Thi    Queen    v. 
&  E.  86  ;  1  I 

Foot  v.  Prows  .   S 
p    I  lurham,  1"  Mod.  1  16  :  King  v. 
!  163  .     Mi  '  'all   V.    Manu- 

,  6  C  mn.  128  ;  9  Coi 
■  :  17  Com  Isey  v. 

Wright,    I    R  Wiei    v.   I' 

!  .  Wheeling  v.   Black,  25 

W.  V  i.  266  ;  People  v.  Runkel,  !'  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  1  17  ;  Vernon  Society  v.   H 
Cow.  (N  5  Johns. 

Ch.  (N.  V.)  366  ;  Pender  v.  King,  6  Vin. 
2    K  at    i  om.    _     . 


Hicks  v.  Launcelot,  1  Rol.  Abr.  513  ; 
Bank  v.  Petway,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  522  ; 
Si. •wait  v.  State,  4  Ind.  396  ;  Ri  ■•.  o. 
Poole,  <  as.  temp.  Hardw.  23,  and 
Phillips  v.  Wickham,  1  Paige  Ch.  590, 
were  considered  to  have  a  contrary  bear- 
ing. It  was  decided,  in  I.eek  v.  Ilanseon), 
9  Post.  (29  N.  II.)  213,  222  (1854),  that 
where  the   charter   or   incorporating    act 

10  provision  for  the  contiuu 
corporate  officers  in  office  after  the  expira- 
tion   of    the    term    for  which  the; 
elected,  they  could  not   hold    over   until 
others    shuuld  be  chosen  and    qualified  ; 
citing  the  opinion  of  <  chancellor  Walworth, 
in    Phillips  v.    Wickham,  1    Paige,  590  ; 
bu1  admitting  that  The  People  v.  Runkle, 
9    Johns.    (X.  Y.)   147,  and    Trust 
Hills,  6  Cow.  (N.  V.)  23,  held  a  different 
view.     In    People  v.  Tieman,   8   Abb.  Pr. 
359;    s.  c.    30    Barb.    (N.  Y.)    193,   the 

ae  Court,  at  special  term,  denied 
that  the  officer  himself  could  hold  over 
unless  authorized  by  statute,  though  to 
the  public  his  acts  are  sustained. 
See  Cocke  v.  Halsey,  16  Pet.  71.  One 
holding  a  municipal  office,  under  a  valid 
appointment,  is  nol  precluded  from  con- 
tinuing to  act  thereunder  until  his  succes- 
Bor  is  elected  and  qualified,  by  the  mere 
fact  that  he  has  taken  an  oath  and  filed 
an  official  bond  under  an  illegal  election. 
Forristal  v.  People,  3  111.  A]  p.  170.  Under 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  Virginia,  of • 
fleers  must  qualify  be/on  the  day  on  which 
their  terms  begin,  and  on  failure  to  do  so 
the  offices  are  vacant.  In  such  case  the 
incumbents  continue  to  perform  the  duties 

of  the  office  alter  the  expiration  of  their 
own  terms  until  their  successors  are  quali- 
fied.    Johnson  i\   Maun,  77  Va,  265  ;  see 

-1  !,    Hole. 


S  222 


VACANCIES   IN    OFFICES,    WHEN    FILLED. 


305 


hold  over  upon  their  own  neglect  of  duty.  Therefore,  where  the  char- 
ter made  it  the  express  duty  of  the  trustees  in  office  to  give  notice 
of,  and  themselves  to  hold,  the  annual  elections,  it  was  held  that  if 
they  omitted  to  discharge  this  duty,  though  inadvertently,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  omission  there  was  and  could  he  no  election,  that 
they  were  not  entitled  to  hold  over,  although  by  the  charter  it  was 
provided  that  they  should  continue  in  office  until  a  new  election 
should  be  made  and  their  successors  should  qualify.1 


§  222  (161).  Vacancies  in  Municipal  Offices,  when  filled.  —  At 
common  law  there  must  be  a  vacancy  in  the  office  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  election  ;  "  for  one  cannot,"  says  Mr.  Willcock,  "  be  elected 
to  a  corporate  office  in  reversion."2  The  same  doctrine  has  been 
recognized  in  this  country,  and  a  vacancy  must  exist  before  an 
election  to  fill  it  can  be  ordered,3  and  an  election  to  fill  an  antici- 
pated vacancy  is  not  valid  unless  expressly  authorized  by  the  charter 
or  statute.4  Elections,  however,  in  advance  of  the  expiration  of  the 
regular  term  of  the  incumbent  of  an  office,  are  always  provided  for 
and  held,  but  such  cases  are  not  elections  to  vacancies  within  the 
meaning  of  the  rule  under  consideration.  Where  the  charter  pro- 
vides that  in  case  of  the  absence  of  the  mayor  from  the  city,  another 


1  People  v.  Bartlett,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
422  (1831).  In  such  a  case,  being  trus- 
tees de  facto,  their  acts  would  he  good. 
And  their  title  would  also  be  good  except 
when  called  in  question  by  quo  warranto, 
lb.;  Lynch  v.  Lafflaud,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 
96  (1867).  Validity  of  acts  of  officers  de 
facto.  Ante,  sees.  215,  note,  216,  note. 
People  v.  Stevens,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  616,  per 
Bronson,  J. ;  People  v.  Runkle,  9  Johns. 
(X.  Y.)  147;  Trustees  v.  Hill,  6  Cow. 
(X.  Y.)  23;  Plymouth  v.  Painter,  17 
Conn.  585  ;  Smith  v.  State,  19  Conn.  493; 
People  v.  Bartlett,  6  Wend.  (X.  V.)  422  ; 
State  v.  Jacobs,  17  Ohio,  143  ;  Hinton  v. 
Lindsay,  20  Ga.  746  ;  post, 'sees.  276,  892. 
The  unconditional  repeal  of  a  municipal 
charter  abolishes  all  the  offices  under  it ;  so 
also  does  the  substitution  of  a  new  charter 
having  inconsistent  provisions,  ami  not 
providing  for  the  rights  of  officers  under  the 
old  charter.  Crook  v.  People,  106  111. 
237.  See  this  case  also  as  to  who  are  "  the 
city  officers  then  in  office,"  as  used  in  the 
Incorporation  Law  of  Illinois. 

2  Willc.  Corp.  207,  pi.  526  ;  Hob.  150  ; 
Skin.  45  ;  Glover,  216. 

3  Lindsey  v.    Luckett,   20  Tex.     516  ; 
VOL.    I.  —20 


Biddle  v.  Willard,  10  Ind.  63  (1857)  ; 
People  v.  Witherell,  14  Mich.  48. 

4  Biddle  v.  Willard,  supra.  In  this 
case  it  was  said,  that  a  resignation  to  take 
effect  at  a  fixed  future  time  may,  if  no 
new  rights  have  attached,  be  withdrawn, 
even  after  acceptance,  by  the  consent  of 
the  party  accepting  ;  and  under  the  laws 
of  that  State  it  was  held  that  such  a  res- 
ignation did  not  create  a  vacancy  which 
would  authorize  an  election  at  a  period 
prior  to  the  taking  effect  of  the  resigna- 
tion. See  infra,  sees.  225,  note,  226, 
note. 

There  is  no  technical  or  peculiar  mean- 
ing to  the  word  "  vacant,"  as  used  in  the 
Constitution.  It  means  empty, unoccupied, 
as  applied  to  an  office  without  an  incum- 
bent. There  is  no  basis  for  the  distinction 
urged  that  it  applies  only  to  offices  vacated 
by  death,  resignation,  or  otherwise.  An 
existing  office,  without  an  incumbent,  is 
vacant,  whether  it  be  a  new  or  an  old  one. 
r<:r  Stuart,  J.,  Stocking  v.  State  (vacancy 
in  new  judicial  circuit),  7  Ind.  326  (1S55); 
followed,  Collins  v.  State,  8  Ind.  344 
(1S56). 


MUNII  U'  \l.   CORPORATIONS.  §  -'l:', 

':  ill  act  as  mayor  only  such  an  absence  as  will  rendei  the 
.    to  perform  the  duties  of  his  office  is  intended.1 

^  223     L62      Refusal   to   serve  in   Office. —  It  is  an  established 
-law principlt  in  England,  that  since  a  municipal  corporation 
titled  to  the  official  service  of  its  eligible  members,  it  may,  by 
virtue  of  its  inherent  or  incidental  power,  pass  a  by-law  imposing 
icuniary  penalty  upon  such  as  refuse,  without  legal  excuse,  an 
which  they  have  been  duly  elected.2     The  ground  of  this 
trine  is  clearly  set  forth  by  Lord   Bolt   in   Vanacker's  Case,  and 
although  all   of  his   reasoning   is  not   applicable  to  our  American 
municipal   corporations,  still  it  is  believed  that   under  the   usual 
sral  welfare  clause  or  under  their  incidental  power  to  pass  rea- 
sonable and   necessary   by-laws,  they  would   be  authorized,  where 
such  an  ordinance  did  not  contravene  the;  charter  or  statute,  or  public 
.■   policy  respecting  offices,  to  impose  a  reasonable  fine  for 
refusing  corporate  offices.      In  this  country,  however,  offices  have  not 
usually  he, mi  regarded  as  burdens  to  be  avoided,  but   rather  as  dis- 
tinctions to  be  coveted,  and  hence  there  has  been  little  occasion  to 
the  power  of  the  courts,  or  to  test  the  authority 
of  the  corporations  1"  enforce  the  undertaking  of  their  offices.     If, 
however,  under  the  charter  or  statute,  or  the  law  or  policy  of  the 
e,  an  officer  has  the  right  to  resign  or  lay  down   his  office  at 
pleasure,  as  is  usually  the  Case  with  us,  the  authority  to  impose  a 
ing  to  serve  would  probably  not  exist.3 

1   Detroit  v.  Moran,   16  Mich.  "213.  councillor,  auditor,  or  assessor,  or  mayor, 
\       cker,    1   Ld.  to  accept  the  office  or  pay  a  fine  to  the 
C.  Carth.   482;    s.  C.    L2  borough    fund.     The  refusal   to  take  , the 
Mod.  272;  1  Salk.  142;  Rex  v.  Bower,  "2  requisite  oaths  is  a  refusal  of  the  office. 
&    R.  761,  842;  s.  c.  1    Barn.  &  Exeter v.Starre, 2  Show.  159.     As  there  is 
.    7;    Vintners'  Co.    v.    Passey,    1  a  common-law  duty  to  serve  in  an  office  to 
i;    Willr.    230;   Glover,     181;  which  a  person  has  been  duly  elected,  this 
•.  211.   [fofa  public  and  magisterial  duty  may,  if  il Hire  lie  sufficiently  mi- 
ll may  he  im-  portant,  I"1  enforced    by  mandamus,    ami 
;       i,  though  tin'  person  be  also  liable  to  the  paymenl  of  the  fine  is  nut  in  lieu  of 
nished  by  indictment,  or,  in  the  dis-  service,  unless  the  statute  or  by-law  re- 
ar, by  criminal  informa-  lease  him    from  service    by  treating    the 
London  v.  Vanacker,  1    Ld.  Raym.  penalty  as  compensation.     Rex  v.  Bower, 
•.  Orosvenor,  1  Wils.  18  ;  s.  c.  1  Ham.  &  Cress.  585;  s.  c.  2  Dowl.  &  R. 
H    i      rford,  11  Mod.  842  ;  Rex  v.  Leyland,  8  Maule  &  Sel.  184; 

.  Rex    v.  Woodtav  .    2  Term    R.  R  \  v.  W Irow,  'J   Term    R.    731  ;  post, 

v.    Whitwell,  5  Term  R.  86  ;  see.  830.     By  the    above-mentioned  pro- 

v.    Leyland,    3   M.   &  9    184.     The  vision  of  the  Municipal  Corporations  A<  t 

6  Win.  of  5  and   6  Win.  IV.,  the  line  is  in  lieu  of 

M  inic.  Corp.  Act.  the  acceptance  "l   the  office.      Grant  on 

34)    requires    every  qualified  Corp.  222. 

alderman,         8  See  Willc.  133,  pi.  308  ;  Grant,  221, 


224 


RESIGNATION    OF    OFFICE. 


307 


§  224  (163).  Resignation  of  Municipal  Offices. — An  office  must 
be  resigned  either  (first)  expressly,  or  (second)  by  implication.1  If 
the  charter  prescribes  the  mode  in  which  the  resignation  is  to  be 
made,  that  mode  should  of  course  be  complied  with.2  Acceptance 
by  the  corporation  is,  at  common  law,  necessary  to  a  consummation 
of  the  resignation,  and  until  acceptance  by  proper  authority,  the 
tender  or  offer  to  resign  is  revocable.3  But  if  the  statute  provides 
that  an  officer  may  resign  at  pleasure  and  that  his  resignation  shall 
take  effect  when  filed,  the  principle  just  stated  does  not  apply,  and 
when  his  resignation  is  filed,  he  ceases  to  be  an  officer.4  The  right 
to  accept  a  resignation  is  a  power  incidental  to  every  corporation.5 
It  is  also  a  common-law  principle  that  the  right  to  accept  the  resig- 
nation of  an  officer  is  incidental  to  the  power  of  appointing  him.6 
If  no  particular  mode  is  prescribed,  neither  the  resignation  nor 
acceptance  thereof  need  be  in  writing,  or  in  any  form  of  words.7 


222  ;  post,  sec.  226,  note  ;  Gates  v.  Dela- 
ware County,  12  Iowa,  405  ;  United 
States  v.  Wright,  1  McLean,  509  ;  State 
&c.  v.  Ferguson,  31  N.  J.  L.  (2  Vroom) 
107. 

1  Regents  of  University  v.  Williams,  9 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  365,  422  (1838)  ;  Willc. 
132,  238  ;  Grant,  26S,  246,  note  e  ;  lb. 
221,  222. 

2  Willc.  239  ;  Rex  v.  Hughes,  5  Barn. 
&  ( Iress.  886,  896  ;  Rex  v.  Mayor  of  Ripon, 
1  Ld.  Raym.  563  ;  Rex  v.  Payne,  2  Chitty, 
366  ;  Reg.  v.  Morton,  4  Q.  B.  146.  The 
statute  may  provide  that  the  officer  shall 
continue  until  his  successor  is  elected  and 
qualified,  and  in  such  case  he  will  not 
cease  to  he  an  officer  merely  by  resigning 
so  as  to  be  relieved  from  the  discharge  of 
his  duties  as  such  officer.  Badger  v. 
United  States,  93  U.  S.  599  (1876)  (man- 
damus) ;  Amy  v.  Watertown,  130  U.  S. 
302  (1889).  See,  further  on  this  point, 
post,  sec.  887. 

3  Reg.  v.  Lane,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1304  ; 
Rex  i'.  Ripon,  supra  ;  Hazard's  Case,  2 
Rol.  11  ;  Jenning's  Case,  12  Mod.  402  ; 
Rex  v.  Patteson,  4  B.  &  Ad.  9  ;  1  New  & 
Mann.  612.  The  acceptance  may  be  by 
entry  in  books,  by  vote,  or  resolution,  or 
by  treating  the  place  as  vacant  and  elect- 
ing another  bo  fill  it,  or  ordering  an  elec- 
tion if  to  be  filled  by  a  popular  vote.  Van 
Orsdall  v.  Hazard,  *3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  243  ; 
State  v.  Ancker,  2  Rich.  (S.  C.)  245.  One 
elected  to  an  office  cannot  resign  it  before 


he  has  qualified  and  become  an  incumbent 
of  it.  Miller  v.  Supervisors,  &c,  25  Cal. 
93  ;  Willc.  236. 

4  Amy  v.  Watertown  (No.  1),  130 
U.  S.  302  (1889),  distinguishing  Badger 
v.  United  States,  supra.     Post,  sec.  887  a. 

5  Rex  v.  Tidderley,  1  Sid.  14  ;  Hazard's 
Case,  supra.  The  "common  council" 
may  regulate  resignations  by  by-laws,  and 
it  may  accept  resignations,  as  it  represents 
the  corporation  at  large.  Rawlinson  (5th 
ed.)  317,  note  ;  Staniland  v.  Hopkins,  9 
M.  &  VV.  178  ;  Willc.  240,  pi.  615. 

e  Van  Orsdall  v.  Hazard,  3  Hill  (N.V.), 
243  ;  asserting,  arguendo,  the  incidental 
power  of  municipal  corporations,  as  such, 
to  accept  resignations,  and  approving  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Willcock  (Munic.  Corp. 
240),  who  observes,  respecting  the  cases 
on  this  subject  :  "  I  presume  that  a  right 
to  accept  a  resignation  passes  incidentally 
with  a  right  to  elect."  See,  also,  Rex  v. 
Tidderley,  1  Sid.  14,  per  Hale,  Ch.  B.; 
Jenning's  Case,  12  Mod.  402  ;  Taylor's 
Case,  Poph.  133.  The  English  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  1882,  sec.  36,  provides 
that  any  "  person  elected  to  a  corporate 
office  may  at  any  time  by  writing  signed 
by  him,  and  delivered  to  the  town-clerk, 
resign  the  office,  on  payment  of  the  tine 
provided  for  non-acceptance  thereof." 

7  Same  authorities  ;  and  see,  also.  Rex 
v.  Ripon.  1  Ld.  Raym.  563  ;  S.  C.  2  Salk. 
433  ;  Regina  v.  Lane.  1  Ld.  Raym.  1304  ; 
Jenning's  Case,  12   Mod.   402;  Regina  v. 


Y 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  226 

$  225       164).     Implied    Resignation;     Incompatible     Office.  -—  An 

igned  or  vacated  by  the  Incumbent  being 
d   to  and   accepting   an    incompatible   office.      The    rule,   says 

I  .         i..  in  a  leading  English  this  subject,  thai   where  two 

re  incompatible  they  cannot  be  held  together,  is  founded  on 
the  plainest  principles  of  public  policy,  and  has  obtained  from  very 
early  times.1  The  principle  applies  not  only  where  the  second  office 
is  the  superior  and  more  Important  one,  but  also  where  it  is  nut.2 
rule  has  been  generally  stated  in  broad  and  unqualified  terms, 
that  the  acceptance  of  the  incompatible  office,  by  whomsoever  the 
appointment  or  election  mi-lit  he  made,  absolutely  determined 
original  office,  leaving  no  shadow  of  title  in  the  possessor,  whose 
successor  may  be  at  once  elected  or  appointed,  neither  </uo  warranto 
nor  amotion  being  necessary.8 

165).  Same  subject.  Acceptance  of  Resignation.  —  The 
doctrim  just  stated  is  undoubtedly  true  where  the  acceptance  of  the 
second  office  is  made,  by  or  with  the  privity  of  that  authority  which 
has  the  power  to  accept  the  surrender  of  the  first  or  to  amove  from 
it;  but  "such  acceptance  does  not  operate  as  an  absolute  avoidance, 
in  cases  where  a  person  cannot  divest  himself  of  an  office  by  his  own 
mere  act,  but  requires  the  concurrence  of  another  authority  to  his 
nation  or  amotion,  unless  that  authority  is  privy  and  consent- 

Gloucester,  Holl  R.  150;   Van    Orsdall   v.  other,    but  his  acceptance  of  the  second 

II  B  |  ■.  Y.),  243,  248  ;  State  office  is  in  law  an  implied  resignation  of 
v.  Allen,  21  Ind.  516  (1863)  ;  People  v.  the  first,  whenever  Lt  may  be  resigned  by 
Police   Board,    26   N.  Y.  316  ;    McCunn's  the  mere  act  of  the  incumbent  without  the 

19  N.  V.  188,  distinguished.     Stat-  assent  or  concurrence  of  a  superior  author- 

utory  limitation   on   the  righl   to    resign  ity.     Per  Gray,   C.  J.,  in  Commonwealth 

befon  >'■  Hawkes,    123     Mass.  525  (1878).     The 

States,   93  U.  S.  599  rule  that  one  vacates  an  office  by  accept- 

People   v.  Commoi               il,   77  ing  another  office  incompatible  therewith, 

N.   Y.  503,   approving  text      A  resigna-  applied  to  a  solicitor's  acceptance  of  the 

made  to  the  officer  who  makes  the  office  of  representative  in  Congress.    State 

appointment  vacates  the  office  as  soon  as  v.  Butz,  9  S.  C.  156  ;  post,  sec.  4*27,  note. 

ii  isreceived;  there  is  no  acceptance  nee  -  Milward  v.  Thatcher,  2  Term  R.  87, 

sary.      Gilbert  v.  Luce,  11  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  which   settled     this    poinl    conclusively; 

91;  Olmsted  v.  Dennis,  77  N.  V.  379.  R      ».  Trelawney,  8  Burr.  1015;  Gabriel 

i  /■  ,              ...    Re  c  v.  1                  I  v.  Clerke,  Cro.  E1L     7':  .  Ri  ,  o.  Godwin, 

.  lol.  9  (1832)  :  1  Nev.  &  Mann.  Doug.  397,  note  22;  Willc.  240,  pi.  017; 

Regents  of  the  University  v.  Wil-  Glover,  139. 

liams,  9  Gill  &  Johns.  (M.I.)  365  (183  G  briel   v.  Clerke,  supra;   Vendor  v. 

1  Kyd,  369-375  ;  State  v.    Butz,  9   B.  I  .  Sandwich,  1  Sid.  305;  Milward  v.  Thatch- 

...  in.  120.  er,  supra;  Glover,  329  ;  Willc.    240,    pi. 

By  the  common  law,  when  two  offices  017.    Where  a  resignation  is  to  take  effeel 

or  p                    ire  incompatible  with  each  a1  a.  future  day  the  council  may  till  the 

holding  the  one  is  no1  .Ii--  vacancy  before  thai  day.     Leech  v.  The 

Hua.                                                          th<  State,  78  End.  570.    -'Supra,  sec.  222,  note. 


§227 


INCOMPATIBLE   PUBLIC    OFFICES. 


309 


ing  to  the  second  appointment."  1  If  one  holding  an  office  in  a  cor- 
poration be  by  that  corporation  elected  to  an  incompatible  office, 
this,  of  course,  is  a  consent  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  that  the 
first  office  be  vacated  ;  and  if  the  second  office  be  accepted,  the  first 
is  at  once  and  ipso  facto  determined.  But,  until  acceptance,  the  for- 
mer office  is  not  vacated.2 


§  227  (166).  Incompatible  public  Offices.  —  The  rule  under  con- 
sideration is  not  limited  to  corporate  offices,  but  extends,  both  in  its 
principle  and  application,  to  all  public  offices.  Thus,  if  a  judge  of 
the  Common  Pleas  accepts  an  appointment  to  the  King's  Bench, 
the  first  office  is  vacated,  since  it  is  the  duty  of  the  one  to  correct 
the  errors  of  the  other.3  Whether  offices  are  incompatible  depends 
upon  the  charter  or  statute,  and  the  nature  of  the  duties  to  be  per- 
formed.4 The  same  man  cannot  be  judge  and  minister  in  the  same 
court,  and  hence  the  offices  are  not  compatible.5     Where  the  re- 


1  Parke,  J.,  Rex  v.  Patteson,  supra.  It 
has  been  held  in  this  country,  however, 
that  an  incumbent  of  a  public  office  may 
lay  it  down  at  his  pleasure,  and  that  the 
officer  to  whom  the  resignation,  by  law, 
is  to  be  made  cannot  forbid  it  or  refuse 
it ;  and  that  when  received  by  such  offi- 
cer it  operates  to  vacate  the  office  re- 
signed. Gates  v.  Delaware  County,  12 
Iowa,  405  ;  United  States  v.  Wright,  1 
McLean,  509.  The  delivery  by  a  city 
engineer,  whose  office  was  elective,  of  a 
written  resignation  to  the  mayor  and 
council,  takes  effect  without  any  accept- 
ance. State  v.  Mayor  of  Lincoln,  4  Neb. 
260  (1877).  Lake,  C.  J.,  says  :  "In  ab- 
sence of  statute,  there  is  no  rule  requiring 
acceptance  of  resignation  to  make  it  ef- 
fective. The  refusal  of  the  municipal 
authorities  to  accept  it  will  not  compel 
the  officer  to  retain  the  office  against  his 
will."  lb.  Compare  State  v.  Ferguson,  2 
Vroom  (31  N.  J.  L.),  107,  129  ;  Lewis  v. 
Oliver,  4  Abb.  Pr.  R.  121  ;  People  v.  Por- 
ter, 6  Cal.  26.  Denying  right  under  stat- 
ute to  withdraw  resignation  after  deliver- 
ing it.  State  v.  Hauss  (sheriff),  43  Ind. 
105  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  314.  Ante, 
sec.  222,  note. 

2  lb. ;  Mil  ward  v.  Thatcher,  supra  ;  Rex 
v.  Pateman,  supra ;  Wille.  243,  pi.  G23  ; 
Arkwright  v.  Cantrell,  7  Ad.  &  E.  565. 
Acceptance  necessary  ;  see,  also,  State  v. 
Ferguson,   2  Vroom  (31   N.   J.   L.),   107 


(1864);  see  Lewis  v.  Oliver,  4  Abb.  Pr. 
121.  Acceptance  of  an  incompatible  of- 
fice, even  under  a  void  election,  puts  an 
end  to  the  first  office  ;  and  the  officer,  on 
being  ousted  from  the  second  office,  can- 
not be  restored  to  the  first.  Rex  v. 
Hughes,  5  B.  &  C.  886  ;  Rex  v.  Bond,  6 
D.  &  R.  333. 

3  Glover  on  Corp.  139. 

4  Milward  v.  Thatcher,  supra,  per  Bui- 
ler,  J.;  People  v.  Carrique,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
93,  and  cases  cited ;  Stanilaud  v.  Hopkins, 
9  M.  &  W.  178. 

Incompatibility  in  offices  exists  where 
the  nature  and  duties  of  the  two  offices 
are  such  as  to  render  it  improper,  from 
considerations  of  public  policy,  for  one 
incumbent  to  retain  both.  It  does  not 
necessarily  arise  when  the  incumbent 
places  himself,  for  the  time  being,  in  a 
position  where  it  is  impossible  for  him  to 
discharge  the  duties  of  both  offices  (Bryan 
v.  Cattell,  15  Iowa,  538  (1864),  per 
Wright,  C.  J. ) ;  and  accordingly  that  case 
held  that  the  office  of  district  attorney 
and  of  captain  in  the  volunteer  service  of 
the  United  States  were  not  legally  incom- 
patible. Two  offices  are  incompatible 
where  the  holder  cannot,  in  every  in- 
stance, discharge  the  duties  of  each.  P.-r 
Bailey,  J.,  Rex  v.  Tizzard,  17  Eng.  C.  L. 
193. 

5  Poph.  28,  29  ;  1  Sid.  305  ;  2  Keb. 
93  ;  Glover,  139. 


310  Ml  N1CIPAL   COBPOBATIONS.  §  ±29 

corder  is  an  adviseT  to  the  mayor,  the  two  offices  cannot  lie  held 

So  a  representative   in   Congress   holds  a  public  oj 

within  the  i.  of  a  charter  which  prohibits  an  alderman  from 

holding  "any  other  pub]  "    and  upon  bis  election  to  and 

uch  public  office"  during  his  term  as  alderman,  his 

alderman  immediately  becomes  vacant.2     The  proper  pro- 

ling  is  1  )  muss  to  compel  the  common  council  to  order  a 

tion  to  ldl  such  vacancy,  and  not  by  quo  warranto  to  try 

the  title  to  such  oilier,  such  representative  being  neither  a  dt  facto 

Eficer. 

vj  228    I  L67).    Abandonment  of  Office.  — An  olliee  may  he  rtirulal 
■  ,it}     A  voluntai  ment  by  a  civi]  officer  in  the 

military  service  of  the  United  States  for  three  years,  or  during  the 
war  vacates  the  civil  office,  being  a  constructive  resignation  by 
abandon menl  B  So  where  residence  within  tin  corporation  is  neces- 
sary  in  order  to  be  eligible  to  hold  an  office,  permanent  removal 
from  the  municipality  may  undoubtedly  be  taken  as  evincing  an 
intention  to  resign,  and  as  an  implied  resignation.6 

§  229  168).  Compensation  of  Municipal  Officers  — We  have  had 
3ion  to  discuss  the  complete  supremacy  of  the  legislature  over  pub- 
lic corporations,  limited  only  by  constitutional  restraints.7  Its  au- 
thority over  public  offices,  which  are  created  or  authorized  solely  for 
the  public  convenience,  is  equally  great,8  and  may  he  conferred  upon 
municipal  corporations  with  respect  to  municipal  offices.  The  le- 
gislature, in  the  absence  of  constitutional  limitation,  may  create  and 
abolish  offices,  add  to  or  lessen  their  duties,  abridge  or  extend  the 

1  Will,'.  241,  pi.  518  :  Rex  v.  Marshall,  3  Lamb  v.  Lynd,    II  Pa.  336  ;  State  v. 

cited,  2  B.  &   A.  341.     Clerk  of  a  school  Rahway,  33  X.  J.  L.  L10;  Fish  v.  Weath- 

district  and  collector  of  the  district    were  erwax,  2  Johns.  Cas.  217. 
held  not  incompatible,  and  the  same  per-         4  Willc.  238;  State  v.  Allen,  21  Ind. 

re,  be  appointed  to  both  516   (1863).      In    People  v.    Hanifan,    96 

-,  there  being  no  prohibition  in  the  III.  120,  the  refusal  of  an  alderman  to  at> 

act.     Rowland  v.  Lv  :e,  L6  !  Y.)  tend  council  meetings  was  hold  to  be  an 

135   (1819).     The  offices    of   councilman  abandonment  of  the  office. 

■i  are  incompatible.     State  &  State  r.   Allen,  21  Ind.  51G  (1S63). 

>-.  II  ..   246.     See  generally  as  Bui    see     Bryan    v.    Cattell,    15    Iowa, 

t.i  incompatible  State  and  Federal  offices,  538. 

i  '■    Dallas,  3  Yeates  (Pa  I.  316;         '•  Willc.  238  ;  ante,  sec.  19")  ;  Curry  v. 

i  I'all.  229;  Commonwealth  v.  Binns,  Stewart,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  5G0  (1871). 
17  Serg.  .v   Rawle  (Pa.),  219;  Common-         '  Ante,  chap.  iv. 

''•  I    •  !-  5  Ban  (Pa.),  ''.7.  s  Ante,  chap.  Lv.;  Stater.  Douglass,  26 

pie  v.  Common  Council,  77  N.  V.  Wis.    128  (1870);  s.   c.   7  Am.    Rep.   87, 

N    V  ),  and  m.te.     As  to  special  constitutional  re« 

N     trand,  46  X.    Y.  381;  Btrictions,  ante,  sees.  58,  60. 
u.  Gri   o,  58  X.  Y.  804, 


§  230 


COMPENSATION    OF   OFFICERS. 


311 


term  of  office,  and  increase,  diminish,  or  regulate  the  compensation 
of  officers  at  its  pleasure.1  But  after  the  services  are  rendered  there 
is  an  implied  (if  not  express)  contract  to  pay  therefor  at  the  rates 
fixed  by  the  ordinance  or  law  in  force,  at  the  date  when  the  ser- 
vices were  rendered,  which  contract  cannot  be  impaired  by  subse- 
quent legislation.  Hence,  where  the  law  in  force  at  the  date  when 
a  county  district  attorney  rendered  services,  provided  for  the  levy  of 
taxes  for  county  purposes  at  a  specified  maximum  rate,  and  after 
the  services  were  rendered  a  constitutional  provision  was  adopted 
restricting  the  limit  of  taxation,  it  was  held  that  such  restrictive 
provision  impaired  the  obligation  of  the  plaintiff's  contract  pro  tanto, 
and  was,  to  that  extent,  void,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to 
a  mandamus  to  the  county  officers,  to  levy  and  collect  a  tax  under 
the  law  on  this  subject  which  was  in  force  when  his  services  were 
rendered.2 


§  230  (169).    Compensation  of  Officers.  —  There  is  no  such  implied 
obligation  on  the  part  of  municipal  corporations,  and  no  such  relation 


1  Ante,  chap.  iv. ;  and  see  also  Conner 
v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  1  Seld.  (5 
N.  Y.)  285  (1851);  affirming  s.  c.  2  Sandf. 
S.  C.  R.  355  ;  Warner  v.  People,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  81  ;  2  Demo,  272 ;  People  v. 
Morrell,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  563  (1839); 
Phillips  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  1 
Hilt.  (N.  Y.  Com.  PI.)  483;  Bryan  v. 
Cattell,  15  Iowa,  538,  553,  per  Wright, 
C.  J.;  Coffin  v.  State,  7  Ind.  157  (1855); 
People  v.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481  ;  Tur- 
pen  v.  County  Comm'rs,  7  Ind.  172  ;  Ore- 
gon v.  Pyle,  1  Oreg.  149  ;  Bird  v.  Wasco 
Co.,  3  Oreg.  282  (1871)  ;  Cowdin  v. 
Huff,  10  Ind.  83  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim. 
276  ;  Butler  v.  Pennsylvania,  10  How. 
402  ;  Smith  v.  New  York,  37  N.  Y.  518 
(1868);  Swann  v.  Buck,  40  Miss.  268 
(1866).  While  the  office  is  continued, 
and  the  officer  not  removed,  he  is  entitled 
to  salary.  Hoke  v.  Henderson,  4  Dev. 
(N.  C.)  1  ;  Cotton  v.  Ellis,  7  Jones  (N. 
C.)  Law,  545.  An  officer  holding  over 
and  continuing  to  discharge  his  official 
duties  until  his  successor  was  qualified, 
was  held  to  be  entitled  to  compensation 
for  the  time  without  an  express  provision 
to  that  effect.  Robb  v.  Carter,  65  Md. 
321.  A  constitutional  amendment  prohib- 
iting the  legislature  from  increasing  the 
compensation  of  a  public  officer  during  his 


continuance  in  office  refers  only  to  his 
holding  under  one  appointment.  Smith  v. 
City  of  Waterbury,  54  Conn.  174.  The 
same  provision  was  declared  to  render  il- 
legal a  vote  of  a  city  council  to  pay  a  joint 
standing  committee  for  services  rendered, 
though  the  office  of  councilman  had  no 
compensation  attached  to  it.  Garvie  v. 
Hartford,  54  Conn.  441.  A  salary  may 
be  reduced  during  an  official  term.  Harvey 
v.  Rush  County,  32  Kan.  159.  An  ordi- 
nance of  a  city  is  not  a  "  law  "  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution  of  Pennsyl- 
vania providing  that  "no  law  shall  ex- 
tend the  term  of  any  public  officer  or  in- 
crease or  diminish  his  salary,  &c. ,  after 
his  election."  Baldwin  v.  Philadelphia, 
99  Pa.  St.  164  (1881).  Statute  author- 
izing the  common  council  to  increase  com- 
pensation of  police  justices  for  additional 
duties  imposed  upon  them,  was  held  to 
authorize  only  one  increase,  and  a  second 
increase  was  held  to  be  invalid.  Cox  v. 
New  York,  103  N.  Y,  519. 

2  Fisk  v.  Jefferson  Police  Jury,  116 
U.  S.  131  (1885).  Limit  of  taxation  fixed 
when  debt  was  created  cannot  be  exceeded 
unless  the  limit  has  been  enlarged  by  sub- 
sequent statutes.  Stewart  v.  Jefferson 
Police  Jury,  116  U.  S.  135. 


812 


IB  k  l  [ONS. 


§  230 


them  and  officers  which  they  are  required  by  law  to  i  Lei  ;. 
;11  oblige  them  to  make  compensation  to  8uch  officers,  unless  the 
to  il  n  by  law,  ordinance,  or  by  contract.1    Offi- 

ofa  municipal  corporation  are  de  cued  to  have  accepted  their 
e  with  know]  ,  and  with  reference  1",  the  provisions  of 

charter  or  incorporating  statute  relating  to  the  services  which 
they  may  be  called  upon  to  render,  and  the  compensation  provided 
therefor.     Aside  from  these,  or  some  proper  by-law,  then.'  is  no  im- 
.  'sumpsit  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  with  respect  to  the 
of  its  officers.     In  the  absence  of  express  contract,  t! 
rmine  and  regulate  the  right  of  recovery,  and  the  amount.2     If 
charter  or  by-laws  provide  for  a  peculiar  mode  of  compensation, 
for  example,  to  a  city  surveyor  for  superintending  grading  of 
streets,  by  an  assessment  upon  the  property  owners,  the  city  is  not 
liable  before  it  collects  the  money,  if  it  makes  the  requisite  assess- 
ments, and  is  proceeding  with  proper  diligence  to  enforce  them.3 


1  Sikes  v.   Hatfield,   13  Gray  (Mass.), 
347   (1859);    Barton   ».  New  Orleans,  16 
d    31 7  ;  « rarnier  v.  St.  Louis,  :$7  Mo. 
.    Rowe  v.  County  of  Kern,  72  CaL 
.  Whit  v.  Levant,  78  Me.  568  ;  Perry 
r  i  beboygan,  55  Mich.  ii .".  i  >  ;  Haswell  v. 
N'.'W  Ydk,  81  N.  V.  255.     It  is  advisable 
that  salaries  should  be  fixed  by  ordinance, 
and  ii"i    voted  as  a  matter  of  grace  and 
-  oith  o.  Commonwealth,  41    Pa, 
D  '••  w    York,  39  Barb. 

Y.)   L69  ;  Bladen  v.  Philadelphia,  60 
164.     See  opinion  of  Thompson, 
C.   •'..   Philadelphia    o.    Given,    lb.    136. 
jipal  corporations  are  not  liable  for 
performed    by    an    officer    under 
tatute.     Meagher  v. 
•v,  5  Nev.  244  I  .  Bee.  910; 

i  ["Central       -       ,2  Col.  588  (1875). 

The  fii  <1   sentenci    of  this  section  of  the 
pplied  in  Bosworth  o.  New 
6  La.  .in.   194,  495  (1874).     An 
I  without    sufficient    i 
and  another  appointed  in  his  place  cannot 
ry   subsequently   accruing 
until  there  lias  been  an  adjudication  in  a 
ling  declaring  him  entitled 
id  t!i  it  the  incumbent  was  a 
-  [by    .  Portland,  1  I  '  Ireg   2  i3. 
Where,   at  the  time  an  officer  is  elected, 
nol   been   fixed,   an  ordi- 
b  'in   fixing  liis 
■  iolai  ion  ol   I 
!i   upon   i  nlarging  or  di- 


minishing the  salary  of  an  officer  during 
Ids  term  of  office.  State,  ex  rel.  v.  Mel  tow- 
ell,  19  Neb.  442;  Wheelock  v.  McDowell, 
20  Neb.  160.  See  also  Purcell  v.  Parks, 
82  111.  346  ;  Rucker  v.  Supervisors,  7  W. 
\'a.  661.  If  the  Legislature  shortens  an 
officer's  term  of  office  he  cannot  recover 
his  salary  for  his  unexpired  term.  Long 
,:  New  York,  81  N.  Y.  425.  A  dc  facto 
v  cannot  recover  the  salary  annexed 
to  the  office  ;  the  salary  is  an  incident  to 
the  office  and  not  to  its  occupation.  Burke 
v.  Edgar,  67  Cal.  182  ;  Meehan  v.  Hud- 
son, 46  N.  J.  L.  (17  Vroom)  276.  Fur- 
ther  as  to  de  facto  officers,  see  ante,  sees. 
215  n.,  221  n.,  230  n.,  235  n.,  237  n., 
256  and  note. 

I.  ke  r.  Central  City,  4  Col.  65.  A 
public  officer  is  not  entitled  to  payment 
for  duties  imposed  uiion  him  by  statute  in 
the  absence  of  an  express  provision  for 
such  payment.  Jones  v.  Carmarthen,  8 
M  ■'.  W.  605  ;  Askin  v.  London,  1  Upper 
('an.  Q.  B.  292  ;  Pringle  and  McDonald, 
In  re,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  254;  Begins 
v.  Cumberlege,  36  L.  T.  n.  s.  700;  Brazil 
v.  McBride,  69  Ind.  244  ;  Doolan  ».  Mani- 
towoc,  18  Wis.  312  ;  supra,  sec.  216. 

8  Baker  v.  City  of  Utica,  19  N.  Y.  326; 
People  v.  Supervisors,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  362; 
Cumming  v.  Mayor,  kc.  of  Brooklyn,  11 
Paige,  596;  Jersey  City  v.  Qnaife,  2 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  63;  Andrews  v.  United 
States,  2  Story  C.  C.  203  ;  United  States 


§231 


CHANGE   OF   COMPENSATION. 


313 


§  231  (170).  Power  to  abolish  Office,  and  to  regulate  and  to 
change  Salary.  —  A  municipal  corporation  may,  unless  restrained 
by  charter,  abolish  an  office  created  by  ordinance;  and  may  also,  un- 
less the  employment  is  in  the  nature  of  a  contract,  reduce  or  other- 
wise regulate  the  salaries  and  fees  of  its  officers,  according  to  its  view 
of  expediency  and  right.  Although  an  officer  may  be  elected  or  ap- 
pointed for  a  fixed  period,  yet  where  he  is  not  bound,  and  cannot 
be  compelled  to  serve  for  the  whole  time,  such  election  or  appoint- 
ment cannot  be  considered  a  contract  to  hire  for  a  stipulated  term. 
Ordinances  fixing  salaries  are  not  in  the  nature  of  contracts  with 
officers.1 


v.  Brown,  9  How.  487;  Barton  v.  New 
Orleans,  16  La.  An.  317  ;  McClung  v.  St. 
Paul,  14  Minn.  420  (1869);  Smith  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 41  Pa.  St.  335.  "It  is  very 
plain  to  us  that  a  town  officer,  as  such, 
has  no  legal  claim  against  the  town  to  re- 
cover pay  for  services  rendered,  unless  by 
an  express  vote  of  the  town,  or  a  uniform 
usage  to  pay  that  particular  officer  from 
year  to  year,  for  his  services.  And  in  the 
latter  case,  it  would  be  very  questionable 
whether  a  recovery  at  law  could  be  had, 
if  it  had  all  along  been  left  to  the  town  to 
make  such  compensation  as  they  should 
deem  reasonable  after  the  services  had 
been  rendered.  .  .  .  The  same  principle 
has  always  been  recognized  in  this  State 
in  regard  to  all  officers.  If  no  law  of  the 
State  fixed  their  fees  or  pay,  their  services 
must  be  gratuitous."  Per  Reclficld,  J., 
Boyden  v.  Brookline,  8  Vt.  284  (1836). 
But  the  decision  (in  Boyden  v.  Brookline, 
8  Vt.  284)  does  not  extend  strictly  be- 
yond official  services  ;  and  when  a  town 
agent,  acting  for  the  town,  or  the  town  it- 
self, employs  an  attorney  at  law  to  prose- 
cute or  defend  suits  against  the  town,  the 
latter  is  liable  for  the  services.  And  the 
rule  is  the  same  if  the  "  town  agent,"  be- 
ing an  attorney,  renders  for  the  town 
professional  services,  in  suits  which  the 
proper  authorities  of  the  town  directed  to 
be  instituted.  Langdon  v.  Castleton,  30 
Vt.  285  (1858);  City  of  Central  v.  Sears, 
2  Col.  588  ;  Locke  v.  Central  City,  4  Col. 
65.  A  provision  that  a  city  marshal  shall 
have  the  same  duties,  responsibilities,  and 
fees  as  sheriffs  does  not  import  that  he 
may  recover  from  the  county  in  which  the 
city  is  located  for  services  rendered  in  the 


administration  of  tho  criminal  law.  Christ 
v.  Polk  County,  48  Iowa,  302.  A  muni- 
cipal officer  is  presumed  to  know  the  city 
ordinances  and  orders  which  fix  his  salary, 
and  his  acceptance  of  the  amount  so  fixed 
will  estop  him  from  claiming  more.  Gal- 
breath  v.  Moberly,  80  Mo.  484  ;  Rau  v. 
Little  Bock,  34  Ark.  303.  As  to  estoppel 
by  acceptance  see  also  Hobbs  v.  Yonkers, 
102  N.  Y.  13  ;  Mclnery  v.  Galveston,  58 
Tex.  334. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Bacon,  6  Serg.  & 
Rawle  (Pa.),  322  (1820);  followed,  Baker 
v.  Pittsburgh,  4  Pa.  St.  49  (1846)  (abol- 
ishing annual  salary  of  collector  of  tolls); 
also,  approved,  University  v.  Walden,  15 
Ala.  655  (1849);  but  distinguished,  Carr 
v.  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  190  ;  Comw.  v.  Mann, 
5  W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  418  ;  Smith  v.  County,  2 
Par.  (Pa.)  293  ;  Madison  v.  Kelso,  32  Ind. 
79  ;  Warner  v.  People,  2  Denio  (N.  Y. ), 
272  ;  Conner  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  285,  296;  Augusta  v. 
Sweeny,  44  Ga.  463  ;  Brazil  v.  MeBiide, 
69  Ind.  244;  Des  Moines  v.  Hillis,  55 
Iowa,  643  ;  Marden  v.  Portsmouth,  59 
N.  H.  18.  Under  special  circumstances, 
—  Held,  that  the  salary  of  a  city  officer 
could  be  diminished  by  the  council.  Cox 
v.  Burlington,  43  Iowa,  612  (1876).  A 
legislature  may  authorize  the  reduction  of 
the  salary  of  a  city  officer  during  his  term. 
Love  v.  Jersey  City,  40  N.  J.  L.  456.  A 
statutory  provision  that  "  the  compensa- 
tion or  salary  of  any  officer  shall  be  fixed 
before  his  appointment "  does  not  require 
that  it  be  fixed  before  every  new  appoint- 
ment ;  it  is  sufficiently  complied  with 
when  the  salary  is  once  fixed.  People  v. 
Crissey,  91  N.  Y.  616.     A  statute  or  city 


1 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§23:2 


171).     Same   subject.    Exception   to  Rule   resting  on  Con- 
tract.—  But  where  the  services  to  be  performed  arc  professional  or 
rather  than  public  or  official,  an  employment  under  an  ordi- 
ice  for  a  fixed  time,  at  a  fixed  .sum  for  the  period,  has   been  held 
to  1  ■  met,  ami  not  subject  to  be  impaired  by  the  corporation. 

Thus  tin-  appointment  or  election  by  a  city  council,  for  ay/"-/  «//,/ 
period,  of  a  city  otlicer,  —  for  example,  a  city  engineer,  ion 
: ,  at  the  late  of  one  thousand  dollars  per  year,  —  if  accept*  d 
by  him,  constitutes,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts, a  contract  between  him  and  the  city;  and  the  city,  iu 
such  a  case,  has  no  authority,  unless  expressly  conferred,  to  abolish  or 
shorten  the  term  of  office,  so  as  to  deprive  the  officer,  without  his 
consent,  of  the  right  to  compensation  for  the  full  period,  unless  for 
misbehavior  or  unfitness  to  discharge  the  duties  of  the  place.1 


ordinance  fixing  the  amount  of  the  salary 
ity  officer  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a 
contract.  Love  v.  Jersey  City,  40  N.  .1.  L. 
h  officer,  by  continuing  in  offii  e 
ami  receiving  warrants  for  incut  lily  pay- 
menl  lary  during  the  term,  waives 

all  objections  t"  the  reduction.  !>•■  In 
an  action  against  a  city  treasurer,  on  his 
!  bond,  for  moneys  received  by  him, 
he  'iin ii. it  charge  commissions  for  the 
whole  term  at  the  rate-  allowed  by  law  at 
his  acre--.  .  when  his  compensa- 

tion has  \-  d  to  a  lower  rate  sub- 

sequently. Iowa  City  v.  Foster,  10  Iowa, 
189.  Where  a  police  judge  agreed  to 
accept  the  compensation  fixed  by  the  city 
council  in  payment  of  his  services,  if  the 
council  would  by  a  change  of  ordinance 

id mpensation  for  the  clerk  of  the 

court,  —  Held,  that  the  agreement  was 
i  on  a  valid  consideration  ;  but  thai 
in  cases  where  judgment  was  rendered 
againsl  the  city  before  such  change,  no 
I  be  recovered.  Crane  v.  Des 
Moines,  17  [owa,  1"."':  supra,  sec.  212. 
!  I  ommonwealth  o.  Bacon,  supra,  it  was 
held  thai  an  ordinance  which  reduced  the 

ry  of  the  mayor  after  the  commi 
ment  of  his  term  was  valid.      The  court 
Baid,  "  This  cannol    be  considered  in  the 
natii-  iring  fur  a  year,  becau 

•  •!  v  on  the  mayor  to  sei  \  b 

■  be  yi  ar."     Though  an  ordinance  may 

fix  term  and  compensation  of  officer,  th* 

ed,  if  its  abolition  be 

dary  reduced.      There 


is  no   contract  between   corporation   and 

that  the  service  shall  continue,  or 

the  salary  not  be  changed.      Waldraven 

v.  Memphis,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  431  (1867); 

II  ken  v.   Gear,   3   Dutch.  (N.J.)  265 

(1859).  The  power  to  abolish  municipal 
offices  was  reaffirmed,  citing  text,  in 
Butcher  v.  Camden  (fire  marshal  of  city), 
29  N.  .1.  Eq.  (2  Stew.)  478  (1878).  Gen- 
eral power  tu  a  corporation  to  fix  the  com- 
pensation of  its  officers  does  not  authorize 
it  to  take  away  the  fees  of  an  officer,  which 
are  spccifi 'mil y  fixed  by  the  same  ch 
Carr  v.  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  190  (1845).  The 
legislature  may  provide  thai  tie- salary  of 
an  officer  may  be  fixed  by  one  board,  e.  g., 
a  common  council,  though  it  is  payable 
by  another,  e.  g.,  a  county,  or  board  of 
supervisors  ;  and  in  thai  ease,  the  latter 
have  no  authority  to  change  it  when  on<  e 
fixed.  People  v.  Auditors  of  Wayne,  13 
Mich.  233;  People  v.  Wayne  Co.  Audi- 
tors, 41  Mich.  4.  Where  by  the  general 
law  the  compensation  of  the  mayor,  which 
was  specified,  could  be  changed  by  ordi- 
nance "but  not  during  his  term  oj 
an  ordinance  providing  that  "after  the 
expiration  of  the  term  of  the  present  mayor 
of  the  city,  the  mayor  shall  serve  without 
compensation  "  was  held  to  be  uUra  vires 
and  void,  on  the  ground  that  a  power  to 
change  the  salary  was  nol  a  power  to  abol- 
ish it  altogether.  State,  ex  rel.  v.  Nash- 
ville, 15  Lea  (Tenn.),  697. 

1  Chase  u.  Lowell,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  33 
(1856)  ;    aud   see   Caverley   v.   Lowell,    1 


233 


EXTRA    COMPENSATION. 


315 


§  233  (172).  Extra  Compensation.  —  It  is  a  well-settled  rule 
that  a  person  accepting  a  public  office,  with  a  fixed  salary,  is  bound 
to  perform  the  duties  of  the  office  for  the  salary.  He  cannot  legally 
claim  additional  compensation  for  the  discharge  of  these  duties,  even 
though  the  salary  may  be  a  very  inadequate  remuneration  for  the 
services.  Nor  does  it  alter  the  case  that  by  subsequent  statutes  or 
ordinances  his  duties  within  the  scope  of  the  charter  poivers  pertain- 
ing to  the  office  are  increased  and  not  his  salary.1  Whenever  he 
considers  the  compensation  inadequate,  he  is  at  liberty  to  resign. 
The  rule  is  of  importance  to  the  public.  To  allow  changes  and 
additions  in  the  duties  properly  belonging  or  which  may  properly  be 
attached  to  an  office  to  lay  the  foundation  for  extra  compensation, 
would  introduce  intolerable  mischief.  The  rule,  too,  should  be 
rigidly  enforced.  The  statutes  of  the  legislature  and  the  ordinances 
of  our  municipal  corporations  seldom  prescribe  with  much  detail 
and  particularity  the  duties  annexed  to  public  offices ;  and  it  re- 
quires but  little  ingenuity  to  run  nice  distinctions  between  what 
duties  may  and  what  may  not,  be  considered  strictly  official ;  and  if 
these  distinctions  are  much  favored  by  courts  of  justice,  it  may  lead 
to  great  abuse.2 


Allen  (Mass.),  289  (1861),  as  to  ordinance 
constituting  a  contract  with  city  attorney. 
These  cases,  if  really  distinguishable  from 
the  others,  should  not,  it  is  believed,  be 
extended,  but  the  principle  limited  to  in- 
stances where  the  services  are  not  essen- 
tially official  in  their  nature,  and  where  the 
officer  or  other  party  is  bound  to  serve 
for  the  fixed  and  definite  period.  Ap- 
pointment of  police  officer  for  a  year, 
held  not  to  create  a  contract,  and  he  was 
removable,  without  cause,  within  that 
period.  Chicago  v.  Edwards,  58  111.  252 
(1871). 

A  resolution  of  the  council  empower- 
ing an  individual  to  collect  the  taxes  due 
the  city,  at  a  given  rate  per  cent  on  the 
amount  collected  for  his  compensation, 
may  be  repealed  or  modified  at  any  time 
by  the  corporation,  on  the  sole  condition 
that  it  shall  be  liable  for  any  compensa- 
tion earned  under  the  resolution  previous 
to  its  repeal  or  modification.  Hiestand  v. 
New  Orleans,  14  La.  An.  330  (1859).  The 
court  did  not  regard  the  resolution  as 
creating  a  contract,  or,  if  so,  it  was  one  of 
mandate,  revocable  at  the  will  of  the 
principal.     lb. 


1  Ante,  sec.  216.  Though  the  duties  of 
a  municipal  officer  may  be  increased  by  a 
city  council,  it  has  no  power  to  confer 
upon  another  officer  the  duties,  powers, 
and  rights  appertaining  to  his  office  by 
statute.  So,  a  treasurer  duly  appointed 
and  qualified,  whose  duty  it  was  by  law 
to  receive  and  pay  out  the  money  belong- 
ing to  a  city,  was  held  to  be  entitled  to 
commissions  upon  the  proceeds  of  bonds 
sold  by  the  mayor  under  authority  of  the 
council.     Beard  v.  Decatur,  64  Tex.  7. 

2  Per  Potts,  J.,  in  Court  of  Errors  and 
Appeals,  Evans  v.  Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (24 
N.  J.  L.)  766  (1853);  ante,  sec.  216.  The 
text  cited  and  approved  in  Decatur  v. 
Vermillion,  77  111.  315  (1875).  See,  also, 
Andrews  v.  United  States,  2  Story  C.  C. 
202  ;  Palmer  v.  The  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York,  2  Sandford  (N.  Y.)  318  ;  Bussier  v. 
Pray,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.)  447  ;  Angell 
&  Ames  on  Corp.  sec.  317  ;  Gil  more  v. 
Lewis,  12  Ohio,  281  ;  Detroit  v.  Redfield, 
19  Mich.  376  ;  Sidway  v.  South  Park  Com- 
missioners, 120  111.  496.  A  salaried  offi- 
cer cannot  sue  the  city  for  a  balance  of 
salary  due  unless  there  has  been  some  de- 
fault on  the  part  of  the  city  in  making  thl 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§234 


Same   subject. —  Not   only    has    an   officer,  under 

i  circum  no  1      1  claim  for  extra  compensation,  bul  a 

him  an  i  or  sum   beyond  that  fixed  bylaw 

.  •         '.,  he  renders  services  and  exercises  a  degree  of 

than  could  legally  have  been  required  of  him.3 


appropriations.      Waterman   '•. 

,\       \      ..  7   Daly  (N.  V.).  489.     It  has 

.   i  •  that  where  an 

injpi  nsation  is  fix*  d  by  stalutt  he 

i  it  recover  extra  compensation  for  ex- 

.   in  performing  his  duties, 

custom  bad  bei  d  for  a  long 

time   thai    the    corporation   should    bear 

them.    Albrighl  v.  County  of  Bedford,  106 

Pa.  8t. 

A  d  officer  of  a  p  iblic  coi  pora- 

l  i  >  >ii  has  no  claim  for  compensation  extra 
his  salary,  on  the  ground  that  the  duties 
of  his  office  have  been  increased,  or  new 
duties  added  since  the  salary  was  fixed. 
I  v.   Supervisors,    1    Hill    (N.    Y. ), 

Wendell  u.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb.  (N. 
Y  )   204  ;   Palmer  r.  Mayor,   &c.    of   New 
York,   •-'  Sandf.   (N.   Y.)  318;   ante,  sec. 
I  'i     r.    Mayberry,     9   Bush 

(Ky.).  804  :  Andrews  v.  Pratt  (compensa- 
tion for  sale  of  county's  railroad  stock),  44 
I  (1872).     Special  instances,  where 

a  claim  for  compensation,  in  the  absence 
press  provision,  has  hen  sustained, 
where  the  law  has  required  a  public  officer 
to  perform  a  duty,  attended  with  trouble 
and  expense,  clearly  outside  of  his  regnlar 
official  duties,  sir    People  v.  Supervisors, 
12  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  257  ;  Brighl  v.  Super- 
visors, 18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  242;  Mallory  v. 
Supervi8oi  .  5   Co     a  (N.  Y.),  531  ;  lh. 
■.    Redfield,  19  Mich.   376 
(I-'-,:');  McBride  v.  Detroit,  17  Midi.  236; 
i'.'  Mi  b.  2:1:1.     If  a  countj  attorney 
beyond  the  limits  of  his  comity,  at 
tic-  instance  ami  with  tic-  consent  of  the 
entity  board,  he  may  recover  reasonable 
compensation  in   addition   to   his   salary. 
Huffman  v.  Greenwood  Co.,  2:;  Kan.  281  ; 

B  N        ho  Co.,  l.">   Kan.   17>  ;  Leav- 

enworth   Co.    o.    Brewer,    9    Kan.    307. 
This  subject  i-  discussed  in  White  v.  I'olk 
Co.,  17  Iowa,  113  :  /<"■•/,  sec.    17'.'. 
Where  salary  is  fixed  by  ordina 

changed  by  a  committee  or  in- 
di vidua!  members  of  the  corporation  ;  nor 
*ill  their  promise  to  pay  extra  compensa- 


tion for  the  duties  of  the  office  he  landing 
on  the  corporation.  Bu1  i"i  services  per- 
formed by  request,  not  part  of  the  duties 
of  his  other,  and  which  could  as  a]  pro]  ri- 
ately  have  been  performed  by  any  other 
•i,  smh  officer  may,  in  proper  cases, 
recover  a  ju  i  remuneration.  Evans  v. 
Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  .1.  I..)  764  (181 
s.  p.  Detroit  v.  Redfield,  19  Mich.  376 
(1869);  Converse  v.  Gmted  States,  21 
How.  463.  For  services  required  by 
ordinances,  the  city  attorney  is  entitled 
to  the  compensation  fixed  by  ordinance, 
and  no  other  ;  and  the  mayor,  by  vir- 
tue of  his  duty  to  see  that  the  "  or- 
dinances are  duly  enforced,"  cannot  hind 
the  corporation  to  pay  more  than  the 
fixed  salary  or  compensation,  and  this 
duty  does  not  authorize  that  officer  to 
employ  assistant  or  independent  counsel 
in  any  case,  at  the  expense  of  the  corpo- 
ration. Carroll  v.  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  44 
(1849);  Memphis  r.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289, 
321  (1873);  post,  sec.  479.  Further,  as  to 
liability  of  city  to  attorneys,  see  the  chap- 
ter on  Contracts. 

1  Ileslep  v.  Sacramento,  2  Cal.  580 
(vote  of  $10,000  to  mayor  for  meritorious 
services,  held  void);  Hatch  v.  Mann,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  44  ;  reversing,  s.  c.  9  lb. 
262  ;  approved ,  Palmer  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  318;  Ba- 
tho  v.  Salter,  Latch,  54  ;  W.  Jones,  65  ; 
s.  c.  Lane  v.  Sewell,  1  Chitty,  175  ;  lb. 
295  ;  Moii  i  v.  Burdett,  1  Camp.  218  ;  3 
lb.  374;  Callaghan  v.  Hallett,  1  Caines 
(N.  Y.),  104  ;  8.  0.  Col.  &  C.  Cas.  179  ; 
Preston  v.  Bacon,  4  Conn.  471  ;  Shattuck 
v.  Woods,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  175  ;  Bussier 
r.  Pray,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  447  ;  Car- 
roll v.  Tyler,  2  Har.  &  GUI,  54  ;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  l  Bailey  (S.  <'.),  711  ;  Debolt  v. 
Cincinnati,  7  Ohio  St.  237  ;  Pilie  v.  New- 
Orleans,  19  La.  An.  274.  Payments  re- 
ceived by  one,  knowing  the  agent  to  be 
unauthorized  to  make  them,  may  be  re- 
covered by  the  principal  as  money  wrong- 
fully had   and    received.     The  people  are 


§235 


OFFICERS     SALARIES. 


317 


§  235  (174).  Liability  of  Corporation  to  the  Officer;  Right  of 
Officer  to  Salary.  —  Where  an  officer  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
ejected  by  the  people  for  a  specified  term,  is  improperly  removed  by 
the  city  council,  he  may  sue  the  corporation  for  his  salary  and  per- 
quisites for  the  time  intervening  between  his  removal  and  the 
expiration  of  his  term.1  It  is  a  defence  to  the  corporation  that  the 
officer  was  legally  removed  ;  but  if  he  was  removed  contrary  to  law, 
it  is  no  answer  to  the  action  that  the  corporation,  in  making  the 
removal,  acted  judicially,  and  therefore  is  not  liable  for  the  error 
it  committed.2 


not  bound  by  acts  of  a  township  commit- 
tee, ultra  vires,  sanctioning  unlawful  pay- 
ments to  a  collector.  Demarest  v.  New 
Barbadoes,  40  N.  J.  L.  604.  The  princi- 
ple in  the  text  operates  to  deprive  a  pub- 
lic officer,'  or  an  officer  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, of  a  claim  for  a  reward  offered  for 
a  service  which  is  embraced  in  his  official 
or  legal  duties.  Gilmore  v.  Lewis,  12 
Ohio,  281,  where  a  constable  who  arrested 
a  thief  was  held  not  entitled  to  a  reward 
offered  by  the  defendant ;  s.  P.  Pool  v. 
Boston,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  219;  the  doc- 
trine of  the  text  approved.  Decatur  v. 
Vermillion,  77  111.  315  ;  Matter  of  Russel, 
51  Conn.  577.  Where  a.  fireman  employed 
as  such  by  a  city  brought  suit  for  a  reward 
offered  by  a  husband  for  the  rescue  of  the 
dead  body  of  his  wife  from  a  burning 
building,  it  was  held  that,  as  it  was  not 
his  duty  to  rescue  a  person  from  a  burning 
building  at  the  imminent  peril  of  his  oivn 
life,  the  rescue  could  not  be  said  to  be  in 
the  line  of  his  duty  so  as  to  preclude  him 
from  claiming  the  reward.  Reiffl.  Paige, 
55  Wis.  496.  Where  a  person  before  be- 
ing appointed  city  treasurer  agreed  in 
writing  to  repay  to  the  city  all  fees,  &c,  in 
excess  of  $2,000,  and  the  council  failed  to 
fix  his  compensation,  it  was  held  ■  that, 
while  the  agreement  was  invalid,  he  was 
estopped,  by  having  rendered  and  settled 
his  accounts,  from  claiming  more  than  the 
$2,000.  Hobbs  v.  Yonkers,  102  N.  Y. 
13.  A  promise  by  a  candidate  to  serve 
without  compensation  will  not  estop  him 
from  claiming  his  salary.  State,  ex  rel. 
v.  Nashville,  15  Lea,  697.  See  ante,  chap, 
vi.  sec.  139. 

i  Stadler    v.    Detroit,     13    Mich.    346 
(1865);  Shaw  v.  Mayor,  &c,  19  Ga.  468 


(1856).  The  court,  in  considering  the  rule 
of  damages  in  such  a  case,  holds  that  the 
officer  cannot  recover  of  the  corporation 
counsel  fees  for  defending  himself  against 
the  charges  preferred  against  him,  but 
may  recover  such  "damages  as  necessa- 
rily resulted  from  his  amotion  from  office, 
viz.,  his  salary  and  perquisites."  19  Ga. 
468,  supra.  But  the  corporation,  it  is 
suggested,  may  recoup  the  same  as  indi- 
viduals who  improperly  dismiss  servants 
employed  for  a  determinate  period.  2 
Greenl.  Ev.  sec.  261  a.  But  see  United 
States  v.  Addison,  6  Wall.  291  ;  Hoke  v. 
Henderson,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  1.  That  the 
corporation  cannot  thus  reduce  the  amount 
of  recovery,  see  cases  cited  in  the  notes  to 
this  section.  An  action  against  a  city  to 
recover  salary  cannot  be  maintained,  while 
the  office  is  occupied  by  a  de  facto  officer,  or 
until  the  right  to  the  office  has  been  adju- 
dicated. Selby  v.  Portland,  14  Oreg.  243; 
supra,  sec.  230,  note ;  post,  sec.  276. 

2  Shaw  v.  Mayor,  &c,  19  Ga.  468 
(1856);  Shaw  v.  Mayor,  &c,  21  Ga.  280  ; 
see  s.  c.  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Shaw's  Adminis- 
trator, 25  Ga.  590.  In  the  case  last  cited 
it  was  decided  that  if  the  removal  of  a 
city  officer  be  for  a  specified  cause,  not 
warranting  the  removal,  and  the  officer 
sue  the  corporation  for  his  salary,  as  a 
defence  to  such  action  it  may  aver  and 
prove  other  matters,  good  in  law,  to  jus- 
tify such  removal.  In  thus  holding,  the 
court  say  ;  "If  his  term  of  office  had  not 
expired  when  this  suit  was  instituted,  and 
he  had  moved  for  a  mandamus  to  restore 
him,  instead  of  bringing  an  action  for  his 
salary,  the  court  would  not  have  inter- 
fered, if  £ood  cause  for  his  removal  could 
have  been  shown,  although  he  may  havo 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  236 


Liability    of   the    Officer    to    the    Corporation    and    to 

distiu  [uished    from   corporate   officers). 


i    without    notice.      Rex    c 
■  owp.    523  ;  The   King  v. 
.  ..  2  Term  B.    L82."      pet 
.    .1.  ;    25    I  592.      See 

11  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  2 

Ahlermen  held  not   to  be  individually  lia- 
ble for  passing  an  unauthorized  ordinance 
depriving  a  mayor  of  his  office.     Jon 
L  >ring,   55   Mi  ,  sec.    237, 

note.     An    incumbent    was  appointed  by 
the  aldermen  aud  removed  by  the  mayor, 
nominated  a  successor  ;  the  incum- 
iiy  did  not  cease  until  his  suc- 
!■  «as  confirmed.     White  v.  Mayor, 
&  .   ol    Nevt    York,   4   E.   D.   Smith,  563 
v   i"  rs  m  is  no1  entitled  to  the 
salary  of  a  pub]  inless  he  both  ob- 

yes   Hi,'  office.     Farrell  v. 
B  rt,    15  Conn.   191.     Thus,  a  city 

treasurer,  being  indicted  for  forgery,   the 
mayor  ami  council  elected  another  in  his 
i  fur  the  balance  of  his  term.     Upon 
liis  acquittal,  —  Held,  thai  he  could  not  re- 
t  he  salary  for  such  balance  of  his 
term.     It'  the  prosecution  was  malicious, 
he  could   recover  in  tort   from  the  wrong- 
Brunswick   r.    Falun,    fin  ( Ja.   109. 
.  who  has  been  found  guilty 
ol  immoral  conduct  and  discharged  from 

his  o nice   by  a  board  of  polici mmis- 

Bioners    having    jurisdiction,    cannol    re- 
cover  from    the   city   his    salarj    for  the 
his  term.     It  makes  no  dif- 
ference that  the  commissioners  may  have 
;  idgmenl  on  the  evidence, 
no  appeal  having  been  taken.     Qui 
Atl  ..it  ■,    59   Ga.    318.     By   charter,    the 
er  to  appoinl  policemen  was  conferred 
mi   a    board   of  police,    composed    of  the 
mayor  and  recorders,  and  this  board  was 
authorized    to    discharge    policemen,    for 
cause,  and  to  "  decide  on  all  police  mat- 
ining  to  appointments,   dismis- 
'  /  ,/,,,/  without  appeal."    1  n 
iction  for  wages,  broughl  against  the 
city  by  a  policeman,  who  claimed  that  he 
had  been  appointed  for  a  year,   and  dis- 
missed at   the  end  of  a   month,   without 
i:..    Supreme  Courl    decided 
thi  board  having  dismissed  the  plain- 
tiff for  what  it  deemed  sufficient  i  iu  e,  its 
ion  was  I'm  il,  and  the  sufficiency  of 


the  cause  of  dismissal  was  not  inquirable 
into  in  the  action.  N  ilan  v.  New  Or- 
leans, l»i  La.  An.  106  (1855).  Ante,  see. 
2  i0. 

I  '■  i  lai  ing  ..n  office  and  the  prospective 

l I  thi  offici  r  nol   to  be  propertj ,  and 

that  the  right  to  fees  grows  out  of  sen 

nhil.  it  was  decided  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals  that  a  municipal  officer  who  had 
bei  □  kept  out  of  his  office,  and  had  not 
performed  its  duties,  could  not  maintain 
an  action  against  the  city  to  recover  the 
amount  of  fees  accruing  from  the  office. 
Smith  v.  New  York,  37  N.  Y.  518  (1868); 
Saline  Co.  v.  Anderson,  2u  Kan.  298  ;  Do- 
lau  v.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  279  ;  Badley  v. 
Mayor,  33  N.  Y.  603,  607,  per  Denio, 
C.  J.  In  a  later  New  York  case  the  courl 
reviewed  the  previous  decisions,  and  held 
that  the  payment  of  the  fees  or  salary 
provided  by  law,  to  an  officer  de  facto  for 
services  rendered  before  a  judgment  of 
ouster,  will  protect  a  municipality  against 
the  claim  of  the  oil  ice  r  i/rjun  for  the  same 
compensation;  hut  after  the  judgment, 
the  compensation  for  services  rendered, 
which  has  not  been  paid,  may  he  recovered 
by  the  officer  de  jure.  McVeany  v.  New 
York,  80  N.  Y.  185  ;  Steubenville  v. 
Culp,  38  Ohio  St.  18.  See  Benoit  v. 
Wayne  County,  20  .Mich.  17*'),  Cooley,  J., 
dissenting.  It  has,  however,  several  tines 
been  decided  in  California  that  the  salary 
annexed  to  a  public  olliee  i-  iiiriilnit  to  the 
title  to  the  office,  and  not  to  its  occupancy 
and  exercise,  and  that  the  right  to  com- 
pensation is  not  affecb  d  h\  i  he  fad  that 
an  usurper,  officer  de  facto,  has  discharged 
the  duties  of  the  olliee.  Dorsey  v.  Smith, 
28  Cal.  21  ;  Stratton  v.  Oultou,  lb.  44  ; 
Carroll  v. Siebenthaler,  37  Cal.  193  (1869); 
approved,  Meaglnr  V.  County,  5  Nev.  244 
(1869);  where  a  city  physician,  who  was 
duly  elected,  bu1  kept  oul  of  his  oilier  by 
the  prior  incumbent,  who  drew  the  salary 
foi  -'Mm'  months,  was  permitted  to  collect 
his  hack  salary  from  the  city.  Memphis 
V.  Woodward,  12  lleisk.  499.  A  u 
unlawfully  deprived  of  his  office  may  main- 
tain an  action  against  tlve  intfudcr  for 
damages;  in  such  case  the  measure  of 
damages  is  generally  the  salary  or  fees  re- 


§23G 


LIABILITY    OF    THE    OFFICER. 


319 


elected  pursuant  to  statute  by  a  municipal  corporation,  arc  not  the 
servants  or  agents  of  the  corporation  in  such  a  sense  as  will  enables 
the  corporation,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  giving  the  remedy,  to 


ceived  by  the  intruder.  Nichols  v.  Mc- 
Lean, 101  N.  Y.  526  ;  People  v.  Nolan, 
102  N.  Y.  539.  "  The  salary  follows  the 
legal  title."  Libbey,  J.,  in  Andrews  v. 
Portland,  79  Me.  484  (holding  also  that 
in  an  action  by  an  officer  de  jure  for  his 
salary  during  the  time  of  his  unlawful  re- 
moval from  office,  the  city  is  not  entitled 
to  have  deducted  from  the  sum  due  the 
amount  earned  by  him  in  other  ways  dur- 
ing that  time.  To  same  effect  is  Fitzsim- 
mons  v.  Brooklyn,  102  N.  Y.  536).  See, 
further,  ante,  sees.  215,  note  ;  230,  note; 
People  v.  Miller,  24  Mich.  458  (1872); 
Benoit  v.  Wayne  County,  supra  ;  Phila- 
delphia v.  Given,  60  Pa,  St.  136,  per 
Thompson,  C.  J.  Right  of  municipal  offi- 
cer to  retain  his  salary  in  his  own  hands, 
denied,  where  it  was  his  duty  to  pay  all 
sums  received  into  the  treasury.  New 
Orleans  v.  Finnerty,  27  La.  An.  681 
(1875);  S.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  569,  referred  to 
infra,  note. 

The  legal  incumbent  of  a  municipal 
office  rendering  service  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation until  he  has  actual  notice  of 
his  removal.  Jarvis  v.  Mayor,  &o.  of  New 
York,  2  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  396.  Equity  will 
not  ordinarily  enjoin  the  payment  of  the 
salary  to  the  incumbent  pending  a  contest; 
the  bill  must  show  grounds  for  equitable 
relief.  Colton  v.  Price,  50  Ala.  424 
(1874);  Bruner  v.  Prynn  (against  inter- 
loper), 50  Ala.  523  (1874);  Field  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 32  Pa.  St.  478  (1849);  Ram- 
shay,  In  re,  83  Eng.  C.  L.  174  (1852); 
Hennen,  In  re,  13  Pet.  230;  Queen  v. 
Governors,  &c,  8  Ad.  &  El.  632  ;  Page  v. 
Hardin,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  648  ;  Bowerbank 
v.  Morris,  Wall.  C.  C.  R.  118.  In  The 
City  v.  Given,  60  Pa.  St.  136,  the  plain- 
tiff acted  as  city  commissioner  for  some 
months,  when  it  was  decided  that  he  had 
not  been  duly  elected,  and  in  a  suit 
brought  for  his  salary,  it  was  held  that  lie 
could  not  recover,  because  he  had  not 
qualified  by  giving  security.  See,  ante, 
sec.  214,  note.  In  an  action  by  the  right- 
ful officer  on  a  supersedeas  bond  given  in  a 
quo  warranto  proceeding  by  an  intruder, 


the  measure  of  damages  is  the  full  amount 
of  the  salary  (where  the  office  lias  a  fixed 
salary)  received  by  the  intruder  pending 
the  operation  of  the  supersedeas.     I  aited 

States  v.  Addison,  6  Wall.  291.  See  Peo- 
pie  v.  Miller,  24  Mich.  458  (1872). 

"it  is  a  grave:  question,"  says  Sey- 
mour, C.  J.,  "  whether  a  merely  de  i 
officer,  even  when  he  actually  performs 
the  whole  duties  of  the  office,  can  enforce 
the  payment  of  the  salary.  The  authori- 
ties seem  to  be  that  he  cannot.  State  v. 
<  'arrol,  38  Conn.  471 ;  Riddle  v.  Bedford 
County,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  386; 
Bentlytf.  Phelps,  27  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  524; 
People  v.  T.eman,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  193. 
However  this  may  be,  it  is  clear,  we  think, 
that  the  salary  of  an  officer  is  not  due  to 
parties  who  are  neither  officers  de  jure,  nor 
de  facto."  Samis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298 
(1873). 

Respecting  liability  of  an  intruder  to 
the  officer  de  jure  for  salary  and  fees  re- 
ceived, and  when  an  action  will  lie  for 
money  had  and  received,  Glascock  v.  Ly- 
ons, 20  Ind.  1;  Douglas  v.  State,  31  Ind. 
429;  Dorsey  v.  Smythe,  28  Cal.  21;  Strat- 
ton  v.  Oulton,  lb.  44;  City  v.  Given,  60 
Pa.  St.  136;  Allen  v.  McKean,  1  Sumn. 
276;  State  v.  Sherwood,  42  Mo.179;  Hun- 
ter v.  Chandler,  45  Mo.  452;  s.  C.  10 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (x.  s. )  440,  and  note; 
Boyter  v.  Dodsworth,  6  Term  R.  681; 
Sadler  v.  Evans,  4  Burr.  1984;  Peoples. 
Miller,  24  Mich.  458;  Nichols  v.  McLean, 
101  N.  Y.  526;  People  v.  Nolan,  102  N. 
Y.  539.  The  right  of  set-off  in  respect  of 
his  salary  was  denied  to  a  municipal  officer 
where  it  was  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  <! 
posit  all  moneys  received  in  the  treasury, 
and  when1  it  was  provided  his  salary  was 
to  be  paid  in  a  specific  manner.  The 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
raited  States,  allowing  equitable  set-off 
in  such  eases,  were  distinguished  New 
Orleans  v.  Finnerty,  27  La.  An.  681 
(1875);  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  569.  If  the 
city  is  liable  at  once  to  suit  by  the  officer, 
why  deny  the  right  of  set-off? 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  287 

mail  against  such  officers  for  negligence  in  the  discharge 

of  their  official  duty.     This  principle  does  cot,  it  is  believed,  apply 
where  the  corporation  is  injured  by  thi  ace  of  itsown  officers; 

but  even  in  such  case  the  recovery  in  the  absence  of  statute  can 
only  be  for  want  of  fidelity  and  integrity,  not  for  honest  mistakes.1 
T  protecl  the  public,  however,  officers  are  usually  required  to  give 
i  which  case  they  are  of  course  Liable,  as  we  have  seen,  ac- 
ling  to  the  conditions  thereof.2  They  are  also  liable  on  common- 
law  principles  to  individuals  who  sustain  special  damage  from  the 
failure  to  perform  imperative  and  ministerial  duties.3 

§237  (176).    Same  subject.  —  In  this  country  the  officers  of  mu- 
■ '!  corporation  -  a n  ,  in  many  respects,  pi/h/i,-  <>j/in  ,s,  being  charged 
by  legislative  enact  incut  with  duties  which  concern  both  the  corpo- 
ration and  the  public  at  large.     The  duties  and  liabilities  of  such 
ers  to  the  corporation  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  treatise,  and 
have  been  considered.     But  their  individual  rights  and  their  duty 
and  liability  to  others,  upon  contracts  and  for  torts,  are  not,  strictly 
king,  end 'laced  in  the  plan  of  the  work.     They  are,  however,  so 
germane  to  it,  and  reflect  so  much  light  upon  the  subjects  which 
are  herein  treated,  thai    it    has  been  thought  that  a  brief  reference 
to  3ome  of  the  more  important  rules  and  adjudications  was  desirable, 
and  this  has  accordingly  been  made  in  the  note.4 

rish    in     Sherburne    v.    Fiske,    8  cover  money  illegally  allowed  for  claims, 

Cash.  (Mass.)  264,  266  (1851),  opinion  by  the  complaint  should  aver  the    nature  of 

/'            J.;  cites  White   u.    Philipson,  10  the  claims  :  it  should  be  brought  by  the 

Met,    (Mass)    108;   Trafton    v.  Alfred,  3  legal  officer  of  the  county,  but  if  by  a  tax- 

Shepl.  (15  Me.)  258;  Kendall  v.  Stokes,  3  payer,  the  complaint  should  allege  facts 

-7.  Commonwealth   v.  Genther,  17  showing  the  officer's  neglecl  or  refusal  to 

&  Rawle  (Pa.),  135;  Wilson  v.  Mayor,  act.     Hedges  v.  Dam,  72  Cal.  520. 

i   New  York,    1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  595;  Personal  liability  of  municipal  council- 

R           '.    v.    Bazzard,   12  Cush.    (Mass.)  lors  to  the  corporation   for  misappropria- 

112:  Lincoln  v.  Chapin,    132   Mass.    170;  tion  of  its  funds  ;  see  Municipality  of  East 

Minor   v.    Bank,    1    Pet.   (U.  S.)    16,  69.  Nissouri  v.  Horseman,  16  Upper  Can.  Q. 

Where  a    surveyor  of   highways    has,  by  B.  588;    of  treasurer  for    paying   money 

law,  a  discretion  as  to  the  kind  of  repairs,  on  an  illegal  order  of  resolution.     Daniels 

and  exercises  his  test  judgmenl   and  acts  >•.  Burford,  10  Upper  Can.  <}.  B.  481. 

in  good  faith,  the  corporation   for  which  2  Supra,  sees.  214-216. 

he  acts  is  bound,  and    cannol  defeat  his  8  Infra,  sec.  237,  note  and  cases;  post, 

ry    for    the  price  of  materials   fur-  chap,  xxiii. 

nished,  by  evidence  to  show  thai  the  re-  4  Suns  i;v  Public  Officers. — Pub- 

were  not,  in  fact,  necessary.     Bu1  it  lie  officers  have,  in  general,  apower  to  sue 

would  be  otherwise  if  fraud  or  corruption  commensurate  with  their  duties.     If  offi- 

hown.     Palmer  P.Carroll,    i    I       .  porate  body,  suit  .should  be 

>                     I).     See,  also,  People  brought   in  the  nam    of  tin-  corporation, 

wis,  7  .lotus.  (X.  V.)  7:',;  Seaman  v.  unless  the  statute  direel  otherwise.   Shook 

■   V.),   312.      In  an  v.  State,  6  Ind.  113;  State  v.  Rush,  7  Ind. 

I    rvi  ors  to  re-  221;    Supervisors    v.    Stimpson,    4    Hill 


§  238 


AMOTION  ;    DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


121 


§  238  (177).  Amotion  and  Disfranchisement;  the  two  distin- 
guished ;  English  decisions  as  to  Disfranchisement  inapplicable  in 
this  country.  —  The  elementary  works  treat  of  Amotion  and  L>is- 


(N.  Y.),  136,  and  cases  cited;  Todd  v. 
Birdsall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  260,  and  cases 
cited  in  note;  Jansen  "•  Ostrander,  1  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  670;  Cornell  v.  Guilford,  1  Denio, 
(N.  Y.)  510;  compare  Commissioners  v. 
Perry,  5  Ohio,  57;  Barney  v.  Bush,  9  Ala. 
345;  VanKeuren v.  Johnson,  3  Denio,  182; 
Tecumsehu.  Phillips,  5  Neb.  305  (1877); 
Regents  of  State  University  v.  McCon- 
nell,  5  Neb.  423  (1877).  But  it  has  been 
held  that  a  public  officer  cannot,  without 
the  aid  of  a  statute,  maintain  a  suit  in  his 
own  name,  although  he  may  have  taken  a 
note  or  contract  to  himself  individually,  if 
the  consideration  for  such  a  note  or  con- 
tract be  a  liability  to  the  State.  The 
ground  of  this  rule  is  public  policy,  —  to 
discourage  public  officers  from  transacting 
in  their  own  name  the  business  of  the 
public.  Hunter  v.  Field,  20  Ohio,  340 
(1851);  Irish  v.  Webster,  5  Greenl.  (Me.) 
171;  Gilmore  v.  Pope,  5  Mass.  491.  If 
the  obligation  is  taken  to  the  officer  as 
agent,  or  in  his  official  capacity,  the  action 
is  properly  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
government  beneficially  interested.  Du- 
gan  v.  United  States,  3  Wheat.  172;  s.  p. 
United  States  v.  Boice,  2  McLean,  352; 
United  States  v.  Barker,  2  Paine  C.  Ct. 
152;  2  Parsons  on  Notes  and  Bills,  451, 
and  other  cases  cited.  An  action  by  a 
public  officer  does  not  abate  by  the  expi- 
ration of  his  term  of  office.  The  suit  may 
be  continued  in  his  name  until  its  termi- 
nation, or,  by  the  practice  in  many  of  the 
States,  his  successor  may  be  substituted. 
Kellar  v.  Savage,  20  Me.  199  (1841); 
Todd  v.  Birdsall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  260; 
Haynes  v.  Covington,  13  Sin.  &  Mar.  (21 
Miss.)  408;  Grant  v.  Fancher,  5  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  309;  Colgrove  v.  Breed,  2  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  125;  Manchester  v.  Herrington, 
10  N.  Y.  164;  Upton  v.  Starr,  3  Ind.  538; 
Denver  v.  Dean,  10  Col.  375.  Officers 
cannot  be  impleaded  as  individuals  for 
acts  done  in  the  exercise  of  their  corporate 
powers.  Smith  v.  Stephan,  66  Md.  381 
(injunction  against  officers,  as  individuals, 
to  restrain  them  from  issuing  funding 
bonds,  as  authorized  by  law,  denied). 
VOL.    I.  —  21 


Evidence  ;  Proof  of  Title  or  Of- 
ficial Charactkk  ;  Acts  ash  Dei  la- 
rations;  I.'ks  Gestae.—  Where  thi  au- 
thority of  an  officer  of  a  public  corpora- 
tion conies  incidentally  in  question  in  an 
action  in  which  he  is  not  a  party,  it  is  suf- 
ficient to  show  that  he  was  an  acting  offi- 
cer, and  the  regularity  of  his  appointment 
or  election  cannot  be  made  a  question. 
Proof  that  he  is  an  acting  officer  is  prima 
facie  evidence  of  his  election  or  appoint- 
ment, as  well  as  of  his  having  duly  quali- 
fied. But  if  he  relies  alone  on  proof  of  a 
due  election  or  appointment,  such  election 
or  appointment  must  be  legally  established. 
Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  306  (1858); 
Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113;  Johnson 
v.  Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202;  Baker  v.  Shep- 
hard,  4  Fost.  (24  N.  H.)  212  (1851),  and 
cases  cited;  Bean  v.  Thompson,  19  N.  H. 
290;  Blake  v.  Sturdevant,  12  N.  H.  573; 
Burgess  v.  Pue,  2  Gill  (Md.),  254.  Ante, 
sec.  213.  An  officer,  even  when  justify- 
ing  may  prima  facie  establish  his  official 
character  by  proof  of  general  reputation, 
and  that  he  acted  as  such  officer.  John- 
son v.  Steadman,  3  Ohio,  94;  followed, 
Eldred  v.  Seaton,  5  Ohio,  215;  Berry- 
man  v.  Wise,  4  Term  R.  366;  Potter  v. 
Luther,  3  Johns.  431;  Wilcox  v.  Smith,  5 
Wend.  233;  Peoples.  McKinney,  10  Mich. 
54.  But  it  is  not  enough  to  show  that 
the  officer  was  acting  officially  in  the  par- 
ticular instance  in  controversy  in  the  case 
upon  trial,  and  in  which  his  authority  is 
questioned.  Hall  v.  Manchester,  39  N.  H. 
295  (1859).  "The  mere  acting  in  a  public 
capacity  is  sufficient  prima  facie  proof  of 
proper  appointment;  but  it  is  only  prima 
facie  presumption  and  is  capable  of  being 
rebutted."  Per  Lord  Coleridge,  C.  J.,  in 
Regina  v.  Roberts,  36  Law  Times  Rep. 
690  (1878);  s.  c.  6  Am.  Law  Rep.  HI. 
Post,sec.  276,  note.  An  acting  officer  is 
estopped  to  dispute  the  validity  of  his 
own  appointment  and  election.  State  v. 
Sellers,  7  Rich.  Law,  368;  State  v.  May- 
berry,  3  Strob.  144. 

Acts  and  DECLARATIONS  of  officers, 
when   evidence   for  or  against  the  corpo- 


22 


M  IN  I  i'l  P  A  L   CORPORATIONS. 


§  238 


franchisement  together:  indeed,  formerly,  the  important  distinction 
a  the  two  was  not  observed.     Amotion  relates  alone  to  ojji- 


Mitchell    v.    Rockland,   -11    Me. 
S     ool  1  listrict,  38  Me.  164 
.  Morrell    v.  Dixfiel  i.  30   M 

1  ■-.  Simmons,  5  (aim.  (10  111.)  516; 
:  (  ...  c.  [ngl   .  L5   I'-.  Mon.  ( Ky.) 

Hidden   v.    Uuity,   33  N.    II.   .•' ,  ; 
Toll   Co.    v.   Bettsworth,   30   Conn.    380; 
v.    Pennell,   2   11.  of  I..  Cas.  197; 
Curnen  o.  New  York,  7'.'  N.  V.  611.     See 
chapter  ou  Corporate   Records  and  Docu- 
i  of  the  offii         I 

municipal  corporations  in  the  line  ol  their 
official  duty,  and  within  the  scope  ol  their 
authority,   are   binding    upon    the    body 
present  ;  au  md  ad- 

companying  such  acts  as  part 
of  tin-  res  g*  ttue,  i  dculated  to  explain  and 
ter,  and  qo1   narrative 
ti  insactions,   are  competent  evi- 
dence against  the  corporation.     To  render 
such  declarations  and  admissions  evidence, 
they   must  acccompany  acts,  which  acts 
must  be  of  a  nature  to  bind  the  corporate 
body.     Glidden   v.  I  nity,  38  N.   11.   571 
il  556);  Perkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  1  N.  H. 
rimes   v.    Keene,    52    N.   H.   330; 
Phippsburg,    29    Me.    313; 
C  iffin   r.  Plymouth,  49   N.  II.  173;  Hop- 
kinton  v.  Springfield,  12  N.  II.  328;  Pitts- 
field  '•.  Barnstead,  4o  N.  II.  477;   Canaan 
v.  Hanover,  19  N.   II.    H5;  Gray  v.  Rol- 
:.  58  N.  11.  253(1878);  S.  C.  21  AIL. 
!..  Jour.  7'i.     "  A  municipal  corporation 
p  '/  by  the  action  df  its  proper 
officers,  when  the  corporation  is  acting  in 
its   private,   as   contradistinguished   from 
irnmental,  capacity,  and  has  lawful 
powei  ' 
Chi.:,-,,  v.  Sexton,  11.",  111.  230. 

Notice  i"  i  >i  ficers.    -  Where  the  offi- 

igents  "fa  public  corporation  have 

in,  powers  or  duties  with  respeel  to  a  given 

.  their  individual  knowledge,  or  the 

individu 

nol  !  ind  Hi'  affecl  tl orpora- 

tion.     I!  School    Disl 

V*l    1.".:,  (!  358);  Angell  k  Am     Coi 

2  ■    II  .   Turnpike  Co.    10   Mass. 

is  chief  executive  ,, Hi- 
cer  ,,f  the  citw  and    notice   to   him  of  a 
iiffieient,  when   it   would   not 
the  clerk,  who  is  only  a  recording 


officer,  not  authorized  to  act  upon  the 
notice.  Nichols  v.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39 
(1867);  ante,  sees.  208,  209;  post,  chap, 
xxiii.      Index,  title  N 

Indict  men  i    ok  Public  and  Corpo- 
ra i  i:  <  >FFK  BBS.  —  "A   public  oilier,"  it 

is  declared  in  North  Carolina,  "entrusted 
with  definite  powers  to  be  exercised  for 
the  benefit  of  the  community,  who  wick- 
edly abuse8  or  fraudulently  exceeds  them, 
is  punishable  by  indictment."  State  v. 
Glasgow,  N.  C.  Conf.  R.  186,  187  (indict- 
ment of  Secretary  of  State);  State  v.  Jus- 
tices, &c.,  4  Hawks  (N.  C),  194  (when 
county  authorities  indictable  for  non- 
repair of  jail);  see  Paris  V.  l'cople,  27  111. 
74;  State  v.  Comin'rs  ofFayetteville  (non- 
repair of  streets),  2  N.  C.  Law,  617  ;  lb. 
633;  2  Murph.  371;  Stale  p.  Fishl 
N.  <'.  6.r,l;  State  v.  Hall,  97  N.  C.  474. 
But  see  as  to  street  commissioner,  Graf- 
fins  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  (Penn.  & 
W.)  502;  State  v.  Comm'rs,  Walk.  (Miss.) 
368.  Indictment  of  municipal  officers  for 
violation  of  charter.  People  v.  "Wood,  4 
Park.  Cr.  R.  144;  Hammar  v.  Covington, 
3  Met.  (Ky.)  194;  State  v.  Shelby ville,  4 
Sued  (Tenn.),  176;  State  v.  Shields,  8 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  151;  Lathrop  v.  State,  6 
.  (Ind.)  5n2;  Siatc  v.  Burlington, 
36  Vt.  521.  Requisites  of  indictment  for 
non-performance  of  official  duty.  Wattles 
v.  People,  13  Mich,  in',;  State  v.  Mayor, 
11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  217;  State  <•.  Comm'rs, 
I  Dev.  (N.  C.)  315;  3  Chitty  Crim.  Law, 
586,  606,  for  precedents  of  indictments 
against  corporations.  Criminal  infmvna- 
tion  against  municipal  officers.  Willc. 
Corp.  315-318;  Rex  v.  Watson,  2  Term 
R.  204;  lb.  198.  Indictment  against  ma- 
nicipal    corporations.      See    chapter    on 

Heme, lies    a'_'aill^t     Illegal    Corporate    Act-;, 

post,  sees.  931,  933. 

!  :  i.i  iv  of  Officer  for  Moneys 
Received.  A  public  or  municipal  offi- 
cer, who  i-  required  t..  account  for  and  pay 
over  money  that  comes  into  his  hands,  is 
liable  though  it  be  stolen  without  his 
fault,  unless  relieved  from  this  responsi- 
bility by  statute.  Halbert  v.  State.  22 
Ind.'  125  (1864);  Muzzy  v.  Shattuck,  1 
Mo, beck    v.    State,    28  Ind. 


§  238 


AMOTION  ;    DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


323 


cers ;  disfranchisement,  to  corporators  or  members  of  the  corporation. 
Amotion,  therefore,  is  the  removal  of  an  officer  in  a  corporation  from 


86  ;  Hancock  v.  Hazzard,12  Cush.  (Mass.) 
112  ;  Clay  Co.  v.  Simonsen,  1  Dak.  Ter. 
403  ;  affirmed,  Clay  County  v.  Simonsen, 
2  Dak.  Ter.  112  ;  Egremont  v.  Benjamin, 
125  Mass.  15  ;  State  v.  Lewenthall,  55 
Miss.  589  ;  State  v.  Powell,  67  Mo.  395  ; 
State  v.  Gates,  67  Mo.  139  ;  Inglis  v. 
State,  61  Ind.  212  ;  United  States  v. 
Preseott,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  578;  Common- 
wealth v.  Comly,  4  Pa.  St.  372  ;  State 
v.  Harper,  6  Ohio  St.  707  ;  Henry  v. 
State,  98  Ind.  381.  And  a  direction  to  a 
public  officer  (e.  g.  a  county  treasurer)  how 
and  where  to  keep  the  money  (e.  g.  in  a 
safe  provided  by  the  county),  if  made  by 
a  board  or  authority  having  no  legal  con- 
trol or  power  over  the  matter,  will  not  be 
a  defence  to  such  officer  if  the  money  is 
stolen  from  the  safe.  Halbert  v.  State, 
supra.  In  a  suit  against  a  tax-collector  to 
recover  money  received  by  him,  it  is  no 
defence  that  he  received  the  money  on 
account  of  taxes  which  the  legislature  had 
no  constitutional  power  to  impose.  Waters 
v.  State,  1  Gill  (Md. ),  302  (1813);  Thomp- 
son v.  Stickney,  6  Ala.  579  ;  Evans  v. 
Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (21  N.  J.  L. )  764.  Treas- 
urer held  not  entitled  to  credit  for  money 
paid  contractors  upon  warrants  not  drawn 
according  to  the  charter.  McCormick  v. 
Bay  City,  23  Mich.  457. 

Liability  of  Officer  ox  Contracts. 
—  Public  and  municipal  officers  are  not 
personally  /in  hie  on  contracts  within  the 
scope  of  their  authority  and  line  of  duty, 
unless  it  is  very  apparent  that  they  in- 
tended to  bind  themselves  personally. 
Macbeath  v.  Haldimand,  1  D.  &  E.  Term.  172, 
and  Hodgson  v.  Dexter,  1  Cranch,  315, 
are  the  leading  cases.  The  question  is, 
To  whom  was  the  credit  given?  Did  the 
defendant  contract  in  his  public  or  private 
capacity  ?  See  Olney  v.  AVickes,  18  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  122,  where  the  promise  was  held 
not  personal.  Compare  King  v.  Butler, 
15  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  281  ;  Gill  v.  Brown,  12 
Johns.  (X.  Y.)  3S5;  Walker  v.  Swartout, 
lb.  444;  Mott  v.  Hicks,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
513;  Sheffield  v.  Watson,  3 Caines  (N.  Y.\ 
69  ;  commented  on,  12  Johns.  448  ;  Brown 
v.  Rundlett  (full  discussion),  15  N.  H. 
360  (1814),  and  cases  cited  and  criticised  ; 


Belknap  v.  Kheinhart,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
375  ;  Adams  v.  Whittlessey,  3  Conn.  56U  ; 
8  Conn.  329;  Hammarskold  v.  Bull,  et 
ul.  ("State  capitol  commissioners")  11 
Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  493  ;  Lesleys  White, 
1  Speers,  31  ;  Young  v.  Commissioners 
of  Roads,  2  Nott  &  McC.  537  ;  -Miller 
v.  Ford,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  376;  s.  c. 
4  Strob.  213  ;  Copes  v.  Mathews,  10  Sm. 
&  Marsh.  (18  Miss.)  398;  Tucker  v. 
Shorter,  17  Ga.  620  ;  Woodbridge  v.  Hall, 
47  N.  J.  L.  (18  Vroom)  388  ;  Hall  v. 
Cockrell,  28  Ala.  507  (1856);  but  queer e, 
as  to  its  correctness.  In  Nickerson  v. 
Dyer,  105  Mass.  320,  the  agents  or  com- 
mittee of  a  town  were  held  not  to  be  per- 
sonally liable.  A  public  officer  contracting 
with  a  party  who  knows  the  extent  of  his 
authority  is  not  personally  liable,  unless 
such  intent  is  clearly  expressed.  Broad- 
well  v.  Chapin,  2  111.  App.  511  ;  2)0S^ 
chap.  xiv.  In  the  absence  of  a  provision 
to  the  contrary,  an  officer  of  a  municipal 
corporation  is  not  disabled  from  entering 
into  a  contract  with  it.  Municipality  v. 
Caldwell,  3  Rob.  (La.),  368  (1842).  See 
on  this  point,  post,  sec.  292  and  note.  It 
is  held  that  where  the  officers  of  a  pub- 
lic or  municipal  corporation,  acting  offi- 
cially and  under  an  innocent  mistake  of 
the  law,  in  which  the  other  contracting 
party  equally  participated,  with  equal  op- 
portunities of  knowledge,  neither  party  at 
the  time  looking  to  personal  liability,  the 
officers  are  not,  in  such  case,  personally 
liable,  nor  is  the.  corporation  liable.  Hous- 
ton v.  Clay  County  (unauthorized  contract 
by  township  trustees  for  the  erection  of  a 
bridge),  18  Ind.  396  (1862);  Boardman  ». 
Ilayue,  29  Iowa,  339  (1870);  Duncan  V. 
Nifes,  32  111.  532  (lSOS),  and  cases  cited  ; 
Ogden  v.  Raymond,  22  Conn.  379  (1853); 
Dameron  v.  Irwin,  s  Ire.  Law  (X.  ('.), 
421  (ISIS):  Ilite  v.  Goodman,  1  Dev.  & 
Bat.  Eq.  (N.  ('. )  364  (1836);  tves  r.  Ho- 
ler, 12  Yt.  314  (1840);  Stone  v.  Buggins, 
28  Yt.  617  ;  Tucker  r.  Justices,  13  Ire. 
Law  (X.  C.)  434;  Dev  n.  Lee,  4  Jones 
(Law).  238  :  Tucker  v.  Shorter,  17  Ga. 
620:  Copes  v.  Mathews,  10  Sm.  &  Marsh. 
(IS  Miss.)  398  :  11,11  v.  Cockrell,  28  Ala. 
507  ;  compare  1'otts  v.  Henderson,  2  Ind. 


324 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  238 


liia  office,  but  ii  leaves  him  still  a  member  of  the  corporation.     Dis- 
meul   is  to  i  away  the  franchise  or  right  of 

27  I     m    r.   Irish,    58 

Liability    under  Btatute   of 

trustees  or  directors  of  pu  who 

unauthorized  contracts.     I 
Living  Jtone,  l  Dow,  3  11;  P  irrotl  v.  K\  re, 
10  B  Wilson   v.    Goodman,    4 

Hal     . 

p  asoNAL    Liabil- 
ity to  Third   Pi  krons.      Tax-coll 
liable  in  trespass  who  seizes  without  color 
a  for  tax  assessment,  or  under  an  un- 
constitutional law. 

3  Ohio,  370  ;    i  Wade,    I  Ohio, 

1.  mis  v.  Spencer,  2  Paige,  150. 
But  a  collector  whose  warrant  is  in  due 
form,  with  nothing  on  its  face  to  show  the 
illegality  of  the  tax  or  the  want  of  author- 
ity in  the  assessors  or  previous  off 
will  be  protected  in  executing  it,  even 
though  the  tax  be  not  lawfully  assessed. 
i  .  Jenkins,  '  N    V.)  376 

I );  affirmiu  Sandf.  Sup.  i  t. 

l;.  109  ;  Abbotl  v.  Yost,  ~i  Denio  (N.  Y.i. 
Savacool  v.    Boughton,  5  Wend,  i  N. 
Y.)  17"  (1830),  leading  case;   Downing  v. 
I.        .  21    Wend.  17s  (warrant  of  justice 

to  ovi  rsei  rs  of  \ ')>  Alexander  v.  Hoyt, 

7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  89;  Clark  v.  Halleck,  16 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  607  ;    People  v.    Warren, 
5  Hill  (N.  Y),  140  ;  Webber  v.  Gray,  24 
\V,  nd.  (X.  Y.)  485  ;  Loomis  v.  Spi 
■_'     Paige,    153;  Little  v.  Merritt,  1"'  Pick. 
M        i    5 17  ;    see   Suydam   v.    Keys,   13 
Johns.    (N.   Y.)    Ill  ;    Gale   v.    Mead,   2 
Di  nio  (N.  Y.),   160  ;  Tb.  232  ;  Easton  v. 
nder,  11    Wend.   (N.  Y.)  90  ;  I 
rti  n,  19  v-'.  Y.  243.     Liability  of  as- 
ir.     1  >•  'i  w  i ii   /-.  S1  iickland,  57  N.   >>  . 
■W'-j.  I!  --77):    Harshman  v.   Winterbottom, 
123  I     - 

l      <onal  Liability  of  Pubi  n    <  >f- 
\.  ■      of    Subordik 
l;     ponpeai  Supi  rior.  —  Public  ofl 
not  liable  for  the  misconducl  or  mal- 
ofsnch  persons  as  they  areobliged 
to  employ  ;  the  reason  here  being  that  tin- 
in  i  has  no  appli- 
ion,  there  being  ii<>  freedom  of  choi 
n   and   control 
B                                     Mill  (\.  Y.),  531 
(1- 12):    affirmed    in   i  rror,   2    I 


anl  v.  Keefer,  53  111.  117;  Humphreys 
v.  Mears,  I  .Man.  <S:  Kyi.  L87  ;  Bolton  v. 
Crowther,  4  Dowl.  &  Ryl.  195;  Harris  v. 
Baker,  -1  .Mam,-  &  Selw.  27  ;  Bacheller 
v.  Pinkham,  68  Me.  253.  Si  also  I 
v.  '  ottou,  1  Salk.  17  ;  Story  on  Agency, 
•  seq.  :  Story  on  Bail.  300,  802  ; 
Martin  v.  Mayor,  &e.,  1  Hill  (X.  Y.), 
545,  551  ;  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Furze,  3  Hill 
(N.  Y.i,  612,  618.  City  liable  fornegli- 
in  making  public  improvements, 
though  it  let  the  contracl  to  a  contractor 
who  is  to  perform  it  under  the  supervision 
and  direction  of  the  city.  Chicago  v.  Der- 
mody,  Gl  111.  431  :  <  hicago  v.  Joney,  80 
111.  383.  More  fully  on  this  poinl  see 
chap,  xxiii. ;  Wright  v.  Hoebrook  (fulldis- 
52  V  ll.  120  (1872);  s.  c.  13 
Am.  Rep.  12. 

Liability  of   Publii    Officers   fob 
Acts   Judicial    in    their   Nature. — 
rs  are  not  liable  for  honest  errors  or 
mistakes    o  cts  within 

the  snipe  of  their  authority,  judicial  in 
their  nature,  in  the  absence  of  malice  or 
corruption,  or  statute  imposing  the  lia- 
bility.  Post,  chaps,  xxii.  and  xxiii.;  Ram- 
sey v.  Riley,  13  <  »hio,  157  ;  Steward  v. 
Southard,  17  Ohio,  402;  Conwell  v.  Em- 
rie  (road  supervisor),  4  Ind.  209  ;  Bartlett 
v.  Crozier  (highway  overseer),  17  Johns. 
(N.  Y.  I  139  ;  Freeman  v.  Cornwall  (high- 
way overseer),  L0  Tb.  17";  McConnell  v. 
Dewey  (road  supervisor),  5  Neb.  385 
(1877);  Johnson  v.  Stanley,  1  Root 
ii.  ).  245  ;  Township  v.  Carey,  3 
Dutch.  iN.  J.  L.)  ::77  :  Wains  v.  W 
man,  2  Root,  2]  l  ;  Craig  v.  Burnett,  32 
Ala.  728  ;  Stati  .1  lunnington,  12  Md. 
340;  Commissioners  <\  Nesbitt,  11  <;ill& 
.1  (Md.)  50  ;  Woodruff  v.  Stewart,  63 
(action  against  mayor  acting  as 
judge  ''■  r  false  imprisonment).  Easl  River 
l.i.,1,,  Co.  v.  Donnelly,  93  N.  Y.  657. 
Liability  where  the  officer's  function  is 
jiidicial.  Wilkes  >'■  Dinman,  7  How. 
where  the  subject  is  much  considered, 
and  malice  or  wilful  wrong  held  to  be  es- 
sential), Waldron  v.  Berry,  51  N.  H.  136; 
Pi  rry  v.  Reynolds,  53  Conn.  527  ;  Ray- 
mond v.  Fish,  51  Conn.  80  (health  officer 
not   liable   for   men    error  of  judgment); 


238 


AMOTION  ;    DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


325 


being  any  longer  a  member  of  the  corporation.1  American  municipal 
corporations  are,  in  many  respects,  essentially  different  in  their  con- 
Matter  of  Isaacson,  36  La.  An.  56  (failure 
to  levy  a  tax  for  payment  of  judgment). 
The  members  of  a  city  council  are  Dot  in- 
dividually liable,  in  a  civil  or  criminal  ac- 
tion, for  acts  involving  the  exercise  of  dis- 
cretion, unless  they  act  corruptly.  Walker 
v.  Hallock,  32  Ind.  239  (1869);  Baker  v. 
State,  27  I  ml.  485.  Liability  of  minis- 
terial officer,  charged  by  .statute  with  an 
absolute  and  certain  duty.  Clark  v.  Mil- 
ler, oi  N.  V.  528,  and  cases  cited.  Bu1  see 
reference  to  this  case,  cited  by  Miller,  J.,  in 
Dow  v.  Humbert,  91  U.  S.  294,  302  (1875). 
Public  did [i,  not  ordinarily  enforceable  by 
private  action  against  the  officer,  unless 
given  by  statute.  Foster  v.  McKibben,  14 
Pa.  St.  168  ;  McConnell  v.  Dewey  (road  su- 
pervisor), 5  Neb.  385  (1877).  Misappli- 
cation of  public  funds  by  officer.  Town- 
ship, &c.  r.  Linn,  36  Pa.  St.  431.  Ante, 
sees.  214-216,  notes.  Neglect  to  take  a 
bond  required  by  law.  Boggs  o.  Hamilton, 
2  Const.  (S.  C.)  E.  381  ;  State  v.  Dun- 
nington,  12  Md.  340.  A  municipal  officer 
misled  into  issuing  order,  not  liable  to  the 
holder.  Boardman  v.  Hayne,  29  Iowa, 
339. 

Personal  Liability  of  Officer  for 
Torts.  —  Alvord  v.  Barrett  (town  clerk), 
16  Wis.  175  ;  American  Print  Works  v. 
Lawrence,  3  Zabr.  (23  N.  J.  L.)  590,  601. 
JVb  liability  for  acts  done  by  a  public  offi- 
cer under  lawful  authority  and  in  a  proper 
manner,  lb.  Full  discussion  and  cases 
cited  by  Carpenter,  J.;  s.  P.  in  s.  c.  1 
Zabr.  (21  N.  J.  L.)  248,  260,  per  Green, 
C.  J.;  Calking  v.  Baldwin,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  667  ;  and  cases  cited.  How  far 
protected  by  an  unconstitutional  statute. 
lb.  But  if  officers  act  maliciously,  oppres- 
sively, corruptly,  or  without  authority  of 
law,  they  may  be  held  personally  liable. 
Pruden  v.  Love,  67  6a.  190  (declaring  a 
building  a  nuisance  and  tearing  it  down 
without  proper  notice  to  the  owner).     Mc- 


Carthy*. DeArmit,  99  Pa.  St.  »;:j  (unlawful 
arresl   and  imp]  isnnment.  as  to 

measure  of  damages).  Liability  for 
feasance  or  misfeasance,  when-  the  duty  is 
specific,  imperative,  and  not  judicial,  in 
its  nature.  Griffith  v.  Follett,  20  Barb. 
(N.  y.)  630  (1855);  Weaver  v.  Devendorf, 
3  Denio  (N.  Y.),  117  ;  Harmon  v.  Broth- 
erson,  1  Denio  (N.  V.),  537  ;  I  ■  595  ; 
Adsit ».  Brady,  4  Hill  (N.Y.),  630  (1843). 
"  It  is  settled  in  this  court  that  one  who 
imes  the  duties  and  is  invested  with 
the  powers  of  a  public  officer  is  liable  to  an 
individual  who  sustains  special  damage  by 
a  neglect  properly  to  perform  such  duties." 
Finch,  J.,  in  Bennett  v.  Whitney,  94 
N.  Y.  302  (leaving  a  temporary  opening 
in  a  street  unguarded  and  unlighted).  Ho- 
ver v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y.  113  (failing  to 
keep  a  bridge  in  repair).  More  fully,  2>ost, 
chap,  xxiii.  The  principle  on  which  a 
public  officer  is  held  personally  liable  for 
injuries  resulting  from  improper  execution 
of  official  duties  is  well  stated  in  Nowell 
v.  Wright,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  166  ;  Blair  c. 
Langtry,  21  Neb.  247.  In  Amy  v.  Su>  er- 
visors,  11  Wall.  136  (1870),  where  county 
supervisors  were  licld  to  be  personally  liable 
for  failing  to  levy  a  tax,  as  commanded  by 
the  court,  to  pay  the  plaintiff's  judgment, 
Mr.  Justice  Swayne,  stating  the  principle 
of  the  decision,  says:  "The  rule  is  well 
settled,  that  where  the  law  requires  abso- 
lutely a  ministerial  act  to  be  done  by  a 
public  officer,  and  he  neglects  or  refuses 
to  do  such  act,  he  may  be  compelled  to  re- 
spond in  damages  to  the  extent  of  the  in- 
jury arising  from  his  conduct ;  mistake  of 
duty  and  honest  intentions  will  nol  excuse 
the  offender."  Measure  of  damages.  Dow 
v.  Humbert,  91  U.  S.  294  (1S75).  Liabil- 
ity for  fraud.  Oakland  v.  Carpenter,  13 
Cal.  540;  ante,  sec.  208,  n.;  post,  sec. 
910,  n.  A  ministerial  officer,  acting  in 
good  faith,  is  liable  for  actual,  but  not  for 


i  2  Kyd,  50-94;  Willc.  245-276;  Glov- 
er, chap.'  xvi.  pp.  327,  328;  Grant,  250, 
263.  And  see  2  Kent,  Coin.  278,  297, 
where  amotion  and  disfranchisement  are 
used  as  convertible  terms  ;  Angell  &  Ames, 


Corp.  chap,  xii.,  where  the  earlier  cases 
are  quite  fully  collected,  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  English  decisions  satisfactorily  pre- 
sented. Richards  v.  Clarksburg,  30  W. 
Va.  191  (1887),  citing  the  text. 


- 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  239 


tion  from  the  old  English  municipal  cnrjMiniti.ni>,  under  which 
most  of  the  cases  on  the  subjecl  ol  amotion  and  disfranchisement 
usually  cited  in  the  books  arose.  These  cases,  especially  those  re- 
lating to  dist'rancliisement  are,  in  general,  inapplicable  here,  and 

dd,  it  i-  believed  by  the  author,  be  followed  by  our  courts  as 
tits  with  unusual  caution,  and  only  when  they  rest  upon  or 
principles  general  in  their  nature,  and  which  embrace  in 
their  operations  municipal  institutions  possessing  the  distinctive 
characteristics  of  ours.  Eere,  the  inhabitants  of  the  municipality 
are,  by  legislative  enactment,  the  corporators;  certain  of  those  in- 
habitants (usually  all  of  the  adult  male  residents)  have  the  constitu- 
tional or  statutory  righl  to  elect  the  legislative  or  governing  body, 
and  also,  frequently,  the  other  more  important  officers  of  the  corpo- 
ration. It  would  seem  that  the  English  doctrine  oi  disfranchisement 
of  a  corporator  or  member  has  no  application  to  our  municipal  cor- 
porations, whether  the  corporator  be  considered  the  "inhabitant"  or 
the  "  voter." 

s   239  (IT"1).    Disfranchisement;    English    Doctrine    not    applicable 

here.  —  Whether  the   power  ol'  disfranchisement   he   incidental  to 

the   corporation,  or  must   be   expressly  conferred,  respecting   which 
there  is  in  England  some  contrariety  of  view,1  we  need  not  inquire, 


exemplary  damages,  for  illegal  acts  injuri- 
ous tn  private  persons.  Tracy  v.  Swart- 
out,  Ki  Pet.  (U.  S.)  80  (1836)  (action 
against  collector  ot  customs);  lb.  137; 
Jenner  v.  Joliffe,  9  Johns.  382.  As  no 
one  is  bound  by  an  unauthorized  ordi- 
nance, the  municipal  authorities  enacting 
■  are  not  individually  liable  tin  re- 
for.  So  held,  in  act  inn  by  an  ex-mayor 
against  aldermen  for  depriving  him  of  his 
cilice.  Jones  -.  Loving,  55  Miss.  109; 
\  provision  of  law  mak- 
ing a  civil  corporation  liable  "  for  the  ille- 
gal doings  and  defaults"  of  its  officers 
(there  being  no  provision  thai  the  officers 
Bhall  nol  also  remain  liable),  does  nol  de- 
prive the  party  injured  ol  his  righl  to 
proceed  personally  againsl  the  officer  or 
agent  who  committed  the  injury.  Both 
are  liable.  Bounds  v.  Mansfield,  38  Me. 
(:'.  Heath)  586  (1854).  Election  officers  for 
,  whi  a  liabU .  <  rordon  v.  Far- 
rer,  2  1  '"ill.'.  (Mich. )  111  ;  Carter  o.  Har- 
rison, 5  Blackf.  188;  Jeffries  v.  Ankeny, 
11  Ohio,  87  l  ;  compare  Ramsey  v.  Riley, 
13  Ohio,  Waldron,  11 


Johns.  (N.  Y. )  114  ;  Lincoln  v.  Hapgood, 
11  Mass.  350;  Bridge  v.  Lincoln,  14  Mass. 
367.  Collection  and  revenue  officers  not 
liable  to  the  party  paying  for  money  vol- 
untarily paid  to  them.  Elliot!  v.  Swart- 
out,  10  Pet.  137  (1836);  Thompson  v. 
Stickney,  6  Ala.  579.  More  fully,  post, 
chap,  xxiii.  When  liabh  in  trespass. 
McCoy  V.  Cliillicothe,  3  Ohio,  370; 
Loomis  v.  Spencer,  2  Paige,  153.  Re- 
cnriliiuj  nffirrr.  llainscv  r.  Riley,  13  Ohio, 
157  :  approved,  Stewart  v.  Southard,  17 
Ohio,  102. 

1  Grant,  263.  "  This  right  [of  disfran- 
chisement]  has  been  but  sparingly  exer- 
cised, though  it  is  undoubtedly  an  incident 
to  every  corporation,  with,  perhaps,  some 
exceptions  in  cases  of  trading  and  mone- 
tary bodies."  tb.  Willcock  (271,  pi.  709) 
denies  that  it  is  an  incidental  right,  and 
claims  thai  the  rule  laid  down  in  the 
second  resolution  (Bagg's  Case)  on  this 
point,  that  "  no  freeman  of  any  corpo- 
ration can  be  disfranchised  by  the  corpo- 
ration, unless  they  have  authority  to  do  SO 
by  the  express  words  oi'  the  charter,  or  by 


§  240  AMOTION  ,     DISFRANCHISEMENT.  327 

for  here  (were  there  no  constitutional  obstacles)  the  legislature  never 
bestows  upon  the  council,  or  governing  body  which  represents  the 
corporation,  the  right  to  disfranchise  the  citizen  or  corporator;  and 
it  is  clear  that  such  a  formidable  and  extraordinary  authority  does 
not  exist,  and  cannot  be  exercised  by  the  council,  as  an  incidental 
or  implied  right.  To  burn  or  destroy  the  charters  of  the  corpora- 
tion, or  wilfully  to  falsify  its  books,  were  in  England  considered 
such  breaches  of  duty  on  the  part  of  a  corporator  as  would  work  a 
forfeiture  of  the  corporate  character,1  there  being,  according  to  Lord 
Coke,  "  a  tacit  condition  annexed  to  the  franchise,  which,  if  he  break, 
he  may  be  disfranchised."2  Surely,  there  is  here  no  such  tacit  con- 
dition annexed  to  the  constitutional  or  statutable  right  of  a  resident 
of  a  municipality  to  be  and  remain  a  corporator,  though  there  may 
be  a  similar  condition  annexed  to  municipal  offices.  Wilfully  to 
destroy  or  falsify  the  charter  or  books  of  a  municipal  corporation  is 
an  act  which  is  punishable  by  the  criminal  codes  of  the  different 
States ;  and  if  the  offender  is  convicted  and  imprisoned,  it  may  re- 
sult as  an  incident  of  such  conviction  that  he  will  cease,  for  the  time, 
to  be  a  resident,  and  hence  will  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  corpo- 
ration ;  but  the  corporation  itself  has  no  power  to  disfranchise  him, 
that  is,  to  deprive  him  of  the  privileges  and  rights,  without  absolv- 
ing him  from  the  liabilities  of  other  citizens,  while  he  remains  within 
the  limits  of  the  municipality. 

§  240  (179).  Amotion ;  Rex  v.  Richardson.  —  The  power  to  amove 
a  corporate  officer  from  his  office,  for  reasonable  and  just  cause,  is 
one  of  the  common-law  incidents  of  all  corporations.3     This  doctrine, 

prescription,"  —  is  the  law.     Mr.  Glover  2  13  Coke,  98  a. 

simply   adopts  Mr.  Willeoek's   language.  3  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517  ;  Rex 

Glover,  335.     Mr.  Kyd's  exposition  of  the  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  723  ;  Rex  v.  Don- 

secoiui  resolution  in  Bagg's  Case,  2  Kyd,  caster,  2  Burr.  738     Jay's  Case,  1  Vent. 

52.     And  see  leading  case  of  Rex  v.  Rich-  302  ;  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Stra.  819  ;  Rex 

ardson,  1  Burr.  517,  which  was  a  case  of  v.   Ponsonby,   1  Ves.  Jr.  1;  Rex  v.  Lyme 

amotion,   but    has    been   often    taken   as  Regis,  Doug.  153;  Rex  v.  Tidderley,  1  Sid. 

asserting  an  incidental  power  to  disfran-  14,  per  Haie,  C.  B. ;  Rex  v.  Taylor,  3  Sulk, 

chise  for  cause  as  well  as  to  amove.  Angell  231;  1  Roll.  Rep.  409;  s.  c.  3  Bulst.  189; 

&   Ames,  sees.   408,    409.     See,  generally,  Rex  v.  Chalke,   1  Lord  Raym.   225  ;  Rex 

Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's  Society,  2  v.  Heaven,  2  Term  R.  772  ;  Reg.  v.  New- 

Binn.   (Pa.)  448   (1810);  Evans  v.  Phila-  bury,  1  Queen's  Bench,  751  ;  2  Kyd,  50- 

delphia  Club,  50  Pa.  St.  107  ;  Hopkinson  94,    where   the    old    eases   are   digested  ; 

v.  Marquis  of  Exeter,  Law  Rep.  5  Eq.  63  ;  Glover,   chap.    xvi.  ;    Willc.   246  ;  Grant, 

State  v.  Georgia  Med.   Soc,   38  Ga.  608;  240  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  chap,  xii.;  2  Kent, 

s.  c.   8  Am.  Law   Reg.   (N.  s.)  533,   Mr.  Com.  297  ;  Richards  v.  Clarksburg,  3d  W. 

Mitchell's  note.  Va.  491  (1887);  State  v.  The  Judges.   35 

1  Mayor  v.  Pilkinton,  1  Keb.  597  ;  Rex  La.  An.  1075  ;  Ellison  v.  Raleigh,  89  N.  C. 

v.   Chalke,   5   Mod.   257  ;  1   Lord  Raym.  125  ;  ante,  sec.  212,  note. 
226  ;  Grant,  Corp.  265. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  l!42 

ired  before,1  has  been  considered  as  settled  ever  since 
Lord  M  nsfield's  judgment  in  the  well-known  case  of  The  King  v. 
Richardson.2  It  is  there  denied  that  there  can  be  no  power  of 
amotion  unless  given  by  charter  or  prescription ;  and  the  contrary 
doctrine  is  asserted, —  thai  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  from  the 
nature  of  corporations,  and  for  the  sake  of  order  and  government, 
the  power  is  incidental 

n  24]  (180),  Where  Power  of  Amotion  resided  in  old  English 
Corporation. —  l>ut  the  power  to  amove,  like  every  other  incidental 
power,  is  incident  to  the  corporation  at  large,  and  not  to  any  select 
body  or  particular  part  of  it,  and  unless  delegated  to  a  select  body 
or  part,  it  mu  t  1"'  exercised  by  the  whole  corporation,  and  at  a  cor- 
regularly  ami  duly  convened.9  The  power  to  hold 
such  an  assembly  is,  however,  implied  in  the  power  of  amotion.4 

2  (181).  Power  of  Amotion  in  this  country. — By  the  corpo- 
ration  at  large,  as  used  in  the  preceding  section,  is  meant  the  ditfer- 
ranks  and  orders  which  compose  it,  including  the  definite  and 
indefinite  bodies.  The  essentials  in  such  a  corporation  of  a  valid 
corporate  assembly  have  previously  been  described.  Our  American 
corporations,  however,  have  no  ranks,  orders,  or  integral  parts  corre- 
d  ling  to  the  constitution  of  an  old  English  corporation.  Here 
the  common  council,  or  the  elective  governing  body  (whatever  name 
be  given  to  it),  exercises  all  of  the  powers  of  the  incorporated  place. 
li  -  th"  council,  as  the  representative  of  the  corporation,  the  inci- 
dental powers  of  a  corporation,  such  as  the  power  to  amove,  or  the 

1  Lord  Bruce's  Ca    .  2  Stra.  819,  820;  but,  unless  expressly  changed  or  limited 

Til:           ;  C      .    i    Si  L.    11,   per   Hale,  by  charter,  it  belongs  to  the  corporation 

C.  I'>.  at  large.      Lord   Mansfield  seemed   to  be 

-  Rex  v.  Richardson,  ]  Burr.  517,  noted  of  opinion  that  it  was  competent  to  trans- 

.  251.     "It  is  accessary  to  the  fer  this  power  from  the  whole  body  to  a 

r   and  governmi  i  elect    body   by  an  ordinance  or  by-law. 

a   there  should   be  such  power  Bagg"    Case,  11  Co.  99  a ;  Rex  v.   Rich- 

[amotion],  as  much  as  the  power  of  mak-  ardson,    1  Burr.  539.     But  this  question 

us  not  to  have   been   directly   deter- 

:t  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Stra.  819;  Rex  mined.     Will.-.  -217,  pi.  634;  lb.  248,  pi. 

v.  Lyme  Regis,   Doug.   153;  Rex  v.  Rich-  635  ;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 

t,pra  :  Rex  v.  Doncaster,  Say.  38;  536.     Onderthe  Constitution  of  Pennsyl- 

231  ;  Rex  v.  Faver-  vania  municipal   officers   who   hold   tlu-ir 

sham,   s  t.   R.  856;    Pane's  Ch  e,   Dong,  offices  by  appointment  may  be  removed  at 

153;    Will.'.   246,   pi.   629;    Grant,   240,  the  pleasure  of  the  power  appointing  them. 

■    v.  Houseman  v.  Commonwealth,  100  Pa.  St. 

I      536  (1856).  222. 

Even  if  the  right  to  elect  an  officer  b  '   Fane's  Case,  Doug.  153 ;  Rex  v.  Lyme 

a   particular   person    or   seled    class,    the  Regis,  lb.  149. 
Lb  qoI   Incidental   to  it, 


§  243  POWER   OF   AMOTION    IN   THIS    COUNTRY.  329 

power  to  ordain  by-laws  ?  Or  is  the  council  in  the  nature  of  a 
select  body,  possessing  no  right  to  exercise  any  of  the  ordinary  in- 
cidental powers  of  the  corporation,  unless  expressly  authorized  by 
charter  or  legislative  grant?  The  question  not  being  judicially  set- 
tled as  to  our  municipal  corporations,  the  opinion  is  ventured  that, 
in  the  absence  of  an  express  grant  or  statute  conferring  or  limiting 
the  power,  the  common  council  of  one  of  our  municipal  corporations 
as  ordinarily  constituted,  does  possess,  in  the  absence  of  any  express 
or  implied  restriction  in  the  charter,  the  incidental  power,  not  only 
to  make  by-laws,  but,  for  cause,  to  expel  its  members,  and,  for  cause, 
to  remove  corporate  officers,  whether  elected  by  it  or  by  the  people. 

§  243.  Same  subject.  —  Whatever  necessity  or  reason  exists  for 
the  right  of  amotion  at  common  law,  with  respect  to  the  corporation 
at  large,  would,  in  the  absence  of  any  controlling  legislative  pro- 
vision, seem  to  exist  here  not  only  as  to  the  doctrine  itself,  but  also 
with  respect  to  that  authorized  body  by  which  alone  the  corporation 
acts,  and  which  exercises  all  the  corporate  powers  and  functions. 
All  of  the  inhabitants  cannot  meet  and  act  in  their  primary  capacity, 
except  in  organizations  like  the  toivns  in  the  New  England  States ; 
and  if  an  implied  or  incidental  right  of  amotion  exists  at  all,  it  must 
be  exercised  by  the  council  or  governing  body  of  the  corporation. 
If  it  does  not  exist  in  the  council,  it  cannot  be  delegated  to  it  by  an 
ordinance  or  by  any  act  of  the  corporation,  though  if  the  right  does 
exist,  its  exercise  may,  of  course,  be  regulated  by  ordinance  or  by- 
law.1    And  the  right  may  doubtless,  we  think,  be  inferred  from  the 

1  See,   generally,   Willard's  Appeal,   4  Law  Reg.   (x.  s.)  533,  and   note  ;   Smith 

R.  I.  597  ;  State,  &c.  v.  Trustees,  &c,  5  v.  Smith,  3    Desaus.  557-      But  see  State 

Ind.  89  ;  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II.  v.  Jersey  City,   1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536,  in 

[82]  414  ;  Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's  which  the  power  to  expel  a  member  of  the 

Society,    2   Binn.    (Pa.)    448;    Common-  council  was  expressly  conferred,  but  where 

wealth  v.  Bussier,  5  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  Mr.  Justice  Potts,  delivering  the  opinion 

451  ;  Commonwealth   v.    Guardians,    &c,  of  the  court,  says  :  "  The  rule  is  well  set- 

6  Serg.    &  Eawle   (Pa.),   469  ;    Common-  tied  that  a    corporation   has,   at  common 

wealth  v.    Sutherland,    3  Serg.    &    Eawle  law,   an  inherent  jurisdiction  to  expel  a 

(Pa.),  145;  Johns  v.  Xicholls,  2  Dall.  184;  member  for  sufficient  cause."      After  no- 

1  Yeates,  80;  People  v.  Comptroller,  &c,  ticing  the  offences  which  will  justify  ex- 

20   Wend.    (N.    Y.)    595;    State,    &c.    v.  pulsion,   he  adds  :   "  But  the  jurisdiction 

Lingo,   26  Mo.  496  ;  Fawcett  v.   Charles,  in  this  case  is  not  derived  from  the  eom- 

13  Wend.  473;  Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch,  mon  law.     The  common  council  is  not  the 

(N.J.)   265;   People  v.    Board  of  Trade,  corporation,  and,   whatever  powers  a  mu- 

45  111.  112  (1867):  Neall  v.  Hill,   16  Cal.  nicipal  corporation  may  have  to  amove  or 

145  ;  State  v.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  20  expel  a  member  at  common  law,  it  is  clear 

Wis.   63  ;  People  v.    Medical  Society,  24  that    the    corporation    itself  has    not,    by 

Barb.  (X.  Y.)  570  ;  Evans  v.  Philadelphia  any  by-law,  delegated  any  of  them  to  the 

Club,   50  Pa.   St.   107  ;    State  v.  Georgia  common  council,  and  that  body,  therefore, 

Medical  Society,  38  Ga.  608  ;  s.  c.  8  Am.  cannot    avail    itself   of   the    common-law 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  245 


s-  power  to  make  needful  or  reasonable  by-laws,  if  there  is 
nothing  in  the  charter  or  legislation  to  rebut  the  inference. 


§  L'  I  I    (1  82)      Special  Statutory  Tribunal.  — A  provision  in  a  city 

chai  ting  the,  board  of  aldermen  with  the  sob  power  to  try  all 

impeachments  of  city  officers,  the  judgment  only  extending  to  removal 
ami  disqualification  tu  hold  any  corporate  office  under  the  charter, 
<</  unconstitutional  as  authorizing  the  exercise  of  judicial  powers 
by  a  legislative  or  municipal  body,  but  is  rather  the  exercise  of  a 
power  ne<  essary  for  its  police  and  good  administration.1 


s  245  (183).  Power  to  amove 
the  terms  under  which  the  power 
prescribed,  they  must  &<   pursued 

jurisdiction,  vested  as  an  inherent  right  in 
the  corporation  itself,  tu  expel  a  member 
of  their  own  body.  -J  Bac.  Abr.  21,  title 
ma  ;  Willc.  on  Corp.  629.  The 
council  derives  its  jurisdiction  from  the 
charter  of  the  corporation."  This  case 
rules  that  when-,  in  express  terms,  the 
right  of  the  council  to  expel  <i  member  for 
n  i  is  given,  it  cannot  exercise 
the  power  for  any  other  cause.  And  it 
would  seem  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
or  at  least  of  the  judge  delivering  the 
opinion,  that  the  common-law  power  of 
expulsion  belonging  to  a  corporation  could 
not  I"-  exercised  by  the  common  council, 
that  body  not  being  the  corporation  in 
which  the  power  is  vested.  Infra,  sees. 
245,  note,  280.  Sain.-  principle  as  to  pri- 
vate corporations.  State  v.  Chamber  ot 
'  amerce,  20  Wis.  72.  Compare  People 
r.  Board  of  Trade,  45  111.  113. 

-  te  v.  Ramos,  10  La.  An.  420.    See 
P    ,ple  v.  Bearfield,  35  Barb.  (X.  V.)254, 

200.  A  board  of  aldermen, 
Bitting  in  a  judicial  capacity  as  a  court  of 
impeachment  to  try  charges  preferred 
against  a  city  ofTi'-i-r  l>y  another  branch  of 
the  municipal  governing  body,  is  a  court 
of  limited  jurisdiction,  and,  if  not  sworn, 
or  not  Bworn  by  an  officer  authorized  to 
administer  oaths,  their  proceedings  and 
judgment  of  guilty  are  void,  and  create  no 
icy.  Tompert  v.  Lithgow,  1  Bush 
(K.i.  L76  (1866).  See  Hadley  v.  Mayor 
X    '.'.  603    cited   infra,  Be  .   253, 

-  ite  v.  Lingo,  26  Mo.  (;,  Jones)  196; 


to   be   Strictly   Pursued. — "When 

of  amotion  is  to  he  exercised  are 
with  strictness.2    Whether,  if  the 

State  v.  Trustees  of  University,  5  Ind.  77, 
89  (1854);  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II. 
[82]  41 1 ;  State  o.Chamber  of  <  !ommerce,  20 
Wis.  63;  Etegina  v.  Sutton,  10  Mod.  76; 
Paston  v.  Urber,  Hutt.  103;  Regina  v. 
Ricketts,  7  Ad.  &  El.  960;  Rex  v.  Ox- 
ford, G  Ad.  &  El.  34'.i;  Commonwealth  v. 
Sutherland,  3  Serg.fi  Rawle  (Pa.),  145; 
Commonwealth  V.  Sinner,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  338;  Murphy  v.  Webster,  131  Mass. 
482.  In  the  Queen  v.  Sutton,  supra,  so 
strictly  was  a  clause  in  a  charter  confer- 
ring the  right  of  removal  construed,  that 
it  was  held  that  when-  acts  were  to  be  done 
by  a  majority,  thai  word  was  to  be  under- 
stood as  a  majority  of  the  whole  corpora- 
tion, and  thai  if  the  officer  whose  removal 
was  proposed  was  a  member  it  could  be  ef- 
fected only  by  a  majority  of  all  the  mem- 
bers, including  himself,  and  that  his  per- 
sonal interest  did  not  exclude  him  from 
voting  as  a  member   upon  the  question. 

Sec,  also,    State    v.  Jersey   City,    1    Dutch. 

(N.  J.)  536;  Madison  v.  Korbly,  32  Ind. 
7  1;  Suite  v.  McGarry,  21  Wis.  496,  where 
"other  cause"  for  removal  was  held  to 
mean  "other  Ufa-  cause."  The  Circuit 
Court  of  Vie  United  States  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  restrain  the  mayor  or  city  authori- 
ties from  removing  a  city  officer,  upon 
charges  of  malfeasance  in  office.  An  in- 
junction issued  in  such  a  case  and  pro- 
ceedings in  contempt   for  disobedience  of 

the  writ,  held  void.  Re  Sawyer,  124  U. 
S.  200;  supra,  sec.  202,  note  ;  more  fully, 
post,  chap.  xxii. 


§  246  officers;  power  of  expulsion.  331 

power  to  expel  or  remove  be  given  for  certain  causes,  this  excludes  the 
right  to  exercise  the  power  in  any  other  case,  will  depend  upon 
the  intent  of  the  legislature  to  be  gathered  from  a  consideration  of 
the  whole  charter  or  statute.  Power  to  appoint  "  subject  to  removal 
only  for,"  &c,  clearly  limits  the  power  of  removal  to  the  specified 
causes.1  Express  power  of  expulsion  or  removal  for  specified  rea- 
sons was,  in  New  Jersey  and  in  Georgia,  considered  to  exclude  any 
implied  power,  and  to  limit  the  right  to  the  enumerated  causes.2 

§  246  (184).  Power  of  Expulsion  for  Specified  Causes  construed. 
—  A  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  gave  to  the  common  council 
express  power  to  " expel  a  member  for  disorderly  conduct"  and  one 
of  the  aldermen,  being  guilty  of  official  corruption  in  receiving 
bribes,  was,  after  a  hearing,  expelled  from  the  council.  The  court 
was  of  opinion  that  the  question  as  to  the  right  to  expel  for  the 
conduct  charged,  depended  upon  the  construction  of  the  words 
"disorderly  conduct;"  and  it  held  that  receiving  bribes  for  his 
official  influence  and  votes  was  disorderly  conduct,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  charter.3  In  another  case,  the  charter  authorized 
the  council  "to  dismiss  the  marshal  for  malpractice  in  office,  or 
neglect  of  duty ; "  and  it  was  held  that  the  council  could  not  remove 
this  officer  for  the  crime  of  gambling,  as  this  was  neither  malpractice 
in  office  nor  official  neglect,  within  the  meaning  of  the  charter.4 

i  People  v.  Higgins,  15  111.  110.     See  4  Mayor   v.    Shaw,    &c,  16    Ga.    172 

supra,  sec.  243,  note.  (1854).      Relator  was  removed  from   the 

2  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J. )  office  of  policeman  of  the  city  of  New  York, 
536  (1856);  The  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Shaw,  by  the  board  of  police,  under  the  charge 
16  Ga.  172  (1854).  See  s.  c.  19  Ga.  468;  of  "conduct  unbecoming  an  officer,"  this 
21  Ga.  280;  25  Ga.  590;  Cleary  v.  Tren-  being  one  of  the  offences  for  which,  under 
ton,  50  N.  J.  L.  331  (1888);  Clark  v.  the  statute,  a  policeman  can  be  removed. 
Cape  May,  50  N.  J.  L.  558  (1888).  But  The  specifications  were  that  he  was  ap- 
see  Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's  So-  pointed  policeman  contrary  to  law  when 
ciety,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  441;  4  Binn.  (Pa.)  he  was  more  than  thirty  years  of  age,  and 
448;  Angell  &  Ames,  sec.  415.  Under  that  he  had  been  appointed  after  having 
the  Illinois  statute,  it  is  held  that  the  resigned  from  the  force  without  a  vote  by 
county  authorities  do  not  possess  general  yeas  and  nays,  contrary  to  the  require- 
powers  of  removal,  and  that  they  cannot  ments  of  law.  It  was  held  that  these 
remove  a  treasurer  elected  by  the  people,  specifications  had  only  reference  to  rela- 
except  for  causes  specified  in  the  statute  ;  tor's  title  to  the  office,  and  not  to  his 
but  it  may  be  observed  that  a  county  conduct  while  an  officer,  and  did  not  au- 
treasurer  is  a  public  and  not  a  corporate  thorize  the  removal.  People,  ex  rel.  Clapp 
officer.  Clark  v.  The  People,  15  111.  213  v.  Board  of  Police,  72  N.  Y.  415  (1878). 
(1853).     So  a  power  of  removal  conferred  Reported  below,  5  Hun,  457. 

upon  the  mayor  and  common  council  can-  Power  to  punish  for  contempt.  Whether 

not   be   exercised   by   the   council  alone,  the  council  possesses  the  power  to  punish 

Charles  v.  Hoboken,  3  Dutch.  (N.J.)  203.  for  contempt  depends  upon  the  provisions 

3  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  of  the  charter.  The  power  must,  as  the 
536  (1856).  author  conceives,  be  conferred  either  ex- 


: 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§247 


§247      1  Power  to  Expel  construed  and  limited.  —  The  power 

the  council  does  not  authorize  a  resolution  by 
it  thai  "the  president  of  the  council  be  directed  not  to  appoint  a 
in  member  on  any  committee,  nor  call  his  name,  nor  allow  him 
n  the  action  of  the  board,"  since  this  would  create  no 
ncy  which  could   be  supplied,  but   would  leave  the  seat  occu- 
:   while  :  'I  the  occupant,  and  left  his  constituents  un- 

represented.1 


or  as  incidental  to  some  power 
which  is  conferred,  or  it  will  aot  exist. 
In  Doyle  i».  Falconer,  1  Privy  Council 
App  als,  329,  it  was  held  thai  the  colonial 
parliamenl  of  I  )ominica  had  not  the  in- 
herent privilege  of  parliamenl  as  a 

dd  not  therefore  punish  for  con- 
tempt; but  in  the  later  case  of  The 
Speaker  v.    Glass,   3    Privy   Council   Ap- 

60,  il  was  decided  that  the  dele- 
gation of  legislative  authority  to  the 
Victoria  parliament  was  broad  enough  to 
include  this  power.  These  cases  afford 
very  interesting  illustrations  of  the  nature 
ot  the  power  to  punish  for  contempt. 
I  of  the   United  States  to 

punish  for  contempt.  Burr's  Trial,  355; 
Unite  I  .  I  ludson,  7  Crau 

Kearney,    In  re,  7  Wheat.  38.     Power  of 
11   V.  S.  Stats,  at  Large,  155; 
I,     TheCon- 

a  of  the   (Jniti  '1   States  vests  no 
general  power  in  either  House  of  C 
to  pun  pt.      Either    House 

may  punish  its  own  members  for  dis- 
orderly conduct,  or  for  failure  to  attend 
il  ions,   and    may    impeach    officers 

of  the  government,  and  may,  where  an 
examination  of  witnesses  is  neces 
the  performance  of  these  duties,  line  orim- 
■  itness;  bul  neither 
:ommit  a  witness  for  contempt 
for  refusing  to  answer  questions  concerning 
the  private  affairs  of  citizens;  for  example, 

"  the  •  | I  "  in  the   Districl  of 

Columbia,  such  an  investigation  being 
judicial,  not  legislative,  and  the  sergeant- 
at-arms  cannot  justify  in  an  action  Rot  false 
imprisonment  under  such  an  order.  Kil- 
bonrn  v.  Thompson,  1"::  0.  S.  168  (1880). 
Where  th<  I  acorporation   Act 

authori         I  il    of   the 

-  other  things,  for  "  wilful  violation 
of  any  of  the  ordinances  of  Buch  town  or 


city.''  and  provided  for  trial  before  the 
board  of  aldermen,  who  were  empowered  to 
enter  judgment  of  removal  against  him 
upon  finding  that  the  charges  were  "  a  suf- 
ficient cause  for  removal  from  office,"  it 
was  held  thai  the  aldermen  were  not  in- 
vested with  unlimited  discretion,  without 
rd  to  whether  he  was  guilty  of  an 
offence  in  law  or  not ;  and  that  a  viola- 
tion of  an  ordinance  which  was  void  for 
being  unrea  onable  and  in  contravention 
of  common  right,  did  not  furnish  proper 
ground  for  removal.  Milliken  v.  Weather- 
ford,  54  TeX.  388. 

>  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
536  (1856).  See  State  v.  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, 20  Wis.  72.  Powt  r  to  suspend. 
Whether,  pending  proceedings  to  expel,  a 
her  can  be  suspended  from  his  duties, 
was  a  question  not  determined  in  the 
case;  but  in  The  State,  &c.  v.  Lingo,  26 
Mo.  496  (1858),  it  was  held  that  the 
power  to  provide  for  removing  from  office 
corporate  officers  gives  the  power  to  sus- 
pend from  office  during  the  investigation 
of  the  charges  for  which  the  suspension 
was  made.  The  court  say,  "The  power 
to  remove  necessarily  includes  the  minor 
power  to  suspend."     lb.  499. 

The  charter  of  a  city  empowered  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  for  sufficient  cause  to 
remove  constables  and  police  officers.  By 
a  vote  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  the 
plaintiff,  a  constable  and  police  officer, 
was  "  suspended  from  duty  on  the  po- 
lice," and  from  that  time  was  not  permit- 
ted   to   perform   the    duties  of  the  (dice, 

although  he  was  ready  and  offered  to  do 
so,  until  he  was  afterwards  reinstated.  It 
was  held  that  he  could  not  recover  for 
services  during  the  period  of  his  suspen- 
sion. Ladd,  J.,  says:  "  It  does  not  seem 
to  require  argument  to  show  that  the 
power  to  remove  must  include  the    power 


§  250  OFFICERS  ;    POWER   OF   REMOVAL.  333 

§  248  (186).      Re-election  of  expelled  Member  of  Council.  —  The 

expulsion  of  a  member  of  the  common  council  does  not  disqualify 
him  from  being  re-elected  to  the  same  office,  unless  it  is  expressly  so 
provided  by  the  charter ;  for  where  the  law  annexes  a  disqualifica- 
tion to  an  offence,  it  does  so  in  terms.  Hence,  if  a  mem  Iter,  hav- 
ing been  expelled  even  for  bribery,  be  re-elected,  he  cannot  be 
expelled  a  second  time  for  the  same  identical  act  for  which  he  had 
before  been  expelled.1 

§  249  (187).  Instance  of  implied  Power  of  Removal  for  Cause 
by  the  appointing  Power.  —  It  was  held  in  a  case  in  Khode  Island 
that  a  clerk  of  a  school  committee  —  an  officer  created  by  the  school 
law,  and  necessary  to  the  organization  and  legal  action  of  the  com- 
mittee —  may,  after  an  election  by  the  committee,  be  removed  from 
office  by  the  committee,  but  only  for  cause,  as  the  statute  gives  no 
express  power  to  remove,  and  after  due  notice  and  opportunity  given 
him  to  defend  himself  upon  the  charges  presented.2 

§  250  (188).  Power  of  Removal.  —  Where  an  officer  is  appointed 
during  pleasure,  or  where  the  power  of  removal  is  discretionary,  the 
power  to  remove  may  be  exercised  without  notice  or  hearing.  But 
where  the  appointment  is  during  good  behavior,  or  where  the  re- 
moval can  only  be  for  certain  specified  causes,  the  power  of  removal 
cannot,  as  will  presently  be  shown,  be  exercised,  unless  there  be  a 
formulated  charge  against  the  officer,  notice  to  him  of  the  accusa- 
tion, and  a  hearing  of  the  evidence  in  support  of  the  charge,  and  an 
opportunity  given  to  the  party  of  making  defence.3 

to  suspend."     Shannon  v.  Portsmouth,  54  less  expressly  forbidden  by  law,   is  inci- 

N.  H.    183   (1874);    Westberg  v.    Kansas  dental  to  the  committee,  as  necessary  to 

City,    64   Mo.    493   (1877);  Wayne  Co.  v.  enable  it  duly  to  perform  its   functions." 

Benoit,  20   Mich.    176;   Attorney-General  lb.  p.  601.    It  is  sufficient  cause  for  the  re- 

v.    Davis,  44   Mo.    131;  Prinim  v.  Caron-  moval  of  such  a  clerk  that  he  refuses  to 

delet,  23  Mo.  22.     Infra,   sec.  248,  note,  produce  papers  which  belong  to  the  body 

1  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J. )  which  elected  him,  and  of  which  he  is 
536  (1856).  If  the  common  council,  simply  the  custodian,  or  refuses  to  keep 
without  authority,  suspend  a  member  from  or  amend  the  records  when  duly  ordered 
the   duties   of  his  office,  mandamus  is  a  to  do  so.     lb. 

proper  remedy  to  restore  him  to  the  exer-  3  Field  v.  Commonwealth,  32  Pa.    St. 

cise  of  his  legal  rights,     lb.;   supra,   sec.  478  (1859);  Ramshay,  In  re,  83  Eng.  Com. 

247,  note;   AVillc.  on   Municipal  Corpora-  Law,   174,  189  (1852);  Hennen,  In  re,  13 

tions,   368,  pi.  74,  75;  lb.   377,   pi.   96;  3  Pet.    (II.    S.)    230;    Queen  v.   Governors, 

Black.  Com.  110;  Rex  v.  Barker,  3  Burr.  &c,  8  Ad.   &  El.    632;    Bagg's  Case,  11 

1266;    Angell  &   Ames   on   Corporations,  Coke,    93    (b);    Rex   v.    Coventry,  1   Ld. 

sees.  702,  706.  Eaym.  391;    Dr.    Gaskin's  Case   8  T.  R. 

2  Willard's  Appeal,  4  R.  I.  595,  597,  209;  Rex  r.  Oxford,  2  Salk.  4'2S;  Rex  v, 
per  Ames,  C.  J.,  who  says,  "Such  a  Mayor,  &c,  1  Lev.  291;  2  Kyd,  58,  59; 
power  with  regard  to  such  an  officer,  un-  Willc.  253,  254;  Grant,  244;  Rex  v.  An- 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§251 


Incidental    Power    to    remove    for    Cause  ;    Rex    v. 

Richardson. —  In  the  leading  case  of  The  King  v.  Richardson,  the 
point  was  decided,  as  above  mentioned,  that  a  corporation,  in  the 
absence  of  an  ex]  mt  of  authority,  had  the  incidental  power 

to  make  a  by-law  to  remove  officers  (or  just  cause.  Lord  Mansfield 
in  that  case  classified  the  offences  which  would  justify  the  exercise 
of  the  power;  and  his  judgment  therein  has  been  followed  both  in 
England  and  in  this  country,  in  cases  arising  in  private  corporations 
not  of  a  pecuniary  character.  According  to  Lord  Mansfield,  there 
arc  tlnvc  sorts  of  offences  for  which  an  officer  or  corporator  may  be 
discharged:  1.  Such  aa  have  no  immediate  relation  to  his  office,  but 
are  themselves  of  so  infamous  a  nature  as  to  render  the  offender  unfit 
to  execute  any  public  franchise.  2.  Such  as  are  only  against  his 
oath  and  the  duty  of  his  office  as  a  corporator,  and  amount  to 
lnvaches  of  the  tacit  condition  annexed  to  his  franchise  or  office. 
3.  Offences  of  a  mixed  nature,  —  as  being  an  offence  not  only 
against  the  duty  of  his  office,  but  also  a  matter  indictable  at  the 
common  law.1     In  offences  of  the  first  class  the  removal  can  only 


]  1,1.  Raym.  710;  Page  v.  Hardin, 
s    B.    Mon.    648  ;    Ho  oken    i».    Gear,    3 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)   265;   Madison    v.    Korbly, 
32  In.l.  71  (1869);  Stadler  v.  Detroit,  L3 
346  (1865).     Charter  power  of  re- 
moval,   without    cause,   at   any  time,  of  a 
patrol    appointed    for  a   year,    see 
Chicago  r.  Edwards,  58  111.   252    (1871). 
■-/,    by    the    appointing 
power,  of  officers,  the  duration  of    whose 
term  is   not    fixed,    -<■■    People  v.  Comp- 
troller, &  ■  .  20  Wend.  (X.  V. )  595;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Sutherland,  3  Serg.  &  Etawle 
(Pa  ),    1  15;    Field   v.  Girard  College,  54 
-    tew.  Doherty,  25  La.  An. 
119  (1-7:'.);  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  131;  State 
v.  St.  Louis,  90   Mo.    19;  People  v.  Nich- 
N.  Y .  582.     A  resolution  to  " dis- 
"  of  an  officer,  passed 
by  a  council  having  power  to  remove  him 
pleasure,  was  hi  1  1   to  be  a  removal 
3l   ■        Sohn,  97  Ind.  L01.    Where  ex- 
■   is  given   by   statute   to  the 
■  officer  at  his  pleasure, 
tr  thai  the  mayor  i>  the 
exclusive  judge  of  the  propriety  of  exer- 
the  power.     People   v.  New  York, 
Y.  191.     The  mayor  of  a  city  held 
cud  the  fire-engi- 
1  ily  appointed  by  the   mayor   with 

at  Of  ti  incil,  and 


declare  vacancy,  and  appoint  another  per- 
son in  his  place.  State  v.  Bryson,  44 
Ohio  St.  457;  State  v.  Hudson,  44  Ohio 
St.  137.  Power  to  remove  officers  under 
a  special  statute  and  charter  provision, 
see  Ham  v.  Police  Board,  142  Mass.  90; 
New  Brunswick  v.  Fitzgerald,  48  N.  J.  L. 
457. 

It  is  the  law  in  England,  as  applied  to 
the  old  corporations,  that  causes  which 
disqualify  the  person  to  be  an  officer  will 
no1  authorize  the  corporation  to  amove 
him,  but  he  must  be  ousted  by  quo  war- 
ranto. The  reason  given  is  that  one  so 
disqualified   is   not,    in  law,   a  corporate 

officer,    and    hen :anno1   be  amoved  as 

such  by  the  corporation.  Rex  v.  Don- 
caster,  Say.  40;  Buller  N.  P.  203;  Bex 
v.  Lyme  Regis,  Doug.  85;  Symmers  r. 
Regem,  Cowp.  502;  Willc.  259,  pi.  669; 
Wide.  281,  pi.  72S.  And  see  Fawcett  v. 
Charles,  L3  Wend.  473  (1S35).  It  has 
elsewhere  been  shown  [ante,  sec.  200  ct 
seq.)  that  with  us  the  councils  of  munici- 
pal corporations  are  often  made  judges  of 
the  qualifications  of  their  members  and 
officers,  and  this  may  modify  or  el. 
the  ride  above  mentioned,  which  seems  to 
rest  on  narrow  ami  technical  grounds. 

1  Res  o.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517,  538, 
(175S)  ;    followed,    Bex    v.    Liverpool,    2 


251 


OFFICERS  J     IMPLIED    POWER    OF    REMOVAL. 


335 


be  made  after  there  has  been  a  previous  conviction  in  a  court  of 
law ;  and  an  amotion  will  not  be  sustained  by  a  subsequent  con- 
viction.1 In  offences  of  the  second  class  the  corporation  may  try, 
and  if  the  charge  is  established,  remove,  without  any  previous  or 
other  proceeding  in  the  courts.2  In  offences  of  the  third  class  the 
English  judges  have  differed  on  the  point  whether  the  officer  may 
or  may  not  be  removed  before  a  conviction  in  a  court  of  justice. 
The  principal  cases  and  the  result  on  this  point  are  briefly  stated  in 
the  note.3 


Burr.  723;  supra,  sec.  240.  So,  also,  in 
Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's  (Benevo- 
lent) Society, '2  Binn.  (Pa.)  441  (1310); 
Commonwealth  v.  Guardians,  &c,  6  Serg. 
&  Rawle  (Pa.),  469  (1821).  These  cases 
adopt  Lord  Mansfield's  classification,  and 
assert  the  inherent  power  of  corporations 
to  expel  for  offences  falling  within  any 
of  the  three  classes.  See,  also,  Butch. 
Benef.  Assoc.  35  Pa.  St.  151;  38  Pa.  St. 
208;  Evans  v.  Philadelphia  Club,  50  Pa. 
St.  107;  Society,  &c.  v.  Commonwealth, 
52  Pa.  St.  125. 

The  courts  in  a  proper  case  may,  by 
mandamus,  compel  a  corporation  to  amove 
an  officer;  and  the  result  of  the  English 
cases  on  this  point  is  considered  to  be 
that  where  the  offence  of  the  officer  is 
such  that  the  corporation  has  the  power 
to  amove,  the  court  will  only  compel  it 
to  do  so  where  some  one  is  injured  by 
the  omission  to  remove;  but  where  it  is 
required  to  amove,  or  the  office  is  declared 
by  the  charter  or  statute  to  be  void  if 
such  an  act  be  done  or  omitted,  there  the 
court  will  compel  it  to  amove,  though  no 
one  be  shown  to  have  been  aggrieved. 
Rex  v.  Truro,  3  Barn.  &  Aid.  592;  Rex  v. 
West  Looe,  5  Dowl.  &  R.  416;  Rex  v. 
Totness,  5  Dowl.  &  R.  483;  Grant  on 
Corp.  243,  and  note. 

1  Rex  v.  Richardson,  supra,  and  cases 
cited  in  last  note. 

2  Rex  v.  Richardson,  supra;  Common- 
wealth v.  St.  Patrick's  Society,  supra,  and 
cases  cited  in  last  note  but  one. 

8  Rex  v.  Carlisle,  Fortesc.  200;  s.  c.  11 
Mod.  379.  In  this  case  the  corporation, 
before  conviction,  amoved  a  capital  citizen 
for  giving  a  bribe  to  a  freeman,  and  offer- 
ing him  another  to  influence  his  vote  at 
the  election  for  a  mayor.  The  court's 
judgment   was   in   favor   of  the  right  to 


amove.  Although  there  might  have  been 
a  previous  conviction,  yet  this  being  a 
great  offence  against  the  duty  of  his  office, 
the  corporation  might  amove  without  a 
conviction.  In  Rex  v.  Derby,  Cas.  temp. 
Hardw.  155,  Lord  Hardwicke  mistook  the 
above  case  on  this  point,  and  inclined  to 
think  there  ought  to  be  a  previous  con- 
viction. And  such  seemed  also  to  be  the 
inclination  of  Holt,  C.  J.,  in  Rex  v. 
Chalke,  Comb.  397,  where  the  removal 
was  before  conviction,  for  criminally  raz- 
ing entries  in  the  corporation  books  which 
were  at  first  proper,  but  the  point  was  not 
decided.  In  Haddock's  Case,  T.  Raytn. 
439,  the  amotion  was  for  riotously  assem- 
bling and  assaulting  several  corporators, 
thereby  impeding  the  business  of  the  cor- 
poration. It  was  considered  that  the  of- 
fence was  two-fold,  —  one  against  the 
duty  of  his  office  as  a  corporator,  the  other 
(wholly  disconnected)  of  a  riot.  And  as 
he  might  be  guilty  of  one  and  yet  be  ac- 
quitted of  the  other,  the  corporation  might 
amove  without  conviction;  and  the  case 
is  said  to  be  different  from  that  of  Chalke 
(supra),  for  there  the  officer  could  not 
have  been  guilty  of  the  offence  at  law 
without  at  the  same  time  having  been 
guilty  of  a  breach  of  his  duty.  The  cases 
decided  are  considered  to  favor  this  view, 
viz.,  if  the  act  is  criminal  and  single  in 
its  nature,  so  that  a  conviction  or  acquit- 
tal in  the  courts  of  law  will  necessarily 
determine  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
party,  there  must  be  a  conviction,  but 
otherwise  there  may  be  a  removal  with- 
out, or  independent  of,  a  conviction. 
Buller's  N.  P.  206 ;  Willc.  249-252  ; 
Glover,  331,  338  ;  Grant,  240  ;  2  Kyd, 
88-94,  where  the  prior  cases  are  digested 
and  stated.  Lord  Mansfield,  in  Rox  v. 
Richardson,  1  Burr.  538,  leaves  the  point 


Ml/NICIl'AL    CoIiroKATIONS. 


§252 


§  J  Scope    of  implied   Power   of   Removal.  —  Principle 

and  sound  [  that  the  implied  power  of  removal  for  uf- 

irporation    be   restricted  to  acts   of   a   serious 

nature  directly  affecting  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  corporation.1 

Cau  emoval  have,  in  some  instances,  been  held  sufficient  in 

land  which  would  not  probably  lie  so  regarded  in  this  country. 

principal  English  ire  given   in  the  aote.     The  sufficiency 

and  reasonableness  of  the  cause  of  removal  are  questions  for  the 


A    removal     for    a   riot     in 
the  council-chamber,  without  a   pn 

R  i  v.  \  ati       S  ited   8    Mod.    101. 

irther,    Eai  Carth.    17:;; 

H  Is,    t   Burr.    L999;  Regina  v. 

Newberry,  1  Q.  B.  751  ;  2  Bac  Abr. 
(  Bouv.  ed. )  176,  and  cases  c 

1  Evans  c  Philadelphia  Club,  50  Pa. 
St.  107;  Butch.  B.  Assoc,  35  Pa.  St. 
151;  38  Pa    -  ociety,  &c.  v.  Com- 

Ith,    52   Pa.    St.    125;    Common- 
wealth v.   Philanthropic  Society,  5  Binn. 
i .  <  loin m on  <  louncil,  9 
i4;  Mayor,  &c.    v.   Geisel,    19   Ind. 
'.  ri  pht,  L9  [nd.  346. 
a   !:■  3alk.   -J  19.     Pov- 

erty of  i  ,:  In   could  not  pay 

taxes,  .uise  for  amoving   him. 

/         But  not  applicable  here.      Bui 
rujitry  insufficient  cause    of    amotion     of 
councilman.     Rex   i>.   Liverpool,   2    IWirr. 
:  R    ..  v.  Chitty,  ;'.  Ad.  &  E.  609. 

Total  desertion  of  duties  of  office  sufficient 
cause.  Buller's  X.  I'.  206;  Rex  r.  Rich- 
ardson, 1  Burr.  541.  When  abst  nee  and 
upon  me-:  ings,  and  neglect 
of  duly,  will  :it  cause.     Sei    Ri  x 

v.  Richard  on,  swpn  i;  Rex  v.  Wells,  4 
Burr.  2004;  1  Hawk.  P.  C.  chap.  lxvi. 
sec.  l,  i.il  negled  of  duty,  ap- 

"        fu  ''/,    in    ca 
cited;  Lor  i   Brace's  I  lase,  2  Sim.  819,  and 
Ri  '.  v   Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym,  1233; 
diet's   X.    P.   201 
Lord  Hawley'    Ca  e,  1  Vent   1  t''.:  i:       o. 
,   ]    Barn.    S    Ad.    936;    Q 
.  fcc,  of  Pomfret,  l'>  Mod.    107;  2 
'.,  where  the  oldi 

155-264;  Angel]  .v  Ames, 
am  iry  of  Engli  I 
Mm  h  depends  upon  the  cause  <>f  the  neg- 
i    th  t  is  to  obstruct 


or  lander  the  business  of  the  corporation 
el  officer  from  being  done. 

Habitual  drunk*  nness,  disqualifying 
from  the  performance  of  duty,  is  a  suf- 
ficient cause  to  remove  an  alderman  or 
officer  charged  with  magisterial  functions. 
Rex  v.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  231;  1  Rolle,  409; 
3  Bulst.  190.  But  casual  intoxication,  or 
bring  drunk  by  accident,  is  not  a  sufficient 
cause,  for  the  reason  (charitably  allowed) 
that  this  is  likely  to  happen  to  the  best. 
Rex  v.  Taylor,  supra,  A.  I).  1616.  Old 
age  is  insufficient.  Bac.  Abr.  Corp.  E.  9; 
Hazard's  Case,  2  Rolle,  11. 

Mere  threats  or  attempts,  no  injury  re- 
sulting, not  sufficient.  Bagg's  Case,  11 
Coke,  93.  Insulting  language,  or  libel 
upon  mayor  or  officers,  held  insufficient, 
on  the  ground  that  personal  oll'cnces  are 
to  !»■  punished  by  law,  and  not  by  the 
corporation.  Rex  v.  Oxford,  Palm.  455; 
Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke,  93,  96,  97,  98,  99; 
Clerk's  Case,  2  Cro.  506;  Buller's  X.  P. 
203;  Reg.  v.  Lane,  Fortesc.  275;  s.  c.  11 
Mod.  270  ;  Earle's  Case,  Carth.  174  ; 
AVillc.  261,  pi.  680.  See  Regina  v. 
.  2  Ld.  Raym.  777;  limes  v.  Wylie, 
1  Carr.  &  K.  257:  Regina  v.  Treasury,  10 
Ad.   &    I'..   374;  2   leu.  &   D.  498. 

'  cial  misconduct,  amounting  to  mis- 
demeanor, has  been  before  mentioned,  and 
the  cases  cited.  The  misconduct  must, 
it  seems,  specially  relate  to  the  execution 
of  the  office.  Hex  r.  Wells,  4  Burr.  1999; 
Bee  Regina  v.  Newberry,  1  Q.  B.  751.  If 
the  same  person  hold  tivo  oj/iccs,  miscon- 
duct with  respect  to  one  will  authorize 
removal  from  that  one,  but  not  from  both; 
but  if  the  offence  is  against  the  duties 
of  both,  the  removal  may  be  from  both. 
I  halke,  1  Id.  Raym.  226:  s.  c.  5 
Mod.  2."7:  Mxr  Doncaster,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
1560;  s.  C.  1  Barnard.  265;  Rex  v.  "Wells, 


§254 


officers;   proceedings  to  amove;  notice. 


337 


§  253  (191).  Proceedings  to  amove.  —  Respecting  the  proceed- 
ings to  amove,  it  has  already  been  observed  that  they  must  be  had 
by  and  before  the  authorized  body  duly  assembled,  in  conformity  with 
the  rules  on  that  subject,  which  are  elsewhere  stated.1  The  pro- 
ceeding in  all  cases  where  the  amotion  is  for  cause  is  adversary  or 
judicial  in  its  character ;  and  if  the  organic  law  of  the  corporation 
is  silent  as  to  the  mode  of  procedure,  the  substantial  principles  of 
the  common  law  as  to  proceedings  affecting  private  rights  must  be 
observed.2 

§  254  (192).  Notice  of  Proceeding  to  amove.  —  And  first,  the 
officer  is  entitled  to  a  personal  notice  of  the  proceeding  against  him, 


4  Burr.  1999;  Rex  v.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad. 
936.  Misemployment  of  corporate  funds 
in  his  custody  is  not  sufficient  cause  of 
amotion,  though  generally  it  is  good  cause 
of  suspension  from  a  financial  office;  for 
the  court  will  not  grant  a  mandamus  to 
restore  until  the  accounts  are  made  up  and 
submitted  to  the  corporation.  Rex  v. 
Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  226;  s.  c.  5  Mod. 
259  ;  Rex  v.  London,  2  Term  R.  182  ; 
"Willc.  262,  pi.  685  ;  Angell  k  Ames,  sec. 
428.  On  principle,  it  may  be  suggested 
that  if  an  implied  power  of  amotion  exists 
at  all,  it  should  extend  to  a  case  where 
the  financial  officer  of  a  corporation  is 
misemploying  its  funds  entrusted  to  his 
safe  keeping. 

i  Rex  v.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  231;  Rex  v. 
Sandys,  2  Barnard.  302;  Taylor  v.  Glou- 
cester, 1  Roll.  409;  s.  c.  3  Bulst.  190; 
Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  226;  2  Kyd. 
57;  Grant,  245,  275;  Willc.  264,  pi.  691; 
Willc.  266,  pi.  698.  Necessity  for  vote 
or  corporate  act,  declaring  the  removal  or 
expulsion.  Commonwealth  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania, &c.  Institute,  2  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  141  ;  Commonwealth  V.  German 
Society,  15  Pa.  St.  251;  Stadler  v.  De- 
troit, 13  Mich.  346.  Where  the  ordinance 
creating  an  office  expressly  reserves  to  the 
city  council  the  power  to  remove  the  in- 
cumbent at  pleasure,  the  repeal  of  the 
ordinance  and  notice  to  him  of  the  repeal 
operate  as  a  removal.  Chandler  v.  Law- 
rence, 128  Mass.  213. 

Where,  by  statute,  the  mayor,  recorder, 
and  an  alderman  were  constituted  a  body 
to  try  charges  against  policemen  appointed 
by  the  corporation,  with  power  to  sus- 
pend or  remove,  the  presence  of  the  mayor 
vol.  i.  — 22 


is  essential  to  the  constitution  of  the  legal 
body,  and  if  one  act  in  the  trial  of  such  a 
charge  as  mayor,  who  is  not  such  de  jure 
[or  de  facto],  the  order  of  removal  is  void. 
Hadley  v.  Mayor,  &c,  33  N.  Y.  603;  see 
supra,  sec.  244.  Special  provision  of 
charter  construed  to  give  the  power  of  re- 
moval to  the  mayor  and  council,  and  not 
to  the  council  alone.  Charles  v.  Hoboken, 
3  Dutch.  (N.  J. )  203.  Andrews  v.  King, 
77  Me.  224,  where  the  officer  was  "  sub- 
ject after  hearing  to  removal  by  the  mayor, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
aldermen,"  it  being  held  that  the  hearing 
should  have  been  by  the  "  board  of  mayor 
and  aldermen  ;  "  a  hearing  by  the  alder- 
men alone  being  held  insufficient  though 
the  officer  had  consented  to  it.  In  this  case 
it  was  also  held  that  the  mayor  and  alder- 
men should  first  find  as  a  fact,  and  adjudi- 
cate, that  sufficient  cause  for  removal  ex- 
isted, before  a  valid  order  of  removal  could 
be  made. 

2  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II.  [82], 
414,  416  (1836).  "This  proceeding," 
(amoval  of  a  trustee  of  the  university)  "  is 
essentially  adversary;  the  justice  of  the 
common  law  permits  no  investigation  of 
facts  which  may  be  followed  by  a  loss  of 
a  right  or  by  the  infliction  of  a  penalty,  to 
be  conducted  ex  parte."  lb.,  per  Lane,  J., 
Murdock  v.  Academy,  12  Pick.  244;  State 
v.  Trustees,  &c.,  5  Ind.  77.  Charter 
mode,  if  prescribed,  must  be  pursued. 
lb.;  Bacher's  Case,  20  Pa.  St.  425;  see 
People  v.  Bearfield,  35  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  254; 
State  v.  Common  Council,  9  Wis.  254; 
Madison  v.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74;  Tonipert 
v.  Lithgow,  1  Bush,  (Ky.)  176  (1866). 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  254 

an  1  of  the  time  when  the  trial  body  will  meet.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  notice,  citation,  or  summons  set  out  the  charges  in  detail, 
but  it  should  contain  the  .substantial  fact  that  a  proceeding  to  amove 
is  intended.1  The  analogies  <>!'  the  ordinary  procedure  in  the  courts 
of  the  Stat.'  (in  the  absence  <>f  statute  or  by-law)  may  be  followed, 
qo  sui  li  details  as  the  notice  or  summons,  mode  of  service, 
lice  nt'iii  ■'  with:   1.    By  appearance  and  answer 

to  the  charges.2  2.  By  a  total  desertion  of  the  place,3  so  that  it  is 
ii"!  practicable  to  give  the  ootice;  as  where  the  officer  lias  perma- 
nently, ii"t  temporarily,  left  the  municipality  and  resides  constantly 
where  with  his  family.  Though  he  may  have  been  absent  or 
left  the  borough,  yet  if  he  return  and  be  in  the  place  at  the  time  of 
thr  amotion,  he  is  entitled  to  notice."1  If  the  amotion  be  for  ^ood 
cause,  such  as  conviction  of  an  infamous  crime,6  or  the  repeated 
declaration  of  the  officer  that  he  would  not  discharge  the  duties  of 
his  office,6  while  it  would  be  more  regular  to  give  the  notice,  yet  its 
omission  will  not  entitle  him  to  a,  mandamus  to  be  restored;  for  if 
restored  he  could  be  amoved  again,  and  the  courts  will  not  order 
a  restoration  where  they  can  see  that  there  is  good  ground  of  re- 
moval, and  that  the  order  to  restore  would  be  without  practical  and 
useful  effect.7     With  these  exceptions,  the  party  is  entitled  to  no- 

D  >-.  Saddlers'  Co.,  10  House  of  the  acts  in  question  .are  not  of  an  official 

I;  State  v.  Bryce,   supra;  nature.     lb.      Where    power   is  given    to 

I;  Richardson,  1    Burr.  540;  Rex  v.  remove   for   cause,  a  specification   of  the 

Doncaster,  2   Burr.  738;  see  1   B.  &  Ad.  charges,  notice,  ami  an  opportunity  to  be 

942;     Rex    v.    Liverpool,    2    Burr.    731;  heard,  are  essential,  though  the  charter  be 

Bag       '        ,  11  B   p.  99a;   Rex  v.  Wilton,  silent  as  to  the  procedure  to  be  adopted  in 

5  Mod.  259;  Exeter  v.  Glyde,  4  Mod.  37;  such  a  case.  State  v.  St.  Louis,  yo  Mo.  19. 

K  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240;  Willc.         -  Willc.  264;  Rex  v.  Wilton,  2   Salk. 

265;   [nnes  v.  Wvli,-,  1  C.  &  K.  257;  428;  Keg-  ».  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240; 

South    P.   R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  165;  People  v.  Rex   v.    Feversham,  8  Term  R.  356;  Rex 

-     .ly,    24    How.    I'r.    216;  v.    Carmathen,  1   Maule  &  Sel.  697;   s.  p. 

-.    Neuse,    &c.    Co.,    1    Hawks  Commonwealth    v.    Pennsylvania    Benef. 

(N.  C),  274;  Commonwealth  v.  Pennsyl-  Institute,  2  Serg.  &  Rawle,  141. 

Bet  !.    In  unite,  2  Serg.   &  Rawle  3  Willc.  265,  266;  Grant,  245;  Rex  v. 

(Pa.),  Ill  Vandyke,  2  Whart.  Harris,  1   B.  &  Ad.  936;  Rex  v.    Shrews- 

(Pa.)   309;  Nichols,    In   re,  6   Abb,   New  bury,   Cases    temp.    Hardw.   151;  7  Mod. 

57   How.  Pr.  395;  People,  202;  Reg.  v.  Trueboy,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1275; 

mere,   &c.,  of   Brook-  11  Mod.  75;  Rex.  v.  Grimes,  5  Burr.  2601; 

lvn.  106  ff.  V.  64;    People  v.  Nichols,  79  Rex  v.  Leicester,  4  Burr.  2089. 
X.    V.    582.      Where   the    power   of  re-  4  Rex  v.  Leicester,  1  Burr.  2089. 

!   in  the  mayor  for  cause,  6  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec.  422,  where 

dicially,  and  a  writ   of  prohibi-  this  opinion  is  expressed;  Grant,  265;  Rex 

tion  will  lie  against  him,  if  he  i  !    his  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  226. 

jurisdiction.     People  o.  Cooper,  57   How.  a  Rex  v.  Axbridge,    f'owp.   523;  see  2 

Pr.   IK.,     [f  the  incnmbenl    of  an    office  Term  R.  182;  Grant  Corp.  245. 

i  means  of  wrong-doing,  '   Rex  v.  Griffiths,   5   B.    k  Aid.   735; 

this  ,  mse  of  removal,   though  sec  Blagrave's  Case,  2  Sid.  6,  49,  72;  Rex 


§255 


OFFICERS  ;    AMOTION  ;    CHARGES. 


339 


tice  of  the  intention  to  amove,  so  that  he  may  have  full  and  fair 
opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his  defence. 

§  255  (193).  The  Charges  muat  be  formulated  :  Opportunity  to 
defend.  —  There  must  be  a  charge,  or  charges,  against  him,  specifically 
stated,  with  substantial  certainty ;  yet  the  technical  nicety  required 
in  indictments  is  not  necessary.1  And  reasonable  time  and  opportu- 
nity must  be  given  to  answer  the  charges  and  to  produce  his  testi- 
mony ;  and  he  is  also  entitled  to  be  heard  and  defended  by  counsel, 
and  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses,  and  to  except  to  the  proofs 
against  him.2  If  the  charge  be  not  denied,  still  it  must,  if  not 
admitted,  be  examined  and  proved.8  Where  the  specific  charge 
stated  is  insufficient  to  justify  the  removal,  or  where  the  removal  is 
erroneous  and  no  good  and  sufficient  ground  therefor  appears,  the 
officer  is  entitled  to  a  mandamus  to  restore  him.*  But  where  the 
proceedings  are  in  conformity  with  the  charter,  and  are  regular, 
the  sentence  will  not  be  inquired  into  collaterally,  nor  its  merits 
examined  by  mandamus  or  action.5 


v.  Rowe,  1  Show.  188;  s.  c.  Carth.  199; 
Grant,  Corp.  245.  If  one  irregularly 
amoved  for  good  cause  be  restored  by 
mandamus,  he  may  be  again  amoved  by 
regular  proceedings  de  novo.  Taylor  v. 
Gloucester,  3  Bulst.  190;  Reg.  v.  Ipswich, 
2  Ld.  Raym.  1233.  In  such  case  the 
office  is  vacated  from  the  time  of  the  sec- 
ond amotion;  the  proceedings  do  not  re- 
late back  to  the  former  irregular  amotion. 
Willc.  269,  pi.  707. 

1  Tompert  v.  Lithgow,  1  Bush  (Ky.), 
176  (1866);  Rex  v.  Lyme  Regis,  Doug. 
179;  Bagg's  Case,  11  Co.  99  a;  s.  c.  1 
Roll.  225;  Glover,  334;  Willc.  267. 

2  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II.  [82], 
414  (1836);  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1  Burr. 
540;  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  734;  Mur- 
dock  v.  Academy,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  244, 
where  the  requisites  of  a  valid  proceeding 
to  amove  are  stated.  Rex  v.  Chalke,  1 
Ld.  Raym.  226  ;  Rex  v.  Derby,  Cas. 
Temp.  Hardw.  154.     Ante,  sec.  254,  note. 

8  Rex  v.  Faversham,  8  Term  R.  356; 
Harman  v.  Tappenden,  1  East,  562;  Willc. 
267;  Glover,  334;  Murdock  v.  Academy, 
12  Pick.  (Mass.)  244.  A  municipal  offi- 
cer, when  removed  by  the  corporation  ap- 
pointing him,  is  entitled  to  actual  notice 
of  his  removal,  and  to  compensation  until 


he  receives  such  notice.  Jarvis  v.  Mayor, 
&c.  of  New  York,  2  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs. 
396. 

4  Reg.  v.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240; 
Madison  v.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74  (1869); 
Commonwealth  v.  German  Society,  15  Pa. 
St.  251  (1850);  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536.  The  restoration  puts 
him  in  the  same  situation  that  he  was  be- 
fore the  attempted  removal.  Willc.  269; 
post,  sec.  847.  Since  there  is  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law  by  quo  warranto  (post, 
chap.  xxi. )  or  by  mandamus  to  restore 
(post  sec.  847),  equity,  will  not  enjoin  the 
corporate  authorities  from  making  an  un- 
lawful removal  or  appointing  a  successor. 
Delahanty  v.  Warner,  75  111.  185  (1874); 
s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  237.  Post,  sec.  275. 
Under  the  statute  of  Florida,  the  action  of 
a  council  in  amoving  an  officer  is  review- 
able by  mandamus,  and  in  that  proceeding 
the  court  will  review  all  the  action  of  the 
council  and  the  testimony  adduced  before 
it.     Donnelly  v.  Teasdale,  21  Fla.  652. 

6  Society,  &c.  v.  Commonwealth,  52 
Pa.  St.  125  (1866);  Peoples.  Bearfield,  35 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  254.  Though  the  amotion 
be  illegal,  the  officers  who  took  part  in  it 
are  no*t  personally  liable,  unless  both 
malice   and   want   of  probable    cause   be 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  256 


§  256  (194).  Effect  of  Valid  Amotion;  Vacancy.  —  If  the  amo- 
tion be  legal  and  authorized,  the  office  becomes  ipso  facto  vacant  from 
the  time  the  amotion  is  declared,  and  another  person  may  be  elected 
ippointed  to  till  it.  If  the  removed  officer  afterward  continues 
to  act,  he  is  a  mere  usurper,  and  may  be  ousted  on  quo  warranto  and 
punished.  Amotion  from  one  office  does  not,  of  course,  affect  the 
party's  title  to  another.1 


shown.     I  human  v.  Tappenden,  3  Espin. 

o.  1  East,  ;"'.">;'>;  Ferguson  v.  Earl 
of  Kinnoul,  9  CI.  &  P.  239. 

Jurisdiction  as  to  tin-  election  and 
amotion  of  officers  in  corporations,  when 
imt  changed  by  Btatute  belongs  to  the  com- 
i  ,,/  not  to  equity.  At- 
torney-General v.  Earl  Clarendon,  17  Ves. 
491;  Dyer,  332;  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22 
[owa,  7.">.  See,  also,  In  re  Sawyer,  124 
U.  S.  200  (1887);  ante,  sees.  202,  note, 
204,  uote,  275,  and  note.  Where,  by 
charter,  a  city  council  had  power  to  re- 
move police  officers,  and  the  mayor  had 
power  also  to  increase  or  diminish  their 
number  at  discretion,  it  was  held,  in  an 
action  brought  by  a  policeman,  removed  by 
the  mayor  for  malfeasance,  for  Ids  salary, 
that  in  the  former  case  the  judgment  of 
the  council,  being  judicial,  was  conclusive, 
while  the  action  of  the  mayor,  being 
ministerial,  was  not  conclusive  upon  the 
officer.  Oliver  v.  Americus,  69  Ga.  165; 
•  e.  202;  post,  sec.  275. 

i  Jay's  Case,]  Vent.  302;  Symmers  v. 

Regem,  Cowp.    503;  Willc.  268,  pi.  704; 

Doncaster,  2  Ld.    Raym.   1566;  1 

Barnard.  265;  Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym. 

Mr.  Willcock,    267,  pi.  704,    whoso 


language  is  adopted  by  Glover  (Corp. 
334),  states  that  if  a  person  legally  amoved 
continues  to  act,  he  is  a  mere  usurper, 
and  that  "all  corporate  acts  in  which  he 
has  concurred  are  equally  void,  as  though 
he  had  never  been  elected  or  admitted." 
But  if  he  is  permitted  to  act  after  amotion, 
it  would  probably  be  considered,  in  this 
country,  that  his  acts  would,  as  to  third 
persons,  be  valid,  like  those  of  an  officer 
de  facto.  If  the  removal  be  unauthorized, 
Mr.  Willcock  states  the  rule  to  be,  "  That 
all  corporate  acts  in  which  he  has  con- 
curred between  the  moment  of  his  removal 
and  restitution  are  of  equal  validity  as  if 
he  had  never  been  amoved,"  &c.  Willc. 
269,  pi.  707.  If  he  was  regularly  present 
and  concurred,  it  can  well  be  seen  how 
this  should  be  so  ;  but  his  concurrence 
when  not  regularly  acting,  or  when  a  de 
facto  successor  has  taken  his  place  and  is 
acting,  would  not  seem  to  alter  the  legal 
quality  of  the  act.  In  this  country  the 
acts  of  a  de  facto  officer  of  a  de  jure  office 
are  everywhere  considered  valid  as  re- 
spects the  public.  Ante,  sees.  215,  note, 
221,  note,  230,  note,  235,  note,  237,  nrte. 
Post,  sees.  276,  892,  note ;  Cushing  v- 
Frankfort,  57  Me.  541. 


§  259  CORPORATE   MEETINGS.  341 


CHAPTER   X. 

CORPORATE   MEETINGS. 

§  257  (195).  Subject  outlined.  — The  subject  of  Corporate  Meet- 
ings will  be  considered  under  the  following  general  heads :  — 

1.  Common  Law  Requisites  of  a  Valid  Corporate  Meeting  — 
sees.  258-261. 

2.  Notice  of  Corporate  Meetings  at  Common  Law  and  under  the 
English  Municipal  Corporations  Act  —  sees.  262-265. 

3.  New  England  Town  Meetings ;  Requisites  of  Notice  and  Power 
of  Adjournment —  sees.  266-269. 

4.  Constitution  and  Meetings  of  Councils,  or  of  Select  Governing 
Bodies,  and  herein  of  Quorums  and  Majorities ;  of  Integral  Parts ; 
and  of  Stated,  Special,  and  Adjourned  Meetings  —  sees.  270-287. 

5.  Mode  of  Proceeding  when  convened  —  sees.  288-292. 

§  258  (196).  Common-Law  Requisites  of  a  Valid  Corporate 
Meeting.  —  As  respects  their  mode  of  action,  municipal  corporations 
in  this  country  are  of  two  general  classes.  In  the  one,  as  in  the 
organization  of  towns  in  the  New  England  States,  heretofore  adverted 
to,  all  of  the  qualified  inhabitants  meet,  act,  and  vote,  in  person} 
In  the  other,  which  is  the  kind  that  prevails  generally  throughout 
the  States,  and  even  in  many  of  the  larger  places  in  New  Englaud, 
the  affairs  of  the  town  or  city  are  administered  by  a  select  or  repre- 
sentative body,  usually  denominated  the  council,  and  which  is  elected 
by  the  qualified  voters  of  the  incorporated  place,  not  assembled  to- 
gether in  a  meeting,  but  at  an  election,  where  each  elector  votes 
separately  and  by  ballot.2 

§  259  (197).  Corporate  Meetings.  —  The  latter  class  of  corpo- 
rations is  properly  municipal.  The  former  class  is  not  so  strictly 
municipal  as  it  is  public  in  its  character.3  Where  there  is  a  council 
or  governing  body,  the  inhabitants  or  voters,  in  their  natural  capacity, 
have  no  power  to  act  for  or  to  bind  the  corporation,  but  the  corpora- 

1  Ante,  chap.  ii.  sec.  28.  8  Ante,   chap.  i.  sec.  9;  chap.  ii.  sees. 

2  Ante,  chap.  ii.  sec.  28  et  seq.;  chap.     22,  23,  and  note. 
ix.  sec.  194  et  seq. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  260 

ti. mi  must  act,  and  can  be  bound  only  through  the  medium  of  this 
body.  Therefore,  authorized  acta  done  by  the  council  are  not  their 
but  those  of  the  corporation.  The  council  is  a  body  which  is 
tantly  changing  ;  it  is  simply  the  agent  of  the  corporation.  But 
its  members,  it  has  been  well  observed,  arc  not  only  not  the  muni- 
cipal corporation,  bul  arc  not  even  a  corporation.1  Whether  the  cor- 
poration be  of  the  one  class  or  the  other,  its  affairs  must  fo  transa 

rporaie  meeting,  in  the  one  case  of  the  qualified  inhabitants, 
and  in  the  other  of  the  members  of  the  council  or  governing  body, 
duly  convened  at  the  proper  time  and  place,  and  upon  due  notice 
m  cases  where  notice  is  requisite.2 

5J  260  (108).  Requisites  of  a  valid  Corporate  Meeting  of  the  old 
English  Municipal  Corporations.  — In  England,  prior  to  the  General 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835,3  the  requisites  of  a  valid  corpo- 
meeting  depended  upon  the  constitution  of  the  particular  cor- 
poration under  its  charter,  or  prescriptive  usage.  To  constitute  a 
corporate  assembly  there  must  at  common  law  be  present  the  mayor 
ot  other  head-officer  (he  being  considered  an  integral  part  of  the 
corporation,4  in  whose  absence  no  valid  corporate  act  could  be  done), 
a  majority  of  the  members  of  each  select  or  definite  class  (these 
classes  being  also  considered  integral  [tarts),  and  some  members  of 
the  indefinite  body  (indefinite  in  point  of  numbers;  usually  styled 
the  commonalty,  and  of  each  of  the  indefinite  classes  if  there  he 
more  than  one.5  If  there  be  no  indefinite  class,  and  the  eoverniii'j 
body  consist  of  a  select  or  definite  class,  the  common-law  requisite 
of  a  valid  corporate  assembly  is,  that  a  majority  of  the  select  class 
must  be  present;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one  such  class,  then  a 
majority  of  each  of  the  select  classes  of  which  the  corporation  is 
constituted;  and  the  presence  of  the  mayor  at  a  select  assembly  of 
this  kind  is  not  necessary,  unless  it  is  expressly  required.6  But 
where  a  common  council  exists  (which,  in  contemplation  of  the  an- 
eieut  law,  is  a  meeting  of  the  body  at  large,  or  those  of  them  who 

imore,    L0   Ad    &  EL  4  Ante,  chap.  iii.  sec.  35.      Further  aa 

Regina    v.  York,   2   Queen's   l'>.  to  mayor,  see  ante,  chap,   ix.,  relating  to 

•    Simpson,  8  Queen's  B.  73;  Municipal  Elections  and  • 'Hirers,  sec.  208. 

The   Municipal  Corpora-  ■•  Willc.    52,  53,66;  Bex  v.  Atkyns,  3 

Acl    1882,    sec.    1".                    pro-  Mod.  23;  1  Rol.  Ahr.  514;  Rex  v.  Carter, 

vides  thai  "thecouncil  shall  exercise  all  Cowp.   59;  Rex    v.  Smart,   4   Burr.  2143; 

the  powers  vested   in   the  corporation  l>y  Rex   v.  Gaborian,   11    East,  87,  note;  Rex 

this  Act  or  otherwise."     Post,  v.  Morris,   l    East,   26;   Rex   v.  Belliinger, 

-  Dey  v.  Jei        City,  19  »    J.  Eq.  H2  1  Term  R.  823;  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  Term  R. 

(1869);   Baltimore  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  18  -J7>:    Rex   v.    Varls,   Cowp.    250;    Rex   v. 

(186  Monday,  Cowp.  539. 

*  Ante,  chap.  iii.  sue.  35  et  seq.  °  See  authorities  cited  in  the  last  note, 


§  261  REQUISITES   OF   VALID    CORPORATE   MEETINGS.  348 

thought  proper  to  attend,  or  were  considered  by  their  fellow  freemen 
the  men  best  fitted  to  attend),  though  such  council  has  become  a 
select  or  definite  class,  there  the  presence  of  the  mayor  or  head  pre- 
siding officer  is  necessary  to  a  valid  assembly,  though  such  presence 
be  not  required  by  the  charter.1 

§  261  (199).  Same  subject.  —  A  majority  of  each  definite  part 
means  a  majority  of  the  number  of  members  of  which  that  part  con- 
sists, not  merely  a  majority  of  the  existing  members  of  the  part ; 
but  if  the  act  is  to  be  done  by  an  indefinite  body  alone,  it  is  valid  if 
done  at  a  meeting  duly  convened,  although  but  a  small  fraction  of 
the  whole  body  at  large  be  present.  But  while  the  presence  of  a 
majority  of  each  definite  integral  part  was  necessary  to  a  valid  cor- 
porate meeting,  yet  it  is  settled  law  that  a  majority  of  those  present, 
when  legally  assembled,  will  bind  the  rest.2  Not  only  did  the  law 
of  the  old  corporations  in  England  require  the  presence  of  a  majority 
of  the  members  of  each  definite  integral  part,  but  it  went  to  the 
extreme  length  of  holding  that  where  the  presence  of  the  mayor 
was  necessary,  he  must  be  the  legal  mayor,  and  if  he  be  merely  an 
officer  de  facto,  and  afterwards  be  ousted  on  quo  warranto,  all  corpo- 
rate acts  done  under  the  sanction  of  his  office  are  voidable.3  By 
reason  of  the  change  in  the  constitution  of  municipal  corporations 
in  England,  wrought  by  the  Corporations  Act  of  1835,  many  of  the 
rules  respecting  corporate  meetings  are  no  longer  applicable,  though, 
as  we  shall  see,  some  of  them  still  are.  Under  that  statute  the  cor- 
poration acts,  and  can  only  act,  through  the  council ;  and  it  is  pro- 
vided that  all  questions  shall  be  decided  by  a  majority  of  all  the 
councillors  present,  including  questions  of  adjournment;  that  one 

1  Wfflc.  67.  Young,    12  Gratt.    (Va.)  303(1855),  ap- 

2  Rex  v.  Bellringer,  4  Term  P.  810  proving  Willo.  216,  pi.  546;  Labonrdette 
(1792),  and  cases  cited;  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  v.  Municipality,  2  La.  An.  527  (1847); 
Term  R.  268;  Rex  v.  Monday,  Cowp.  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  12  Met. 
531,  538;  Rex  v.  Devonshire,  1  Barn.  &  (Mass.)  99  (1846);  Damon  v.  Granby,  2 
Cress.  609;  Rex  v.  Bower,  1  Barn.  &  Pick.  (Mass.)  345,  355  (1824);  Coles  v. 
Cress.  492;  Rex  v.  May,  4  Barn.  &  Ad.  843;  Trustees,  &c,  of  Williamsburg,  10  Wend. 
Rex  v.  Headley,  7  Barn.  &  Cress.  496;  (N.  Y.)  658  (1833);  Rex  v.  Greet,  8  Pain. 
Willc.  216,  pi.  546;  Blacket  v.  Blizard,  9  &  Cress.  363;  The  Queen,  ex  rel.  Hyde  v. 
Barn.  &  Cress.  851 ;  Rogers,  In  re,  7  Cow.  Barnhart,  7  Upper  Can.  L.  J.  126  ;  The 
(N.  Y.)  526  (1827);  lb.,  note  a,  764;  Queen,  ex  rel.  Heenan  v.  Murray,  1  Upper 
Willcocks,  In  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402,  Can.  L.  J.  x.  s.  104;  2  Kent  Com.  293; 
and  note  462,  463  (1827);  Young  v.  Buck-  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec.  501;  Launtz  v. 
ingham,  5  Ohio,  485,  489  (1832);  Buell  v.  People,  113  111.  137. 

Buckingham,   16   Iowa,    284   (1864),   and  3  Rex    v.    Carter,    Cowp.    59;    Rex    r. 

cases  cited;  State  v.  Deliesseline,    1   Mc-  Hebden,    Amir.     391;    Rex  v.    Dawes,  4 

Cord  (S.  C).  52  (1821);  State  v.  Huggins,  Burr.  2279;  Willc.  54,  55. 
Harper    (S.    C),     94    (1824);   Booker  v. 


MUNICIPAL   COBPOBATIONS.  §  203 

1  part  of  the  number  of  the  whole  council  shall  be  a  quorum  ; 

that  tin-  mayor,  it'  present,  shall  preside,  and  if  absent,  that  a  pre- 

ng  officer  .shall   be  chosen,  who  shall  have  a  second  or  casting 

Notice  of  Corporate   Meetings  at  Common  Law,  and 
under  the  English  Municipal    Corporations    Act.  —  Due    notict    of  the 

time  and  plaa  of  a  corporate  meeting  is,  by  the  English  law,  essen- 
tial to  its  validity,  or  its  power  to  do  any  act  which  shall  bind  the 
corporation.  Respecting  notice,  the  courts  in  England  adopted  cer- 
tain rules,  which,  since  they  form  the  basis  of  much  of  the  statute 
law  in  this  country  upon  the  subject,  and  have  in  the  main  been 
followed  by  our  courts,  and  are  founded  on  reason,  may  advan- 
tageously be  here  mentioned.  All  corporators  are  presumed  to  know 
of  tin-  days  appointed  by  the  charter,  statute,  usage,  or  by-laws,  for 
tin-  transaction  of  particular  business,  and  hence  no  notice  of  such 
meeting  lor  the  transaction  of  such  business  is  necessary,  or  for  the 
transaction  of  the  mere  ordinary  affairs  of  the  corporation  on  such 
day-  ;  yet  if  it  is  intended  to  proceed  to  any  other  act  of  importance, 
a  notice  is  necessary,  the  same  as  at  any  other  time. 

§  !_' <*).'!  'L'ol  .  Notice  how  Given  and  how  Waived.  —  A  notice, 
when  necessary,  must,  if  practicable,  be  given  to  every  member  who 
has  a  right  to  vote,  where  the  act  is  one  to  be  done  by  a  body  con- 
nur  of  a  definite  class  or  classes,  and  it  must  be  given  by,  or 
issued  by  order  of,  sonic  one  who  has  the  authority  to  convene  a 
corporate  meeting.  Bui  notice  may  be  altogether  dispensed  with 
or  it-  necessity  waived,  by  the  presence  and  consent  of  every  one  of 
those  entitled  to  it.2  It  must  be  served  personally  upon  every  resi- 
dent member,  or  left  at  his  house.  If  temporarily  absent,  it  may  be 
left  with  his  family,  or  at  his  house  or  last  place  of  abode.  An 
ordei  to  serve  all  is  not  sufficient;  all,  if  practicable,  must  be  served, 
but  if  the  party  entitled  to  notice  has  entirely  quit  the  municipality, 
and  has  no  family  or  house  within  its  limits,  notice  is  not  neces^ry. 
It  must  be  served  a  reasonable  time  before  the  hour  of  meeting,  of 
which  the  court  will  judge  from  all  the  circumstances,  including 
usage.  If  the  charter  provides  a  method  by  which  the  notice  shall 
rved,  its  provisions  must  be  strictly  obeyed.8 

1  5  rod  8  Wm.  IV.  chap,   lxxvi.    roc.  '-'  Beaver  Creek  v.  Hastings,  52  Mich. 

Rawliimon  on    Corp.   (5th    ed.)   186;  528;  Lord  v.  Anoka,  86  Minn.  176;  State 

85,  87;  English    Mu-  v.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 
nicipal                                    32,  Bee.  21.  *  Lord  v.  Anoka,  36  Minn.  176. 


§  265  meetings;   notice  under  English  act.  345 

§  264  (202).  Requisites  of  Notice ;  Time  and  Place  ;  "Waiver.  — 
The  notice  must  state  the  time  of  meeting,  and  the  place,  it*  it  be  not 
the  usual  place.  It  is  not  necessary  to  state  what  business  is  to  be 
done,  when  the  meeting  relates  only  to  the  ordinary  affairs  of  the 
corporation ; .  but  when  it  is  for  the  purpose  of  electing  or  removing 
officers,  passing  ordinances,  and  the  like,  the  fact  should  be  stated,  so 
that  members  may  know  that  something  more  than  the  usual  routine 
of  business  will  be  transacted.  Such  great  importance  is  attached  to 
notice  that  it  can  only  be  waived  by  universal  consent ;  but  if  every 
member  of  a  select  body  be  present  at  a  regular  or  stated  meeting 
or  at  a  special  meeting,  they  may,  if  every  one  consents,  but  not 
otherwise,  transact  any  business,  ordinary  or  extraordinary,  though 
no  notice  was  given,  or  an  insufficient  notice,  but  the  unanimity  of 
consent  should  plainly  appear  from  their  recorded  declaration,  acts, 
or  conduct.  This  unanimity  is  only  necessary  in  order  to  enter 
upon  the  business ;  once  commenced,  the  usual  rules  which  govern 
the  body  and  its  actions  apply.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  fore- 
going rules  are  not  applicable  where  they  are  in  conflict  with  the 
charter ;  and  hence,  if  this  imperatively  requires  a  special  notice,  it 
cannot  be  waived,  even  by  consent  of  all.  The  guild  hall  is  the 
proper  place  for  the  meeting ;  if  there  be  none,  the  meeting  should 
be  at  the  usual  place ;  and  if  at  any  other  place,  it  should  be  stated, 
to  prevent  fraud  or  surprise.  Acts  done  at  an  unusual  place  will  be 
closely  scrutinized.1 

§  265  (203).  Notice  under  English  Act.  —  By  the  English  Muni- 
cipal Corporations  Act,2  the  subject  of  meetings,  stated  and  special, 

1  Authorities  in  support  of  the  last  and  both  select  and  indefinite  bodies  of  public 

two  preceding  sections  of  the  text :  Willc.  corporations.     Rex  v.  Langhorne,  4  Ad.  & 

chap.  i.  sec.  42,  et  seq. ;   Rex  v.  Hill,  4  B.  EL  538.     See,  also,  Rex  v.  Faversham,  8 

&  C.  441;  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  7."4;  Term.  R.  356,  ^?erLord  Kenyon,  arguendo. 

Rex  v.  Doncaster,   2   Burr.    744;    Rex  v.  Where  the  city  charter  provided  that  the 

Theodorick,   8  East,  545;  Hex  v.  May,  5  mayor  might  call  special   sessions  of  the 

Burr.  2682;  Rex  v.    Oxford,    Palm.    453;  council,    and  that   he    should    "specially 

Rex  v.  Grimes,  5  Burr.  2601;  Kynaston  v.  state  to  them  when  assembled  the  objects 

Shrewsbury,   2    Stra.   1051;    Musgrove  v.  for  which  they  have  been  convened,  and 

Nevison,  1  Stra.   584;  s.  c.   2  Ld.  Raym.  their  action  shall  be  confined  to  such  ob- 

1359;  Rex  v.  Mayor  of  Shrewsbury,  Cases  jects,"  an  ordinance,  passed  at  a  meeting 

temp.    Hardw.    147;    Smyth  v.    Barley,  2  so  called,  having  no  reference  to  anything 

House    of  Lords   Cases,    789  ;    Grant   on  alluded  to  in  the  mayor's  message,  was  de- 

Corp.    154-156;    Glover   on    Corp.    chap,  clared   void.      St.   Louis  v.  Withaus,  16 

viii.  pp.  146-173.    Formerly  the  rule  that  Mo.  App.  247;  affirmed  on  appeal,  90  Mo. 

where  notice  was  necessary  every  member  646. 

must  be  notified,  was  applied  only  to  the  2  5  and  6  Wm.    IV.  chap.  Ixxvi.   sec. 

case    of  definite  bodies,    but  it  has  more  69;   ante,  sees.  35,  37  ;  Consolidated  Act 

recently  been  declared  to  be  applicable  to  1882,  sec.  22. 


846  Ml'MCIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §266 

immona  required  arc  made  matter  of  express 
::.      It   provides  tor  every  borough  or  city  four  quarterly 
•unci!  in  each  year,  to  be  held  at  a  fixed  date.     No 
to  6<   transacted  at  these  quarterly  meetings  is 
;.  ;  but  three  days'  notice,  by  posting  on  or  near  the  town 
hall,  is  required  of  the  time  and  place  of  every  intended  meeting. 
given  to  the  mayor  to  caU  special   meetings,  or,  on  his 
refusal,  to  five  mi  mbers  of  the  council,  in  which  case  the  notice  on 
or  Dear  the  town  ball  shall  state  therein  the  business  proposed  to  be 
transacted  at  such  meeting,  and  in  ever}   case  a  summons  (in  addi- 
tion to  the  notice)  must  he  left  at  the  usual  place  of  abode  of  every 
member  of  the  council,  or  at   the   premises  occupied  by  him,  in 
f  which  be  is  enrolled  aa  a  burgess,  at  least  three  clear  days 
re  i lie  meeting,  and  no  business  can  be  transacted  not  specified 
in  the  summons.     Power  to  adjoivrn  meetings  is  expressly  conferred 
upon  the  council  by  the  same  section.1 

vj  266  (204).  New  England  Town  Meetings;  Notice  and  Ad- 
journment.—  In  New  England  the  inhabitants  are  required  to  be 
Bed  or  warned  of  town  meetings.  The  requisites  of  such  notice, 
and  manner  of  giving  it,  are  prescribed  by  statute.  The  provision 
is  quite  general  thai  the  articles  or  matters  to  he  acted  upon  shall  be 
ified  or  inserted  in  the  notice  or  warrant.  The  courts  in  those 
States  concur  in  requiring  the  statute  as  to  notice  to  be  faithfully 
observed  by  the  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of  calling  meetings. 
Meetings,  to  be  valid,  must  be  warned  or  notified  according  to  law. 
The  rule  of  the  English  courts  applied  to  indefinite  corporate  bodies, 
thai  if  .ill  are  present  notice  may,  by  unanimous  consent,  be  waived,2 
i-  not  regarded  as  applicable  to  the  town  meetings  of  New  England, 
and  heni  facto  meeting,  nol  duly  notified,  though  attended  by 

all  the  voters  capable  of  attending,  is  not  a  valid  meeting,  and  its 
re  void.3 

1  In   construing  fliis   statute,    it    has  notice.     Town  Council,  &c.  v.  Court,  1  E. 

lir]. I  that  where  the  meeting  is  an  &    K.  77<>;  Regina  v.  Whipp,   4    Queen's 

quarterly   meeting,    notice    is  Bench,  ill.     Ante,  sec.  259,  note. 

any  I              which  teas  -   l;    .  v.  Theodorick,  8  East,  545  ;  ante, 

ipon  at   the  general  sec.  28. 

'■•    i iting,   bu1   r  i  - .  t  3  Bayward  v.  School  District,  2  Cush. 

(Mass.)  419  (1848);   M •  v.  Newfield,  4 

h    an   adjourned   quartt-rly  Greenl.  (Me.)   -II  (ls-_'^):  School   District 

ithoul  the  notice  and  summons  <•.  Atherton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)   106   (LS46); 

which  tl.                                     B  Little  v.  Merrill,  10  Pick.    (Mass.)  548; 

.    1"  Queen's   Bench,  717,7.".:..  !'u\    v.    Dover,   1'J    Pick.    (Mass.)  206; 

:  l:     nolds  v.  New  Salem,  6  Met.    (M  i    .) 

Barn.  St  Ad.  '.':;■;.     As  to  340;  Congregational  Society  v.  Sperry,  10 


§  267    MEETINGS  ;    REQUISITES   OF   NOTICE ;    OBJECT    OP   MEETING.     347 


§  207    (205).     Requisites   of  Notice  ;   Object   of  Meeting.  —  It  is, 
however,  sufficient  if  the  pwpose  or  object  of  the  meeting  can  fairly 


Conn.    200;    Bloomfield   v.    Charter   Oak 
Bank,  121  U.  S.  121, 130;  Kami  0.  Wilder, 
11    Cush.    (Mass.)    294    (1853);    Stone  v. 
School   District,    8   Cush.     (Mass.)    592; 
Brewster  v.   Hyde,  7   N.  H.  206;  North- 
wood  v.  Harrington,  9  N.  H.  369;  Giles  v. 
School  District,  11  Fost.  (31  N.   H.)  304; 
Lander   v.   School  District,    33   Me.    239 
(1851);  Jordan  v.  School  District,  38  Me. 
164  (1854.)     So  in  Vermont  it   has   been 
decided  that  it  cannot  be  shown,  by  parol, 
to  validate  the  levy  of  tax  by  a  meeting 
not  legally  warned,  that  all  the  legal  voters 
of  the  district  were  present  at  the  meet- 
ing.     Sherwin    v.    Bugbee,    17    Vt.    337 
(1845);  distinguished  by  the  court  from 
Rex   v.  Theodorick,    8   East,   543.      And 
see,  also,  Hunt  v.  School    District,  14  Vt. 
300;  Pratt  v.  Swanton,  15  Vt.  147.    Requi- 
sites of  notice  and   sufficiency.     Wyley  v. 
Wilson,  44  Vt.  407   (1872).     Under   the 
legislation  of  Connecticut,  although  it   is 
held  that  the  right  to  call  a  borough  meet- 
ing for  any  lawful  purpose  is  a  legal  right 
of  every    freeman,    yet    as   it    is    shared 
with  all  other  freemen  it  can  be  enforced 
only  by  a  proceeding   in  the  name  of  the 
State.       Peck    v.    Booth,    42     Conn.    271 
(1875).     But  see  post,  sees.  865,  900,  921, 
923,  n.     "  A  town  [in  Connecticut]   can- 
not make  a  contract,  or  authorize  any  offi- 
cer  or   agent   to   make  one  in  its  behalf, 
except   by   vote   in  a  town  meeting  duly 
notified   or  warned ;    and   the    notice   or 
warning  must   specify   the   matter   to   be 
acted  on,  in  order  that  all  the  inhabitants 
(whose   property   will    be   subject   to    be 
taken  on  execution  to  satisfy  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  town)  may  know  in   advance 
what  business  is  to  be   transacted  at   the 
meeting.     If  the  subject  of  the  vote  is  not 
specified   in   the   notice   or   warning,  the 
vote  has  no  legal  effect,  and  binds  neither 
the  town   nor  the   inhabitants.     No  one 
can   rely   upon   a  vote  as  giving  him  any 
rights  against  the  town,  without  proving  a 
sufficient  notice  or  warning  of  the  meeting 
at  which  the  vote  was  passed.     Reynolds 
v.   New   Salem,  6  Met.    340  ;    Stoughton 
School  District  v.  Atherton,  12  Met.  105; 
Moor  v.    Newfield,   4   Greenl.   44;  Dillon 
Mun.    Corp.   sees.    266-26S.      Upon   this 


point  the  statutes  and  decisions  of  Con- 
necticut are  perfectly  clear."  Per  Gray, 
J.,  Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank,  121 
U.  S.  129  (1886).  A  tax  voted  at  a  meet- 
ing not  legally  viarned  is  illegal,  and  may 
be  recovered  back  if  the  party  did  not  pay 
it  voluntarily.  Rideout  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 1  Allen  (Mass.),  232  (1861).  So  it 
may  be  recovered  back  if  the  assessment  is 
void.  Gerry  v.  Stoneham,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 
319  (1861);  Tobey  v.  Wareham,  2  Allen 
(Mass.),  594;  post,  chap,  xxiii.  See  Mas- 
sachusetts act  of  1859,  chap,  cxviii.,  limit- 
ing, in  such  cases,  the  plaintiffs  right  of 
recovery  to  illegal  excess  of  taxation. 

Authority  to  the  clerk  to  call  and  warn 
"  the  annual  meetings,"  does  not  author- 
ize him  to  call  and  warn  special  meetings  ; 
and  the  acts  and  doings  of  a  special  meet- 
ing thus  called  are  wholly  void.  School 
District  V.  Atherton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  105 
(1846).  And  authority  "  to  warn  "  future 
meetings  does  not  authorize  him  "to 
call"  such  meetings.  Stone  v.  School 
District,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  592  (1851). 

As  to  proof  of  notice,  and  the  return  of 
the  person  or  officer  making  the  warning, 
and  what  it  shall  show,  see  State  v.  Wil- 
liams, 25  Me.  564  (1846),  and  the  Massa- 
chusetts and  Maine  decisions  therein  cited 
and  commented  on.  Christ's  Church  v. 
Woodward,  26  Me.  (ISShep.)  172  (1846); 
Fossett  v.  Bearce,  29  Me.  523  (1849); 
Bearce  v.  Fossett,  34  Me.  575  (1852);  Jor- 
dan v.  School  District,  38  Me.  164  (1854); 
Perry  v.  Dover,  12  Pick.  206;  Houghton 
v.  Davenport,  23  Pick.  235;  Williams  r. 
Lunenberg,  21  Pick.  75;  Briggs  v.  Mur- 
dock,  13  Pick.  305;  Eand  ©.Wilder,  11 
Cush.  (Mass.)  294  (1853);  Cardigan  v. 
Page,  6  N.  H.  1S2  ;  State  v.  Donahay,  1 
Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.).  404;  Hardcastle  v. 
State  (27  N.  J.  L.),  552;  Detroit,  &c.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bearss,  39  Ind.  598;  McPike  v.  Parr, 
51  Mo.  63;  French  v.  Edwards,  13  Wall. 
511.  In  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  17  Vt.  337, 
the  strict  view  is  held  that  the  notice  or 
warning  must  be  recorded  by  the  clerk.  If, 
as  recorded,  the  time  for  which  the  meet- 
ing was  to  be  holden  is  not  specified,  the 
defect  cannot  be  supplied  by  parol  evidence 
that  in  the  original  warning  the  hour  for 


- 


MUNICIPAL    COKPORATIONS. 


§2C7 


•  from  the  notice  or  warrant.1  And  where  the  statute 
requires  the  time  and  place  to  be  stated  in  the  notice,  its  require- 
ments must  In-  observed,  and  there  ran  be  no  legal  meeting  unless 
it  originally  assembles  at  the  prescribed  time  and  place.  The  law 
rictly  held  as  to  the  important  particulars  of  time  and  place,  as 
will  appear  by  the  illustrations  in  the  notes.2 

the  meeting  was  named.    This  decision  was  -  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439.  4-14, 

not  put  nj the  ground  that   the  Btatute  (1844).     In  reference   to   town  meetings, 

expressly  required  the  warning  to  be  re-  the  statute  of  Vermont    requires  that  the 

corded  (which  it  did  not),  bul   upon    the  notice    shall    be    in   writing,    and   shall 

ad  that  the  statute  intended  that  the  "specify  the  business  to  be  done,  ami  the 

rd8  should  furnish  all   the  means   for  time  and  place  of  holding  said  meeting." 

testing   the  validity   "f  the   proceedings.  Referring  to   this  statute,  Redfield,  J.  (in 

as  !•.  Society,  &c.,  L2   Vt.  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  supra),   says  :    "  We 

i);   post,  sec.    310.     Where   the  have  no  doubt   the  place  of  holding  the 

place  of  an  annual  meeting  is  not  fixed  by  meeting  must  be  definitely  specified.     It 

te  or  charter,  notice  of  the   meeting  would  hardly  do  to  warn  a  meeting  to  he 


and  place  is  essential.  United  States  v. 
McKelden,  -  Rep.  Dec.  L879,  p.  778; 
M.  Arthur  £  Ma.  key,  162.  Presumption  in 
of  meeting  after  lapse  of 
long  time.  Peterborough  v.  Lancaster,  14 
N  II.  882,  892  :  post,  sees.  267,  note,  285, 
note.  Length  of  notice.  Hunt  v.  School 
District,  14  Vt.  800;  Pratt  v.  Swanton,  15 
Vt  247;  post,  Bee.  285,  note. 

Under  a  statute  of  JVi  w  York,  the  notice 
it  required  of  school  meetings  held  to  be 
directory  only,  and  the  want  of  notice, 
when  not  fraudulently  or  wilfully  omit- 
ted, does  not  render  the  meeting  invalid, 
and  its  proceedings  void.  Marchaut  v. 
rthy,    6    Hill    (N.    Y.),    646;   af- 

fir 1   in   error,    8    Denio  (N.  Y.),  526. 

See,  also,  Williams  r.  I.arkin,  3  Denio, 
114;  pott,  sec.  290.  Where  the  charter 
required  the  clerk  to  publish  a  notice  re- 
quiring  all  persons  interested  in  and  op- 
posed  to  a  local   improvement  to  attend 

before    the   council    at    n   day   named,  and 
such  notice  was  given  and  a  hearing  had, 
held  that    Bince   the  chatter  pro- 
vided  for  but   one  notice  and  one  hearing, 
a   matter  of  discretion  with  the 
council  whether  another  hearing  should 
be  allowed,  and  that  subsequent  action  by 
ancil  w  ithonl  Buch  notice  or  second 

hearing  was  n<  t,  under  the  circumstai r, 

invalid.     Locke  v.  Rochester,  5  Lansing 

I,    11    (1871);  pOSt,    sees.  80S,  804, 

1  School  District  v.  Blakeslee,  13  Conn. 
827. 


held  at  some  place  in  the  district,  or  at  a 
designated  village,  or  at  one  of  two  or 
more  dwelling-houses.  So,  too,  in  regard 
to  time,  there  seems  to  be  a  propriety  in 
having  it  definitely  fixed.  If  the  day, 
only,  is  named,  the  question  immediately 
arises,  Shall  the  inhabitants  be  required 
to  attend  the  whole  day  ?  or,  When  can 
the  meeting  transact  the  business  for 
which  they  meet,  so  as  to  bind  the  absent 
members?  The  fact  that  the  meeting 
adjourned  to  another  day  and  hour  will 
not  help  the  matter,  on  the  obvious  prin- 
ciple that  the  adjourned  meeting  could 
have  no  more  authority  than  the  original 
meeting,  which  was  void." 

Where  it  appears  that  a  meeting  was 
held  on  the  day  appointed,  it  will  be  pre- 
turned  thai  it  was  held  at  a  suitable  time 
in  the  day,  and  pursuant  to  the  notice. 
A  meeting  should  be  opened  within  a 
reasonable  time  after  the  hour  specified  ; 
but  what  is  such  reasonable  time  depends 
upon  circumstances.  School  District  v. 
Blakeslee,  13  Conn.  227-  Where  a  meet- 
ing was  called  at  a  certain  school-house, 
it  was  held  to  mean  within  the  walls  of 
the  building.  An  assemblage  of  some  of 
the  citizens  in  the  highway  near  the 
Bel 1-house,  and  an  adjournment  to  an- 
other place,  was  not  a  legal  meeting,  and 
its  transactions  wen'  not  binding,  though 
the  school-house  was  locked,  and  the 
weather  cold  and  no  lire  in  the  building. 
Chamberlain  >'.  Dover,  18  .Me.  466  (is:'.'',). 
See,    also,  Haines   v.    School  District,  41 


§  269 


MEETINGS  ;    POWER   TO   ADJOURN. 


349 


§268  (206).  Specification  of  Object  of  the  Meeting.  —  Where  the 
statute  requires  the  notice  "to  specify  the  business  to  be  done,"  an 
omission  to  comply  with  this  requirement  makes  the  meeting  void, 
and  it  is  held  that  a  notice  stating  generally  "  to  do  any  proper 
business,"  is  insufficient,  and  the  acts  and  votes  of  a  meeting  held 
under  it  are  of  no  binding  or  legal  force.1  Indeed,  the  rule  is  gen- 
eral that  where  the  statute  requires  the  business  to  be  stated  in  the 
warrant  or  notice,  this  is  absolutely  essential,  and  the  meeting  must 
be  confined  to  those  matters.2 

§  269  (207).  Power  to  adjourn.  —  At  a  meeting  duly  constituted 
and  organized,  a  majority  of  the  members,  electors,  or  corporators 
present,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute  either  conferring  or  denying 
the  power,  have,  in  the  absence  of  any  restrictive  statute,  the  implied 
incidental  corporate  right  to  adjourn  the  meeting  to  another  time, 


Me.  246  (1856)  ;  Kingsbury  v.  School 
District,  12  Met.  99.  But,  in  Maine, 
where  a  meeting  had  been  called  for  the 
basement  of  a  building,  the  fact  that  the 
meeting,  which  was  crowded,  being  un- 
able to  take  a  division  within  the  walls 
with  ease  or  comfort,  by  unanimous  con- 
sent and  without  protest,  from  any  one 
passed  out  into  the  open  air,  where  the 
count  was  made,  was  held  not  to  render 
its  proceedings  invalid.  Brown  v.  Win- 
terport,  79  Me.  305. 

1  Hunt  v.  School  District,  14  Vt.  300 
(1842);  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439; 
s.  c.  17  Vt.  337,  444  (1844).  "Such 
meetings  are  void  for  all  purposes  of 
transacting  business  not  specified  "  in  the 
written  notice  required  by  the  statute. 
lb.,  per  Redfield,  J. 

2  lb.;  Johnson  v.  Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202; 
Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113;  Baker  v. 
Shepherd,  4  Fost.  (24  N.  H.)  208. 

By-laws  passed  at  a  town  meeting  not 
duly  warned  (as,  for  example,  where  the 
notice  did  not  "  specify  the  objects "  of 
the  meeting  as  required  by  statute)  are 
void.  Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391 
(1824);  Willard  v.  Killingworth,  8  Conn. 
247;  Bloomfield  v.  Charter  Oak  Bank, 
121  U.  S.  121,  130.  The  party  claiming 
under  a  by-law  must  show  it  was  passed 
at  a  meeting  duly  warned.  8  Conn.  247, 
supra.     And  must,  perhaps,  show  all  the 


essentials  of  its  validity,  such  as  the  due 
passage,  publication,  &c.     lb. 

Where  the  statute  requires  that  all 
matters  to  be  acted  upon  at  the  meeting 
shall  be  inserted  in  the  warrant  or  notice, 
a  failure  to  do  this  will  avoid  as  to  both 
parties  any  contract  that  may  be  made,  or 
any  act  that  may  be  done,  with  respect  to 
a  matter  not  embraced  in  the  warrant  or 
notice.  Cornish  v.  Pease,  19  Me.  (1  Appl. ) 
184  (1841);  Spear  v.  Robinson,  29  Me. 
(14  Shep.)  531   (1849);  Little  v.  Merrill, 

10  Pick.  (Mass.)  543  ;  Blackburn  v.  Wal- 
pole,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  97;  Torrey  v.  Mill- 
bury,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  64;  lb.  75;  Had- 
sell  v.  Hancock,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  52(5; 
Jones  v.  Andover,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  146 
(1829);  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  99  (1846);  Rand  v.  Wilder, 

11  Cush.  (Mass.)  294  (1853).  But  if  the 
matter  is  embraced  in  the  warrant  or 
notice,  and  the  meeting  duly  met,  it  is  no 
objection  to  its  action  that  it  was  had 
near  the  close  of  the  meeting,  and  when 
a  portion  of  the  voters  had  retired.  Beau 
v.  Jay,  23  Me.  (9  Shep.)  117  (1843). 
Subsequent  legal  meeting  may  ratify  acts 
of  previous  meeting  not  duly  notified. 
Jordan  v.  School  District,  38  Me.  164. 
By  participating  in  a  meeting  illegally 
called,  a  party  is  not  estopped  to  deny  its 
legality.  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  105. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§270 


either  on  the  same  or  to  a  future  day,  and,  if  fairly  done,  to  another 
witlnn  the  corporate  limits.1 

§270  208).  Constitution  and  Meetings  of  Councils  or  select 
Governing  Bodies  ;  and  herein  of  Quorums  and  Majorities,  of  Inte- 
gral Parts,  and  of  stated,  special,  and    adjourned   Meetings. —  Unlike 

the  towns  of  New  England,  in  which  all  the  qualified  voters  meet 
and  act  in  their  primary  capacity,  the  councils  of  cities  and  towns  are 
Tep  bodies,  the  number  of  whose  members  is  fixed  by  law, 

and  they  are  elected  by  the  legal  voters  of  the  incorporated  place. 
This  council  is  the  governing  body  of  the  municipal  corporation, 
and  the  corporation,  unless  it  is  otherwise  provided,  can  act  and  be 
bound  only  through  the  medium  of  the  council.'2     The  charter  or 


i      imberlain   v.    Dover,    13  Me.    (1 

Bhep.)    466    (1886)  j  People   v.  Martin,  1 

Beld.    (5   N.  V.)  22  (1851);   Hubbard    v. 

.    15    Mich.   146;  Kimball  v.  Mar- 

1 1    N.    II.    465    (1863);  Drisko  v. 

Columbia,  7.".   Me.  73;  Ex  parU  Wolf,  14 

G Ml    v.    Baker,    8   Cowen 

(N.  V.i.  286;  infra,  sees.  285,  287.    Exc- 
lusive judges  of  necessity  of  ad- 
journment   of   town    meeting;    and  such 
adjournment  to  next  day,  and  at  another 
place,  in   the  town   twenty    miles    distant, 
red   lawful,     lb.     The  statute 
provided  that  if  at  any  annual  town  meet- 
ing no   place  La  fixed  by-  the  electors  for 
I   annual  town   meeting,  such  town 
'  shall   be  held  at  the  place    of  the 
Dual  town  meeting.      1   Rev.  Sts. 
N.  V.  340,  see.  15.      Held,   in   People  v. 
M.rtin,  1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  22,  that  though 
the    place    of   meeting   was    thus    contin- 
gently fixed  by  statute,  the  electors,  being 
led,  might  adjourn  it  for  the 
residue  of  the  day  to  another  place  in  the 
Concluding  hia  opinion   in    this 
l.,  well    remarks:    "  I  confess 
ive  had  some  difficulty  in  coming 
to  this  conclusion,  and  I  think  the  power 
[whirl,  i-  decided  to  exi  urning  a 

town  meeting  to  another  time  and  place, 
inder  peculiar  cin  ,  he  op- 

I.  and  lead  to  a  defeat 
of  the  popular  will.  This  power  ought 
not  to  }»■  exerci  in  a  case  of 

extror  People  v.  Martin,  1 

Seld 

'ijournmrnt,  arts  by  a 
portion   .f  the   voters  who  remain  are  in- 


valid. Kimball  v.  Lamprey,  19  K.  H. 
215.  In  Massachusetts,  an  adjournment 
of  a  meeting  should  appear  of  record,  and 
parol  evidence  of  an  adjournment  to  an- 
other day  is  held  to  he  inadmissible.  Tay- 
lor v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397  (1824"). 
See  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (X.  J.) 
309,  and  chapter  on  Corporate  Records 
and  Documents,  post,  sec.  298.  An  ad- 
journed meeting  of  a  meeting  not  legally 
called  cannot  validate  the  former  meeting, 
nor  itself  legally  act.  United  States  v.  Mc- 
Kelden,  Vol.  VIII.  Rep.  1879,  McArthur 
&  Mackey,  162;  ante,  sec.  268,  note.  The 
statute  of  New  York  (1  Rev.  Sts.  342)  only 
requires  the  town  meeting  to  be  kept  open 
during  the  daytime,  or  some  part  thereof, 
but  not  that  it  shall  be  kept  open  during 
the  whole  and  every  part  of  the  day,  be- 
tween the  rising  and  setting  of  the  sun. 
People  v.  Martin,  1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  22 
(1851). 

2  Central  Bridge  Corp.  v.  Lowell,  15 
Gray  (Mass.),  106,  116  (1860),  where  an 
act  affecting  a  city  was,  by  its  terms,  to 
take  effect  on  acceptance  by  the  city,  it 
was  held  that  the  acceptance  might  be 
made  by  the  governing  body.  The  legis- 
lative and  corporate  powers  of  a  munici- 
pality, whoso  exercise  is,  by  the  charter 
or  constituent  act,  committed  to  the  coun- 
cil or  governing  body,  can  he  exercised 
only  at  a  corpora/'  meeting  duly  held;  and 
the  corporate  will  must  be  ascertained  hy 
vote  and  embodied  in  a  definite  form. 
The  form  which  the  corporate  will  assumes 
is  usually  either  a  resolution  or  ordi- 
nance,  or  something  equivalent   thereto. 


§  271         meetings  ;   mayor's  presence  and  function.  351 

constituent  act  of  the  place  usually  contains  provisions  as  to  the  con- 
stitution of  the  council,  its  stated  and  special  meetings,  and  the 
notice  thereof  requisite  to  be  given,  how  many  shall  constitute  a 
quorum,  and  an  enumeration  of  its  powers.  The  usual  scheme  of 
the  organization  of  the  council  is  to  divide  the  territory  of  the  incor- 
porated place  into  districts  or  wards,  the  voters  in  each  of  which 
elect  one  or  more  representatives,  annually,  called  aldermen  or 
councilmen ;  and  these,  when  duly  convened,  constitute  the  council, 
over  which  the  mayor  or  head  executive  officer  of  the  corporation  pre- 
sides, sometimes  constituting  a  member  of  the  council,  and  in  other 
instances,  having  power  to  vote  only  when  there  is  a  tie  or  to  give 
a  second  vote  in  case  of  a  tie.1 

§  271  (209).  Mayor's  Presence  and  Function.  —  The  doctrine  of 
the  English  courts  as  to  the  old  corporations  in  that  country,  that  the 
mayor  was  an  integral  part  of  the  corporation,  whose  presence,  unless 
otherwise  provided  in  the  charter,  was  necessary  to  a  valid  corporate 
meeting ;  that,  during  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor,  the  corpora- 
tion could  do  no  valid  act,  unless  expressly  empowered,  except  to 
elect  another  and  thus  complete  the  body ;  and  that  the  acts  of  the 
corporation  under  the  presidency  of  any  other  than  a  mayor  de  jure, 
were  voidable,  has,  it  is  believed,  no  application  to  the  office  of  mayor 
in  the  corporations  of  this  country.2 

Schumm   v.    Seymour,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  may  make  a  valid  order,  though  it  be  by 

N.  J.    Eq. ),   143;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  6  parol  only,  for  the  removal  of  a  disorderly 

Vroom  (35  N.  J.  L. ),  404.  See  chapter  on  person   who   disturbs   the  business  of  the 

Ordinances,  post,  sec.  307,  note.  meeting.     Parsons  v.  Brainard,  17  Wend. 

1  Power  to  preside  and  give  casting  (N.  Y. )  522  (1837).  Approval  by  the 
vote  at  meetings  of  a  religious  corporation  mayor  of  proceedings  of  the  council  may, 
construed.  People  v.  Rector,  &c,  48  by  special  requirement  of  charter,  be 
Barb.  (N.  Y. )  603.  A  mayor  of  a  city  of  essential  to  their  validity.  Graham  v. 
the  second  class  in  Kansas  may  give  the  Carondolet,  33  Mo.  262  (1862);  Kepner  v. 
casting  vote  to  confirm  an  officer  appointed  Commmon wealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124.  A 
by  him.  Carroll  v.  Wall,  35  Kan.  36.  charter  required  every  resolution  of  the 
Post,  sec.  288,  note.  council  to  be  sent  to  the  mayor,  who  should 

2  Infra,  sec.  284.  The  text  approved,  either  approve  it,  in  which  case  it  would 
Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411  (1876);  become  operative  and  effectual,  or  disap- 
Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  prove  it,  in  which  case  he  should  return  it. 
130  (1871).  And  see  ante,  chap,  ix.,  as  to  It  was  held  that  his  approval  was  to  be 
powers  and  duties  of  the  mayor,  sees.  208,  made  known  by  a  written  declaration  at- 
209.  A  provision  in  a  charter  that  "the  tested  by  his  signature.  N.  Y.,  &c.  R.  Co. 
mayor,  recorder  and  aldermen,  when  as-  v.  Waterbury,  55  Conn.  19.  When  ap- 
senibled  together,  shall  constitute  the  com-  proval  by  mayor  not  necessary.  State  v. 
mon  council,"  makes  the  mayor  a  member  Jersey  City,  1  Vroom  (30  X.  J.  L. ),  93, 
of  the  council.  People  v.  Harshaw,  60  148;  see  Dey  v.  Jersey  City,  19  X.  J.  Kq. 
Mich.  200.     Infra,  see.  273.  412:  Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  241;  State 

The  presiding  officer  of  a  town  meeting,  v.  Newark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  399;  post, 
with  statute  authority  to  maintain  order,      sec.  331,  note. 


852 


MUNICIPAL    CiiKI'ollATIONS. 


S  272    210  .    Same  subject. — The  right  of  (he  mayor  or  other 
i-  to  jrresidi  over  the  meeting  of  the  council  is  a  franchise,  and 
be  tested  by  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto} 
cannot  be  determined,  al  least  ordinarily,  unless  by  statute  pro- 
vision, on  <>  bill  in  chancery  to  enjoin,  or  in  any  other  indirect  or 
collateral  proceeding.3 

§  273  (211).  Constitution  of  Council.  —  Who  shall  compose  the 
U  or  governiug  body  of  the  corporation  is  in  all  cases  prescribed 
by  the  charter  or  incorporation  act,  but  the  language  used  has  been 
such  a9  Bonietiuies  to  lead  to  controversy.3  The  organic  act  of  a  city 
provided  "  that  the  intendant  of  police  shall  have  a  seat  in  the  board 
of  commissioners  [the  governing  body  of  a  city  corporation],  and 
when  present  -hall  preside  therein;  in  his  absence,  the  board  shall 
appoint  a  chairman  pro  /rwiyw/r."  It  was  held  that  the  intendant 
was  thereby  constituted  one  of  the  commissioners,  and  had  the  right 
to  participate  in  making  ordinances.4     Where  the  power  to  legislate 


i  Cochran  o.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75 
(1867),  and  authorities  there  cited  ;  Re 
Sawyer,  124  U.  S.  200  (1887)  ;  Reynolds 
v.  Baldwin,  1  La.  An.  162  (1846);  Rex  v. 
Williams  1  Burr.  402  ;  Willc.  456,  pi. 
837;  Rex  v.  Hertford,  1  Ldi  Rayni.  426; 
approved,  Commonwealth  v,  Arrison,  15 
Berg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  130;  ante,  chap.  ix. 
}.  in  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  supra, 
it  was  held  that  the  mayor,  in  cities  of 
the  second  class,  organized  under  the  Gen- 
era]  Incorporation  Act  (Rev.  of  Iowa, 
I860,  chap,  li.),  is  not  ex  officio  a  memher 
of,  iinr  has  he  any  right  to  preside  over, 
the  city  council;  that  the  council  was 
composed  exclusively  of  trustees  or  alder- 
men, and  elected  its  own  presiding  officer. 
The  mayor  of  X'tn   York  was   held    not    to 

be  a  member  of  the  common  council;  and 
the  common  council,  having  the  power  by 
Statute  to  appoint  to  office,  may  exercise 
it  without  the  concurrence  of  the  mayor, 
who  has  no  veto  power  npon  the  appoint" 
l  Achley's  case,    i    Abb.   Pr.    Rep. 

i6).  The  burgess  of  a  borough  in- 
corporated  under  the  Pennsylvania  Gen- 
eral Borough  Law  of  1851  has  no  right  to 

i  member  of  the  town  council,  and 
cannot  refuse  to  sign  ordinances  regularly 

by  the  town  council,  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  not  pre  ent  >  a  member  when 
they  were  adopted.  Commonwealth  v. 
I  ,10  l'hila.  (Pa.)  510. 


3  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75, 
86  (1867);  Re  Sawyer,  124  U.  S.  200 
(1887)  ;  post,  chap.  xxii.  ;  Topping  v. 
Gray,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  259;  affirming  s.  c. 
9  Paige,  5H7;  Markle  v.  Wright,  13  Ind. 
548;  Hullman  v.  Honcomp,  5  Ohio,  237; 
People  v.  Cook,  4  Seld.  (9  N.  Y.)  67;  af- 
firming s.  c.  14  Barb.  257;  Mayor  v.  Con- 
ner, 5  Ind.  171 ;  Mozley  v.  Alston,  1 
Thill.  790;  Lord  v.  The  Governor,  &c,  2 
Thill.  740;  Peabody  v.  Flint,  6  Allen 
(Mass.),  52  ;  Hagner  v.  Heyberger,  7 
Watts  &  Serg.  (Pa.)  104;  Teople  v.  Car- 
penter, 24  N.  Y.  86;  Teople  v.  Draper,  15 
N.  Y.  532  ;  People  v.  Insurance  Co.,  2 
Johns.  Ch.  371;  Teople  v.  Same  Co.  (quo 
warranto),  15  Johns.  358  ;  Demarest  v. 
Wickham,  Mayor,  &c,  63  N.  Y.  320 
(1875);  Commonwealth  v.  Bank  (quo  war- 
ranto), 28  Ta.  St.  389;  in  chancery,  lb. 
379;  Hughes  v.  Tarker,  20  N.  H.  58  ; 
Strahl,  ///  re,  16  Iowa,  369;  Updegratr  v. 
Crans,  47  Pa.  St.  103;  Facey  v.  Fuller, 
13  Mich.  527;  see  Kerr  v.  Trego,  47  Ta. 
St.  292,  cited  infra,  sec.  275. 

3  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75 
(1867). 

*  Raleigh  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  (N.  C.) 
Law,  49  (1853).  In  this  case  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  North  Carolina  admit 
(argiicnda)  that  an  officer  —  as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  intendant  —  has  no  right, 
under  the   act    of    incorporation,    to    sit 


§274 


MEETINGS  ;    PROPER    CORPORATE   BODY   MUST   ACT. 


353 


for  the  corporation  is  vested  in  "  the  mayor  and  councilmen,"  the 
council  by  itself  cannot  legislate,  but  must  act  in  conjunction  with 
the  mayor.  In  deciding  the  point  the  court  observes  :  "  If  a  simple 
resolution  [instead  of  an  ordinance]  would  be  sufficient,  yet,  before 
it  would  have  any  validity,  it  would  necessarily  have  to  be  signed 
by  the  mayor  as  a  part  of  the  law-making  power :  the  co-ordinate 
action  of  both  is  required."1 


§274  (212).  Proper  Corporate  Body  must  act.  —  It  is  undoubtedly 
true,  as  already  stated,  that  the  corporate  authority  must  be  exercised 
by  the  proper  body.  Thus,  where  a  town  was  organized  under  a 
charter  which  vested  the  corporate  powers  of  the  place  in  a  presi- 
dent and  six  trustees,  and  subsequently  a  general  incorporation  act 
was  passed  which  was  erroneously  supposed  to  apply  to  the  town, 
and  under  which  the  town  elected  different  officers  from  those  pro- 
vided in  the  special  charter,  at  a  different  time  and  constituting  a 
different  body,  it  was  held,  in  the  absence  of  legislative  ratification, 
that  this  latter  body  could  not  exercise  the  authority  of  the  corpora- 
tion, since  they  were  a  body  without  any  legal  existence,  and  were 
not  the  body  authorized  to  act  for  the  corporation.  The  principle 
that  the  acts  of  de  facto  officers  are  valid  was  considered  nut  to  be 
applicable.2 


with  the  legislative  body  of  the  corpora- 
tion ;  hut  if  he  does  so  and  acts  with  them, 
that  an  ordinance  thus  passed  will  be 
void,  because  the  powers  given  to  the  cor- 
poration must  be  exercised  in  strict  con- 
formity to  the  special  delegation  of  au- 
thority, and  because,  in  the  case  supposed, 
the  ordinance  is  not  passed  by  the  body 
to  which  the  power  is  given ;  citing  Rex 
v.  Croke,  Cowp.  26.  The  view  of  the 
court  is  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  the 
English  courts  as  applied  to  their  corpo- 
rations. Thus,  Mr.  Willcoek  says  :  "It 
may  be  unnecessary  to  add  that  whenever 
a  particular  business  is  delegated  to  a 
select  body,  if  others  join  in  the  perform- 
ance of  it,  the  act  is  void ;  as  if  the  mayor, 
aldermen,  and  commonalty  join  in  making 
a  by  daw  which  is  directed  to  be  made  by 
the  mayor  and  aldermen.  For  if  others 
are  allowed  to  vote,  a  by-law  might  be  es- 
tablished, although,  all  those  to  whom  the 
power  is  specifically  delegated  should  be 
in  the  minority."  Corp.  68,  pi.  128 ; 
Parry  v.  Berry,  Comyns,  269 ;  Rex  v. 
Head,  4  Burr.  2521 ;  Hoblyu  v.  Regem,  2 
vol.  i. —23 


Bro.  P.  C.  329;  Rex  v.  Westwood,  4  B. 
&  C.  799,  818;  Green  v.  Durham,  1  Burr. 
131;  see  post,  sec.  276,  and  note.  Whether 
the  mere  fact  that  a  single  unauthorized 
person  is,  by  a  mistaken  construction  of 
the  charter,  allowed  to  participate  in  the 
transactions  of  a  meeting  of  the  council, 
would,  in  this  country,  be  held  necessarily 
to  avoid  them,  is  a  question  which  per- 
haps remains  yet  to  be  settled.  It  has 
been  held,  that  if  persons  who  are  not 
qualified  vote  at  a  town,  parish,  or  dis- 
trict meeting,  without  objection  or  chal- 
lenge at  the  time,  proof  of  that  fact  can- 
not afterwards  be  made  with  a  view  to  in- 
validate the  proceedings.  Sutton  v.  Cole, 
3  Pick.  (Mass.)  232  (1825).  So  if  such  a 
meeting  is  called  by  persons  acting  under 
color  of  authority,  it  will  be  legal  if  no 
exception  to  their  authority  is  taken  at 
the  time.     lb. 

i  Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488  (1872), 
per  Wagner,  J.  Sequel  of  the  case,  Sax- 
ton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153  (1875). 
Ante,  sec.  271,  note. 

2  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa,  12  (1868); 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§275 


^  27  Injunction  where  two  conflicting   Municipal  Bodies 

are  concurrently  acting.  —  Where  there  aic  two  bodies,  each  of  which 
cl,n  <j,,    regularly  organized  municipal  council  and  each  is 

is  such,  to  the  detriment  and  confusion  of  the  public,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  awarded  to  the  body  which  was, 
legally  entitled  to  act,  a  provisional  injunction  to  re- 
strain the  other  body  from  interference  with  them.     The  bill  in  the 
was  filed  by  the  body  which, prima  facie,  had  the  written  or 
.!  title,  as  against  the  other  and  presumptively  usurping  body. 
[     ther  the  Attorney-General  nor  any  public  officer  was  a  party. 
To   the  defendants'   objection  that  in   such   a  case  the  Attorney- 
G  neral  alone  can  file  a  bill,  the  court  replied:  "We  do  not  think 
so.     It  is  right  for  those  to  whom  public  functions  are  entrusted  to 
that  they  are  not  to  be  usurped  by  others."1 


.  Genevieve,  1   Dillon   C.  C. 
I         1871);  infra,  sec.  276. 

ftego,  17  Pa.  St.  292  (1864). 
Author's  Comments.  In  reference  to  the 
importanl  point  decided  in  the  case  just 
cited  it  may  be  observed  tint,  in  the  ab- 
!  statute,  chancery  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  corporate  elections,  or  to  deter- 
mine the  title  I  ■  coi  porate  offices.  In  a 
case  like  thai  above  mentioned,  prompt 
.iii'l  efficacious  judicial  intervention  such 
.1-;  chancery  only  can  afford  is  extremely 
conveni  a  needful,  but  the  diffi- 

culty is  tu  find,  aside  from  statutory  aid, 
an  ackn  head  of  equitable  juris- 

nnder  which  such  a  ease  can  be 
brought.  The  general  doctrine  of  our 
jurisprudence  undoubtedly  is  that  winch 
is  thus  stated  by  Gray,  J.,  In  re  Sawyer, 
124  (J.  S.  212  (1887):  "The  jurisdiction 
mine  the  title  to  a  public  office 
•  exclusively  to  the  courts  of  law, 
nnd  i-  ri,  error, 

nr  appeal,  or  by  mandamus,  prohibition, 
vrranto,  or  information  in  the  nature 
of  a  writ  of  q  ing  to  the 

cireun  I   I  he  mode  of 

hed  by  the  common  law 
or  by  Btatute.     No  English  ca      ha     been 
■  f  a  bill    for  an  injunction  to   re- 
ippointmenl  or  removal  of  a 
officer.     In    the   courts  of  the 
i  h  i  power  in  a  courl  of 
■    !•  nied   in  many  well-con- 
•  ing  them. 
In  K'Tr  v  ''",  the  Supreme 


Court  of  Pennsylvania  rested  the  right  to 
grant  a  provisional  injunction  upon  the 
ground,  very  broadly  stated,  that  all  cor- 
porate bodies  and  officers  are  under  law  and 
that  "this  remedy  [by  injunction]  extends 
to  all  acts  that  are  contrary  to  law  and 
for  which  there  is  no  adequate  remedy  at 
law  ;  and  we  can  hardly  imagine  any  act 
that  more  clearly  falls  within  this  de- 
scription than  one  that  casts  so  deep  a 
shade  of  doubt  and  confusion  on  the  pub- 
lic affairs  of  a  city  as  this  does.  In  such 
a  case  no  remedy  is  adequate  that  is  not 
prompt  and  speedy."  Similar  views  are 
expressed  in  the  dissenting  opinion  of 
Waitc,  C.  J.,  In  re  Sawyer,  124  U.  S. 
223.  The  stress  of  the  question  therefore 
is,  whether  t lie  jurisdiction  in  equity  is  to 
be  strictly  limited  by  the  existing  land- 
marks and  to  the  acknowledged  heads  of 
thai  jurisdiction,  or  whether,  agreeably  to 
the  principles  in  which  one  source  of 
equity  jurisdiction  has  had  its  origin, 
namely,  the  inadequacy  of  common-law 
remedies,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
may,  by  a  species  of  judicial  legislation 
which,  consciously  oi  otherwise,  is  al- 
ways in  operation,  be  extended  to  a  case 
ofsuchan  urgent  and  extraordinary  nature 
as  that  which  was  presented  by  the  facts 
in  Kerr  i>.  Trego.  On  the  whole  it  seems 
to  the  author  that  Kerr  v.  Trego  may  bo 
regarded  as  a  sound,  or  a1  leasl  an  allow- 
able, application  of  the  principles  of  equi- 
ty jurisdiction  to  a  case  of  greal  public 
ncy,  where,   under  the  legislation    of 


§  276    MEETINGS  ;    ACTS   OF   DE    FACTO    COUNCILS   AND    OFFICERS.    355 


§  276  (214).  Acts  of  de  facto  Councils  and  Officers.  —  In  this 
country  the  doctrine  is  every  where  declared,  that  the  acts  of  de  facto 
officers,  as  distinguished  from  the  acts  of  mere  usurpers,  are  valid, 
and  the  principle  extends  not  only  to  municipal  officers  generally, 
but  also  to  those  composing  the  council,  or  legislative  or  governing 
body  of  a  municipal  corporation.1     But  in  order  that  there  may  be, 


the  State  as  it  existed  in  Pennsylvania, 
the  common-law  remedies  were  not  only 
inadequate,  but  wholly  unsuited  to  the 
emergency  in  hand.  The  temptation  to 
supply  serious  defects  and  lacunae  which 
experience  from  time  to  time  discloses  in 
common-law  remedies,  by  a  judicial  ex- 
tension of  the  principles  of  equity  juris- 
diction, so  as  to  secure  justice  or  prevent  its 
failure,  is  always  strong,  and  on  the  whole 
resistless.  A  conservative  chancellor  may 
say  here  and  there,  ' '  I  have  no  power  —  the 
case  is  one  for  the  legislature  ;  "  but  the 
natural  and  general  tendency  when  such  a 
course  is  not  contrary  to  existing  legisla- 
tion or  policy,  is  to  assert  in  the  particu- 
lar case  a  power  felt  to  be  necessary,  and 
whose  exercise  promises  to  be  beneficial. 
This,  it  is  true,  is  judiciary  law;  but  it  is 
law  which  is  necessarily  evolved  in  the 
very  process  of  legal  administration.  So 
it  has  been  in  the  past,  and  so  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  case  it  must  continue 
in  the  future.  Law  thus  originating  in 
actual  experience,  and  limited  by  the 
judges  in  its  application  to  the  exigency 
which  calls  it  into  existence,  must  on  the 
whole  he  excellent,  though  likely  to  be  in- 
complete. It  will  be  observed  that  the 
court  did  not  undertake  on  the  bill  filed  to 
adjudge  the  questions  of  title  between  the 
conflicting  bodies.  It  disclaimed  the  right 
to  do  so.  Its  injunction,  granted  in  the  pub- 
lic interest,  simply  maintained  the  existing 
prima  facie  legal  status  until  the  question 
of  title  should  be  determined  in  the  usual 
mode  and  by  the  proper  tribunals.  Dema- 
rest  v.  Wickham,  Mayor,  63  N.  Y.  3'20 
(1875),  was  an  action  by  two  assistant 
aldermen  in  their  own  names  to  restrain 
the  defendant,  as  mayor,  from  recognizing 
the  board  of  aldermen,  organized  as  the 
common  council  and  usurping  the  rights 
of  the  board  of  assistant  aldermen,  of 
which  the  plaintiffs  were  members,  on 
the  ground  that  they  had  usurped  the 
office   in   question,    having   been    elected 


under  an  alleged  unconstitutional  act,  and 
to  restrain  this  alleged  illegal  and  usurping 
body  from  the  exercise  of  unauthorized 
powers.  It  was  held  that  the  action  could 
not  be  maintained,  and  that  the  remedy 
under  the  legislation  of  New  York  was  an 
information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto 
by  the  Attorney-General  in  the  name  of  the 
State.  The  case  is  distinguishable  from 
Kerru.  Trego.  Mode  of  organizing  councils 
to  which  new  members  are  to  be  admitted, 
and  tests  in  case  of  conflicting  councils, 
for  determining  which  is  the  legal  or- 
ganization. Kerr  v.  Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  292; 
supra,  sees.  202,  note,  204,  255,  note,  272. 
1  Scoville  v.  Cleveland,  1  Ohio  St.  126 
(1853);  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa,  12 
(1868);  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa, 
75,  84;  Strahl,  In  re,  16  Iowa,  360;  Peo- 
ple v.  Stevens,  5  Hill  (N.  Y. ),  616;  State 
v.  Jacobs,  17  Ohio,  143;  People  v.  Bart- 
lett,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  422;  Pritchett  v. 
People,  1  Gilm.  (6  111.)  529;  People  v. 
Runkle,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  147;  Trustees, 
&c.  v.  Hill,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y. )  23;  Williams 
v.  School  District,  21  Pick.  75;  see  Rex 
v.  Mayor,  &c,  8  Mod.  Ill  ;  DeGrave  v. 
Monmouth,  4  Car.  &  P.  Ill;  Laver  v.  Mc- 
Glachlin,  28  Wis.  364 ;  post,  sec.  892, 
note;  Gushing  v.  Frankfort,  57  Me.  541; 
Lockhart  v.  Troy,  48  Ala.  579  (1872); 
Riddle  v.  Bedford,  7  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  386; 
People  v.  Hopson,  1  Denio  (N.  Y. ),  574; 
Hamlin  v.  Dingman,  5  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  61; 
People  v.  Nostrand,  46  N.  Y.  375;  Olm- 
sted v.  Dennis,  77  N.  Y.  378;  Koontz  v. 
Hancock,  64  Md.  134.  As  to  de  facto 
officers,  ante,  sees.  197  note,  221  note,  256, 
post,  763  note,  892  note.  In  a  case  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  decided  in  1851,  it  was 
held  that  an  act  done  by  a  definite  body, 
under  authority  of  parliament,  teas  not 
invalid  because  officers  de  facto  joiwad  with 
officers  de  jure  in  the  doing  of  it.  The 
judges  having  unanimously  declared  this 
to  be  their  opinion,  the  Lord  Chancellor 
said  :    The   opinion    of  the  judges  as   to 


MUNICIPAL   I  ORPOEATIONS. 


s<  -JT7 


within  the  meaning  of  t'  rule,  a  ./.  facto  officer,  there  must 

and  the  notion  thai   there  can  be  a  d\  facto  office 

terized  as  a  political  solecism,  without  foundation  in 

md  without  support  in  law;  and,  therefore,  a  person  cannot 

claim  to  be  a  dc  facto  officer  of  a  municipal  corporation  when  the 

,ration  or  people  have,  in  law,  no  power,  in  any  event,  to  elect 

or  appoint  such  an  offii 

7    (215).     Action   by   Indefinite   Body;   Majority   present   may 

act.  —  The  common-law  principle,  that  if  an  act  is  to  h  dom  by  an 
Unit  body  it  is  valid  if  passed  by  a  majority  of  those  present  at 
a  h-u'.tl  meeting,  do  matter  how  small  a  portion  they  may  constitute 
of  the  whole  number  entitled  to  be  present,  has  been  deemed  applir 
■  .  the  tovms  of  New  England.     In  those  towns  the  corporate 
power  resides,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  inhabitants,  or  citizens  at 
laro-e,  and  these  form  the  constituent  body.     If  the  meeting  has  been 
duly  railed    and  warned,  those  who  assemble,  though   less  than  a 
\rity  of  the  whole,  have  the  power  to  act  for  and  bind  the  whole, 
unless  it  is  otherwise  provided  by  law.     Those  who  remain  away 
are  justly  and  conclusively  presumed  to  assent  to  what  may  law- 
fully be  done  by  those  who  attend.2 


vestrymen   -'■  od  &  Jurc  was  0I" 

great  importance.     When  it  was  consid- 
er.-.i    thai    there  were  many  persona  who 
h  irged  with  very  important  duties, 
ami  who  perform  those  dul 

necessary  for  their 
performance  the  puhlic   could    not    easily 
n    at    the   time,  and  when  it   was 
remembered   what    inconveniences   would 
arise  if  the  validity  of  their  acts  depended 
on  the  propriety   of  the   election   of  the 
who  had   to  perform   them,  the 
■  Dunciation  of  the  prin- 
ciple thus  made  by  the  judges  was  very 
iii.l   in    the   correctness  of   it  he 
his  i  ntire  concurrence. 
:-  ■    .   \,  <  int,  5   Eng.  Law 

Lord   Chancellor  Truro.     See 
.  ,  3,  oote.      \ 

18    prima 

.  Barnes,  8  Q. 
B.  In;  (crown  cases 

r  ,  86  Lav,  Times  Rep.  690 

Am.  I  17,  note, 

,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  pub- 
1  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa,   15,   18, 


(1868)  ;  Hildreth's  Heirs  v.  Mclntire's 
Devisees,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  206;  People 
v.  White,  24  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  520,  540, 
541;  Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mich.  250; 
Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
130  (1871).  In  Norton  V.  Shelby  Co., 
118  U.  S.  425  (1885),  the  doctrine  of  the 
text  was  asserted  and  enforced  as  sound. 
Mr.  Justice  Field  reviews  the  cases,  and 
distinguishes  The  State  v.  Carroll,  33 
Conn.  449.  See  post,  chap,  xiv.;  Hurt  v. 
Winona  &  St.  Peter  Ky.  Co.,  31  Minn. 
472  (approving  text).  Dc  facto  officer's 
official  bond  not  obligatory  there  being  no 
Buch  de  jure  office.  Tinsley  v.  Kirby,  17 
S.  C.  1,  v;  supra,  sec.  274;  post,  chap, 
xxi.;  sec.  892. 

-  Damon  w.  Granby,  2  Pi« k.  (Ma 
345,  355  (1824);  Commonwealth  o.  Ips- 
wich, 2  Pick.  (Mass.)  70;  Williams  v. 
Lunenburg,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  75;  Church 
.  5  Bobt.  (\.  V.)  649  (1867);  First 
Pari  h  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  148 
(1838);  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450 
(1866). 

At  a  i lopular election,  a  candidal 
municipal  office  received  a.  plurality  of  all 


§  278     MEETINGS ;    QUORUM    AND   MAJORITY   OP   DEFINITE    BODY.     357 

§  278  (216).  Quorum  and  Majority  of  Definite  Body.  —  The 
corouion-law  rules  as  to  quorums  and  majorities,  established  with 
reference  to  corporate  bodies  consisting  of  a  definite,  number  of 
corporators,  have  also,  in  general,  been  applied  to  the  common 
council,  or  select  governing  body  of  our  municipal  corporations, 
where  the  matter  is  not  specially  regulated  by  the  charter  or 
statute.1  Thus,  to  use  Mr.  Dane's  illustration,  if  the  body  consists 
of  twelve  common  councilmen,  seven  is  the  least  number  that  can 
constitute  a  valid  meeting,  though  four  of  the  seven  [the  seven  be- 
ing duly  assembled  and  present]  may  act.2  Thus,  where  a  council 
consisted  of  eighteen  members,  exclusive  of  the  mayor,  the  election 
of  a  clerk  by  nine  votes  was  held  lawful  and  valid,  the  other  mem- 
bers remaining  present,  though  protesting  against  the  method  of 
electing  and  refusing  to  vote.  It  was  held  that  the  legal  effect  of 
their  refusal  to  vote  while  remaining  present,  was  an  acquiescence 
in  the  action  of  those  voting.3  So,  also,  a  statute  in  reference  to 
a  definite  body,  declaring  that  a  "majority  of  those  'present  at  any 
regular  meeting  shall  be  competent"  to  transact  business,  leaves  the 
number  which  may  form  a  quorum  to  be  determined  by  the  com- 
mon law ;  that  is,  there  must  be  at  least  a  majority  present,  and 
such  a  provision,  it  was  considered,  did  not  authorize  a  minority  of 
the  whole  body  to  act.4 


the  votes  cast,  but  not  a  majority.    There  As  to  municipal  elections.     Ante,  chap.  ix. 

was  no  provision  of  the  charter  and  no  by-  sec.  196. 

law  on  the  subject.  The  usage  in  the  cor-  1  Text  approved  in  Heiskell  v.  Baltimore, 
poration  seemed  to  have  been  to  consider  65  Md.  125,  where  Stone,  J.,  said  :  "  But 
the  person  having  the  highest  number  of  when  in  the  case,  like  the  present,  of  a 
votes,  although  not  a  majority  of  the  municipal  corporation,  the  statute  law 
whole,  as  duly  elected.  The  statute  in  creating  it  is  silent  as  to  what  shall  con- 
relation  to  State  elections  expressly  pro-  stitute  a  legal  assembly,  the  common  law 
vided  that  "plurality,  or  the  highest  both  in  England  and  in  this  country  is 
number  of  votes,  should  make  a  choice."  well  settled,  that  the  majority  of  the 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  majority  of  members  elect  shall  constitute  the  legal 
the  court  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  body."  To  same  effect,  Barnert  v.  Pater- 
common-law  rule,  that  a  majority  is  neces-  son,  48  N.  J.  L.  (19  Vroom)  395;  Cadmus 
sary  to  a  valid  election,  applied,  and  was  v.  Farr,  47  N.  J.  L.  (18  Vroom)  208;  Mc- 
not  controlled  by  the  terms  or  spirit  of  Dermott  v.  Miller,  45  N.  J.  L.  251. 
the  general  election  law  of  the  State.  2  5  Dane,  Abr.  150;  Willcocks,  In  re, 
State  v.  Wilmington,  3  Harring.  (Del.)  7  Cow.  (N.  Y. )  402,  410  (1827),  note  d, 
294  (1840).  Harrington,  J.,  dissented,  and  criticism  on  the  rule  stated,  in  1  Kyd 
holding  (and,  as  it  would  seem,  with  on  Corp.  418,  425  ;  2  Kent  Com.  293  ; 
reason)  that  the  plurality  principle  had  Buell  v.  Buckingham,  16  Iowa,  284  (1864); 
been  the  one  "  invariably  adopted  as  most  Regents,  &c.  v.  Williams,  9  Gill  &  Johns. 
in  consonance  with  our  institutions  in  all  (Md. )  365;  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11  Wis.  470. 
cases  where  the  law  of  election  is  silent  in  3  State  v.  Green,  37  Ohio  St.  227. 
this  respect."  lb.,  p.  305.  See  First  4  Willcocks,  In  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y. )  402 
Parish  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick.    (Mass.)   148.  (1827);   lb.     463,     and    note;   lb.    526, 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  -82 

>17).     Same  subject.      Quorum.  —  So,  if  B  boaTd   of  village 

rs,  and  all,  or  four,  <  nt,  two  can 

do  do  valid  <i*-i.  even  though  the  others  are  disqualified  by  interest 
from  voting,  and  therefore  omit  or  decline  to  vote ;  their  assenting  to 
the  measure  voted  for  by  the  two  will  not  make  it  valid.  Ii'  three 
only  were  present  they  would  constitute  a  quorum;  then  the  votes 
of  two,  being  a  majority  'if  the  quorum,  would  be  valid;1  certainly 
so  where  the  three  arc  all  competent  to  act.2 

8  280  218).  Legal  Quorum  defined.  —  In  another  case,  the  power 
of  amotion  was  conferred  upon  a  city  council  to  be  exercised  "by  a 
of  two-thirds  of  that  body"  and  this  was  considered  to  give  the 
power  of  removal  to  two-thirds  of  a  legal  quorum.  Two-thirds  of 
the  whole  number  of  members  composing  the  council  were  held  not 
to  be  required.  The  point  was  admitted  to  be  close,  and  the  French 
text  of  the  charter  was  regarded  as  favoring  the  conclusion  reached.3 

1     (219).      Quorum    under    Special    Charter    Provision.  —  The 

charter  of  a  city  contained  a  provision  that  no  ordinance  should  be 

■1  by  the  common  council,  except  by  a  majority  of  all  the  mem- 

elected.     Eight  wore  elected;  and   it   was  decided,   under  the 

above-mentioned  requirement   of  the   charter,   that   an    ordinance 

could  not  be  passed  by  a  vote  of  four  against  three,  since  four  did 

not  constitute  a  majority  of  all  the  members  elected,  although  it  did 

itute  a  majority  of  the  legal  quorum  present  at  the  meeting.4 

c  282  (220).    Majority  of  Quorum  must  concur.  —  In    the   absence 

of  special  provision,  the  major  part  of  those  present,  at  a  meeting  of 
a  select  body,  must  concur  in  order  to  do  any  valid  act.  Therefore, 
when  it  appeared  that  thirteen  ballots  were  cast  when  the  members 

ami  note;  Heiskell  v.  Baltimore,  65  Md  Btitute  a  quorum.     Heiskell  v.  Baltimore, 

125  :     Barnert    v.  Paterson,  48  N.  J.  L.  65    Md.    125;    Barnert   v.    Paterson,    48 

.    207,   note  ;   infra,  sees.  N.  J.  L.  305. 

In    Iowa,    by    statute     "all         '  Coles    v.  Williamsburgh,    10   Wend. 

ordinances  and  resolutions,  or  orders  for  (N.  Y.)  658  (1833);  McDermott  v.  Miller, 

the   "/'/"  '  of  money  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vroom)  251. 

Bhall  require   for  tlnir  passage   or  adop*         a  Buell  v.  Buckingham,   16  Iowa,  284 

tion  the  concurrence  of  a  majority  of  all  (1864),  and  cases  cited.  Post,  sec.  292,  n. 
the                    i    any    municipal   corpora-         3  Warnoch  v.  Lafayette,  J  La.  An.  419. 

'.    ■      lution  for  a  change  of  See,  on  this  point,  Logansport  v.  Legg,  20 

the  boundaries  of  a  city  does  not  require  Ind.  315  ;  Statu  v.  Porter,  113  Ind.  7'.'. 
Buch    majority   concurrence.      Strohm   v.         4  San  Francisco  v.  Bazen,  5  Cal.  169 

1  :   [owa,    12.     Authorizing  a  (1S5."»).     See,  also,  Oakland  v.  Carpentier, 

"     ttle  their  rules  of  pro-  18  CaL  540;  McCracken  v,  San  Francisco, 

cednre"    held  nol  to  confer  upon  it  the  16"  Cal.  591  ;  Pimental  v.  San  Francisco, 

power  of  declaring  what  number  shall  con-  21  Cal.  351. 


§  283  MEETINGS  ;    QUORUM  ;    MAJORITY.  359 

present  were  only  entitled  to  give  twelve  votes,  of  which  seven  were 
for  one  person  and  six  for  another,  there  was  no  election,  and  the 
council,  though  it  had  declared  that  the  person  receiving  seven  votes 
was  duly  elected,  might  subsequently  rescind  its  action  and  proceed 
to  a  new  election.1  And  in  South  Carolina  the  general  rule  is  rec- 
ognized, and  a  majority  of  the  board  of  managers  of  elections  — 
having  power,  by  statute,  to  determine  the  validity  of  contested 
elections  —  is  a  quorum,  and  a  majority  of  that  quorum  may  act 
and  decide.2 

§  283  (221).  Extent  of  the  Majority  Principle  ;  application  to 
Committees,  Public  Officers,  &c.  —  And,  as  a  general  rule,  it  may  be 
stated  that  not  only  where  the  corporate  power  resides  in  a  select 
body,  as  a  city  council,  but  where  it  has  been  delegated  to  a  committee 
or  to  agents,  then,  in  the  absence  of  special  provisions  otherwise, 
a  minority  of  the  select  body,  or  of  the  committee  or  agents,  are 
powerless  to  bind  the  majority  or  do  any  valid  act.  If  all  the 
members  of  the  select  body  or  committee,  or  if  all  the  agents  are 
assembled,  or  if  all  have  been  duly  notified,  and  the  minority  refuse 
or  neglect  to  meet  with  the  others,  a  majority  of  those  present  may 
act,  provided  those  present  constitute  a  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber. In  other  words,  in  such  case,  a  major  part  of  the  whole  is 
necessary  to  constitute  a  quorum  and  a  majority  of  the  quorum 
may  act.  If  the  major  part  withdraw  so  as  to  leave  no  quorum,  the 
power  of  the  minority  to  act  is,  in  general,  considered  to  cease.3 
But  where  the  duties  are  purely  ministerial,  and  not  judicial,  or  are 
of  such  a  nature  as  to  exclude  the  idea  of  action  as  a  body  or  board, 
and  where  they  are  devolved  on  public  officers  or  agents  rather  than 
on  the  agents  of  corporations,  the  rule  above  stated  (as  the  cases 

1  Labourdette  v.  Municipality,  2  La.  3  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  12  Met. 
An.  527  (1847).  (Mass.)  99  (1846);  Day  v.  Green,  4  Cash. 

2  State  v.Deliesseline,  1  McCord  (S.C.),  (Mass.)  438,  439  (1849);  Fisher  v.  School 
52  (1821),  where  the  subject  is  elaborately  District,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  494  (1849); 
considered  by  Nott,  J.;  s.  p.  State  v.  Hug-  Coffin  v.  Nantucket,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  269 
gins,  Harper  (S.  C.)  Law,  94  (1824),  fur-  (1850);  11  Cush.  433;  Damon  v.  Granby, 
ther  holding  that  where,  of  eighteen  man-  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345,  355  (1824);  State  v. 
agers  appointed  by  the  legislature,  two  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  493;  Charles 
refused  to  qualify,  one  was  disqualified,  v.  Hoboken,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  203;  Dey 
and  one  dead,  the  remaining  fourteen  (from  v.  Jersey  City,  19  N.J.  Eq.  412  (1S69); 
necessity  and  public  convenience)  properly  Baltimore  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  18  (1866). 
constituted  the  board,  and  might  act  by  a  Text  quoted  and  approved,  Brown  v.  Dis- 
majority  of  the  fourteen.  The  decision  trict  of  Columbia,  127  U.  S.  579,  586 
rests  upon  the  legislative  intent,  deduced  (1887). 

from  various  provisions  of  the  act,  to  com- 
mit the  matter  to  the  acting  managers. 


K'li'AL    rOKl'OIJATIONS. 


283 


below  referred  to  will  show;  has  been  relaxed,  and  in  some  ins! 
deemed  to  be  wholly  inapplicable.1 


1  With   respect    to   persons  or  officers 

illy  in  a 

matter,  it    .  held,  there 

ion  of    statute  to   the 

.,  that  whei  and  act,  a 

i  may  decide  and    bind  the   rest, 

and  this  notwithstanding  the  expn 

the   minority,    or  their  wrongful 

withdrawal  before  the  acl  is  consummated. 

..;.;'  Cow.  (N.  V.)  526  (1827) 

(appraisal  of  damages  by  canal  appraisers), 

lb.  note  ",   and    the   cases   there 

ad  reviewed  ;  lb.  764,  explanation. 

u  ther,    Will  ocks,    In    re,    7  <  low. 

,  N.  V.)    102,  and    note  ;    lb.    462,    463; 

o.  Buckingham,  5  <  >liio,  485,   489 

.    Hoboken,   3   Dutch. 

(N.J.)  203;  Martin   v.  Lemon,  26  Conn. 

N   w  York,  62  X.  V. 

•  1 1875)  ;  People  v.  Palmer  (effect 

of  death  of  one  of  the  members  or  offi- 

I;  People  v.  Syracuse,  63 

X.  Y.  291;     lie,  sec.  99,  note;  post,  chap. 

xxiii. 

The    statute   authorized    the  appoint- 

'   three  levee  inspectors,  and   pre- 

their  duties,  which   involved  the 

of  judgment.     //-  Id,  thai  all  must 

meet    and   act,    and    that   the  action  of  a 

majority  in  the  absence  of  the   third  was 

void.      Ballard   v.    Davis,    31    Miss.    525 

re  a  majority  of  a  committee  is  au- 
thorized   to   act,    they   constitute  a  party 
racting;  and  anothi  r  mi  m- 
ber  of  a  committee,  nol    acting  as  such, 
in  individual,  constitutes  another 
i  i    being  contracted  with, 
iccordingly  held  that  a  majority  of 
committee   may  contract  with   or 
employ  one  of  their  own  number,  and  such 
contract,  if  fairly  mad.' and  without   fraud 

or  corruption,  will  be  binding  upon  the 

corporation.      Junkins   v.    Union    8c] 1 

District,    19   M      220;    Buell  v.  Bucking- 

I  ;  post,  Bee.    1 13,  note  ; 

12 ;    Willard  v.   Newburyport, 

12  Pick.  (Mai  i.)  227.  3mith  r. 

.  61  N.  Y.  IN  II-:;,).     But  a  con- 

ii  a  majority  of  a 

committee  of  the  corporation,  though  in 

of   the    whole,    hinds    neither 


party.  Post,  sec.  452.  But  it  will  be 
binding  if  the  authority  was  joint  and 
Beveral,  or  if  ratified.  Adams  v.  Hill,  1C 
Me.    (  I    Shep.)    2ifi    (1889);    Kupfer  v. 

Smith    1  .   L2    M      .   185  (1815); 

A  11m  r.  Cooper,  22  Me.  133  (1842).  In 
Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345 
(1842),  this  distinction  is  taken.  If  a 
public  corporation  appoints  a  committee 
of  its  own  members,  a  majority  may  hind, 
for  such  is  the  usage  and  the  common  law 
in  relation  to  corporations.  But  if  the 
authority  is  given  to  persons  not  mem- 
bers of  the  body,  such  persons  are  agents, 
and  not  technically  a  committee,  and  all 
must  concur,  unless  it  appear  that  it  was 
intended  that  a  majority  should  act.  See 
authorities  cited  by  Solicitor-General  Davis 
in  same  case,  p.  350;  Viner's  Ah.  title 
Autliority,  B.  pi.  7.  Further  as  to  bind- 
ing force  of  the  act  of  majority  of  a  com- 
mittee or  hoard  of  selectmen,  sec  Jones  v. 
Amlovcr,  9  Pick.  (Mass. )  146;  <  Irommett  v. 
Pearson,  18  Me.(6Shep.)  344  (1841);  Jun- 
kins v. School  District,  39  Me.  220  (1855); 
Inhabitants,  &c.  v.  Cole,  3  Pick.   (.Mass.) 

232,  24  1  ;  Kingsbury  v.  Scl 1    District, 

12  Met.  (.Mass.)  99  (1846);  Keyes  v.  West- 
ford,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  273  (1835)  ;  Green 
v.  Miller,  6  Johns.  (X.  V.)  39  (1810); 
Grindley  v.  Barker,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  236, 
per  Eyre,  C.  .T.;  King  v.  Beeston,  3  Term 
It.  592  :  Guthrie  V.  Armstrong,  5  Barn.  & 
Aid.  628  (1822),  where  it  was  held  that  a 
power  given  to  fifteen  jointly  and  sever- 
ally was  well  executed    hy  four.       A  School 

committee  appointed  according  to  and 
under  a  statute  are  public   officers  within 

the  meaning  of  the  statute  which  gives  a 
majority  of  such  officers  authority  to  act 
for  the  whole.  Keyser  v.  School  District, 
35  N.  H.  477(1857).  Where  an  authority 
is  given,  by  law,  to  a  committee,  or  to 
more  persons  than  one,  to  do  an  act  of  a 
public  nature,  one  alone,  unless  there  bo 
something  to  show  such  intention,  cannot 
act  independently  and  without  the  con- 
currence (,f  the  others,  or  at  least  of  a  ma- 
jority. If  the  act  is  ministerial,  a  ma- 
jority at  least  must  concur  :  but  unless 
required,  or  such  is  the  practice,  they  need 
not   act   as   a   board,  and   be  convened  or 


§  284       MEETINGS  ;    MAJORITY   PRINCIPLE  ;    JOINT    ASSEMBLIES.        361 

§  284  (222).  Application  of  Majority  Principle  to  Joint  Assemblies. 
—  The  doctrine  of  the  English  courts  is,  that  all  of  the  integral  parts 
of  a  corporation  necessary  to  do  an  act  must  not  only  meet,  but 


notified  to  be  convened  as  such.  But  if 
the  act  is  judicial  in  its  nature,  that  is, 
requiring  the  exercise  of  judgment,  unless 
special  provision  is  otherwise  made,  all 
must  meet  or  have  notice  to  meet,  a  ma- 
jority will  constitute  a  quorum,  and  a 
majority  of  the  quorum  will  be  compe- 
tent to  act.  Martin  v.  Lemon,  26  Conn. 
192  (1857).  In  this  case  it  was  ruled  that 
one  of  a  committee  of  three  to  remove 
encroachments  on  highways  could  not  act 
alone.  Committees  of  public  corporations 
have  sometimes  been  held  to  be  governed, 
with  respect  to  meeting  and  notice,  by 
different  rules  from  a  board  which  has 
necessarily  to  be  assembled  or  convened 
before  it  can  act.  And  the  acts  of  a  ma- 
jority of  such  committees  have  been  con- 
sidered valid,  though  some  member  of  the 
committee  was  not  notified.  Gallup  v. 
Tracy  (town  committee  to  stake  out  oyster 
grounds),  25  Conn.  10  (1856).  But  com- 
pare Martin  v.  Lemon,  26  Conn.  192. 
And  see  Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
345,  354;  Grindley  v.  Barker,  1  Bos.  & 
Pul.  229;  Keeler  v.  Frost,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
400;  Perry  v.  Tynen,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  137. 
Town  committee  held  to  be  an  agent  of 
the  town,  and  not  a  board  of  public  offi- 
cers or  a  judicial  body,  and  may  act  by 
the  agreement  of  the  individual  mem- 
hers  separately  obtained.  Shea  v.  Mil- 
ford,  145  Mass.  528  (1888)  ;  Haven 
v.  Lowell,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  35.  Where 
a  public  authority  is  to  be  exercised  by 
two  officers  —  a  number  not  admitting 
of  a  majority  —  regularly,  both  should 
act ;  yet,  to  prevent  a  failure  of  justice, 
it  seems  one  may,  in  certain  cases,  as 
where  the  other  is  dead,  disqualified,  or 
absent,  act  alone.  But  certain  it  is,  that 
where  one  only  acts,  the  consent  of  the 
other  will  be  presumed.  This  is  an  appli- 
cation of  the  strong  presumption  which 
obtains  in  favor  of  the  performance  of 
official  duty.  Downing  v.  Rugar,  21 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  178  (1839),  and  authori- 
ties cited.  This  case  also  holds  that  the 
presumption  of  consent  should  be  rebutted 
only  by  the  testimony  of  the  other  officer. 


lb.  185.  "  It  is  a  general  principle  that 
where  a  board  of  officers  (for  example, 
overseers  of  the  poor)  is  constituted  to 
perform  a  duty  provided  by  law,  the  act 
of  the  majority  is  the  act  of  the  whole 
body."  Per  Bennett,  J.,  Walcott  v.  Wal- 
cott,  19  Vt.  37,  39  (1846).  See,  also, 
King  v.  Beesten,  3  Term  R.  592;  Jones  v. 
Andover,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  146. 

Under  the  statutes  of  Pennsylvania,  all 
powers  conferred  upon  county  commis- 
sioners may  be  legally  executed  by  two 
without  the  concurrence  of  the  third. 
Commissioners  v.  Leckey,  6  Serg.  & 
Rawle  (Pa.),  166  ;  Cooper  V.  Lampeter,  8 
Watts  (Pa.),  128;  Curtis  v.  Butler  Co., 
24  How.  435;  Jefferson  Co.  v.  Slagle,  66 
Pa.  St.  202,  where  it  is  held  that  a  con- 
tract by  two  county  commissioners  within 
the  scope  of  their  authority  bound  the 
county,  although  not  made  at  their  office. 

Where  three  commissioners  are  ap- 
pointed to  contract  for  site  for  poor-house, 
two  of  them  cannot  make  a  valid  purchase. 
Pulaski  Co.  v.  Lincoln,  4  Eng.  (9  Ark.) 
320  (1849).  Action  of  less  than  a  ma- 
jority of  commissioners  of  public  build- 
ings, appointed  by  act  of  legislature,  is 
void.  Petrie  v.  Doe,  30  Miss.  698  (1856). 
A  statute  declaring  that  every  board  of 
township  trustees,  "  and  the  members 
thereof,"  shall  be  overseers  of  the  poor 
was  construed  to  make  each  member  an 
overseer,  with  power  to  act.  County 
Commisssoners  v.  Jones,  7  Ind.  3,  5 
(1855). 

When  majority  may  Ian  fully  execute 
powers  of  a  public  nature.  Commissioners 
v.  Leckey,  6  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  170; 
Baltimore  Turnpike,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  484; 
McCready  v.  Guardians,  9  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  99;  Commonwealth  v.  Commis- 
sioners, 9  Watts  (Pa.),  466,  471;  Cooper  v. 
Lampeter,  8  Watts  (Pa.),  128;  Caldwell 
V.  Harrison,  11  Ala.  755;  Commissioners 
v.  Tarver,  21  Ala.  661  ;  Crist  v.  Town 
Trustees,  10  Ind.  462;  Somerset  v.  Par- 
son, 105  Pa.  St.  360;  Schenck  v.  Peay,  1 
Dillon  C.  C.  R.  267. 


- 


municipal  eokror.ATiON.s. 


rU  till  the  act  is  completed;  and  therefore  it'  one  of  such 
i  withdraws,  though  wrongfully  and  to  defeat  any 
consummated,  the  act  is  not  valid.1  The 
liability  of  this  rule  t"  abuse,  since  it  enables  onu  i>l'  the  parts  of  ;i 
joint  meeting  or  assembly  to  defeat  any  action  whatever,  has  led  the 
courts  in  this  country  to  deny  its  applicability  here,  or  to  apply  it 
with  caution/* 


1  K in^c  r.  Williams,  2  Maule  &  Sel. 
141;  following  King  v.  Buller,  8  East, 
:  questioning  King  v.  Norris,  1  Bar- 
nard. K.  B  ited  ami  reviewed,  7 
C  526,  uote  :  King  v.  Miller,  ti  Term 
R.  278  ;  2  Kent's  Com.  292.  Mr.  Will- 
cock  vindicates  tin-  rule,  -  unds 
not  very  satisfactory.  Corp.  53,  54. 
Supra,  sec  271. 

'-'  Humphrey,  //<  re,  10  Wend.  N.  Y. 

612  (1884);  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y. 

128,    146  :  /"/•  Demo,  .1.;   First  Parish  v. 

.    21     IV  !..    (  Mass.)    148    (1838); 

v.  Allison,  23   111.  437.     Ante, 

sec.  271. 

Th >mmon-law  rule,  that  to  the  due 

tution  ofacorporate  assembly  a  ma- 
li  integral  or  compo- 
nent   pari    or    body    must    necessarily    be 
present,    was  departed   from  by  the    Su- 
preme  Court  of  New   Hampshire   in   the 
i  I         :om.    By  the  charter, 
tie'   city   government  of  Portsmouth  was 
I  in  a  mayor,  "one  council  of  seven, 
di  nominated  the  board  of  aldermen, 
ami  one  council  of  twenty-one,  to  be  de- 
nominated   the    common    council,  which 
boards  Bhonld,  in   their  .joint   capacity,  be 
denominated  the   city  council."      It  was 
further    provided    by   the   charter  that  a 
"  majority  of  each  board  shall   constitute 
a  quorum  ;"  that  the  two  bodies  shall  sit 
ami  acl  separately,  except  "when  the  two 
an-  required  to  meet  in  convention  ;"  that 
at   the  meeting  oi  tie-    "city   council  in 
convention,   if  it   shall  appear  that  a  ma- 
jority  of  either  of  said   bodies  is  not  pres- 
fche   members  may  compel  the  at- 
tendance  of  the  absentees,  &c.    The  hoard 
Idermen    and    the   common    council 
separately  voted  to  meet  in  convention  on 
L2rh  of  .lum-,   for  th^  choice  of  city 
officers;  hut  when  tie'  time  arrived,  only 
a    minority    (three   out    of   seven)    of  the 
board  of  aldermen  appeared.      The  com- 


mon council  and  these  aldermen,  twenty* 
three  in  all,  being  a  majority  of  both 
board.-,,  proceeded  to  elect  city  officers  ; 
and  it  was  held,  1st,  that  the  election 
was  valid  ;  and  2d,  that  a  majority  of 
tie-  twenty-three  present  could  elect  In 
reference  to  this  decision  it  may  be  ob- 
served that  the  court  take  no  notice  of 
the  power  of  compelling  the  attendance 
of  the  absentees,  and  that  this  provision 
seemed  to  contemplate  the  presence  of  a 
majority  of  each  of  the  constituent  bodies. 
The  court  cite  and  approve  Whiteside  v. 
People,  26  Wend.  634,  and  Humphrey, 
In  re,  10  Wend.  612  ;  in  both  of  which, 
however,  the  constituent  bodies,  so  to  call 
them,  duly  met,  hut  refused  to  act.  It  is 
substantially  admitted  by  the  court  that 
tie  decision  they  make  is  not  in  conform- 
ity with  the  English  rule,  but  they  con- 
sider it  to  be  the  one  "  which  will  best 
enable  the  government  of  the  city  to  pro- 
ceed with  regularity;"  and  that  "after 
every  preliminary  step  has  been  properly 
taken,  the  mere  neglect  of  one  of  the 
constituent  bodies  to  cany  its  previous 
vote  into  effect  ought  not  to  hinder  t lie 
other  bodies  from  performing  the  duties 
required  by  the  charter."  Per  Gilchrist, 
C.  J.,  in  Beck  v.  Hanscom,  supra,  9  Fost. 
(29  N.  II.)  21:;,  226.  In  Kimball  v.  Mar- 
shall, 44  X.  II.  465  (18(53),  Bell  v.  Hans- 
com, supra,  is  approved,  ami  its  doctrine 
applied  to  a  differenl  state  of  facts. 

Effect  of  refusal  of  one  of  ln-o  distinct 
bodies  to  go  into  a  joint  meeting,  or,  after 
being  assembled  in  joint  meeting,  to  par- 
ticipate in  "the  joint  ballot"  by  which 
officers  (by  statute)  are  to  be  removed  or 
appointed,  Bee,  iii  Court  of  Errors,  Whit- 
Bide    B.   'flic    People,   26    Wend.   (N.    V.)    684 

(1841),  reversing  decision  of  Supreme 
Court  in  same  case,  23  Wend.  9.  See 
Act  of  Congress  of  .Inly  25,  1866  (14 
Statutes   at   Large,   243),   regulating  the 


§  286    MEETINGS ;    NOTICE   OF   SPECIAL   MEETINGS ;    HOW   GIVEN.     363 

§  285  (223).  Stated  and  Special  Meetings ;  Power  to  adjourn ; 
Notice.  —  The  usual  division  of  the  meetings  of  corporate  bodies  is 
iuto  (1)  stated  or  regular,  and  (2)  special  meetings ;  and  meetings  of 
either  class  possess  an  incidental  power  of  adjournment,  from  whence 
we  have  another  class  known  as  adjourned  meetings.  The  time  of 
holding  regular  or  stated  meetings  is  fixed  by  the  charter,  or  by 
ordinance  or  by-law  passed  in  pursuance  thereof;  and,  in  either 
case,  the  time  thus  appointed  is  presumed  to  be  known  to  the 
members  of  the  body  ;  and  unless  the  charter  or  by-law  otherwise 
provides,  it  is  their  duty  to  attend  such  meetings  without  further 
or  special  notice.  Absent  members,  equally  with  those  who  are 
present,  are  bound  by  whatever  is  lawfully  done  at  a  regular  or 
stated  meeting,  or  any  regular  and  valid  adjourned  meeting.1 

§  286  (224).  Notice  of  Special  Meetings  ;  how  given.  —  If  the 
meeting  be  a  special  one,  the  general  rule  is,  unless  modified  by 
the  charter  or  statute,  that  notice  is  necessary,  and  must  be  person- 
ally served,  if  practicable,  upon  every  member  entitled  to  be  present, 
so  that  each  one  may  be  afforded  an  opportunity  to  participate 
and  vote.2     By  the  charter  of  a  city,  the  power  of  imposing  taxes 


election  of  United  States  senators  by  the 
legislatures  of  the  several  States  in  joint 
assembly,  containing  proriiions  (the  neces- 
sity for  which  has  been  shown  by  expe- 
rience) to  prevent  one  of  the  bodies  from 
defeating  action. 

i  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  128 
(1860)  ;  Smith  v.  Law,  21  N.  Y.  296  ; 
ante,  sees.  277,  278  ;  State  v.  Smith  (pre- 
sumptions of  regularity),  22  Minn.  218 
(1875)  ;  ante,  sees.  266,  note,  269;  post, 
sees.  286,  note,  287,  note,  as  to  presump- 
tion of  regularity  ;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State 
(presumptions  of  regularity),  4  Zabr.  (24 
N.  J.  L. )  718  ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Sanders, 
36  N.  H.  252.  See  and  compare  State 
v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  309.  If 
the  charter  does  not  provide  for  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  time  for  holding  "  stated 
meetings  "  shall  be  fixed,  the  city  council 
may  fix  or  change  the  time  by  simple 
motion,  though  it  has  previously  been 
fixed  by  a  formal  resolution,  approved 
and  published.  State  v.  Kantler,  33 
Minn.  69. 

3  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  128, 
134,  per  Selden,  J. ;  lb.  146,  per  Denio,  J. ; 
Rogers,  In  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  526,  and 


cases  cited  in  valuable  note  ;  Downing  v. 
Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  178;  Burgess 
v.  Pue,  2  Gill  (Md.),  254;  Stow  v.  Wyse, 
7  Conn.  214  ;  Harding  v.  Vandewater,  40 
Cal.  77  ;  Smyth  v.  Darley,  2  House  Lords 
Cases,  789  (1849).  A  charter  provision 
that  the  council  shall  meet  at  such  time 
and  place  as  they  may  by  resolution  di- 
rect does  not  preclude  other  meetings 
than  those  fixed  by  such  resolution,  and 
such  other  meetings  are  valid  if  all  the 
members  actually  attend  and  participate 
in  the  proceedings,  and  they  are  otherwise 
regular.  State  v.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 
Presumption  that  all  members  were  pres- 
ent and  acted,  lb.  Ante,  sees.  266,  note, 
269,  285,  note  ;  post,  292,  note. 

At  a  stated  meeting  of  a  select  body  at 
which  all  the  members  are  not  present,  it 
is  not  competent,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York,  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  or  by-law  to  that 
effect,  to  appoint  a  future  new  or  special 
'meeting  to  determine  independent  -matters 
not  taken  up,  and  which  could  not  legally 
have  been  taken  up  at  the  stated  meeting, 
and  to  act  at  such  future  time,  unless  all 
have  actual  notice.     If  any  one  thus  en- 


BfUNICIPAL   CORPORATION-.  §  287 

belonged  to  the  inhabitants  assembled  in  annual  town  meeting. 
It  was  provided  that  if  at  this  meeting  no  tax  was  voted,  or  an 
insufficient  tax,  the  common  council  "should  call  a  meeting  of  the 
inhabitants,  by  advertisement  or  otherwise,"  for  the  purpose  of 
having  them  vote  a  tax.  The  court  seemed  to  be  of  opinion  that 
the  common  council  were  obliged  to  specify  the  objects  of  the  call  in 
their  notice,  it  being  a  special  meeting;  and  it  decided  that  if  it  did 
t\  a  particular  purpose,  that  any  act  of  the  meeting  "wholly 
beside  the  special  purpose  of  the  meeting  as  stated,"  was  void.1 

7     225       Adjournment  of  Regular  Meeting.  —  A  regular   meet- 

.  mil.'--  special  provision  is  made  to  the  contrary,  may  adjourn 

i>>  a  future  fixed  day;  ami  at  such  meeting  it  will  be  lawful  to 
trau-art  any  business  which  might  have  been  transacted  at  the 
stated  meeting,  of  which  it  is,  indeed,  but  the  continuation.  Unless 
such  be  the  special  requirement  of  the  charter  or  of  a  by-law,  or  the 
established  <>r  general  usage,  the  adjourned  regular  meeting  would 
not,  it  is  supposed,  be  limited  to  completing  particular  items  of 
business  which  had  been  actually  entered  upon  and  left  unfinished 
at  the  first  meeting;  but  might,  if  the  adjournment  was  general,  do 
any  act  which  might  lawfully  have  been  done  had  no  adjournment 
taken  place.2  Where  the  meeting,  if  a  regular  one,  can  only  act 
upon  i  specific  matter,  or,  if  a  special  one,  can  only  act  upon  matters 
of  which  notice  has  been  given  to  the  members,  while  it  is  com- 
petent, in  either  case  to  adjourn,  the  adjourned  meeting  is  in  both 
cases  limited,  equally  with  the  first  meeting,  to  the  specified 
matters.3 

]  to  notice  docs  not  receive  it,  and  is  Brooks,    36  La.    An.    641  ;  Ex  /<  //<    Mi- 

not  present,  the  action  is  void.     People  v.  ramie,  73  Cal.  365.     Ante,  sees.  269,  285. 

Batchelor,    22    X.    Y.    128    (1860);  to  be  Adjournment    by    minority    to    day   ap. 

read  in  connection  with  Smith  v.  Law,  21  pointed     for    regular    meeting.       People 

N.  V.  296.  v.   Rochester,    5   Lansing    (N.    Y.),    142 

1   Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  flalst.  (F.J.)  (1871). 
8:"i2  (17'.";).      Sri-,  also,  Ilex   v.  Liverpool,  8  Seadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  Law  and 

2  Burr.  7:.:.;  Res   o.  Donca  ter,  Tb.  738  ;  Equity,  L6 ;  8.  c.  17  Law  T.  225,  H.   of 

King       M  .1  Str.  385  ;  Machell  L.  (1851).  In  this  case,  the  statute  (a  local 

v.  ffevinson,  2  Ld.   Raym.   1355;  2  Bac.  art)  required  notice  to  be  given  of  a  meet- 

Ahr.  18.  ing  of  vestrymen  to  be  held  for  the  pur- 

-  Smith  ?•.  Law,  21  N.  V.  206  ;  AVnr-  pose  of  making  a  rate  for  the  relief  of  the 

n<T   v.    Mower,    11    Vt.    385  ;    People  v.  poor.     Such  notice  was  given,  specifying 

Blor,  22  N.  V.   128;   Rawlinson  on  the  purpose  of  the  meeting;  the  meeting 

Corp.  (5th  ed.)  186,  note  ;  Rex  v.  Harris,  was  held  accordingly  on  the  12th  of  Au- 

1  B    •'.   \.  986  :  Seadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  gust,    when  it  was  resolved  that   a  rate 

I        and   Equity,  L6   (1851);    People  v.  should  be  made  ;  but  as  the  details  could 

5  X.  Y.)  22 ;  Street  Case,  not  be  completed,  the  meeting  was  ad- 

1    La.   An.  412;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State,  4  jonrned,  and  at  an  adjourned  meetingthe 

Zal»r.  (21  X.  J,  L. )   718  ;   Xuw  Orleans  V.  matter  of  the  rate  was  completed  ;  but  the 


§  288     meetings;  mode  of  proceeding  when  convened. 


365 


§  288  (226).  Mode  of  Proceeding  when  convened.  —  After  a 
meeting  of  the  council  is  duly  convened,  the  mode  of  proceeding  is 
regulated  by  the  charter  or  constituent  act,  by  ordinances  passed 
for  that  purpose,  and  by  the  general  rules,  so  far  as  in  their  nature 
applicable,  which  govern  other  deliberative  and  legislative  bodies.1 
If  the  council  consists  of  two  boards,  the  concurrence  of  both  is 
essential  to  valid  legislation,  and  this  concurrence  must  be  by  simul- 
taneously existing  bodies.2  The  rule  of  legislative  bodies  consisting 
of  two  branches,  that  unfinished  business  at  the  end  of  a  session  is 
discontinued,  and  must  be  afterwards  taken  up  anew,  if  at  all,  was 
considered  applicable  to  the  legislative  acts  of  the  common  council 
of  New  York,  composed  of  a  board  of  aldermen  and  a  board  of 
assistant  aldermen.3 


notice  for  the  adjourned  meeting  contained 
no  mention  of  the  purpose  for  which  the 
meeting  assembled.  And  the  question 
which  the  House  of  Lords  put  to  the 
judges  in  reference  to  the  adjourned  meet- 
ing, was :  "  Supposing  the  rate  to  be 
otherwise  valid,  was  it  invalid  by  reason 
of  the  notice  not  stating  the  purpose  for 
which  the  [adjourned]  meeting  assem- 
bled ?  "  The  judges  answered  :  "  We  are 
unanimously  of  opinion  that  the  rate  was 
not  rendered  invalid  by  reason  of  the 
alleged  defect  in  the  notice  of  the  ad- 
journed meeting.  It  was  sufficient  to  give 
notice  [as  required  by  the  act]  on  the 
church  door,  of  the  purpose  for  which 
the  first  meeting  was  to  be  held,  and,  that 
notice  having  been  duly  given,  we  think 
that  the  notice  so  given  extended  to  all 
the  adjourned  meetings,  such  adjourned 
meetings  being  held  for  the  purpose  of 
completing  the  unfinished  business  of  the 
first  meeting,  and  being  in  continuation 
of  that  meeting."  And  such  was  the 
judgment  of  the  House  of  Lords.  See, 
also,  Rex  v.  Harris,  1  Barn.  &  Ad.  936. 
"  Meetings  may  be  adjourned,  but  noth- 
ing may  be  transacted  at  any  adjourned 
meeting  save  the  unfinished  business  of 
the  former  meeting."  Brice's  Ultra  Vires, 
Green's  Am.  ed.  534,  citing  Reg.  v.  Grim- 
shaw,  10  Q.  B.  747,  which  holds  that  at 
an  adjourned  quarterly  meeting  notice 
must  be  given  of  any  business  not  actually 
begun  at  the  quarterly  meeting,  but  of 
business  actually  begun  no  notice  is  ne- 
cessary.   The  text,  sec.  287,  states  the  rule 


as  it  seems  to  be  understood  in  this  coun- 
try, viz.  that  under  the  conditions  stated 
in  the  text  the  adjourned  meeting  may 
transact  any  business  which  might  have 
been  transacted  by  the  regular  meeting. 

Presumption  as  to  regularity  of  ad- 
journment  when  proceedings  of  the  ad- 
journed meeting  come  before  the  court. 
Hudson  Co.  v.  State,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.) 
718  ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Sortwell,  8  Allen 
(Mass.),  217;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  309  ;  State  v.  Smith, 
22  Minn.  218  (1875).  Supra,  sec.  285, 
note. 

1  Where  an  ordinance  is  enacted  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  a  statute, 
the  fact  that  in  its  passage  a  parliamen- 
tary rule  was  violated,  will  not  render  it 
invalid.  McGraw  v.  Whitson,  69  Iowa, 
348.  Where  the  mayor  has  the  right  to 
vote  only  in  case  of  a  tie,  he  may  law- 
fully exercise  the  power  when  one  half  the 
members  of  the  council  have  voted  and 
the  other  half  have  abstained  from  voting. 
Launtz  v.  People,  113  111.  137.  Ante,  sec. 
270. 

2  Wetmore  v.  Story,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
414  (1856). 

3  Wetmore  v.  Story,  22  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
414  (1S56).  A  subsequent  council  is 
bound  by  knowledge  duly  communicated 
to  a  previous  council.  Bank  v.  Seton,  1 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  299  (1828).  In  Common- 
wealth v.  Lancaster,  5  Watts  (Pa.),  152, 
Gibson,  C.  J.,  expressed  his  opinion  to  be 
that,  notwithstanding  a  by-law  or  rule  re- 
quires certain  corporate  acts  to  be  in  a 


MUNICIPAL    C'OKrORATIONS. 


8  290 


Committees  of  Council.  — The  council  may  ascertain 
Hum  of  a  committee,  ami  the  members  <>t'  the 
ucil  may,  where  they  know  the  facts  of  their  personal  knowle 
without  further  inquiry.1     Asa  public  corporation  may  entirely 
,ke  the  powers  of  a  committee  it  has  appointed,  so  it  may  con- 
ation oi  those  powers  by  increasing  the  number  of  the 
[f  the  new  members,  either  by  design  or  mistake,  are 
luded    from    acting,    the    proceedings    of   the    others    will    be 
irregular.2 


§290    f'_'L':.     Right   to    rescind    Previous    Acts. —  At    any    time 

re  the  rights  of  third  persons  have  vested,  a  council  or  other 

corporate  body  may,  if  consistent   with   its   charter  and   rules   of 

actiou,  rescind  previous  votes  and  orders.3     Thus  a  vote  levying  a 


given  form,  and  that  alterations  of  such 
by-law  or  rule  shall  only  be  made  by  a 
of  two  thirds  of  the  meinhi  r  .  ye1 
that  a  majority  may  repeal  the  by-law  or 
rule,  and  may,  without  such  repeal,  do 
valid  the  prescribed  form,  by  a 

majority  \ 

B  ell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 
(U.  S. )  287,  296,  p  r  Clifford,  J.;  Com- 
monwealth o.  Pittsburgh,  14  Pa,  St.  177  ; 
Main  v.  Ft.  Smith,  49  Ark.  480.  Coun- 
cil may  order  sewer  to  be  built  by  a  com- 
mitter-. C.llins  v.  Holyoke,  146  Mass. 
1 1888);  Dorey  v.  Boston,  146  Mass. 
.  339,  and  eases  cited.  As  to  power  of 
council  to  appoint  officers,  and  when  it 
may  delegate  its  powers  to  a  committee. 
lb.;  Prebli  v.  Portland,  15  Me.  241  ;  Sal- 
mon v.  Haynes,  50  \.  J.  L.  97  (1888); 
96,  200,  283,  note.  The  English 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  1882,  sec.  22, 
provides  thai  "the  council  may  appoint 
out  of  their  own  body  such  and  so  many 
committees  as  they  think  lit,  for  any  pur- 
I  -  which  in  the  opinion  of  the  council 
would  be  bettei  ind  managed  by 

ucb  committees  ;  but  the  ai 
,n' h  committee  shall  be  submitted 
to  the  council  tor  their  approval." 
-  Damon   v.  Granby,   2   Pick.   I 

I ).     In  this  case  it  was  further 
held,   where   ti  ts  of  a   town  con- 

ted    with   the    plaintiff    "to  a 

place  to  be  designated 

Ol     ']■■'■    town,"    that     the 

ii  might  disagree  to  1 1  ..  ami 


"designate  the  place  for  themselves,  at 
any  time  before  the  ground  was  pre- 
pared,"  on  indemnifying  the  plaintiff  for 
any  extra  labor  or  expense  which  their 
fluctuating  proceedings  may  have  occa- 
sioned. A  notice  to  appear  before  a  com- 
mittee to  whom  a  matter,  as,  for  example, 
the  laying  out  or  altering  "f  a  street,  has 
been  duly  referred,  is  equivalent  to  a 
notice  to  appear  before  the  city  council, 
as,  for  this  purpose,  the  committee  repre- 
sent the  council.  Preble  v.  Portland,  45 
Me.  241  (1858). 

n  Bigelow  v.  Hillman,  37  Me.  58  ;  ReiS 
V.  Conner,  5  Eng.  (10  Ark.)  241  :  State  v. 
Boyt,  2  Oreg.  246  ;  ante,  sec.  69  K  1 
Case,  17  Pa.  St.  71,  75  ;  Nev.  Orleans  v. 
St.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An.  211.  Recon- 
sideration at  subsequent  meet  Jul,'.  Locke 
v.  Rochester,  5  Lansing  (X.  V.),  11 
(1871);  Sank  i'.  Philadelphia,  1  Pa,  1.  • 
Gaz.  Hep-  259.  "  The  righl  of 
trap  lost  measure- [at  the  same  meeting,  or 
pursuant  to  its  rules]  inheres  in  every 
body  possessing  legislative  powers."  Per 
Whelpley,  C.  .1.,  Jersey  City  v.  State,  1 

V ra   (80   N.  .1.   L.),  521,    529    (1863); 

Red  v.  Augusta,  2.r>  Ga.  3S<>.  "  All  delib- 
erative assemblies,  during  their  session, 
have  a  righl  to  do  and  undo,  consider  and 
reconsider,  as  often  they  think  proper, 
ami  it  is  the  result  only  which  is  done." 
Per  Kirkpatrwk,  C.  J.,  in  Stati  v.  Foster, 

•1    llalst.     (X.   J.)    101,     in?    (1823). 

also,  State  r.  Jersey  City,  "•  Dutch.  (X..1  ) 
530.     While  public  money  is  in  the  pos- 


§291 


MEETINGS  I    VOTE   BY   AYES    AND    NAYS. 


367 


tax,  so  long  as  it  rests  in  mere  resolution,  and  has  not  been  acted 
upon,  may  be  reconsidered,  and,  if  rescinded,  the  collector  cannot 
legally  proceed  to  collect  the  tax.1 

§  291  (229).  Charter  requirement  of  Vote  by  Ayes  and  Nays. — • 
A  provision  of  a  city  charter,  that  the  ayes  and  nays  shall  be  called 
and  published  whenever  the  vote  of  the  common  council  shall  be 
taken  on  any  proposed  improvement  involving  a  tax  or  assessment 
upon  the  citizens,  was  considered,  by  two  of  the  three  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  notwithstanding  the  use 
of  the  word  " shall"  to  be  directory  merely,  "  the  essential  requisite 
being  the  determination  of  the  corporation,  and  not  the  form  or 
manner  of  expressing  that  determination."2  But  an  opposite  vicio 
has  elsewhere,  as  we  think  properly,  been  taken  of  similar  provi- 
sions, the  courts  regarding  the  requirement  that  votes  shall  in  such 
cases  be  entered  at  large  on  the  minutes,  as  intended  to  accomplish 


session  of  the  proper  officer,  the  proper 
authorities  have  entire  control  over  it, 
and  they  may,  so  far  as  the  officer  holding 
it  is  concerned,  rescind  a  prior  order  (not 
yet  complied  with)  to  pay  money  to  an 
individual.  Tucker  v.  Justices,  13  Ire. 
(N.  G.)  Law,  434;  Dey  v.  Lee,  4  Jones 
(N.  ('. )  Law,  238.  A  resolution  is  not 
invalid  because  passed  upon  a  reconsidera- 
tion of  a  negative  vote  moved  by  one  who 
voted  originally  with  the  minority.  Locke 
v.  Rochester,  5  Lansing  (N.  Y.),  11  (1871). 
But  in  Sank  v.  Philadelphia,  8  Phila.  Rep. 
(by  Wallace)  117,  a  nisi  prius  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  it  was  held  that  the 
city  councils,  having  once  voted  to  sustain 
the  mayor's  veto  of  an  ordinance  passed  by 
them,  could  not  reconsider  this  vote,  nor 
take  any  further  action  on  the  measure.  6 
Am.  Law  Rev.  720. 

The  vote  of  a  town  meeting  rescinding 
its  former  action  in  authorizing  a  subscrip- 
tion in  aid  of  a  railroad  held  to  be  lawful, 
no  rights  of  third  parties  having  vested, 
and  nothing  having  been  done  under  the 
authority  to  subscribe.  Estey  v.  Starr, 
56  Yt.  690.  A  vote  ratifying  a  contract 
made  by  town  officers  without  due  author- 
ity cannot  be  rescinded  so  as  to  affect  the 
validity  of  the  contract.  Brown  v.  Win- 
terport,  79  Me.  305. 

i  Stoddard  v.  Gilman,  22  Vt.  568;  Pond 
V.  Negus,  3  Mass.  230. 

2  Striker  v.  Kelly,   7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  9, 


24,  29  (1844),  Bronson,  J.,  dissenting ; 
s.  c.  in  Error,  2  Denio,  323.  Under  a  law 
requiring  a  vote  of  the  common  council, 
where  more  than  a  majority  is  required, 
to  "  be  taken  by  the  yeas  and  nays,  which 
shall  be  entered  on  the  journal, "  the  pro- 
ceeding, to  be  valid,  must  appear  from  the 
journal  itself,  and  cannot  be  proved  by 
evidence  aliunde.  Carlton  Street,  In  re, 
16  Hun  (N.  Y.),  497.  See  McCormick  v. 
Bay  City,  23  Mich.  457  (1871);  Indianola 
v.  Jones,  29  Iowa,  2S2  ;  Mount  Morris 
Squar*3,  In  re,  2  Hill,  20  ;  Elmendorf  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  N.  Y.,  25  Wend.  693.  See 
also,  Solomon  City  v.  Hughes,  24  Kan. 
211.  The  view  expressed  in  the  Xeiv  York 
cases,  referred  to  and  approved.  St.  Louis 
v.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513  (1S73);  per  Wagner, 
J.;  post,  sec.  450,  note-  In  Morrison  v. 
Lawrence,  98  Mass.  219,  the  grant  of  an 
important  special  power  was  construed  to 
require,  as  a  condition  to  its  exercise,  the 
taking  of  the  ayes  and  nays,  and  a  record 
of  the  vote.  The  decision  or  determina- 
tion of  a  question  hy  a  town  meeting  or 
common  council  should  be,  and  probably 
must  be,  by  a  formal  vote  or  resolution. 
People  v.  Adams,  9  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  333 
(1S32)  ;  Denning  i>.  Roome,  6  "Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  651  (1831).  A  requirement  that 
the  vote  "  shall  in  all  cases  be  taken  by 
ayes  and  noes"  held  not  to  apply  to  votes 
on  motions  to  adjourn.  Green  Bay  v. 
Brauns,  50  Wis.  204. 


Ml'NR'Il'AL    C'Olil'OKATIUNS. 


§  292 


an  important  public  purpose,  and  therefore  consider  the  provision  as 
mandatory,  and  its  observance  essential  to  valid  corporate  action.1 
The  proper  remedy  for  tin'  council  i>  t"  cause  ;i  nunc  pro  tunc  entry 
t,,  l„.  made.2  This  it  has  power  to  do.3  Statutory  provision  re- 
quiring for  tin-  passage  of  municipal  ordinances  of  a  general  nature 
that  they  be  /■<<"/  ><n  three  different  days,  unless  three-fourths  of  all 
members  elected  shall  dispense  with  the  rule,  is  mandatory. 
Thus  where  two  ordinances  were  reported  for  passage,  and  the 
requisite  number  voted  in  favor  of  suspending  the  rule  for  leading 
on  different  days,  and  the  ordinances  were  respectively  passed,  it 
was  held  that  the  vote  suspending  the  rules  applied  only  to  the  first 
ordinance,  and  that  the  second  was  not  legally  adopted.4 

§  292  (230).  Acts  by  less  than  Quorum  void.  —  Acts  done  when 
less  than  a  legal  quorum  is  present,  or  which  were  not  concurred  in 
by  the  requisite  nuinher,  are  void.5     This  is  a  fundamental  rule  in 

i  Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich. 
104  (1870),  where  the  purpose  of  the  re- 
quirement is  well  expounded  ;  Spangler 
r.  Jacoby,  11  111.  297  ;  Supervisors,  &c.  o. 
People,  -J.">  111-  181  ;  .Morrison  v.  Law- 
rence, supr'i :  McCormick  v.  Day  City,  23 
..  457  (1871)  ;  Delphi  r.  Evans,  36 
Ind.  90  (1871)  :  Cutler  v.  Russellville,  10 
Ark.  105  ;  Town  of  Olin  v.  Meyers,  55 
Iowa,  209.  Accordingly  a  provision  of 
Btatute  that  no  ordinance  for  the  improve- 
ment of  a  street  should  be  adopted,  except 
upon  the  report  and  recommendation  of 
the  city  board  of  improvements,  and  re- 
quiring that  such  report  be  recorded  in  its 
mandatory,  and  the  n  port 
and  recommendation  were  held  jurisdic- 
tional, and  not  provable  by  parol  evidi 
i;  jmolda  v.  Schweinefus,  1  Sup.  Court, 
Ohio)  Rep.  215. 
Whei  I  law  required  the  yeas 

and  nays  to  be  called  and  recorded  on  the 
pa  jage  of  all  ordinances,  it  was  held  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Colorado  that  when 
the  record  failed  to  show  such  calling  and 
rding  as  to  an  ordinance  concerning 
misdemeanors,  the  ordinance  was  a  nullity 
and  a  conviction  under  it  void.  Tracy  v. 
The  People,  6  Col.  151. 

Where  a  local  improvement  is  proposed, 
and  it  is  not  petitioned  for  by  a  majority 
of  the  owners  of  property  to  be  ass* 
the  charter  declares  that  it  shall  he  ordered 
only  by  the   vole  of  at  least  three-fourths 


of  all  the  aldermen  present,  such  vote 
to  be  by  ayes  and  nays  on  the  record 
of  the  common  council  ;  if,  when  the 
record  is  presented,  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  improvement  was  ordered  by  a  vote 
of  three-fourths  of  the  aldermen  present, 
by  vote  entered  by  ayes  and  nays,  the 
ordinance  is  void,  and  judgment  for  a  sale 
of  the  property  to  pay  the  local  assessment 
cannot  rightfully  be  entered.  Rich  v. 
Chicago,  59  111.  286  (1871).  Effect  of 
such  a  provision  on  the  power  to  make  a 
contract  by  parol.  Indianola  v.  Jones, 
29  Iowa,  282  (1870)  ;  post,  sec.  449,  and 
note. 

2  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319; 
Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head,  13  Allen,  129; 
Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104; 
Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90  ;  Commis- 
sioners v.  Ilearne,  59  Ala.  371;  Musselman 
v.  Manly,  42  Ind.  462;  Vawter  v.  Frank- 
lin College,  53  Ind.  88. 

8  See  preceding  note. 

*  Bloom  v.  City  of  Xenia,  32  Ohio  St. 
461  ;  s.  P.  Morrison  v.  Lawrence,  98 
Mass.  219  ;  State  v.  Hudson,  5  Dutch. 
(X.  J.)  473  ;  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90. 
This  is  not  the  rule  in  New  York.  Cases 
supra. 

0  Logansport  v.  Legg,  20  Ind.  315 
(1863);  Ferguson  v.  Chittenden  Co.,  1  Eng. 
(6  Ark.)  47^  (1846);  Price  v.  Railroad 
Companv,  13  Ind.  58  (1859)  ;  McCracken 
v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591;  Pimental 


§  292  ACTS   BY   LESS   THAN    QUORUM    VOID.  369 

the  law  of  corporations;  but  whether,  in  favor  of  the  holder  of  ne- 
gotiable securities  issued,  or  purporting  to  bo  issued,  under  authority 
conferred  by  the  legislature,  the  corporation  might  not,  in  some 
cases,  be  estopped  to  show  that  a  quorum  whs  nut  present  or  that 
the  requisite  number  did  not  concur  in  the  act,  is  a  question  which 
remains,  perhaps,  to  be  settled.1  It  is  clear  that  members  of  a 
council  cannot  properly  act  upon  questions  in  which  their  own 
pecuniary  interest  is  directly  and  specially  involved.2  But  it  has 
been  held  in  Michigan  that  proceedings  on  the  part  of  a  municipal 
corporation  ordering  a  paving  improvement  are  not  rendered  invalid 
on  the  ground  that  two  of  the  aldermen  who  formed  part  of  the 
quorum  of  the  common  council  which  ordered  the  improvement, 
and  without  whose  presence  there  would  have  been  no  quorum, 
were  petitioners  for  the  improvement  and  owners  of  property  liable 
to  assessment  therefor.  It  might  be  otherwise,  the  court  concede, 
if  the  common  council  acted  as  commissioners  of  apportionment 
in  making  the  assessment  upon  the  property  that  was  to  bear  the 
burden,  or  on  the  confirmation  of  a  report  in  which  the  interest  of 
these  aldermen  was  directly  involved.3 

v.  San  Francisco,  21  Cal.  351  ;    State  v.  express    provision    to    this  effect  in  the 

Wilkesville,   20  Ohio  St.    288.     Number  English    Municipal   Corporations   Act   of 

present  and  acting,  how  proved.     13  Ind,  1882,  sec.  22. 

58,   sitpra.       Presence  of  quorum,    when  3  Steckert  v.   East  Saginaw,   22  Mich, 

presumed.     Insurance  Company   v.  Sort-  104  (1870),  where  the  reasons  for  the  dis- 

well,   8   Allen  (Mass.),   217.     Ante,  sees,  tinctions    taken    are    clearly    stated    by 

236,  note,  267,  note,  285,  note,  2S6,  note.  Cooley,  J.     In  the  same  State  it  was  also 

1  See  ante,  sec.  89  ;  post-,  chapter  on  held  that  the  mayor  of  a  city,  who  was  a 
Contracts.  Construction  of  charter  pro-  practising  lawyer,  might  lawfully  be  em- 
vision  requiring  unanimity.  Post,  sec.  ployed,  when  there  was  no  collusion  or 
310.  fraud,   and  no  doubt  as  to  the  necessity 

2  Members  of  a  municipal  board  are  and  value  of  his  services,  by  a  resolution 
disqualified  to  vote  therein  on  proposi-  of  the  council  to  appear  and  defend  a  suit 
tions  in  which  they  have  a  direct  pecu-  against  the  city,  and  that  he  could  recover 
niary  interest  adverse  to  the  municipality  the  value  of  his  services.  Niles,  Mayor, 
they  represent.  Oconto  County  Sup.  v.  &c.  v.  Muzzy,  33  Mich.  61  (1875) ;  s.  c. 
Hall,  47  Wis.  208;  Pickett  r.  School  Dist.,  20  Am.  Rep."  670. 

25  Wis.  551  ;  Coles  v.  Williamsburgh,   10  Eight  of  corporation  to  contract  with  its 

Wend.  659;  Wal worth  Bank  v.  F.  L.  k  T.  officers   or   coimcilmcn.      Ante,    sec.    283, 

Co.,  16  Wis.  629  ;  United  Brethren  Church  note,    and   cases   cited;    post,    sec.    443, 

v.   Vandusen,  37  Wis.    54.      Post,    chap.  Dote, 
xiv.  ;   ante,  sec.  237,  note.     There  is  an 


Note.  —  In  Eushville  Gas  Co.  v.  Rushville  (Ind.  Sup.  Ct.  1S89,  MSS.,  41  Alb.  L. 
J.  143),  the  city  council  was  composed  of  six  members,  all  of  whom  were  present  and 
qualified  to  vote  upon  a  resolution,  which,  when  submitted,  was  voted  for  by  three 
members,  the  other  three,  though  present,  refusing  to  vote.  The  court  held  that  the 
resolution,  having  received  the  vote  of  a  majority  of  a  quorum,  although  not  of  a  major- 
ity of  all  present,  was  legally  adopted.  It  deserves  further  consideration  whether  this 
result  is  consistent  with  the  majority  rule  applicable  to  definite  bodies. 
vol.  i.  — 24 


C70  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  294 


CHAPTER   XL 

CORPORATE   RECORDS   AND   DOCUMENTS.  —  CUSTODY.  —  RIGHT   OF 

INSPECTION. 

§  293  (231).  Power  to  appoint  Clerk  pro  tem.  —  Corporations 
have  the  incidental  power,  if  the  regular  clerk  is  temporarily  absent, 
to  appoint  a  private  person  a  clerk  pro  tem.,  for  the  purpose  of  mak- 
ing  the  entries  of  what  is  transacted  at  the  corporate  meeting.  His 
entries,  made  by  the  direction  of  the  corporate  authorities,  or  en- 
made  by  the  regular  clerk  from  memoranda  furnished  by  the 
clerk  'pro  tem.,  are  competent  evidence  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
meeting.1 

§  294  (232).  Amendment  of  Record. — The  clerk  or  officer  of  a 
New  England  town,2  who  has  made  an  erroneous  record,  may,  while 
in  office  (but  not  afterwards),  or  after  a  re-election  to  the  same  office, 
amend  the  same  according  to  the  truth,  being  liable,  like  a  sheriff  who 
amends  his  return,  for  any  abuse  of  the  right  ;  as,  where  he  makes  a 
fraudulent  or  untruthful  amendment,  the  town  is  not  concluded  or 

1  Hutchinson    v.    Pratt,    11    Vt.    402  331  ;  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319 

(1839).    See  also  Rexw.  Mothersell,  1  Stra.  (1878),  citing  text. 

rred  to  infra.     Board  of  public         2  Ante,  sees.  29,  30,  as  to  New  Eng- 

works  of  a   city  is  a   quasi  corporation,  land  towns.     New   Haven,  &e.,   Railroad 

lature  of  its  duties,  laying  out  Co.  v.  Chatham,  42  Conn.  465.     Speaking 

•  iblishing  grades,   sewers,    &c,  of  the  records  of  the   town  of  Concord, 

requires  it  to  keep  a  record  of  its  proceed-  Massachusetts,   Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  in 

.  although  no  such  record  is  in  terms  his  Concord  Address  says:    "I  have  read 

provided  for.    Larned  v.  Briscoe,  62  Mich,  with  care  the   town    records   themselves. 

(1886).      Sufficiency  of  memoranda.  They  exhibit  a  pleasing  picture  of  a  com- 

Louisville  v.    McKegney,  7  Bush  (Kv.),  munity  almost    exclusively   agricultural, 

570).     Failure  of  clerk  to  take  oath  where  no  man  has  much  time  lor  words, 

■  doea   not    invalidate  his   record,  in  his  search  after  things  ;  of  a  community 

Stebbins  v.  Merrit,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  27;  of  great  simplicity  of  manners,  and  of  a 

214.      Signature   of  chairman  manifest  love  of  justice.     I  find  our  annals 

to  minutes  affixed  at  a  day  subsequenl  to  marked  with  a  uniform  good  sense.     The 

th  •  meeting  hell  sufficient,  under  a  statute  toi f  the  record  rises  with  the  dignity  of 

iring  the  minutes  of  corporate  meetings  the  event.     These  soiled  and  musty  books 

to  he  signed  by  the  chairman.     Miles  o.  are   luminous  and    electric   within.     The 

h,  3  Gale  &  l».  119;  [nglis  v.  Rail-  old  town  clerks  did  not  spell  very  correctly, 

way  Co.,    16   Eng.    Law  &   Eq. -55.     See  but  they  contrive  to  make  intelligible  the 

•        relating  to  Corporate  will  of  a  free  and  just  community." 

ad  i  lorporate  <  officers  ;  post,  sec. 


294 


CORPORATE   RECORDS  ;    AMENDMENT   OP   RECORD. 


371 


bound  by  an  erroneous  record,  whether  made  by  design  or  accident, 
unless  when  it  would  on  general  principles  be  estopped.1 


i  Cass  v.  Bellows,  11  Fost.  (31  N.  H.) 
501  (1855)  ;  Harris  v.  School  District,  8 
Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  58,  66  (1853)  ;  Gibson  v. 
Bailey,  9  N.  H.  168;  Whittier  v.  Varney, 
10  N.*H.  291;  Welles  v.  Battelle,  11  Mass. 
477;  Low  i>.  Pettengill,  12  N.  H.  310; 
Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  306;  Scam- 
mon  v.  Scammon,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  429; 
President,  &c.  v.  O'Malley,  18  111.  407 
(1857);  Mottv.  Reynolds,  27  Vt.  (1  Wins.) 
206  (1855);  Boston  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pom- 
fret,  20  Conn.  590  (1850);  compare  Cov- 
ington v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  295,  below 

Cited. 

The  necessity  and  reasonableness  of  the 
doctrine  stated  in  the  text  are  thus  ex- 
pounded by  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  Welles  v. 
Battelle,  11  Mass.  477,  481  (1814):  "We 
have  had  frequent  occasion  to  perceive  the 
great  irregularity  which  prevails  in  the 
records  of  our  towns  and  other  municipal 
corporations  ;  and  the  courts  have  always 
been  desirous  to  uphold  these  proceedings, 
where  no  fraud  or  wilful  error  was  discov- 
erable. Too  much  strictness  on  subjects  of 
this  nature  would  throw  the  whole  body 
politic  into  confusion  (Kellar  v.  Savage, 
17  Me.  444).  For  it  cannot  be  expected 
that,  in  all  corporations,  persons  will  be 
every  year  selected  who  are  capable  of 
performing  their  duty  with  the  exactness 
which  would  be  useful  or  convenient.  .  .  . 
The  first  entry  made  by  the  clerk  here 
[that  an  officer  was  sworn  into  office]  was 
certainly  defective,  but  the  defect  is  prop- 
erly cured  by  the  subsequent  entry  of  the 
existing  clerk,  he  being  the  same  person 
that  officiated  at  the  time  of  the  first  entry. 
He  will  be  sufficiently  watched  by  in- 
terested parties,  to  render  a  deviation  from 
truth  neither  safe  nor  easy."  The  doctrine 
of  the  case  in  11  Mass.  477  was  followed 
and  applied  in  Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13 
Me.  466  (1836),  where  it  was  further  held 
that  the  municipal  body  was  not  bound  by 
an  erroneous  record  of  a  clerk,  even  though 
the  plaintiffs,  confiding  in  its  correctness, 
had  made  a  building  contract  with  the 
"contracting  and  building  committee" 
named  in  the  record.  The  meeting  in  this 
case,  which  attempted  to  confer  this  power 


upon  the  committee,  was  not  a  legal  one, 
because  not  held  at  the  time  and  place 
appointed  ;  and  it  was  considered  by  the 
court  that  the  plaintiff's  remedy  was  against 
the  committee,  and  not  against  the  town, 
if  the  former  acted  without  authority. 
See  further  as  to  correcting  and  amending 
records,  Williams  v.  School  District,  21 
Pick.  75,  holding  that  where  two  different, 
but  not  contradictory  records  were  made 
up  by  the  clerk  from  memoranda  taken  at 
the  meeting,  both  were  originals  and  com- 
petent testimony. 

Clerk  cannot  amend  records  after  he  is  out 
of  office.  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  105  (1846);  Hartwell  v. Lit- 
tleton, 13  Pick.  (Mass.)  229,  232  (1832). 
Contra,  to  the  effect  that  he  may  amend, 
though  out  of  office  at  the  time,  see  Gib- 
son v.  Bailey,  9  N.  H.  168  (1838);  Gibson 
v.  Bailey  followed  in  Missouri  in  one  case, 
Kiley  v.  Cranor,  51  Mo.  541,  543  (1873). 
But  may,  while  he  is  in  office.  Bishop  v. 
Cone,  3  N.  H.  513  (1821);  Hoagv.  Durfey, 
1  Aiken  (Vt.),  286  (1826);  Chamberlain  v. 
Dover,  13  Me.  466  (1836).  That  successor 
cannot  make  the  amendment.  State  v. 
Williams,  25  Me.  555,  561  ;  29  Me.  523  ; 
Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397. 
But  the  corporation  might,  in  proper  cases, 
authorize  the  successor  to  supply  the 
omitted,  or  correct  the  erroneous,  entry. 
Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402,  419. 
Bonds  of  a  city  which  by  statute  are 
directed  to  be  signed  by  the  mayor,  but 
which  were  in  fact  signed  by  the  ex-mayor, 
were  held  to  be  void  even  in  the  hands  of 
a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.  Coler  v. 
Cleburne,  131  U.  S.  162  (18S9). 

In  New  Hampshire  it  is  the  practice  to 
allow  these  amendments  only  upon  the 
order  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  by  the  officer  by  whom 
they  were  made,  even  after  he  has  ceased 
to  hold  the  office.  A  clear  case  must  be 
made  out.  The  court  do  not  permit  any 
erasures  or  interlineations  of  the  original 
record,  but  require  the  amendment  to  be 
written  upon  a  separate  piece  of  paper, 
signed  by  the  proper  officers,  and  with  it 
a  copy  of  the  order  allowing  the  amend- 


nCIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §  296 

Same  subject.  —  In  ;i  case  in  Vermont,  the  clerk  of 
iwn,  pending  the  trial,  amended  th  record  by  adding  his  slgna- 
clerk  to  I  I  of  the  warning  for  the  meeting  in  ques- 

tion.    His   right  to  do  so,  though   he  bad   meantime   been  out  of 
but  was  again  restored,  was  sanctioned  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
KedfielJ,  C.   J.,  remarking:   "We   think,    in   general,   it   must   he 
e  right  of  the  clerk  of  a  town  or  other  municipal 
corporation,  while  having  the  custody  of  the  records,  to  make  any 
.  1  according  to  the  facts.     His  having  been  out  of  office,  and 
i  tin,  could  not  deprive  him  of  that  right.     But  even  an 

officer  could  not  alter  or  amend  a  record  upon  the  testimony  of 
third  prisons  ordinarily,  and  ought  not  to  do  it  upon  his  own 
llection,  unless  in  very  obvious  cases  of  omission  or  error,  of 
which  the  present  might  fairly  be  regarded  as  one,  probably.  Such 
should  ordinarily  be  made  by  the  original  documents 
01    minutes."  l 

§  296.    Right   of  Clerk  to   amend  Records   ex  parte.  —  The  right 
of//  park  to  amend  the  records  of  the  proceedings  of  town 

corporations  was  very  thoroughly  considered  inacase  in  Connecticut.2 
statute  of  that  State  requires  town-clerks  to  keep  the  record 
books  of  their  respective  towns,  and  to  enter  truly  all  the  votes  and 
proceedings  of  the  town.  The  town-clerk  made  an  entry  showing 
thai  at  a  town-meeting  held  in  1843,  the  town  assumed  to  the 
plaintiff  a  liability  to  commence  January  1,  1844.  If  the  time 
thus  stated,  was  the  true  time,  the  plaintiff  had  a  cause  of  action 
against  the  town.  In  1849  the  clerk,  not  upon  his  own  personal 
knowledge,  or  upon  any  written  memorandum,  but  on  the  informa- 
tion of  others  (with  the  correctness  of  which,  however,  he  was  per- 
fectly satisfied),  amended  the  record  so  as  to  show  that  the  liability 
of  the  town  was  not,  by  the  vote,  to  commence  until  April  1,  1844. 
If  this  was  the  true  time,  the  plaint  ill'  had  no  cause  of  action.  The 
majority  of  the  court  (three  judges  against  two)  held  that  the  clerk, 

menl  ;  and  this  paper  is  annexed  to  the  2  Boston  Tnrnpike  Co.  v.  Pomfret,  20 
Pierce  v.  Richardson,  87  Conn.  590  (1850).     The  subject  of  amend- 
..il.  per  /.  ments  of  the  records  of  the  proceedings 
1   Motl  v.   Reynolds,  27  Vt.  (1  Wins.)  of  a  common  council  in  Connecticut,  when 
2i  -   (1855).      Amendments  in  open  it  can  he  made  by  the  cleric  and  when  by 
rk   of   the  order  of  court  upon    mandamus,  is  con- 
town,   pending  trial  to  which   the  clerk  is  shirred   in  Samis  w.    King,  40  Conn.  298 
a  pa                                       icular  decision  (1873).     Parties  to  mandamus  to  compel 
of    the    court,    disregarded.        Badley    v.  the    clerk   of   a   city   to    amend    record. 
I       mberlin,    11    Vt.    618  (1839).     Com-  Farrell    v.    King,    41    Conu.   448  (1874); 
in. nt.  •!   on   and   distinguished.     Mott  v.  Logansport    v.    Crockett,    G4    Ind.    319 
Re]            27  >          Wms.j  206  (1855).  (1878). 


§  297  corporate  records;  when  amended,  and  by  whom.    373 

still  continuing  in  office,  was  competent  to  amend  the  record ;  that 
this  power  is  derived  solely  from  his  official  character  and  does  not 
depend  on  the  permission  of  the  court  in  which  the  record  is  offered 
as  an  instrument  of  evidence,  nor  on  inquiry  into  the  truth  of  it  as 
originally  made,  or  as  amended,  and  that  such  a  record  is,  in  such 
an  action,  conclusive  evidence  of  its  own  truth.  The  dissenting 
judges,  without  denying  the  power  of  amendment  in  all  cases,  were 
of  opinion  that,  in  view  of  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  absence  of 
written  memoranda  or  personal  recollection  by  the  clerk,  the  clerk 
had  no  authority  to  make  the  amendment,  and  that  the  correct 
course  would  have  been  to  make  application  to  the  proper  court  by 
legal  process,  e.  g.,  mandamus,  to  correct  the  mistake  in  the  record, 
if  one  existed,  and  thus  give  the  opposite  interested  party  an  oppor- 
tunity to  show  that  the  record  was  already  right.  It  would  seem, 
under  the  special  circumstances,  that  the  dissenting  view  was  the 
better  one. 

§  297  (234).  When  Record  amended,  and  by  •whom. — Where 
the  clerk  makes  up  the  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  council,  and 
it  is  read  and  approved  at  the  same  or  at  a  subsequent  meeting,  the 
author  doubts  the  authority  of  the  clerk,  on  his  own  motion,  to  amend 
it  afterwards  without  the  direction  of  the  council.  The  council, 
unless  private  rights  have  attached,  may,  doubtless,  order  the  record 
of  its  own  proceedings,  even  after  it  has  once  been  approved,  to  be 
corrected  according  to  the  facts.  The  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky, 
without  determining  the  extent  of  the  power  of  the  same  council  at 
a  subsequent  meeting  to  correct  errors  and  omissions  in  the  journal 
entry  of  proceedings  at  a  previous  meeting,  decided  that  this  could 
not  be  done  by  an  entirely  new  board  in  respect  to  the  official  action 
of  their  predecessors ;  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that  where  the 
records,  as  kept,  showed  only  that  in  August,  1854,  an  ordinance 
was  reported,  a  new  council  could  not,  in  1856,  add  to  the  records 
words  showing  that  the  ordinance  had  passed,  nor  could  the  fact  of 
its  passage  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence.1 

1  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  371  ;  Musselman  v.  Manly,  42  Ind.  462 
295  (1858)  ;  see,  also,  Lexington  v.  Head-  Vawter  v.  Franklin  College,  53  Ind.  88 
ley,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  508  (1869)  ;  Graham  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319 
v.  Carondolet,  33  Mo.  262  ;  State  v.  Jer-  Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head,  13  Allen,  129 
sey  City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  93,  148,  Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104 
and  ante,  chapters  on  Corporate  Meetings  Pontiac  v.  Axford,  49  Mich.  69  ;  Delphi 
and  Ordinances  ;  post,  sec.  310  ;  ante,  sec.  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90;  Chamberlain  v. 
290.  A  public  corporation  may,  like  every  Evansville  (nunc  pro  tunc  entry  supply- 
court  of  record,  amend  its  records  nunc  pro  ing  clerical  omission),  77  Ind.  542  (1SS1), 
tunc.      Commissioners  v.  Hearne,  59  Ala.  citing  text. 


:'.,  [  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  _'.  '.» 

Wheu  Parol  Evidence  admissible,  and  when  not.  — 

■  in. iv,  it'  aecessary,  be  admitted  to  apply  a  resolution  or 
of  a  town  to  its  proper  subject-matter?  but  not,  in  general, 
large,  or  contradict  its  terms  or  meaning,  in  respect  to 
mat  for  example,  laying  out  a  highway  or  street)  regularly 

within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  town  or  its  officers,  and  where  the  en- 
try of  record  is  made  in  pursuance  of  statute  requirement.2  Where 
the  record  of  a  meeting  states  that  "the  inhabitants  met  and  ad- 
journed  the  meeting,"  parol  evidence  may  be  admit  ted  to  show  when 
and  where  the  meeting  was  held,  how  many  were  present,  and  how 
many  afterwards  came,  and,  finding  no  meeting,  went  home.3 


§  299  236).  Same  subject.  — Parol  evidence  in  a  collateral  action 
cannot  be  received  to  cunt  rail  id  the  records  of  a  public  corporation, 
required  by  statute  to  be  kept  in  writing,  or  to  show  a  mistake  in 
the  matters  as  therein  recorded.     Thus,  if  the  records  of  a  school 


1  Baker  v.  Windham,  13  Me.  (1  Shep.) 

74  (183"'.).  In  this  cum'  the  town  of  Wind- 
ham entered  upon  its  records  the  follow- 
"Voted  to  indemnify  Benj.  Baker 
in  his  costs  in  the  action  against  A.  Small, 
which  have  or  may  arise  in  the  same  on 
account  of  Gray  line."  In  an  action  hy 
Baker  against  the  town  to  recover  costs 
of  a  suit  which  he  had  brought  against 
Small,  parol  evidence  was  adjudged  to 
have  been  rightly  admitted  to  show  that 
Baker  brought  the  action  in  his  name 
against  Small,   on   account  of  the   Gray 

■  the  requesl  of  the  selectmen   of 
Windham,  for  the  purpose  of  settling  a 

I  line  between  that  and  the  ad- 
joining town,  with  the  express  agreement 
that  the  town  should  pay  all  costs,  and 
to  show  that  these  fai  ts  were  before  the 
town  when  the  vote  was  passed,  and  also 

to    show    that    the    suit    SO    institute. 1    \\.;3 

conducted  under  the  advice  and  direction 
of  the  authorities  of  the  town. 

2  Manning  v.  Fifth  Parish,  &c,  6  Pick. 

|  16;   Wild  v.   D.i-,   43   Ind.   455 

(1  ^7::)  ;    Croramett    v.    1'earson,    18   Me. 

'  man,  77  Me.  117  ; 

■  on  v.   Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.J  295  ; 

B  16  Vt.  349  ;    Lexington   v. 

H  5  Bush  (Ky.),  508  (1869)  ;  Gal- 

braith  v.  Littiech,  .  •  ;  Pittsburgh 

262  ;  post,  sec  310  ; 
,291,      Pa    I  ■  ••  idence  is  not  ad- 
missible where  no  sufficient  reason  is  shown 


for  not  producing  the  record  of  proceed- 
ings, which  is  the  primary  evidence.  Au- 
rora v.  Fox,  78  Ind.  1  (1881). 

3  Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13  Me.  466 
(1836).  But  parol  evidence  of  an  adjourn- 
ment to  another  day  cannot  be  given  so 
as  to  validate  acts  done  on  the  day  ad- 
journed to.  Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick. 
(Mass.)  31*7.  Where  a  statute  requiring 
a  record  to  be  made  of  the  persons  sworn 
into  office  is  directory,  if  the  record  is 
not  made,  the  fact  may  be  shown  by 
parol  or  other  competent  evidence.  Kel- 
lar  v.  Savage,  17  Me.  (5Shep.)  444  (1840). 
In  Meth.  Chapel  Corp.  v.  Herrick,  25 
Me.  354,  it  was  held,  that  to  establish  a 
resulting  trust  in  the  corporation  [with 
respect  to  lands],  it  could  not  prove  by 
parol  evidence  the  authority  of  the  com- 
mittees to  act  for  it  ;  the  authority  should 
appear,  and  could  only  be  shown  by  it3 
records.  Further,  as  to  what  facts  may 
be  shown  by  parol,  W<  t  Path  v.  Co. 
Comm'rs,  36  Me.  71  ;  35  Me.  373  ;  Smith 
v.  County  Comm'rs,  42  Me.  395  ;  Leavitt 
nan,  77  Me.  117;  Long  v.  Battle 
Creek,  30  Mich.  323  ;  Kohlhepp  v.  West 
Roxbury,  120  Mass.  506  ;  Oliphant  v. 
Comm'rs,  18  Kan.  386  (1877)  ;  Austin  v. 
Allen,  t",  Wis.  134  ;  Anderson  v.  Comm'rs, 
12  Ohio  St.  <!35  (ISol)  ;  (Jurnscy  v.  Ed- 
wards, 26  N.  II.  224  ;  Lewis,  Em.  Dom. 
6cc.  605,  and  cases  ;  ante,  sec.  2GS,  and 
note  ;  post,  sec.   310. 


§  300  CORPORATE   RECORDS  J    PROOF   OF   OMITTED    FACTS. 


375 


district  show  that  the  district  voted  to  authorize  their  clerk  to  call 
and  warn  "  their  annual  meetings,"  parol  evidence  in  an  action 
by  the  district  is  not  admissible  to  prove  that  the  real  vote  of  the 
district  was  to  authorize  the  clerk  to  call  and  warn  all  district  meet- 
ings.1 So,  where  the  record  of  a  town  stated  the  warning  to  have 
been  on  the  17th,  and  the  meeting  to  have  been  held  on  the  19th 
of  January,  parol  evidence  cannot  be  admitted  to  show  that,  by 
mistake,  the  clerk  inserted  the  "19th"  instead  of  the  "29th."  The 
remedy  is,  to  have  him  correct  the  record,  if  in  office,  according  to 
the  truth.2 


§  300  (237).  Proof  of  omitted  Facts  by  Parol.  —  But  a  distinction 
has  sometimes  been  drawn  between  evidence  to  contradict  facts 
stated  on  the  record  and  evidence  to  show  facts  omitted  to  be  stated 
upon  the  record.  Parol  evidence  of  the  latter  kind  is  receivable 
unless  the  law  expressly  and  imperatively  requires  all  matters  to 
appear  of  record,  and  makes  the  record  the  only  evidence.3     Thus, 


1  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  105  (1816)  ;  Morrison  v.  Law- 
rence, 98  Mass.  219  ;  Mayhew  v.  Gay 
Head,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  129.  The  cases 
are  not  uniform  on  the  subject  of  the 
collateral  impeachment  of  the  record  of 
public  boards  and  bodies.  See  Lewis,  Em. 
Dom.  chap.  xxvi.  and  cases. 

2  Durfey  v.  Hoag,  1  Aiken  (Vt.),  286 
(1826).  Where  the  record  recited  that  the 
rules  were  suspended,  without  showing  by 
what  vote,  it  was  conclusively  presumed 
in  a  collateral  proceeding  to  be  correct, 
and  oral  evidence  to  prove  otherwise  was 
rejected.  Eldora  v.  Burlingame,  62  Iowa, 
32.  So  in  Connecticut,  if  a  town  corpora- 
tion makes  an  erroneous  record  of  its  pro- 
ceedings, this  cannot  be  contradicted  in  a 
collateral  action.  In  such  an  action  the 
record  is  conclusive.  If  false,  and  the 
corporation  will  not  correct  the  record,  a 
party  interested  may,  by  mandamus,  com- 
pel it  to  make  the  correction.  Boston 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pomfret,  20  Conn.  590 
(1850).  Upon  this  point,  all  the  judges, 
though  differing  on  other  points,  seemed 
to  agree.  So,  on  an  appeal  from  an  assess- 
ment for  a  city  street,  —  Held,  that  parol 
evidence  was  not  admissible  to  prove  that 
the  common  council  agreed  to  an  arrange- 
ment proposed  by  the  appellant  and  recom- 
mended by  the  committee  on  streets,  that 
in  consideration  of  his  opening  and  grad- 


ing certain  streets  without  expense  to  the 
city,  he  should  not  be  called  on  to  pay 
any  assessment  when  the  street  in  ques- 
tion should  at  some  future  time  be  laid 
out.  It  seems  that  such  an  agreement, 
however  proved,  would  be  of  no  validity. 
Gilbert  v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn.  102 
(1873)  ;  see  Nichols  v.  Bridgeport,  23 
Conn.  189  ;  post,  chap.  xix.  ;  supra,  sec. 
295. 

Purchasers  of  such  paper  [bonds  issued 
by  cities  for  stock  in  railroads]  look  at  the 
form  of  the  paper,  the  law  which  author- 
ized it  to  be  issued,  and  the  recorded  pro- 
ceedings on  which  it  is  based.  Therefore, 
as  against  purchasers,  the  record  cannot 
be  contradicted  by  parol  evidence.  Per 
Clifford,  J.,  in  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville  (ac- 
tion on  municipal  bonds),  24  How.  (U.  S.) 
287,  298.  See  chapter  xiv.  on  Contracts, 
post,  as  to  the  rights  of  holders  of  such 
securities. 

3  Moor  v.  Newfield,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  44 
(1826).  "The  only  legal  mode  of  proving 
facts  on  record  is  by  the  record  itself,  or 
by  an  attested  copy  of  it."  lb.,  per  Mellen, 
C.  J.  ;  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  105,  113  (1847),  per  Dewey, 
J.  ;  Langsdale  v.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  467  ; 
Indianapolis  v.  Imberry,  17  Ind.  175,  179  ; 
Delphi  v.  Evans  (referring  to  previous 
cases),  36  Ind.  90  (1871)  ;  Bigelow  >: 
Perth    Amboy,     1    Dutch.    (N.   J.)    297 


MUNICIPAL   Ci»i:i'oitATIOXS. 


§300 


well-considered  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,1 
it  w;is  held  that  the  arts  of  a  corporation  might  be  proved  otherwise 


.  Gearhart  v.  Dixon,  1  Pa.  St.  224 
.   Bridgford  v.  Tuscumbia,  1  Woods, 

;  Whi  re  the 

law  '>r  charter  requires  the  cli  rk  to  kei  p  a 
journal  of  all  of 

of  the  i".:;.  council,  that,  ?,  ia  the 

proper  evidence  of  the  official  doings  of 
d  v.     Lowell  v.  Whei  lock,  11  Cush. 
(Mass.)  391  i  i  •  II  rris  v.  Whitcomb, 

4  day  (Mass.),   133;    Morrison  v.   Law- 
19  ;    I  iOui  i  ille  v.  Mc- 
K  ,7  Hush  (Ky.),  651  (1870)  ;  jaosC, 

see.  310. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  advert- 
ing to  the  distinction  in  the  text,  sus- 
tained    under    the    circumstances    stated 
below  the  introduction  of  parol  testimony 
as  a  means  of  establishing  i»  part  the  pas- 
nice.     Troy  v.  Atchison, 
&  .    Railroad    Co.,    13    Kan.   70   (1-71)  ; 
E    C.   11    Kan.   519.     The  exact  point  de- 
ppears  from  the   syllabus  settled 
,  which  is  as  follows  :  Where 
a   city  fails  to  provide   any  hook  for  the 
record  of  its  ordinances,   but  its  ordin- 
ifter  their  passage  and  approval,  are 
and  kepi  on  file  in  the  office  of  the- 
■  k,  and  a  third  party  obtains  a  duly 
!  copy  of  an   ordinance  so  placed 
and  kept  on  file,  and  acts  in  good  faith 
upon    such    ordinance,    and    is    induced 
partly   thereby    to   make    large   expendi- 
■    money,  in  a   subsequent   contro- 
versy between    the   city  and   such   third 
parties  or  their  assigns  the  rule  of  equita- 
ble estoppel  will  apply  to  the  city,  and 
and    existence   of  said 
ice  may  be  shown    by  parol  testi- 
mony.     Troy  >•.    Atchison,  &c.   Railroad 
'..  13  Kan.  70  (187-1)  ;  post,  sees. 
In  a  case  where  the  authority 
i  ling  a  streel  was  in  question,  parol 
ony  was  luid  properly  admitted  to 
th  it  a  clause  in  an  ordinance  grant- 
authority  !;  id  been  -truck  out  be- 

and  hid  I n  reinstated 

by   a  clerk,    bj    whose  direction   it  was 

printed,  and  a  printed  copy  thus  altered 

b)  him  in  the  n  cord  book.     Dyer 

■ii.  70  Cal.   136.     /• 

and  change  of  grade  of  streets,  see 

hap.  xxiii. 


1  Bank,  &c.  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat. 
64.  Delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
Mr.  Justice  Story,  arguendo,  makes  these 
important  observations:  "Would  the 
omission  of  the  corporation  to  record  its 
own  dm, i.js  have  prejudiced  the  rights  of 
the  party  relying  upon  the  good  faith  of 
an  actual  vote  of  the  corporation  ?  If  such 
omission  would  not  be  fatal  to  the  plaintiff 
in  suits  against  the  corporation  (as,  in  our 
opinion,  it  would  not  be),  it  establishes  the 
fact  that  acts  of  the  corporation,  not  re- 
corded, may  be  established  by  parol  proofs, 
and,  of  course,  by  presumptive  proofs. 
In  reason  and  justice,  there  does  not  seem 
any  solid  ground  why  a  corporation  may 
not,  in  case  of  the  omission  of  its  officers 
to  preserve  a  written  record,  give  such 
proofs  to  support  its  rights  as  would  be 
admissible  in  suits  against  it  to  support 
adverse  rights.  The  true  question  in  such 
case  would  seem  to  be,  not  which  party 
was  plaintiff  or  defendant,  but  whether 
the  evidence  was  the  best  the  nature  of 
the  case  admitted  of,  and  left  nothing  be- 
hind in  the  possession  or  control  of  the 
party  higher  than  secondary  evidence. 
.  .  .  We  do  not  admit,  as  a  general  prop- 
osition, that  the  acts  of  a  corporation  are 
invalid  merely  fnun  an  omission  to  have 
them  reduced  to  writing,  unless  the  stat- 
ute creating  it  makes  such  writing  indis- 
pensable as  evidence,  or  gives  to  them  an 
obligatory  force.  If  the  statute  imposes 
such  restriction,  it  must  be  obeyed."  (12 
Wheat.  69,  74.)  This  was  the  case  of  a 
private  corporation.  The  same  principle 
was  applied,  in  the  case  of  the  United 
State,  v.  Fillebrown,  7  Pet.  28,  to  the  acts 
of  boards  of  public  agents  or  officers,  and 

it  was  in   that  case  ac "dingly  held  that 

the  board  of  commissioners  of  the  navy 
hospital  fund,  not  being  required  by  law 
to  reduce  it-  proceedings  to  writing  in  or- 
der to  make  them  binding,  oral  evidence 
of  such  proceedings  (no  record  having 
been  made)  was  competent.  See  Langs- 
dale  v.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  467.  In  a  case  in 
Vermont  in  respect  of  a  town  which  is  re- 
quired to  keep  a  record,  it  is  said  that  it 
"appears  to  us  that  in  the  absence  of  all 
record,  it  might  be  competent  for  the  de« 


§  301  CORPORATE   RECORDS  ;    PROOF   OF   OMITTED    FACTS. 


0-7 
01  i 


than  l>y  its  records  or  some  written  document,  even  although  it  was 
its  duty  "  to  keep  a  fair  and  regular  record  of  its  proceedings."  The 
statute  did  not  prescribe  that  nothing  but  a  recorded  vote  or  written 
document  should  bind  the  corporation  or  be  received  as  evidence. 
Such  written  evidence  was  not  deemed  indispensable  unless  posi- 
tively required.  The  direction  to  keep  a  record  was  regarded  as 
directory. 


§  301  (238).  Same  subject.  —  Where  the  records  of  a  municipal 
corporation  have  heen  so  carelessly  and  imperfectly  kept  as  not  to  show 
the  adoption  of  a  resolution  or  other  acts  of  the  city  council,  and 
there  is  no  written  evidence  in  existence,  parol  testimony  may  be 
admitted,  e.  g.,  to  show  that  certain  work  was  done  by  authority  of 
the  city,  by  proving  the  passage  of  a  resolution  of  the  council,  the 
appointment  of  a  committee  to  make  the  expenditure,  their  report 
after  the  work  was  done,  and  its  adoption  by  the  council.1 


fendants  (trustees  and  collector  of  the  cor- 
poration  justifying  under  its  proceedings) 
to  show,  by  parol,  the  proceedings  of  the 
meeting.  Where  there  is  a  record,  it  can- 
not be  added  to  or  varied  by  parol.  Tay- 
lor v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  403.  But 
where  there  is  an  omission  to  make  rec- 
ords, the  rights  of  other  persons,  acting 
under  or  upon  the  faith  of  a  vote  not  re- 
corded, ought  not  to  be  prejudiced.  And 
it  would  seem  that  the  right  in  such  a 
case  is  reciprocal  in  the  corporation  and  in 
those  who  claim  adversely  to  it."  Per 
Williams,  C.  J.,  Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11 
Vt.  402,  421.  But  compare  Stevens  v. 
Eden,  &c.  Society,  12  Vt.  68S  ;  16  Vt. 
439  ;  17  Vt.  337. 

The  rights  of  creditors  or  of  third  per- 
sons cannot  be  prejudiced  by  the  neglect 
of  the  council  to  keep  proper  minutes  ; 
against  the  corporation,  what  the  council 
in  fact  did  may  be  shown  by  evidence 
aliunde  the  record  kept  by  it.  Bigelow 
v.  Perth  Amboy,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  297 
(1855) ;  San  Antonio  v.  Lewis,  9  Tex.  69 
(1852). 

Proof  of  the  action  and  orders  of  a  muni- 
cipal board  of  health,  see  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances, post,  sec.  371,  note. 

1  Eoss  v.  Madison,  1  Ind.  (Carter)  281 
(1848);  Langsdale  v.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  467; 
Indianapolis  v.  Imberry,  17  Ind.  175,  179; 
Delphi  v.  Evans  (reviewing  previous 
cases),  36  Ind.  90  (1871).     In  the  same 


State,  however,  county  commissioners  and 
township  trustees  are  required  by  law  to 
keep  a  true  record  of  their  proceedings; 
and  it  was  held  under  the  circumstances 
appearing  in  the  cases  below  cited,  that 
they  "can  only  speak  by  their  record" 
when  legally  assembled.  County  Com- 
m'rs  v.  Chitwood,  8  Ind.  504,  507  (1851); 
Trustees  v.  Osborne,  9  Ind.  45S.  So,  in 
Maine,  "school  districts  are  required  by 
law  to  keep  an  account  of  their  proceed- 
ings by  a  sworn  clerk,  and  such  proceed- 
ings can  be  proved  only  by  the  record  or  a 
copy  thereof  duly  authenticated."  Jordan 
v.  School  District,  38  Me.  164  (1S54). 
The  records  of  public  or  quasi  corporations 
are  not,  in  Ohio,  considered  to  be  "  of 
that  absolute  verity  that  any  person  shall 
be  estopped  to  show  the  truth,  in  conse- 
quence of  any  matter  which  they  contain  " 
or  omit  to  contain  ;  and  it  was  accordingly 
adjudged  that  the  fact  whether  an  official 
bond  was  received  or  refused  and  rejected 
may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence,  on  which 
point  the  record  was  silent.  Westerhaven 
v.  Clive,  5  Ohio,  136  (1821),  as  to  records 
of  township  trustees.  See  Green  v.  State, 
8  Ohio,  310  (1838),  in  which  it  was  queried 
whether  the  county  commissioners  could 
appoint  an  agent  by  parol  or  only  by 
record.  In  Iowa,  it  has  been  held  that 
where  no  record  entry  is  made,  such  an 
appointment  may  be  shown  by  parol  tes- 
timony, and  that  the  agent  acted  accord- 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  302 


Mandamus   to  enforce   Delivery  of   Corporate   Booka 

and  Records ;  Replevin.  —  Mandamus  is  an  appropriate  remedy  for 
ted  and  authorized  officer  of  a  public  or  municipal  cor- 
tiou  to  compel  the  delivery  to  him  by  his  predecessor,  or  by  an 
usurper,  of  the  books,  pap  rs,  records,  and  seal  pert  a  i  inn-  t<»  the  oflice.1 
And  such  a  corporation,  it  has  been  held  (though  the  cases  are  con- 
flicting), may  maintain  replevin  in  its  name  for  the  possession  of  its 
ird  ;  and  this  action  is  maintainable  againsl  a  stranger  or  any 
id  not  legally  entitled  to  the  custody  of  the  records.2 


ingly.  Powesheik  County  v.  Ross,  9  Iowa, 
M  l  :  Athearn  v.  District,  33  [owa,  105 
(1871);  and  see  ace.  Ross  v.  .Madison,  1 
Ind.  (Carter)  281  ;  compare  Meeker  v. 
Van  Rensselaer,  15  Wend.  397.  Where 
recording  is  not  required  by  charter  or 
law,  resolutions  of  a  council  are  admissi- 
ble in  evidence,  although  not  recorded. 
Darlington  v.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa.  St. 
68.     Se<  |  310;  Louisville  v.  Mc- 

Kegney,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  651,  construing 
charter  as  tu  requisites  of  the  journal  re- 
quired to  be  kept  by  each  board  of  the 
council 

1  Proprietors  of  Church  v.  Slack,  7 
Cush.  (Mass.)  226,  239  (1851)  ;  Common- 
wealth  v.  Athearn,  3  Mass.  285  ;  Rex  v. 
Wildman,  2  Strange,  879  ;  King  v.  In- 
gram, 1  W.  Bl.  50  ;  King  v.  Round,  1  Ad. 
&  Kl.  139;  Cranford  v.  Powell,  2  Burr. 
1013  ;  Res  v.  Clapham,  1  Wils.  305  ;  3  Bl. 
Coin.  31n  ;  Kimball  v.  Lamprey,  19  N.  H. 
215  (1848),  where  the  ahove  authorities 
are  cited  and  digested  by  Gilchrist,  C.  J.; 
Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397; 
Parish,  &c.  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.) 
148,  156;  Bates  v.  Plymouth,  14  Gray 
.  163  ;  Perkins  v.  Weston,  3  Cush. 
549. 

7'/,--  following  points  have   been   ruled 

iii    n  •,  ms    in    England : 

If  the  custody  of  their  documents  belong 

to  one  of  their  officers  in   virtue   of   his 

orporation  cannot  compel  him 

to  deliver  them  up,  bu1  may  require  that 

he  Bubmit  them  to  their  inspection  when- 

•il   proper.     Reg.  v.  I pswich, 

'2  LA    Raym.    1238  .    R  i    v.    Pigram,   2 

Burr.    707;    Wide.     345;    Glover,     260. 

Sometimes   the    custody    of   these   docu- 

•    1   to  the  town-clerk  or 

other  officer,  merely  as  the  Bervanl  of  the 

tion,    in   which  case   they  may  ap- 


point another  to  receive  them  ;  and  if 
they  are  not  delivered  over  after  demand, 
the  corporation  may  obtain  possession  of 
them  by  an  action  of  detinue,  or  the  court 
will  compel  a  delivery  by  mandamus.  lb. 
If  the  predecessor  in  ollice,  or,  he  being 
dead,  his  personal  representative,  or  an- 
other person  having  possession  of  corporate 
documents  under  him,  refuse  to  deliver 
them  over  to  the  successor  or  the  corpora- 
tion, on  a  proper  application,  the  court 
will  grant  a  mandamus  to  compel  him  to 
do  so.  Rex  v.  Nottingham,  1  Sid.  31  ; 
Anonymous,  1  Barnard.  402  ;  Willc.  345  ; 
Glover,  260.  This  writ  is  said,  indeed,  to 
lie  to  any  person,  whether  stranger  or  cor- 
porator, who  happens  to  be  in  possession 
of  the  books  of  a  corporation,  and  who  re- 
fuses to  deliver  them  up.  Proprietors  of 
Church  v.  Slack,  7  Cush.  (Mass.). 226 
(1851)  per  Fletcher,  J.;  Rex  v.  Ingram,  1 
W.  Bl.  50  ;  Willc.  246  ;  Glover,  231  ; post, 
chap.  xx. 

3  Parish,  &c.  v.  Stearns,  21  Tick. 
(Mass.)  148  ;  School  District  v.  Lord,  44 
Me.  374  (replevin  for  records  of  dis- 
trict). The  court,  holding  that  replevin 
would  lie,  say:  "The  action  is,  there- 
fore, rightfully  brought,  and  may  be 
maintained  if  the  defendant  was  not  the 
legal  clerk  of  the  district."  Per  Rice,  J., 
44  Me.  374,  384.  The  right  or  title  of 
an  office  cannot  be  determined  by  a  civil 
action  between  the  respective  claimants, 
as  by  an  action  of  replevin  for  the  official 
books  and  papers,  and  until  the  issue  as 
to  the  right  is  determined,  by  quo  warranto 
or  other  proper  proceeding,  no  suit  in 
replevin  can  be  maintained  by  one  claim- 
ant against  the  other  for  the  possession  of 
the  appurtenances  of  the  office.  Des- 
mond r.  Mi  ('arty,  17  Iowa,  525.  In  La 
Grange   v.  State  Treasurer,  24  Mich.  466, 


§  303 


CORPORATE   RECORDS,   INSPECTION    OF. 


379 


§  303  (240).  Inspection  of  Records  and  Papers.  —  Concerning 
the  right  to  inspect  cur  pur  ate  documents  and  papers,  the  following 
points  have  been  ruled  as  stated  by  Mr.  Willcock :  Every  corpora- 
tor has  a  rigid  to  inspect  all  the  records,  books,  and  other  documents 
of  the  corporation,  upon  all  proper  occasions ;  and  if,  upon  applica- 
tion for  that  purpose,  the  officer  who  has  the  custody  refuse  to  show 
them,  the  court  will  grant  a  mandamus  to  enforce  his  right.1  One 
who  has  a  prima  facie  title  to  a  corporate  office  has  a  right  to  inspect 
such  documents  as  relate  to  that  title,  and  may  obtain  a  mandamus 
for  this  purpose  before  any  suit  has  been  instituted.2  A  corporator 
has  a  right  to  inspect  these  documents,  to  obtain  information  as  to 
his  rights,  whether  in  dispute  with  a  stranger  or  the  corporation 
itself,  or  any  of  its  members.3  When  the  corporator's  application 
to  inspect  is  founded  on  his  general  right,  he  has  a  mandamus,  but 
when  it  is  founded  on  a  suit  pending,  he  obtains  a  rule.4  In  an 
action  by  one  corporation  against  another,  rules  were  made  absolute 
for  each  corporation  to  inspect  so  much  of  the  books  and  records  as 
related  to  the  subject  in  dispute.5  The  motion  for  the  rule  to  inspect 
and  to  have  copies  should  be  supported  by  affidavits  showing  the 
foundation  of  the  claim,  the  application,  the  proper  officer,  and  his 


the  court  decided  that  replevin  does  not 
lie  for  papers  filed  in  a  public  office.  Post, 
sec.  848. 

i  Rex  v.  Shelley,  3  Term  R.  142  ;  Rex 
v.  Babb,  lb.  5S0  ;  Harrison  v.  Williams,  3 
Barn.  &  Cress.  162  ;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  5  D. 
k  R.  484  ;  Willc.  347  ;  Glover,  262.  Any 
person  sufficiently  interested  is  entitled  to 
inspect  entries  in  books  of  public  corpora- 
tions relating  to  public  matters  of  the  cor- 
poration, where  the  evidence  is  required 
in  a  civil  action.  Grant,  Corp.  311.  In 
People  v.  Cornell,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  329, 
it  is  held  that  a  corporator  without  any 
special  or  private  interest  has  the  right 
to  inspect  and  take  copies  of  all  public 
documents  and  records,  under  reasonable 
restrictions  to  secure  the  safety  of  the 
originals. 

8  Rex  t>.  Newcastle,  2  Stra.  1223  ;  Rex 
v.  Lucas,  10  East,  235  ;  Rex  v.  Purnell,  1 
Wils.  242  ;  Rex  v.  Bridgeman,  2  Str.  1203 
People  v.  Mott,  1  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  247 
Cockburn  v.  Bank,  13  La.  An.  289  ;  Peo 
pie  v.  Walker,  9  Mich.  328  ;  People  v, 
Cornell,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  329  ;  post,  chap, 
xx. 

*  Edwards  v.  Vesey,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw, 
123  ;  Rex  v.  Babb,  3  Term  R.  580  ;  Rex  v, 


Bridgeman,  2  Stra.  1203  ;  Grunt  on  Corp. 
312. 

In  England  the  right  to  inspect  the 
auditor's  report  extended  o  "  any  inhabi- 
tant or  ratepayer."  The  difference  be- 
tween an  inhabitant  and  a  ratepayer  is 
that  "inhabitant"  means  a  residenti 
whether  a  ratepayer  or  not,  and  that  a 
"ratepayer"  is  a  person  who  pays  taxes, 
whether  a  resident  or  not.  The  King  v. 
North  Curry,  4  Barn,  k  Cress.  961.  Mere 
colorable  residence  is  insufficient  to  consti- 
tute a  person  an  inhabitant.  The  King  v. 
Sargent,  5  Term  R.  466  ;  The  King  v. 
Duke  of  Richmond,  6  Term  R.  560  ;  Bruce 
v.  Bruce,  2  B.  &  P.  229,  note  ;  The  King 
v.  Mitchell,  10  East,  511  ;  Whithorn  v. 
Thomas,  7  M.  &  G.  1.  The  English  Mu- 
nicipal Corporations  Act  1882,  sec.  233, 
provides  that  any  burgess  may  inspect  the 
proceedings  of  the  council  on  payment  of 
a  fee  of  one  shilling,  and  may  make  copy 
thereof  ;  may  also  inspect  the  treasurer's 
accounts  and  Freemen's  Roll. 

*  Rex  v.  Shelley,  3  Term  R.  142. 

6  Mayor  of  London  v.  Lynn  Regis,  1 
H.  Bl.  206  ;  Mayor,  &c.  of  Southampton 
v.  Graves,  8  Term  R.  592. 


MUNTCIP  VI.   C0HP0EATI0N8. 


§004 


refusal  The  rule  will  require  the  expense  attending  obedience  to 
be  borne  by  the  applicant,  and  will,  in  proper  cases,  allow  the  officer 
a  remuneration  for  his  trouble,  [fthe  officer  disobey,  without  suf- 
nl  reason,  the  rule  to  allow  an  inspection  or  to  give  copy  of,  or 
to  produce  corporate  documents,  the  court  will  grant  an  attachment 
against  him.1 


8  304     241).    Records  as  Evidence  for  the  Corporation.  —  A  public 

or  municipal  corporation,  required  by  law  to  keep  a  record  of  its 

public,  or  official  proceedings,   may   itself  use  such  records  as  evir 

ts  to  which  it  is  a  party;  but  the  records  must  first  be 

properly   authenticated.2      Indued,  in   actions   generally,  including 


1  Willc.  352,  853  ;  Grant,  311  el  seq. 
g    .  also,    People    v.    Mott,    1    How.    Pr. 
'  ickburn  v.  Bank,  13  La. 
People  v.  Walker,  '.'  Mich.  328. 
iol  I  >istrict  v.  Blakeslee,  13  <  lonn. 
227  (1839)  ;  Denning  v.  Roome,  6  Wend. 
(N.  V.)   651  ;   Wood  v.  Jefferson  County 
.  9  Cow.  (N.  V.)  205  ;  State  v.  Van 
Winkle,   1    Dutch.  (N.  J.)  73 ;   McFarlan 
v.    Triton    Ins.    Cu.,    4    Denio    (X.   Y.), 
ovj  ;  Highland  Turnp.  Co.  v.  McKean,  11 
Julius.  (X.  V.)  154.      Denning  v.  Roome, 
above  cited,  holds  thai  the  original  minutes 
or  records  of  the  corporation  of  a  city  were 
competent  evidence  of  corporate  acts,  with- 
out further  proof  of  their  verity.     Records 
of  corporation  held  admissible,  though  not 
v    law   to   1"'   kept,   and,   where 
itive,  explainable  by  parol  evidence. 
barl  v.  Dixon,   1    Pa.  St.  224(1S4:>)  ; 
Adams  v.   Ma.k,  3  N.   II.  493,  499,  per 
Bichardson,  C.  J. 

p  tints  have  been  decided 
1'.  illicit  corporations:  Where 
charters  or  corporation  hooks  are  to  be 
d  in  evidence,  being  records  or  instru- 
ments of  a  public  nature,  they  may  them- 
selves 1"'  produced  ;  and  examined  copies 
of  t  i  i    ma\  also  hi-  given  in  evi- 

.     Tin'  Court  of  King's  Bench  will 
make  a  rule  to  |  originals, 

unless  it  be  shown  by  affidavit  that  a  new 

entry,  rasure,  or  sn:r ther  circumsl 

r  bion  nec<      ry.      To  give 

1 k-i  this  public  character,  it  must  ap- 

.    if    they    he    questioned,    that     they 

been  publicly  1.'  pi .  and  that  i  i 
i  ]<■  en    made   by   tie-   proper  officer  ; 

a  entries  made  bj  other  persons 


may  he  good,  if  the  town-clerk  be  sick  or 
refuses  to  attend  —  which,  however,  must 
be  proved,  and  the  reason  why  they  were 
not  made  by  the  proper  officer  shown. 
Rex  v.  Mothersell,  1  Stra.  93  ;  Brocas  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  »f  London,  1  Stra.  307  ;  Rex 
v.  Gwyn.  Mayor,  &c,  1  Stra.  401  ;  Willc. 
343  ;  Glover,  258  ;  Rex  v.  Smith,  1  Stra. 
126;  Grant,  318.  Whoever  produces  the 
book  must  establish  its  authority  before  he 
delivers  it  in,  and  may  he  required  to 
show  where  it  has  been  kept,  and  how  it 
came  into  his  possession,  lux  v.  Mother- 
sell,  1  Stra.  93  ;  Hex  v.  Thetford,  12  Vin. 
Abr.  90,  p.  16  ;  Willc.  344  ;  Glover,  258. 
A  book  containing  minutes  of  some  corpo- 
rate acts  which  occurred  ten  years  ago,  en- 
tirely written  by  the  relator's  clerk,  who 
was  not  an  oilier  of  the  corporation,  and 
appearing  never  to  have  been  kept  among, 
or  esteemed  as,  one  of  the  corporate  docu- 
ments, or  even  seen  before  the  present 
application  for  an  information,  is  not  ad- 
missible as  a  corporate  document.  Rex  v. 
Mothersell,  1  Stra.  93.  Nor  is  the  copy 
of  a  letter  made  fifty  years  ago  and  found 
in  the  corporation  chest  ;  but  the  original 
must  he  first  accounted  for,  as  though  it 
had  been  found  in  the  possession  of  a 
private  person.  Rex  v.  Gwyn,  1  Stra. 
401.     Nor  are  entries  of  a  private  nature, 

in  the  public  hooks  of  a  corporate evi- 

dence  lor  the  corporation  in  support  of  a 
right  which  they  claim,  for  this  were 
allowing  the  party  to    fabricate  evidence 

for  themselves.  Rex  V.  I >ehen ham,  2  B. 
&  Aid.  1^7;  Marriage  v.  Lawrence,  3  B. 
.v.  Aid.  144;  Grant  on  Corp.  318,  319, 
and    cases;    2   Phil.   Ev.   122;   Angell   & 


§  305 


CORPORATE  RECORDS  ;  COMMITTEE  S  REPORT. 


381 


actions  against  agents  or  officers  of  the  corporation,  as  individuals, 
the  original  minutes  or  records  of  the  corporation  are  competent 
evidence  of  the  acts  and  proceedings  of  the  corporation.  Lhily 
authenticated  copies  have  often  been  received  in  evidence  where  the 
original  document  or  proceeding  was  of  a  public  nature.1 

§  .305  (242).  Evidential  Force  of  Committee's  Report.  —  An 
admission  by  a  corporation  of  a  fact  or  of  a  liability,  duly  and  prop- 
erly made,  is,  of  course,  evidence  against  it.  But  a  municipal 
corporation,  by  accepting,  that  is,  receiving  the  report  of  a  committee 


Ames  Corp.  sec.  679  ;  Willc.  344.  The 
English  Municipal  Corporations  Act  1882, 
sec.  22,  provides  that  "a  minute  of  the 
proceedings  at  a  meeting  of  the  council," 
duly  signed  as  specified  in  the  act,  "  shall 
be  received  in  evidence  without  further 
proof  ; "  and  are  presumed  to  be  regular 
and  valid,  "  until  the  contrary  is  proved." 
How  such  proof  must  be  made,  see  Reg.  v. 
Thomas,  8  A.  &  E.  183. 

1  Denning  v.  Roome,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y. ) 
651  (1831);  citing  Owings  v.  Speed,  5 
Wheat.  424  ;  Rex  v.  Mothersell,  1  Stra. 
93  ;  12  Vin.  Abr.  90,  pi.  16.  See  also, 
People  v.  Adams,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  333  ; 
Wood  ».  Jefferson  County  Bank,  9  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  194,  205;  Angell  &  Ames  on 
Corp.  sec.  679  ;  Turnpike  Co.  v.  McKean, 
11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  154;  People  v.  Mur- 
ray, 57  Mich.  396  ;  O'Mally  v.  McGinn, 
53  Wis.  353.  In  Denning  v.  Roome, 
supra,  the  defendant  was  sued  in  his  in- 
dividual cap/icily  for  removing,  by  order  of 
the  city  council,  a  certain  fence  erected  by 
the  plaintiff.  The  defendant  (although  it 
was  argued  that,  being  the  agent  of  the 
corporation,  the  latter  should  be  consid- 
ered as  the  party  and  its  own  records  as 
incompetent  in  its  own  favor  to  justify 
its  acts)  was  allowed  to  show  by  the  rec- 
ords of  the  corporation  that  the  fence  was 
on  a  portion  of  the  public  street. 

The  clerk  of  a  city  or  town  is,  by  law, 
the  proper  certifying  officer  to  authenti- 
cate copies  of  the  votes  and  ordinances 
thereof.  Such  copies  are  admissible  in 
evidence  without  preliminary  proof,  as  in 
ordinary  instruments,  of  the  genuineness 
of  the  clerk's  signature,  but  are,  of 
course,  only  prima  facie  evidence;  and 
they  may  be  shown  to  be  inaccurate,  false, 
or  forged.     Commonwealth   v.    Chase,    6 


Cush.  (Mass.)  248  (1850).  Where  the 
original  document  is  of  a  public  nature, 
and  would  be  evidence  if  produced,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  show  the  document  itself, 
for  it  may  be  required  at  many  places  at 
the  same  time  ;  for  that  reason  an  imme- 
diate sworn  copy,  made  by  the  proper 
officer,  will  be  admitted.  Rex  v.  Lord 
George  Gordon,  Doug.  593  ;  1  Phil.  Ev. 
405  ;  Willc.  344  ;  Glover,  259.  Grant, 
318,  lays  down  the  rule  generally,  that 
sworn  copies  of  public  entries  in  books  of 
public  corporations  are  admissible  wher- 
ever the  originals  would  be,  and  the  cor- 
poration will  not  be  compelled  to  produce 
their  books  in  court  except  for  reasons 
shown.  It  has,  however,  been  held  that 
the  by-laws  of  a  corporation,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  special  provision,  must  be 
proved  by  the  production  of  the  by-laws 
themselves,  as  these  are  the  primary  evi- 
dence. Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H. 
31  ;  Moor  v.  Newfield,  4  Greenl.  (Me.) 
44  ;  Hallowell  Bank  v.  Hamlin,  14  Mass. 
178.  So,  of  the  votes  of  a  corporation, 
the  record  is  the  best  evidence.  Haven 
v.  Asylum,  13  N.  H.  532.  See  also  Man- 
ning v.  Parish,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  6  ;  Taylor 
v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  403  ;  Green  v. 
Indianapolis,  25  Ind.  490.  It  may  be  re- 
marked that  there  are  statutes  in  various 
States  under  which  certified  copies  would 
be  receivable  in  evidence  instead  of  the 
originals.  Licenses  from  a  city  or  town 
authorizing  persons  to  pursue  particular 
employments,  &c,  need  not  be  in  writing. 
Boston  v.  Shaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  415 
(1830).  An  ordinance  of  a  city  of  another 
Stale  may  be  proved  by  producing  the 
book  in  whicli  it  is  recorded,  or  by  a 
sworn  copy.  Louisville,  N.  A.,  &  Chic. 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Shires,  10S  111.  617. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  305 


of  inquiry,  does  not  admit  the  truth  of  the  tacts  stated  therein;  and 
such  a  report,  though  accepted  by  a  vote  of  the  corporation,  is  not 
admissible  in  evidence  against  it.1  In  an  action  of  assumpsit  against 
a  town  corporation,  to  support  his  cause  of  action,  the  plaintiff  pro- 
duced the  books  of  the  corporation,  by  which  it  appeared  that  the 
Bum  demanded  in  the  declaration  had  lieen  allowed  l.y  the  council 
to  the  plaintiff  on  the  5th  of  September,  on  final  settlement,  at  winch 
time  the  plaintiff  was  present  and  assented  to  the  settlement.  The 
defendant  contended  that  the  resolution  had  been  passed  by  mis- 
take, and  offered  to  show,  by  the  same  books,  the  passage,  three  days 
afterwards,  in  the  plaintiff's  absence,  of  a  resolution  rescinding  the 
amount  of  the  plaintiffs  account.  It  was  held  that  the  subsequent 
lution  was  not  competent  evidence,  the  court  basing  this  opinion 
on  the  proposition  that  the  hooks  of  a  corporation  are  evidence 
against  it,  but  not  in  its  favor,  in  an  action  against  the  corporation  by 
a  stranger.2 

Notice  to  corporator  or  member  is  not 
notice  to  the  corporation  ;  it  should  be 
formally  given  as  such  to  the  authorized 
head  or  proper  officer.  Powles  v.  Page, 
3Com.  R.  31  ;  Edwards  v.  Railroad  Co., 
1  Myl.  &  Cr.  659  ;  Grant  Corp.  315.  Lan- 
c<'y  brought  an  action  for  libel  against  the 
mayor  and  cleric  of  the  city  of  Bangor 
for  the  following  statement  contained  in 
their  annual  report  :  "  Balance  due  from 
John  Lancey,  Collector,  $6,004.50."  The 
balance  was  shown  to  be  less.  It  was 
held  that  there  was  no  presumption  of 
law  that  the  officers  of  a  city  or  town 
knew  the  contents  of  the  city  records,  and 
no  rule  of  law  obliging  them  to  be  ac- 
quainted therewith  ;  and  unless  the  de- 
fendants made  the  publication  maliciously 
they  were  entitled  to  a  verdict.  Lancey 
v.  Bryant,  80  Me.  (10  Shep.)  466  (1849)  ; 
ante,  sec.  237,  note,  and  oases. 

a  Mayor  v.  Wright,  2  Port.  (Ala.)  230 
(1835),  citing  1  Stark  Ev.  292  ;  but  is  not 
the  proposition  too  broadly  stated  .' 


1  Dudley  V.  Weston,  1  Met.  (Mass.) 
477  (184»;j  ;  followed  by  Collins  r.    Dor- 

.  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  396  (1850)  ;  and 
lating  to  defective  highways.  In 
The  Kin-  r.  Ilardwick,  11  East,  578,  a 
rated  parishioner  made  a  confession,  which 
waa  admitted  in  evidei against  the  par- 
ish, on  the  ground  that  the  parish  was 
ion  or  company,  of 
which  ho  was  a  member  ;  compare  May- 
or,  &c.    v.    Long,    1   Camp.   22.      Bui   this 

the  law  in  this  country,  and  it  may 

I .  laid  down  that  the  admission  of  a 
corporator  cannot  be  received  against  the 
body.  Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart,  3  Day 
(Conn.),  493,  denying  The  King  v.  Hard- 
wick,  supra  :  <  Isgood  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  3 
Cow.(N.  V.)  612,  623.  Bu1  the  admission 
of  an  officer  when  made  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  his  official  duty,  and  within  the 
Bcope  of  his   powers,    may   lie   admissible 

•  the  corporation.  Peyton  v.  Hos- 
I'.  363  |  Angell  &  Ames  on 
1  ;  1       ec.  659  ;  ante,  sec. 

237,   UOte,  and  cases. 


§  307  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES  ;    DEFINITION.  383 


CHAPTER   XII. 

MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 

§  306  (243).  Subject  outlined. — This  subject  will  be  considered 
under  the  following  heads  :  — 

1.  Definition,  General  Nature  and  Common-Law  Requisites  of 
Ordinances  —  sees.  307-330. 

2.  Of  the  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording  —  sees.  331-335. 

3.  Of  the  Power  to  impose  Fines,  Penalties,  and  Forfeitures  — 
sees.  336-353. 

4.  On  Whom  Binding,  and  Notice  thereof — sees.  354-356. 

5.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  Licensing,  Taxing,  and  Regulation 
of  Amusements  and  Occupations,  including  the  Sale  of  Intoxicating 
Liquors  —  sees.  357-365. 

6.  Ordinances  relating  to  Public  Offences  —  sees.  366-368. 

7.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  Public  Health,  Safety,  and  Conve- 
nience :  Herein  of  Hospitals,  Cemeteries,  and  Burials ;  Nuisances ; 
Markets  and  Inspection  Regulations ;  Dangerous  Occupations  and 
Practices  ;  and  of  the  Police  Power  and  General  Welfare  Clauses  in 
Charters  —  sees.  369-407. 

8.  Mode  of  enforcing  Ordinances  :  Herein  of  Actions  and  Prosecu- 
tions, and  their  Nature ;  Mode  of  pleading  Ordinances ;  Requisites 
of  Complaints  to  enforce  Ordinances  ;  Construction,  Defences,  Evi- 
dence, &c.  —  sees.  408-422. 

Definition,  General  Nature,  and  Common-Law  Requisites  of 
Ordinances. 

§  307  (244).  Definition.  —  Under  the  general  term  of  "ordinances" 
have  been  sometimes  included  all  the  regulations  by  which  a  cor- 
poration is  itself  governed,  including  special  charter  or  statute  regu- 
lations, as  well  as  by-laws.  In  this  country,  the  term  "  ordinance  " 
is  not  usually  applied,  if  ever,  to  charters,  or  acts  of  the  legislature 
respecting  municipal  corporations  regulating  their  powers  and  mode 
of  action,  but  is  limited  in  its  application  to  the  acts  or  regulations, 
in  the  nature  of  local  laws,  passed  by  the  proper  assembly  or  gov- 
erning body  of  the  corporation.  Indeed,  in  general  and  professional 
use  the  term  "ordinance"  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  equivalent  in  meaning 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§307 


to  the  term  "by-law,"  and  is  the  word  most  generally  used  to  denote 
by-laws  adopted  by  municipal  corporations.     According  to  Lord 
Coke  the  word  "  by  "  or  "  bye "  signifies  a  habitation;  and  thence  a 
by-law  in  England,  and  a  by-law  or  ordinance  in  this  country,  may 
1.7-  defined  t"  be  tin'  law  of  the  inhabitants  of  the-  corporate  place  or 
trict,  made  by  themselves  or  the  authorized  body,  in  distinction 
tieral  law  of  the  country  or  the  statute  law  of  the  partic- 
ular State  ' 


i  Willc.  73  ;  2  Kyd,  95,  98. 

Nature  of  Ordinances  or 
In  ;i  case  iii  -'<&, 

denying  u>  towns  in  that  State  power  un- 
der the  statute  to  prohibit  by  ordinance 
tie  of  intoxicating  liquor,  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Shaw  observed  that  the  term  "by- 
law" lias  ;i  limited  and  peculiar  meaning, 
and  is  used  to  designate  such  ordinances 
or  regulations  which  a  corporation,  as  one 
of  its  legal  incidents,  lias  power  to  make 
with  respect  to  its  own  members  and  its 
own  concerns.  In  respect  to  municipal 
and  quasi  corporations  tin-  meaning  has 
been  Bomewhal  -  stended,  hut  even  here 
the  word  is  used  to  designate  such  ordin- 
.:  La  ions  as  have  reference 
to  legitimate  and  proper  municipal  or 
corporate  purposes.  There  is  a  broad  dis- 
tinction between  tin-  power  of  a  public 
corporation  to  make  "by-laws"  and  the 
I  •  make  "  laws  : "  author- 
ity to  make  the  former  does  nol  include 
the  power  to  legislate  upon  general  sub- 
i  imonwealth  v.  Turner,  1  Cush. 
(M  as. )  193.  See  also  Taylor  /•.  Lambert- 
ville,  4:;  N.  .T.  Eq.  (16  Stew.)  107.  "It 
me  ins  a  loi  d  law  prescribing  a  general 
and  permanent  rule."    Elliott,  .1.,  Citizens' 

'    C  ■    v.    I.'v. I,   11  1    Ind.   332 

( 1 S  s  7  >  pal  by-law,  according 

to  the  definition  of  a  distingui 
l,i  itory  over  a  par- 

tr .  1  i  -t  ri«t .  not  being  at  variance  with 
th,-  of  the  realm,  and  being 

ed  to  tin-  purpo  of 
th.-  corporation  ;  and  any  rule  or  ordin- 
of  a  permanent  character  which  a 
corporation  is  empowered  to  make,  either 
by  tin-  common  or  statute  law,  is  a  by- 
law. Per  Parke,  !'••,  Gosling  '•.  Veley,  19 
I,..' 

i  ,i,<ii   Ordinances  discrimi- 
nated.—  A   resolution    IS  an  order  of  the 


council  of  a  special  and  temporary  char- 
acter ;  an  ordinance  prescribes  a  perma- 
nent rule  of  conduct  or  government. 
Blauchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  '.<»;,  103, 
per  Scott,  .1.  Where  the  charter  commits 
the  decision  of  a  matter  to  the  council 
and  is  silent  as  to  the  mode,  the  decision 
may  he  evidenced  by  a  resolution,  and 
need  not  necessarily  be  by  an  ordinance. 
State  v.  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
493  ;  Merch.  Union  1'..  Wire  Co.  i>. 
Chicago,  I).  &  Q.  By.  Co.,  70  Iowa,  105; 
Butler  v.  Passaic,  44  N.  J.  L.  171.  But 
if  the  organic  law  requires  an  act  to  be 
done  by  ordinance,  or  if  such  requirement 
is  implied  by  necessary  inference,  a  reso- 
lution i>  not  sufficient.  Newman  v.  Em- 
poria, 32  Km.  156;  Hunt  v.  Lambertville, 
45  N.  J.  L.  (1C  Vroom)  27'.»  (a  resolution 
granting  authority  to  build  a  sewer  set 
aside). 

Resolution  or  vote  held  equivalent 
to  formal  ordinance  in  a  case  where  the 
litter  was  not  expressly  required  by  the 
charter  or  statute.  Merch.  Union  15.  Wire 
Co.  v.  Chicago,  B.  k  Q.  It.  Co.,  70  Iowa, 
105.  In  State  v.  Bayonne,  6  Vroom  (35 
N.  J.  L.)|  335,  resolutions  and  ordi- 
nances  are  discriminated,  and  the  latter 
said  to  require  more  .solemnity  than  the 
former.  A  resolution  adopted  by  a  city 
council,  not  approved  by  the  mayor,  and 
not  published  in  the  manner  required  by 
the  charter,  has  not  the  effect  of  an  or- 
dinance. Central  v.  Scars,  2  Col.  588 
(187T)).  Tin-  legislative  powers  of  a  city 
council,  as  in  fixing  the  compensation  of 

city  ollii'crs  (it  was  held,  construing  the 
charter),  must  he  exercised  by  ordinance, 
when  this  is  intended  to  be  permanent. 
2b.  A.  resolution  has  ordinarily  the  same 
■  '  as  an  ordinance,  as  both  are  legisla- 
tive acts.  Sower  t\  Philadelphia,  35  Pa. 
St.  231  (1800)  ;  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco, 


§  308 


ORDINANCES  I     AUTHORITY    TO    ENACT. 


385 


§  308  (245).  Authority  delegated  to  Municipalities ;  Nature  o? 
Ordinances;  Repeal.  —  Although  the  proposition  that  the  legislature 
of  a  State  is  alone  competent  to  make  laws  is  true,  yet  it  is  also  set- 
tled that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  delegate  to  municipal 
corporations  the  power  to  make  by-laws  and  ordinances}  with  appro- 


6  Cal.  190.  Where  the  power  to  make 
ordinances  and  by-laws  is  general,  and 
no  form  in  whicli  these  shall  be  enacted 
or  passed  is  prescribed,  it  was  held  that 
an  ordinance  containing  a  prohibition  and 
annexing  a  penalty  was  valid,  notwith- 
standing it  purported  by  its  terms  to  be  a 
resolution.  In  substance  it  was  an  ordi- 
nance or  regulation,  and  the  form  in 
which  it  was  passed  did  not  make  it  void. 
Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  335 
(1849).  Where  a  city  has  power,  by  char- 
ter, to  make  "  ordinances,  rules,  resolu- 
tions, and  by-laws,"  which  are  required 
to  be  passed  by  the  vote  of  a  majority  of 
the  council  and  signed  by  the  mayor,  any 
form  of  procedure  may  be  adopted  if  it 
appears  upon  the  record  in  a  permanent 
form,  —  as,  by  a  record  in  the  minutes  of 
an  oral  motion  with  the  vote  thereon. 
Green  Bay  v.  Brauns,  50  Wis.  204.  By 
one  section  of  the  charter  the  council 
was  authorized  to  make  "by-laws,  ordi- 
nances, resolutions,  and  regulations,"  and 
by  another  "by-laws  and  ordinances" 
were  to  be  submitted  to  the  mayor  for 
his  approval,  and  it  was  held  that  there 
was  no  such  distinction  as  to  require  that 
"  by-laws  and  ordinances "  must,  and 
"regulations  and  resolutions"  need  not, 
be  submitted  to  the  mayor,  to  be  approved 
by  him.  Kepner  v.  Commonwealth,  40 
Pa.  St.  124.  The  words  "  regulation," 
"resolution,"  and  "ordinance,"  as  used 
in  the  charter,  denned  by  Lowrie,  C.  J. 
lb.  Hoio  construed.  The  charter  of  a  city 
bears  the  same  general  relation  to  the  ordi- 
nances of  a  city  that  the  Constitution  of  a 
State  bears  to  its  statutes,  and  the  general 
rules  applicable  to  unconstitutional  stat- 
utes may  be  applied  in  construing  ordi- 
nances. Quinette  v.  St.  Louis,  76  Mo. 
402. 

Construction  of  particular  ch.arter  pro- 
visions when  corporate  purpose  may  be 
expressed  in  the  form  of  a  resolution.  — 
State  v.  Elizabeth  (acceptance  of  dedica- 
tion), 8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  432  ;  State 
vol.  i.  —  25 


v.  Jersey  City  (building  sewers),  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  493  ;  lb.  185,  196  ;  State  v.  Jersey 
City  (signature  of  mayor),  1  Vroom  (30 
N.  J.  L. ),  148;  State  v.  Trenton,  7  Vroom 
(36  N.  J.  L.),  499,  503.  Instances  where 
an  ordinance  was  held  essential.  State  v. 
Bayonne  (grading  street),  6  Vroom  (35 
N.  J.  L.),  335;  lb.  205;  Cross  v.  Morris- 
town  (alteration  of  width  of  street  and 
sidewalk),  3  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.),  305  ; 
State  v.  Bergen  (appointment  of  commis- 
sioners to  a&sess  damages),  4  Vroom  (33 
N.  J.  L.),  39,  72  ;  Faterson  v.  Barnet,  46 
N.  J.  L.  (17  Vroom)  62  ;  ante,  sec.  258, 
note  ;  sec.  270,  note. 

Mode  of  Exercising  Power.  —  Where 
the  power  to  do  certain  acts  or  pass  cer- 
tain ordinances  is  conferred  upon  the 
council,  but  the  particular  mode  of  exer- 
cising the  power  is  not  prescribed,  this 
may  be  done  by  ordinance,  and  any  mode 
may  be  adopted  which  does  not  infringe 
the.  charter  or  general  law  of  the  land. 
Thus,  for  example,  power  was  given  to  a 
city  "to  levy  and  collect  a  special  tax," 
not  specifying  the  mode  of  collection. 
Held,  that  an  ordinance  requiring  the 
mayor  to  enforce  the  collection  of  the  tax 
by  suit  in  the  nature  of  an  action  for 
debt,  was  valid,  as  it  did  not  violate  the 
charter  or  the  general  law.  Cincinnati  v. 
Gvvynne,  10  Ohio,  192  ;  Markle  v.  Akron, 
14  Ohio,  586  (1846).  Prescribed  mode 
essential.  Cross  v.  Morristown,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  305  ;  Anderson  v.  O'Conner,  98  Ind. 
168  ;  post,  chap.  xix. 

1  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  586  (1855)  ; 
St.  Paul  v.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41  (1866)  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Duquet,  2  Yeates  (Pa.), 
493  ;  Hill  v.  Decatur,  22  Ga.  203  ;  State 
v.  Clark,  8  Post.  (28  N.  H.)  176  (1854)  ; 
Milne  v.  Davidson,  5  Martin,  n.  s.  (La.) 
586  ;  Markle  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio,  586,  590 
(1846);  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Morgan,  7  Martin, 
N.  s.  (La.)  1,  per  Martin,  J.  ;  Trigally 
17.  Memphis,  6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382  (1869); 
Metcalf  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  103  (1847). 
That  such  a  power  may  be  delegated  to 


Ml'NICIPAL   C0BP0RATI0N8. 


§  308 


priate  sanctions,  which,  when  authorized,  have  the  force,  in  favor  of 

municipality  an  i  against  persons  bound  thereby,  of  laws  passed 

by  the  legislature  of  the  State.1    A  penalty  imposed  by  an  ordinance 


munici]  is  admitted   even 

-    tea  which  deny  the  validity  of 

what   are   known   as    /  Laws. 

Wall,  /:  re,  L8  Cal.  27«  (1874);  s.  o.  17 

.11,  note  ;  Glov- 

o.  Howell  (local  option  as  to  sale 

of  intoxicating   liquors),    7<>    N.    V.    287 

i  Railway  Co.,  In 

S.    Y.    361    (1877);  Covington  v. 

St.    Louis,   78   111.   548   (1875).     Iu 

v.  Pontiac,  40  111.  301  (1866),  the 

Supreme  I  ouvt  held  that  a  provision   in 

a  town  charter  forbidding  any  person  to 

do   a   certain  act,    fixing  the  amount   of 

fine   aud    prescribing   the   penalty,  was  a 

actment  of  itself;  that  an  or- 

the  same  effect  was  void;  and 

that   a   party    could    be    prosecuted   only 

under  the  charter,  and  not  under  the  or- 

dinance.     In  view  of  the  general  authority 

given   in   the    same   charter  to  make  all 

ordinances  necessary  to  carry  into  effect 

the   powers   granted   in   the  charter,  the 

correctness  of  this  decision  may  admit  of 

fair  debate,  although   it  is  undoubtedly 

true  thai  i rdinance  is  necessary  where 

the    prohibition    in    the    charter   is   com- 

i,   and   the  remedy 

Ashton  v.  Ellsworth,  48  111. 

The  Bubject  of  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
•     '•'     legi  ■'  itive  function  to 
idered  in  an  able 
opinion   by  Chief  Justice  Doe,  in  State, 
il  61  N.  H    264,  314  (1881), 

in  which  he  reviews    the  authorities  in  ex- 
t  The  facts,  briefly  stated,  were  that 

the  legislature  had  submitted  a  proposition 
whether  an  act   authorizing  share- 
holders in   corporations  to  cast  all  their 


was  intended  to  be  a  d<  Legation  of  legisla- 
tive power,  and  that,  while  the  principle  of 
local  government  authorizes  the  grant  of 
limited  powers  of  local  legislation  to  mu« 
nicipulities,  the  power  of  general  State 
li  islation  cannot  be  so  delegated.  See 
also  Bowles  v.  Landaff,  59  N.  H.  164,  and 
Gould  v.  Raymond,  lb.  260.  Council  may 
order  sewer  to  be  built  by  a  committee. 
Collins  v.  Holyoke,  1  16  .Mass.  21)8  (1888). 
See  Dorey  v.  Boston,  lb.  336,  339,  and 
cases.     Ante,  sees.  97,  289. 

1  Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 
407  (1862);  Brick  Presb.  Church  v.  City, 
&c.,  5  Cow.  538;  St.  Louis  v.  Boflin- 
ger,  19  Mo.  13,  15,  per  Gamble,  J.;  St. 
Louis  v.  Lank,  49  Mo.  574  ;  Jones  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  '2  Daly  (N.  Y.).  307  ;  McDermott  v. 
Board  of  Police,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  422 
(1857);  Mason  v.  Shawneetown,  77  111. 
533  (1875);  Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  Des 
Moines  (city  of),  44  Iowa,  508  ;  s.  o.  24 
Am.  Rep.  756,  citing  text;  State  v.  Tryon, 
39  Conn.  183  (1872);  Indianapolis  v.  In- 
dianapolis Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing 
text  ;  Bearden  v.  Madison,  73  Ga.  184  ; 
St.  Johnsbury  v.  Thompson,  59  Vt.  300; 
Starr  v.  Burlington,  45  Iowa,  87.  A  city 
council  is  "a  miniature  general  assembly, 
and  their  authorized  ordinances  have  the 
force  of  laws  passed  by  the  legislature  of 
the  State."  Per  Scott,  J.,  Taylor  v.  Car- 
ondelel  (forfeiture  clause  in  lease),  22  Mo. 
105  (1855);  St.  Louis  v.  Foster,  52  Mo. 
513  (1873).  In  Hopkins  v.  Mayor  of 
Swansea,  1  M.  &  W.  621,  640,  Lord  Abin- 
gcr  said  :  "  The  by-law  has  the  same  effect 
within  its  limits,  ami  with  respect  to  the 
persons  upon  wham  it  lawfully  operates, 
as  mii  net  of  parliament  has  upon  the  sub- 


lidate  for  director  or  to     jed    a1   large.'1     Valid  ordinances  of  cor- 


vd  or  more  candi- 

;  i  w,  to  the  vote  of 

pie  of  the  Stal  '.   voting   in    their 

The   election 

! n  held  and  the  law  havin 

!  adopted  and   put   into  effect,  the 

validity  of  tin-  proceeding  was  test  I    by 

proceed ii  ■  insl  "iie  who 

had  been  declared  elected  r  director  of  a 

railroad  company.    It  v.  bhattheact 


ns  are  as  binding  on  the  corporators 
and  inhabitants  of  the  place  as  the  general 
laws  of  the  State  upon  the  citizens  at 
large.  Milne  v.  Davidson,  5  Martin  v.  s. 
(  La. )  586.  And  therefore  it  ha  -  bei  a 
held  that  contracts  between  the  inhabitants 
of  a  city,  in  i  f  the  express  provis- 

ions of  <<  valid  ordinance  of  a  municipal 

ttion,  are  illegal,  and  cannot  be  en- 
forced.    Milne  v.  Davidson  (lease  of  house 


§  809 


ORDINANCES  ;    BY   WHAT    BODY    ENACTED. 


387 


authorized  by  the  legislature  for  the  doing  of  certain  specified  acts 
amounts  to  a  prohibition,  and  the  prohibited  acts  become  thereby 
unlawful.1 


§  309  (246).  Ordinances  must  be  adopted  by  Proper  Body  and  in 
the  Prescribed  Mode. —  Ordinances  being  among  the  most  important 
and  solemn  acts  of  a  corporation,  it  is  essential  to  their  validity  that 
they  shall  be  adopted  by  the  proper  body,  duly  assembled,  and  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  the  charter.2     What  is  necessary  to  constitute 


for  private  hospital),  5  Martin,  supra 
(1827);  Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 
407  (1367);  but  compare  Baker  v.  Port- 
land, 58  Me.  199  ;  s.  c.  10  Am.  Law  Reg. 
(n.  s. )  559,  and  see.  Judge  Redficld's 
note.  And  see  also  Heeny  v.  Sprague,  11 
K.  I.  456  (1377);  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  502, 
holding  that  no  private  action  for  dama- 
ges impliedly  exists  in  favor  of  a  person 
injured  by  a  breach  of  duty  imposed  by  a 
municipal  by-law  against  tbe  person  who 
violated  the  by-law.  A  distinction  be- 
tween by-laws  and  statutes  suggested  and 
discussed  by  Durfee,  C.  J. ;  see  Johnson  v. 
Simonton,  43  Cal.  242  (1872).  The  courts 
will  not  enjoin  the  passage  of  unauthorized 
ordinances,  and  will  ordinarily  act  only 
when  steps  are  taken  to  make  them  avail- 
able. Chicago  v.  Evans,  24  111.  52  (1860); 
Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  359  ;  Des 
Moines  Gas  Co.  v.  Ues  Moines  (city  of),  44 
Iowa,  505  (1870);  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  756, 
distinguishing  Davis  v.  Mayor,  14  N.  Y. 
506  ;  People  v.  Sturtevant,  9  N.  Y.  263. 
Ante,  sec.  197,  note  ;  post,  chap.  xxii. 
But  if  a  party  is  injuriously  affected  by  an 
ordinance,  he  may  have  its  validity  judi- 
cially determined  before  it  is  attempted  to 
be  executed.  State  v.  Paterson,  34  N.  J. 
Law,  163  ;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  lb.  31, 
390  (1870).  But  see  Sheridan  v.  Colvin, 
78  111.  237. 

The  jurisdiction  of  every  council  is  not 
only  to  be  confined  to  the  municipality 
the  council  represents,  but  is  to  be  exer- 
cised, when  not  otherwise  provided  for, 
by  by-law.  When  a  corporation  is  duly 
erected,  the  law  tacitly  annexes  to  it  the 
power  of  making  by-laws  or  private  stat- 
utes. This  power  is  included  in  every  act 
of  incorporation  ;  for,  as  is  quaintly  ob- 
served by  Blackstone,  "  as  natural  reason 
is  given  to  the  natural  body  for  the  gov- 


erning it,  so  by-laws  or  statutes  are  a  sort 
of  political  reason  to  govern  the  body 
politic."  1  Bl.  Com.  476.  Though  the 
power  to  make  by-laws  is  unquestionably 
an  incident  of  every  corporation,  it  is 
rarely  left  to  implication  ;  but  is  usually, 
as  in  the  present  case,  conferred  by  the 
express  terms  of  the  act  of  parliament.  A 
by-law  is  a  rule  obligatory  over  a  particu- 
lar district,  not  being  at  variance  with  the 
general  laws,  and  being  reasonably  adapted 
to  the  purposes  of  the  corporation.  Gosling 
v.  Veley  et  al.,  19  L.  J.  (n.  s.)  Q.  B.  135. 
Hopkins  v.  Swansea,  4  M.  &  W.  621  ;  The 
Queen  v.  Osier,  32  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  324. 
The  courts  upon  general  principles  recog- 
nize judicially  what  municipal  councils  are 
competent  to  do,  and  hold  that  it  is  not 
necessary  for  them  to  recite  in  a  by-law 
all  that  is  requisite  to  show  that  they 
have  proceeded  regularly  in  passing  it. 
Grierson  v.  Ontario,  9  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
623  ;  Fisher  v.  Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  492  ;  The  King  v.  Harrison,  3  Burr. 
1328  ;  Methodist  Prot.  Church  v.  Balti- 
more, 6  Gill  (Md.),  394;  Stuyvesant  v. 
New  York,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y. )  588;  Harr. 
Mimic.  Manual,  4th  ed. 

1  Johnson  v.  Simonton  (swill  milk  or- 
dinance of  San  Francisco),  43  Cal.  242 
(1872).  Thus  a  city  ordinance,  duly  au- 
thorized, imposing  a  penalty  for  feeding 
distillery  slops  to  cows,  and  also  for  vend- 
ing the  milk  of  cows  so  fed,  amounts  to 
an  authoritative  prohibition  in  both  re- 
spects ;  and  the  acts  thus  prohibited  are 
illegal.     lb. 

The  code  at  Iowa  (sec.  4S9),  requires 
that  "  no  ordinance  shall  contain  more 
than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  clearly 
expressed  in  its  title."  Under  it  an  ordi- 
nance entitled  "  Regulating  the  use  and 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors"  was  declared 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§309 


[id  corporate  meeting,  and  the  manner  of  performing  valid  cor- 

porate  acts,  are  subjects  treated  of  in  another  chapter.1     When  the 

•    ,   7   ordinances  d,   it   must    be    pursued. 

Thus,  if  the  charter  provides  that  uo  by-law  shall  be  passed  unless 
introduced  at  a  previous  regular  meeting,  this  is  a  restriction  on  the 
power,  and  must  be  observed;  and,  accordingly,  an  ordinance  i'or 
opening  a  street  was  adjudged  void,  on  the  ground  that  the  name  of 
one  immissioners  was  changed  without  laying  the  ordinance 

over  until  another  meeting.2     So  where  by  the  charter  the  mayor  is 


.  its  subject  being  entirely  prohibitory. 
Town  of  Cantril  r.  Sainer,  59  Iowa,  26.  See 
also  Dempsey  o.  Burlington,  66  Iowa,  687. 
There  is  a  similar  statutory  provision  in 
Ka  isas.  Smith  v.  Emporia,  27  Kan.  523; 
Stebbins  v.  Mayer,  3S  Kan.  573.  See, 
ecs.  51,  270-287. 

1  Ante,  chap.  x. 

-  State  v.  Bergen,  33  N.  J.  Law,  39 
(1868),  distinguished  from  State  v.  Jersey 
i  ,21  Mitch.  (N.  J.)  448,  where  the  vari- 
ance was  immaterial.  New  Orleans  v. 
B  oka,  30  La.  An.  641  ;  Danville  v. 
Sbelton,  76  Va.  325.  See  as  to  constitu- 
tional requirement  that  hills  shall  be  read 
on  successive  days  before  their  passage, 
ley  Const.  Lim.  139,  and  cases  there 
cited.  Con  struction  of  similar  restriction 
requiring  previous  publication.  Douglass, 
In  re,  46  N.  V.  42  ;  N.  Y.  &c.  School,  In 
re,  17  N.  Y.  556  ;  Dubuque  v.  Wooton,  28 
Iowa,  571'  Where  a  statute  requires  that 
no  vote  shall  be  taken  upon  an  assessment 
ordinance  or  resolution  until  it  has  been 
published  three  .lavs,  a  resolution  passed 
without  such  prior  publication  was  held 
illegal,  and  tie  t   founded  upon 

it  void.  Addison  Smith,  In  re,  52  N. 
Y.  526.  The  provision  is  held  to  be 
mandatory.  Phillips,  In  re,  60  N.  Y.  16  ; 
Little,  In  re,  60  N.  Y.  343  ;  Anderson,  In 
re,  60  N.  Y.  457  ;  Douglass,  In  re,  46 
N.  Y.  12  ;  St,te  v.  Boboken,  38  N.  J.  L. 
110  :  State  V.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218.  I'n- 
thal  no  act  or  ordinance  of 
any  board  of  trustees  of  a  town  should  bo 
valid  until  the  certificates  of  their  election 
should  be  filed,  the  filing  to  be  within  ten 
days  after  the  election,  it  was  held  that 
the  effect  of  filing  the  certificates  a  year  or 
more  after  the  election  was  to  legali: 
validate  ordinances  previously  made  for 
Street  improvements,  and  to  authorize  the 


recovery  of  assessments  provided  for  by 
them.     Jennings  V.  Fisher,  103  Ind.  112, 
overruling  Ligonier  v.  Ackerman,  46  Ind. 
552,   and    Pratt   V.    Luther,   45   Ind.   250. 
Where  the  statute  authorized  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  erection  of  wooden  build- 
ings  in    any  block,  upon   the   petition   of 
two-thirds  of  the  property  owners  thereon, 
an  ordinance  adopted  without  a  petition 
being  first  made  was  declared  void.     Des 
Moines  v.  I  rilchrist,  67  Iowa,  210;  compare 
Keokuk  r.  Scroggs,  39  Iowa,  447.     Where, 
under  a  rule  of  a  city  council,  a  council- 
man was  not   allowed  to  vote  upon  ques- 
tions in  which  he  was  directly  interested, 
an  ordinance  passed  by  the  lowest  number 
necessary,  of  which  one  vote  was  cast  by 
an  interested  councilman,  was  declared  in- 
valid.   Buffington  Wheel  Co.  v.  Burnham, 
60  Iowa,  493.   By  the  Iowa  code,  sec.  489,  an 
ordinance  containing  more  than  one  .subject 
is  void.      Under  this  clause  an   ordinance, 
the  first  section  of  which  vacated  an  alley, 
and  the  second  granted  the  vacated  land 
to  a  private  person,  was  held  to  be  valid, 
its   purpose   being   to   transfer   the  title. 
l>etnpsey    v.   Burlington,    66    Iowa,    687. 
Where   the   law    required  the   rending  of 
the  ordinance  on  three  different  dags,  the 
fact  that  the  third  reading  was  after  the 
annual  election  and  entrance  upon  office 
of  a  new  mayor  and  four  new  aldermen, 
was  held  to  be  a  sufficient  compliance  with 
it.     McGraw  v.   Whitson,  69   Iowa,  348. 
The   readings   may   be    at    "adjourned" 
meetings  ;    three  general  meetings  of  the 
council    are    not    intended.       Cutcomp    v. 
Utt,  60  Iowa,    156.     Where  the  minutes 
of  the  council  showed  the  adoption  of  a 
motion  to  reduce  certain  licenses,  and  stated 
that  "the  mayor  was  instructed  to  prepare 
an  ordinance  covering  said   changes,"   it 
was  held,  on  an  application  for  a  man- 


§310 


ORDINANCES  ;    EVIDENCE   OF   ADOPTION. 


389 


part  of  the  law-making  power,  his  concurrence  in  legislative  action 
is  essential  to  its  validity.1  Municipal  ordinances,  otherwise  valid, 
may,  like  an  act  of  the  legislature,  be  adopted  to  take  effect  in  future 
and  upon  the  happening  of  a  contingent  event.2  The  ordaining  clause 
of  an  ordinance  has  been  held,  under  the  circumstances  stated  in  the 
note,  not  to  be  essential  to  its  validity,  although  the  charter  contains 
a  provision  requiring  such  a  clause  and  prescribing  the  form,  the 
court  considering  the  provision  to  be  directory  only.3 

§  310  (247).    Evidence  of  Adoption  of  Ordinances.  —  In  the  absence 
of  required  record  evidence  of  the  passage  of  an  ordinance,  it  is  not 

Municipal  corporations,  however,  may 
become  liable  as  wrong-doers  for  things 
done  by  direction  of  the  councils  without 
by-laws.  Croft  v.  Peterborough,  5  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  35  ;  Nevill  v.  Ross,  22  Upper 


damns  to  compel  the  issue  of  a  license  at 
the  reduced  rate,  that  the  record  did  not 
show  a  complete  legislative  act,  and  that 
the  resolution  did  not  effect  a  change  in 
the  rate  of  license.  Jones  v.  McAlpine, 
64  Ala.  511. 

i  Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488  (1872)  ; 
Saxton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153  (1375)  ; 
therefore  a  resolution  without  the  mayor's 
signature  ordering  local  improvements  is  a 
nullity.  lb.  ;  Irvin  v.  Devors,  65  Mo.  625 
(1877).  The  act  of  a  mayor  in  announcing 
that  a  motion  is  lost  does  not  amount  to 
an  adjudication,  so  as  to  prevent  its  being 
attacked  collaterally.  Chariton  v.  Holli- 
day,  60  Iowa,  391.  Ante,  sec.  272  et  seq. 
2  Baltimore  v.  Clunet,  23  Md.  449 
(1865)  ;  Northern  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Baltimore, 
21  Md.  93  (1863)  ;  State  v.  Kirkley,  29 
Md.  85  (1868)  ;  ante,  sec.  44.  See  Troy 
v.  Atchison,  &c.  Railroad  Co.,  13  Kan.  70 
(1874);  ante,  sec.  300,  note.  Another  com- 
mon but  erroneous  belief  is,  that  a  muni- 
cipal council  can  by  order  or  resolution  do 
that  which,  if  done  through  a  by-law  or 
ordinance,  wo  aid  be  illegal.  This  it  can- 
not do.  No  municipal  council  can  do  that 
informally  which  it  has  no  power  to  do 
directly  and  formally.  Daniels  v.  Bur- 
ford,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  478.  A  by-law, 
order,  or  resolution  which  revives  an  illegal 
by-law  is  of  course  itself  illegal.  Canada 
Co.  v.  Oxford,  9  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  567.  An 
order  or  resolution  duly  signed  and  sealed 
is  virtually  a  by-law  or  ordinance,  but 
many  orders  and  resolutions  pass  by  mere 
vote,  without  being  thus  authenticated. 
The  municipal  rules  of  proceeding  gen- 
erally require  more  formal  steps  to  be 
taken,  in  passing  a  by-law  or  ordinance, 
than  in  adopting  an  order  or  resolution. 


Can.  C.  P.  487  ;  Darby  v.  Crowland,  38 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  338  ;  Lewis  v.  City  of 
Toronto,  39  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  343.  The 
power  to  make  by-laws  or  ordinances 
necessarily  supposes  the  power  to  enforce 
them  by  pecuniary  penalties,  competent 
and  proportionable  to  the  offence.  In  con- 
struing a  by-law,  &c,  the  court  will  look 
at  the  whole  of  it,  to  ascertain  its  meaning, 
and  construe  one  part  with  another  or  other 
parts,  so  as,  if  possible,  to  give  full  effect 
to  the  whole.  Cameron  and  East  Nissouri, 
In  re,  13  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  190. 

3  St.  Louis  v.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513 
(1873).  The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri 
having  decided  in  the  Pacific  Railroad  v. 
Governor,  23  Mo.  353,  and  Cape  Girar- 
deau v.  Riley,  52  Mo.  424, that  the  validity 
of  a  statute,  duly  authenticated,  could 
not  be  impeached  by  showing  a  departure 
from  the  forms  prescribed  in  the  Consti- 
tution in  the  passage  of  laws,  applied  the 
same  principle  to  the  passage  of  ordi- 
nances. Therefore,  although  the  charter 
required  chat  the  style  of  ordinances  shall 
be,  "  Be  it  ordained,"  &c,  yet  this  is  di- 
rectory; and  omitting  the  enacting  clause, 
or  using  an  imperfect  enacting  clause  does 
not  invalidate  the  ordinance.  St.  Louis  v. 
Foster,  supra.  To  same  effect,  People  v. 
Murray,  57  Mich.  396.  As  to  the  con- 
flicting decisions  in  respect  to  whether  the 
forms  prescribed  in  Constitutions  to  be 
observed  in  the  enactment  of  laws  are 
imperative  or  directory  only,  see  Cooley 
Const.   Lim.   chap.  vi. 


MUNRii'AL  i .■•»i;i,oi;ation.s.  $  ol2 

Qomj  cept  possibly  under  peculiar  circumstances,  to  establish 

.  loptioD  by  extrinsic  testimony;1  but  where  unanimity  is  ueo  - 
.  to  Leg  il  authority  to  make  an  order,  and  an  order  is  entered,  it 

will  be  presumed,  when  the  contrary  dues  uot  appear,  that  it  was 

made  with  the  required  unanimity.2 

ij  311.    Motives  for   adopting   Ordinances   not  subject   to   Judicial 
inquiry.  -    h  is  well  settled  that  the  judicial  branch,  of  the  govern- 
ment cannot  institute    an   inquiry  into  the  motives  of  tfa    leg 
department  in  the  enactment  of  laws.     Such  an  inquiry  would  not 
only  be  impracticable  in  most  cases,  hut  the  assumption  and  exer- 
of  such  a  power  would  result  in  subordinating  the  legislature  to 
the  courts.3     In  analogy  to  this  rule  it  is  doubtless  true  that  the 
courts  will  not,  in  general,  inquire  into  the  motives  of  the  council  in 
ling  ordinances.4     But  it  would  he  disastrous,  as  we  think,  to 
apply  the  analogy  to  its  full  extent.     Municipal  bodies,  like  the 
directories  of  private  corporations,  have  too  often  shown  themselves 
capable  of  using  their  powers  fraudulently,  for  their  own  advantage 
or  to  the  injury  of  others.     We  suppose  it  to  be  a  sound  proposition 
that  their  acts,  whether  in  the  form  of  resolutions  or  ordinances,  may 
hed  for  fraud  at  the  instance  of  persons  injured  thereby. 

§  312  (248).  Same  subject.  —  Accordingly,  in  Ohio,  in  a  case 
where  the  legislature  chartered  a  gas  company,  reserving  the  power 
of  control,  and  subsequently  empowered  the  city  council  to  regulate 
the  price  of  gas,  the  court  considered  the  intention  to  be  to  limit  the 

1  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  120  ;  infra,  sec.  334.     Where  a  record  is 

295    (1858).      See   ante,    sees.    297,    300,  silent  as  to  proceedings  required  by  law  to 

304,  note;   post,  sec.  335.  to  be  taken,  —  as  that  the  yeas  and  nays 

a  Lexington  r.  Headley,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  shall  be  called, —no  presumption  arises 

|  ;  Covington  v.   Boyle,  0  Bush  that  other  proceedings  than  those  men- 

(Ky.).   2<>4   (1st',:')  ;    McCormick  v.   Hay  tioned  in  the  record  took  place.     Tracey  v. 

city,  23  .Mir!,.  457  (1871)  ;  see  Steckert  The  People,  •',  Col.  151. 

d    1     •    9aginaw,  'J2  Mich.  l"t  ;  post,  sec.         8  Cooley  Const.   Lim.  186,  187,  where 

The  Una!  action  "f  a  city  council,  or  many  of  the  cases  are  collected, 
other  deliberative  body,  on  any  measure,         4  Freeporfc  v.   Marks,  59  Pa.  St.  253  ; 

is  shown  by  its  adjournment  thereon,  the  Buell  v.  Hall,  20  Iowa,  282  (collateral  ac- 

public  promulgation  of  its  action,  or  sub-  tion  between   third   persons).       It  being 

sequent    proceedings  inconsistent  with  a  well  settled  that  the  courts  may  decide 

purpose  to  review.     Stale  v.  Van  Buskirk,  upon    the    reasonableness    of    ordinances, 

4o  X.  J.    I,.  403.     In  Illinois  a  book  or  they  will  in  general  judge  of  these,  what- 

pamphlet  containing  the  ordinances  of  a  ever  their  purpose,  by  considering  their 

municipal  corporation  and  purporting  to  nature  and  effect,  rather  than  by  institut- 

be  published  by  its  authority,  is  evidence  ing  an   inquiry  into  the   motives  of   the 

of  the  passage  and  contents  of  the  ordi-  members  of  the  council  ;  although  where 

nances  contained  in  it,  and  of  their  legal  the  latter  is  material  and  relevant,  it  may 

publication.     Lindsay  v.  Chicago,  115  111.  in  the  author's  judgment  be  done. 


314 


DURATION   AND   REPEAL   OF   ORDINANCES. 


391 


company  to  a  fair  and  reasonable  price,  and  that  it  must  be  fairly 
exercised ;  and,  if,  in  the  colorable  exercise  of  the  power,  a  majority 
of  the  members,  for  a  fraudulent  purpose,  combined  to  fix  the  price 
at  a  rate  at  which  they  knew  it  could  not  be  made  and  sold  without 
loss,  their  action  would  not  bind  the  company,  and  in  such  a  case, 
their  good  faith,  it  was  held,  might  be  inquired  into.1 

§  313.  Legislative  Officers  are  not  personally  liable  for  Adoption 
of  Ordinances.  —  Where  the  officers  of  a  municipal  corporation  are 
invested  with  legislative  powers,  they  are  of  course  exempt  from 
individual  liability  for  the  passage  of  any  ordinance  within  their 
authority,  and  their  motives  in  reference  thereto  will  not  be  in- 
quired into ;  nor  are  they  individually  liable  for  the  passage  of  any 
ordinance  not  authorized  by  their  powers ;  for  such  ordinance  is 
void,  and  need  not  be  obeyed.2 

§  314  (249).  Duration  and  Repeal  of  Ordinances.  —  Since  a  valid 
by-law  never  becomes  obsolete,  it  remains  in  force  until  repealed  by 
the  legislature  or  the  corporation.  The  power  to  make  includes  the 
power  to  repeal  without  reference  to  the  people  of  the  municipality.3 
The  repeal  cannot  operate  retrospectively  to  impair  private  rights 
vested  under  it.4     Therefore,  the  legislature,  having  authorized  a 

1  State  v.  Cincinnati  Gas  Company,  18 
Ohio  St.  262  (1868),  distinguished  from 
Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Cranch,  87  ;  Bank  v. 
United  States,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  553. 
The  courts  will  not  inquire,  even  on  the 
complaint  of  the  State,  into  the  motives 
which  governed  members  of  the  legisla- 
ture in  the  enactment  of  a  law,  or  allow 
to  be  shown,  for  the  purpose  of  defeat- 
ing the  operation  of  the  law,  that  it  was 
passed  by  fraud,  corruption,  and  bribery 
of  the  members.  Wright  v.  Defrees,  8 
Ind.  298  ;  followed,  McCulloch  v.  State, 
11  Ind.  424,  431  (1858)  ;  s.  P.  Sunbury, 
&c.  Eailroad  Co.  v.  Cooper,  7  Am.  Law 
Reg.  158  (1858);  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  135, 
136,  186,  208. 

2  Jones  v.  Loving,  55  Miss.  109  ;  Paine 
v.  Boston,  124  Mass.  4S6  ;  Freeport  v. 
Marks,  59  Pa.  257  ;  Baker  v.  State,  27 
Ind.  485  ;  Commissioners  v.  Ducket,  20 
Md.  468  ;  Weaver  v.  Devendorf,  3  Denio 
(X.  Y.),  117  ;  Pike  v.  Megoun,  44  Mo. 
491. 

3  Kansas  City  v.  White,  69  Mo.  261  ; 
The  King  v.  Ashwell,  12  East,  22  ;  The 
King  v.  Bird,  13  East,  367  ;  Great  Western 


Railway  Co.  and  North  Cayuga,  In  re,  23 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  28  ;  Bloomer  v.  Stolley, 
5  McLean,  158  ;  Santo  et  al.  v.  State  of 
Iowa,  2  Iowa,  165  ;  Bank  of  Chenango  v. 
Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467  ;  Rice  v.  Foster,  4 
Harring.  (Del.)  479  ;  The  People  v.  Col- 
lins, 3  Mich.  347  ;  Welch  v.  Bowen,  103 
Ind.  252  ;  Greeley  v.  Jacksonville,  17  Fla. 
174.  Li  re  Moliie  Hall,  10  Neb.  537, 
where  an  ordinance  to  suppress  houses  of 
prostitution,  passed  under  the  authority  of 
the  general  incorporation  law,  was  held 
not  to  be  repealed  by  the  adoption  of  a 
new  incorporation  law  by  the  legislature, 
containing  authority  for  cities  to  "  re- 
strain, prohibit,  and  suppress"  such  houses, 
ami  expressly  repealing  the  old  law. 

A  provision  in  an  ordinance  which  is 
plainly  repugnant  to  an  ordinance  previ- 
ously adopted  repeals  the  latter  ordinance 
to  the  extent  of  the  conflict  between  them. 
Ex  parte  Wolf,  14  Neb.  24  ;  Burlington  v. 
Estlow,  43  N.  J.  L.  13. 

4  Rex  v.  Ashwell,  12  East,  22  ;  3  Term 
R.  198  ;  The  King  v.  Bird,  13  East,  379  ; 
Terre  Haute  v.  Lake,  43  Ind.  480  (1873)  ; 
State  v.  City  Clerk,  &c,  7  Ohio  St.  355  ; 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §315 

corporation  to  establish  a  cemetery  within  the  limits  of 
d  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  city,  and  such  consent  having 
been  given,  the  city  authorities  cannot,  alter  their  consent  has  been 
1  upon,  repeal  the  resolutions  giving  it,  and  enjoin  the  religious 
corporation  from  the  use  of  the  cemetery,  unless,  indeed,  it  is  shown 
to  be  an  actual  nuisance,  detrimental  to  the  health  of  the  city,  in 
which  case  its  police  and  governmental  powers  might  doubtless  be 
exercised.1 

^  315  (250).  Mode  of  conferring  the  Power ;  Construction  of 
Grants  of  Authority.  —  Municipal  charters,  or  incorporating  acts,  are 
sometimes  silent  as  to  the  power  to  pass  by-laws  or  ordinances  ;  and 
where  this  is  the  case,  the  municipal  body  has  the  power,  incidental 
to  all  corporations,  to  enact  appropriate  by-laws.2  Occasionally,  the 
charter  or  incorporating  act,  without  any  specific  enumeration  of 
the  purposes  for  which  by-laws  may  be  made,  contains  a  general 
and  comprehensive  grant  of  power  to  pass  all  such  as  may  seem 

ssary  to  the  well-being  and  good  order  of  the  place.  More 
frequently,  however,  the  charter  or  incorporating  act  authorizes  the 

tment  of  by-laws  in  certain  specified  cases,  and  for  certain  pur- 
poses;  and  after  this  specific  enumeration  a  general  provision  is 
added,  that  the  corporation  may  make  any  other  by-laws  or  regula- 
tions necessary  to  its  welfare,  good  order,  &c,  not  inconsistent  with 

•  1  v.  Gilman,  22  Vt.  568  ;  Pond  v.  Church,    10   La.   An.   431  ;  ante,  sec.  97. 

.  ::  M  iss.  .    hap.  x.;  State  The  repeal  of  an  ordinance  puts  an  end  to 

.  19  Ml.  351  (1862);  Bigelow  v.  a  pending  prosecution  under  the  repealed 

Hillman,  .".7  Me.  52;  Reiff  v.  Conner,  5  ordinance,  unless  there  be  a  saving  clause, 

Ark.)  'JH  ;   Road,  In  re,  17  Pa.  The  contrary  rule  as  to  State  statutes  held 

.  75;  Nelson  v.  St.  .Martin's  Parish,  not   to   apply   to   by-laws  or  ordinances. 

Ill    r.  s.   716;    Louisiana    v.   Pillsbury,  Naylor  v.  Galesburg,  56  111.285  (1870); 

278  :  Cape  May  &  S.  I..  R    R.  Kansas  City  v.  dark,  08  Mo.  588  ;  Barton 

Co.  v.  May,  35  X.  J.  Eq.  419  :  Peo-  v.  Gadsden,  79  Ala.  495,  which  also  boldj 

i.ii.  Ill   X.  Y.  1  (1S88);  Cun-  that  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  salt-  of 

ningham  k.  Almonte,   '21   Upper  Can.  C.  liquor  under  a  penalty  is  repealed  by  an 

T    159;  Greal  Western  R.  Co.,  &c,  In  re,  ordinance  prohibiting  such  sale  without  a 

6.    C.  I'.   28.     An  act  changing  an  license,   because  of  inconsistency   and   re- 

porated  town  into  a  city  does  not  of  pugnancy.      The  fact  that  an   ordinance 

itself  repeal  pre-existing  ordinances.     Per  directing  a  certain  street  improvement  to 

:.  .1.,   Erie    Academy  Trus.  v.  Erie,  be  made  was  repealed,  held,  to  be  conclu- 

81  Pa    St.  515  (1858);  ante,  sec.  85,  note,  sive  in   favor  of  a  perpetual   injunction, 

Subsequent  constitutional  provision  or  /••-  restraining  the  contractor  or  the  city  from 

,i,  Lnconflicl  withexisting  proceeding.     Kaime  v.  Ilarty,  4  Mo.  App. 

by-laws,  renders  the  latter  void.     Mobile  357. 

v.  Dargan,  15  Ala.  310  (1871).  2  A  Coal-Float   v.   Jeffersonville,    112 

Orleans  v.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  Ind.  15,  citing  the  text.     Supra,  Bee.  308, 

I    .   An.  -ll  c  nguished    from  note.    Chamberlain  w.  Evansville,  77  Ind, 

b.    Chnrcb    o.   Mayor,  f>  Cow.  51-J. 
(N.     Y.)    538;     Musgrove    v.   Catholic 


5  316 


ordinances:   special  and  general  grants. 


393 


the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  State.  This  difference  is  essential 
to  be  observed,  for  the  power  which  the  corporation  would  possess 
under  what  may,  for  convenience,  be  termed  "  the  general  welfare 
clause,"  if  it  stood  alone,  may  be  limited,  qualified,  or,  when  such 
intent  is  manifest,  impliedly  taken  away  by  provisions  specifying 
the  particular  purposes  for  which  by-laws  may  be  made.  It  is  clear 
that  the  general  clause  can  confer  no  authority  to  abrogate  the 
limitations  contained  in  special  provisions. 

§  316.  Special  and  general  Grants  of  Authority. — When  there 
are  both  special  and  general  'provisions,  the  power  to  pass  by-laws 
under  the  special  or  express  grant  can  only  be  exercised  in  the  cases 
and  to  the  extent,  as  respects  those  matters,  allowed  by  the  charter 
or  incorporating  act ;  and  the  power  to  pass  by-laws  under  the  gen- 
eral clause  does  not  enlarge  or  annul  the  power  conferred  by  the 
special  provisions  in  relation  to  their  various  subject-matters,  but 
gives  authority  to  pass  by-laws,  reasonable  in  their  character,  upon 
all  other  matters  within  the  scope  of  their  municipal  authority,  and 
not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  and  general  laws  of  the  State.1 


1  State  v.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424 
(1856),  where  this  subject  is  ably  treated 
in  a  judgment  delivered  by  Mr.  Justice 
Foster,  holding  a  bydaw  of  the  city  of 
Concord,  in  relation  to  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquor,  invalid,  as  contravening  the 
special  provisions  of  the  charter,  and 
therefore  not  sustainable  under  the  gen- 
eral welfare  clause  of  the  charter. 

"The  power  to  make  by-laws,  when 
not  expressly  given,  is  implied  as  an  inci- 
dent to  the  very  existence  of  a  corpora- 
tion ;  but  in  the  case  of  an  express  grant 
of  the  power  to  enact  bydaws  limited  to 
certain  specified  cases  and  for  certain  pur- 
poses, the  corporate  power  of  legislation  is 
confined  to  the  objects  specified,  all  others 
being  excluded  by  implication."  Per  Saw- 
yer, J.,  arguendo,  in  State  v.  Ferguson,  33 
N.  H.  424,  430  (1856)  ;  citing  2  Kyd  on 
Corp.  102  ;  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.  177  ; 
and  Child  v.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.,  2  P. 
Wins.  207.  The  true  rule  in  such  cases 
may,  perhaps,  be  correctly  expressed  to 
be,  that  the  enumeration  of  special  cases 
does  not,  unless  the  intent  be  apparent, 
exclude  the  implied  power  any  further 
than  necessarily  results  from  the  nature  of 
the  special  provisions.  Heisembrittle  a. 
Charleston,     2  McMullan    (S.   C),    233; 


Wadleigh  v.  Gilman,  3  Fairf.  (12  Me.) 
408  ;  State  v.  Clark,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.) 
176,  and  comments  in  33  N.  H.  432  ; 
State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Turner,  1  Cush.  (Mass.) 
493  ;  Collins  v.  Hatch,  18  Ohio,  523  ;  see 
New  Orleans  v.  Philippi  (taxation),  9  La. 
An.  44  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas 
Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing  text;  Laundry 
License  Case,  22  Fed.  R.  701  ;  Clark  v. 
South  Bend,  85  Ind.  276.  Huesing  v. 
Rick  Island,  Supreme  Court,  111.  MSS. 
1889,  applying  text.  Post,  sec.  432  et  scq.t 
and  cases. 

In  Georgia,  the  Superior  Courts  adopt 
the  following  as  the  true  rule  for  ascer- 
taining the  extent  of  the  power  of  a  city  to 
pass  ordinances.  "The  city  council  is 
restrained  to  such  matters,  whether  spe- 
cially enumerated  or  included  under  gen- 
eral grant,  as  are  indifferent  in  themselves, 
such  matters  as  are  free  from  constitu- 
tional objection  and  have  not  been  the 
subject  of  general  legislation  ;  or,  as  it  is 
expressed  in  the  charter,  are  not  repug- 
nant to  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the 
land."  Dubois  v.  Augusta  (health  ordi- 
nance), Dudley  (Ga.)  Rep.  30  (1831); 
Williams  v.  Augusta  (powder  ordinance), 
4  Ga.   509,    514   (184S).      Power  to  pass 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


§317 


And  it  has  1 n  very  properly  held  that  a  special  -runt  of  power  to 

u  municipal  corporation  to  adopt  ordinances  on  enumerated  subjects 
connected  with  municipal  concerns  is  in  addition  to  the  incidental 
I        i  of  the  corporation.1 


^  317  (251).      Ordinances  cannot  enlarge  or  change  the  Charter  or 

statute.  —  Since  all  the  powers  of  a  corporation  are  derived  from 
law  ami  its  charter,  it  is  evidenl  that  no  ordinance  or  by-law  of 
•poration  can  enlarge,  diminish,  m-  vary  Us  powers?     A  similar 

.<.  laws  h  incidental,  but  this  -  Thompson  v.   Carroll,  22   How.    122 

power  i-  limited  nol  only  by  the  terms,  (1859);  Andrews  v.  Insurance  Co.,  87  M-- 

bhe  spirit  and  design,  of  the  charter,  256    (1854);    Thomas   v.    Richmond,    12 

the  general  principles  and  policy  of  Wall.  349(1871);  Garden  City  v.  Abbott, 

the  common  law.     Taylor  v.  Giiswold,  2  lit   Kan.  2S3,  (license  tax  upon  non-resi- 


.1.  S.  Green  (X.  .1.),  222  ;  Mount  Pleas- 
ant v.  Breeze,  11  Iowa,  WJ  (1860),  per 
Wright,  J. 

A  power  to 'pass  ordinances  to  "im- 
prove the  morals  and  order"  of  the  peo- 
ple  does  nol  authorize  an  ordinance  to 
'•  punish  "  tin'  offence  of  keeping  houses 
of  ill-fame.     Whether  t  ire  i  an 

utionally  confer  power  upon  cities 


denl  attorneys,  imposed  by  ordinance  un- 
der a  law  authorizing  such  a  tax  upon 
residents  only  held  unlawful);  Common- 
wealth r.  Roy,  1  in  Mass.  432  ;  state  v. 
Municipal  Court  of  St.  Paul,  32  Minn. 
329  ;  State,  ex  rcl.  v.  Nashville,  15  Lea, 
697  (power  to  change  a  salary  confers  no 
power  to  abolish  it).  "A  power  vested  by 
legislation  in  a  city  corporation,  to  make 


to  puni  de  crimes  by  the  laws  of    by-laws  for  its  own   government  and  the 


the  Stal  Chariton  v.  Bar- 

ber, .".I  I  i,  »0  (1880),  Beck,  J.;  s.  c. 
11  Cent.  Law  J.  358;  37  Am.  Rep.  209. 
More  fully,  post,  sec.  432  et  srq. 

i  Stab'  v.  Morristown,  33  N.  J.  L.  57 
.1.  in  his  opinion,  distin- 
guishes such  a  case  from  Norris  v.  Staps, 
Hobart,  210,  where  the  corporation  was 
created  by  the  crown,  and  where  it  was 
held  thai  a  Bpecial  clause  in  the  letters- 


regulation  of  its  own  police,  cannot  be 
construed  as  imparting  to  it  the  power  to 
repeal  the  [general]  laws  in  force,  or  to 

supersede  their  operation  by  any  of  its 
ordinances.  Such  a  power,  if  not  expressly 
conferred,  cannot  arise  by  mere  implica- 
tion, unless  the  exercise  of  the  power  given 
be  inconsistent  with  the  previous  law, 
and  does  necessarily  operate  as  its  repeal 
pro  tanto.     Nor  can   the  presumption  bo 


patent  authorizing  the  corporate  body  (a     indulged,    that    the   legislature   intended 


fellowship  of  weaver.-)  to  make  by-laws, 
did  nol  add  to  implied  powers,  and  th  i1 
it-  by-laws  were  subject  to  the  general 
law  of  the  realm  and  subordinate  to  it. 
"But,"  he  adds,  "a  special  grant  of 
power  to  a  municipal    corporation    is  an 

differenl  thing 
of  authoi  ity  to  legislate  by  ordinance  on 
injects,  and  does  add  to 
the  powers  incident  to  the  creation  of  the 
corporation.  The  numerous  instances,  in 
our  own  State,  of  the  grau1  of  Buch 
I  in  relation  to  the  opening  and  im- 

provemenl     of    Btreets,    the    making    of 
,    md   the  assessment  of  taxes,  af- 
ford illustrations  of  this  distinction."    lb. 
62. 


thai  an  ordinance  passed  by  the  city 
should  be  superior  to,  or  take  the  place 
of,  the  general  law  of  the  State  upon  the 
same  subject."  Simpson,  C.  J.,  March  v. 
Commonwealth,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25, 
29  (1851);  Rothschild  v.  Darien,  69  Ga. 
503  ;  Breninger  v.  Belvidere,  44  N.  J.  L. 
350.  "Huckster"  means  a  petty  dealer 
or  retailer  of  small  articles  of  provisions, 
&c,  and  an  ordinance  cannot  enlarge  the 
ordinary  meaning  so  as  to  embrace  "any 
person  nol  a  farmer  or  butcher  who  should 
sell,  or  oiler  for  sale,  any  commodity  not 
of  his  own  manufacture,"  and  subject  such 
person  to  a  penalty;  it  nol  being,  Bays 
,.!.,'•  pari  of  t  be  franchise  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations  to  change  the  mean- 


§  319  ORDINANCES   MUST   BE   REASONABLE   AND   LAWFUL.  395 

rule  obtains  in  England,  where  it  is  held  that  neither  the  king's 
charter  nor  any  by-law  can  introduce  an  alteration  in  rules  which 
have  been  prescribed  to  a  corporation  by  an  act  of  parliament.1 
By-laws  are  in  their  nature  strictly  local,  and  subordinate  to  the 
general  laws. 

§  318  (252).      Ordinance  need  not  recite  Authority  to  pass  it. — 

It  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  ordinance  executing  powers 
conferred  by  the  legislature  that  it  should  state  the  power  in  exe- 
cution of  which  the  ordinance  is  passed.  If  it  state  no  particular 
power  as  its  basis,  it  will  be  judicially  regarded  as  emanating  from 
that  power  which  would  have  warranted  its  passage.  If  two  such 
powers  exist,  it  may  be  imputed  to  either,  in  conformity  to  which 
its  provisions  and  prerequisites  show  that  it  has  been  adopted.  If, 
in  these  respects  it  is  in  accordance  with  both,  no  injustice  can  result 
in  regarding  it  as  the  offspring  of  both  or  either  of  the  powers.2 

§  319  (253).  Must  be  Reasonable  and  Lawful.  —  In  England, 
the  subjects  upon  which  by-laws  may  be  made  were  not  usually 
specified  in  the  king's  charter,  and  it  became  an  established  doctrine 
of  the  courts  that  every  corporation  had  the  implied  or  incidental 
right  to  pass  by-laws ;  but  this  power  was  accompanied  with  these 
limitations,  namely,  that  every  by-law  must  be  reasonable,  and  not  in- 
consistent with  the  charter  of  the  corporation,  nor  with  any  statute 

ing  of  English   words."      Mays   v.   Cin-  nance,  nor  averred  in  proceedings  to  en- 

cinnati,    1     Ohio    St.     268,    272    (1853).  force   it.      Stuyvesaut   v.    Mayor,    &c.    of 

"Butcher"  denned.      Henback  v.  State,  New  York,    7   Cow.    (N.  Y.)  588;    s.   P. 

53   Ala.    523   (1875);  S.  c.   25  Am.  Rep.  Young  v.  St.   Louis,   47  Mo.  492  (1871). 

650  ;  18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  364.  This  case  reaffirmed  in  Kiley  v.  Forsee,  57 

1  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  Term  R.  277  ;  Rex  Mo.  390  (1874);  Platter  v.  Elkhart  Couuty, 
v.  Barber  Surgeons,  1  Ld.  Raym.  585.  It  103  Ind.  360.  But  the  charter  may  be 
has  even  been  said  that  the  general  as-  imperative  in  requiring  the  necessity  to  be 
sembly  cannot  authorize  a  municipal  cor-  expressed  by  ordinance  or  resolution  ;  so 
poration  to  repeal,  by  ordinance,  a  statute  held  in  Hoyt  v.  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich, 
of  the  State.  Haywood  v.  Mayor,  &c,  12  39  (1869).  So,  in  England  it  is  not  ne- 
Ga.  404,  per  Lumpkin,  J.  But  it  may  pro-  cessary  that  the  preamble  to  a  by-law 
vide  that  on  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  should  state  the  reasons  for  making  it. 
of  a  certain  character,  the  State  law  on  the  Rex  v.  Harrison,  3  Burr.  1328.  See,  also, 
subject  shall  not  be  in  force  in  the  corpo-  Grierson  v.  Ontario,  9  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
rate  limits.  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450;  623  ;  Fisher  v.  Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can. 
post,  chap,  xxiii.  Q.    B.    492.      If  a  municipal  corporation 

2  Per  Dorsey,  C.  J.,  Methodist  P.  attempt  to  act  according  to  a  statute  not 
Church  v.  Baltimore,  6  Gill  (Md.),  391  in  force,  this  does  not  invalidate  their  pro- 
(1848).  Under  power  to  pass  an  ordi-  ceedings,  if  the  same  are  in  accordance 
nance  if  found  necessary,  the  necessity  for  with  existing  statutes.  State  v.  Jersey 
its  enactment,  being  implied  from  its  mere  City,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  493. 

passage,  need  not  be  recited  in  the  ordi- 


306 


MFNIflPAL    CORPORATION'^. 


§319 


of  parliament,  dot  with  the  general  principles  of  the  common  law 
of  the  land,  particularly  those  having  relation  to  the  liberty  of  i\k>. 
subject  or  the  rights  of  private  property.1  In  this  country  the  courts 
have  often  affirme  1  the  general  incidental  power  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations to  make  ordinances,  but  have  always  declared  that  ordinances 
]  ed  in  virtue  of  the  implied  power  must  be  reasonable,  consonant 
with  the  general  powers  and  purposes  of  the  corporation,  and  nut 
inconsistent  with  the  laws  or  policy  of  the  State.2 


i  Sutl  '  II  pitalCase,  10  Rep.  31  a; 
Feltraakera  v.  Davis,  1  B  >s.  &  P.  98,  LOO; 
Norria  v.  Staps,  Hob.  211  ;  1;  i  v.  M  rid- 
stone,  3  Burr.  L837  ;  ( 'om.  Dig.  Fronch. 
Y.  10;  London  u.  Vanacre,  1  Ld.  Raym. 
;  2  Kyi,  chap.  iv.  sec  10,  p.  95,  and 

tted  ;  Bac  Abr.  tit.  By-law. 
-  An  ordinance  which  is  within 
powers  granted  cannot  beheld  to  be  unrea- 
sonable and  raid.     Haj  aes  v.  Cape  May, 
BO  N.  J.  L  55  (1887).     In  such  case  the 
court  can  only  construe  the  extent  of  the 
•  i'l  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  rea- 
sonableness of  an   ordinance   carrying   it 
into  effect.     District  of  Columbia  v.  Wag- 
gaman,  4  Mackey,  828.     Must  be  reason- 
I.  I  :'■  reon,  'J  I mtch.  (N.  J.) 

298  ;  D  ryton  v.  Quigley  (citing  text),  29 
N.  .1.  Eq.  77  (1878);  Comm'rs  v.  Gas 
Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318  (1859);  Fisher  v.  Ear- 
.  2  Grant  (Pa.)  I  lases,  291  ( L854); 
Commonwealth  v.  Robertson,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  438  (1850);  Waters  v.  Leech,  3 
Ark.  110;  Mayor  >■.  Wintield,  8  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  707  d  348);  Davis  v.  Anita,  73 
Iowa,  825  (1887).    Text  approved.    Frank, 

/,'   re,  •'•-  •  !al.   606.      < ' monwealth  v. 

Steffee,  7  Bush  (Ky),  161  (1870);  Peo- 
pie  v.  Throop,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  183, 
186  II  334)  ;  Mayor  v.  Beasly,  1  Humph. 
Freeman,  38 
\.  II.  126  (1859);  White  v.  Mayor,  &c, 
(Tenn.),  Pedrick  v. 

.  1 2  I  tray  (Mas-.),  n;i ;  |  lunharn  r. 
Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  162  ;  Clason 
v.  Mil.  I  Wis.  316  (18?2);  Tug- 

,   7s  111.  408  (1875)  ;  Ex 
bin  Yan,  60  Cal.  7s  ;   Gilham   v. 
Wells,  64  Ga.    192  ;  Meyers  v.   Chicago, 
R.  I.,  &  P.  R.  Co.,  ."'7   Iowa,  556,  approv- 
ing text  ;  Cape  Girardeau  v.  Riley,  72  Mo. 
\      :  town,  LOO  Pa.  8t. 
M   li  \    v   Freeport,  96  Pa.  St.  24  ; 
Kirkhaiu  >•.  Ku^.-ll,   70  Va.  H50  ;  Atkin- 


son v.  Goodrich  Transportation  Co.,  60 
Wis.  Ill  (ordinance  requiring  spark  ar- 
rester on  steam-boats).  An  ordinal re- 
quiring druggists  to  furnish  quarterly  veri- 
fied staU  m*  rUs  of  the.  kind  and  quantity  of 
intoxicating  Liquors  sold,  to  whom,  &c, 
was  held  unreasonable  and  oppressive. 
Clinton  (city  of)  v.  Phillips,  58  111.  102; 
s.  c.  11  Am.  Rep.  52.  An  ordinance  for- 
bidding the  placing  or  carrying  of  sign- 
Is  on   side-walks   is    reasonable  and 

valid.     Coi owealth  v.  McCafFerty,  145 

M  iss.  884.     An  ordinance  a  li- 

a  nsi  from  peddlers  of  "  not  less  than  one 
nor  more  than  twenty-five  dollars  for  a 
fixed  time,  in  the  discretion  of  the  mayor," 
held  unreasonable.  State  Center  v.  Baren- 
stein,  66  Iowa,  249.  An  ordinance  re- 
quiring cotton  merchants  to  keep  a  record  of 
the  name  of  the  seller  of  loose  cotton,  and 
the  quantity  of  each  purchase,  also  held 
to  he  against  the  principles  of  personal  lib- 
erty  and  common  right.  Long  v.  Taxing 
District,  7  Lea,  134.  An  ordinance  forbid- 
ding prcar/ii  mi,  lecturing,  frc,  on  a  public 
common,  held  reasonable.  Commonwealth 
v.  Davis,  140  Mass.  485;  Mankato  v. 
Fowler,  32  Minn.  364  (license  fee  of  $300 
upon  auctioneers  unreasonable).  An  ordi- 
nance absolutely  prohibiting  (nol  regulat- 
ing) street  processions  with  musical  in- 
strument-, banners,  torches,  &c,  or  while 
singing  or  shouting,  without  the  consent 
first  obtained  of  the  mayor,  under  a  penalty 
of  a  fine  not  exceeding  $500,  and  costs,  and 
in  default  of  payment,  imprisonment  not 
exceeding  ninety  days,  was  held,  in  the 
absence  of  any  express  legislative  author- 
ity therefor,  to  be  unreasonable  and  void, 
and  for  this  reason  a  member  <>f  the  Sal- 
ration  Army,  convicted  thereunder,  was 
discharged  on  habeas  corpus.  lie  Frazee, 
98  Mich.  896  (1886);  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  Rep. 
72  ;  35  Alb.  Law  J.,  G.     The  opinion  of 


$   320  ORDINANCES   MUST   BE     REASONABLE   AND    LAWFUL. 


397 


§  320  (254).     Same  subject.  —  The  principle  of  law,  that  ordi- 
nances passed  under  the  general  authority  to  enact  all  such  as  will  be 


Campbell,  C.  J.,  states  the  grounds  of  this 
conclusion  with  great,  and  almost  convin- 
cing, force.  See  People  v.  Rochester,  51 
N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  (44  Hun)  166  (Salvation 
Army  walking  through  streets  with  ban- 
ners). "An  ordinance,  general  in  its 
scope,  may  be  adjudged  reasonable  as  ap- 
plied to  one  state  of  facts,  and  unreasonable 
when  applied  to  circumstances  of  a  differ- 
ent character."  Knapp,  J.,  in  Nicoulin  v. 
Lowery,  49  N.  J.  Law,  391  ;  Pennsylva- 
nia R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jersey  City,  47  N.  J. 
Law,  286. 

The  trustees  of  public  schools  had  stat- 
utory authority  to  direct  what  branches 
should  be  taught,  and  to  adopt  and  en- 
force all  necessary  rides  and  regulations 
for  the  management  and  government  of 
schools.  A  candidate  for  admission  passed 
a  satisfactory  examination  in  everything 
but  grammar,  and  was  refused  admission 
on  that  account.  Held,  a  rule  or  regula- 
tion denying  him  admission  on  that  ac- 
count was  unreasonable,  and  that  manda- 
mus would  lie  to  compel  his  admission  to 
study  the  other  branches.  Trustees  v. 
People,  &c,  87  111.  303  ;  s.  p.  Rulison  v. 
Post,  79  111.  567. 

Ordinance  may  be  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable, as  that  one  for  building  a  side- 
walk was  unnecessary  and  oppressive,  it 
being  located  in  an  uninhabited  portion  of 
the  city  and  disconnected  with  any  other 
street  or  sidewalk.  Corrigan  v.  Gage,  68 
Mo.  541. 

Musi  not  conflict  with  the  charter  or  stat- 
ute, or  be  repugnant  to  fundamental  rights. 
Dubois  v.  Augusta  (health  ordinance), 
Dudley  (Ga.)  Rep.  30  (1831);  Williams 
v.  Augusta  (powder  ordinances),  4  Ga. 
509  (1843);  Adams  v.  Mayor,  &c.  (liquor 
statute),  29  Ga.  56  ;  Taylor  v.  Griswold, 
2  Green  (N.  J.),  222  (1834);  New  Orleans 
v.  Philippi  (taxation),  9  La.  An.  44  ;  Per- 
due v.  Ellis  (liquor  traffic),  18  Ga.  586  ; 
Haywood  v.  Mayor,  12  Ga.  404  ;  Paris  v. 
Graham  (tax  on  dram-shops),  33  Mo.  94  ; 
St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94  ;  St. 
Louis  v.  Bentz,  11  Mo.  61  ;  Can-  v.  St. 
Louis  (fee  of  officers),  9  Mo.  191  (1845)  ; 
Marietta  v.  Fearing  (estray  animals),  4 
Ohio,  427  (1331);  Collins  v.  Hatch  (ani- 


mals   at    large),    18    Ohio,    523    (1849)  ; 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v.  Nichols  (in- 
spection laws),  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  209  (1843); 
Commonwealth  v.  Turner  (liquor  traffic), 
1  Cush.   (Mass.)    493   (1848);    Philips  v. 
Wickham,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  590  ;  How- 
ard   v.    Savannah,    T.    Charlt.    R.    173 ; 
Smith  v.  Knoxville,  3  Head  (Teun.),  245 
(1859);  Cowen  v.    West   Troy,    43   Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  48  (1864);   Pesterfield  v.  Vickers, 
3  Coldw.    (Tenu.)   205;   City  Council  v. 
Benjamin,    2   Strob.    (S.   C. )    508 ;    City 
Council  v.  Ahreus,   4  Strob.  (S.  C.)  241  ; 
Heisembrittlea.  Charleston  Council,  2  Mc- 
Mul.   (S.  C.)  233;  City  Council  v.  Gold- 
smith, 2  Speers  (S.C. ),  435;  State  v.  Welch, 
36  Conn.  215;  Newton  v.  Belger,  143  Mass. 
598  ;    White    v.    Bayonne,    49    N.  J.  L. 
311  ;  Lozier  v.   Newark,   48  N.  J.  L.   (19 
Vroom)  452  ;  Volk  v.  Newark,   47  N.  J. 
L.  (18  Vroom)  117  ;  Ex  parte  Kearny,  55 
Cal.  212  ;    Cape   Girardeau  v.   Riley,   72 
Mo.  220  ;  State  v.  Brittain,  89  N.  C.  574. 
An  ordinance  authorizing  the  tax-collector 
and  police  to  put  the  purchaser  of  land  at  a 
sale  for  taxes  in  possession  thereof,   held 
void  for  violating  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision declaring  that  no  person  shall  be 
deprived  of  property  without   "due  pro- 
cess of  law."      Calhoun   v.    Fletcher,   63 
Ala.   574.     An  ordinance  imposing  a  li- 
cense tax  upon  the  owners  of  towboats  run- 
ning between  New  Orleans  and  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  held  to  be  a  regulation  of  com- 
merce between  the  States,  and  void  under 
art.  1,  sec.  8,  par.  3,  of  the  U.  S.  Consti- 
tution.   Moran  v.  New  Orleans,  1 12  U.  S. 
69.     An  ordinance  which  gave  to  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities  arbitrary  power  to  give 
or  withhold  consent  for  carrying  on  the 
laundry  business,  without  regard  to  legal 
discretion  or  to  the  competency  of  persons 
applying  therefor,  and  the  administration 
of  which   caused   unjust   discriminations 
founded  on  differences  of  race,  declared  to 
be  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  U.  S.  Constitution.    Yick  Wo 
v.  Hopkins,  118  IT.  S.  356,  reversing  Mat- 
ter of  Yick  Wo,  68  Cal.  294.     See  also  In 
re  Tie  Loy,   26   Fed.  Rep.    611.      But  a 
municipal  ordinance  prohibiting  washing 
and  ironing  in  public  laundries,  in  speci- 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATION-. 


\onable,  or  they  will  1"'  void,  is  well  illustrated 
by  a  case  in  Pennsylvania.1  A  municipal  corporation  passed  two 
ordinances  in  relation  t<>  «  gas  company,  —  a  private  corporation, 
with  ;i  special  charter  authorizing  the  construction  and  maintenance 
of  suitable  gas-works  within  the  limits  of  the  municipal  corporation, 
and  the  use  of  th  for  tin'  laying  down  of  pipes.     The  first 

ordinance  prohibited  the  gas  company  from  opening  paved  streets 
from  December  to  March  in  each  year,  for  the  purpose  of  laying  yas 
mains.  This  ordinance  the  court  considered  to  he  reasonable,  in 
view  of  the  difficulty  of  repairing  the  paved  streets  during  the  win- 
ter months.  And  the  other  ordinance  prohibited  the  gas  company 
from  opening  a  paved  street  at  any  time,  for  the  purpose  of  laying 
pipes  from  the  main  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  street.  The  court 
say:  "The  effect  of  this  ordinance  is  to  compel  the  company  to 
tstruct  two  mams,  one  on  each  side  of  the  street  instead  of  one; 


Red   territorial   limits,   from  ten. at  night 
till  six  in  the  morning,  and  operating  upon 
'  iged  in  the  same  business  under 
like  conditions,  sustained  as  a  Legitimate 
police  regulation,  within  the  competency 
of  ;i  municipality  possessed  of  the  ordinary 
powers,   and   is  not  in   conflict   with    tin; 
Fourteenth  Amendmenl  of  tin-  Constitu- 
tion   of    the    United    States,    since    tins 
Amendment   does   not  impair  the   police 
power  "t    tin-   State.      Barbier    v.    < '  m- 
nolly,    113   ('.  S.  27  (1884);  Soon  Hing 
r.  i  rowley,   Tb.  703.      Index  title,  "  Po- 
wer"; infra,  sees.  324,  325,  357, 
and    note.      When   a   legislature   lias   no 
.  under  the  Constitution,  to  author- 
irporation  to  pass  an  or- 
dinance (as  here,  to  permit  a  railway  to 
■  .in   streets)  it 
i!  act,  legalize  such  an 
ordinance  adopted  by  a  city  without  au- 
thority.     Strange  v.  Dubuque,  62  Iowa, 
And  see  Independent  School  Dist. 
.  igton  o.  Burlington,  60  tov 
A  i >"■'•  jhea, 

■it    of    the    council,    "  the   public 

good  required,"  held  not  to  confer  power 

of  a  public  street  t>>  an 

p.      Hntchin- 

!  i.  nton  Board  ol   I i  alth,  39  N.  J. 

Eq.  (1-  Stew.)  569. 

An  ordinal 

<    :   to  1  lie  highest 
bidder"  was  held  void  for  want  of  l     i  la- 
ity to  (  uact  it.    Mar- 


tin, In  re,  27  Ark.  467  (1872).  An  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  heavy  awnings  over 
sidewalks,  withoul  consent  of  municipal 
authorities,  is  reasonable  and  valid.  Ped- 
rick  v.  Bailey,  12  Cray  (Mass.),  161. 
Under  the  general  welfare  clause  an  ordi- 
nance forbidding  sale  of  lew 

mporary  stand  without  paying 
a  license  tax  is  unauthorized  and  unrea- 
sonable. Barling  v.  West,  29  Wis.  307; 
s.  c  9  Am.  Rep.  576  ;  post,  sec.  387. 

An  ordinance  conferring  upon  one  per- 
son the  right  to  remove  and  convert  to  his 
own  use  dead  animals,  to  the  exclusion  of 
their  owners'  rights,  held  unconstitutional 
as  being  a  taking  of  private  property  for 
public  use  without  compensation,  and  as 
depriving  a  person  oi  his  property  without 
due  process;  of  law.  River  Rendering  Co. 
v.  Behr,  77  Mo.  91.  Where  power  was 
conferred  upon  a  town  "to  prevent  the  in- 
troduction of  infectious  or  contagious  dis- 
and  to  preserve  the  health  of  the 
inhabitants,"  an  ordinance  forbidding  any 
person  "to  import,  sell,  or  otherwise  dial 
nd-hand  or  cast-off  garments,"  Sec, 
with  a  proviso  excepting  the  sale  of  such 
articles  when  not  imported  or  when  they 
had  nol  been  used  by  persons  having  in- 
fections diseases,  was  held  not  included  in 
the  power  conferred,  and  unlawful  as  be- 
ing  in  restraint  of  lawful  trade.  Greens- 
boro v.  Ehrenreich,  so  Ala.  579. 

1  Commissioners  of  North  Liberties  v. 
Gas  Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318  (1849). 


§  321  ORDINANCES   MUST   NOT   BE   OPPRESSIVE.  399 

thereby  materially  increasing  the  expense  to  the  company,  and  con- 
sequently enhancing  the  price  of  gas  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  dis- 
trict." And  this  ordinance  was  declared  to  be  void.  So,  where  the 
city  owns  ivatcr-works,  its  by-laws  in  respect  to  the  supply  of  water 
to  the  citizens  must  be  reasonable  ;  and  a  supply  cannot  lie  refused 
on  the  application  of  the  owner,  because  the  tenant  was  in  arrears  for 
water  supplied  to  him  while  he  occupied  another  house  owned  by 
another  landlord.1 

§  321  (255).  Must  not  be  Oppressive.  —  Courts  will  declare 
ordinances  to  be  void  that  are  oppressive  in  their  character.  Thus, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee,  in  a  judgment  which  reflects  credit 
upon  the  tribunal  that  pronounced  it,  declared  void  an  ordinance  of 
the  city  of  Memphis  which  ordered  the  arrest,  imprisonment,  and 
fine  of  all  free  negroes  who  might  be  found  out  after  ten  o'clock  at 
night,  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation.2  So,  an  ordinance  forbid- 
ding, under  penalty,  the  "  knowingly  associating  with  persons  having 
the  reputation  of  being  thieves  and  prostitutes,"  can  only  be  sus- 
tained, by  construing  it  to  require  proof  of  complicity,  actual  or 
intended,  with  the  persons  named  in  the  complaint  as  the  reputed 
thieves  and  prostitutes  ;  otherwise  it  would  be  void,  as  an  invasion 
of  the  right  of  personal  liberty.3     So,  where  the  common  council  of 

1  Dayton  i>.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2  2  Mayor  v.  Winfield,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
Stew.)  77  (1878);  see  cases  cited  in  report-  707  (184S).  The  oppressiveness  and  in- 
er's  note  at  end  of  the  opinion.  The  eqnality,  alleged  to  invalidate  a  by-law, 
Chancellor  in  substance  says  :  "The  must  be  made  apparent  to  the  court, 
water- works  belong  to  the  municipality,  Mayor  v.  Beasly,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  232 
and  are  for  the  benefit  of  the  inhabitants  (1839);  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547 
of  the  city.  The  inhabitants  are  entitled  (1869).  A  by-law  prohibiting  sivinc  run- 
to  the  use  of  the  water  on  compliance  ning  at  large  in  a  city  is  presumptively 
with  reasonable  regulations.  The  use  of  reasonable  as  a  sanitary  or  police  regnla- 
the  water  for  the  complainant's  tenants  is  tion.  Commonwealth  v.  Patch,  97  Mass. 
necessary  to  the  full  enjoyment  by  him  of  221  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Bean,  14  Gray 
his  property.     To  refuse  to  furnish  water  (Mass.),  52. 

to  his  tenant  there  unless  the  complainant  Ordinances    to   regulate    callings    and 

pays  a  debt  due  from  the  tenant  to  the  trades  must  not  be  unreasonable,  partial, 

city  for  water  furnished  to  him  elsewhere,  in   restraint  of  trade,  or  in  contravention 

on    premises   not   belonging  to  the  com-  of  public  policy.     Frank,  In  re,  52  Cal. 

plainant,  would,  obviously,  be  to  compel  606(1877).    Thus  a  statute  forbidding  the 

him  to  pay  the  tenant's  debt  as  a  condi-  reservation  of  seats  at  public  exhibitions, 

tion  precedent  to  obtaining  the  water  for  upon    the   sale    of  tickets   of    admission, 

his  premises  while  occupied  by  the  tenant,  after  the  opening  of  the  doors,  is  an  un- 

The  regulations  must  be  reasonable.      1  constitutional    interference    with   private 

Dill,  on  Mini.  Corp.  sees.  319,  320.     The  property.     Dist.  of  Columbia  v.  Saville, 

refusal  to  furnish  water  to  complainant  is,  1  McArthur,  581. 

under  the  circumstances,  unjustifiable,  and  3  St.  Louis  v.  Fitz,   53   Missouri,  582 

is  an  injury  for  which  he  is  entitled  to  re-  (1873). 
lief  in  this  court.     High  on  Inj.  sec.  7S7." 


100  MUNICIPAL   COEPOEATIONS.  §  322 

Baltimore,  by  ordinance,  forbade  any  person  to  i  n  ct  or  maintain  any 
or  boiler  without  authority  from  the  mayor,  and  author-1 
:  the  mayor,  upon  six  months'  notice,  to  revoke  any  permil  to  use 
or  maintain  a  steam-engine  or  boiler,  and  that  thereupon  the  si 
should  be  removed,  under  a  heavj  penalty  for  failure  to  remove  it, 
in  an  action  to  restrain  the  prosecution  of  a  suit  for  the  penalty  by 
maintaining  a  steam-engine  after  notice  to  remove  the  same  by 
the  mayor,  it  was  held  that,  by  itself,  a  stationary  steam-engine  is  not 
a  nuisanpe  ;  and  that  an  ordinance  which  commits  to  the  unrestrained 
will  of  a  single  public  officer  a  power  practically1  absolute  oveT  the 
use  of  steam  within  a  city,  so  thai  h<-'  mighl  prohibit  its  use  altogether, 
the  exercise  of  which  may  proceed  from  enmity  or  prejudice,  from 
partisan  zeal  or  animosity,  from  favoritism  and  other  improper  influ- 
ences, and  motives  easy  of  concealment  and  difficult  to  be  deteeted 
and  exposed,  does  not  fall  within,  the  domain  of  law,  and  is  void 
and  inoperative.1 

§  322  (256).  Must  be  Impartial,  Fair,  and  General.  —  As  it 
would  be  unreasonable  and  unjust  to  make,  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, an  act  done  by  one  person  penal,  and  if  done  by  another 
not  so,  ordinances  which  have  this  effect  cannot  he  sustained. 
Special  and  unwarranted  discrimination,  or  unjust  or  oppressive  in- 
terference in  particular  cases,  is  not  to  he  allowed.  The  powers 
vested  in  municipal  corporations  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  he  ex- 
ercised by  ordinances  general  in  their  nature  and  impartial  in  their 
operation.2 

1  Baltimore  v.  Radecke,  49  Md.  217;  (1877);  s.  c.  10  Chicago  Legal  News,  370. 
8.  c.  21  Alb.  Law  Jour.  117.  So   an   ordinance    compelling    a    railroad 

2  Russ  r.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  12  company  to  station  flagmen  wherever  tin' 
N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  38  ;  White  v.  Mayor,  2  railroad  may  cross  streets,  &c,  is  a  valid 
Swan   (Term.),    364  (18f>2)  ;    De    Ben   v.  exercise  of  legislative  power,  as  a  police  reg- 

:  I.  I  La.  An.  30    (  i  v.  Rumpff,  ulation  for  the  safety  of  the  public  and  pas- 

4.".  111.  'jo;    Hudson   v.  Thome,  7  Paige,  sengers  on  the  trains,  Such  ordinance  when 

261  :  Baton  Rouge  Council  v.  Cremoniui,  passed  is  a  judicial  act,  imposing  pecuniary 

l.i.  An.    "j  17  ;    Ex    parte    Chin  Van,  burden  and  loss  on  the  railroad  company, 

I'd.  7s  ;  Zanone  v.  Mound  City,  and  is  subject  to  review  by  courts,  which 
Citizens'  Gas  &  M.  <',,.  v.  will  determine  whether  the  power  cou- 
Elwood,  ill  Ind.  :;:;-2  (1887).  The  doc-  ferred  was  exercised  in  a  legal  and  reason- 
trine  of  the  text  approved  ami  applied,  able  manner.  State  >•.  East  Orange,  41 
Tugman  v.  Chicago,  7-  111.  lor,  (1875).  N.  J.  I-.  127.  So,  also,  a  resolution  of  a 
An  ordinance  pi  i  i particular  rail-  water  board,  under  authority  of  a  city 
ration  by  nam<  from  running  charter,  requiring  certain  consumers  to  put 
locomotivi                m  on  a    pi   ifiedstreel  in  expensive  meters,  without  their  consent, 

did,  and  does  uo1  contravene  the  prin-  under  the  penalty  of  cutting  off  the  water 

ciple  stated  in  the  text.     Richmond,  &c.  for  non-payment  ofthe  price  of  theme 

Richmond,  'JO'    U.S.  521  was  declared  void  as  being  an  unwarranted 


323      ORDINANCES  \     REGULATION   AND   RESTRAINT   OF   TRADE.      401 


§  323  (257).  May  regulate,  but  not  restrain  Trade.  —  In  England, 
certain  customs  prevail  in  prescriptive  corporations  restrictive  of 
freedom  of  trade  and  against  common  right.  Such  customs,  from 
long  usage  and  unknown  origin,  are  regarded  in  the  light  of  regula- 
tions prescribed  by  a  charter  which  is  supposed  to  have  existed,  but 
is  lost.  Such  customs,  while  not  favored  by  the  English  courts,  are 
yet  held  legal,  but  must  be  incontrovertibly  established.  But  by 
the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835  (5  &  6  Wm.  IV.  chap, 
lxxvi.  sec.  14*,1    exclusive  rights  of  trading  have  been  abolished,  and 


14> 1 

discrimination.  Red  Star  Steamship  Co. 
v.  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vroom) 
246,  citing  the  text. 

Ordinances  should  be  general,  or,  at  all 
eveiits  not  discriminating  in  their  opera- 
tion. They  may,  it  is  said,  impose  fines 
on  persons  violating  their  provisions  with- 
in the  corporation  or  within  a  designated 
district  therein,  or  in  a  certain  street  ;  hut 
an  ordinance  naming  one  individual  and 
directing  him  to  do  certain  acts  with  re- 
spect  to  a  building  alleged  to  he  a  nui- 
sance, and  in  default  of  compliance,  im- 
posing a  fine  of  a  specific  amount  upon 
him,  was  held  to  be  unreasonahle,  con- 
trary to  common  right,  and  void.  Muni- 
cipality v.  Blineau,  3  La.  An.  688  (1848). 
Compare  Bozant  v.  Campbell,  9  Rob.  (La.) 
411  (1S45),  where,  without  repealing  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  private  hospitals, 
the  grant  of  permission  to  one  or  more  in- 
dividuals to  erect  such  hospitals  was  sus- 
tained. And  see,  also,  Commonwealth  v. 
Goodrich,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  545,  where  a 
municipal  regulation,  limited  in  its  charac- 
ter, was  considered  valid.  Such  cases  de- 
pend upon  their  special  circumstances. 
The  test  is  that  the  regulation  must  be 
reasonable  as  applied  to  the  subject- 
matter. 

If  an  ordinance  is  general  in  its  applica- 
tion, the  mere  fact  that  it  peculiarly  affects 

a  particular  person  raises  no  presumption  sistent  with  the  whole  charter  and  the 
that  it  was  enacted  for  the  purpose  of  an-  general  legislation  of  the  state.  An  ordi- 
noying  him  or  depriving  him  of  his  rights,  nance  fixing  one  rate  of  license  for  selling 
Shinkle  v.  Covington,  83  Ky.  420.  Or-  goods  which  are  within  or  in  transit  to  the 
dinances  may  be  adapted  to  the  varying  city,  and  another  rate  for  goods  not  within 
municipal  necessities  and  exigencies.    Cov-     or  in  transit  to  the  city,  is  invalid.   Frank, 


act  in  a  partial  and  oppressive  manner  ; 
therefore  it  cannot  select  particular  indi- 
viduals by  name,  and  require  them  to 
construct  pavements  or  local  improve- 
ments in  front  of  their  lots,  and  omit 
others  in  the  same  improvement  district,  if 
this  be  done  without  good  cause  or  reason 
for  the  distinction.  White  v.  Nashville, 
2  Swan  (Tenn.),  364  (1852);  post,  sec.  799. 

1  Ante,  chap.  iii.  sec.  35,  and  note. 
Post,  sec.  362,  note  and  cases  as  to  monop- 
olies and  ordinances  in  restraint  of  trade. 
Criminal  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade 
and  the  various  English  statutes  in  respect 
thereof  are  instructively  presented  by  Mr. 
Justice  Stephen,  3  Hist.  Criminal  Law, 
chap.  xxx.  The  fact  that  certain  per- 
sons were  engaged  in  a  particular  kind  of 
business  in  a  given  locality,  at  the  time  of 
the  adoption  of  an  ordinance,  would  not 
authorize  the  municipal  corporation,  by 
such  ordinance,  to  permit  such  persons  to 
continue  their  business,  whilst  it  prohib- 
ited others  from  engaging  in  the  same 
business  in  the  same  locality.  Tugman 
v.  Chicago,  78  111.  405  (1875). 

A  statute  authorizing  municipal  au- 
thorities to  license  and  regulate  such  call- 
ings, trades,  and  employments  as  the 
public  good  may  require,  will  empower 
them  to  exact  a  license  for  revenue  pur- 
poses,  if  that  construction  is  not  incon- 


ington  v.  East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548 
(1875);  post,  sec.  394.  In  exercising  its 
power  to  require  adjacent  lot-owners  to 
make  local  improvements,  the  corporation, 
it  has  been  held  in  Tennessee,  must  not 
vol.  I.  —  26 


In  re,  52  Cal.  606;  s.  p.  Mayor  v.  Althrop, 
5  Coldw.  554;  Cronin  v.  People,  82  N.  Y. 
318  (an  ordinance  regulating  the  slaughter 
of  animals  held  valid).  Supra,  sec.  319, 
note. 


lu-2  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §3-^ 

itwithstanding  such  custom  or  by-law  [to  tlie 

contrary],  every  person  in  any  borough  may  keep  any  shop  for  the 

sale  of  aU  lawful  wares  and  merchandise,  by  wholesale  or  retail,  and 

use  every  lawful  trade,  occupation,  mystery,  and  handicraft,  for  hire, 

l<  .  or  otherwise,  within  any  borough." 

§324      258).     Customs    in  Restraint    of    Trade  — In     this  country 

corporations  derive  all  their  powers  from  legislative  acts  of  compara- 
tively modem  date,  and  prescriptive  custom*  in  restraint  of  trade  or 
against  nun, una  right  arc  unknown.  No  inconsiderable  portion  of 
.  in  the  old  honks  in  England  relate  to  these  customs,  their 
validity  and  mode  of  proof,  but  they  are  in  the  main  inapplicable  to 
the  present  period  and  to  the  institutions  in  this  country,   where 

lom  in  the  choice  and  pursuit  of  all  occupations  never  has  been 
denied.  The  inapplicability  of  the  English  decisions  is  noticed  by 
Mr.  Justice  Dewey,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Massachusetts  in  an  important  case  involving  the  validity  of  an 
ordinance  of  the  city  of  Boston  regulating  the  use  of  hackney  coaches 
and  other  vehicles  within  the  city.  He  observes  that  "in  the  argu- 
ments addressed  to  the  court,  the  question  was  somewhat  discussed 
as  to  the  power  incident  to  municipal  corporations  to  create  by-laws 
of  the  character  here  adopted  ;  and  a  reference  was  made  to  various 
cases   in    the   English  courts,  where  questions  of  this  nature   had 

en.     Upon  examination  of  those  cases  they  will  be  found  less 

important  and  less  satisfactory  as  guides  here,  inasmuch  as  it  is  quite 

nous  that  in  many  of  them,   and   particularly  those   where   the 

nance  seemed  most  questionable  as  not  being  within  the  ordi- 
nary  exercise  of  municipal  authority,  the  by-laws  were  sustained 
round  of  ancient  and  long-continued  usage,  ripening  into 
a  prescriptive  right  on  the  part  of  the  municipal  corporation."     But 
«no  round,"he    adds,  "can  be  urged  here,  and  the   present 

ordinance,  if  sustained  at  all,  must  he  shown  to  he  authorized  by  the 
provision  of  the  charter,  or  be  derived  as  an  incidental  powei 
resulting  from  its  incorporation  as  a  city,  or  be  found  in  some  gen, 
eral  or  special  statute."1 

[ei     2  I  lush,  as  will  authorize  one  city,   unless  it  has 

(M;                                             is  to  Eng-  ind  direct  authority  so  to  do  from 

i,„iS  remarks  oi              ,    '..   in  the  legislature,  to  pass  an  ordinance  re- 

'.  L45  quiring  the  Inhabitants  of  other  towns  to 

!  |  •'  ,,,,  from  it  a  license  before  exercising 

.tirt  decided  thai  tbe  busi-  thai  employment  in  carrying  persons  to  or 

from  town  from   it.     Such  an  ordinance  was  consid- 

md  omnibn  I  to  be  an  unnecessary  restraint   upon 

D                      ritorial  or  local  o  bu  mess,  and  is  not  binding  upon  citizens 


§  326       ORDINANCES   MUST   NOT    CONTRAVENE    COMMON   RIGHTS.       403 

§  325  (259).  Must  not  contravene  Common  Right.  —  An  ordi- 
nance cannot  legally  be  made  which  contravenes  a  common  right, 
unless  the  power  to  do  so  be  plainly  conferred  by  a  valid  and  com- 
petent legislative  grant ;  and  in  cases  relating  to  such  a  right,  au- 
thority to  regulate,  conferred  upon  towns  of  limited  powers,  has  been 
held  not  necessarily  to  include  the  power  to  prohibit.1  Thus,  in 
Connecticut,  it  is  held  that  every  one  has,  presumptively,  a  common- 
law  right  to  fish  in  navigable  rivers,  and  that,  though  every  town 
may,  by  statute,  have  the  power  to  make  by-laws  to  regulate  fish- 
eries of  clams  and  oysters  within  its  limits,  yet  this  power  does  not 
authorize  a  by-law  prohibiting  all  persons  except  its  own  inhabitants 
from  taking  shell-fish  in  a  navigable  river,  within  the  limits  of  such 
town  ;  such  a  by-law,  being  in  contravention  of  a  common  right,  is 
void.2 

§  326  (260).  Same  subject. —  But  there  is,  however,  no  common 
right  to  do  that  which,  by  a  valid  law  or  ordinance,  is  prohibited  ; 
and  hence  courts  will  not  declare  an  authorized  ordinance  void  be- 
cause it  prohibits  what  otherwise  might  lawfully  be  done.  In  dis- 
cussing the  subject,  Mr.  Justice  Evans  illustrates  it  in  this  wise : 
"  If  there  was  no  law  interfering,  the  butcher  might  kill  his  beeves 
and  hogs  in  the  street.  If  the  butcher  could  do  it,  any  man 
might,  and  it  might,  therefore,  be  said  to  be  a  common  right ;  but 
when  the  law  prohibited  it,  it  was  no  longer  a  common  right.  A 
legal  restraint  may  be  imposed  on  a  few  for  the  benefit  of  the 
many."  3     Therefore,  while  ordinances  which  unnecessarily  restrain 

of  other  places.     The  court  does  not  ques-  Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2  Green  (N.  J. ),  222 

tion  the  right  of  the  city,  by  reasonable  (1834);  ante,  sec.  89,  and  note. 
by-laws,    to    require    inhabitants,    whose  *  Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2  Green  (N.  J.), 

business   is. local  and   carried    on  within  222  (1834);  State  v.  Mott,  61    Md.    297; 

the  city,  to  obtain  a  license  before  exercis-  Milliken   v.    Weatherford,    54   Tex.    388, 

ing  certain  employments.     Per  Dewey,  J.,  where  an  ordinance  prohibiting   the  rent- 

Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  ing  of  private  property  to  lewd  women  was 

562,  575  ;  see  also  Napman  v.  People,  19  declared  void. 

Mich.   352    (1869)  ;  Barling  v.  West,    29  2  Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391  (1824): 

Wis.  307;  s.  c.  9  Am.   Rep.  576  (1871);  Peck  v.   Lockwood,  5  Day  (Conn.),    22  ; 

Hives  v.  Appleton,   24  Wis.  542  ;  Taylor  Willard   v.    Killingworth,    8   Conn.    247  ; 

v.    Pine    Bluff,    34    Ark.    603    (excessive  Clason  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  316.     The 

charge    for   weighing   cotton)  ;  post,    sec.  general  welfare  clause  does  not  authorize 

369.  the  imposition  of  a  license  tax  for  engaging 

Whenever  a  by-law  seeks  to  altera  icell-  in  a  lawful  business,  — sale  of  lemonade, 

settled  and    fundamental  principle  of  the  cake,  &c,  at  temporary  stands  on  sidewalk. 

common  law,  or  to  establish  a  rule  interfer-  Barling  v.  West,  29  Wis.  307  (1871);  S.  c. 

ing  with  the  rights  of  individuals  or  the  9  Am.   Rep.  576  ;  see  post,  sec.  387  ;  ante, 

public,  the  power  to  do  so  must  come  from  sec.  89. 
plain    and    direct    legislative    enactment.  8  Per   Evans,   J.,    in    City  Council   v 


1  1 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORAT] 


§  3-7 


trade  or  operate  oppressively  upon  individuals  will  not  be  sustained, 
ich  as  are  reasonably  calculated  to  preserve  the  public  health 
are  valid  although  they  may  abridge  individual  liberty  and   indi- 
vidual rights  in   respect  of  property.1     Accordingly,  in  a  populous 
.  .in  ordinance  is  valid  as  a  sanitary  regulation  which  prohibits 
the   purchasing   of  carcasses   of  animals   for    boiling,   Bteaming,  or 
lering  the  same,  and  the  rendering  and  steaming  of  the  same, 
within  the  city,  except  in  certain  enumerated  cases  and  under  speci- 
fied  conditions  of  a  reasonable  character.2 


§  327    (201).    Validity    is    for    the    Court,    and    not    the    Jury,   to 

determine.  —  Whether  an  ordinance  be  reasonable  and  consistent 
w  Lth  the  law  or  nut  is  a  question,  for  the  court,  and  not  the  jury,  and 
evidence  to  the  latter  on  this  subject  is  inadmissible.  But  in  deter- 
mining this  question  the  court  will  have  to  regard  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  (articular  city  <>r  corporation,  the  objects  sought  to  be 
ined,  and  the  necessity  which  exists  for  the  ordinance.  Regula- 
tions proper  for  a  large  and  prosperous  city  might  he  absurd  or  op- 
pressive  in  a  small  and  sparsely  populated  town,  or  in  the  country.3 


Ahrens.  I   Strob.   (S.  C.)  Law,  241,  257 

I  ity  Council  v.  Baptist  Church, 

Q,29H1  317, 

2);  St.  Paul  v.  Colter,   12  Minn.  41, 

1  Text  approved,  State  v.  Holcomb,  68 
Iowa,  107;  Commonwealth  v.  Patch,  97 
.M., ■-.  221. 

2  State  '■    Fisher,  52  Mo.  171  (1873). 

3  Kneedler  v.  Norristown,  100  Pa.  St. 
368,  approving  text.     Bacon  Abr.  tit.  By- 

< lommonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick. 
(Mi  ii   v.  Sweet,   1 

i  \.  .1.  i,  L96  (1832);  Vaudine,  Peti- 
tioner, &c,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)   187   (1S28). 
B    ton  v.  Shaw,  1   Met.  (Mass.)  130,  135 
(181<i);  Austin  t>.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (M 
121 .  125  (1834);  Budson  v.  Thorne,  7  I 

\\  Y  i  261  :  Commonwealth  v.  Stod- 

der,    2   Cush.  62,    575    (1848); 

Commissioners  v.  <  ras  <  !o.,  1-  Pa.  St.  318  ; 

Dub  ' '  w.  (N.  Y.)  162, 

:  Buffalo  v.  Webster,  10  Wend. 

\     V.)    100  ;    Brooklyn    v.    Breslin,    57 

N  16  (1874);  Frank,  Tn   re,  52 

.  ipproving  text.  ■  319. 

"  Where   the  municipal  legislature  ha* 

nut'  '.  it  musl  be  governed,  not 

by  our  discretion,  but  by  its  own  ;  and  we 

bhall   not  he  hasty  in  convicting  them  of 


being  unreasonable  in  the  exercise  of  it." 
Per  Lowrie,  J.,  Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2 
Granl  (Pa.)  Cases,  291  (1S54);  s.  p.  St. 
Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547.  "The 
courts,"  says  Dewey,  J.,  "doubtless  have 
the  power  to  deny  effect  to  a  by-law  ob- 
noxious to  the  objection  that  it  is  unrea- 
sonable.  It  is,  however,  a  power  to  be 
cautiously  exercised,"  especially  whore 
the  question  is  a  practical  one,  —  for  ex- 
ample, the  length  of  time  which  ought  to 
be  allowed  to  vehicles  to  remain  in  the 
street,  and  as  to  which  the  city  authori- 
ties, it  is  to  be  presumed,  can  judge  bet- 
ter than  the  court.  Commonwealth  v. 
Robertson, 5  Cush.  (Mass.)438,  442(1850). 
See,  also,  Vintners  v.  Passey,  1  Burr.  239  ; 
Workinghara  v.  Johnson,  Cas.  temp. 
Hardw.  2S.r.  ;  Pointers'  Co.  v.  Phillips,  6 
Bing.  N.  C.  314;  St.  Paul  v.  Colter,  12 
Minn.  41  ;  Commonwealth  r.  Patch,  97 
M  i  ».  221. 

The  doctrine  of  the  text  that  the  valid- 
ity of  a  by-law  is  in  all  cases  a  </ 
the  court,  and  that  evidence  to  the  jury 
is  inadmissible,  has  been  denied  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  which,  in 
Clason  r.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  816(1872) 
(involving  the  validity  of  an  ordinance 
to  protect  the  harbor,  and  also  the  city, 


§  320       ORDINANCES   MUST   NOT   VIOLATE   LEGISLATIVE   POLICY.       405 

§  323  (262).  Legislative  Authority  to  adopt  what  would  other- 
wise be  Unreasonable  Ordinances. — Where  the  legislature,  in  terms, 
confers  upon  a  municipal  corporation  the  power  to  pass  ordinances 
of  a  specified  and  defined  character,  if  the  power  thus  delegated  be 
not  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution,  an  ordinance  passed  pursu- 
ant thereto  cannot  be  impeached  as  invalid  because  it  would  have 
been  regarded  as  unreasonable  if  it  had  been  passed  under  the  inci- 
dental power  of  the  corporation,  or  under  a  grant  of  power  general 
in  its  nature.  In  other  words,  what  the  legislature  distinctly  says 
may  be  done  cannot  be  set  aside  by  the  courts  because  they  may 
deem  it  to  be  unreasonable  or  against  sound  policy.  But  where  the 
power  to  legislate  on  a  given  subject  is  conferred,  and  the  mode  of 
its  exercise  is  not  prescribed,  then  the  ordinance  passed  in  pursuance 
thereof  must  be  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  power,  or  it  will  be 
pronounced  invalid.1 

§  329  (263).  Must  be  consistent  with  Public  Legislative  Policy. 
—  The  rule  that  a  municipal  corporation  can  pass  no  ordinance 
which  conflicts  with  its  charter  or  any  general  statute  in  force  and 
applicable  to  the  corporation,  has  been  before  stated.2  Not  only  so, 
but  it  cannot,  in  virtue  of  its  incidental  power  to  pass  by-laws,  or 
under  any  general  grant  of  that  authority,  adopt  by-laws  which  in- 
fringe the  spirit  or  are  repugnant  to  the  policy  of  the  State  as  de- 
clared in  its  general  legislation.  This  principle  is  well  exemplified 
by  a  case  in  Ohio,3  in  which  incorporated  towns  were,  by  statute, 

from  inundation  by  preserving  the  shore  Louis,  authorizing  the  city  authorities  "to 

or  beach),  considered  it  to  be  no  violation  regulate,"  and,   by  construction,   to   per- 

of  principle,  in  a  case  where  the  reason-  mit  bawdy  houses,  and  the  objection  made 

ableness  of  the  ordinance  depended  upon  by  counsel  to  an  ordinance  licensing  such 

extrinsic  facts,  to  submit  testimony  to  the  houses,   Napton,   J.,   says:   "It  is  naked 

jury  bearing  upon  the   reasonableness  of  assumption  to  say  that  any  matter  allowed 

the  requirements  of  the  ordinance.     But  by  the  legislature  is  against  public  policy, 

the  argument  of  the  counsel  for  the  city,  The  best  indications  of  public  policy  are 

that   this   view   makes   the   same   by-law  to  be  found  in  the  enactments  of  the  legis- 

"  valid  in  one  case  and  invalid  in  another,  lature.     To  say  that  such  a  law  is  of  un- 

according  to  the  varying  weight  of  testi-  usual    tendency   is    disrespectful    to    the 

mony  and  the   varying   views  of  juries,"  legislature,    who,   no   doubt,    designed   to 

seems   unanswerable,   and  the  text  states  promote  the  morals  and  health  of  the  citi- 

probably  the  true  doctrine.    See  Glover  on  zens.     Whether  the  ordinance  in  question 

Corp.  297,  and  cases  in  this  note.  is  calculated  to   promote  the   object  is  a 

1  Peoria  v.  Calhoun,  29  111.  317(1862);  question  with  which  the  courts  have   no 

St.  Paul  v.  Colter,  12  Minn.   41  (1866)  ;  concern,"    when   the  legislative   will   has 

Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,   57  N.  Y.   591,   596  been  plainly  expressed.     State  v.  Clarke, 

(1874) ;  A  Coal-Float  v.  Jeffersonville,  112  54  Mo.  17,  36  (1873). 

Ind.    15  ;  Breninger  v.   Belvidere,   44   N.  a  See  ante,  sees.  89,  317,  319. 

J.  L.  350  ;  post,  sec.   420.     Speaking  of  a  3  Marietta    v.    Fearing,     3    Ohio,    427 

provision  of  the  charter  of  the  city  of  St.  (1S31).     See  also  Grand  Rapids  Electric, 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  330 


prohibited  from  subjecting  stray  animals  owned  by  persons  not  resi- 
dents of  such  towns  to  their  corporation  ordinances.     It  was  held 
an  ordinance  operating,  not  on  the  animals  but  on  the  non-resi- 
denl  in   the  shape  of  a  penalty,  violated  the  spirit  of  the 

statute,  and  was  void  So,  in  a  later  case  in  the  same  state,  it  was 
showD  that  the  genera]  policy  of  the  State  was  to  allo\t  animals  to 
run  at  large;  and  it  was  ruled  that  a  municipal  corporation  with 
power  to  pass  "all  by-laws  deemed  necessary  for  the  well-regulation, 
health,  cleanliness,  &c,"  of  the  borough,  and  with  power  to  "abate 
nuisances,"  had  no  authority  to  pass  a  by-law  restraining  cattle  from 
running  at  large,  such  a  by-law  being  in  contravention  of  the  gen- 
eral law  of  the  State.1 


§  330  (2G4).  Same  subject.  —  The  general  statutes  of  the  State 
abolished  the  system  of  inspecting  hay,  and,  in  the  place  of  it,  the 
seller  was  required  to  prepare  the  article  for  market  in  a  particular 
manner,  at  the  peril  of  being  subjected  to  certain  designated  penal- 
ties. In  other  words  he  was  at  liberty  to  dispose  of  his  hay  without 
inspection  if  he  chose  to  do  so.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  was 
decided  that  a  city  ordinance,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  pressed  hay 
without  inspection,  was  void,  because  it  conflicted  with  the  laws  of  the 
State  upon  the  same  subject.2 


kr.  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  Edison,  &c.  Co., 
33  Fed.  Rep.  659;  Ex  parte  Chin  Van, 
60  Cai.  7s ;  Baltimore  i>.  Scharf,  54  Md. 
499. 

»  Collins  v.  II  tch,  18  Ohio,  523(1849). 
But  in  Illinois  it  bas  been  decided  that  a 
town,  authorized  bj  its  charter  to  declare 
what  should  be  nuisances,  and  to  provide 
fur  the  abatement  thereof  by  ordinance, 
may  pass  an  ordinance  declaring  swine 
running  at  large  within  the  corporation 
to  be  nuisances,  and  providing  for  the 
taking  up  of  the  same,  &c,  and  tins 
though  under  the  laws  of  tie  State  the 
owners  of  stock  may  lawfully  allow  it  to 
run  at  large  upon  the  common,  the  court 
rding  the  power  named  in  the  charter 
nidging  or  limiting  any  right  of  com- 
mon which  might  otherwise  exist.  Rob- 
-  Ie,  30  HI.  159  (1868).  By-laws 
which  contravene  the  policy  of  the  gen- 
eral I  the  stat'\  by  undertaking 
to  punish  acts  which  those  statutes  au- 
thorize, are  void.  Canton  v.  Nist,  9  Ohio 
holding  void  a  by-law,  which, 
disregarding   the  statutory  exceptions  of 


cases  of  necessity,  charity,  &c,  prohibited 
the  opening  of  shops  for  business  on 
Sunday.  Followed,  Thompson  v.  Mount 
Vernon,  11  Ohio  St.  688,  adjudging  an  or- 
dinance to  he  invalid  because  inconsistent 
■with  the  liquor  law  of  the  State.  And 
see  Adams  v.  Mayor,  &c,  29  6a.  56;  Sill 
v.  Corning,  1  E.  P.  Smith  (15  N.  Y.),  297; 
Cincinnati  v.  Gwynne,  10  Ohio,  192 ; 
Wood  v.  Brooklyn,"  14  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  425; 
Marklc  v.  Akron,  11  Ohio,  586;  Thomas 
r.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349  (1870).  But 
a  corporation  may,  in  some  cases,  consist- 
ently with  general  law,  further  regulate  by 
ordinance  Bubjects  already  regulated  by 
Btatute.  Huddleson  v.  Ruffin,  6  Ohio  St. 
604;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  Wend.  (N.  V.) 
237  ;  State  v.  Welch,  30  Conn.  215 
(1869). 

-  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v.  Nichols, 
■I  Hill  (N.  V.),  209  (1843).  Compare 
Mayor  v.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.), 
156  ;  Rogers  V.  Jones,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
•j:;7.  Construction  of  power  to  appoint 
[hmasters.  Hoffman*.  Jersey  City, 
84  N.  .1.  L.  172(1870). 


§  331       ORDINANCES:     SIGNING,   PUBLICATION,   AND    RECORDING.      407 


Of  the  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording  of  Ordinances. 

§331  (J205).  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording.  —  When  ordi- 
nances are  required  to  be  published  before  they  shall  go  into  effect, 
this  requirement  is  essential,  and  the  publication  must  be  in  the 
designated  mode!  Until  such  publication  be  made,  or  until  they 
have  gone  into  operation,  no  penalty  can  be  enforced  under  them.1 
Whether  the  mayor's  signature  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  ordi- 
nance depends  upon  the  charter ;  but  unless  made  essential,  such 
provisions,  where  the  ordinance  is  duly  enacted,  have  sometimes 
been  regarded  as  directory.2 


1  Barnett  v.  Newark,  28  111.  62  (1862); 
Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2  Iowa,  90  (1855); 
Higley  v.  Bunce,  10  Conn.  567  (1835); 
Meyer  v.  Fronun,  108  Ind.  208  ;  Napa 
v.  Easterby,  61  Cal.  509  ;  Wain  v.  Phil- 
adelphia, 99  Pa.  St.  330  ;  Schwartz  v. 
Oshkosh,  55  Wis.  490.  Specified  mode  of 
publishing  the  proceedings  of  the  council 
is  essential.  State  v.  Hoboken,  9  Vroom 
(38  N.  J.  L.),  110  ;  lb.  113  ;  Hoboken  v. 
Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.J.)  265.  Failure  to 
publish  ordinance  held  not  to  affect  va- 
lidity of  bonds  issued  under  a  subsequent 
act  authorizing  the  corporation  to  incur  a 
debt.  Amey  v.  Allegheny  City,  24  How. 
364 ;  Clark  v.  Janesville,  10  Wis.  136 
(185.9)  ;  State  v.  Newark,  1  Vroom  (30 
N.  J.  L. ),  303  ;  People  v.  San  Francisco, 
27  Cal.  655.  Where  publication  for  Jive 
successive  days  is  required,  a  publication 
for  five  successive  week-days  is  sufficient, 
though  a  Sunday  intervenes  when  no  paper 
is  issued.  Ex  parte  Fiske,  72  Cal.  125. 
Publication  in  a  newspaper  published  only 
on  Sunday  held  valid  under  the  Ohio 
statute.  Hastings  v.  Columbus,  42  Ohio 
St.  585.  Under  a  charter  forbidding  the 
increase  of  salaries  during  terms  of  of- 
fice, and  providing  that  ordinances  should 
not  take  effect  until  after  publication  for 
twenty  days,  an  ordinance  respecting  sala- 
ries, adopted  before  a  term  began,  but  the 
last  publication  of  which  was  after  that 
time,  was  held  to  fix  the  salaries  for  that 
term.  Stuhr  v.  Hoboken,  47  N.  J.  L.  (18 
Vroom)  147.  Where  the  charter  pro- 
vided that  a  failure  to  pxtblish  should  not 
make  ordinances  void  unless  the  delay 
caused  them  to  operate  retrospectively, 
it  was  held  that  an  ordinance  became  a 


law  without  publication.  Schweitzer  v. 
Liberty,  82  Mo.  309.  When  no  provi- 
sion for  the  publication  of  ordinances  is 
contained  in  a  special  charter,  the  promul- 
gation should  be  reasonably  sufficient  to 
notify  all  parties  interested,  and  the  pre- 
sumption is  in  favor  of  the  reasonableness 
of  the  time  adopted  by  the  corporation, 
which  must  prevail  unless  countervailing 
facts  are  proved.  Pitts  v.  Opelika,  79  Ala. 
527,  which  further  decides  that  a  provision 
for  publication  contained  in  a  general  law 
applies  only  to  municipalities  organized  un- 
der that  law.  Pubiication  held  not  neces- 
sary when  not  required  by  the  charter.  In 
re  Guerrero,  69  Cal.  88.  In  Massachusetts 
a  provision  by  ordinance  for  the  publication 
of  ordinances  is  held  to  be  directory,  and 
not  a  condition  precedent  to  their  validity. 
Commonwealth  v.  Davis,  140  Mass.  485. 

2  Blan  chard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96, 
101,  103  (I860);  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y. ),  9  ;  Elmendorf  v.  Mayor  of  New 
York,  25  WTend.  (N.  Y.)  693.  See,  how- 
ever, Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  supra ;  State 
v.  Newark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  399;  State  v. 
Hudson,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  475  ;  Kepner 
v.  Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124  ;  State 
v.  Jersey  City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  93  ; 
Creighton  v.  Manson,  27  Cal.  613  ;  Taylor 
v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  241  ;  Dey  v.  Jersey 
City,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  412  ;  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  93  ;  lb.  148  ; 
State  v.  Newark,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  185 
(1876);  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  6  Cal. 
190;  State  v.  Henderson,  38  Ohio  St. 
644  ;  Wain  v.  Philadelphia,  99  Pa.  St. 
330  ;  Opelousas  v.  Andrus,  37  La.  An. 
699  ;  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  R.  Co  o. 
Waterbury,  55  Conn.  19  (holding  also  that 


MUNICIPAL    CORPOB  LTIONS. 


§  333 


Alternate    Modes  of   Publication.  —  Where  alternate 

ion   of  a  by-law  are  allowed   by  statute,  and  the 

ite    requires  the  corporation   to    direct    which    mode    shall    be 

adopted,  a  publication  made  by  order  of  the  clerk,  without  direction 

from  or  selection  of  the  mode  having  been  made  by  the  corporation, 

is  aot  valid.1 


§  333  (267).     Time    of    Publication.  —  A  municipal  charter  re- 
quired  every  ordinance  to  be  published  for  the  space  of  twenty  days 


the  fact  that  there  was  a  practice  of  treat- 
i  -  of  the  common  council  as  ap- 
by  the  mayor  unless  disapproved 
in  writing,  was   immaterial).     See   a/*/--, 
chapter  on  Corporate  Meetings,  sec.  293. 
minutes  not  equivalent  to  signing 
resolution,  when  latter  is  essential.     Gra- 
il mi  r.  Carondelet,   33    Mo    262  (1862)  ; 

W Iruff  v.  Stewart,  63  Ala.  206, 

where  signing  minutes  was  held  sufficii  at. 
"When  to  he  signed.     Miles  v.   Bough,  3 
Gale  &  D.  119  ;  Inglis  v.  Railway  Co.,  16 
I         Law  .v  Eq.  :">.").     When-  another  offi- 
cer  is  rx -officio  clerk  of  the   council  his 
signature   to   an  ordinance   as   "clerk   of 
is  a  proper  authentication  of 
it.     In  re  Guerrero,  69  Cal.  88.     A  legis- 
provisiou   requiring   the  "presiding 
ol  tlu-  council  to  sign  all  ordinances 
i--  direi  tory   in   its  nature.     If   regularly 
ordinance  is  valid,  though  not 
Mitel.      It  is,  of  course,  com- 
petenl  for  the  legislature  to  make  the  sig- 
an  essentia]  condition  of  validity. 
;  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96,  101, 
103(186       I     hei  v.  Graham,  1  Cm.  (Ohio) 
$70);  ante,  sec.  293.     See  Stale  v. 
.1   Dut<  h.  (N.  J.)399.     Signature 
of  mayor  Dot  essential  under  general  in- 
corporation laws  of  Indiana.     Martindale 
■  :  L  nl.    Ill  (1876).     No  muni- 
linance  is  binding  unless  signed  by 
the  in  lyor  and  promulgated  in  the  English 
Breaux's  Bridge,  In  re,  30  La. 
An.   1105;  ante,  aec.   271,  note.     Where, 
by  mistake,  the  date  of  approval  by  the 
ntered  as  of  a  day  prior  to  the 
of  an  ordinance,  it  was  held,  in  a 
suit  to  colled  a  tax  under  the  ordinance, 
ill  other  requisites  had  1 n  com- 
plied with  and  no 

I  he  ordinance 
«j.,  no;  affected.    Allentown  v.  Grim,  109 


Pa.  St.  113.  Where  the  charter  required 
the  mayor  to  sign  ordinances  or  return 
them  within  five  days  with  his  rea  one 
lor  not  doing  so,  an  ordinance  passed  by 
the  council,  but  which  was  not  signed 
nor  returned  by  the  mayor,  was  held  in- 
valid. In  re  Standiford,  5  Mackey  (Dist. 
of  Col.),  549,  and  see  Pennsylvania  Globe 
Ga  Light  Co.  v.  Scranton,  97  Pa.  St.  538. 
Injunction  does  not  lie  to  prevent  a  mayor 
from  signing  an  ordinance,  even  when  the 
intended  ordinance  is  a  repeal  of  one  under 
which  a  valid  contract  has  been  entered 
into.  New  Orleans  Elevated  I!y.  Co.  v. 
New  Orleans,  39  La.  An.  L27.  As  to 
whal  may  1»'  considered  sufficient  proof  of 
an  ordinance  having  been  signed  by  the 
mayor,  see  Knight  r.  Kansas  City,  St.  J.  & 
('.  B.  I;.  R.  Co.,  70  Mo.  231.  Bonds  of  a 
city  signed  by  an  ex-mayor  held  invalid. 
Coler  v.  Cleburne,  131  U.  S.  162  (18S9). 

1  Iligleyv.  Bunce  (restraining  cattle), 
10  Conn.  435  ;  s.  C.  lb.  567  (1835).  The 
language  of  the  statute  was  this  :  "  Such 
by-laws  shall  not  be  in  force  until  pub- 
lished lour  weeks  in  a  newspaper  printed 
in  such  town,  or  in  the  town  nearest  to 
such  town  in  which  a  newspaper  is  printed, 
or  in  some  other  newspaper  generally  cir- 
culated in  the  town  where  such  by-law  is 
made,  as  the  town  shall  direct."  Rev.  1821, 
p.  458.  Ildd,  thai  the  town  must  point 
out  one  of  the  three'  descriptions  of  news- 
papers in  which  the  by-law  should  be 
printed.     If).      Mode  of  publication  under 

the  general  u rporation  law  of  Illinois 

of  1872.  Byars  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  77  111. 
467(187."').  Special  provisions  construed. 
Phillips,  In  re,  60  N.  Y.  16  (1875);  Bass- 
ford,  In  re,  50  N.  Y.  509  (1872).  Certifi- 
cate of  city  clerk  of  due  publication  not  com- 
petent evidence  unless  made  so  by  statute. 
B.  K.  Co.  v.  Engle,  76  111.  317  (187:.). 


§  33-i  ORDINANCES  \    PROOF   OP   PUBLICATION.  409 

in  at  least  one  newspaper  before  it  should  go  into  effect ;  and  it  was 
held  that  an  ordinance  would  go  into  force  in  twenty  days  after  its 
publication  in  the  first  number  of  the  paper  ;  that  twenty  days  need 
not  intervene  between  the  first  aud  last  insertions  ;  that  it  is  clearly 
sufficient  if  it  be  published  in  each  number  of  the  paper  issued 
within  the  twenty  days,  and  probably  sufficient  if  there  is  but  one 
insertion,  twenty  days  after  which  the  ordinance  will  go  into  effect.1 
Where  an  ordinance  has  been  once  duly  published,  and  it  is  after- 
wards included  in  a  revision  or  digest  of  ordinances,  no  additional 
publication  is  necessary.2 

§  334  (268).  Proof  of  Publication.  —  A  charter  provided  that  no 
ordinance  should  be  in  force  until  published  in  some  newspaper  of 
the  place,  and  also  declared  that  ordinances  should  be  sufficiently 
proved  in  any  court  (among  other  modes)  by  a  printed  copy  taken 
from  the  newspaper  or  printed  pamphlet  in  which  the  same  had 
been  published,  provided  the  same  purports  to  have  been  done  by 
authority  of  the  corporation.  Under  this  provision,  the  production 
of  a  newspaper  published  in  the  town,  containing  what  appears  as 
an  ordinance,  with  a  caption,  "  Published  by  Authority,"  duly  signed, 
is  evidence  of  the  existence  and  adoption  of  the  ordinance.3  So 
where  the  charter  provides  that  ordinances  published  by  authority  of 
the  corporation  shall  be  received  in  evidence  without  further  proof, 
a.  book  of  ordinances,  purporting  to  be  thus  published,  is  competent 

1  Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J. )  which  were  in  force  before  it  was  made." 
265  (1859).  Where  a  city  is  required  to  St.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  509.  Ex- 
promulgate  its  ordinances,  it  is  sufficient  to  ception  to  rule,  see  Emporia  v.  Norton,  16 
publish  tbem  in  the  newspaper  in  which  Kan.  236  (1876). 

tbe    ordinances    are    usually    published,  3  Block   v.    Jacksonville,    36    111.    301 

though   there   may  be   other   newspapers  (1865).      Authorized  book   of  ordinances 

within  the  city.     Truchelut  v.  City  Coun-  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  due  passage  and 

cil,  1  Nott  &  McC.   (S.  C. )  227  (1818)  ;  publication  of  the  ordinances  therein  con- 

and  see  cases  noted  in  sec.  331,  note,  ante,  tained.     Prell  v.   McDonald,  7  Kan.   426 

2  St.  Louis  v.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513  (1871);  s.  c.  12  Am.  Rep.  423.  See  Pen- 
(1873).  "It  would  be  of  the  most  mis-  dergast  v.  Peru,  20  111.  51.  Proof  of  pub- 
chievous  consequence  to  hold  that  the  lication  under  special  charter  provision, 
revision  of  a  law  had  the  effect  of  making  St.  Charles  v.  O'Malley,  18  111.  407; 
the  revised  law  entirely  original,  to  be  Moss  v.  Oakland,  88  111.  109.  In  an  action 
considered  as  though  none  of  its  provi-  against  a  city,  plaintiff  need  not  prove 
sions  had  effect  but  from  the  date  of  the  the  publication  of  an  ordinance  offered 
revised  law.  When  a  former  provision  i3  in  evidence,  where  he  shows  that  the  city 
included  iu  a  revised  law,  it  is  only  there-  had  for  several  years  acted  upon  the  or- 
by  intended  to  continue  its  existence,  not  dinance  as  in  force.  Atchison  v.  Kin?,  9 
to  make  it  operate  as  an  original  act,  to  Kan.  550  (1872)  ;  State  v.  Atlantic  City 
take  effect  from  the  date  of  the  revised  (burden  of  proof),  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.), 
law.  The  revision  has  not  the  effect  to  99,  106.  A  note  upon  the  record  of  an 
break  the  continuity  of  those  provisions  ordinance  stating  that  it  had  been   duly 


HO  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §330 

evidence,   without  further  authentication;  but  it  is  not,  of  course, 
lusive.1 

Recording  Ordinances.  —  A  provision  in  a  statute 
chaining  an  incorporated  town  into  a  city,  that  the  existing  town 
hall  remain  in  i'orce  provided  they  shall  bt  recorded 
within  four  months  thereafter,  is  merely  directory,  and  such  ordi- 
nances  are  valid,  though  not  recorded  within  the  designated  period.2 
Noris  it  a  valid  objection  to  a  municipal  ordinance  that  it  is  re- 
corded in  print  (being  printed  and  pasted  in  the  proper  book),  and 
not  in  manuscript.3 

Of  the  Power  to  impose  Fines,  Penalties,  and  Forfeitures. 

§  336  (270).  Common-Law  Principles  adopted.  —  That  by-laws 
or  ordinances  may  nut  he  inoperative  or  useless,  it  is  necessary  that 
.  ]„ -null if  should  be  annexed  to  the  breach  of  them  ;  and  it  is  set- 
tled in  England,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  Magna  Charta, 
that  without  the  express  sanction  of  parliament,  no  by-law  can  be 
enforced  by  disfranchisement  of  the  offender,  or  by  his  imprison- 
ment, or  by  forfeiture  of  his  goods  or  property.  Under  incidental 
power  to  pass  by-laws,  a  corporation  may,  in  England,  annex  pecu- 
niary penalties  of  a  certain,  fixed  and  reasonable  character,  but  with- 
out express  authority  given  by  a  statute,  the  only  penalty  it  can 
prescribe  is  a  pecuniary  one,  usually  called  a  fine.  Therefore  in  the 
absence  of  a  statute  or  special  custom  justifying  it,  a  by-law  cannot 
five  a  power  of  distress  and  sale  of  the  goods  of  the  offender,  since 
such  a  power  is  contrary  to  the  common  law.  And  where  a  corpor- 
ation is  empowered  to  enforce  its  by-laws  in  a  special  manner,  as 
by  fine,  it  is  limited  to  the  manner  prescribed.  These  safe,  salu- 
tary, and  enlightened  principles  of  law  have  been  recognized  by  the 
American  courts  as  applicable  to  the  ordinances  of  our  municipal 
corp. nations,  as  the  cases  to  which  reference  is  made  fully  show.4 

published,  held  prima  facie  proof  of  the  competent  where  the  charter  does  not  re- 

t'  (niblication.     Downing*.   Milton-  quire  them  to  be  recorded,  and  no  record 

vale,  3''>  Kan.  7  1".  thereof  has   been   made.      Darlington  v. 

1  St.  Loui   p.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513(1878);  Commonwealth,  41  Pa.  St  68.     See  ante, 

Lindsay  V.Chicago,  11;'.  111.  120  ;  ante,  sec.  sec.  310. 

3],,    |  4   In   Louisiana,  in  a  case  where  an  or- 

-  Trn      '     of  Academy  v.  Erie,  31  Pa.  dinance  required  properly  owners  to  make 

Amey  v.  Allegheny  City,  their  sidewalks  conform  to  a  uniform  grade 

2i  How.  364  i  Tipton  v.  Norman,  72  Mo.  under  pain  of  a  fine,  or  imprisonment,  in 

880.     S ihapter  on  Corporate  Records  default  of  payment  of  the  fine,  it  was  held 

an  1   Documents,  by  Bcrmudcz,   C.  J.,  citing  this  section, 

>-.     Ashley,     86     111.     177  that    "a    municipal    corporation    has    no 

of  resolutions  is  right   to  enforce   obedience   to    the  ordi- 


§  337  ORDINANCES  :    FINES   AND   PENALTIES.  411 

§  337  (^71).  Statutory  regulation  of  Fines  and  Penalties  under 
Ordinances.  —  By  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  the  subject  of 
by-laws  and  their  penalties  is  regulated.  It  is  declared  "  that  it 
shall  be  lawful  for  the  council  of  any  borough  to  make  such  by-laws 
as  shall  to  them  seem  meet  for  the  good  rule  and  government  of  the 
borough,  and  for  the  prevention  and  suppression  of  all  such  nuisan- 
ces as  are  not  already  punishable  in  a  summary  manner  by  virtue  of 
an  act  in  force  throughout  such  borough,  and  to  appoint,  by  such  Inj- 
laics,  such  fines  as  they  shall  deem  necessary  for  the  prevention  and 
suppression  of  such  offences  ;  provided  that  no  fine,  to  be  so  ap- 
pointed, shall  exceed  the  sum  of  five  pounds,  and  that  no  such  by-law 
shall  be  made,  unless  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  the 
council  shall  be  present."  ]  Respecting  the  fines  mentioned  in  this 
section,  Mr.  Rawlinson  suggests  the  inquiry  whether  it  be  necessary 
or  not  that  the  exact  amount  of  each  fine  should  be  mentioned  in  the 
by-law,  the  limit,  to  wit,  51.,  being  fixed  by  the  act.  It  is  contended, 
he  observes,  by  some  persons,  that  the  amount  may  be  left  open,  and 
that  a  by-law,  enacting  that  the  offence  shall  be  punishable  by  a  fine 
not  less  than  10s.  and  not  exceeding  5^.,  would  be  valid.  This 
wTould  be  convenient,  but  some  have  doubted  whether  the  corpora- 
tion could  enforce  it  by  the  usual  common-law  remedies,  viz.,  by  an 
act  of  debt  or  assumpsit.  It  is  believed,  he  adds,  that  by-laws  have 
invariably  fixed  the  exact  sum  ;  but,  nevertheless,  it  would  seem  that 
a  fine  of  51.,  with  power  to  the  mayor  or  other  officer  to  reduce  it  to 
any  sum  not  exceeding  a  specified  amount,  would  be  good.2  In  this 
country,  the  practice,  if  not  general,  is  at  least  not  uncommon,  to 
prescribe  limits  to  fines,  and  allow  them  to  be  imposed  within  those 
limits,  at  the  discretion  of  the  magistrate  or  court  entrusted  with 
jurisdiction  to  hear  complaints  for  breaches  of  municipal  ordinances.3 


nances  which  it  has  the  power  to  pass,  by  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  238,  243  ;  Snell, 
fine  or  imprisonment,  or  other  penalty,  In  re,  30  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  81. 
unless  that  right  has  been  unquestionably  3  In  England  it  is  held  that  where  the 
conferred  by  the  lawgiver  ;  for  this  is  in-  statute  gives  a  discretion,  either  as  to  the 
flicting  a  punishment  for  the  commission  amount  of  the  penalty  or  its  application, 
or  omission  of  an  act  declared  an  offence,  a  the  justice  must,  on  the  face  of  the  con- 
prerogative  which,  as  a  rule,  appertains  to  viction,  show  in  what  manner  the  discre- 
the  sovereignty  only."  State  v.  Bright,  38  tion  has  been  exercised.  The  King  v. 
La.  An.  1;  see  also  Slessman  v.  Crozier,  80  Dimpsey,  2  Term  R.  96;  The  King  v. 
Ind.  487.  Symonds,  1  East,  189  ;  Boothroyd,  In  re, 

1  5  &  6  Wm.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  90  ;  15  M.  &  W.  1  ;  The  King  v.  Seale,  8 
ante,  sec.  35,  and  note  ;  post,  sec.  408.  East,   568,   573  ;   The  King  v.   Smith,   5 

2  Rawlinson  on  Corp.  (5th  ed.)  165,  M.  &  S.  133;  The  Queen  v.  Johnson,  8  Q. 
166,  note  ;  post,  sec.  341  ;  Piper  v.  Chap-  B.  102  ;  Wray  v.  Toke,  12  Q.  B.  492  ; 
pell,  14  M.  &  W".  624  ;  Peters  v.  London,  see  also  The  King  v.  Wyatt,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
2  Upper  Can.  Q.   B.  543  ;  Fennell,  In  re,  1478 ;  The  King  v.  Priest,  6  Term  R.  538. 


U2 


MCNKirAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§339 


Implied    Power    to    annex    Pecuniary     Penalties. — 

,.  ;L|,  ordinance  or  by-law  without  a  penalty  would  be  nugatory,1 
municipal  corporations  have  an  implied  power  to  provide  for  their 

rcement  by  reasonable  and  proper  fines  against  those  who  break 
them.8  So  the  right  to  make  by-laws  gives  to  the  corporation,  with- 
out any  express  grant  of  power,  the  incidental  right  to  enforce  them 
by  reasonable  pecuniary  penalties.      What  is  reasonable  defends 

.  the  nature  of  the  offence  and  the  circumstances.3 

9  (273).     Charter  Mode   governs.  —  Where    the    charter    or 

inic  act   prescribes    the    manner  in  which  by-laws  are    to    be 

enforced,  or  the  sanctions  or  punishments  to  be  annexed  to  their  vio- 


1;  was  held  in  A  .  where  the 

charter  authorized  the  council  to  enforce 
their  ordinances  by  a  penaltynot  exceed- 
ing fifty  dollars,  that  the  council  must 
ribe  a  precise  penalty  for  each  of- 
fence, and  therefore  an  ordinance  declaring 
a  penalty  for  its  violation  not  exceeding 
fifty  dollars  was  void.  State  v.  Zeigler,  3 
Vroom  (32  N.  J.  L.),  262;  followed  in 
k  v.  Washington,  47   X.  J.   L.  (18 

Vr i)  254.     In  A'o  w  the  law 

is  that  fines  imposed  by  ordinances  must  be 

mount  and  cannot  be  left  to  the 

etion  of  the  court.     Ordinances  pre- 

Bcribing  a  fine  of  "  not  more  than"  a  sum 

re  therefore  void  for  uncertainty 

and  vagueness.    Stat.-  v.  Worth,  95  N.  C. 

61  5  ;  State  >■■  Crenshaw,  '.»!  X.  C.   877; 

Cainan,  94  N.  <'.  883.     The  i»ro- 

vimon   for  a  fine  not  exceeding  $5u0  for 

such  trivial  offences  as  most  of  those  cov- 

ered    by    the    ordinance   before  the  court 

(one  prohibiting  processions  without  the 

consent  of  the  mayor,  ante,  sec.  319,  note), 

tli.'  council  exercising  no  discretion,  but 

turning  this  greal  power  over  to  the  courts, 

without  any  classification,  held  void.    How 

tie  of  penalties  is  allowable 

not  decided,  but  the  court  said  they  must 

ible  whether  sliding  or  tixed. 

j       Campbell,   <'.  J.,    /  I':  i.  ee,   63 

Mich.  396  (1886);  8.  o.  80  X.   W.   Rep. 

72  ;  :::.  Alb.  I..  I.  6,  citing  Grand  Rapids 

v.   I'  Mich.   54  ;    Bee  post,  sees. 

340,  341,  410;  Harr.  Munic.  Man.  360. 

"    S  I         .land,  3  K.  I.  117.    Hut 

no  penalty  ran  be  enforced  for  an  illegal 

Third  Avenue  Rail- 

. .  Y .  12  ;   Mayor  v.  Second 


Avenue  Railroad  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  261. 
"  Municipal  fine,"  as  used  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  California,  means  a  fine  imposed 
by  local  laws  of  particular  places,  such  as 
incorporated  towns  and  cities,  and  nol  a 
fine  imposed  by  the  general  laws  of  tin- 
State.  People  v.  Johnson,  30  Cal.  98 
(l>nv,). 

-  Fisher  v.  Ilarrisburg,  2  Grant  (Pa.) 
Cas.  291  (1854);  Barters.  Commonwealth, 
3  l'a.  (Pen.  &  W.)  253  ;  Trigally  v.  Mem- 
phis,  6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382  (1869).  The 
amount  must  be  reasonable.  Zylstra  v. 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  382.  The 
penalty,  says  Mr.  "Willcock,  must  be  im- 
posed on  the  person  who  violates  the  by- 
law. Thus,  if  goods  be  sold  by  an  un- 
authorized person  within  the  city,  the 
penalty  must  be  imposed  on  the  seller, 
and  not  on  the  buyer ;  for  how  can  he 
distinguish  between  those  authorized  to 
sell  and  those  who  are  not  ?  Willc.  on 
Corp.  154,  pi.  369,  370  ;  Cuddon  v.  East- 
wick,  1  Salk.  143,  192  ;  s.  c.  6  Mod.  124; 
and  see,  also,  Fa/akerly  v.  Wiltshire,  1 
Stra.  469.  The  rule  stated  above,  as  to 
the  person  on  whom  penalties  must  be 
imposed,  may  be  extended  or  enlarged  by 
express  provisions  of  the  organic  act  of  the 
corporation. 

;1  Mayor,  &c.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3 
Ala.  137  (1841).  A  penalty,  although 
small,  tixed  on  every  stroke  of  the  ham- 
mer which  an  unauthorized  person  uses  in 
his  trade  of  a  goldsmith,  18  unreasonable. 
Willc.  I'M.  pi.  368.  Same  principle, 
.Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v.  Ordrenan, 
12  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  122  (1815).  See,  ante, 
chap,  x.,  Municipal  Courts. 


§340 


ORDINANCES  :     MODE    OF    ENFORCEMENT. 


413 


lation,  this  constructively  operates  to  negative  the  right  of  tlio 
corporation  to  proceed  in  any  other  manner  or  to  inflict  any  other 
punishment.  Tims,  in  the  leading  case  1  on  this  subject,  the  char- 
ter prescribed  in  what  manner  by-laws  should  be  enforced,  namely, 
by  fine  and  amerciament,  or  either,  and  it  was  decided  that  the  cor- 
poration was  precluded  from  declaring  a  forfeiture  of  property,  or 
from  inflicting  any  other  punishment ;  and  the  doctrine  of  this  case 
has  been  everywhere  followed  in  the  courts  of  this  country. 

§  340  (274).  Same  subject. — A  charter  of  a  city  specifically 
enumerated  various  powers,  which  the  council  was  expressly  author- 
ized to  enforce  by  a  penalty  not  exceeding  one  hundred  dollars  for 
their  violation ;  and  the  same  charter  empowered  the  council  to  pre- 
vent and  remove  encroachments  upon  the  streets,  but  was  silent  as 
to  the  imposition  of  penalties  for  a  violation  of  its  provisions.  The 
council  passed  an  ordinance  imposing  a  continuing  penalty  of  ten 
dollars  a  day  for  every  day's  failure  to  remove  an  encroachment, 
after  notice  ;  and  it  was  held,  and  properly  so,  that  it  possessed  no 


i  Kirk  r.  Nowill,  1  Term  R.  118,  124 
(1786),  per  Mansfield  and  Biiller :  fol- 
lowed in  Hart  v.  Mayor,  &c.  9  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  571,  588,  606  (1832);  Cotter  v. 
Doty,  5  Ohio,  393  (1832);  Heise  v.  Town 
Council,  6  Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  404  (1853); 
Miles  v.  Chamberlain,  17  Wis.  446  (1863). 
In  Hart  v.  Mayor,  supra,  it  was  accord- 
ingly decided  that  a  corporation  having 
authority  "  to  inflict  penalties  for  the  vio- 
lation of  any  by-law,  not  exceeding  $25 
for  any  one  offence,"  could  not  pass  a  by- 
law subjecting  property  to  seizure  and 
sale,  or  forfeiting  it,  even  though  it  waa 
used  contrary  to  the  by-law,  which  was  in 
other  respects  valid,  the  remedy  for  en- 
forcing their  by-laws  having  been  speci- 
fied. Hart  v.  Mayor,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
571  ;  ante,  sec.  248  ;  post,  sec.  818. 

Where  specific  modes  of  procedure  and 
penalties  are  prescribed  against  persons 
failing  to  take  out  license  for  keeping 
drink  ing-houses,  as  fines,  suits,  and  prose- 
cutions, a  municipal  corporation,  in  the 
absence  of  express  grant,  has  no  right  to 
close  the  doors  of  a  drinking-house  sum- 
marily, because  the  keeper  has  failed  to 
take  out  a  license.  Bolte  v.  New  Orleans, 
10  La.  An.  321  (1855).  That  a  municipal 
corporation  cannot  annex  other  or  greater 
penalties  than  those  authorized  in  its  or- 


ganic act,  that  power  to  punish  by  "  fine  " 
is  exclusive,  and  that  it  is  not  compe- 
tent to  order  a  forfeiture  in  addition,  see 
Schroder  v.  City  Council,  2  Const.  Rep. 
(S.  C.)  726;  s.  c.  3  Brev.  533  (1815); 
McMullen  v.  City  Council,  1  Bay  (S.  C), 
46  ;  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  lb.  382  ;  New 
Orleans  v.  Costello,  14  La.  An.  37  ;  Co- 
lumbia B.  Hunt,  5  Rich.  (S.  C.)  550,  558; 
Kennedy  v.  Sowden,  1  McMullan  (S.  C. ), 
328  ;  compare  Crosby  v.  Warren,  1  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  385.  An  ordinance  treated 
as  wholly  void  because  it  fixed  the  mini- 
mum fine  for  an  offence  at  five  dollars 
when  the  law  required  it  to  be  three  dol- 
lars. Petersburg  v.  Metzker,  21  111.  205 
(1859).  A  party  cannot  enjoin  the  collec- 
tion of  a  fine  and  costs  imposed  for  the 
violation  of  a  city  ordinance,  on  the 
ground  of  there  being  no  offence  charged 
or  cause  of  action  stated  before  the  mayor. 
The  remedy  in  Indiana  in  such  case  is  by 
appeal.  Schwab  v.  Madison,  49  Ind.  329 
(1874).  The  city  of  New  Orleans  has 
power  to  inflict  fines  and  imprisonment 
under  its  police  power  only,  and  cannot 
apply  them  to  violators  of  ordinances  for 
the  raising  of  a  revenue,  —  as  for  selling 
vegetables  without  paying  for  the  privi- 
lege.    State  v.  Patamia,  34  La.  An.  750. 


tit  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §342 

power  to  ini]  h  a  penalty;  but  the  decision  was  put  upon  the 

the  specific  enumeration  of  the  powers  which  might  be 
ctual  by  penal  provisions  was  an  implied  exclusion  of 

the  ri"ht  to  impose  any  penalties  whatever  in  other  cases.1 

S    341     (275       Penalty   may   be    within   Fixed   Limits.  —  A   muni- 

'  corporation,  with  power  to  pass  by-laws  and  to  affix  penalties, 
it'  not  prohibited  by  the  charter,  or  if  the  penalty  is  not  fixed 
bv  the  charter,  make  it  discretionary,  within  fixed  reasonable  limit*, 
for  example,  "not  exceeding  fifty  dollars."  The  maximum  limit 
must  of  course  be  reasonable.  This  enables  the  tribunal  to  adjust 
the  penalty  to  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  and  is  just 
and  reasonable.  The  older  English  authorities,  so  far  as  they  hold 
such  a  by-law  void  for  uncertainty,  are  regarded  as  not  sound  in 
principle,  and  ought  not  to  be  followed.2 

§   342    '276).    Single   Offence   cannot  be   made   Double.  —  As   the 

power  to  pass  ordinances  ami  to  punish  for  their  violation  must  be 
reasonably  exercised,  the  corporation  cannot  multiply  one  offence  into 

i/,  and  puuish  for  each.  Thus,  where  an  authorized  ordinance 
prohibited  "  any  person  from  cutting  down  and  making  use  of  cedar 
and  other  trees,"  within  a  specified  locality,  a  complaint,  charging 

defen  lant  "  with  having  cut  down  a  cedar  tree  at  various  times, 

i  Grand  Rapida  v.   Hughes,   15  Mich.  Fennell,  Inre,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  238  ; 

54  (1866).     Whether  there  is  8uch  an  im-  State  v.  Cantieny,  34  .Minn.  1.     A  by-law 

plied  exclusion  must  depend  in  each  case  fixing  one  penalty  for   the   first   offence, 

upon  the  supposed  intention  of  the  legis-  and  a  larger  for  the  second,  and  a  still 

■   be   gathered  from  a  survey  of  larger  one  for  every   subsequent   offence, 

the  whole  charter.    The  authority  to  adopt  does  nol  appear  to  be  bad  for  uncertainty. 

rdinauce  implies  the  right  to  enforce  Butchers' Co.  v.  Bullock,  supra.     Where 

it  b]  uiiary  penalties,  and  this  the  penalty  is  fixed  by  by-law,  it  can  only 

right  exists  unless  excluded  by  other  pro-  be  changed  by  the  same  authority  which 

:i,  0f  the  charter.     Supra,  sec.  338.  affixed  it.     Rex  v.  Ashwell,  12   East,  29; 

|:i   v  ;i  when  a  municipal  Seaming  v.  Cryer,  3  Leon.  7  ;  Moore,  75  ; 

corporation  is  an  ordi-  Bendl.   159  j    Davies  v.   Lowden,   Carter, 

void,,  that  a  quity  29.     A  penalty  fixed  either  by  the  char- 

j  n-isdiction,  al  thi     ail  of  any  person  ter  or  by-law  is  essential.     Bowman  v.  St. 

i  is  injuriously  affected  thereby,  to  stay  John,  43  111.  337;  Ashton  v.  Ellsworth, 

on  by  injunction.     Baltimore  v.  43  111.  299  ;  supra,  sees.  337,  333  ;  infra, 

19  Md.  217:  s.  o.  21  Alb.  Law  see.  843.     The  old  English  rale  stated  in 

.117:  l.ut  see  Index,  tit.  Tnjtmdim.  the  text  was  followed  in  NewJer      i-i  ite 

P     lps,    27    Ala.    55  v.   Zeigler,  3  Vroom  (32  X.  J.  L),  262; 

i),  overruling,  on  this  point,  Mayor,  Mellick  >■.  Washington,    17  X.  J.  L.  (13 

254);  but  the  reason  of  the  matter 

v.  Harris,  7  Jones  (Law),  281.    See,  and  the  |  tctice  in  this  country  is 

Piper  v.  '    W.  otherwise,   and    the   text  states  correctly, 

Co.  v.  Bullock,  we   think,    the   American    doctrine.     See 

3  B.   &  IM.    I".l  ;    Granl   on  Corp.   84;  cases  in  note  to  sec.  337,  supra. 


§  344       ORDINANCES  :    LIMITATION   OF   AMOUNT   OF  PENALTIES.         415 

and  that  he  continued  to  do  so,  from  time  to  time,  until  he  had  com- 
mitted one  hundred  violations  of  the  ordinance,  by  cutting  down  one 
hundred  cedar  trees,"  was  held  to  set  forth  but  a  single  offence;  for, 
said  the  court,  "  the  matter  charged  is  a  trespass  with  a  continuando, 
which  in  law  is  but  one  offence,  and  it  may  well  be  that  every  tree 
cut  by  the  defendant  was  cut  on  one  day,  and,  under  the  ordinance, 
the  cutting  of  more  trees  than  one,  at  one  time,  would  be  but  one 
offence."  1 

§  343  (277).  Limitation  of  Amount  of  Penalties.  —  Where  there 
is  a  limitation  upon  the  corporation  as  to  the  amount  of  penalties  to 
be  imposed  for  the  infraction  of  by-laws,  they  cannot  exceed  the 
limit  directly,  nor  can  they  do  so  indirectly  by  multiplying  what  is 
in  substance  one  offence  into  several,  or  subdividing  one  transaction 
or  violation  into  a  number  of  offences,  and  annexing  a  penalty  to 
each.2  But  where  each  offence  is  distinct,  and  the  punishment  for  each 
is  within  the  power  of  the  corporation  to  impose,  the  punishment  is 
not  made  illegal,  though  the  separate  fines  in  the  aggregate  exceed 
the  limit  allowed  by  the  charter,  and  are  imposed  by  the  same 
magistrate  or  tribunal  at  one  sitting.3 

§  344  (278).  Same  subject.  —  By  its  charter,  the  power  of  a  city 
corporation  to  impose  fines  for  breaches  of  its  ordinances  was  limited 
to  one  hundred  dollars.  By  the  charter  the  city  had  also  the  power 
to  regulate  the  inspection  of  flour,  and  it  passed  an  ordinance  by 
which  any  person  selling  flour  without  inspection  should  be  fined 
"  five  dollars  for  each  barrel  so  sold."  It  was  held  that  this  ordinance, 
as  to  the  penalty,  was  valid  so  far  as  to  authorize  a  fine  not  ex- 
ceeding one  hundred  dollars ;  that  if  a  single  sale  exceeded  twenty 
barrels,  the  fine  could  be  but  one  hundred  dollars,  while  if  it  was 
less  than  twenty  barrels,  the  fine  would  be  five  dollars  on  each 
barrel.  The  court  observed  that  a  recovery  on  a  single  transaction 
where  more  than  twenty  barrels  were  sold  would  bar  any  future  pro- 
ceeding for  the  balance.4 

1  State  v.  Moultrieville,  Rice  (S.  C.)  Corporation  of  New  York,  14  Wend. 
Law,  158  (1839);  Hnrr.  Mimic.  Man.  361.  (N.  Y.)  87.    Continuing  offence.    Marshall 

2  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v.  Ordre-  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  416.  Supra,  sees, 
nan,   12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  122  (1815)  (pen-  337,  341. 

alty  for  illegally  keeping  powder),  citing  3  Heise  v.  Town  Council,  6  Rich.  (S.  C.) 

and  approving  opinion  of  Lord  Mansfield  Law,  404  (fines  for  violating  liquor  ordi- 

in   Crepps  v.    Dnrden,   Cowp.    640.      See  nance);    compare   State   v.   Moultrieville, 

also,   Hart  v.  Mayor,  &c,   9  Wend.  571,  supra. 

588,    606  (1832)  ;    Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  *  Chicago    v.    Quimby,     38     111.     274 

1  Bay  (S.  C),  382    1794);  vide  Stokes  v.  (1865). 


lit".  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  346 

Power  of  Forfeiture  must  be  Expressly  Conferred  — 

A       ;  -  neral  powei  to  make  by-laws,  caimot  make 

;i  by-law  ordaining  a  forfeiture,  of 'property.  To  warrant  the  exercise 
uli  an  extraordinary  authority  by  a  local  and  limited  jurisdic- 
tion, the  rul<  mably  adopted  thai  it  must  beplainly,ii  not, 
isly  conferred  by  the  legislature.1  And  even  if  the 
i'  to  declare  a  forfeiture  is  conferred,  still  no  person  can,  by 
ordinance,  be  deprived  of  his  property  by  forfeiture  without  notice 
or  without  legal  investigation  or  adjudication;  an  ordinance  in  vio- 
lation of  this  principle  is  void,  as  "contrary  to  the  genius  of  our 
laws  and  institutions."3  In  England  the  power  of  municipal  cor- 
porations  to  impose  a  forfeiture  for  offences  created  by  ordinances 
or  by-laws  has  been,  in  many  cases,  sanctioned  by  usage,  without 
any  express  power  in  the  charter  to  impose  the  forfeiture.  But  in 
this  country,  inasmuch  as  corporations  derive  all  their  power  from 
charter  or  act  of  the  legislature,  the  right  to  inflict  a  forfeiture  must 
be  plainly  given,  and  cannot  be  derived  from  usage.3 

§  346  (280).  Power  to  Fine  does  not  include  Power  to  Forfeit.  — 
How  strictly  the  courts  hold  that  municipal  corporations  cannot,  in  the 
nee  of  clear  statute  authority,  pass  by-laws  ordaining  a  forfeiture, 
is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Heise  v.  The  Town  Council 
of  Columbia.  The  town  council  had  power  to  enforce  obedience  to 
their  ordinances  "byjlne,  not  exceeding  fifty  dollars."  Special  au- 
thority was  given  to  municipal  corporations  to  grant  licenses  to  retail 
liquor.  The  council  passed  an  ordinance  relating  to  this  subject,  the 
penalty  for  violating  which  was  a  "  fine  of  not  more  than  fifty  dol- 
lars for  each  offence,  and  also  a  forfeiture  of  the  license"     It  was 

1  Ki:\        .'.       11,  1  Term  R.  IIS,  124,  Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Halst.  (N.  J.)  352  ; 

per   ."  .  -,    followed    by  Taylor  v.  Carondelet  (forfeiture  of  lease), 

rrora  of  New  Xbrk,  in  Hart  v.  22  Mo.  105,  112  ;  Mayor,  &c.  of  Mobile 

Ubany,  9  Wend.  (N.  V.)  v.    Yuillr,   3  Ala.    137    (1841);    Miles  v. 

58$,per  Sutherland,  J.;  p.  605,  per  Chamberlain,  17  Wis.    14G  ;   Donovan  v. 

>r;  2  EydonCorp.  110;  Vicksburg,  29  Miss.   217;   Cincinnati  v. 

Willcock  on  Municipal  Corporations,  180,  Buckingham,     10     Ohio,     257;     Wilcox 

pi.  449;   Angell  k  Ames  on    Corp.    sec.  v.    Hemming,    58    Wis.    144;    post,    sec. 

Doty,  5  Ohio,  394  (1832)  ;  348;   Harr.  Munic.  Man.  311,  313. 
White  r.  Tallman,  2   Dutch.    (N.  J.)  67  2  Cotter  v.   Doty,    5  Ohio,   393,   398; 

6);  Clerk  v.  Tucket,  3  Lev.  281  ;  Lee  Rosebaugh  v.  Saffin,  10  Ohio,  32  (1840)  ; 

v.   Wallis,     1     Kenyon,    292  ;    Adley   v.  Slessman  v.  Crozier,  80  Ind.  487. 

S   60;  Phillips  v.  Al-         *  Taylor   v.  Carondelet,    22   Mo.    105, 

l.i,,    i!    Pa.  St.    181.     In  further  illustra-  112;    Kirk  v.  Nowill,   1  Term    R.   118; 

ti«Mi  "       r,    Sua.    >-.    Ordrenan,    12  Adley   v.    Reeves,    1    Maul'1   &   Sel.    60; 

Johns.  (N    V.)  122;  Dunham  v.  Rochester,  Varden    v.    Mount,    78    Ky.    86,    citing 

ii    (N.   V.).    I  12     !    2  I    |    !'■      '•  r   v.  text. 

ealth,  3  Pa.  (Pen.  &  W.)  253  ; 


§  348  ORDINANCES  :    POWER   TO    FORFEIT   PROPERTY.  417 

held  that  the  license  which  was  granted  and  paid  fur  was  essentially 
property  ;  that  the  council  could  only  impose  Junes,  and  that  it  had 
no  power  to  ordain  a  forfeiture  of  the  license,  there  being  (in  the 
opinion  of  the  court)  no  difference  between  the  forfeiture  of  a  license 
and  of  goods  and  chattels.1 

§  347  (281).  Judicial  Procedure  necessary  in  some  Instances. — 
An  ordinance  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans  authorizing  without  any 
prior  judicial  proceedings,  a  sale,  under  the  orders  of  the  mayor,  of 
all  property  suffered  to  remain  on  the  levee  beyond,  a  specified  period, 
is  invalid,  since  it  makes  the  corporation  judges  and  parties  in  the 
same  cause,  and  enforces  a  forfeiture,  and  divests  the  owner  of  his 
property  without  a  trial  in  due  course  of  law.  Such  a  power  is  not 
similar  to  that  exercised  by  a  corporation  in  removing  nuisances,  as 
that  power  arises  from  necessity  and  ceases  with  that  necessity.  It 
would  be  competent  for  the  corporation  to  ordain  that  the  property 
should  be  removed  at  the  expense  of  the  proprietor,  and  to  recover 
these  expenses,  and  any  fine  which  might  be  imposed,  by  judicial 
proceedings.2 

§  343  (282).  Forfeiture  of  Animals  at  Large;  Notice;  Legal  Pro- 
ceedings.—  The  right  to  denounce  a  forfeiture  against  animals  run- 
ning at  large  in  a  town  or  city,  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  ordinances 
forbidding  it,  must  be  plainly  conferred  or  it  will  not  be  held  to 

1  Heise  v.  Town  Council,  &c,  6  Rich,  bread  illegally  baked  in  violation  of  an 
(S.  C.)  Law,  404  (1S53).  As  to  revo-  authorized  by-law  of  the  corporation,  is 
cation  of  unexpired  license  for  sale  of  not  contrary  to  a  constitutional  provision 
intoxicating  liquors,  State  v.  Cook,  24  declaring  that  vested  rights  shall  not  be 
Minn.  247  (1S77).  License  to  sell  liquor  divested  unless  for  purposes  of  public 
under  the  laws  of  the  State  is  not  a  con-  utility  and  for  adequate  compensation 
tract,  and  may  be  terminated  by  a  repeal  previously  made.  It  may  be  observed 
of  the  law.  Fell  v.  State,  42  Md.  71  that  the  court,  without  any  special  dis- 
(1873);  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  83.  State  v.  cussion,  assumed  that  power  "to  regu- 
Bonnell  (Sup.  Ct.  Ind.),  21  N.  E.  Rep.  late  everything  which  relates  to  bakers" 
1101  (1839).  The  revocation  by  a  muni-  gave  authority  to  denounce  a  forfeiture  of 
cipal  corporation  of  a  license  to  sell  intox-  bread  baked  contrary  to  the  provisions  of 
icating  liquors  upon  certain  specified  con-  the  ordinance  of  the  city.  See,  on  this 
ditions,  a  violation  of  which,  according  to  point,  Mayor,  &c.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3 
the  terms  of  the  license,  should  have  the  Ala.  137  (1841).  Assize  of  bread  has 
effect  to  revoke  it,  is  not  a.  forfeiture  be-  been  deemed  necessary  from  an  early  pe- 
yond  the  powers  of  the  corporation.  Hur-  riod  in  England.  Burn's  Justice,  title 
ber  v.  Baugh,  43  Iowa,  514  (1S76).  "Bread."   Construction  of  English  statute 

2  Lmfear  v.  Mayor,  4  La.  97  (1831).  regulating  sale  of  bread.  Queen  V.  Wood, 
Compare  with  Guiflotte  v.  New  Orleans,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  559;  Queen  v.  Kennett, 
12  La.  An.  432  (1857),  in  which  it  was  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  567  ;  Aerated  Bread  Co. 
held  that  an  ordinance  providing  a  forfeit-  v.  Gregg,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  355. 

ure,  for  the  use  of  the  city  workhouse,  of 
vol.  i.  —  27 


MiAH'lI'M.   CORPORATIONS.  §  349 

i  This  is  iii  accordance  with  the  rule  of  the  English  courts, 
that  a  Btatute  will  not  be  takeD  to  invest,  by  implication,  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  with  the  extraordinary  powers  of  forfeiting  the 
property  of  the  subject,  and  that,  if  it  be  intended  that  any  such 

■!•  shall  be  given,  it  must   be  by  express  words  to  that  effect. 

'I'l,,.  ,  ree  in  holding  that  when  the  power  to  denounce  the 

linst  such  animals  is  given,  there  should  be  nut  in.  either 

■  i  or  constructive,  or  "prior  legal  proceedings.  The  view  of  the 
courts  will  be  best  understood  by  referring  to  some  of  the  cases 
upon  the  subject.  In  Mississippi,  an  ordinance  authorizing  the 
seizure  and  sale  of  hogs  running  at  large  without  notice  or  trial, 
or  opportunity  for  trial,  and  providing  that  one  half  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  the  sales  should  go  to  the  hospital  and  the  other  half 
to  the  city  marshal,  was  held  to  be  in  violation  of  the  constitu- 
tional  provision  that   no  person  "can  be  deprived  of  his  property 

by  due  course  of  law,"  and  securing  right  to  a  jury  trial.2 

^  349  (283).  Same  subject.  —  Tn  a  similar  case  in  Ohio,  Grimke,  J., 
delivering  opinion  of  the  court,  observes:  "The  ordinance  commands 
the  marshal  to  seize  and  impound  the  hogs,  and  then,  without  any 
srve,  without  any  notice,  by  means  of  which  the  owner  might  be 
able  to  exculpate  himself,  directs  them  to  be  sold  and  the  proceeds 
placed  in  the  city  treasury.  Such  an  ordinance  is  as  contrary  to 
spirit  of  the  charter  (Cincinnati)  as  it  is  alien  from  the  general 
•  •cuius  of  our  institutions."3 

1  n  o.  Mount,  78  Ky.  86";  Wilcox  costs  and  expenses,  but  not   imposing  a 

,..   Hemming,  58  Wis.  141;  Knoxville  v.  penalty,   held  valid  under  a  charter  au- 

King,  7  Lea  I            .   141,  approving  the  thorizing  the  impounding  and  sale  "for 

any  penalty  imposed  by  any  ordinance  or 

novan  v.  Vicksburg,  29  Miss.  (7  regulation,  and  all  costs."     Fort  Smith  v. 

rush.)  247  (1855);  Poppen  v.  Holmes,  44  Dodson,  46  Ark.  296.     Such  an  ordinance 

HI.   862;    Darst  v.    People,  51    111.  286;  is  valid,  and  takes  effect  whether  the  owner 

II,.;                    |  ;,,,  6  i;i  .h.  404;  Whilfudd  resides  in  the  town  ot  not.     Rose  v.  Har- 

,-.  1.                          \.  ('.  l.;i\v)  268  ;  Me-  die,  98  '•'    •'.  II  ;  infra,  sec.  355,  note. 

.    M  i;,     (Ky.)    133  ;  8  Ri>                    Saffin,  10  Ohio,  32,  37 

i,  7  Mon.  (Ky.),  647;  (1840).      However  it   may   he  when   the 

M         (    ;      ;;..    86    (1879);  power  to  forfeit   without   notice  or  prior 

IOC.    L.  J.  73.     Power  to  impose  legal  proceedings  is  explicitly  conferred,  it 

i     Qers  of  animals  run-  is  clear  that  the  power,  unless  plainly  and 

ning    at  large  excludes,    by   implication,  expi                 a,  cannot  be  exercised  with- 

■law    upon  out  such  notice  and  previous  adjudication; 

the   subjeel    in    any   other   way;   as,    for  but  with  these  the  remedy  may,  if  need- 

mple,  by  a  sale  of  the  animal  ful,  be  "  prompt  and  strong."    Cincinnati 

berlain,  17  Wis.  446  v.    Buckingham,    L0  Ohio,  257,  262,  per 

Bi  ,pl  ■,  r.  Lane,  C.  .1        What   i                  ig  at  large. 

!l                                 |      tersville  v.   Lan-  Kinder  v.   Gillespie,    63  111.   88   (1872); 

A-  ordinance  directing  Case  v.  Hall,  21  111.  632. 
the                                       of  animals  for 


§  351   ORDINANCES  :  POWER  TO  FORFEIT  PROPERTY  ;  NOTICE.   419 

§  350  (284).  Same  subject.  Notice.  —  In  North  Carolina  the 
general  principle  was  declared  that  an  ordinance  of  an  incorporated 
town  which  authorizes  the  property  of  one  man  to  be  taken  from  him 
and  given  to  another,  without  any  notice  to  the  owner  or  trial  of  his 
lights,  was  unlawful.  The  town  authorities,  under  power  given  to 
make  ordinances  for  the  removal  of  nuisances  and  for  the  good  gov- 
ernment of  the  town,  passed  an  ordinance  to  this  effect :  "  That  every 
hog  at  large  in  the  said  town  shall  be  taken  up  and  penned,  and  ad- 
vertised to  be  sold  on  the  third  day  ;  and  unless  the  owner  should  pay 
the  charges  (specified  in  the  ordinance)  for  taking  up  and  keeping 
such  hog,  and  a  sale  is  effected,  the  money  arising  therefrom,  after 
paying  the  charges,  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  owner  of  the  said  hog." 
The  validity  of  this  ordinance  was  drawn  in  question,  and  two  points 
were  ruled  by  the  Supreme  Court :  1.  That  the  ordinance  was  rea- 
sonable, and  the  corporation,  under  the  power  above  referred  to,  had 
authority  to  pass  it ;  2.  That  it  sufficiently  provided  for  notice  to 
the  owner  by  the  impounding  of  the  animal,  and  the  three  days' 
public  advertisement,  and  that  personal  notice  was  not  necessary.1 
In  a  subsequent  case  in  the  same  court  a  similar  ordinance  was  sus- 
tained. It  was  objected  that  it  was  invalid,  because  it  provided  for 
no  judicial  decision  condemning  the  property  to  be  sold.  This  ob- 
jection the  court  regarded  as  insufficient,  "  since  the  owner  may,  if 
he  choose,  have  a  full  investigation  of  the  case  by  bringing  an  action 
of  replevin,  as  in  any  other  case  of  distress."  2 

§  351  (285).  Same  subject.  — In  South  Carolina  it  has  been  held 
that  under  authority  to  enforce  by-laws  by  fine,  an  ordinance,  other- 
wise legal,  which  authorized  the  marshal  to  kill  hogs  running  at 
large,  contrary  to  the  ordinance,  and  appropriate  them  to  his  own 
use,  was  void.3 

1  Shaw  v.  Kennedy  (X.  C),  Term  R.  Albany,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571  (1832); 
158  (1817);  Hellen  v.  Noe,  3  Ire.  (N.  C.  White  v.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67 
Law)  493  (1843).  Same  principle.  Spit-  (1856);  Phillips  v.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481  ; 
lerw.  Young,  63  Mo.  42  (1876),  holding  Moore  v.  State,  11  Lea,  35;  Knoxville  v. 
that  such  an  ordinance  was  unauthorized  King,  7  Lea,  441.  Power  must  be  strictly 
as  a  sanitary  or  police  regulation  under  pursued,  or  the  sale  will  be  void,  and  the 
power  to  abate  nuisances.  officer  a  trespasser.     Clark    v.    Lewis,    35 

2  Whitfield  v.  Longest,  6  Ire.  (Law)  111.  417.  See  Friday  v.  Floyd,  63  I!!.  50 
268(1846).  In  Iowa  a  similiar  ordinance  (1872),  three  judges  dissenting.  Sale  is 
was  sustained.  Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4  void  where  two  animals  belonging  to  dif- 
Iowa,  296  (1856);  Gilchrist  v.  Schmidling,  ferent  owners  are  sold  at  once.     lb. 

12   Kan.    263  (1873).     Contra,    Willis  v.  3  MoRae  v.  O'Lain,  cited   Kennedy  v. 

Legris,    45    111.    289    (1867);    Bullock    v.  Sowden,   1    McMnllan   (S.   P.)   Law,  328. 

Geomble,  Tl>.  218  ;  Poppen  v.  Holmes,  44  But  authority  to  impose  "fincsa  id p 

111.  360.     But  see  Hart  v.   Mayor,  &c.  of  ties"  authorizes  a  fine  against  those  who 


1^0 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  353 


Equity  will  not  ordinarily  relieve  against  Valid  For- 
feitures.—  A  forfeiture  imposed  by  a  municipal  corporation,  under 
I;  tive  authority,  for  a  violation  of  a  valid  by-law,  and  inflicted 
penalty  for  such  violation,  cannot  be  relieved  against  in  equity, 
unless,  perhaps,  where  peculiar  circumstances  furnish  grounds  for 
equitable  interposition,  the  general  doctrine  being  that  equity  may 
relieve  against  forfeitures  declared  by  contract,  but  uot  against  those 
expressly  declared  or  authorized  by  statute.1 


8  353  (287).  Power  to  enforce  by  Imprisonment  must  be  ex- 
pressly given.  —  In  this  country  it  is  not  unusual  to  provide,  in  the 
organic  act  of  municipal  corporations,  that  it'  lines  for  violation  of 
liv-laws  or  ordinances  are  not  paid,  (he  offender  may  be  committed  to 
prison  for  a  limited  period.  And  in  respect  to  some  offences  pub- 
lic in  their  character,  the  power  to  imprison  in  the  first  instance  is 
often  conferred.2  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  unless  the  au- 
thority be  plainly  given,  it  dors  not  exist  ;  and  when  given,  before 
it  can  be  exercised  there  must  be  a  judicial  ascertainment  by  a  coin- 
petent  tribunal  or  magistrate  of  the  guilt  of  the  party.3 

violate  the  ordinance  forbidding  hogs  run-  (forfeiture    clause    in   lease);    Teachy   v. 

ning  at  Large,  and  the  seizure,  impound-  Somerset,  1  Str.  447;  Gorman  v.  Low,  2 

ing,  and  sale  (upon  notice)  of  the  animals  Edw.    Ch.   324;  Keating   v.    Sparrow,    1 

to  pay  the  fine,  whether  they  belong  to  Ball  &   Beat.  367;  State  v.  Railroad  Co., 

residents  or  non-residents.      Kennedy  r.  3  How.  (U.  S.)  534. 

Sowden,  supra ;  B.  P.  Crosby  v.  Warren,  -  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  (Pen. 

1   Rich.  (S.  C.)   Law,  385(1845),   Ward-  &  W.)  253  (1831);  New  Orleans  v.  Cos- 

law,  •!.,  dissenting;  McKee  v.   McKee,  S  tello,  14  La.  An.  37;  Burlington  v.  Kel- 

]'..  Moii.  (Kv.)  4:;:;  (1S48);  see  Kinder  v.  lar,    18   Iowa,   59;  London    v.   Wood,   12 

Gillespie,  C>3  III.  88  (1872).     But  it  seems  Mod.  686  ;    Bab  v.  Clerk,  V.  Moore,  411; 

doubtful,  upon  the  principles  adopted  in  Clarke's  Case,  5  Co.  64;  1  Roll.  Abr.  364; 

the  construction  of  powers  of  this  charac-  Com.  1%-  By-Law,  E.  1  ;  Chilton  v.  Rail- 

ter,  whether  authority  to  impose  fines  and  way  Co.,  16  M.  &  W.  212;  King  v.  Mer- 

penalties  extends  any  further  than  to  the  chanl  Taylors'  Co.,  2  Lev.  200. 

imposition  of  pecuniary  fines  and  penal-         ;i  Burnett,  In  re,  30  Ala.  461  (1857). 

See    Mayor  of  Mobile  v.   Yuille,  3  Charter  powei   to  punish  violations  of  or- 

Ala.    137;   White  0    Tallman,   2    Dutch,  dinances  "by  fines,  imprisonment,  labor, 

(N.J.)  67  (1856).     The  power  to  forfeit,  or  other  penalty  prescribed  by  ordinance" 

like  the  power  to  tax,  should   be  given  will  authorize  the  city  council  to  prescribe 

either    expressly,   or,    al   all    ■  as  punishment  either  fine  or  imprisonment 

iary  implication.     And   it  has  been  (nol    both),  and   not   even   imprisonment 

held  thai  it  cannot  be  implied  from  the  as  means  of  enforcing  payment  of  a  fine. 

power  "to  ini|  and  Brieswick    v.    Brunswick,    51    Ga.    639 

'•all  such  fines  and  all  such  for-  (1874);  8.   0.    2]    Am.    Rep.  240.      Fines 

nd  penalties  as  may  be  incurred  for  the  violation  of  ordinances,  held,  under 

under  the  laws  and  ordinances  of  the  cor-  Bpecial  charter   provisions,  collectible  by. 

:    Levied,  and   col-  commitment   of  the  persons,   or  by  fieri 

lected."     Cotter  v.    Doty,    5   Ohio,    3l»5  facias.     HiuMleson  v.  Ruffin,  6  Ohio  St. 

2).  604.      The  power  to  punish  offenders  by 

1  Taylor  v.   Carondelet,    22   Mo.    105  fine  or  imprisonment,  conferred  upon  a 


§355 


ORDINANCES  :    ON   WHOM    BINDING. 


421 


On  whom  Ordinances  are  binding,  and  who  must  notice  them. 

§  354  (288).  Who  bound.  —  In  England  the  by-laws  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  bind  not  only  the  members,  but,  if  they  are  general 
in  their  nature  and  purposes,  and  not  limited  to  any  particular  class 
or  description,  but  intended  to  extend  to  all  persons  coming  within 
the  local  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation,  they  bind  all,  whether  mem- 
bers or  strangers,  and  all  must  take  notice  of  them  at  their  peril.  And 
by-laws  made  by  a  municipal  corporation  with  respect  to  a  liberty 
or  franchise  granted  them,  with  local  jurisdiction  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  municipality,  are  as  binding  upon  persons  going  into  the  lib- 
erty, as  the  by-laws  of  the  city  upon  those  who  come  within  its 
walls.1 


§  355  (289).  Same  subject.  —  So,  also,  in  this  country  it  is  settled 
that  valid  ordinances  bind  not  only  the  inhabitants  of  the  corporation, 
but  also  strangers  or  non-residents  coming  within  its  limits.  These, 
for  the  time  being,  are  regarded  as  inhabitants,  and  liable  in  the  same 
manner  for  violations  of  ordinances.2     So  far  is  plain.     But  suppose 


municipal  corporation,  does  not  include 
the  authority  to  coerce  the  payment  of  a 
fine  by  imprisonment.  Brieswick  v .  Bruns- 
wick, 51  Ga.  639  (1874).  Where  an  ordi- 
nance provided  that  a  convicted  person 
should  forfeit  a  sum  "not  exceeding  five 
hundred  dollars,  and  may  be  imprisoned 
not  exceeding  sixty  days,  or  both,"  a  sen- 
tence to  pay  a  fine  of  one  hundred  dollars 
or  perform  sixty  days'  work  on  the  public 
streets,  was  held  to  be  void,  the  latter 
clause  being  unauthorized  by  the  ordi- 
nance, and  the  whole  sentence  being  un- 
certain and  in  the  alternative.  Ex  parte 
Martini,  23  Fla.  343  (1837).  Authority  to 
enforce  penalties  for  violations  of  ordi- 
nances by  "  distress  and  sale"  of  property 
must  be  expressly  or  plainly  granted. 
White  v.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67 
(1856)  ;  Bergen  v.  Clarksou,  1  Halst. 
(N.  J.)  352.  A  law  authorizing  a  munici- 
pal corporation  to  recover  a  fine  for  breach 
of  a  police  regulation  does  not,  without  ex- 
press provision  therefor,  authorize  the  ar- 
rest and  criminal  prosecution  of  the  offend- 
er. State  v.  Ruff,  30  La.  An.  497.  And 
in  England,  likewise,  such  a  power  cannot 
be  conferred  by  the  crown,  and  can  only 
exist  by  authority  of  parliament  or  a  spe- 
cial  custom.      Clerk   v.   Tucket,    3    Lev. 


281  ;  s.  c.  2  Vent.  183 ;  Lee  v.  Wallis,  1 
Kenyon,  295 ;  Sayer,  263 ;  Adley  r. 
Reeves,  2  Maule  &  Sel.  60  ;  Willc.  179  ; 
Glover,  311.  Verbal  order  of  police  ma- 
gistrate will  not  justify  police  officer  in 
holding  a  person  in  custody  for  the  non- 
payment of  a  fine  imposed  for  the  breach 
of  a  municipal  ordinance.  Board  of 
Trustees  v.  Schroeder,  58  Illinois,  353 
(1871). 

i  Willc.  105,  107  ;  Glover,  289,  290 ; 
London  v.  Vanacre,  1  Ld.  Raym.  498  ; 
Salk.  143 ;  Pierce  v.  Bartrum,  Cowp.  270  ; 
Fazakerly  v.  Wiltshire,  1  Stra.  462;  Kirk 
v.  Nowill,  1  Term  R.  118  ;  Butchers' 
Co.  v.  Morey,  1  H.  Bl.  370.  Do  not  bind 
beyond  limits  of  authorized  jurisdiction. 
See  3  Mod.  158  ;  T.  Jones,  144  ;  2  Brownl. 
177  ;  Hob.  211  ;  Hutt.  6  ;  11  Rep.  53  ; 
Godb.  252.  An  ordinance  passed  in  1834, 
prohibiting  the  erection  of  "stables,  &c, 
in  the  interior  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans, 
or  any  of  its  incorporated  suburbs,"  held 
not  to  extend  to  the  city  of  Lafayette, 
subsequently  added,  by  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture, to  the  city  of  New  Orleans.  New 
Orleans  v.  Anderson,  9  La.  An.  323 
(1854). 

-  Heland  v.  Lowell.  3  Allen  (Mass.), 
407  (1862);  Whitfield  v.  Longest,  6  Ire. 


422 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  355 


;i  person  living  without  the  limits  of  the  corporal  Ion  suffers  his  cattle 
or  property  to  stray  into  it  and  violate  its  ordinances.     Here  two 

itions  may  arise:  1.  Can  such  property,  being  within  the 
poration,  1"-  dealt  with  the  same  as  if  it  belonged  to  an  inhabitant 
of  the  corporation  '.  It  is  held  that  it  can.1  -.  Can  such  non-resident 
owner  be  made  amenable  personally  to  a  penalty  to  the  corporation? 
In  other  words,  has  a  corporation  power,  unless  expressly  conferred, 
to  provi  ting  a  penalty  from  a  non-resident  who  suffers 

his  property  to  violate  an  ordinance,  lmt  who  himself  was  at  the 
time  without  the  corporate  limits?  This  remains,  perhaps,  to  be 
settled;  though  it  is  certain  that  ordinances  will  not  be  construed 
bo  extend  to  persons  living  without  the  corporation  and  not  being 
within  it,  unless  such  an  intention  plainly  appears.2 


16);   approving   Pierce    v. 
Bartram,  '  'owp.  269.     See  a] 

p,  LO  Wend.  (N.  V.)  99  ;  Comm'rs 
of  Wilmington  v.  Roby,  8  Ire.  (Law  )  250  ; 
Comm'rs  of  Plymouth  v.  Pettijohn,  4 
1  lev.    | 1  .    L ;  Strauss  v.  Pon1  La  ,    10 

[U.  "."1  (1866);  City  Council  o.  Pepper,  1 
Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  864  (1845)  ;  City 
Couucil  v.  King,  1  McCord  (S.  C), 
Marietta  v.  Fearing,  1  Ohio,  427  (1831)  : 
Dodge  ».  Gridley,  10  Ohio,  173;  Horney 
r.  Sloan,  1  Smith  (Ind.),  136  ;  Kennedy 
v.  Sowden,  1  McMullan  (S.  (.'.),  323  ; 
Bott  v.  Pratt,  33  Minn.  323  ;  Knoxville 
v.  King,  7  Lea,  4  11.  Taxation  of  non- 
residenta  using  streets.     Pout,  sec.   682, 

1  Whitfield  v.  Longest,  6  Ire.  (Law) 
288  (1 346)  ;  Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4 
Lowa,  296,  300  (1856);  Reed  v.  People,  1 
Park.  Cr.  Rep.  181  ;  Rose  v.  Bardie,  98 
K.C.  44.  Supra,  sec.  848,  note.  The  point 
was  also  ruled  the  same  way  in  Spitler  v. 
young,  68  Mo.  12  (1876);  but  the  ordi- 
nance was  construed  not  to  apply  to  a  case 
where  the  hogs  owned  outside  of  the  cor- 
ii  escaped  from  a  pen  in  conse- 
quence  of  a  flood,  over  which  the  owner 
had  no  control,  which  washed  the  pen 
m d  where  the  owner  was  using  dil- 
igence to  reclaim  them.  Wagner,  J., 
■  While  the  hogs  in  this  case  were 
found  in  the  Btreets,  yet  they  were  not 
t  li<i  ••  within  tip-  meaning  and  spirit  of  the 

ordinal ,  which  was  designed  to  prohibit 

hogs  from  running  at  large  in  the  ordinary 


-  Plymouth  v.  Pettijohn,  4  Dev.  (Law) 
591.  Inability  to  punish  nou-resident 
owner  criminally  in  respect  to  property 
within  corporate  limits,  see  Reed  v.  Peo- 
ple, 1  Park.  Cr.  Rep,  481.  Power  "to 
make  such  prudential  rules  and  regubv 
tions  as  may  seem  necessary  for  the  bet- 
ter improving  of  the  common  lands  of  a 
town,"  &c,  extends  only  to  regulations 
as  between  those  who  have  the  tight  to 
enjoy  them  in  common,  but  does  not  cou- 
fer  the  power  of  imposing  a  penalty  for 
trespasses  by  strangers ;  for  such  acts  the 
town  must  pursue  its  common-law  rem- 
edy. Foster  v.  Rhoads,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
191  (1821).  See,  also,  People  v.  Works, 
7  Wend.  (N.  V.j  186  ;  Holladay  v.  Marsh, 
3  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  142.  City  held  not  to 
have  power  to  require  a  license  tax  from 
non-resident  owners  of  wagons  engaged 
in  hauling  into  and  out  of  the  city  for 
hire.  St!  Charles  V.  Nolle,  51  Mo.  122 
(1872).  See  Index,  Vehicles.  Ordinances 
cannot  have  an  extraterritorial  effect,  un- 
less the  power  be  plainly  conferred  upon 
the  corporation.  Strauss  v.  Pontiae  (liquor 
ordinance),  40  111.  801  (1866);  Gosselink 
v.  Campbell,  4  lowa,  296  ;  Robb  v.  Indi- 
anapolis, 38  Ind.  49  (1871);  Chicago 
Packing  Co.  v.  Chicago,  88  111.  221  (1878). 
Whether  a  party  resides  within  tin  Iimit3 
embraced  by  an  ordinance  is  a  question 
of  fact.  Board  v.  Pooley,  11  La.  An. 
743  ;  Police  Jury  v.  Villaviabo,  12  La. 
An.  788  ;  New  Orleans  v.  Boudro,  14  La, 
An.  3U3. 


§357 


ORDINANCES  :    NATURE   OF   LICENSE   POWER. 


423 


§  356  (290).  Notice.  —  All  persons  upon  whom  ordinances  are 
binding  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  them.1  Lut  where  a  party  is 
liable  to  a  penalty  if  he  does  not  do  a  given  act  upon  notice,  a  news- 
paper notice  is  not  sufficient,  unless  that  mode  is  pointed  out  by  the 
law,  or  general  power  is  given  to  the  corporation  embracing  within 
it  the  authority  to  prescribe  the  kind  and  manner  of  notice.2 


Ordinances  relating  to  the  Licensing,  Regulation,  and  Taxing  of 
Amusements  and  Occupations,  including  the  Sale  of  Intoxicating 
Liquors. 

§  357  (291).  Nature  of  License  Power.  —  Charters  not  unfre- 
quently  confer  upon  the  corporation  the  power  "  to  license  and 
regulate  "  or  to  "  license,  regulate,  and  tax  "  certain  avocations  and 
employments,  and  to  "  tax  and  restrain  "  or  "  prohibit  "  exhibitions, 
shows,  places  of  amusement,  and  the  like ;  and  unless  there  is  some 
specific  limitation  on  the  authority  of  the  legislature  in  this  respect, 
such  provisions  are  constitutional.3    Where,  by  the  charter  of  a  city, 


1  Palmyra  v.  Morton  (sidewalk  ordi- 
nance), 25  Mo.  593  (I860)  ;  Buffalo  v. 
Webster,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  99  (1833). 
See  Peed  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  Rep.  481; 
City  of  London  v.  Vanacre,  12  Mod.  270, 
272  ;  Glover  on  Corp.  207,  290  ;  Knox- 
ville  v.  King,  7  Lea  (Tenn.),  441  (citing 
text);  Faribault  v.  Wilson,  34  Minn.  254 
(as  all  persons  within  the  city  limits  are 
bound  to  take  notice  of  the  ordinances,  a 
complaint  setting  forth  a  violation  of  an 
ordinance  need  not  recite  it,  —  a  reference 
to  its  number  is  sufficient).  Infra,  sec. 
413.  Where  a  city  having  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  storage  of  fertilizers  within 
the  corporate  limits,  allowed,  without  ob- 
jection or  warning,  a  railroad  company  to 
erect  expensive  storehouses  to  accommo- 
date its  traffic  in  such  merchandise,  it 
was  held  that  the  city  was  estopped  from 
asserting  its  ordinance  against  the  com- 
pany ;  and  that  the  railroad,  being  bound 
to  deliver  its  freight  in  the  city,  was  not 
included  in  the  terms  of  the  ordinance. 
Mayor  of  Athens  v.  Georgia  R.  R.,  72  Ga. 
800.  As  to  estoppel  see  also  Atlanta  v. 
Gate  City  Gas-Light  Co.,  71  Ga.  106  ;  post, 
sees.  606,  803. 

-  Keckely  v.   Commissioners  of  Roads, 
4McCord  (S.  C),  257  (1828). 

3  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Clutch,    6   Iowa, 
546  (1858).     In  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala. 


137  (1841),  it  was  determined  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
State  which  would  invalidate  a  grant  of 
power  to  a  municipal  corporation  "  to 
license  bakers,  and  regulate  the  weight  and 
price  of  bread,  and  to  prohibit  the  baking, 
for  sale,  except  by  those  licensed."  Such 
a  grant  of  power  does  not  unlawfully  in- 
terfere with  the  right  of  citizens  to  pur- 
sue their  lawful  occupations.  In  the  City 
of  Boston  v.  Schaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  415 
(1830),  it  was  decided  that  it  is  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  to  grant  a  city  or 
town  power  to  require  the  payment  of 
money  as  the  condition  of  exercising  par- 
ticular employments,  e.  g.  giving  theatri- 
cal or  other  exhibitions.  This  is  not  in 
the  nature  of  a  tax,  which  must  be  gen- 
eral, but  of  an  excise  on  special  vocations. 
Approved,  Cincinnati  v.  Bryson,  15  Ohio 
625  ;  New  Orleans  v.  Turpin  (auctioneers). 
13  La.  An.  56  (1S58)  ;  Municipality  17. 
Dubois  (livery-stable  keeper),  10  La.  An. 
56  ;  Charity  Hospital  v.  Stickney,  2  La. 
An.  550  ;  Slaughter  v.  Commonwealth,  13 
Graft.  (Va.)  767;  Carroll  v.  Tuskaloosa, 
12  Ala.  173  ;  Merriam  v.  New  Orleans,  14 
La.  An.  318  ;  Wynne  v.  Wright,  1  Dev.  & 
&  B.  (N.  C)  "Law,  19;  Savannah  r. 
Hartridge,  8  Ga.  23  ;  Cincinnati  v.  Bry- 
son, 15  Ohio,  625,  dissenting  opinion  or 
Burchard,  J. ;  Collins  v.  Louisville,  2  B. 


124 


MUNICIPAL    COItl'OIlATIONS. 


§357 


the  power  to  license  a  particular  occupation  within  its  limits  is  given 
to  the  common  council,  such  power  involves  the  necessity  of  deter- 
mining with  reasonable  certainty  both  the  extent  and  duration  of 
the  license  and  the  sum  to  be  paid  therefor;  and  must  be  exercised 
by  the  common  council,  and  cannot  be  delegated  by  it,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  to  any  person  or  authority.1  Concerning  useful  trades  and 
employments,  a  distinction  is  to  be  observed  between  the  power  to 
"license"  and  the  power  to  "tax."  In  such  cases  the  former  right, 
unless  such  appears  to  have  been  the  legislative  intent,  does  not 
give  the  authority  to  prohibit,  or  to  use  the  license  as  a  mode  of 
taxation  with  a  view  to  revenue,  but  a  reasonable  fee  for  the  license 
and  the   labor  attending  its  issue  may  be  charged.2      Respecting 


Mon.  (Ky.)  134;  The  Germania  v.  State,  7 
Mil.  1;  Lucas  v.  Lott.  Comm'rs,  11  Gill  & 
Johns.  (Md.)  506  ;  Sears  v.  West,  1  Murph. 
(N.  C.)  --".'1  ;  People  v.  Thurber,  13  111. 
557;  Savannah  v.  Charlton,  36  Ga.  460 
(1867).  Forbidding  driving  of  carts  with- 
ase.  \V1><>  are  cartmen  '  Brooklj  n 
v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  591  (1874);  post,  sees. 
;  1. 1  i  St.  Louis  v.  Trustees,  102 
til.  189  ;  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  v.  East  St. 
I  102   [11.  560  (the   Illinois  Constitu- 

tion of  1870  did   not  affect  the  power  of 
islature  in  regard  to  conferring  the 
right  upon  cities  to  require  licenses);  State 
v.  Hayne,  -1  S.  C.  403  ;  Suae  v.  Columbia, 

1  :  Charleston  v.  Oliver,  16  S.  C. 
?7  ;  United  States  Distilling  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 112  111.  19  (brewers  and  distillers); 
Information  against  Oliver,  21  S.  C.  318  : 
Van  Hook  v.  Selma,  70  Ala.  361  ;  People 
v.  Mulholland,  82  N.  V.  324  (delivering 
milk  from  vehicles).  A  power  to  "levy  a 
lisi  retionary  and  not  man- 
datory. [Jnder  it  a  city  may  abstain  from 
taxing  ation.      New  Orleans  v. 

Mule,   38   La.  An.   S26  ;  see   chapter  on 
.  p  >st :  ante,  sec.  115  ;  Kniper  v. 
Louisville,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  599. 

The    cases    show    some    diversity    of 
opinion    is  to  the  right  to  tax  particular 

nents  as  distinguished   from  prop- 
erty :  bul  the  correel  view,  it  is  submitted, 
is  tin's:    Unless    specially   restrained    by 
1     n  titution,  the  legislature  may  pro- 
vide for  the  taxing  of  any  occupation  or 

•ill   may  confer  tins  power  upon 
municipal  corporations.      Bui  such  taxes 

to  be  inequitable,  and  the  principle 

from  danger  of  greal  abuse.    I  [ence 


ordinances  of  this  character  ought  not  to 
be  sustained,  unless  the  authority  be  ex- 
pressly  or  otherwise  unequivocally  con- 
ferred.  Newton  v.  Atchison,  31  Kan.  l.M 
(quoting  the  foregoing  with  approval).  In 
this  case  a  license  tax  upon  merchants, 
graduated  according  to  their  average  stock 
on  hand,  was  held  valid,  and  not  in  any 
illegal  sense  double  taxation.  In  Tulloss 
r.  Sedan,  31  Kan.  165,  the  same  court 
held  alicense  tax  upon  druggists,  which  was 
much  larger  for  those  not  having  permits 
to  sell  Liquors  than  for  those  having  such 
permits,  was  not  illegal  or  void. 

1  Darling  v.  St.  Paul,  19  Minn.  389 
(1872).  Compare  this  ease,  however,  with 
Decorah  v.  Dunstan,  38  Iowa,  96  (1874), 
in  which  it  was  held  that  where  an  incor- 
porated town  had  the  power  to  regulate 
and  license  auction  sales,  kc,  ami  to  pass 
all  ordinances  necessary  to  exercise  that 
power,  an  ordinance  authorizing  the  mayor 
to  lix  the  amount  of  the  license  within  a 
specified  sum  was  held  not  to  he  invalid. 
The  general  doctrine  on  the  subject  of  the 
delegation  of  municipal  powers  is  elsewhere 
discussed  ;  and  the  line  drawn  between 
duties  of  a  ministerial  and  executive  char- 
acter which  may  be  delegated,  and  legisla- 
tive or  discretionary  powers  which  may 
doI  be  delegated.  An  ordinance  which 
required  the  recommendation  of  twelve  cit- 
izens and  taxpayers  in  the  block  where  it 
was  proposed  to  establish  a  laundry,  be- 
fore  the  authorities  should  issue  a  license 
therefor,  held  illegal.  In  re  Quong  Woo, 
13  Fed.  Rep.  229;  supra,  sec.  319,  and 
note.    Ante,  sec.  96  ;  post,  sees.  716,  780. 

2  State  v.  Bean,  91  N.  C.  554  (quoting 


§357 


ORDINANCES  :    NATURE   OP   LICENSE   POWER. 


425 


amusements,  exhibitions,  &c,  the  authority  of  the  corporation  under 
the  power  to  liceuse  has  been  regarded  as  greater  than  when  the 
same  word  is  employed  as  to  trades  and  occupations.1     Words  of 


text,  and  holding  that  a  power  to  license 
the  carrying  on  of  trades,  &c,  is  a,  police 
power,  and  does  not  confer  power  to  use  the 
license  as  a  mode  of  raising  revenue).  See 
also  Ex  parte  Mirande,  73  Cal.  365  ; 
O'Maley  v.  Freeport,  96  Pa.  St.  24  ;  Van- 
sant  v.  Harlem  Stage  Co.,  59  Md.  330; 
Miihlenbrinck  v.  Commissioners,  42  N. 
J.  L.  364.  Compare  Flanagan  v.  Plain- 
field,  44  N.  J.  L.  118;  Clark  v.  New 
Brunswick,  43  N.  J.  L.  175. 

A  general  incorporation  act  conferring 
power  to  license  certain  enumerated  occu- 
pations is  to  be  construed  as  if  inhibiting 
the  licensing  of  those  not  enumerated. 
Cairo  v.  Bross,  101  111.  475.  Where  a 
charter  provided  that  licenses  should  be 
proportioned  to  the  amount  of  business,  an 
ordinance  varying  the  amount  according 
to  the  number  of  persons  employed  was 
held  lawful.  Ex  parte  Sisto  Li  Protti, 
68  Cal.  635.  One  who  transacts  business 
both  as  a  wholesale  and  retail  merchant 
may  be  required  to  take  out  licenses  in 
each  capacity.  New  Orleans  v.  Koen,  38 
La.  An.  328. 

1  Ash  v.  People,  11  Mich.  347  ;  ante, 
sec.  115  ;  Youngblood  v.  Sexton  (distinc- 
tion between  license  and  taxation),  32 
Mich.  406  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  654; 
St.  Paul  v.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248  (1878). 
Power  "  to  exact  license  money"  and  "  to 
regulate  "  the  sale  of  liquors  held  not  to 
confer  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  thereof. 
Sweet  v.  Wabash,  41  Ind.  7  (1872);  Free- 
holders v.  Barber,  2  Halst.  (N.  J.)  64;  Car- 
roll v.  Tuskaloosa,  12  Ala.  (s.  s.)  173; 
Greensboro  v.  Mullins,  13  Ala.  (n.  s.) 
341;  Lucas  v.  Lott.  Comm'rs,  11  Gill  & 
Johns.  (Md.)  506;  City  Council  v.  Ahrens, 

4  Strob.  (S.  C.)  241  ;  Kip  v.  Paterson,  2 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298  ;  Portland  v.  O'Neill, 

1  Oreg.  218 ;  Bennett  v.  Birmingham, 
31  Pa.  St.  15  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder, 

2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562;  Day  v.  Green,  4 
Cush.  (Ma_3.)  433  ;  Dunham  v.  Rochester, 

5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462  ;  Lawrenceburg  v. 
Wuest,  16  Ind.  337  ;  Cheny  v.  Shelby- 
ville,  19  Ind.  84  ;  Leavenworth  v.  Booth 
(construing  words  "license  tax  "),  15  Kan. 


627  (1875);  Welch  v.  Hotchkiss  (building 
license  fee  of  fifty  cents  sustained),  39 
Conn.  140  (1872);  s.  C.  12  Am.  Rep.  383; 
post,  sec.  405,  note.  St.  Paul  v.  Treager, 
25  Minn.  248,  approving  text  ;  Bennett  v. 
People,  30  III.  389;  East  St.  Louis  v. 
Wehrung,  46  111.  392  ;  Savannah  v.  (  harl- 
ton,  36  Ga.  460  ;  Darling  v.  St.  Paul,  19 
Minn.  389  (1872),  citing  text ;  post,  chap. 
xix. 

Power  "to  regulate  the  sale  of  meat," 
&c,  held  to  authorize  a  city  to  require 
that  a  license  shall  be  obtained  for  the 
selling  of  meat,  &c.  Kinsley  v.  Chicago, 
124  111.  359  (1888). 

Distinction  between  taxation  and  jwlice 
regulation  well  stated  by  Dcpue,  J.,  in 
State  v.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L.  280  (1869); 
Commonwealth  v.  Markham,  7  Bush 
(Ky.),  486  (1870);  State  v.  Cassidy,  22 
Minn.  312  ;  post,  sec.  768  ;  see,  also,  Kip 
v.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298  ;  Mayor 
v.  Avenue  Railroad  Company,  32  N.  Y. 
261  ;  33  N.  Y.  42,  distinguished  and 
questioned  in  Frankford  and  Phila.  P. 
R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  58  Pa.  St.  119 
(1868);  Johnson  v.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa. 
St.  445  ;  Freeholders  v.  Barber,  2  Halst. 
(N.  J.)  64.  Difference  between  tax  and  a 
license  to  exercise  particular  callings  upon 
making  pecuniary  compensation  for  the 
privilege.  People  v.  Thurber,  13  111.  557; 
Mount  Camel  v.  Wabash  Co.,  50  111.  69; 
Kniper  v.  Louisville,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  599. 
Smith  v.  City  of  Madison,  7  Ind.  86 
(1855),  so  far  as  it  holds  that  authority 
"to  suppress  and  restrain"  bowling  sa- 
loons confers  the  power  to  license  and  tax 
them,  cannot,  as  it  seems  to  us,  be  sus- 
tained. Mayor,  &c.  v.  Beasley,  1  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  240,  holds  that  power  in  a  charter 
to  regulate  and  restrain  tippling-houses 
did  not  confer  the  power  to  tax  them. 
The  word  "  restrain"  (Emporia  r.  Volmer, 
12  Kan.  622,  630  (1874)  held  not  to  bo 
synonymous  with  the  word  "  prohibit  "  or 
"suppress."  Approving  text.  Frank,  In 
re,  52  Cal.  606  ;  Hudson,  &c.  v.  Hoboken, 
41  N.  J.  L.  71.  A  power  "to  regulate" 
victualling    houses    held   to    include    the 


126 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


character,  however,  do  not  always  have  exactly  the  same 
meaning,  and  the  intention  of  the  legislature  in  using  them  must 
often  be  gathered  from  the  whole  charter  and  the  general  Legislation 
of  the  Suite  respecting  the  subject-matter. 

292  .  Same  subject.  Regulation  of  Occupations.  —  III 
harmony  with  the  foregoing  princi]  Les,  it  has  been  held  that,  under 
authority  "to  license  and  regulate "  draymen,  &c,  a  municipal  cor- 
poration  may,  by  ordinance,  require  a  license  to  be  first  taken  out, 
and  charge  a  reasonable  sum  for  issuing  the  same  and  keeping  the 
necessary  record,  but  cannot,  by  virtue  of  this  authority,  without  more, 
levy  a  tax  upon  the  occupation  itself;  and,  under  the  power  to  regu- 
late, it  may  make  proper  police  regulations  as  to  the  mode  in  which 
the  employment  shall  be  exercised.1 


power  to  licensi  them.  St.  Johnsbury  v. 
Thompson,  59  Vt.  300. 

One  who  sella  his  own  goods  ai  public 
auction,  as  well  as  one  who  sells  another's, 
is  an  ■  r,"  allowing  the  common 

council  of  any  municipality  to  require  a 
i  loshen  v.  Kern,  68  I  u«  1 .  468. 
The  power  thus  conferred  on  a  common 
council  is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regula- 
tion,    lb. 

1  Cincinnati  v.  Bryson,  15   Ohio,   6525 
(1846).     As  to  correctness  of  application 
of  the  principle  of  law  to  the  farts,  ijucere. 
1        ult,    in    connection    with    the    above 
I  I  incinnati,   1  Ohio  St.  268 

(1853)  :  with  which  compare  Cincinnati  v. 
Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  261  ;  and  sec  cases 
cited  supra,  *<■>•.  357  ;  Mays  v.  Cincinnati, 
supra,  cited  by  Cornell,  J.,  in  St.  Paul 
v.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248  (1878)  ;  The 
1.  License  Case,  22  Fed.  Rep.  701  ; 

M         t  v.  State,    15  Ohio  St.   63;  Foil 
h   v.  Avers,  43  Ark.   82;  Russellvillo 
V.  White,    11    Ark.   485.     An  act  to  reg- 
ulate  and    license   the    keeping    of    ■ 

led  as  an  exercise  of  the  police, 
and  not  the  taxing  power  of  the-  State, 
and  not  to  be  within  the  constitutional 
provision  requiring  uniformity  of  taxation. 
Carte,  o.  Dow,  16  Wis.  298  (1862);  Ten- 
ney  v.  ken/,  //,.  566.  In  the  case  last 
cited,  Pa  e,  J.,  obsi  rves  :  "  We  cannoi 
the  position  that,  if  the  Bum  re- 
quired for  a  license  exceeds  the  expense  of 
issuing  i»,  the  act  transcends  the  licens- 
ing power,  and  imposes  a  tax.     By  such  a 


theory  the  police  power  would  be  shorn 
of  all  efficiency.  .  .  .  We  have  no  doubt, 
therefore,  that  the  legislature  may,  in 
regulating  any  matter  that  is  a  proper 
subject  of  the  police  power,  impose  such 
.sums  for  licenses  as  will  operate  as  partial 
restrictions  upon  the  business,  or  upon 
the  keeping  of  the  particular  kinds  of 
property  regulated."  Sec,  also,  Fire  De- 
partment v.  Hclfenstein,  16  Wis.  136. 
Special  constitutional  provisions  in  refer- 
ence to  taxation  have  been  held  to  have 
no  reference  to  license  taxes.  Leaven- 
worth v.  Booth,  15  Kan.  627,  635,  636 
(1875);  Anderson  v.  Kerns  Drain.  Co.,  14 
Ind.  201;  Bright  v.  McCullough,  27  Ind. 
223,  232;  People  v.  Coleman,  4  Cal.  46. 

The  law  recognizes  property  in  dogs, 
and  a  city  ordinance  requiring  the  owner 
of  such  property  to  obtain  a  license  to  keep 
the  same,  and  subjecting  him  to  arrest, 
fine  and  imprisonment,  for  not  procuring 
such  license,  is  invalid.  Washington  v. 
Meigs,  1  McArthur,  5:5;  Harrington  v. 
Miles,  11  Kan.  480.  See,  on  this  general 
subject,  State  v.  Cyniis,  26  Ohio  St.  400; 
Ward  v.  State,  48  Ala.  161;  post,  sec.  768; 
ante,  sec.   141. 

The  legislature  may,  for  police  pur- 
poses, prescribe  the  limits  of  municipal 
bodies,  enlarging  or  contracting  them  at 
pleasure,  and  give  them  power  to  pass  or-. 
dinancea  to  prevent  nuisances  beyond  their 
boundaries.  Tims  a  packing  house  which 
has  been  licensed  by  the  town  where  it  is 
located,  but  within  one  mile  of  the  corpo- 


§  359 


ORDINANCES  :    SCOPE   OF   LICENSE   POWER. 


427 


§3.39  (293).  Same  subject.  —  So  authority  to  a  city  to  adopt 
rules  and  orders  "  for  the  due  regulation  of  omnibuses,  stages,  &c," 
was  held  not  to  authorize  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  requiring  the 
payment  of  a  tax  or  duty  on  each  carriage  licensed,  varying  from  one 
to  twenty  dollars,  according  to  the  different  kinds  of  carriages,  and 
the  stands  occupied.  This  was  regarded  as  a  direct  tax  upon  the 
vehicle  used,  or  its  owner,  and  not  necessary  to  secure  the  objects  of 
the  above  grant  of  power  to  the  city.1     So  where,  under  an  act 


rate  limits  of  a  city,  does  not  exempt  the 
same  from  an  ordinance  of  that  city  re- 
quiting it  to  be  licensed  by  that  munici- 
pality. The  person  using  the  establishment 
is  liable  to  be  charged  a  license  by  both 
the  town  and  city.  Chicago  Packing  Co. 
v.  Chicago,  88  111.  221. 

In  Ash  v.  People,  11  Mich.  347  (1863), 
it  appeared  that,  by  its  charter,  authority 
was  given  to  a  city  to  erect,  establish, 
and  regulate  markets  and  market-places, 
and  to  license  and  regulate  butchers  and 
shop-keepers  at  any  other  place  in  the 
city,  for  the  sale  of  meats,  &c,  and  to  au- 
thorize the  mayor  to  grant  such  licenses 
and  to  prescribe  the  sum  of  money  to  be 
paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  therefor. 
An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  of 
meat-shops  outside  of  the  public  markets 
without  a  license,  and  requiring  the  pay- 
ment of  a  license  fee  of  five  dollars,  was 
sustained,  although  the  amount  exceeded 
the  expense  of  making  and  registering 
the  license.  The  court  denied  that  the 
fee  demanded  was  a  tax,  and  regarded  it 
as  but  a  reasonable  compensation  for  the 
additional  expense  of  municipal  supervi- 
sion over  the  business  at  the  place  licensed. 

A  ferry  license  fee  of  fifty  dollars  was 
held  not  to  be  a  tax,  within  the  meaning 
of  the  terra,  as  used  in  the  Constitution  of 
Michigan  and  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Detroit.  Chilvers  v.  People,  11  Mich.  43 
(1862);  ante,  sec.  115.  "The  power  to  li- 
cense and  regulate  carries  with  it  the  right 
to  require  the  payment  of  a  [reasonable] 
sum  in  consideration  of  the  license." 
Per  Wriqhti  J.,  in  State  t*.  Herod,  29  Iowa, 
123  (1870).  Whenever  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  authorized  to  make  by-laws 
relative  to  a  given  subject,  and  to  require 
of  those  who  desire  to  do  any  act  or  trans- 
act any  business  pertaining  thereto  to 
obtain  a  license   therefor,    the  reasouable 


cost  of  granting  such  licenses  may  be 
properly  charged  to  the  persons  procur- 
ing them,  although  the  power  to  do  so  is 
not  expressly  given  in  the  charter.  Welch 
v.  Hotchkiss,  39  Conn.  140  (1872).  Under 
a  power  to  "license,  tax,  regulate,  sup- 
press, and  prohibit  hawkers,  peddlers, 
pawnbrokers,"  &c,  a  city  may  grant  li- 
censes imposing  such  conditions  and  bur- 
dens as  it  sees  fit.  Launder  v.  Chicago, 
111  111.  291.  In  Illinois  the  legislature  is 
not  restricted  to  immoral  or  injurious 
occupations  in  authorizing  a  city  to  impose 
license  fees,  nor  is  a  power  to  suppress  any 
business  necessary  in  order  to  warrant  the 
exercise  of  a  power  to  license.  Brauu  v. 
Chicago,  110  111.  187;  post,  sees.  405,  note, 
768. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)  562,  572  (1S4S);  distinguished 
from  Boston  v.  Schaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
415,  as  to  licenses  for  theatrical  exhibi- 
tions. Power  to  the  city  council  of  Charles- 
ton to  make,  inter  alia,  "  such  ordinances 
respecting  streets,  carriages,  wagons,  carts, 
drays,  &c. ,  as  to  them  shall  seem  expedi- 
ent and  neaessary,"  was  held  to  authorize 
an  ordinance  requiring  all  persons  who 
drive  for  hire  any  cart,  dray,  wagon,  or 
omnibus,  within  the  city,  to  take  out  a 
license,  and  to  require  the  vehicle  to  be 
numbered,  or  on  failure  to  do  so  to  pay  a 
fine.  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich 
(S.  C.)  Law,  364  (1845).  A  street- 
sprinkling  cart  is  a  "public  vehicle"  on 
which  a  license  tax  is  properly  imposed. 
St.  Louis  v.  Woodruff,  4  Mo.  App.  169. 
A  similar  ordinance,  imposing  annual 
charge  on  each  car  of  a  street-railway 
company,  was  sustained  as  a  police  regu- 
lation. Frankford  Railway  Company  v. 
Philadelphia,  58  Pa.  St.  119  (1868);  s.  p. 
Johnson  v.  Philadelphia,  69  Pa.  St.  445; 
and  Allerton  v.  Chicago,  6  Fed.  Rep.  555. 


128 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOBATIONS. 


8  360 


authorizing  the  trustees  of  a  village  corporation  to  make  ordinances 
"  in  relation  to  hucksters,  and  for  the  good  government  of  the  vil- 
I  I  eld  that  an  ordinance  was  unauthorized  which  required 

that   hucksters  should,  before  exercising  their  employment,  take  a 

and  be  taxed  a  .sum  varying  from  live  to  thirty  dollars.1 


j:  360    (294).    Same  subject. —  On  the  other  hand,  the  power  t" 
"  1:  ulate,  and   restrain  amusements,"  it  was  admitted   or 

taken  for  granted,  would  authorize  an  ordinance  taxing,  or  requiring 
exhibitors  to  pay  a  specific  sum  for  the  privilege,  this  being  con- 
sidered as  a  means  oi  regulating  and  restraining  them.2  So  a  grant 
of  power  to  a  city  or  town  to  license  exhibitions  "on  such  terms 


A  municipal  corporation  may  under  its 
ordinary  powers  of  local  government  pass 
ordinanci  s  requiring  a  street-railway  com- 
pany incorporated  by  legislature,  ami 
having  its  rails  down  ami  in  use  through 
the  streets  under  legislative  sanction,  to 
make  its  tracks  conform  to  the  grade, 
to  keep  in  repair  the  space  between  the 

tnd  to  remove  snow  and  the  like. 
But  it  has  no  powerto  require  such  a  com- 
pany so  organized  to  take  out  a  license 
and  pay  license  fee  as  a  means  of  taxa- 
tion, unless  power  is  given  to  resort  to 
and  license  fees  for  revenue  pur- 
poses. A  provision  in  the  charter,  grant- 
in,'  power  "to  license  and  regulate,"  does 
not  authorize  the  exaction  of  license  fees 
for  revenue  purposes.  Power  to  license 
when  specially  given  in  a  charter  is  never- 
theless a  police  power.  The  exaction  of 
license  fees  for  revenue  purposes  is  the 
exercise  of    the  power  of    taxation.     The 

tion  between  the  power  to  license 
a-  a  police  regulation  and  the  same  power 
as  a  revenue  measure  is  of  the  utmost 
importance,  [f  granted  with  a  view  to 
revenue,  the  amount  of  tax,  if  not  limited 
by  charter,  is  in  the  discretion  and  judg- 
ment of  the  authorities;  if  given  as  a  police 
power,  it  must  he  exercised  as  a  means  of 
regulation  only,  and  cannot  he  used  as  a 
source  of  revenue.    North  Hudson  Railway 

l!  w>]  -  n,  11  V  .1.  L.  71  ;  Mayor  v. 
Avenue  Railroad  Co.,  82  N.  V.  261.  Power 
to    license,    tax,    and   regulate    horse    r.iil- 

hackney  carriages,   &c.,  dues   not 

extend    tO  taxation  of  jinri',     , ■./'/,'.  v  USed 

by  a  merchant  or  manufacturer.  St. 
Louis  v.  Grove,  46  Mo.  571  (1870).     Nor 


does  power  to  license,  tax,  and  regulate 
authorize  the  grant  of  an  exclusive  right 
to  run  omnibuses  within  the  limits  of  the 
city.  Logan  v.  Pyne,  43  Iowa,  524  (1S76); 
Snyder  c.  North  Lawrence  (hacknej  coach, 
what  is),  8  Kan.  82  (1871). 

1  Dunham  v.  Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  V  ) 
462,  466  (1826).  Sec  further,  Index.  Mar. 
lcets. 

Under  a  charter  authorizing  the  license 
of  wagons,  &c,  and  requiring  owners  and 
keepers  of  wagons,  &c.,  using  them  in  the 
city,  to  take  out  a  license,  all  hucksters, 
gardeners,  &c,  who  are  not  residents  and 
taxpayers  of  other  towns,  may  be  com- 
pelled to  take  out  a  license.  Frommer  v. 
Richmond,  31  Gratt.  646.  A  city  has  no 
right  to  require  that  persons  owning  vehi- 
cles for  hire  within  its  limits  and  who 
have  paid  their  city  licenses  shall  obtain 
from  the  city,  at  a  certain  fixed  and  ex- 
orbitant price,  the  plates  which  an  ordi- 
nance of  the  city  has  prescribed  for  the 
convenient  identification  of  the  vehicles. 
Such  an  exaction  is  another  license  in 
disguise,  and  therefore  unconstitutional. 
Walker  V.  New  Orleans,  31  La.  An.  828. 

2  Hodges  v.  Mayor,  2  Humph.  (Tetin.) 
61.  Sec  also,  Carter  v.  Dow,  16  Wis. 
299;  Tenncy  v.  Lenz,  lb.  566.  Speaking 
of  this  subject,  Mr.  Justice  Cooley  ex- 
presses it  as  his  opinion  that  when-  the 
right  to  impose  license  fees  to  operate  as 
a  restriction  upon  the  business  or  thing 
licensed  can  be  fairly  deduced  from  the 
taxing  power  conferred  upon  the  corpora- 
tion, it  should  be  done,  rather  than  to 
derive  the  right  solely  from  the  power  to 
regulate.     Const.  I.im.  202,  note. 


§  362 


ORDINANCES  :    MONOPOLIES    INVALID. 


429 


and  conditions  as  to  it  may  seem  just  and  reasonable,"  authorizes  it 
to  exact  money  for  the  license;  it  is  not  confined  to  regulating  time 
and  place,  establishing  police  regulations,  &C.1 

§361  (295).  Right  must  be  plainly  conferred.  —  Even  the  riyht 
to  license  mud  be  plainly  conferred,  or  it  will  not  be  held  to  exist. 
Thus,  power  to  make  "  by-laws  relative  to  hucksters,  grocers,  aud 
victualling  shops"  does  not  authorize  the  corporation  to  exact  a 
license  from  persons  carrying  on  such  business.  Nor  does  the  gen- 
eral power  to  pass  prudential  by-laws,  not  inconsistent  with  the 
laws  of  the  State,  confer  the  authority  to  demand  a  license.2 

§  362  (296).  Monopolies  invalid. —  The  power  to  license  and 
regulate  a  lawful  and  necessary  business  will  not  give  the  corpora- 
tion the  power  to  make  contracts  which  create  or  tend  to  create  a 
monopoly? 

1  Boston  v.  Schaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
415  (1830);  distinguished  from  Common- 
wealth v.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562, 
572  (1S4S). 

2  Dunham  v.  Rochester,  5  Cowen, 
(N.  Y. )  462  (1826) ;  Commonwealth  v.  Stod- 
der, 2  Cush.  (Mass)  562  (1848)  ;  Mays  v. 
Cincinnati,  1  Ohio  St.  268  (1853)  ;  Gale 
v.  Kalamazoo  (market-house  contract),  23 
Mich.  344  (1871)  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  80  ; 
St.  Paul  v.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248  (1878); 
St.  Paul  v.  Stoltz,  33  Minn.  233  (ordi- 
nance requiring  license  to  peddlers  held 
void).  By-laws  requiring  a  license,  which 
may  be  so  heavy  as  to  amount  to  a  pro- 
hibition, were  justly  considered  to  be  in 
restraint  of  trade,  which  the  general  law 
favors,  and  in  this  case  were  adjudged 
void,  "both  for  want  of  jurisdiction  "  in 
the  corporation  to  pass  them,  and  for  want 
of  "conformity  to  the  general  law."  1 
Ohio  St.  268.  Where  the  charter  gave 
the  corporation  the  power  "to  license 
bakers,  and  to  prohibit  sales  of  bread  ex- 
cept by  those  licensed,"  the  court  doubted 
whether  under  this,  aside  from  the  taxing 
power  of  the  corporation,  an  ordinance 
could  be  supported  which  required  twenty 
dollars  to  be  paid  by  the  baker  for  a  license, 
although  it  admitted  that  the  corporation 
could  require  a  fee  for  issuing  and  register- 
ing the  license.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Mobile  v. 
Yuille,  3  Ala.  137  (1841).  Statutory  con- 
ditions precedent  must  be  complied  with 


to  make  a  license  valid  ;  and  licenses  are 
generally  considered  personal,  ceasing  with 
the  life  of  the  license,  and  not  transfera- 
ble without  consent.  Munsell  v.  Temple 
(grocery  license),  3  Gilm.  (8  111.)  96; 
Lewis  v.  United  States,  Morris  (Iowa), 
199;  Lombard  v.  Cheever  (ferry  license), 
lb.  473  ;  Brunetti  v.  New  Orleans,  9  La. 
430.  As  to  power  to  revoke  licenses. 
Towns  v.  Tallahassee,  11  Fla.  130  (1866). 
"Junk  shops,"  defined  by  O'Neall,  C.  J., 
"to  be  a  place  where  odds  and  ends  are 
purchased  or  sold,"  and  cities  are  often 
empowered  to  exact  a  license  from  keepers 
thereof.  City  Council  v.  Goldsmith,  12 
Rich.  (S.  C)  Law,  470  (1860).  "Shows" 
defined  :  McKee  v.  Town  Council,  Rice 
(S.  C. )  Law,  24.  Licensed  auctioneer 
held  not  liable  to  the  payment  of  a  pawn- 
broker's license,  under  a  city  ordinance. 
Hunt  v.  Philadelphia,  35  Pa.  St.  277. 

3  Chicago  v.  Rumpff,  45  111.  90  (1867). 
In  this  case,  under  a  power  granted  to  the 
city,  in  its  charter,  to  regulate  and  license 
the  slaughtering  of  animals  within  the 
corporate  limits,  the  common  council 
passed  an  ordinance,  whereby  a  particu- 
lar building  was  designated  for  the  slaugh- 
tering of  all  animals  intended  for  sale  or 
consumption  in  the  city,  the  owners  of 
which  were  granted  the  exclusive  right,  for 
a  specified  period,  to  have  all  such  ani- 
mals slaughtered  at  their  establishment, 
they   to   be  paid  a  specific  sum   for   the 


I 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


Intoxicating    Liquors. — The    authority    of   munici- 

pahties  to  license,  tax,  restrain,  or  prohibit  the  traffic  in  or  sale  of 


by  all  persons  exercising  it,  and 
to   have   the    option    ol    accepting    such 

.    but    which    Was    1 1 1 1 1    to    take 

ntil  they  executed  a  certain  bond 
t li.-r. -i n    required;    and   it  was  held   that 

tion   of  the   corporate    authorities 
could   nol    1"'    regarded   as   regulating  or 
licensing  the  business,   '"it  was  simply  a 
conditional  proposition,  which,  if  accepted, 
would  constitute  a  contract.     It  h 
held  that  this  contract  tended  to  create  a 
. ,  and  was  therefore  void.     And 
the  opinion  was  expressed  that,  under  the 
authority    was  conferred    simply 
to  pass  ordinances  to  locate  and  construct, 
and  to  regulate,  license,    restrain,  abate, 
or   prohibit    slaughtering    establishments 
within  the  prescribed  limits;  and  to  that 
end    the    corporate    authorities    may    so 
regulate   the    business  as   to  prohibit   its 
e  j  i  ise,    except    in   a    pari  icular    plaoe ; 
but  the  spot  so  designated  must  he  open 
to   the   enjoyment   of    all    persons  alike, 
upon  the  same  terms  and  conditions.     A 
monopoly  cannot    be   implied,   but  must 
rest  upon  cxpivss  grant.      Tuckahoe  Canal 
Co,  v.  I!  lilroad  Co.,  11  Leigh  ( Va.),  42,  per 
Tucker,   President.     A  city  charter  grant- 
ing the  city    the   right   to  "exercise  and 
enjoy  all  the  rights,  immunities,  powers, 
and  privileges  appertaining  to  a  municipal 
corporation,"   and    to    "license,    tax,   and 
liackm-y    carriages,    omnibuses," 
....  ..  doe's  not  authorize  the  city  anthori- 

l   rso/n.   tli--  sole  and 

■  right  to  run  omnibuses  in  the  city. 
Logan  '-.  I'vne.  43  Iowa,  624  (1876);  8.  C. 
22  Am.  R  ip.  261  ;  Gale  o.  Kalam 

144  (1871  |;  B.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  80,  in 
which  the  opinion  of  Cooley,  J.,  will  he 
found  to  he  highly  instructive. 

odious  to  the  law.     A  monopoly 

1"  of  any  merchandise  or 

comino  '  rained  to  om  or  to  icei 

tain  number  (11  Co.  86)  ;  and  it  has  three 

luents,  —  the    increase 

of  the  price,  the  ba  the  wares,  the 

irishment   of   other-;.     V<.     Statute 

opoliea  :    By  statute,  21  Jac.  /.  ch. 

■  I  all  commissions, 

foi    any   sale,    buying,    selling,    making, 


working,  using  of  a  thing.  &C,  arc  void. 
And  any  one  grieved,  &c,  may  have  an 
action  on  the  statute,  and  recover  treble 
damages  and  double  costs.  So  monopolies 
are  contrary  to  Magna  Charta.  2  Inst. 
63.  By  statute,  88  Edw.  III.  a  merchant 
may  freely  deal  in  all  manner  of  mi  rchan- 
di>c.  The  statute  of  21  Jac.  11.  does  not 
extend  to  letters-patent  for  inventions,  &c. 
The  first  part  of  this  section  is  simply  a 
declaration  of  the  common  law.  When- 
ever a  by-law   seeks  to  alter  a  well-settled 

and  fundamental  principle  of  the  common 
law,  or  to  establish  a  rule  interfering  with 
the  rights  of  individuals  or  the  public, 
the  power  to  do  so  must  come  from  plain 
and  direct  legislative  enactment.  . 
sees.  319,  323,  325,  3'26.  Post,  see.  3n!>, 
as  to  power  to  preserve  tie-  Public  Health, 
Safety  and  Convenience.  Legal  restraints 
in  the  form  of  regulations,  may,  however, 
he  imposed  upon  the  few  for  the  benefit 
of  the  many.  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to 
determine  when  a  by-law  is  in  restraint  of 
trade,  and  when  it  is  a  mere  regulation  of 
trade.  The  former  is  illegal,  the  latter 
legal.  The  following  have  been  held  to  be 
bad,  as  in  restraint  of  trade:  That  no 
member  should  sell  the  barrel  of  any  hand- 
gun, &c,  ready  proved,  to  any  person  of 
the  trade  not  a  member  in  London,  or 
within  four  miles  thereof.  The  Mali, 
&c.,  of  Gunmakers,  &c.,  '•.  Fell,  Willes, 
384.  No  member  should  strike  his  stamp 
or  mark  on  the  barrel  of  any  person  not  a 
member  of  the  company,  &c.  V>.  That 
every  person  not  being  already  free  of  the 
city,  occupying,  using,   or  exercising,  or 

Who  -hall    OCCUpy,  use,  or  exercise  the  ait, 

trade,  or  mystery  of  a  butcher  within  the 
said  city  or  its  liberties,  shall  take  upon 
himself  the  freedom  of  the  Company  of 
Butchers,  and  that  if  any  person  or  per- 
sons (except  such  as  are  already  free, 
&C.)  shall  use  the  trade  of  a  butcher,  not 
being  free  of  this  company,  he  shall  pay, 
\c  Harrison  v.  Godman,  1  Burr.  12. 
So  as  "to  persona  using  the  occupation  of 
music  and  dancing."  Robinson  >••  Gros- 
court,  5  M'"l.  lo  i.    That  no  person  should 

erect  any  1 th,   for  the  purpose  of  any 

show    or    public    entertainment,    in    any 


§  363 


ORDINANCES  :    INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


431 


intoxicating  liquors,  is  so  differently  conferred,  and  so  laTgely  in- 
fluenced by  tbe  general  legislation  and  policy  of  the  State  od  the 
subject,  that  the  decisions  relating  to  it  are  mostly  of  local  applica- 
tion. Sometimes  the  State  laws  are  manifestly  intended  to  repeal 
or  modify  prior  special  charter  provisions,  which  gave  the  control  of 
the  matter  to  the  local  authorities ; 1  and  at  other  times  incorporated 
places  have,  by  the  course  of  legislation,  been  excepted  from  the 
general  operation  of  the  State  laws,  and  have  been  allowed  to  license, 
regulate,  or  prohibit  the  traffic,  as  they  deemed  best.2 


public  place  within  the  borough,  without 
license  from  the  mayor,  which  license 
should  not  be  given  at  or  for  any  other 
time  than  during  the  annual  fairs,  if  three 
inhabitant  householders,  residing  within 
100  yards  of  the  place  intended  to  be 
used,  should  have  previously  memorialized 
the  mayor  to  withhold  9uch  license,  &c. 
Elwoodr.  Bnlloch,  6  Q.  B.  3S3.  So  where 
it  was  provided  that  those  only  to  whom 
licenses  were  granted  should  have  slaugh- 
ter-houses within  the  city.  Nash  v.  Me- 
Ct  cken,  In  re,  33  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  181. 
Or  that  none  but  three  persons  appointed 
by  the  city  should  sweep  for  hire  or  gain 
any  chimney  or  flue  in  the  city.  The 
Queen  v.  Johnson,  38  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
549.  Prohibiting  the  use  of  canals  on 
Sundays.  The  Calder  and  Hebble  Navi- 
gation' Co.  v.  Pilling,  14  M.  &  W.  76. 
Prohibiting  licensed  tavern-keepers  from 
having  a  light  in  their  bars.  Regina  v. 
Belmont,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  298.  Hair. 
Mimic.  Manual  (Canada),  5th  ed.  313. 
Criminal  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade 
fully  discussed.  3  Stephen,  Hist.  Criminal 
Law,  chap,  xxx.,  pp.  202-227. 

Power  of  the  legislature  to  grant  or 
authorize  the  granting  of  monopolies,  or 
exclusive  privileges,  as  affected  by  the  13th 
and  1  l'h  amendment  to  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, see  Slaughter-house  Cases,  16 
Wall.  3(5  (1872)  ;  Barthet ».  New  Orleans, 
24  Fed.  Rep.  563  ;  post,  chap,  xviii.,  as  to 
gas  companies  ;  post,  sec.  385,  note.  An 
ordinance  granting  to  a  water  company  the 
<  right  to  furnish  water  to  the  in- 
habitants held  to  be  void  as  creating  a 
monopoly.  Brenham  v.  Brenham  Water 
Co.,   67  Tex.   542. 

i  State  v.  Harris,  10  Iowa,  441  ;  Bur- 
lington r.  Kellar,  18  Iowa,  59;  Ham- 
mond v.  Haines,  25  Md.  541.     The  adop- 


tion of  a  general  law  regulating  the  sale  of 
liquors  does  not  estop  the  State  front 
granting  power  to  municipal  corporations 
to  further  regulate  the  traffic  by  requiring 
licenses  of  retail  dealers.  Wolf  v.  Lan- 
sing, 53  Mich.  367. 

2  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  586  ;  Trustees 
v.  Keeting,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.),  341;  Phillips 
v.  Tecumseh,  5  Neb.  305  (1877).  Con- 
struction of  charters  in  connection  with 
State  laws  on  the  subject.  Town  Council 
v.  Harbers,  6  Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  96; 
lb.  404  ;  State  v.  Estabrook,  6  Ala.  653  ; 
IWest  v.  Greenville,  39  Ala.  69  ;  Adams  v. 
Mayor,  29  Ga.  56  ;  Chastain  v.  Town 
Council,  29  Ga.  333  ;  Cuthbert  v.  Conley, 
32  Ga.  211  ;  State  v.  Garlock,  14  Iowa, 
444 ;  Harris  v.  Intendant,  &c.  28  Ala. 
577  ;  Piobinson  v.  Mayor,  kc.  1  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  156;  Pckin  v.  Smelzel,  21  111. 
464  ;  State  v.  Plunkett,  3  Harr.  (N.  J.)  5; 
both  held  consistent  and  able  to  stand  to- 
gether. Byers  v.  Olney,  16  111.  35  ;  Page 
v.  State,  11  Ala.  849  ;  Benefield  v.  Hines, 
13  La.  An.  420  ;  Louisville  v.  McKean,  18 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  9  ;  Deitz  v.  Central,  1  Col. 
323  (1871);  Burckholter  v.  McConnells- 
ville,  20  Ohio  St.  308  ;  Baldwin  Co.  v. 
Liquor  Dealers,  42  Ga.  325 ;  State  v.  Sher- 
man, 20  Mo.  265.  A  :/  rural  fair  author- 
izing towns  to  require  licenses  of  persons 
selling  liquor  held  to  be  constitutional. 
Moundsville  v.  Fountain,  27  W.  Va.  182. 
A  general  power  in  a  city  or  town 
charter  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors  is  sufficient  to  authorize  the 
adoption  of  an  ordinance  for  any  partial 
prohibition  deemed  advisable.  Under  a 
on  giving  the  exclusive  power  to 
v,  prohibit  in  any  manner 

they  may  see  tit,  the  sale,  &c.,  of  liquors 
within  the  said  city,  an  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting   the  sali',   &C,    in   less  quantities 


- 


MUNICIPAL   COUI'OKATIONS. 


§304 


Effect  of  General  Laws  respecting  the  Liquor  Trade. 

—  Where  there  are  general  laws  of  the  State  respecting  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  a  public  corporation,  by  virtue  of  a  general 
power  "to  make  all  by-laws  that  may  be  necessary  ti>  preserve  the 
peace,  good  order,  ami  internal  police"  therein,  is  nol  authorized  to 
pass  an  ordinance  requiring  a  corporate  license,  and  punishing  per- 
who  sell  such  liquors  without  being  thus  licensed.1 


than  five  gallons,  is  valid  and  may  lie  en- 
i.  Where  the  power  is  conferred  on 
tlir  municipalities  by  the  Legi  la1  are  it  is 
wholly  discretionary  with  the  municipality 
to  license  and  regulati ,  "!■  partially  or  en- 
tirely to  prohibit  the  traffic.  Gunnarssohn 
v.  Sterling,  '.'2  111.  569  :  Goddard  v.  Jack- 
sonville, 1.")  111.  588;  Kettering  V.Jack- 
sonville, 50  111.  3!)  ;  Tekin  c.  Smelzel,  21 
111.  464  ;  Barbaugh  r.  Monmouth,  74  111. 
371  ;  Schwnchow  W.Chicago,  68  111.  444; 
Baldwin  v.  Murphy,  82  111.  485  ;  Byers  v. 
I  I  y,  16  111.  :;;,  ;  Martin  v.  People,  88 
190.  Where  the  power  is  to  "  license, 
regilate  ami  prohibit,"  the  prohibition 
need  mil  hi  total,  hut  applies  to  any  sales 
nol  Licensed  bylaw.  Dennehy ».  Chicago, 
120  111.  627.  A  power  to  regulate  places 
where  liquors  an-  sold  held  sufficient  to  val- 
idate an  ordinance  preventing  the  employ- 
nu  nt  ../'  women  en  Hi-  m.  Bergman  v.  <  Ileve- 
land,  40  Ohio  St.  651.  A  power  "  to  license 
saloons,  taverns,  and  eating  houses"  held, 
under  the  legislal  ion  applicable  to  the  ques- 
tion, nol  to  authorize  licensing  the  sale  of 
liquors.  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Vansice,  43 
Mich.  361.  Prohibiting  by  ordinance  the 
uor  on  Sunday  is  not  a  violation 
of  the  constitutional  provision  forbidding 
the  establishment  of  any  religion  by  Law. 
Minden  r.  Silverstein,  36  La,  An.  912. 
A  /■  ."■  /•  to  n  julate  the  Liquor  traffic  con- 
fers the  power  to  confine  it  to  designated 
parts  of  a  city.  In  re  Wilson,  32  .Minn. 
1  15. 

/./'/'  held  tn u  a  tax,  in  the 

titul  ional  sense  of  the  term,  compel- 
ling uniformity  of  taxation.  East  St. 
Louis  v.  Wehrung,  46  111.  392.  Special 
provision  of  charter  construed  not  to  give 
i  to  prohibit  absolutely  the  ale  of 
liquor  in  the  town.  Bill  v.  Decatur,  22 
Ga.  203.  A  State  Law  providing  for  the 
ue  nt   of  a   specified   tax   on   Liquor 

nee  ■;,    i  .!,■■!   t.i   he  devoted    to 


towns  and  cities  in  which  the  business 
was  earned  on,  was  held  to  be  a  tax  and 
not  a  Licensing  of  the  sale,  and  not  to  be 
unconstitutional  because  unjust  or  unequal, 
nor  because  the  municipality  had  no  voice 
in  the  levy.  Youngblood  v.  Sexton,  32 
Mich.  406  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  654. 
"  Licenses  to  sell  liquors  are  not  contracts 
between  the  Slate  and  the  person  licensed, 
giving  the  latter  vested  rights,  and  par- 
taking of  the  nature  of  contracts,  but  are 
merely  temporary  permits  to  do  what 
otherwise  wotdd  be  an  offence,  issued  in 
the  exercise  of  police  powers,  and  subject 
to  the  direction  of  government,  which  may 
revoke  them  as  it  deems  tit."  /'■  r  Day, 
Ch.  J.,  in  Columbus  City  v.  Cutcomp,  (51 
Iowa,  672,  citing  Metropolitan  Hoard  of 
Excise  v.  Barrie,  34  N.  V.  t;.">7  ;  ('alder  v. 
Km  hy,  6  Cray,  597  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Brennan,  103  Mass.  70.  A  municipal 
ordinance  imposing  a  license  upon  the 
sale  of  liquor  without  prohibiting  it, 
does  not  abridge  the  right  of  a  citizen  to 
pursue  a  lawful  employment,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
In  re  Bickerstaff,  70  Cal.  35.  The 
payment  of  a  license  tax  upon  the  sale 
of  Liquor  imposed  by  a  city  does  not  ex- 
empt the  person  who  pays  it  from  lia- 
bility to  pay  a  similar  tax  imposed  by  the 
county.  In  re  Lawrence,  69  Cal.  608.  In 
Kansas  the  power  to  license  or  authorize 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  is  not 
vested  in  the  cities,  but  is  conferred  upon 
the  probate  judges.  Kansas  v.  Topeka,  31 
Kan.  452.  See  also  State  v.  Topeka,  30 
Kan.  (i")3.  A  license  tax  has  been  held 
not  to  be  a  penalty  but  a  debt,  so  far  as 
relates  to  the  application  of  the'  Statute  of 
I, imitations.  San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Hen- 
dricks, 71  Cal.  242. 

1  Commonwealth   v.  Turner,   1    Cush. 
(Mass.)  493   (1848);  Loeb  v.   Attica,   82 


§  365 


ORDINANCES  :     INTOXICATING    LIQUORS. 


433 


§  365    (299).    Power  to  license  Sale  of   Liquor   under  the   General 

Welfare  Clause.  —  In  the  absence,  however,  of  controlling  general 
legislation,  power  to  a  city  to  pass  "in  general,  every  other  by-law 
or  regulation  that  shall  appear  to  the  city  council  requisite  and  acces- 
sary for  the  security,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city,  or  for 
preserving  the  peace,  order,  and  good  government  within  the  same," 
was  held  to  authorize  an  ordinance  (and  the  same  is  constitutional) 
to  prevent  shopkeepers,  unless  licensed  by  the  city,  from  keeping 
spirituous  liquors  in  their  shops  or  in  any  adjacent  room.1 


Ind.  17")  ;  and  see  notes  to  sec.  363,  antt  ; 
post,  sec.  436.  The  limitations  on  such  a 
general  power  to  make  by-laws,  discussed 
by  Shaw,  C.  J.  As  to  text,  see  Common- 
wealth v.  Dow,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  382 
(1845).  General  welfare  clause  does  not 
authorize  a  municipal  corporation  to  pass 
an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  retail  of  in- 
toxicating liquors,  when  this  is  repug- 
nant to  the  State  laws  on  the  subject. 
Burnett,  Lire,  30  Ala.  461  (1857).  But 
under  a  different  state  of  general  legis- 
lation, see  State  v.  Clark,  8  Foster  (28 
N.  H.),  176(1854);  Heisembrittle  v.  City 
of  Charleston,  2  McMullan  (S.  C), 
233  ;  State  v.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424 
(1851);  distinguished  from  and  comment- 
ing on  the  above  cases.  State  v.  Freeman 
38  N.  H.  426,  approving  and  following 
State  v.  Clark,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  176; 
Megowan  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Met.  (Ky. ) 
3  (1859).  Where  then'  is  no  legislation 
authorizing  township  officers  incorporated 
under  general  laws  of  the  State  to  regulate 
and  license  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
or  to  exact  a  fee  for  such  license,  there  is 
no  power  in  the  board  of  trustees  either  to 
pass  an  ordinance  requiring,  or  to  grant 
a  license  for  this  purpose.  A  provision 
limiting  the  amount  that  maybe  charged 
for  liquor  licenses  by  cities  and  towns  does 
not  give  the  power.  They  have  just  such 
powers  as  the  law  has  conferred  upon  the 
board,  and  none  other.  Walter  v.  Colum- 
bia City,  61  Ind.  24  ;  Cowley  v.  Rushville, 
60  Ind.  327  ;  McFee  v.  Greenfield,  62 
Ind.  21. 

Ordinance  ultra  vires.  License  to  sell 
liquors  at  retail.  Subsequent  ordinance 
restricting  sale  invalid.  A.  obtained  a 
license  to  sell  liquors  ;  subsequently  an 
ordinance  was  passed  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  liquor  during  the  continuance  of  divine 
vol.  i.  —  28 


service  at  any  time  thereafter  to  be  held 
by  any  denomination  of  Christian  people 
within  the  corporate  limits,  providing  that 
the  prohibition  should  cover  the  entire 
appointed  time  for  divine  worship  from 
its  commencement  to  its  final  close,  and 
on  all  protracted  occasions  covering  inter- 
missions by  day  and  night  :  Held  invalid, 
as  the  element  of  time  was  not  fixed  by 
the  corporate  will,  but  left  to  a  casual  and 
incidental  control,  dependent  upon  the 
will  and  pleasure  of  the  various  denomina- 
tions of  Christian  people,  and  ignoring  all 
others.  Gilham  v.  Wells,  21  Alb.  Law 
Jour.  319  ;  64  Ga.  192  (1880). 

1  Heisembrittle  v.  City  Council,  2  Mc- 
Mullan (S.  C.)  Law,  233  (1842).  Fol- 
lowed and  affirmed.  City  Council  v.  Ah- 
rens,  4  Strob.  (S.  C.)  Law,  241  (1850). 
See  City  Council  v.  Baptist  Church  (giv- 
ing preamble  to  charter  in  question),  lb. 
306,  308.  A  town  had  exclusive  authority 
over  the  sale  of  liquors  therein,  and  it  was 
held  that  power  to  "  regulate,  restrain, 
and  suppress  shops  and  places  for  the  sale 
of  ardent  spirits  by  retail  "  amounted  to  an 
authority  to  forbid  the  sale  ;  for  if  there 
is  a  sale  it  must  be  made  in  some  shop  or 
place.  Clintonville  v.  Meeting,  4  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  341  (1847)  ;  Thomas  v.  Mt, 
Vernon,  9  Ohio,  290.  Requiring  a  license 
tax  from  the  owner  of  a  saloon  situated 
three  miles  from  the  settled  portions  of  a 
city,  though  within  its  limits,  held  un- 
lawful on  the  ground  that  the  ben 
the  parties  should  be  reciprocal,  and  in 
this  case  the  saloon  owner  reeei' 
benefits  whatever  from  the  city  govern- 
ment. Salt  Lake  City  v.  Wagner,  2 
I'tah,  400.  Construction  of  charter  pro- 
visions holding  thai  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors  might  be  declared  a  nuisance 
by  the  municipal  authorities.      Block  i: 


i.;i 


MINICIPAL    COKPORATIONS. 


§  366 


A    lorporation  whose  charter  contained  the  general  welfare  clause, 

and  also  specific  power  "  to  license  persons  to  retail  spirituous  liquors, 

and  to  prohibit  persons  from  selling  without  such  license,"  and  was, 

ems,  silent  as  to  the  amount  which  might   be  demanded  for  a 

license,  was  adjudged  competent  to  enact  an  ordinance  demanding 

i  as  a  fee  for  a  retail  license.1 

Power  by  its  charter  to  a  city  "to  tax,  or  entirely  suppress,  all 

petty  groceries,"  was  held,  in  connection  with  other  provisions   of 

charter    expressly   authorizing    certain    other   subjects   to   be 

licensed,  not  to    confer   upon  the  corporation  the    power  to  grant 

licenses  for  retailing  vinous  liquors,  and  to  demand  a  sum  of  money 

therefor.2 

Ordinances  Relating  to  Public  Offences. 

S  366    (300).    Distinction  between  Laws   and   By-Laws;      Concur- 
rent Prohibitions,  &c  —  Statute  law  and  by-laws  are  intended   to 


Jacksonville,  36  111.  30]  ;  Goddard  v. 
Same,  15  111.  588  ;  Byers  v.  Trustees,  &c, 
16  111.  35  ;  Pekin  fl.'Smelzel,  21  111.  164. 
1  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  19  Ga.  586  (1855). 
But  see  Burnett,  In  re,  30  Ala.  461,  and 
compare  that  with  Inteudant  v.  Chandler, 
399.  See,  also,  St.  Louis*.  Smith, 
2  Mo.  113;  where  there  was  charter 
power  to  "restrain  and  prohibit  tippling- 
and  the  corporation  was  held  en- 
titled to  impose  a  license  fee.  Power  to 
and  "restrain"  sale  of  liquor  in- 
cludes power  to  grant  licenses.  Mt.  Car- 
mel  v.  Wabash  County,  50  111.  69  ; 
Schweitzer  v.  Liberty,  82  Mo.  309;  Port- 
land v.  Schmidt,  13  Oreg.  17.  Where 
authority  was  conferred  upon  a  corpora- 
tion to  suppress  and  prohibii  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  drinks,  as  well  as  to  license 
the  same,  an  ordinance  which  impo  i  i  a 
penalty  for  selling  such  drinks  without 
license,  which  penalty  exceeds  thai  fixed 
by  the  general  law  of  the  Territory,  is 
reasonable.  Deitz  v.  Central,  1  I  ol.  323 
(1872). 

hould  be  no  arbitrary  discrimina- 
ing  such  lic(  uses.     Zanone  o. 

Mound  I  111.  552.     If  the   | rer 

to  fix  tl  ranted    to  the   muni  :ipal 

corporation  its  discretion  in  fixing  it  can- 
not  be  reviewed  by  the  courts.  Wolf  v. 
Lansing,  53  Mich.  367.  Courts  will  not 
presume,    as    matter   of    law,   that    the 


amount  of  a  license  tax  upon  selling 
liquor  is  unreasonable,  oppressive  or 
prohibitory.  In  re  Guerrero,  69  Cal.  88. 
Ex  parte  McNally,  73  Cal.  632. 

2  Leonard  v.  Canton,  35  Miss.  (6 
I  189  (1858).  Power  "to  prohibit 
tippling-houses,"  does  not  authorize  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  sales  of  beer  by 
brewers,  Strauss  v.  Pontiac,  40  111.  301 
(1866).  Prohibition  in  ordinance  to  sell 
liquors  without  license  held  not  to  apply 
to  sales  by  manufacturers,  but  to  retail 
dealers.     St.  Paul  v.  Trover,  3  Minn.  291. 

Under  a  law  requiring  a  majority  of 
citizens  to  petition  for  a  license  to  the 
city  council,  a  license  panted  upon  a 
petition  signed  by  a  less  number  is  void 
and  affords  no  protection.  Eureka  v. 
Davis,  21  Kan.  578  ;  and  the  mayor  is  not 
bound  to  sign  any  license  so  ordered. 
Welsford  v.  Weidlein,  '23  Kan.  601  :  s.  p. 
State  )•.  Young,  17  Kan.  414  ;  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Kan.  210  :  Eureka  v.  Davis,  21 
Kin.  578  :  Wabaunsee  Co.  v.  Muhlen- 
backer,  18  Kan.  12!':  Bouldinv.  Baltimore, 
15  Md.  18.  Cannol  compel  its  issue  by 
mandamus.  State  v.  Stevens,  23  Kan. 
456.  Where  there  is  no  law  governing 
the  amount,  it  is  a  question  of  expediency, 
of  which  the  city  authorities  are  the  sole 
judge.  Goldsmith  v.  New  Orleans,  31 
La.  646. 


§  307  ORDINANCES   RELATING    TO    PUBLIC    OPPENC1  3.  135 

meet  different  wants  and  exigencies,  and  to  serve  different  purposes. 
The  former,  when  general  in  its  nature  and  operation,  is  intended  to 
furnish  a  rule  for  the  government  of  the  people  of  the  State  every- 
where. The  latter,  made  by  the  corporation  under  derivative  au- 
thority, are  local  regulations  for  the  government  of  the  inhabitants 
or  the  regulation  of  the  local  concerns  of  the  incorporated  place; 
and  of  course  they  must  be  void,  unless  specially  authorized  by  the 
charter  or  organic  act  of  the  corporation,  whenever  they  are  repug- 
nant to,  or  inconsistent  with,  the  general  law  of  the  land.  No  im- 
plied power  to  pass  by-laws,  and  no  express  general  grant  of  the 
power,  can  authorize  a  by-law  which  conflicts  with  the  statutes  of 
the  State,  or  with  the  general  principles  of  the  common  law  adopted 
or  in  force  in  the  State.1 

§367  (301).  Same  subject.  —  The  laws  of  the  State  operate 
within  the  limits  of  municipal  corporations  and  upon  their  inhabi- 
tants the  same  as  elsewhere,  unless  it  is  otherwise  clearly  provided 
in  the  charter,  or  by  some  statute  of  the  State  ;  and  unless  so  pro- 
vided, in  case  of  conflict  betivecn  laws  and  by-laws,  the  latter  must 
give  way.  But  the  State  may,  and  as  to  local  matters  frequently 
does,  except  municipal  corporations  from  the  operation  of  its  laws, 
and  either  provides  a  special  law  for  them  or  authorizes  them  to  pro- 
vide special  regulations  for  themselves ;  and  when  this  is  done 
there  is  no  conflict.  But  these  local  laws  and  regulations  are  at  all 
times  subject  to  the  paramount  authority  of  the  legislature.  Ques- 
tions of  difficulty  have  arisen  in  consequence  of  grants  of  power  to 
municipal  corporations  to  make  ordinances  respectiny  matters  and 
acts  already  regulated  by  general  statute,  and,  if  criminal  in  their 
nature,  punishable  under  the  laws  of  the   State.     Hence,   the  same 

i  Ante,   sees.   317,   319,    320-330;  see,  76  N.  C.  33;  States  Langston,  83  X.  C. 

also,  post,  see.  42'.)  c.t  scq.,  432,  et  scq.  and  692;  State  v.  Brittain,  89  N.  C.  574;  Cen- 

cases.     New  Hampton  v.  Conroy,  56  Iowa,  terville  v.  Miller,  57  Iowa,  56;  People  v. 

498  ;  Foster  v.  Brown,  55  Iowa,  686;  State  Brown.  2  Utah,  4C2  (an  ordinance  creating 

v.  Lee,  29  Minn.  445.     An  ordinance  au-  ami  punishing  the  offence  of  assault  and 

thorizing   the   licensing  of  an    occupation  battery  declared  void).      But  see  Ex  parte 

which  is  illegal  and  criminal  under  the  Douglass,  1  Utah.  108,  where  an  ordinance 

general  law  of  the  State  is  null  and  void,  to    punish   persons    keeping    a    house    for 

A  license,  issued  under  such  an  ordinance  gaming  purposes  was  held  to  be  authorized 

is  no  defence  against  an  indictment  under  by  the  charter  of  Salt  Lake  City,  though 

the   general   law.     State   ».    Lindsay,   34  the  offence  was  punishable  by  the  general 

Ark.  372  (keeping  a  gaining  table).  law  of  the  State.      In   Indiana  a  statute 

An  ordinance  making  that  which  is  a  forbidding  towns  to  punish  offences  which 

crime   under  the   general   lav;   an    offence  are  provided   for  by  general   law,   is  held 

against  the  town,  held  to  he  void.     State  constitutional,    Jett  r.  Richmond,  78  Ind. 

v.  Keith,  94   X.  C.  933  (resisting  officer),  316;    fndinnapolis   v.    Huegle,    L8  N.   E. 

citing  Town  of  Washington  v.  Hammond,  Rep.  172. 


1-  6  MUNICIPAL   (  ORPORATIONS.  §  368 

comes  to  be  forbidden  by  genera]  statute  and  by  the  ordinance 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  each  providing  a  separate  and  different 
i  ame  transaction  may,  if  complex  in  its  nature, 
be  in  one  part  of  it  an  offence  against  the  general  law,  and  in 
another  against  the  by-law;  but  such  cases  present  no  difficulty. 
But  can  the  same  act  be  twice  punished,  once  under  the  ordinance 
and  once  under  the  statute  ?  The  cases  on  this  subject  cannot  be 
reconciled.  Some  hold  that  the  same  act  may  be  a  double  offence, 
one  against  the  State  and  one  against  the  corporation.  Others 
regard  the  act  as  constituting  a  single  offence,  and  hold  that  it  can 
be  punished  but  once,  and  may  be  thus  punished  by  whichever 
party  first  acquires  jurisdiction. 

§  368  (302).  Author's  Conclusions.  —  In  view  of  the  somewhat 
strict  construction  of  grants  of  corporate  powers,  elsewhere  ex- 
plained and  illustrated,  and  of  the  subordinate  nature  and  purposes 
of  by-laws,  the  following  rules,  although  seeming  to  rest  on  sound 
principles,  are,  in  view  of  the  decisions,  stated  with  some  distrust  of 
their  entire  correctness  :  I.  A  general  grant  of  power,  such  as  mere 
authority  to  make  by-laws,  or  authority  to  make  by-laws  for  the 
good  government  of  the  place,  and  the  like,  should  not  be  held  to 
confer  authority  upon  the  corporation  to  make  an  ordinance  punish- 
ing an  act  —  for  example,  an  assault  and  battery  —  which  is  made 
punishable  as  a  criminal  offence  by  the  laws  of  the  State.1  The 
intention  of  the  State  that  the  general  laws  shall  not  extend  to  the 
inhabitants  of  municipal  corporations,  or  that  these  corporations 
shall  have  the  power,  by  ordinance,  to  supersede  the  State  law,  will 
not  be  inferred  from  grants  of  power  general  in  their  character;  nor 
will  such  authority  in  the  corporation  be  held  to  exist  as  an  implied 
or  incidental  right.  IT.  Where  the  act  is,  in  its  nature,  one  which 
constitutes  two  offences,  one  against  the  State  and  one  against  the 
municipal  government,  the  latter  may  be  constitutionally  authorized 
to  punish  it.  though  it  be  also  an  offence  under  the  State  law  ;  but 
the  legislative  intention  that  this  may  be  done  ought  to  be  manifest 
and  unmistakable,  or  the  power  in  the  corporation  should  be  held 
not  to  exist.  III.  Where  the  act  or  matter  covered  by  the  charter 
or  ordinance,  and  by  the  State  law,  is  not  essentially  criminal  in  its 
nature,  and  is  one  which  is  generally  confided  to  the  supervision 
and  control  of  the  local  government  of  cities  and  towns,  but  is  also 
of  a  nature  to  require  general  legislation,  the  intention  that  the 
municipal  government  should  have  power  to  make  new,  further, 

1  Text  approved  State  v.  Langston,  83  N.  C.  692. 


CCS   ordinances:   by-laws  relating  to  public  offences.    437 


and  more  definite  regulations,  and  enforce  them  by  appropriate 
penalties,  will  be  inferred  from  language  which  would  not  be  suf- 
ficient were  the  matter  one  not  specially  relating  to  corporate  duties, 
and  fully  provided  for  by  the  general  laws.  Such  are  the  general 
principles  to  be  extracted  from  the  authorities,  but  the  exact  state 
of  the  law  will  more  satisfactorily  appear,  and  indeed,  can  only 
be  seen,  by  reference  to  the  adjudicated  cases;  accordingly,  the  lead- 
ing cases  upon  the  subject  are  stated  in  the  note,1  and  in  some  of 


1  Smith,  In  re,  Hcmpst.  201  (1832); 
Mayor,  &c.  of  Savannah  v.  Hussey,  21 
Ga.  80  (1857);  Brownville  r.Cook,  4  Neb. 
101  (1875);  St.  Charles  v.  Meyer,  5S  Mo. 
86  (1874);  New  Orleans  v.  Miller,  7  La. 
An.  651  (1852);  Municipality  v.  Wilson, 
5  La.  An.  747;  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo. 
330  (furious  driving);  St.  Louis  v.  Caf- 
ferata,  24  Mo.  94  (Sunday  ordinances); 
Amboy  v.  Sleeper,  31  111.  499;  State  v. 
Ledford,  3  Mo.  102  ;  Independence  v. 
Moore,  32  Mo.  392;  McLaughlin  v.  Ste- 
phens, 2  Cranch  C.  C.  148  ;  St.  Louis  v. 
Bentz,  11  Mo.  61  (ordinance  against  va- 
grants) ;  United  States  v.  Holly,  3  Cranch 
C.  C.  R.  656;  Jefferson  City  v.  Courtmire, 
9  Mo.  693  (ordinance  against  riots);  Davis 
v.  State,  4  Stow.  &  Port.  (Ala.),  83;  State 
v.  Plunkett,  3  Harrison  (N.  J.),  5  (1840); 
Rico  v.  State,  3  Kan.  141  (1865);  Rogers 
v.  Jones,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y. ),  261 ;  Mayor,  &c. 
of  New  York  v.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N. 
Y.),  156;  Borough  of  York  v.  Forscht,  23 
Pa.  St.  391;  March  v.  Commonwealth,  12 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25;  Commissioners  v.  Har- 
ris, 7  Jones  (Law),  281;  Brooklyn  v.  Toyn- 
bee,  31  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  282;  Davenport  i\ 
Bird,  34  Iowa,  524  (1872);  Zylstra  v. 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  382  ;  Peters- 
burg v.  Motzkcr,  21  111.  205  (1859);  Howe 
v.  Treasurer  of  Plainfield,  37  N.  J.  L. 
145;  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  253; 
State  v.  Clark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  54  ;  State 
v.  Pollard,  6  R.  I.  290;  People  v.  Jack- 
son, 8  Mich.  110;  post,  sec.  376  n. ;  sec. 
411;  State  v.  Topeka,  36  Kans.  76;  In  re 
Sic,  73  Cal.  1 42,  approving  text;  Ex  parte 
Bourgeois,  60  Miss.  663. 

Treating  of  the  constitutional  question 
involved,  Mr.  Justice  Cooley  remarks  that, 
although  the  decisions  are  not  uniform, 
the  clear  weight  of  authority  is,  "  that 
the  same  act  may  constitute  an  offence 
both  against  the  State  and  the  municipal 


corporation,  and  both  may  punish  it  with- 
out violation  of  any  constitutional  prin- 
ciple." Const.  Lim.  199;  8.  P.  March  v. 
Commonwealth,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25,  29, 
per  Simpson,  C.  J.;  Howe  v.  Plainfield, 
supra ;  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neh.  101 
(1875).  In  England  a  by-law  imposing  a 
penalty  on  a  corporator  for  refusing  to 
serve  in  a  corporate  office,  is  valid,  not- 
withstanding the  party  may  be  indicted 
for  the  same  refusal,  as  he  may  be  in  all 
cases  of  municipal  offices  necessary  or 
proper  to  carry  on  the  government  of  the 
corporation.  Grant  on  Corp.  82.  A  dis- 
tinction was  there  early  made  between 
grave  offences  classified  as  pleas  of  the 
crown,  and  triable  upon  an  issue  of  not 
guilty  between  the  king  and  the  defendant, 
and  lesser  or  petty  offences  punishable 
by  fine  or  amerciament  upon  presentment 
in  court  leet,  or  inferior  jurisdictions.  See 
Hale,  P.  C,  Vol.  I.  ch.  Hi.;  Vol.  II.  ch. 
xix.;  Norton's  Com.  London,  370,  453. 

The  history  of  Courts  of  Summary  Juris- 
diction in  England,  and  an  outline  of  their 
jurisdiction  under  the  Summary  Jurisdic- 
tion Act  of  1879,  will  be  found  in  Mr. 
Justice  Stephen's  History  of  Criminal 
Law,  Vol.  I.,  ch.  iv.  Post,  sees.  42S,  432, 
433. 

In  Georgia  the  general  welfare  clause 
in  a  charter  was  decided  not  to  authorize 
the  passage  of  an  ordinance  prescribing  a 
different  mode  of  trial  and  punishment  in 
addition  to  that  provided  for  by  the  gen- 
eral criminal  code  of  the  State,  fur  har- 
boring and  enticing  seamen.  Savannah 
v.  Hussey,  21  Ga.  80  (1857).  The  power 
of  municipal  corporations  to  legislate  re- 
specting offences  fully  covered  by  the 
State  law  is  denied,  and  the  general  sub- 
ject is  largely  and  satisfactorily  discussed; 
and  it  is  well  remarked  that,  in  such 
cases,  "the  law  of  the  State  is  the  law  of 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


its  aspects  the  matter  is  further  considered  in  the  chapter  on  Mu- 
nicipal Courts. 


the  corporation  ;   ami  they  cannot  make 
another   law  for  themselves."      The  fol- 
lowing is  extracted  from  the  opinion  de- 
.    by  a  very   able  judge  :  "  Under 

qi  ral  grant  of  power  [to  pass  all 
Buch  ordinances  as  may  seem  necessary 
for  the  security,  welfare,  &c.,  of  the  city] 
the  city  authorities  may  cover  all  [proper] 
cases  not  provided  for  by  the  paramount 
authorities  of  the  State.  All  those  or- 
i  regulating  cemeteries,  commons, 
markets,  vehicles,  fires,  exhibitions, 
lamps,  licenses,  water-works,  watch,  po- 
lice, city  taxes,  city  officers,  health,  nui- 
sances, &c,  are  legitimate  and  proper. 
Nay,  I  might  go  further,  and  concede 
thai  where  a  State  law  defines  an  offence 

lly,  and  prescribes  a  punishment, 
without  reference  to  the  place  where  it  is 
committed,  in  town  or  country,  and  the 
act,  when  committed  in  the  streets  and 

places  of  the  city,  would  be  attend- 
ed with  circumstances  of  aggravation, 
Buch  as  an  affray,  for  instance,  the  corpo- 
rate authorities,  with  a  view  to  suppress 
this  special  mischief,  might  probably  pro- 

jainst  it  by  ordinance.  And  this 
i.>  going  quite  far  enough."  But  I  deny 
that  "  a  municipal  corporation  can  legis- 
late- criminaliter  upon  a  ease  fully  covered 
by  the  State  law,  though  aware  that  decis- 
ions may  be  found  to  support  "  that  view. 
Per  Lumpkin,  J.,  in  Savannah  v.  Ilussey, 
2]  Ga.  SO,  86  (1857).  And  it  is  settled 
in  Georgia,  that  where  an  act  amounts  to 
(in  indictable  offence  it  cannot  be  punished 
under  municipal  ordinances,  but  the  of- 
fender  must  be  bound  over  to  the  proper 
court:  if  it  does  not  amount  to  an  indict- 
able offence,  the  offender  may  be  punished 
nnder  the  ordinances  of  the  municipality, 
and  if  it  is  a  nuisance,  steps  may  also  be 
taken  to  have   it   abated.       Vason  v.  Au- 

38  Ga,  542(1868);  Reich  v.  State, 
53  Ga.  73  (1874). 

i,  Alabama  it  i*  held  that  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  with  power  to  enact 
ordinances  "for  the  good  government  of  the 

not   contravening  the  laws  of  the 

may  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a 

battery  within  its 

limits,  and  a  punishment  under  the  State 


law  for  the  same  act  is  no  bar  to  a  prose- 
cution under  the  ordinance.  Collier,  C.  J., 
d<  livering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  says: 
"The  object  of  the  power  conferred  by 
barter,  and  the  purpose  of  the  ordi- 
nance itself,  was  not  to  punish  an  offence 
against  the  criminal  justice  of  the  coun- 
try, but  to  provide  a  mere  police  regulali on 
for  the  enforcement  of  good  order  and 
quiet  within  the.  limits  of  the  corporation. 
.  .  .  The  offences  against  the  corporation 
and  the  State  are  distinguishable  and 
wholly  disconnected,  and  the  prosecution 
at  the  suit  of  each  proceeds  upon  a  differ- 
ent hypothesis:  the  one  contemplates  the 
observance  of  the  peace  and  good  order 
of  the  city;  the  other  has  a  more  enlarged 
object  in  view,  —  the  maintenance  of  the 
peace  and  dignity  of  the  State."  Mayor, 
&c.  of  Mobile  v.  Allaire,  14  Ala.  400 
(1848).  If  the  principle  stated  in  the 
text  be  correct,  the  soundness  of  this  de- 
cision under  the  powers  conferred  upon 
the  corporation  may  admit  of  doubt,  but 
the  same  view  had  been  previously  taken 
in  the  same  court  in  The  Mayor,  &c.  of 
Mobile  v.  Rouse  (liquor  law),  S  Ala.  515 
(1845)  ;  and  see  Moore  v.  State,  16  Ala. 
411  ;  Greensboro  v.  Mullins,  13  Ala. 
341.     Post,  sees.  407,  428,  432,  433. 

In  Texas  it  is  held  that  an  offence  com- 
mitted against  (lie  proper  police  regulations 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  which  at  the 
same  time  violates  the  penal  laws,  can 
Legally  be  prosecuted  under  either,  and  a 
prosecution  under  one  will  be  no  bar  to  a 
legal  prosecution  under  the  other.  Ham- 
ilton v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  643  (1878). 
Extent  of  police  power.  Shaferv.  Mumma, 
17  Md.  331;  ante,  sees.  141,  144,  357,  358. 
In  Ohio  an  ordinance  prohibiting  singing, 
speech-making,  &c,  in  the  streets  was 
held  valid.  Trimble  v.  Bucyrus,  3  Bates 
Ohio  St.  Dig.  410;  21  Alb.  Law  Jour.  176. 
Si,  on  this  point  ante,  sec.  319.  /,'• 
Frazee,  63  Mich.  396;  People  v.  Rochester, 
51  N.  V.  Sup.  Ct.  (44  Hun)  166. 

Authority  to  pass  ordinances  "to  pre- 
serve the  health  and  comfort  of  the  town" 
does  not  empower  the  corporation  to  pass 
an  ordinance  to  prevent  or  punish  breaches 
of  tlic  peace.     Raleigh   v.    Dougherty,    3 


§  3G9 


ORDINANCES  I     HEALTH  ;    HOSPITALS  ;    BURIALS.  439 


Ordinances  relating  to  the  Public  Health,  Safety,  and  Convenience. 
§  3G9   (303).     Health  Ordinances;    Hospitals    and   Burials.  —  Our 

municipal  corporations  are  usually  invested  with  express  power  to 


Humph.  (Tenn.)  11  (1842);  see  chapter  on 
Municipal  Courts,  post. 

Where  gambling   and  the   keeping  of 

gambling-houses  are  made  public  offences 
by  the  State  laws,  offenders  ma}-  be 
prosecuted  in  the  State  courts  for  the 
violation  of  these  laws,  notwithstanding 
the  organic  acts  of  cities  may  give 
to  the  city  council  power  "to  restrain, 
prohibit,  and  suppress  games  and 
gambling-houses."  In  thus  holding,  the 
court  adds,  "It  is  not  necessary,  in 
this  case,  to  decide  whether  both  the 
State  and  the  city  can  punish  for  the 
same  act  ;  but  we  have  no  doubt  that 
the  one  which  shall  first  obtain  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  person  of  the  accused  may 
punish  to  the  extent  of  its  power."  Rice 
v.  State,  3  Kan.  141  (1865).  The  same 
point  has  been  decided  the  same  way  in  a 
later  case,  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Min- 
nesota. State  v.  Crunimey,  17  Minn,  72 
(1871).  Gambling  being  punishable  under 
the  general  law,  a  city  council  "invested 
with  authority  to  make  ordinances  to  se- 
cure the  inhabitants  against  fire,  against 
violations  of  the  law  and  the  public  peace, 
to  suppress  riots,  gambling,  drunkenness, 
indecent  and  disorderly  conduct,  to  pun- 
ish lewd  ln-havior  in  public  places,  .  .  . 
and,  generally,  to  provide  for  the  safety, 
prosperity,  and  good  order  of  the  city," 
possesses,  by  virtue  thereof,  no  power  to 
make  the  keeping  of  any  gambling  device 
a  misdemeanor,  and  to  punish  the  same. 
Mount  Pleasant  v.  Breeze,  11  Iowa,  399 
(1860).  This  case  was  approved  In  re 
Lee  Tong,  18  Fed.  Rep.  253.  A  power  to 
suppress  gambling  does  not  include  a 
power  to  license  it.  Goetler  v.  State,  45 
Ark.  454. 

Police  officers  in  Indiana  held  to  have 
no  power  to  seize  and  destroy  gambling 
apparatus  without  an  ordinance  being 
passed,  but  no  opinion  was  expressed  as 
to  the  validity  of  such  an  ordinance. 
Ridgeway  v.  West,  60  Ind.  371  (1878). 
Power  to  suppress  gambling-houses. 
Society  of  Arts,  &c.  v.  Musgrove,  44  Miss. 


820;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep.  723;  Moore  v.  S1 

•16  Miss.  117  ;  s.  c.  12  Am.  Rep.  367. 

In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  where  the 
same  act  (as,  lor  example,  furious  drii 
in  highways  ami  public  places)  is  a  viola- 
tion of  a  valid  municipal  ordinance  and 
of  the  general  criminal  statutes  of  the 
state,  the  offender  can  be  punished  but 
once  ;  and  hence,  to  an  indictment  in  the 
State  court,  he  may  plead  a  former  con- 
viction under  the  ordinance  of  the  muni- 
cipal corporation.  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo. 
330  (1860).  But  quozre.  The  opinion  in 
this  ease  assumes,  without  discussion, 
that  the  offence  is  single.  lb.  The  1 
and  it  would  seem  the  correct  doctrine  on 
this  subject,  is  thus  expressed  by  Wagm  r, 
J.,  in  The  State  v.  Gordon,  60  Mo.  383, 
385  (1875)  :  — 

"  The  legislature  has  the  undoubted 
right,  in  reference  to  statutory  misde- 
meanors, to  say  in  what  particular  juris- 
diction they  shall  be  tried,  and  to  make 
that  jurisdiction  exclusive  of  all  others. 
When  the  power  to  hear  and  determine 
these  minor  offences  is  given  to  a  municipal 
corporation,  but  no  words  of  exclusion  or 
restriction  are  used,  the  remedies  between 
the  State  and  corporation  will  be  construed 
to  be  concurrent;  but  where  the  manifest 
intention  is  that  the  prosecution  shall  be 
limited  exclusively  to  one  jurisdiction, 
that  intention   must   prevail." 

In  State  v.  Wister,  62  Mo.  592(1876), 
the  defendant,  indicted  for  keeping  a 
bawdy  house,  pleaded  autrefois  convict, 
upon  a  complaint  before  the  city  recorder. 
As  the  charter  did  not  confer  upon  the 
city  exclusive  cognizance  of  this  class  of 
offences  the  plea  was  held  bad,  although 
the  recorder  was  invested  with  "  exclusive 
jurisdiction  of  all  eases  arising  under 
any  ordinance  of  the  city."  B.  p.  3 
r.  Harper.  58  Mo.  531.  In  State  v  I 
don.  60  Mo.  383,  the  charter  in  terms 
conferred  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  the 
municipal  authorities  in  respei  t  of  a  cer- 
tain class  of  misdemeanors,  in  which  was 
included  the  one  in  question  in  this  case. 


440 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§309 


the  health,  and  safety  of  the  inhabitants.     This  is,  indeed,  one 
of  the  chief  purposes  of  local  government,  and  reasonable  by-laws  in 

In  Nebraska  the  doctrine  is  maintained  anapolis"   v.   Blythe,   2    Ind.    (Carter)   75 

that  "the  same                  onstitute  an  of-  (1850).     [u  this  case  the  city  unsuccess- 

u  -t    both    the   State    and    the  fully   soughl    to    recover  a    penalty    pre- 

municipal    government,    and    both    may  scribed   by  ordinance  for  an   assaull   and 

punish  it  withoul  infringing  any  constitu-  battery  committed  by  the  defendanl  with- 

(           i  Neb.  in    the    city.      Same   principle,    City   of 

lul,               ...  C.J.     In  this  Madison  v.  Hatcher,  8   Blackf.  (Ind.)  841 

irdinauce  was  sustained  punish-  (1846).     But   these  cases  were  overruled 

in;,'  "wilful,  malicious,  and  mischievous  by  Ambrose  v.  State,  6  Ind.  351,  in  which 

meddling  with  or  trespasser   upon  prop-  it  was  held  that  a  single  act  might  con- 

The  ordinance  was  mora  specific  stitute  two  offences,  one  against  the  State 

than  the  criminal  code  of  the  State  on  this  and  one   against   the    municipal    govern- 

subject,  but  this  was  not  made  the  basis  ment,  and  "that  each  might  punish  in  its 

ol  the  decision.  own  mode,  by  its  own  officers,  the  same 

In  Minnesota  it  is  held  that  the  legisla-  act  as  an  offence  against  each."     Perkins, 

ture  may  authorize  a  city  to  impose  new  J.,    in   Waldo  v.    Wallace,    12  Ind.   582 

and  additional  penalties  for  acts  (in  this  (1859),  where  prior  cases  in  that  State  are 

case  the  selling  of  liquors  on  Sunday)  al-  referred  to.     See,  also,   Lawrenceburg  i». 

.     penal  by  the  general  laws  of  Wuest,  16  Ind.  337  ;  Fox».  State,  5  How. 

theState.    State  v.  Ludwig,  21  .Minn.  202.  410  ;  Moore  v.  People,  14  How.  13;  }wst, 

"The  principle  established  by  the  weight  sec.  432. 

of  authority,  and  we  think  in  accordance  In    Louisiana,   municipal   corporations 

with  sound  reason,  is  that  the  legislature  are  hell  to  have  no  power  to  impose  a 

of  th     -          nay  authorize   a  municipal  penalty  on  that  which  is  made  punishable 

government  to  impose  new  and  additional  as  a  criminal  offence  by  the  laws  of  the 

remedies   for  acts   already  penal   by  the  State.     But  it  is  admitted  that  there  is  a 

laws  of  the  State.     Per  McMillan,  C.  J.,  class  of  offences  against  public  order  not 

S   ite  v.   Charles,    16   Minn.   471;  made  punishable  by  the  State  law,  which  it 

klyn  v.  Toynbee,    31   Barb.   282;   1  is  within  the  power  of  such  corporation  to 

Dillon   on   Mun.    Corp.  sec.   368;  Cooley  suppress.     New  Orleans  v.   .Miller,  7  La. 

1            Lim.  p.  199,  and  notes  l  and  2."  An.  651  (1852);  Municipality  v.  Wilson, 

[n  Michigan,  in  Slaughters.  People,  2  BLa.  An.  747.    This  case  seems  to  concede 

Doug.  (Mich.)  834,  the  principle  was  de-  that  the  city  corporation  cannot    punish 

cided  that  it  was  not  competent  to  punish,  for  an  act  identical  with  that  punished  by 

under  a  city  ordinance,  an  act  which  was  the  State  law.    See,  also,  Comm'rsv.  llar- 

indictable.     Illustrating  the  difference  be.  ris,  7  Jones  (Law),  281  ;  People  v.  Jack- 

tween    proseeutions,  under   special    penal  son,  S  Mich.  110.     The  charter  of  a  city 

provisions  of  a  city  charter,  of  acts  with  authorized    the  common  council  to  pass 

lines   and   penalties  affixed   by  ordinances  upon  certain  subjects  pertain- 

the  charter,  but  which  acts  aiv  breaches  ing  to  the  police,  good  order,  and  welfare 

law   of  the   State  wherever  com-  of  the  city,  and  provided  thai  a  violation 

mitt.-!,  and   ordinary  prosecutions  under  of  certain  of  such  ordinances  should  be 

municipal  ordinances,  Bee  Wayne  County  a  misdemeanor,  and  might  be  prosecuted 

v.   Detroit,  17  Mich.  890  (1868);   People  before   the  police  court  of  the  city  like 

o.  Detrojt,  18  Mich.  145(1869);   People*,  other  offences,  which  court  might  inflict 

-  Micl  .  110;  post,  chap.  xiii.  the  penalty  named  in  such  ordinance,  pro- 

In   Indiana  it  was  first  hell  that  where  vided  that   no  penalty  should  exceed  the 

the  act   complained  of  is  indictable  as  a  sum  of  fifty  dollars  for  a  single  offence. 

criminal    offence  against  the  laws   of  the  It    was    held    that    the    charter   did   not 

could  not  be  punished  for  attempt    to    confer    upon     the     common 

act  under  or  by  virtue  of  the  ordi-  council  the  power  to  define  and  determine 

nances  of  a  city.     City  Council  of  Indi-  crime, and   was  not  therefore  unconstitu- 


§  369 


ordinances:    public  iiealtii  AND  safety. 


441 


relatioD  thereto  have  always  been  sustained  in  England  as  within  the 
incidental  authority  of  corporations  to  ordain.1  It  will  be  useful  to 
illustrate  the  subject  by  reference  to  some  of  the  adjudged  cases.2 
An  ordinance  of  a  city  prohibiting,  under  a  penalty,  any  person,  not 
duly  licensed  therefor  by  the  city  authorities,  from  "removing  or 
carrying  through  any  of  the  streets  of  the  eity  any  house-dirt,  refuse, 
offal,  or  filth,"  is  not  improperly  in  restraint  of  trade,  and  is  reason- 
able and  valid.  Such  a  by-law  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  monopoly, 
but  is  founded  upon  a  wise  regard  for  the  public  health.  It  was 
contended  that  the  city  could  regulate  the  number  and  kind  of 
horses  and  carts  to  be  employed  by  strangers  or  unlicensed  per- 
sons, as  well  as  they  could  those  of  licensed  persons ;  but  practi- 
cally it  was  considered  that  the  main  object  of  the  city  could  be 
better  accomplished  by  employing  men  over  whom  they  have  en- 
tire control,  night  and  day,  who  are  at  hand,  and  able  from  habit 
to  do  the  work  iu  the  best  way  and  at  the  proper  time.3 


tional.      State   v.   Tryon,    39    Conn.    183 
(1872). 

Tin-  Constitution  of  California,  (art.  11, 
sec.  11),  ordains  that  cities  and  towns  may 
"  pass  and  enforce  within  their  limits  such 
local  police,  sanitary,  and  other  regulations 
as  do  not  conflict  with  general  laws."  An 
ordinance  of  a  city  aimed  at  opium  dens 
was  held  to  be  invalid  because  it  punished 
precisely  the  same  acts  made  punishable 
by  the  Penal  Code.  Text,  sec.  368,  quoted, 
ami  the  court  adds,  "  These  rules  express 
the  law  as  we  understand  it."  Re  Sic,  73 
Cal.  142  (1877).  Re  Johnson,  lb.  228, 
ordinance  prohibiting  persons  to  visit,  for 
purposes  of  prostitution,  houses  of  ill-fame 
sustained,  not  being  in  conflict  with  the 
general  law  of  the  State.  Re  Campbell 
(ordinance  to  suppress  tippling-houses 
sustained),  74  Cal.  20  (1877);  Lane,  Ex 
parte,  7b"  Cal.  587  ;  post,  sec.  436,  note. 

1  Text  approved,  Mayor  of  Monroe  v. 
Gerspaeh,  33  La.  An.  1011. 

2  Ante,  chap.  vi.  sees.  141,  142,  144. 

3  Vandine,  //(  re,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  187 
(1828);  commented  on  in  Commonwealth 
v.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  575,  576 
(IMS).  Ante,  sec.  362,  note.  In  Zylstra 
v.  Corporation  of  Charleston,  1  Pay  (S.  •'.), 
382  (1794),  Mr.  Justice  Waties  (one  of 
the  most  accomplished  of  early  American 
judges),  speaking  of  an  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  making  of  soap  or  candles  con- 
trary to  the  mode  prescribed  and  within 


the  limits  of  the  city,  says,  "  I  am  willing 
to  admit  that  the  by-law  itself  is  a  valid 
one.  If  it  restrained  an  inoffensiv*  trade 
it  would  not  be  so  ;  but  it  is  made  to  re- 
strain one  that  is  both  offensive  and  dan- 
gerous. It  is,  therefore,  calculated  to 
guard  the  comfort  and  safety  of  the  citi- 
zens ;  and  the  benefit  of  a  by-law  is, 
ally,  the  touchstone  of  its  validity."  The 
courts  will  not  interfere  with  the  legiti- 
mate exercise  by  municipal  bodies  of  their 
police  powers  by  which  the  peace,  health, 
comfort,  ami  general  welfare  are  secured  or 
promoted.  Weil  v.  Ricord,  9  C.  E.  Green 
(24  X.  J.  Eq.),  169;  Boehm  v.  Baltimore, 
61  Md.  259. 

"The  proper  control  of  the  time  and 
mode  of  cleansing  such  receptacles  for  ref- 
use matter  [sinks,  cesspools,  &c],  and  re- 
moval of  their  contents,  is  not  only  a 
legitimate  subject  of  municipal  concern, 
but  is  imperatively  demanded  by  a  just 
regard  for  the  comfort  and  health  of  the 
citizen."  Legislation  for  the  protection  of 
the  public  health  and  for  establishing 
boards  of  health  "  ought  not  to  be  regarded 
as  detracting  from  the  general  powers  "f 
municipal  governments,  unless  that  legisla- 
tive intent  clearly  appears."  Knapp,  J. 
in  Nicoulin  v.  Lowery,  49  X.  .L  Law,  391. 
A  power  to  '•  exclude  from  certain  lim- 
its or  to  regulate  all  occupations,  houses^ 
&c,  .  .  .  which  are  against  good  morals, 
...  or  dangerous  to  the  public  safety,"  in- 


442 


MUNICIPAL    CUUI'UIiATIuN^ 


§371 


rO  (304).  Same  subject.  —  Authority  by  charter  to  pass  ordi- 
nances respecting  the  harbors  and  wharves, and  "every  other  by-law 
necessary  tor  the  security,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city."  gives 
to  the  city  council  power  to  pass  a  health  ordinance  requiring  boats 
coming  from  infected  places  to  anchor  before  Landing  and  to  submit 
to  .in  examination,  provided  such  ordinance  be  not  repugnant  to  the 
genera]  law  of  the  Stair.  And  it  was  further  held  that  a  general 
Law  of  the  State,  prohibiting  "  any  person  coming  into  the  State  from 
an  infected  place,  and  in  violation  of  quarantine  regulations,"  was 
not  repugnant  to  and  did  not  render  the  ordinance  invalid.1 

£  :;7l  305).  Hospitals. — Authority  to  the  corporation  of  New 
Orleans  "  to  pass  such  by-laws  as  they  shall  deem  necessary  to  main- 
tain the  cleanliness  and  salubrity  of  the  city,"  was  considered  in  view 
of  its  extensive  nature,  certain  provisions  of  the  civil  code,  and  the 
liability  of  the  city  to  epidemics,  as  conferring  power  upon  the  eity 
council  to  prohibit  the  erection  and  maintenance  of  private  hospitals; 
the  courl  admitting  that  the  same  question  had  been  decided  other- 
wise by  tribunals  governed  by  the  common-law  jurisprudence.2 


eludes  the  power  to  confine  the  keeping  of 
more  tl<  m  two  cows  within  prescribed  lim- 
its.    Re  Linehan,  72  Cal.  lit. 

Power  i"  a  city  council  to  compel  the 
owners  and  occupants  of  slaughter-houses 
to  cleanse  and  aoaU  them  whenever  ac- 
cessary for  the  health  of  the  inhabitants, 
msidered  nol  to  authorize  an  ordi- 
nance entirely  prohibiting  the  slaughter- 
ing of  animals  within  certain  limits  of  the 
city.  Wr<  ford  v.  People,  1  1  Mich.  II 
■  Metropolitan  Board  ol  Hi  dth, 
37  N.  V.  66]  :  Shrader,  In  re,  33  Cal.  279 
(1867).  In  Cronin  v.  People,  82  N.  Y. 
318  (1880);  8.  0.  22  Alb.  Law  J.  430,  it 
d  thai  by  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Albany,  the  common  council  was  author- 
ized by  ordinance  "toregulatt  theerection, 
use,  and  continuance  of  slaughter-houses." 
It  was  held  thai  the  power  to  "  regulate," 
as  thus  used,  gave  the  council  the  righl  to 
determine  and  lis  the  limits  and  localities 
within  which  new  slaughter-houses  may  be 
.  and  from  which  they  may  he  ex- 
cluded, and  also  to  piuhil.it  their  continu- 
ance whenever  and  wherever  they  endanger 
the  health  and  coraforl  of  the  community, 
of  which  the  common  council  was  to  jndge 
for  itself,  and  its  judgmenl  was  implied 
from  the  ordinance,  and  need  not  be  recited. 


Powers  with  respect  to  privies.  Greg- 
ory v.  New  York,  4i>  N.  V.  273.  Tow- 
ers under  legislative  authority  with  respect 
to  swill  milk.  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43 
Cal.  212  (1872).  Power  to  regulate  the 
sale  of  milk  from  vehicles  by  requiring  a 
license  sustained.  People  v.  Mulholland, 
82  N.  Y.  324  (1880). 

i  Dubois  v.  Augusta,  Dudley  (Ga.),  30 
(1831);  ante,  sec.  144,  as  to  Quarantine 
and  Health  Powers  of  municipalities. 

2  Milne  v.  Davidson,  5  Martin,  409. 

A  power  to  "erect  and  establish  .  .  . 
pest-houses  and  hospitals"  does  not  au- 
thoi  i  e  a  city  to  enact  an  ordinance  to  reg- 
ulate and  License  private  hospitals  ;  nor 
does  a  general  power  to  make  by-laws 
"necessary  to  carry  oul  the  objects  of  the 
corporation."  Bessonies  v.  Indianapolis, 
71  Ind.  189. 

As  to  city  hospitals,  see  Vionet  v. 
Municipality,  1  La.  An.  42;  Bozant  v. 
Campbell,  9  Rob.  (La.)  -Ill  ;  Citj  Coun- 
cil v.  Boyd,  1  Const.  Ihp.  A.  1 1  L817 
(S.  C),  352;  Tucker  v.  Virginia  City,  4 
N'rv.  20.  Municipal  corporation  may 
found  hospitals  for  the  poor  under  39  I'.liz. 
chap.  v.  Newcastle,  In  re,  12  Clark  & 
Fin.  102.  Where  a  city  has  power  to 
"  establish  "  a  hospital,  the  purchase,  ao- 


§372 


ORDINANCES  \     CEMETERIES   AND    BURIALS. 


443 


§  372  (306).  Cemeteries  and  Burials.  —  The  public  health,  com- 
fort, and  convenience  are  concerned  in  the  proper  regulation  of 
burials;  and  the  evils  resulting  from  its  neglect  are  especially  to 
be  apprehended  in  the  crowded  populations  of  cities.  Power  to 
regulate  this  matter  may  properly  be  conferred  upon  municipal  cor- 
porations. And  such  power  will  be  held  to  be  given  by  authority  to 
make  police  regulations  or  to  pass  by-laws  respecting  the  health, 
good  government,  aud  welfare  of  the  place.1     Power  to  city  corpora- 


cording  to  existing  law,  of  a  farm  and  tlio 
buildings  thereon  specially  for  the  purpose 
is  an  "establishing"  of  the  hospital. 
Richmond  v.  Henrico  County,  83  Va.  204 
(1887). 

Quarantine  ordinances  of  a  municipal 
corporation,  passed  by  virtue  of  a  grant 
of  power  from  the  State,  whereby  passen- 
ger vessels  are  required  to  remain  in 
quarantine  for  a  specified  period,  are  not 
repugnant  to  the  commerce  clause  of  the 
Federal  Constitution.  St.  Louis  v.  McCoy, 
18  Mo.  238  (1853);  s.  P.  St.  Louis  v.  Bof- 
finger,  19  Mo.  13  ;  Metcalf  v.  St.  Louis, 
11  Mo.  103.  In  modern  usage,  quarantine 
is  not  confined  to  vessels  having  on  board 
the  plague,  but  extends  to  vessels  having 
on  board  other  contagious  diseases.  Per 
Tenney,  C.  J.,  Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  41 
Me.  363  (1856);  s.  c.  again,  45  Me.  496 
(1858);  ante,  sec.  144. 

Boards  of  health.  —  An  ordinance  cre- 
ating and  giving  to  the  board  of  health 
"  general  supervision  over  the  health  of 
the  city,"  and  "  all  necessary  power  to 
carry  the  ordinance  into  effect,"  was  con- 
sidered  to  include  the  power  to  rent  a 
building  for  a  temporary  hospital  to  pro- 
tect the  city  from  an  apprehended  visita- 
tion of  the  cholera,  and  to  make  the  cor- 
poration liable  for  the  rent,  although  it 
did  not  become  necessary  to  use  the  house. 
Aull  v.  Lexington,  18  Mo.  401  (1853). 
Power  of  board  of  health.  Frend  v.  Den- 
nett, 4  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  576  ;  Barton  v.  New 
Orleans,  16  La.  An.  317  ;  Hutton  v.  Cam- 
den, 39  N.  J.  L.  1-22  (1876);  Nicoulin  v. 
Lowery,  49  N.  J.  Law,  391  ;  Ferguson  v. 
Selma,  43  Ala.  398  (1S69)  ;  Tugnian  v. 
Chicago,  78  111.  405  (1875);  Belcher  v.  Far- 
rar,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  325  ;  Hazen  v.  Strong, 
2  Vt.  427  ;  Commissioners  v.  Powe,  6 
Jones  (Law),  134  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Albany, 
8  Fost.   (28  N.  H.)  9.     The  powers  of  a 


board  of  health  held  to  be  advisory  and 
executive,  not  legislative,  and  a  resolution 
of  the  hoard  that  a  specified  tannery  was 
a  nuisance  was  unauthorized  and  void. 
State  v.  Trenton,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L. ), 
283.  Such  a  board  held  not  to  have  the 
power  to  absolutely  prohibit  carrying  on  a 
lawful  business  not  necessarily  a  nuisance. 
Weil  v.  Ricord,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J. 
Eq.),  169.  Regularly  the  orders  of  a  board 
of  health,  directing  the  abatement  of  a 
nuisance,  should  be  in  writing.  Such  or- 
ders may  be  proved  by  the  minutes  of  the 
board,  by  the  written  orders  themselves, 
or  by  being  recited  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  Corporation  of  which  the  board  of 
health  are  members.  How  far  parol  evi- 
dence may  be  received  of  such  orders,  when 
it  appears  that  no  record  or  written  evi- 
dence ever  existed,  is  not  free  from  doubt. 
Meeker  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  15  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  397  (1836),  where  parol  evidence 
of  this  kind  was  held  inadmissible  by  the 
Supreme  Court.  But  see,  in  Court  of 
Errors,  Van  Wormer  v.  Albany,  L8  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  169,  affirming  s.  c.  15  Wend. 
262.  See  also,  People  v.  Adams,  9  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  333  ;  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  651  ;  ante, 
chap.  xi. ;  Health  Department  v.  Knoll,  70 
N.  Y.  530  (1877). 

1  Bogert  v.  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134 
(1859),  per  Perkins,  J. ;  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York  v.  Slack,  3  Wheel."  Cr.  Cas.  237 
(1824);  Brick  Presbyterian  Church  v. 
New  York,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  538  (1826); 
ante,  sec.  142,  note;  Coates  v.  Same,  7 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  585  (1827):  Austin  v.  Mur- 
ray, 16  Pick.  (Mass.)  121  (1S34)  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Fahey,  5  Cash.  (Mass.)  403 
(1850);  New  Orleans  j;.  St.  Louis  I  'hureh, 
11  La.  An.  244  (1856);  distinguished  from 
Brick  Presbyterian  Church  v.  New  York, 
supra  :  Commonwealth  v.  Goodrich,  13 
Allen  (Mass.),   546  ;  ante,  sees.  141,  142. 


-144 


Ml'NICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§373 


tion,  after  enumerating  various  objects,  "in  general  to  pass  every 
other  by-law  that  to  it  shall  seem  requisite  and  necessary  for  the 
irity,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city,"  &c,  was,  by  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  South  Carolina,  considered  to  give  authority 
to  regulate  the  burial  of  the  dead,  and  particularly  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  new  burial  grounds  within  the  limits  of  the  city, 
and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  organ  of  the  court,  also  to  regulate  the 
time  of  burial,  the  manner  of  interment  so  as  to  prevent  noxious 
effluvia,  and  to  prohibit  interments  in  the  private  gardens,  yards, 
and  by-places  of  the  city.1  But  as  every  by-law  must  be  reason- 
able, an  arbitrary  or  unnecessary  or  oppressive  restraint  upon  the 
right  of  burying  the  dead  is  invalid.2 

§  373  (307.)  Same  subject.  —  Where  the  burden  to  support  a 
public  cemetery  is  required  to  be  borne  by  all  the  citizens,  an  ordi- 
nance throwing  that  burden  upon  a  particular  class  is  unreasonable 
and  void.3  Cemeteries  in  cities  are  not  per  sc  nuisances,  but  special 
circumstances  may  make  them  so.  It  is  not,  however,  sufficient  that 
they  affect  the  market  value  of  property  in  the  vicinity.4     A  city 


The  power  of  disinterment  may  be  dele- 
gated by  the  legislature  to  municipalities. 
Kincaid'a  Appeal,  66  Pa.  St.  411  (1870). 

1  Citv  Council  v.  Baptist  Church,  4 
Strob.  (S.  C.)  Law,  306,309  (1850),  per 
Frost,  J.  :  s.  P.  Bogert  v.  Indianapolis, 
13  [nd.  134,  per  Perkins,  J.;  New  Orleans 
v.  st.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An.  2H  ;  dis- 
tinguished  from   5    Cowen,    538,   supra  ; 

.,    v.   St.    Louis  Catholic  Church, 
in  La.  An.  431. 

2  Austin  v.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
121  (1834);  Coates  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  585 ;  Common - 
wraith  i>.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408 
(1850). 

The  law  of  burials,  in  some  of  its  rela- 
tions to  property  and   municipal  rights, 
was  ably  considered  by  the  Hon.  Samuel 
!'..  lI'iL'L'les,  referee,  in  the  matter  of  the 
opening  of  Beekman  Street,  in  New  York 
City,  whose  report,  establishing  the  fol- 
lowing principles,  was  confirmed  by  the 
Supreme    Court:     1.    In    this    country, 
corpses  and  their  burials  are  not  matters 
liastical  cognizance.     2.    That  the 
right  to  bury  a  corpse   and  preserve  its 
remains  is  a  legal  right,  belonging,  in  the 
of   testamentary    disposition,    ex- 
ly  to  the  next,  of  kin,  and  includes 


the  right  to  select  and  change  the  place 
of  sepulture  at  pleasure.  3.  If  place  of 
burial  is  taken  for  public  use  the  next 
of  kin  may  claim  indemnity  for  expense  of 
removing  and  suitably  re-interring  their 
remains.  Beekman  Street,  In  re,  4  Bradf. 
(N.  Y.)  503,  532  (1856)  ;  Bogert  r.  City 
of  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134  (1859),  per 
Perkins,  J.  Many  cases  relating  to  the 
law  of  cemeteries  are  collected  in  Mr. 
Thompson's  note  to  Louisville  v.  Nevin, 
19  Am.  Eep.  78,  79  (1874);  s.  C.  10  Bush 
549.  See,  also,  Brick  Presb.  Church,  In 
re,  3  Edw.  Ch.  Rep.  (N.  Y.)  155.  Laying 
streets  and  highways  through  cemeteries. 
Cemetery  Assoc,  v.  New  Haven,  43  Conn. 
234  (1875)  ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Kep.  643,  and 
note  and  cases  cited.  Trustees  v.  "Walsh, 
57  111.  363  ;  s.  0.  11  Am.  Kep.  21.  Local 
assessments  for  improvements  of  adjoin- 
ing streets.  Louisville  i».  Nevin,  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  549  (1874);  s.  c.  19  Am.  hep.  78. 
See  on  this  point,  post,  sec.  776. 

8  Beroujohn  v.  Mobile,  27  Ala.  58 
(1855). 

4  New  Orleans  r.  St.  Louis  Church,  11 
La.  An.  244  (1856);  Musgrove  v.  Same, 
10  La.  An.  431;  Lake  View  v.  Letz,  44  111. 
81  (1807). 


8  374    OBDINANCES  :    TOWER  TO  PREVENT  AND  ABATE  NUISANCES.    445 

corporation  had  power,  by  charter,  "to  establish  cemeteries  or  burial 
places  within  or  without  the  city."  It  was  held  that  this  would 
authorize  the  city  to  establish  cemeteries  of  its  own,  and  regulate 
them  ;  but  that  it  did  not  empower  the  council  to  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  city  sexton  cemeteries  other  than  those  belonging  to 
the  city,  nor  to  pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  Lol  owners  in  private 
cemeteries,  though  within  the  city  limits,  from  entering  to  bury 
without  the  permission  of  the  city  sexton,  to  be  obtained  only  by 
paying  him  the  price  of  digging  a  grave.1  Certain  statutes  of  New 
York,  authorizing  incorporated  rural  cemetery  associations  to  con- 
demn lands  for  cemetery  purposes,  where  no  right  on  the  part  of  the 
public  to  buy  lots  or  bury  their  dead  there,  or  to  fix  the  price  of 
lots,  is  secured,  were  held  to  be  unconstitutional,  on  the  ground  that 
the  use  was  private  and  not  public.2 

§  374  (308).  Nuisances,  and  of  the  Power  to  prevent  and  abate. — 
It  is  to  secure  and  promote  the  public  health,  safety,  and  conven- 
ience that  municipal  corporations  are  so  generally  and  so  liberally 
endowed  with  power  to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances.  This  authority 
and  its  summary  exercise  may  be  constitutionally  conferred  on  the 
incorporated  place,  and  it  authorizes  its  council  to  act  against  that 
which  comes  within  the  legal  notion  of  a  nuisance ;  but  such  power, 
conferred  in  general  terms,  cannot  be  taken  to  authorize  the  extra- 
judicial condemnation  and  destruction  of  that  as  a  nuisance  which, 
in  its  nature,  situation,  or  use,  is  not  such.3      Speaking  upon  this 

1  Bogert  v.  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134  575),  or  by  a  trial  by  jury.  King  v.  Daven- 
(1859).°  port,  98  111.  305;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Reg.  S9. 

2  Deansville  Cemetery  Association,  In  That  which  is  authorize!  by  legislative 
re,  66  N.  Y.  569;  overruling  s.  c.  5  Hun,  authority  cannot  be  declared  a  nuisance  by 
482.  a   city  corporation.      Cases   supra.      The 

8  Crosby  v.  Warren,  1  Rich.  (S.  C.)  power  to  abate  nuisances  is  a  portion  of 
385;  Roberts?;.  Ogle,  30  111.  459;  Salem  police  authority  necessarily  vested  in  the 
v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  431;  Ding-  corporation  of  all  populous  towns.  Ken- 
ley  v.  Boston,  100  Mass.  544:  Van  Dyke  nedy  v.  Phelps,  10  La.  An.  227. 
v.  Cincinnati,  1  Disney  (Ohio),  532;  Buchanan,  J.  A  city  cannot  create  a  nui- 
Lake  View  v.  Letz,  44  111.  81;  Wreford  sance  upon  private  property,  as,  in  this 
v.  People,  14  Mich.  41  (1865);  State  v.  case,  by  diverting  a  stream,  and  compel  its 
Jersey  City,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  170;  Ward  owner  to  abate  it.  Hannibal  v.  Richards, 
v.  Little  Rock,  41  Ark.  526;  City  of  Den-  82  Mo.  330.  Nuisances  are  of  two  kin. Is 
ver  v.  .Mullen,  7  Col.  345;  McKibbin  v.  —  public  or  common  nuisances,  which 
Fort  Smith,  35  Ark.  352;  Mayor  of  Mon-  affect  people  generally,  and  private  nui- 
roe  v.  Gerspach,  88  La.  An.  1011;  St.  Paul  sauces,  which  may  he  defined  as  anything 
v.  Gillillan,  36  Minn.  298.  The  legisla-  done  to  the  hurt  of  the  lands,  tenements, 
ture  may  invest  a  municipal  corporation  or  hereditaments  of  another.  Russell  on 
with  power  to  abate  nuisances  summarily,  Crimes,  4th  ed.  435.  A  pnhlic  nuisance 
without  requiring  resort  to  legal  proceed-  can  only  he  abated  byapublic  prosecution, 
ings    (Baumgartner   v.    Hasty,   100   Ind.  or  by  a  party  whose  damages  are  special, 


446 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  374 


subject  in  a  v^  ry  important  case,  where  a  city,  under  authority  to  pre- 
vent and  restrain  encroachments  on  rivers  running  through  it,  com- 


and  different  from  those  sustained  by  the 
public  generally.  School  District,  &c.  v. 
617;  Billard  v.  Erhart,  35 
Kan.  611;  Bl  inc  v.  Murray,  36  La.  An. 
162.  See  also  Moore  r.  Langdon,  2 
Mackey,  127.  A  public  nuisance  is  not 
made  Legal  by  having  been  maintained  for 
■•,.  Commonwealth  v.  Upton, 
6  Gi  .  173;  New  Salem  v.  Eagle  Mill 
i  L38    Mass.    8.      The   erection   of  a 

building  in  a  public  street  to  be  used  as  a 
market,  and  as  a  pound  for  confining 
swiiii',  would  be  both  a  public  and  a  pri- 

i  uisance,  and  »i<tij  be  enjoined  at  the 
sail    of  any   one    threatened    with    injury 

by.  Lutterloh  v.  Cedar  Keys,  15 
1  306.  But  see  Benkel  v.  Detroit,  49 
Mich.  249;  Index,  tit.  Injunction.  That 
which  atl'eets  only  three  or  four  persons  is 
a  private  and  not  a  public  nuisance.  The 
King  ».  Lloyd,  4  Esp.  200.  The  term 
"uuisance"  is  well  understood,  and  means 
literally  annoyance,  -  anything  thai  work- 
eth  hurt.  The  King  v.  White,  1  Burr. 
In  King  v.  Davey,  5  Esp.  '217; 
Burditl   '•.  Swenson,  17  Tex.  489. 

i  and  Occupations.  It 
is  not  necessary,  to  constitute  a  nuisance,  to 
show  that  the  smell,  &c.,  produced  should 
be  unwholesomp.  It  is  enough  if  it  ren- 
ders the  enjoymenl  of  life  and  property  un- 
comfortable. Per  Lord  Mansfield,  in  The 
King   !'.  White  et  al.,   1    Burr.   337;  The 

;  v.  Neil,  •>  C  &  P.   485;  St.    Helen's 

Chemical  Co.    v.   Corporation  of  St.  Hel- 

I.     I; .    l    Ex.    Div.  196.     "If  there 

be  smells  offensive  to  the  senses,  that  is 

fja,  as  the  neighborhood  has  aright 
to  fresh  and  pure  air."  Per  Abbott,  C.  .!., 
The  King  v.  Neil,  'J  C.  &  P.  485.  "The 
only  question  therefore  is,  Is  the  business 
[ion  i  >,  a  i  carried  on  by  the 
defendant,  productive  of  smells  to  persons 
pa  ing  al  ng  I  be  public  highway  '"  lb. 
A  by-law  providing  "thai  no  person  shall 
keep  within    the  city 

i  special  resolul  ion  of  the  coun- 
cil" was  held    bad,    tending   to  create  a 
Nash  '■.  Mc<  Iracken,  In  re,  33 
Upper  Can.  Q.  !'•.  181.     So  a  by-law  im- 
fine  upon   every   person    "who 
bhali  keep  or  suffer  to  be  kept,  any  swine 


within  the  said  borough  from  it  Febru- 
ary tu  31st  Octobei  inclusive,  in  any 
year."  Everetl  u.  <  Irapes,  3  L.  T.  n.  s. 
669.  A  resolution  or  license  from  the  cor- 
poration held  to  be  ii"  di  f>  nee  to  a  prose- 
cution for  a  public  nuisance.  The  King 
f.  Cross,  2  C.  &  P.  483.  "This  certifi- 
cate is  no  defence;  and  even  if  it  were  a 
license  from  all  the  magistrates  in  the 
county  to  the  defendant  to  slaughter 
horses  in  this  very  place,  it  would  not  en- 
title the  defendant  to  continue  the  busi- 
ness there  one  hour  after  it  became  a  pub- 
lic nuisance  to  the  neighborhood.  ...  If 
the  defendant's  slaughtering  house  was  so 
conducted  as  to  be  a  public  nuisance  at 
common  law,  the  parish  might  at  any 
time  have  caused  it  to  be  removed:  and  I 
am  clearly  of  opinion  that  in  this  case  it 
was  so  conducted  as  to  be  a  nuisance  at 
common  law,  and  that  the  defendant 
would  not  have  been  and  is  not  entitled  to 
any  compensation."  It  was  in  tins  case 
proved  that  smells  proceeded  from  the 
slaughter-house  which  were  a  great  nuisance 
to  persons  passing  along  the  public  high- 
way. If  a  certain  noxious  trade  is  already 
established  in  a  place  remote  from  habita- 
tion and  public  roads,  and  persons  after- 
wards come  and  build  houses  within  reach 
of  its  noxious  effects,  or  if  a  public  road 
be  made  so  near  to  it  that  the  carrying  on 
of  the  trade  becomes  a  nuisance  to  the 
persons  using  the  road,  in  those  cases  the 
party  would   be  entitled  to  continue  his 

trade,  because  his  trade  was  legal  before 
the  erection  of  the  houses  in  the  one  case, 
and  the  making  of  the  road  in  the  other. 
Per  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  The  King  v.  Cross, 
2  C.  &  P.  484.  But  quaere  ;  and  see  cases 
supra.  But  if  the  man  so  situated  in- 
crease the  nuisance  by  the  manner  or  ex- 
tent to  which  he  carries  on  the  trade  he  is 
liable  to  indictment.  The  King?-.  Watts, 
M.  &  M.  281  :  The  King  V.  Neville,  1 
Peake,  92.  In  countries,  however,  where 
t  works  are  carried  on,  which  are  the 
means  of  developing  national  wealth,  per- 
sons must  not  stand  on  extreme  rights. 
Bandord  v.  Turnley,  3  P..  *  S.  62-66;  Tii  p. 
ing  v.  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co..  I  B.  &  S. 
60S;   s.   c.    11    H.   L.   C.    642;    Gaunt  v. 


§  874    ORDINANCES  :   POWER  TO  PREVENT  AND  ABATE  NUISANCES.    447 


menced  summary  proceeding  to  remove  a  private  wharf,  an  eminent 
judge  uses  this  language:  "But  the  mere  declaration  by  the  city 


Fynney,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  8;  Harrison  v. 
Good,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  338  ;  Salvin  v.  North 
Brancepeth  Coal  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  Ap.  7');,; 
Ball  v.  Ray,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  467  ;  Broder 
r.  Saillard,  I,.  R.  2  Ch.  Div.  692;  Harr. 
Muuic.  Man.  5th  ed.  397. 

Bat  a  priv  tie  individual  cannot  justify 
damaging  the  property  of  another  on  tho 
ground  that  it  La  a  public  nuisance,  unless 
it  do  him  a  special  and  particular  injury. 
Dimes  v.  Petley,  15  Q.  B.  276  ;  Arnold  v. 
Holbrook,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  96  ;  The  Mayor, 
&c.  of  Scarborough  v.  Rural  Sanitary 
Authority  of  Scarborough,  L.  R.  1  Kx. 
Div.  344;  Price  v.  Grantz,  118  Pa.  St. 
402.  A  distinction  must  be  drawn  be- 
tween a  bouse  which  is  a  nuisance  per  se, 
and  one  that  is  only  a  nuisance  by  reason 
of  its  use  or  abuse.  In  the  latter  case 
there  is  no  legal  right  to  destroy  the  prop- 
erty. In  several  parts  of  England  public 
slaughter-houses  are  established,  under  a 
provision  that  "  no  person  shall  slaughter 
any  cattle  or  dress  any  carcass  for  sale  as 
food  for  man  in  any  place  within  the 
limits  other  than  a  slaughter-house."  It 
was  held  that  the  enactment  only  applied 
to  the  slaughtering  of  beasts  intended  by 
the  person  slaughtering  the  same  for  sale 
for  human  food.  Elias  v.  Nightingale,  8 
E.  &  B.  698  ;  see  further,  Anthony  v.  The 
Brecon  Markets  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ex.  167  ;  re- 
versed, L.  R.  7  Ex.  399.  An  indictment 
wiH  lie  for  a  public  nuisance,  but  not  for 
a  private  nuisance.  The  King  v.  Atkins, 
3  Burr.  1706.  That  which  is  not  of  pub- 
lic concern  is  a  mere  civil  injury.  The 
King  v.  Storr,  3  Burr.  1698  ;  The  King  r. 
Johnson,  1  "Wils.  325.  The  non-repair  of 
a  private  road,  even  by  a  public  body,  is 
not  indictable.  The  King  v.  Richards,  8 
T.  R.  634  ;  The  King  r.  Trafford,  1  B.  & 
Ad.  874.  The  writ  quod  permittat  lay  at 
common  law  to  prostrate  a  public  nui- 
sance (Palmer  v.  Poultney,  2  Salk.  458), 
and  after  judgment  on  an  indictment  for 
a  nuisance,  a  writ  of  prostration  may 
still  be  issued.  The  Kin.'  v.  Newdigate, 
Comb.  10  ;  Houghton's  Case,  SirT.  Boyd, 
215  :  Yin.  Abr.  "Nuisance,"  A;  Tb.  "Che- 
min,"  l'itz.  Nat.  Brev.  124;  The  Queen 
v.  Haynes,  7  Ir.   L.  R.  '2.     An  action  on 


the  case  will  lie  for  the  continuum 

■    after   recovery  for   its   erection. 

Rosewell  v.  Prior,  2  Salk.  !■ 
an  indictment  for  a  nuisance  is  in  form  a 
criminal,  it  is  in  substance  a  civil  pro- 
ceeding remedial  in  its  object.  The  King 
v.  Sadler,  4  C.  &  P.  218  ;  Holmes  V.  Wil- 
son, 10  A.  &  E.  503  ;  Dougla 
B.  825;  Thompson  v.  Gibson,  7  M.  &  W. 
456  ;  The  Queen  v.  Chorley,  12  Q.  B.  515  ; 
The  King  v.  Russell,  3  E.  &  B.  942  ; 
Tic  Queen  v.  Loughton,  3  Smith,  575; 
The  Queen  v.  Lincombe,  2  Chit.  214. 
Upon  an  indictment  for  a  continuing 
nuisance  —  such  as  a  wall  across  a  high- 
way—  the  proper  judgment  is,  that  it  be 
abated  (The  King  v.  Stead,  8  T.  R.  142; 
The  King  i'.  Yorkshire,  7  T.  R.  167),  and 
when  the  court  is  satisfied  before  judg- 
ment that  a  nuisance  has  been 
the  judgment  need  not  be  pronounced. 
The  King  v.  Incledon,  13  East,  164  ;  The 
Queen  v.  Paget,  3  F.  &  F.  29.  The  prac- 
tice followed  is  to  respite  judgment  until 
it  be  seen  whether  or  not  the  nuisance  is 
abated,  and,  if  not,  to  inflict  a  heavy  fine 
to  compel  the  abatement.  There  may  be 
an  indictment  for  the  continuance  of  a 
nuisance  (The  Queen  v.  Maybury,  4  F. 
&  F.  90),  and  in  such  a  case  the  former 
judgment  is  conclusive  that  the  locus  in 
quo  was  a  highway,  and  that  the  erection 
upon  it  was  a  nuisance.  This  being  so, 
upon  proof  of  the  continuance  of  the  nui- 
sance the  jury  must  find  the  defendant 
guilty.  See  further,  Regina  0.  Jackson, 
40  Upper  Can.    Q.  1'..  290. 

As  to  the  right  of  an  adjoining  owner 
to  recover  damages  for  a  private  i"j"r'j 
resulting  from  a  public  nuisance  in  a  public 
highway,  where  there  is  a  direct  and  par- 
ticular damage,  such  as  thai   arising  from 

nable  obstruction  to  tl 
his  premises  from  the  highway.      I 
Hobson,    19   Am.    Law    R  g. 
and  note  ;   Bushnell  v.  Robeson,  62   Iowa, 
540  ;  (Slaughter-house)  Irwin  v.  Telephone 
C  ».,  37  La.  An.  63  ;  McDonal  I  v.  Newark, 
42  N.   J.   En..  (15  Stew.)    L36.     A    ' 

which    is    detrimental    to    certain 
classes  of  property  and   busin 
personal  annoyance  to  the  public  at  large 


448 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§374 


council  that  a  certain  structure  was  an  encroachment  or  obstruction 
diil  not  make  it  so,  nor  could  such  declaration  make  it  a  nuisance 
unless  it  in  fart  had  that  character.  It  is  a  doctrine  not  to  be 
t  ilerated  in  this  country  that  a  municipal  corporation,  without  any 
general  laws  cither  of  the  city  or  of  the  State  within  which  a  given 
structure  can  be  shown  to  be  a  nuisance,  can,  by  the  mere  declara- 


is  ;i  public  nuisance  whether  declared  so 
by  ordinance  or  not.  Harmon  v.  '  hicago, 
110  111.  400;  see  cases  below  cited. 

Ringing  of  bells,  blowing  of  horns,  and 
other  unusual  noises,  are  treated  as  nui- 
j.  They  may  or  may  not  be  nui- 
sances according  to  circumstances.  It  is 
in  the  power,  however,  of  the  corporation 
at  any  time  to  treat  all  such,  when  in 
ts  and  public  places,  as  nuisances, 
and  prevent  them.  It  is  difficult  to  de- 
scribe,  though  easy  to  imagine,  such  "an 
unusual  noise"  as  would  be  a  nuisance. 
Some  examples  may,  however,  be  given. 
The  noise  of  a  tinsmith  in  carrying  on 
his  trade,  if  in  a  neighborhood  where 
there  is  a  number  of  offices,  and  of  suffi- 
cient volume  to  prevent  the  occupants 
from  following  their  lawful  business,  will, 
if  it  atl'.it  a  considerable  number  of  in- 
habitants, be  deemed  a  public  nuisance. 
The  King  v.  Lloyd,  4  Esp.  200. 

A  reus,  tie-  performances  in  which 
were  to  be  carried  on  for  eight  weeks 
near  the  plaintiff's  house,  and  the  per- 
formances, which  took  place  every  even- 
ing, lasted  from  about  half-past  seven  till 
pasl  ten  o'clock.  The  noise  of  the 
music  and  shouting  in  the  circus  could  be 
distinctly  heard  all  over  the  house,  and 
so  loud  that  it  could  be  heard  above 
the  conversation  in  the  dining-room, 
though  the  windows  and  shutters  were 
].  This  was  held  to  be  a  nuisance. 
[nchbald  v.  Robinson,  L.  Tl.  4  Ch.  App. 
3SS.  If  a  man  builds  a  rolling-mill  close 
to  inhabited  cottages,  so  that  the  vibra- 
tion produced  by  the  hammers  cracks  tho 
walls  of  the  ■  ottages,  and  the  noise  of  the 
mill  causes  them  to  become  and  remain 
uninhabited,  the  rolling-mill  will  be  a 
!  rth,  4  F.  &  F.  349  ; 
8.  C.   in  L.  T.  N.  8.  210. 

A  s/u  id  near  a  public  high- 

way, where  pi  me  to  shoot   with 

rifles  at  pigeons,   targets,  &c,  may  be  a 
nee.     The  King  r.  -Moore,  3  B.  &  Ad. 


184.     So,   by  means  of  powder,  working 

stone  quarries  near  the  public  streets  and 
dwelling-houses.  The  Queen  v.  Mutters, 
10  Cox,  6  ;  Harr.  Munic.  Man.  5th  ed. 
401,  402. 

A  corporation  has  no  more  right  to 
license  or  maintain  a  nuisance  than  an  indi- 
vidual would  have,  and  for  a  nuisance 
maintained  upon  its  property  the  same 
liability  attaches  against  a  city  as  to  an 
individual.  Haagw.  Co.  Comm'rs,  60Ind. 
511  ;  Petersburg  v.  Applegarth,  2s  Gratt. 
321  ;  Bray  ton  v.  Fall  River,  113  Mass. 
218 ;  Franklin  Wharf  Co.  v.  Portland, 
67  Me.  46  ;  Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis. 
365  ;  Hannibal  v.  Richards,  82  Mo.  330  ; 
"Wood  on  Nuisances,  sec.  742.  Infra,  sec. 
375,  note.  A  city  was  held  liable  for  erect' 
ing  a  pest-house  whereby  plaintiff's  prem- 
ises became  unhealthful  and  infected  with 
the  same  disease,  and  the  occupancy  ren- 
dered unsafe  and  unpleasant.  Niblett  v. 
Nashville,  12  Ileisk.  684.  May  pass  ordi- 
nances to  prevent  as  well  as  to  remove 
nuisances.  Gregory  v.  New  Yolk,  40 
X.  V.  273  ;  see  Wood  on  Nuisances,  sees. 
740,  741,  and  cases  cited.  A  city  held  to 
have  no  power  to  destroy  a  dam  across  a 
creek  within  its  limits  as  a  nuisance, 
(lark  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Syracuse,  13  Barb. 
(X.  Y. )  32.  Abatement  by  individuals 
and  by i  peers.     Manhattan  Mannf. 

&  Fert.  Co.  v.  Van  Keuren,  23  N.  J. 
Eq.  251  ;  Meeker  r.  Van  Rensselaer,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  397.  Destruction  of  build- 
ing by  mob.  Brightman  v.  Bristol,  65 
Me.  426;  8.  o.  20  Am.  Rep.  711.  Under 
the  laws  of  New  York  establishing  boards 
of  licalth,  while  the  board  of  health  of  a 
town  cannot  go  outside  of  its  own  boun- 
daries to  abate  a  nuisance  summarily,  it 
ma\  restrain  the  violation  of  its  order  and 
enforce  abatement,  though  the  cause  of 
tin'  nuisance  arises  in  an  adjoining  mu- 
nicipality. Gould  v.  Rochester,  105  N.  Y. 
46. 


§  374  ordinances:  power  to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances.  440 

tioa  that  it  is  one,  subject  it  to  removal  by  any  person  supposed  to 
be  aggrieved,  or  even  by  the  city  itself.  This  would  place  every 
house,  every  business,  and  all  the  property  in  the  city,  at  the  uncon- 
trolled will  of  the  temporary  lucal  authorities."  2 


1  Per  Miller,  J.,  Yates  v.  Milwaukee, 
10  Wall.  497  (1870)  ;  Pieri  v.  Shieldsboro, 
42  Miss.  493 ;  Underwood  v.  Green,  42 
N.  Y.  140;  Darst  v.  People,  62  111.  306 
(1869)  ;  Miller  v.  Burch,  32  Tex.  208 
(1869);  Everett  v.  Council  Bluffs,  it)  [owa, 
66  (1877),  approving  Yates  v.  Milwaukee; 
Pye  v.  Peterson,  45  Tex.  312  (1876)  ;  s.  c. 
23  Am.  Rep.  608,  approving  Yates  v. 
Milwaukee.  Cole  v.  Kezler,  64  Iowa,  59  ; 
Everett  v.  Marquette,  53  Mich.  450  (a 
staircase  in  a  sidewalk  is  not  a  nuisance 
per  se)  ;  St.  Paul  v.  Gilfillan,  36  Minn. 
298  (dense  smoke  not  a  nuisance  per  se)  ; 
Joyce  v.  Woods,  78  Ky.  386  ;  Green  v. 
Lake,  60  Miss.  451  ;  McCrowell  v.  Bristol, 
5  Lea  (Tenn.),  685;  Ison  v.  Manley,  76 
Ga.  804.  A  person  sick,  even  with  con- 
tagious disease,  in  his  own  house  or  at  a 
hotel,  is  not  a  nuisance.  Boom  v.  Utica, 
2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  104  (1848). 

Works  that  amount  to  a  private  nui- 
sance, causing  actual  damage  to  private 
persons,  cannot  be  justified,  under  a  license 
from  the  city  council  to  erect  them.  But 
the  fact  of  such  license  is  evidence  of  great 
but  not  conclusive  weight  in  favor  of  the 
party  erecting  and  owning  the  works  claimed 
to  be  a  nuisance.  Ryan  v.  Copes,  11  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  217  (1858)  A  pig-sty  in 
a  populous  place  is,  per  se,  a  nuisance. 
Com'lth  v.  Van  Sickle,  Bright.  (Pa.)  69. 
Livery  stable  in  a  town  is  not,  per  sc,  a 
nuisance,  it  depends  upon  its  location  and 
the  manner  in  which  it  is  built,  kept,  or 
used.  Aldrich  v.  Howard,  7  R.  I.  87  ; 
s.  c.  8  R.  I.  246 ;  Burditt  v.  Sweuson,  17 
Tex.  489  (1856);  Morris  v.  Brower,  An- 
thon'sN.  P.  (X.  Y.)  368;  Flint  v.  Russell, 
5  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  151  (1879)  ;  Harrison  v. 
Brooks,  20  Ga.  537  (1856)  ;  Wood  on 
Nuisances,  sees.  528,  529  ;  Pickard  v. 
Collins,  23  Barb.  (X.  Y. )  444  ;  Shiras  r. 
Olinger,  50  Iowa,  571;  20  Alb.  L.  J.  56. 
Nor  is  a  liberty  pole  a  nuisance  per  sc. 
Allegheny  v.  Zimmerman,  10  Pitts.  Leg. 
Jour.  168  ;  s.  c.  95  Pa.  St.  287  ;  Dargan 
v.  Waddell,  9  Ire.  (X.  C.  Law)  '2 !  (  ; 
Kirkman  v.  Handy,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
vol..  i.  — 29 


406;  Cokerr.  Bilge,  10  Ga.  336.  A  tan- 
nery is  not,  per  se,  a  nuisance.  S 
Cadwalader,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  .1.  L. 
Brick-making:  Wanstead,  &c.  v.  Hill,  13 
C.  15.  (n.  s.)  17:i.  Slaughti  r-hou  Du- 
bois v.  Budlong,  10  Bosw.  (X.  Y 
Atty.  -General  v.  Steward  (5  C.  E.  Green), 
20  N.  J.  Eq.  415;  Villavaso  v.  Barthet, 
39  La.  An.  247  ;  see  cases  in  this  note 
supra.  Powder-house,  with  large  quanti- 
ties of  powder  therein,  Located  in  a  city,  is  a 
nuisance.  Cheatham  v.  Shearon,  1  Swan 
(Tenn.),  213,  216;  Dumesnil  v.  Dupont, 
18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  800.  The  manufactur- 
ing ami  keeping  large  quantities  of  gun- 
powder  in  towns  or  closely  inhabited 
places  is  an  indictable  offence  at  common 
law.  Rex  v.  Williams,  1  Russ.  on  Cr.  *  439 ; 
The  lung  v.  Taylor,  2  Str.  1167  ;  Crowder 
v.  Tinkler,  19  Ves.  617.  Planing 
Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274  ;  Dun- 
can v.  Hayes,  22  N.J.  Eq.  25  (1871). 
As  to  gas-ioorks :  Cleveland  v.  Cit.  Gasl. 
Co.,  20  X.  J.  F.q.  201.  Steam  ft 
mill:  Gilbert  v.  Showerman,  23  Mich. 
448.  Stock-yards :  lb.  296  ;  Ashbrook  v. 
Commonwealth,  lBnsh(Ky.\  139.  Porgy 
oil  factory:  Brightman  v.  Bristol,  65  Me. 
42o  (1876):  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  711.  Privies: 
Wahle  v.  Reinbach,  76  111.  322.  Gas  com- 
panies :  Cleveland  v.  Citizens'  Gasl.  Co.,  5 
C.  E.  Green  (20  N.  J.  Eq.),  203.  P 
Ross  v.  Butler,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  294.  Glass 
and  broken-rvarc  in  public  place.  Ex  parte 
Casinello,  62  Cal.  538.  Smoke  an 
vapors  caused  by  burning,  under  public 
authority,  clothing,  bedding,  &c,  to  pre- 
vent the  spread  of  contagious  diseases  is 
not  an  indictable  nuisance.  State  v.  Knox- 
ville,  12  Lea,  146.  Coasting  on  a  public 
street  held  not  necessarily  a  nuisance. 
Burford  V.  Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich.  98; 
see  post,  chap,  on  Streets.  A  wooden  awn- 
vngover  a  side- walk  is  nol  a  nuisance  per  se. 
Hawkins  p.  Sanders,  45  Mich.  4'.M ;  pee 
Index,  tit.  Atoning.  Whether  a  particular 
linii-  kiln  is  a  nuisance  or  not  is  :i  mixed 
n  if  law  and  of  fact.  Stal  '.  Mott, 
61  M  !.  _;'7.    A  m  '  '■  t-ca  ■'  inasl  I 


450 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§375 


§  375    (300).    General  Power  over  Nuisances.  —  Power  to  muni- 
cipal corporations  to  make  "by-laws  relative  to  nuisances  generally" 
been  decided  to  authorize  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping, 
in  any  manner  whatsoever,  of  a  "bowling-alley  for  gam  or  hire,  such 
a  place  being  a  public  nuisance  at  common  law.1     So  under  power 


not  a  nuisance  per  se.     State  v.  Edens,  85 

.  522.     A  w few  building  in  a  city 

i^  ii"t  a  nuisance  per  se,  but  may  become 
bo  by  ill'-  ^av  in  which  it  is  used.     Fields 
r.  Stokley,  99  Pa.  St.  306.     Dead  animals 
arc  not  nuisances  per  se,  but  may  become 
such.     River  Rendering  Co.  v.   Behr,  77 
Mo.  (.'l  ;  CTnderwood  v.  Given,  42  N.  Y. 
1  in.     Flouring  Mill :  Under  the  power  to 
prevent  nuisances  ami  dangerous  manufac- 
tories, a  municipal  corporation  cannot,  on 
petition  of  citizens,  deal    with  a  flouring 
mill  as  a  nuisance,  unless  it  is  shown  by 
the  record  to  tall  within  some  law  or  ordi- 
nance previously  passed.     Lake  v.  Aber- 
deen, 57  Miss.  260.     In  Louisiana,  where 
the    civil    code    (art.    655)    provides    that 
works,  &c.,  causing  annoyance  "shall  be 
regulated  by  the  rules  of  the  police  or  the 
customs  of  the  place"   where  located,  an 
ordinance,  of  a  city  council  ordering  a  black- 
smith shop  to  be  closed  as  a  nuisance  is 
authorized  by  law,  and  may  be  carried  into 
effect  by  an  injunction,  procured  by  the 
city  in  its  corporate  name,  restraining  the 
owner    from    continuing  the    shop.      New 
Orleans*.  Lambert,  14  La.  An.  247  (1859). 
Power  of  municipal  corporations  to  rc~ 
move  nuisances,  and  how  far  their  decision 
as  to  fact  of  nuisance  is  conclusive.    Welch 
i>.    Stowell,   2   Doug.    (Mich.)   332;  Ken- 
nedy i>.  Board  of  Health,  2  Pa.  St.  366  ; 
Com'lthr.  Van  Sickle,  Bright.  (Pa.)  69; 
Green   u.   Savannah.  6  Ga.  1  ;   Roberts  v. 
ogle.  3ii  111.  459  ;  Clark  v.  Mayor,  &c,  13 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  32;  Saltonstall  v.  Banker, 
ray  (Mass.),  196  ;  Kennedy  v.  Phelps, 
10  La.  An.  2-J7  ;  Green  v.  Underwood,  42 
X.  Y.  1  10  :   Mayor  of  Hudson  v.  Thorne, 
7  Paige  IX.   Y.),   261 :  Salem  i>.   Eastern 
R.  I  s.  431  ;  Chicago  v.  Laflin, 

I'.'  [11.  17'2  :  Babi k  v    Buffalo,  56  V  Y. 

Darsl  v.  People  (intoxicating liquors), 
51  111.  286  (1869).  The  power  of  munici- 
cipa]  corporations,  with  respect  to  nui- 
sances, is  treated  iii  the  chapter  xxii.  of 
Mr.  Wood'sworic  on  the  Law  of  Nuisances, 
[n  tance  of  refusal  by  a  court  of  chancery 


to  interfere  with  the  municipal  authori- 
ties in  removing  nuisances.  Ferguson  v. 
Selma,  43  Ala.  398  (1869). 

Under  the  English  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  the  council  of  any  borough  is 
empowered  to  make  by-laws  for  the  good 
rule  and  government  of  the  borough,  and 
the  prevention  and  suppression  of  nuisances 
[ante,  sec.  337)  ;  and  it  is  held  that  this 
power  respecting  the  suppression  of  nui- 
sances is  confined  to  the  suppression  and 
prohibition  of  acts  which,  if  done,  must 
necessarily  and  inevitably  cause  a  nuisance, 
and  it  does  not  empower  the  council  to 
impose  penalties  for  the  doing  of  things 
which  may  or  may  not  be  a  nuisance  ac- 
cording to  circumstances.  Thus,  where 
the  town  council  imposed  a  fine  upon  every 
person  who  should  "keep  or  suffer  to  be 
kept  any  swine  within  the  borough  be- 
tween the  first  of  May  and  the  first  of 
October,"  it  was  held  that  the  by-law  was 
wholly  invalid,  as  the  keeping  of  a  pig  did 
not  necessarily  create  a  nuisance.  Addi- 
son on  Torts,  34,  citing  Everett  v.  Grapes, 
3  Law  T.  R.  N.  S.  Q.  B.  669;  Wan  stead 
Local  Hoard  v.  Hill,  13  C.  B.  N.  s.  479. 

i  Tanner  v.  Albion,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  121 
(1843);  followed,  Updike  v.  Campbell,  4 
E.  D.  Smith  (X.  Y.),  570  (1855);  The  Peo- 
ple v.  Sergeant,  8  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  139,  which 
held  that  a  room  kept  for  the  playing  of 
billiards  was  not  a  public  nuisance,  though 
a  profit  was  made  of  it,  commented  on  and 
distinguished,  and  by  Cowen,  J.,  doubted, 
in  5  Hill,  supra.  A  power  to  "  sitjyrcss 
and  restrain  "  gaming  held  to  grant  power 
to  license  billiard  playing.  In  re  Snell, 
58  Yt.  207.  Whether  a  ball  alley  could 
be  prohibited  under  the  general  authority 
to  pass  liv-laws  relative  to  good  govern* 
ment,  &c,  was  alluded  to,  but  not  deter- 
mined. See  Jackson  r.  People,  9  Mich. 
Ill;  Smith  v.  Madison,  7  Ind.  86.  In 
The  State  r.  Hall,  32  N.  J.  158  (1867),  it 
was  held  that  a  ten-pin  alley  kept  for  gain 
and  public  use  in  a  town  is  not,  per  se,  a 
nuisance.     The  law  on  the  subject  is  very 


§375 


ORDINANCES  :     GENERAL   POWER   OVER   NUISANCES. 


451 


to  pass  by-laws  to  prevent  and  remove  nuisances,  an  ordinance  may 
be  passed  inflicting  a  fine  on  any  person  who  should  exhibit  a  stud- 
horse in  the  streets  of  the  corporation.1 


fully  examined  in  the  opinion  of  Bcaslcy 
C.  J.,  and  the  case  of  Tanner  >•.  Albion, 
supra,  reviewed  and  disapproved.  Where 
a  city  has,  l>y  its  charter,  the  power  to  de- 
termine whether  bowling  alleys  should  be 
allowed,  and,  if  so,  under  what  restric- 
tions, an  ordinance  requiring  them  to  be 
closed  at  a  certain  hour  is  valid.  State  v. 
Hay,  29  Me.  (15  She]..)  457  (1849);  State 
v.  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426;  supra,  sec.  368, 
note.  A  statute  of  Missouri  designed  to 
suppress  gambling  in  St.  Louis  authorized 
the  police  to  seize  gaming  tables  and  gam- 
ing ill-vices  used  for  gambling,  and  made  it 
the  duty  of  the  president  of  the  police  to 
cause  the  same  to  be  publicly  destroyed. 
This  could  be  done  without  notice  to  the 
owner  or  any  semblance  of  judicial  inves- 
tigation. The  statute  was  declared  un- 
constitutional as  depriving  the  owner  of 
such  gambling  tables,  &c,  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  Lowry  v. 
Rainwater,  70  Mo.  152  (1879);  s.  c.  35 
Am.  Rep.  420  (1879);  21  Alb.  Law  Jour. 
72  ;  Fisher  v.  McGirr,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  1; 
Hibbard  v.  People,  4  Mich.  126  ;  Lincoln 
v.  Smith,  27  Vt.  354.  Under  authority 
to  pass  such  ordinances  as  the  council 
"may  consider  fit  and  proper  to  remove 
nuisances  or  causes  of  disease,"  &c,  it  was 
held  that  the  city  of  Savannah  might 
prohibit  the  growing  of  rice  within  the  cor- 
porate limits,  as  being  injurious  to  the 
health  of  the  city,  and  abate  the  same, 
and  that  such  an  ordinance  was  valid  as  a 
police  regulation.  Green  v.  Savannah, 
6  Ga.  1  (1849).  City  held  to  have  no 
power  to  license  &keno  table'to  be  kept  for 
gaming.  Schuster  v.  State,  48  Ala.  199 
(1872).  Where  proceedings  in  respect  to 
nuisances  are  instituted  by  order  of  the 
city  council,  chancery  will  not  enjoin  or 
interfere,  "  unless  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion have  clearly  transcended  their  pow- 
ers." Kennedy  v.  Phelps.  10  La.  An. 
227  (1855)  (building  for  curing  hides)  ; 
8.  p.  Milne  v.  Davidson  (private  hospital), 
5  Mar.  (La.)  586  (1827);  PotteT  o.  Mfe- 
nasha,  30  Wis.  492  (1872)  ;  post,  sec.  405, 
note. 


1  Nolin  v.  Franklin,  4  Yerger,  163 
(1833).  Under  power  "to  prevent  and 
remove  nuisances,"  a  corporation  may,  if 
a  vacant  building  is  so  used  as  to  er 
by  fire  the  property  of  others,  or  the  health 
of  the  community,  declare  the  same  a  nui- 
sance, and  notify  owner  to  abate  it,  and 
if  he  fails,  the  individual  officer  of  the  cor- 
poration who  abates  the  nuisance  may, 
on  being  individually  sued,  justify  the  act. 
Harvey  v.  Dewoody,  18  Ark.  252  (1856). 

Where  a  city  council  has  authority 
under  its  charter  to  prevent  and  remove 
all  nuisances  within  the  city,  "  such  as  all 
decayed  and  dilapidated  houses  and  struc- 
tures calculated  to  produce  disease  of  any 
kind,  or  unfit  for  use  or  habitation,"  &c,  a 
court  of  chancery  will  not  interfere  to  pre- 
vent the  removal  of  such  nuisance  unless 
it  appears  that  the  complainant's  right  is 
illegally  assailed,  or  threatened  with  an 
irreparable  injury,  and  there  is  no  suf- 
ficient remedy  at  law.  Ferguson  v. 
Selma,  43  Ala.  398  (1869).  In  this  case 
the  court  denied  an  injunction  to  prevent 
the  removal  by  the  city  authorities  of  two 
old,  dilapidated,  substantially  valueless 
houses,  on  a  lot  in  an  improving  and 
flourishing  part  of  the  city,  which  were 
filthy,  and  crowded  with  filthy  tenants, 
and  which  had  also  been  condemned  as  a 
nuisance  by  the  board  of  health  of  the 
city.  lb. ;  infra,  sees.  377,  405,  note. 
But  a  city  under  a  charter  authorizing  the 
common  council  "to  regulate  all  wh  irves 
on  the  shore  of  the  Ohio  River  adjoining 
said  city,"  cannot  by  ordinance  define  the 
line  of  high-water  mark,  and  declare  the 
erection  of  buildings  below  said  line  a 
nuisance,  ami  impose  a  fine  upon  persons 
erecting  such  buildings  on  their  own 
lands.  Fvansville  v.  Martin,  41  End.  145 
(1872).  In  Nevada  v.  Hntchins,  59  town, 
506,  it  was  held  that,  under  a  power  to 
abate  nuisances,  an  incorporated  town  is 
not  authorized  to  pass  an  ordinance  im- 
posing a  fine  for  maintaining  a  nuisance; 
but  qua 

If  a  sewer  is  declared  to  br  a 
nuisance  to  property,  the  owner  is  entitled 


452 


MLWICIl'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  376 


i;  376  310).  Suppression  of  Houses  of  Ill-fame.  —  Power  "to  sup- 
press  )awdy-ho\  tes"  gives  the  corporation  authority,  by  implication, 
to  adopt  by  ordinance  the  proper  means  to  accomplish  the  end; 
and  among  the  methods  which  may  he  adopted  is  one  forbidding 
the  owners  of  houses  from  renting  or  letting  the  same  for  this  pur- 
pose or  with  knowledge  that  they  are  to  be  thus  used.1  But  power 
to  the  common  council  of  a  city  "to  make  all  such  by-laws  as  it 
may  deem  expedient  for  effectually  preventing  and  suppressing 
houses  of  ill-fame,"  does  not  authorize  the  council  to  decide  that 
a  given  house  is  kept  for  that  purpose,  nor,  if  kept  for  that  pur- 
pose,  dues  it  authorize  the  council  to  order  it  to  be  demolished;  nor 
if  thus  demolished,  will  it  justify  the  officers  of  the  city  who  did  it, 
in  execution  of  the  ordinance  and  resolution  of  the  council.2    Neither 


to  an  injunction  against  the  city  as  he 
would  be  against  a  private  individual ; 
but  a  court  in  granting  such  injunction 
will  postpone  its  operation  a  reasonable 
time  in  order  to  enable  the  city  to  take 
adequate  measures  to  remove  the  nuisance 
without  unnecessary  injury  to  the  public 
health  and  interests.  Haskell  v.  New 
Bedford,  108  .Mass.  208;  Boston  Rolling 
Mills  v.  Cambridge,  117  Mass.  396  ;  At- 
torney-General v.  Birmingham,  4  K.  &  J. 
528  ;  Spokes  v.  Banbury,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  42  ; 
Goldsmid  v.  Tunbridge,  L.  R.  1  Eq.  161  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Bradford,  L.  K.  2  Eq. 
71  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Colney,  &c,  L.  R. 
4  Ch.  146  :  Breed  v.  Lynn,  126  Mass.  367  ; 
supra,  sec.  374,  note. 

1  Childress  v.  Mayor,  &c,  3  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  347  (1855);  Shreveport  r.  Roos, 
35  La,  An.  1010.  The  legislature  may 
confer  exclusive  power  upon  a  city  to  pro- 
hibit and  suppress  bawdy-houses  ;  in  such 
case  the  general  State  law  upon  the  sub- 
ject was  lieM  to  be  superseded  by  an  ordi- 
nanee  passed  to  enforce  the  power.  Rogers 
v.  The  People,  9  Col.  450  (quaeri  );  supra, 
sec.  366;  post,  sees.  396,  note,  432-436  and 
notes.  Construction  of  power  "to  regu- 
l-i'i  or  suppress  bawdy-houses"  State  v. 
Clarke,  54  Mo.  17  (1873);  State  v.  De  Bar, 
58  Mo.  395  (1874);  commented  on,  ante, 
-7,  nute; post,  see.  436.  Powertoniake 
by-laws  relative  to  nuisances  gives  authori- 
ty to  impose  penalties  on  the  keepers  of 
houses  of  ill-fame,  aud  on  persons  owning 
houses  used,  with  their  knowledge,  I'm' this 
purpose.  McAlister  v.  Clark,  33  Conn.  91 
(1865)  ;  see  Ely  v.  Supervisors,  36  N.  Y. 


297;  Shaffer  ».  Mumma,  17  Md.  331  (1861). 
In  prosecutions  for  keeping  bawdy-houses, 
the  law,  it  has  been  said,  so  tar  relaxes  the 
ordinary  rule  that  common  reputation  as 
to  the  character  of  the  defendants,  and  of 
the  houses  which  they  keep,  is  admissible. 
Statu  v.  .McDowell,  Dudley  (S.  C),  Law, 
346.  A  power  to  "  repress  and  restrain 
disorderly  houses  "  held  to  confer  power 
to  make  it  penal  to  visit  such  houses. 
State  v.  Botkin,  71  Iowa,  87;  s.  p.  lie 
Johnson,  73  Cal.  228  (1SS7).  A  power  to 
"license,  regulate,  and  suppress"  includes 
power  to  prevent  soliciting  for  bawdy- 
house,  &c.  Thomas  v.  Hot  Springs,  34 
Ark.  553.  Keeping  house  of  ill-fame, 
what  ?  Queen  v.  Rice,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  21. 
Sufficient  to  charge  that  the  defendant  did 
on,  &c,  in  the  city  of,  &c,  keep  a  com- 
mon disorderly  bawdy-house  on  a  specified 
street  in  said  city,  as  a  place  of  resort  for 
both  men  and  women  of  lewd  character. 
Queen  v.  Munro,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  44; 
Queen  v.  Levecque,  30  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
509;  Queen  v.  Smith,  35  Upper  I  an.  Q.  B. 
518;  Ilarr.  Mun.  Man.  5th  ed.  395. 

An  ordinance  to  prevent  the  keeping  of 
bawdy-houses  hold  to  be  clearly  within  a 
charter  authority  to  adopt  by-laws  "  for 
preserving  peace,  order,  and  good  govern- 
ment."     State  v.  Williams,  11  S.  C.  288. 

-  Welch  r.  Stowell,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 
332(1816).  In  England  municipal  corpo- 
rations have  the  power  to  prevent  indecent  ■ 
public  •  xposure  of  the  person  andotht  r  inde- 
a  ni  exhibitions.  In  order  to  render  a  per- 
son liable  to  an  indictment  for  indecently 
exposing  his  person  in  a  public  place,  it  is 


§378 


ORDINANCES  :     NUISANCES  ;    INDICTMENT. 


453 


does  such  a  power  authorize  an  ordinance  making  it  a  misdemeanor 
for  a  prostitute  to  reside  or  be  found  within  the  corporate  limits,1 
nor  to  return  to  a  city.2 

§  377  (311).  Nuisances  upon  Rivers  within  City  Limits.  —  A  city 
charged  by  law  with  the  duty  of  preventing  obstructions  of  a  fiver 
within  its  limits  may,  by  its  own  act,  and  withoul  proceeding  by 
indictment,  abate  or  remove  anything  which  obstructs  the  free  and 
public  use  of  the  river,  such  as  a  floating  storehouse,  calculated  to  re- 
main stationary  in  the  water,  and  which  exclusively  occupies  a  por- 
tion of  the  river,  such  a  structure  being  a  public  nuisance.3  It  is 
no  answer  to  this  right  of  abatement  that  room  enough  is  left  for  the 
public,  or  that  the  structure  is  beneficial,4  or  that  the  party  erect- 
ing it  is  the  owner  of  the  adjacent  lots.5 

§  378  (312).  Power  to  demolish  ;  Indictment.  —  But  under  the 
power  to  abate  nuisances,  property  lawfully  erected  and  existing,  or  a 
house  which  is  only  a  nuisance  because  occupied  by  a  business  which 
is  such,  cannot  be  destroyed  or  demolished.  The  public  can  proceed  by 
indictment,  or  the  business  carried  on  in  the  house  be  suppressed.6 


not  necessary  that  the  exposure  should  be 
made  in  a  place  open  to  the  public.  The 
Queen  v.  Thallman,  9  Cox  C.  C.  388 ;  s.  c. 
9  L.  T.  N.  s.  425.  If  the  act  is  done  where 
a  great  number  of  persons  may  be  offend- 
ed by  it,  and  several  see  it,  it  is  sufficient. 
lb.  If  the  indictment,  however,  charge 
the  offence  to  have  been  committed  on  a 
highway,  such  an  indictment  will  not  be 
sustained  by  evidence  that  the  offence  was 
committed  in  a  place  near  the  highway, 
though  in  full  view  of  it.  The  Queen  v. 
Farrell,  9  Cox  C.  C.  446.  An  indecent 
exposure  in  a  place  of  public  resort,  if  ac- 
tually seen  by  only  one  person,  no  other 
person  being  in  a  position  to  see  it,  is 
not  an  indictable  offence.  The  Queen  v. 
Webb,  1  Den.  C.  C.  338  ;  The  Queen  v. 
Watson,  2  Cox  C.  C.  376  ;  The  Queen 
v.  Farrell,  9  Cox  C.  C.  446.  A  party  was 
indicted  for  an  indecent  exposure  in  an 
omnibus,  several  passengers  being  therein. 
Held,  a  public  place  The  Queen  v. 
Holmes,  3  0.  &  K.  360.  But  a  urinal, 
with  boxes  or  divisions  for  the  conven- 
ience of  the  public,  though  situated  in  an 
open  market,  was  held  not  to  be  a  public 
place  within  the  meaning  of  the  allega- 
tion.    The  Queen  v.  Orchard,  3  Cox  C.  C. 


248.  Keeping  a  booth  in  a  public  place 
containing  an  indecent  exhibition  for  hire, 
is  an  indictable  offence.  Regina  v.  Saund- 
ers, L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Div.  15;  Harr.  Munic 
Manual,  5th  ed.  394,  397. 

1  Buell  v.  State,  45  Ark.  336. 

2  Paralee  v.  Camden,  49  Ark.  165. 

8  Hart  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Albany,  9 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571  (1832),  a  valuable 
and  very  carefully  considered  case,  affirm- 
ing S.  c.  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  Ch.  213  ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Vanderbilt,  28  N.  Y.  396.  See 
Dutton  v.  Strong,  1  Black,  23.  Th<»  cor- 
porate body  may  abate  or  remove  the  nui- 
sance ;  but  without  express  autTwrity  can- 
not ordain  afarfeiture  of  the  structure,  or 
seize  and  sell  it,  or  convert  the  materials 
to  their  own  use.  Hart  v.  Mayor,  9  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  571,  609,  supra;  Comptonr.  Waco 
Bridge  Co.,  62  Tex.  715. 

«  Ib.;  Respublica  v.  Caldwell,  1  Dal. 
150  ;  King  v.  Russell.  6  East,  427  ;  KiTi- 
v.  Cross,  3  Camp.  224  ;  King  v.  Jones,  3 
Camp.  229. 

&  Hart  v.  Mayor,  &c.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y. ) 
571,  60S  ;  Strange  R.  1247  ;  3  Bac.  Abr. 
686;  1   Hawk.  P.  C.  303.  note  1. 

o  Clark  v.  Syracuse,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
32;  Welch  v.   Stowell,  2    Doug.   (Mich.) 


454 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  379 


£  379.    Extent  of  Authority  over  Nuisances.  — Finally,  it   may  be 

remarked  that  the  extent  of  municipal  authority  over  nuisances  de- 
pends,  of  course,  upon  the  powers  conferred  in  this  regard  upon  the 
municipality.  Tiny  may  be  general  or  specific,  or  both.  The  au- 
thority to  preserve  the  health  and  safety  of  the  inhabitants  and  their 
property,  as  well  as  the  authority  to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances,  is 
a  sufficient  foundation  lor  ordinances  to  suppress  and  prohibit  what- 
ever is  intrinsically  and  inevitably  a  nuisance.1  The  authority  to 
declare  what  is  a  nuisance  is  somewhat  broader;  but  neither  this  nor 
the  general  authority  mentioned  in  the  last  preceding  sentence  will 
justify  the  declaring  of  acts,  avocations,  or  structures  not  injurious 


332  (1846);  Miller  v.  Burch,  32  Tex.  208 
(1869);  s.  e.  .")  Am.  Rep.  242.  A  license 
from  .i  board  of  health  to  carry  mi  a  man- 
ufactory of  fertilizers  cannot  be  urged  as 
a  defence  to  an  indictment  for  creating  a 
publii  nuisance  by  the  process  of  manu- 
facturing. Garrett  v.  State,  49  N.  J.  L. 
94. 

When  equity  will  interfere  to  prevent 
and  remove  nuisances  which  affect  tht  /<///<- 
lie  ;/•  /"  rally.  People  v.  St.  Louis,  5  Gilm. 
(lit  111.)  :i72  ;  Hoole  V.  Attorney-General, 
22  Ala.  190  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Gas  Co., 
lit  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  639  ;  Aldrich  v.  How- 
ard, 7  R.  I.  s?  ;  Zabriskie  v.  Jersey  Gity 
&  B.  i:.,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  314  ;  Jersey  Gity  v. 
Hudson,  lb.  420;  Attorney-General  v. 
Brown,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J.  Eq.),  89  ; 
Mom,  ,-.  Walla  Walla,  2  Wash.  Ter.  184  ; 
Metropolitan  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  96 
111.  620  ;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  chap,  xxv.; 
Dumesnil  v.  Dupont,  18  K.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
800  (1857).  "  It  is  now  well  settled  that, 
in  addition  to  the  purely  legal  remedies, 
whirli  may  be  resorted  to  in  such  cases, 
courts  of  equity  will  take  jurisdiction  of 
Bnch  public  nuisances,  and,  in  proper 
ifford  relief  by  injunction,  especially 
where  the  nuisance  threatened  or  com- 
mitted  is  of  a  nature  to  be  permanent  or  con- 
tinuous." Dickinson,  J.,  Stearns  County 
v.  St.  Cloud,  M.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  36  Minn. 
t,  sec.  405,  note  ;  Index,  title 
Injunction.  A  city  council  may,  by  reso- 
lution, direct  its  njlim-s  to  prnired  ai/ainst 
a  specified  establishment  as  a  nuisance, 
and  cause  the  same  to  be  abated  under  a 
genera]  ordinance  of  the  corporation  ;  this 
is  a  differenl  thing  from  passing  an  ordi- 
infiicting  a  line  upon  a  particular 


person  for  keeping  a  nuisance,  which  can- 
not be  lawfully  dune.  Kennedy  V.  I  'helps, 
10  La.  An.  227  (1855).  Sec  Common- 
wealth v.  Goodrich,  13  Allen  (.Mass.), 
545  ;  .Municipality  v.  Blineau,  3  La.  An. 
688.  The  power  to  abate  nuisances  must 
be  reasonably  exercised,  so  as  to  do  the 
least  practicable  injury  to  private  rights. 
State  v.  Newark,  5  Vrooni  (38  N.  J.  L.), 
26  l  ;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  sec.  741.  Power 
to  suppress  gambling-houses  does  not,  it  is 
apprehended,  authorize  the  corporation  to 
demolish  the  houses  so  used.  All  com- 
mon gaming-houses  are  nuisances  in  the 
eye  of  the  law,  being  detrimental  to  the 
public,  as  they  promote  cheating  and 
other  corrupt  practices,  and  entice  num- 
bers of  persons  to  idleness,  whose  time 
might  be  otherwise  employed  for  the  good 
of  the  community.  1  Hawk.  P.  C.  cap. 
32,  s.  4  ;  Bosley  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  1  Q.  11. 
Div.  84;  Brodie  &  Bowman ville,  38  Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  580  ;  Harrison  Munic.  Manual, 
5th  ed.  396.  As  to  liability  of  a  city  au- 
thorized to  abate  nuisances  for  failure  to 
exercise  the  power.  Kiley  v.  Kansas,  69  Mo. 
102  ;  Parker  v.  Macon  City,  39  Ga.  729; 
Basset t  V.  St.  Joseph,  53  Mo.  290  ;  Cain  ». 
Syracuse,  95  N.  Y.  83.  Post,  chap,  xxiii. 
Where  a  municipal  corporation  does  an 
act,  lawful  in  itself,  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  create  a  nuisance,  it  is  liable  in  the 
same  manner  that  an  individual  would  be. 
Judge  v.  Meriden,  38  Conn.  90  (1871); 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Norwalk,  37  Conn.  109  ; 
Mooty  u.  Danbury,  45  Conn.  550  (1878). 
More  fully,  post,  chap,  xxiii. 

1  Ante,  sees.  141,  144,  369  ct  srq.,  374; 
post,  sec.  396,  and  note. 


§880  ordinances:   establishment  op  markets.  455 

to  health  or  property  to  be  nuisances.1  Much  must  necessarily  be 
left  to  the  discretion  of  the  municipal  authorities,  and  their  acts  will 
not  be  judicially  interfered  with  unless  they  are  manifestly  unrea- 
sonable and  oppressive,  or  unwarrantably  invade  private  rights,  or 
clearly  transcend  the  powers  granted  to  them  ;'2  in  which  case  the  con- 
templated action  may  be  prevented  or  the  injuries  caused,  redressed 
by  appropriate  suit  or  proceedings.  As  there  is  in  such  cases  a 
judicial  remedy  in  favor  of  the  citizen,  so  on  principle  the  right  of 
the  corporate  authorities  to  resort  at  their  election  to  the  courts  in 
proper  cases,  to  aid  them  when  the  citizen  is  in  the  wrong,  should,  in 
the  author's  judgment,  be  also  recognized.8  It  is  not  unusual  to 
invest  the  municipal  council  with  special  authority  in  respect  of  par- 
ticular avocations,  trades,  acts,  omissions,  and  structures,  with  a  view 
to  conserve  the  public  health  and  safety,  of  which  many  examples 
have  been  given  in  the  notes  to  this  chapter.  The  terms  in  which 
such  authority  is  conferred  measure  its  scope,  but  in  view  of  the 
end  for  which  it  is  given,  it  is  not  subjected  to  a  hostile  or  even  a 
narrow  construction.4 

§  380  (313).  Markets,  and  of  the  Power  to  establish  and  regu- 
late. —  The  States,  under  their  police  power,  may  delegate  to  muni- 
cipal corporations  the  authority  to  establish,  or  authorize  the  establish- 
ment of  markets  ;  and  it  is  competent  to  such  corporations,  under 
proper  grants  of  power,  to  enact  ordinances  forbidding  sales  and 
purchases  of  marketable  articles,  except  at  designated  market-places. 
The  extent  of  the  power  possessed  by  a  particular  corporation  de- 
pends upon  its  charter.  In  England  the  regulation  of  markets  by 
by-laws  has  long  been  exercised,  and  such  by-laws  are  sustained  as 
being  reasonable,  and  conducive  to  the  health  and  good  government 
of  the  municipality.5     In  this  country  the  practice  is  almost  uni- 

1  Supra,  sec.  374,  and  notes.  Corp.    166,   as  to  exclusive  privileges  in 

2  Ante,  sees.  94,  95,  319,  320  et  seq.  England  as  to  markets  and  market  tolls. 

3  Post,  sec.  405,  note.  The  principles  Definition. — A  market  is  a  franchise  or 
upon  which  courts  of  equity  interfere  by  liberty  derived  from  the  crown,  by  grant, 
injunction  in  the  case  of  nuisances  are  or  prescription  which  presupposes  a  grant, 
clearly  stated  by  Ld.  Chancellor  Brougham  2  Black.  Com.  37.  "It  is  a  designated 
in  Earl  of  Ripon  v.  Hobart,  3  Mylne  &  place  in  a  town  or  city  to  which  all  per- 
Keen,  169,  179.  See  also  Flint  v.  Rus-  sons  can  repair  who  wish  to  buy  or  sell 
sell,  5  Dillon,  151,  where  the  authorities  articles  there  exposed  for  sal.''  /'.  ,• 
are  collated.  Breese,  J.,  Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  416. 

4  Post,  sec.  396,  and  note.  Under  the  police  power  it  is  competent  for 

5  Pierce  v.  Bartrara,  Cowp.  270  ;  Player  the  legislature  to  prohibit  private  markets 
v.  Jenkens,  1  Sid.  284  ;  Hex  i>.  CottrelL  1  within  a  reasonable  designated  distance  of 
B.  &  Aid.  67  (1817).     See  also  Mosley  v.  the  public  market.      New  Orleans  v.  - 
Walker,  7  Barn,  k  Cr.  40;   Macclesfield  ford,  27  La.  An.  417;  8.  o.  21  Am.  Rep. 
v.  Pedley,  4  Barn.  &  Adol.  397  ;  Grant  on  563. 


456 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§381 


versal  od  the  part  of  the  legislature  to  confer  upon  the  municipal 
ncies  more  or  less  authority  with  respect  to  markets  and  market- 
places, and  such  grants  are  not  so  strictly  construed  as  those  which 
invest  the  corporation  with  powers  of  a  more  extraordinary  or  un- 
usual character  ;  al  Least  such  is  the  case  unless  a  monopoly  in  favor 
of  private  individuals  is  sought  to  be  sustained,  against  which  the 
courts  strongly  lean.1 

£  38]  (314).  Power  to  Build  and  Establish.  —  Incorporated  cities 
and  towns  may  have  the  power  to  build  market-houses  without  an 
expn  is  grant.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a  town  having  authority 
"to  make  by-laws  for  managing  and  ordering  its  prudential  affairs" 
has  power — the  court  looking  somewhat  to  usage  and  custom   to 

ertain  what  subjects  of  common  interest  are  embraced  under  the 
term  "prudential"  —  to  appropriate  money  for  the  erection  of  a 
market-house,  and  to  raise  the  amount  by  taxation.  This  power, 
it  was  admitted,  more  clearly  exists  in  the  case  of  large  towns  and 
populous  villages.2 


"  A  municipal  market  consists  :  1.  In  a 
for  sale  of  provisions  and  articles  of 
daily  consumption.  2.  Convenient  fix- 
tures. 3.  A  system  of  police  regulations, 
fixing  market  hours,  making  provisions 
fur  lighting,  watching,  cleaning,  detect- 
ing false  weights  ami  unwholesome  food, 
and  other  arrangements  calculated  to 
facilitate  the  intercourse  and  ensure  the 
honesty  of  buyer  and  seller.  4.  Proper 
officers,  ti>  preserve  order  and  enforce 
obedience  to  the  rules."  Per  Lane,  C.  J., 
Cincinnati  v.  Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  257 
(1840). 

1  Wartman  v.  Philadelphia,  33  Pa.  St. 
202,  209  (1854)  ;  LeClaire  v.  Davenport, 
13  Iowa,  -'in  ;  White  v.  Kent,  11  Ohio  St. 
550  ;  St.  John  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
6  Duer  (X.  Y.),  315  ;  Ash  v.  People,  11 
Mich.  'M7  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Jackson,  25  Mo. 
37  :  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547 
I "!  569)  ;  Nightingale,  In  re,  11  Pick. 
I  Mass.)  168  ;  Cougot  v.  New  Orleans,  1G 
In    An.  21  ;  Buffalo  v.  Webster,  10  Wend. 

IN.  Y.)  99  j  Yates  V.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis. 
673;  Bethune  v.  Hughes,  28  Ga.  560  ■ 
distinguished,  Badkins  v.  Robin  son,  53 
Ga.  613  (1875)  ;  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14 
tf.  Y.  356  ;  Municipality  v.  Cutting.  4  La. 
6  :  \.  w  Orleans  v.  Guillotte,  12 
La.  An.  818  (corporate  partnership  with 
individuals)  ;  State  v.   Lieber,   11    Iowa, 


407;  Dubuque  v.  Miller,  11  Iowa,  583; 
Morano  V.  New  Orleans,  2  ha.  217  ;  St. 
Paul  v.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41  ;  Atlanta  v. 
White,  33  Ga.  229. 

The  power  to  establish  and  regulate 
markets,  like  most  other  municipal  pow- 
ers, is  a  continuing  one,  and  markets  once 
established  may  be  abandoned  or  changed 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  corporation,  and 
the  taxpayers  or  property  owners  can- 
not restrain  the  action  or  determination  of 
the  council  entrusted  by  the  charter  with 
the  exercise  of  the  power.  Gall  v.  Cincin- 
nati, 18  Ohio  St.  563  (1869). 

2  Spauldingv.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.) 
71  (1839).  If  the  real  and  principal  ob- 
ject is  the  building  of  a  market-house,  the 
appropriation  of  a  portion  of  the  building 
for  other  purposes,  as  the  holding  of  courts, 
does  not  render  the  erection  of  the  build- 
ing illegal.  If,  however,  the  building  of 
the  market-house  is  merely  colorable,  that 
is,  done  for  the  purpose  of  accomplishing 
distinct  and  unauthorized  objects,  it  would, 
says  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  probably  he 
treated  as  an  abuse  of  power  and  a  nullity. 
lb.  Power  "  to  appoint  market-places 
and  to  regulate  the  same"  was  held,  in 
connection  with  a  general  welfare  clause, 
to  authorize  the  corporation  to  build  a 
market-house.  Smith  v.  Newbern,  70 
N.  C.  14  (1874);  s.  c.  16  Am.  Rep.  766. 


§383  ORDINANCES:     POWERS   RELATING   To    MARKETS.  4">7 

§  382    (315).    Power  to  Establish  and  Regulate.  —  Power  Conferred 

upon  a  municipality  "  to  establish  and  regulate  markets,"  authorizes, 
as  a  necessary  incident,  the  purchase  of  ground  upon  which  to  erect 
a  market  building.1  If  the  title  to  land  purchased  for  the  erection 
of  a  market-house  be  taken  by  the  municipal  corporation  in  fee,  qo 
length  of  use  of  the  same  for  a  market  will  dedicate  it  for  market 
purposes;  and  the  markets  may  be  abandoned  or  changed  at  tin- 
will  of  the  council,  and  the  land  thus  acquired  and  held  be  sold.2 
It  is  incident  to  the  general  power  to  build  a  market  to  determine 
upon  the  form,  dimensions,  and  style  of  the  edifice,  and  therefore  to 
employ  an  architect  to  prepare  plans,  specifications,  &c.3 

§  383  (31G).  Limitation  of  such  Power.  —  But  power  to  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  to  establish  markets  and  build  market-houses 
will  not  give  the  authority  to  build  them  on  a  public  street.  Such 
erections  are  nuisances  though  made  by  the  corporation,  because 
the  street,  and  the  entire  street,  is  for  the  use  of  the  whole  people. 
They  are  nuisances  when  built  upon  the  streets,  although  sufficient 
space  be  left  for  the  passage  of  vehicles  and  persons.  Such  erec- 
tions may,  it  seems,  be  legalized  by  an  express  act  of  the  legislature. 
But  unless  so  legalized,  a  nuisance  erected  and  maintained  by  a 
public  corporation  may  be  proceeded  against,  criminally  or  other- 
wise, the  same  as  if  erected  by  private  persons.4 

1  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356  ;  market  established  within  the  extended 
17  N.  Y.  449  ;  Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  limits.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Dorchester  v.  En- 
416.  It  is  immaterial  whether  this  power  sor,  L.  R.  4  Ex.  335.  But  this  is  subject 
is  conferred  in  express  or  direct  terms,  or  to  the  rights  of  any  person  owning  prop- 
given  only  as  part  of  the  power  to  make  erty  adjoining  the  site  of  the  old  market. 
by-laws,  ordinances,  &c.  Per  Seldcn,  J.,  Ellis  v.  The  Corporation  of  Bridgnorth,  4 
in  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356,  L.  T.  N.  8.  112  ;  2  Johns.  &  11.  67  ;  15 
362.  Purchase  of  land  for  market.  Pco-  C.  B.  N.  s.  52  ;  Hair.  Munie.  Manual, 
pie  v.  Lowber,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  65  ;  s.  c.  5th  ed.  451  et  seq.,  and  cases. 

more  fully,  7  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  IV.  158  ;  Gale  8  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Xew  York, 

v.  Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344  (1871).  17  N.  Y.  449  (1S58).     His  unauthorized 

2  Gall  v.  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio  St.  563  ;  employment  by  a  committee  is  ratified  by 
Cooper  v.  Detroit,  42  Mich.  584.  Con-  a  resolution  of  the  coun.il  passed  with  no- 
struction  of  market-grants  in  England,  tice  of  the  facts,  adopting  his  plans,  draw- 
Where  according  to  the  grant  of  a  market  ings,  &c,  and  he  may  recover  of  the  city 
it  was  to  be  held  in  a  town,  the  grantee  for  the  labor  and  service  of  preparing 
might  from  time  to  time  remove  the  place  them.     lb. 

for  holding  it  according  to  the  eonveni-  4  Wartman  v.  Philadelphia,  88  Pa.  St. 

enee  of  the  inhabitants  for  the  time  being.  202,  210  (1854)  ;  St.  John  v.  New  York, 

Dixon  v.  Robinson,  3  Mod.   108;  Curwen  3  Bosw.  (X.  V.)   188  :  State  v.  Mobile,  5 

v.  Salkehl,  3  East,  538;  The  King  v.  Cot-  Port.   (Ala.)  279  (1837);  Commonwealth 

terill,  1  B.  &  Al.  67  ;  Wortley  o.  The  Not-  v.  Rush,  II   Pa.  St.  (2  Harris)  L86  :  Com- 

tingham  Local  Board,  21  L.  T.  n.  s.  582.  monwealth  i>.  Bowman,  :'•  Pa.  St.  (:}  Barr) 

And   this   applies,   although  the  limits  of  202.  206  ;   McDonald  v.  Newark.  42  N.  J. 

the  town  be  afterwards  extended  and  the  Eq.    (15    Stew.)    136.      See    chapter  on 


458  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  385 

§  384  (317).  Power  under  General  Welfare  Clause.  —  Every  mu- 
nicipal corporation  which  has  power  to  make  by-laws  and  establish 
ordinances  to  promote  the  general  welfare  and  preserve  the  peace  of 
a  town  or  city  may  fix  the  time  or  places  of  holding  public  markets 
for  the  sale  of  food,  and  make  such  other  regulations  concerning 
them  as  may  conduce  to  the  public  interest.1  The  right  to  establish 
a  market  includes  the  right  to  abandon  it,  or  shift  it  to  another 
place  when  the  public  convenience  demands  it;  and  of  this  the 
council  is  the  judge.2 

§  385  (318).  Nature  of  Power  to  Establish  and  Regulate.  —  A  city 
corporation  was  invested  by  its  charter  with  power  "to  erect  mark et- 
1  muses,  to  establish  markets  and  market-places,  and  to  provide  for 
the  government  and  regulation  thereof,"  and  it  was  at  first  decided, 
and  in  the  author's  judgment  properly  decided,  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  State,  that  this  did  not  authorize  the  corporation  to 
pass  an  ordinance  delegating  to  an  individual  the  right  to  erect 
market-houses,  and  to  charge  rent  for  the  use  of  the  stalls  therein, 
reserving  to  itself  no  power  to  control  the  same,  and  that  the  cor- 
poration could  not  compel  persons  to  go  to  such  markets;  but  sub- 
sequently this  ruling  was  reversed,  and  it  was  held  that  such  an 
ordinance  was  valid,  and  that  the  city  had  the  power  to  authorize 
the  erection  of  market-houses  by  an  individual,  and  to  declare  the 
same  a  public  market,  and  to  covenant  to  protect  the  owner  in  the 
exclusive  privilege  thereof;  and  that  the  city  was  liable  for  failing 
to  protect  him  by  the  passage  of  the  retpuisite  ordinances,  he  having, 
on  the  faith  of  the  ordinance,  erected  an  expensive  market-house.3 

Streets,  post,  sees.  657,  660.     Under  the  (1862);  overruling  Davenport  v.  Kelly,  7 

Constitution  of  New  Jersey,  the  legisla-  Iowa,  102.     It  may  be  suggested  that  the 

ture   cannot   authorize   a   market   in    the  right  to  pass  such  an  ordinance,  and  the 

public  Streets  without  providing  compen-  liability  for  failing  to  pass   others,   may 

sation  to  adjoining  lot  owners.     State  v.  admit,  at  least,  of  fair  debate,  in  view  of 

Laverack,    34    N.    J.    Law,    201    (1870)  ;  the  surrender  by  the  city  of  its  charter 

I:     gins  r.  Princeton  (injunction  refused),  powers,  and  its  inability  in  law  to  make 

4  Ealsted  Ch.  309,  320.  binding  contracts  with  reference   to  the 

1   Per  Black,  C.  J.,  Wartman  v.  Phila-  future  exercise  of  its  legislative   author- 

delphia,  33  I'm.  St.  202,  209  (1854).    Note  ity.     The  soundness  of  this  suggestion  is 

bis  observations  in  this  ease  upon  the  ne-  confirmed  by  the  decision  in  Gale  v.  Kala- 

cessity  and  convenience  of  markets.  mazoo,  23  Mich.  344  (1871),  post,  chap. 

-  lb.   "  Tli  ■  right  to  establish  markets  is  xxiii.     In  the  Kelly  case,  supra,  the  point 

a  branch  of  the  sovereign  power,  and  the  was  decided,  and  is  not  overruled,   that 

right    tn   regulate    fchem    is   necessarily   a  the  charter  power  to   establish   markets, 

power  of  municipal  police."     Per  Eustes,  &c.,   conferred  upon  the  council  the  au- 

C.  .1.,  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  thority  to  prohibit  the  exposing  and  offier- 

335.  in<,'  for  sale  meat  in  any  other  places  than 

8  Le  Claire  v.  Davenport,  13  Iowa,  210  those  the  ordinance  designated.      Ash  v- 


§386 


ORDINANCES  :     POWERS   RELATING    TO    MARKETS. 


459 


§  38G     (319).     Construction    of    Special    Powers    in    Relation    to 

Markets.  —  Power  to  make  "by-laws  relative  to  the  public  mar- 
kets," &C,  while  it  would  nut  authorize  a  corporation  entirely  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  meats,  &c,  within  its  limits,  because  this  would 
be  in  general  restraint  of  trade,  will  nevertheless  authorize  a  by-law 
forbidding  the  hawking  about  or  selling  by  retail,  meats,  &c,  < 
at  the  public  markets  and  within  certain  limits  about  the  same.1 
The  courts  differ  somewhat  in  their  construction  of  the  extent  of  the 
power  to  establish  and  regulate  markets,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  cases 
cited  in  the  note.2 


People,  11  Mich.  347  ;  Hatch  v.  Pender- 
gast,  1".  Mil.  251. 

A  city  in  granting  a  license  and  sell- 
ing to  a  party  the  right  to  occupy  a  stall 
in  the  market  docs  not  impliedly  contract 
to  protect  live  lessee  from  competition  by 
unlicensed  persons  ;  nor  can  such  a  con- 
tract be  implied  against  the  corporation 
from  the  existence  of  an  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  same  ;  and  the  failure  of  the  offi- 
cers of  the  corporation,  though  wilful,  to 
enforce  the  ordinance  against  unlicensed 
sellers,  is  no  defence  to  a  bond  given  by 
the  lessee  for  the  payment  of  stall  rent. 
Peck  v.  Austin,  22  Texas,  261  (1858). 
Nor  does  a  city  owning  and  leasing  a 
market-house  impliedly  engage  or  cove- 
nant that  it  will  not  exercise  its  power  to 
establish  markets  by  erecting  other  mar- 
ket-houses and  leasing  them  to  others  ;  if 
it  does  so,  the  injury  to  the  first  lessees  is 
damnum  absque  injuria.  Cougot  v.  New 
Orleans,  16  La.  An.  21  (1861).  A  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  contract  for  build- 
ing a  market-house  with  an  individual 
or  corporation,  conceding  in  consideration 
of  such  building,  and  the  use  of  part  of 
the  same,  exclusive  market  privileges  in 
such  city,  with  rights  to  lease  stalls,  col- 
lect rents,  and  exemption  from  taxes  for 
twenty-one  years ;  but  a  purchaser  at  a 
sale  under  a  judgment  against  the  owner 
takes  only  the  right  of  the  owner  bound 
by  the  judgment,  but  this  will  not  affect 
the  rights  of  the  city  to  use  of  the  rooms 
contracted  for,  of  which  it  had  posses- 
sion.    Palestine  v.  Barnes,  50  Tex.  539. 

As  to  duty  of  corporation  where  they 
sell  or  farm  out  an  exclusive  privilege  to 
vend  articles,  to  enforce  ordinances  de- 
signed to  protect  the  privilege.  La  Rosa 
v.  New  Orleans,  4  La.  24  ;  Rosa  v.  Same, 


1  La.  126  ;  New  Orleans  v.  Peyroux,  6  Mar- 
tin, n.s.  (La.)  155;  Griffon  v.  New  Orleans, 
5  Martin,  N.  s.  (La.)  279.  City  corporation 
cannot  agree  to  abdicate  its  legislative 
powers  in  relation  to  markets,  nor  contract 
to  create  a  monopoly.  Gale  v.  Kalamazoo, 
23  Mich.  344  (1871) ;  ante,  sec.  362. 

1  Buffalo  v.  Webster,  10  Wend.  (N.  V.) 
100  (1833).  Chief  Justice  Savage  affirms, 
arguendo,  that  such  an  ordinance  would 
be  valid  under  the  common-law  power  of 
corporations  to  make  by-laws  for  the  gen- 
eral good  of  the  corporation.  lb.  Ap- 
proving Pierce  v.  Bartram,  Cowp.  269  ; 
following  Bush  v.  Seabury,  8  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  418  (1811),  and  distinguished  from 
Dunham  v.  Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
462  ;  Shelton  v.  Mobile,  30  Ala.  540 
(1857).  "The  fixing  the  place  and  times 
at  which  markets  shall  be  held  and  kept 
open,"  says  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
York  in  Bush  v.  Seabury,  8  Johns.  ( N.  Y.) 
418,  "and  the  prohibition  to  sell  at  other 
places  and  times,  are  among  the  most 
ordinary  regulations  of  a  city  or  town 
police,  and  would  naturally  be  included 
in  the  general  power  to  pass  by-laws  rel- 
ative to  the  public  markets.  If  the  cor- 
poration had  not  the  power  in  question, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  what  useful  purpose 
could  be  effected,  or  what  object  was  in- 
tended, by  the  grant  of  power  to  pass 
laws  '  relative  to  the  public  markets.'  " 

2  Power  to  make  ordinances  concern- 
ing "markets,  health,  and  good  order'' 
of  the  town  authorizes  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  butcher's  meat 
within  the  corporate  limits,  excepting 
at  the  public  market.  Winnsboro  ». 
Smart.  11  Rich.  (S.  0.)  Law,  661  (1858). 
It  seems  the  defendant  was  convicted, 
though  he  sold  the  meat  inside  his  own 


4G0 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  387 


§387  (320).    stands  in  Streets. — Tn  a  well-considered  case  in 
Massachusetts  it  is  decided  that  a  city  corporation  has  the  clear  right 


blacksmith  shop.  .  Such  ordinances  are 
ined,  says  the  court,  on  the  ground 
that  they  arc  not  in  restraint  of  trade, 
but  a  proper  regulation  of  it.  lb.  Legis- 
lative power  to  a  city  "to  erect  market- 
houses,  establish  markets  and  market- 
j  i  .,  and  provide  for  the  government 
and  regulation  thereof,"  authorizes  an 
ordinance  with  a  pecuniary  penalty,  pro- 
viding that  fresh  beef  shall  not  be  sold 
in  the  city  less  than  by  the  quarter  at 
an}-  other  than  the  market-place  during 
market  hours.  Bowling  Green  v.  Car- 
son, 10  Bush  (Ky.),  64  (1873).  So,  in 
St.  Louis  v.  Jackson,  25  Mo.  37  (1857), 
where  it  appeared  that  the  city,  under 
proper  authority,  had  erected  a  public,  or 
city,  market-house,  and  that  by  its  char- 
ter it  had  power  also,  "to  regulate,"  by 
ordinance,  the  sale  of  meats,  it  was  held 
that  this  gave  the  city  authority  to  pro- 
vide, by  ordinance,  that  "no  person,  not 
a  lessee  of  a  stall  in  the  market,  shall 
sell,  or  offer  for  sale,  meat  in  less  quan- 
tities than  one  quarter."  The  court  con- 
sidered such  an  ordinance  as  reasonable, 
highly  proper,  and  not  in  restraint  of 
tra^h,  and  not  embraced  in  the  reasoning 
in  the  case  of  Dunham  v.  Trustees  of 
Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462  ;  s.  p.  see, 
also,  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547 
(1869)  :  Le  Claire  v.  Davenport,  13  Iowa, 
210;  Davenport  v.  Kelley,  7  Iowa,  102; 
Ash  V.  People,  11  Mich.  347.  But  in 
Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  416  (1864), 
where  the  <ity,  by  its  charter,  had  power 
"to  establish  and  regulate  markets,"  and 
under  the  power  passed  an  ordinance  for- 
bidding,  during  market  hours,  the  sale  of 
vegetables  outside  the  limits  of  the  mar- 
ket, it  was  held  that  the  city  could  not 
restrain  a  regular  dealer  or  merchant  from 
vending  vegetables  at  his  place  of  business 
"Hi  ide  of  market  limits  during  any  part 
of  the  day,  such  a  restraint  of  trade  being 
unreasonable.  The  court  reviewed  many 
of  the  r;h.s  in  other  States  on  this  subject, 
and  were  of  opinion  that  the  power  to 
regulate  could  only  extend  to  the  market 
limits,  and  that  these  limits  could  not, 
under  this  power,  be  made  to  extend 
throughout    the   city.     The  court  adhered 


to  its  views  in  a  subsequent  case,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  power  "to  erect  market- 
houses,  establish  markets  and  market- 
places, and  provide  for  the  government 
and  regulation  thereof,"  does  not  author- 
ize the  council  of  a  large  and  growing 
town  to  fix  upon  one  market-place,  and 
prohibit  all  persons  at  all  hours  of  the 
day  from  selling  fresh  meats  elsewhere. 
Such  an  ordinance  was  regarded  as  un- 
reasonable, in  restraint  of  trade,  and 
tending  to  create  a  monopoly.  It  was 
admitted,  however,  that  if  the  ordinance 
had  fixed  a  reasonable  number  of  hours 
each  day  in  which  the  prohibition  should 
operate,  leaving  persons  free  to  sell  out- 
side of  market  hours,  it  would  probably 
be  unobjectionable.  Bloomington  v.  Wahl, 
46  111.  489  (1868).  So,  in  Bethune  v. 
Hughes,  28  Ga.  560  (1859),  the  court, 
leaning  against  exclusive  privileges,  held 
that  power  by  the  charter  to  the  corpora- 
tion "to  establish  and  keep  up  a  public 
market  in  the  city  for  the  sale  of,"  &c, 
does  not  confer  upon  the  city  power  to 
pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
marketable  articles  elsewhere  than  at  the 
market-place.  Distinguished,  Badkins  v. 
Robinson,  53  Ga.  613  (1875)  ;  s.  p.  St. 
Paul  v.  Laidler,  2  Minn.  190  (1858)  ; 
commented  on  and  disapproved  in  St. 
Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547  (1869)  ;  see 
St.  Paul  v.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41.  Char- 
ter power  to  a  city,  "  to  establish  public 
markets  and  other  public  buildings,  and 
make  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  same,  to  appoint  suitable 
officers  for  overseeing  and  regulating  such 
markets  and  to  restrain  all  persons  from 
interrupting  or  interfering  with  the  due 
observance  of  such  rules  and  regulations," 
does  not  confer  upon  its  common  council 
authority  to  pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
"  every  farmer,  gardener,  or  person  pro- 
ducing vegetables"  from  selling  the  same 
in  and  along  its  streets  without  first  pro- 
curing an  annual  license  from  the  city 
authorities,  paying  therefor  into  the  city 
treasury  the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars. 
St.  Paul  v.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248  (1878)  ; 
and  see  Burlington  v.  Dankwardt,  73 
Iowa,    170    (1887).      The   nature    of   the 


§  387 


ORDINANCES  '.    MARKET   STANDS   IN    STREETS. 


4G1 


to  prohibit,  by  ordinance,  the  occupation  of  a  stand  for  the  vending  of 
commodities  in  the  streets.  It  may  thus  prohibit  not  only  its  own 
inhabitants,  but  others.  It  may  make  the  prohibition  absolute,  or 
it  may  make  it  conditional  on  obtaining  license  or  permission.  It  is 
in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation,  and  does  not  violate  private 
rights  or  improperly  restrain  trade.1 


power  "to  establish  public  markets,"  &c, 
is  very  satisfactorily  discussed  in  this  case 
by  Cornell,  J.  An  ordinance  regulating 
the  killing  ami  bleeding  of  meats  is  au- 
thorized by  power  to  regulate  butchers, 
the  place  and  mode  of  selling,  and  to 
prevent  unlicensed  persons  from  acting  as 
butchers.  City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Cleves, 
Hill  &  Denio  (N.  Y.)  SuppL  231  (1843). 
Under  power  to  regulate  the  vending  of 
meats,  a  conviction  under  an  ordinance 
forbidding  the  sale  of  unwholesome  meats 
and  other  provisions  cannot  be  sustained 
for  selling  putrid  eggs.  Mayor,  &c,  of 
Rochester  v.  Rood,  Hill  &  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
Suppl.  146. 

By  the  Municipal  Act  of  Canada  the 
council  may  pass  by-laws  "  for  establish- 
ing and  regulating  all  markets  ;  for  pre- 
venting or  regulating  the  sale  by  retail  in 
the  public  streets  of  any  meat,  vegetables, 
fruit,  or  beverages  ;  for  regulating  the 
place  and  manner  of  selling  and  weighing 
butcher's  meat,  fish,  hay,  straw,  fodder, 
wood,  and  lumber,  &c.  Harr.  Munic. 
Manual,  5th  ed.  p.  451.  The  following 
cases,  digested  by  Mr.  Harrison,  show  the 
judicial  construction  of  the  act. 

The  power  tinder  the  act  is  to  regu- 
late all  markets  established,  apparently 
including  those  established  by  the  Crown, 
as  well  as  those  established  by  municipal 
authority.  "  Regulation  must  of  neces- 
sity include  the  appropriation  of  one  or 
more  parts  of  the  market  for  one  purpose, 
and  other  part  or  parts  for  other  purposes  ; 
of  providing  that  free  passage  through  the 
market  be  kept  open  for  ready  access  to 
shops,  stalls,  or  other  places  where  differ- 
ent commodities  are  exposed  for  sale.  Per 
Draper,  C.  J.,  in  Kelly  and  the  Corpora- 
tion of  the  City  of  Toronto,  23  Upper  <  Ian. 
Q.  B.  4-2G."  A  by-law  enacting  "that  no 
butcher  or  other  person  shall  cut  up  or  ex- 
pose for  sale  any  fresh  meat  in  any  part  of 
the  city  excepl  in  the  shops  and  stalls  in 
the  public  markets,  or  at  such  places  as  the 


Standing  Committee  on  Public  Markets 
may  appoint,"  was  held  good.  lb.  But 
a  by-law  enacting  "that  no  person  Bhould 

expose  for  sale  any  meat,  fish,  poultry, 
eggs,  butter,  cheese,  grain,  hay,  straw, 
cord-wood,  shingles,  lumber,  flour,  wool, 
meal,  vegetables,  or  fruit  (except  wild 
fruit),  hides  or  skins,  within  the  town,  at 
any  place  but  the  public  market,  without 
having  first  paid  the  market  fee  thereon 
as  therein  provided,  except  all  hides  and 
skins  from  animals  slaughtered  by  the 
licensed  butcher  of  the  corporation,  hold- 
ing a  stall  in  the  market,"  was  held  bad. 
Fennell  and  the  Corporation  of  the  Town 
of  Guelph,  In  re,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  238. 
Also,  "that  meat,  fish,  poultry,  eggs,  cheese, 
grain,  hay,  straw,  cord- wood,  shingles,  lum- 
ber, flour,  tvool,  meal,  vegetables,  or  fruit 
(except  wild  fruit),  should  not  be  exposed 
for  sale  within  the  municipality,  except  in 
the  market,  before  12  o'clock,  noon,"  was 
held  bad  as  to  the  articles  mentioned  in 
italics,  lb.  See  In  re  Snell  and  Belle- 
ville, 30  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  91  ;  Harr. 
Munic.  Man.  5th  ed.  452,  457.  and  cases. 
1  Nightingale,  In  re,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
168  (1831).  In  this  case  the  ordinance  of 
the  city  (Boston)  provided  "that  no  in- 
habitant of  the  city  of  Boston,  or  of  any 
town  in  the  vicinity  thereof,  not  offering 
for  sale  the  produce  of  his  own  farm,  &c, 
should,  without  the  permission  of  the 
clerk  of  Faneuil  Hall  market,  be  suffered 
to  occupy  any  stand  with  cart,  sleigh,  or 
otherwise,  for  the  purpose  of  vending 
commodities  in  either  of  the  streets  men- 
tioned in  the  first  section  of  this  ordin- 
ance," &c.  It  was  objected  against  this 
ordinance  that  it  was  void  :  1.  Because  it 
was  partial,  not  operating  upon  all  the 
citizens  of  the  State  equally.  2.  Because 
it  was  uncertain,  the  term  "  vicinity"  Vic- 
ing indefinite.  And,  3.  Because  it  was  in 
restraint   of    trade.      But    neither  of  these 

objections  was  considered  tenable.  The 
validity   of  such  an  ordinance  was  again 


162  Ml'NICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §390 

5  38.S  (321).  Power  to  Tax  Marketmen  must  be  Plainly  Con- 
ferred. —  But  authority  to  erect  a  market,  and  power  "  to  regulate 
the  general  police,"  and  "to  preserve  the  peace  and  good  order  of 
the  city,"  do  uot  authorize  the  corporation  to  impose  a  tax  for  reve- 
nue purposes  upon  persons  occupying  market  stands  in  the  streets,  or 
selling  produce  therein.  Such  a  power  must  he  plainly  conferred 
or  it  will  not  be  held  to  exist.1 

§380  (322).  Power  to  Regulate  is  a  Police  Power.  —  The  right 
to  regulate  markets  established  by  a  city  under  its  charter  is  one  of 
municipal  police.  The  city  authorities  may,  if  their  action  be  not 
unreasonable,  provide  what  articles  shall  or  shall  not  be  sold  at  the 
public  markets,  and  may  impose  penalties  on  those  who  violate  their 
ordinances.  They  may,  for  example,  prohibit  groceries  and  oysters 
from  being  sold  at  the  public  markets,  and  require  oysters,  which 
have  a  great  tendency  to  putrefaction,  to  be  sold  at  certain  desig- 
nated stands,  and  prevent  their  being  sold  elsewhere.2 

§  390  (323).  Inspection  Ordinances.  —A  municipal  corporation, 
says  Mr.  Willcock,  may  regulate  the  manner  of  carrying  on  trade 
within  a  municipality  so  far  as  to  prevent  monopolies  or  the  sale 
of  unfit  commodities,  and  to  ensure  proper  conduct  in  those  who 

affirmed  by  the  same  court  in  Common-  "farmer "  within  the  meaning  of  the  pro- 

wealth*.  Bice,  9  Met  (Mass.)  253  (1845).  viso,  although   the   meats  which  he   sold 

See  this  case  also  as  to  requisites  in  cer-  came  from  sheep  fattened  on  his   farm,   if 

tain  respects  of  complaints  for  the  viola-  the  farm  was  only  a  convenient  appendage 

tion  of  such  an  ordinance,  and  as  to  what  to  his  business  as  a  butcher.     Rochester  v. 

acts  will  be  deemed  to  be  violations.  Pettinger,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  265  (1837); 

In    Louisiana,    on  the  other  hand,  an  St.  Paul*.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248  (1878), 

ordinance  imposing  a  tax  upon  every  load  cited  supra,  sec.  386,  note. 
of  supplies  carried  to  the  public  markets         1  Kip  v.  Paterson,   2  Dutch.    (N.  J.) 

by  persons  not  occupying  stalls  in  the  mar-  298(1S57).      This    power,    it  was   said, 

kets,  was  held  to  be  void  as  being  a  tax  would  authorize  "the  renting  of  stalls  in 

for  revenue  and  not  in  the  exercise  of  the  the  market-house,    and  perhaps  of  even 

police  power.     State  v.  Blaser,  36  La.  An.  prohibiting  sales  in  the  public  streets." 

363.     See  supra,  sec  319,  note;  Shelton  lb.  per  Elmer,  J. 

v.  Mayor,    &c,   of  Mobile,   30   Ala.   540  2  Municipality  v.  Cutting,    4  La    An. 

(1857)  ;  Wartman  v.  Philadelphia,  33  Pa.  335  (1849);  Moranoi?.  New  Oilcans,  2  La. 

St.  202  (1854).     An  ordinance  forbade  the  217.     Power  of  city  to  vacate  leases  and 

salr   of   fresh   meats    except    by    persons  stalls  in  public    market,    under  ordinance 

licensed,  but  contained  a  proviso  in  favor  reserving    the    right,    see    City    Council 

of  farmers,  authorizing  them  to  sell  meats,  v.  Goldsmith,  2  Speers  (S.  C.)  Law,  428. 

•odua  of  their  own  farms.     The  evi-  Occupant  of  city  market   failing  to  pay 

dentobjeel  was  considered  to  be  to  pro-  rent  in  advance,  according  to  contract,  held 

teel    licensed    butchers,    and    at  the   same  a  tenant  at  will.     Dubuque  V.  Miller,  11 

time  to  allow  farmers  to  come  in  and  sell  Iowa,  583.  Control  over  tenants.  "Woelpper 

the  produce  of   their  own    farms.     It  was  v.  Philadelphia,  38  Pa.  St.  203. 
hell  that  an  unlicensed  butcher  was  not  a 


§  390 


INSrECTION   ORDINANCES. 


463 


practise  it  within  their  jurisdiction.1  In  general,  it  may  be  said 
that  incorporated  cities  and  larger  towns  in  this  country  have 
conferred  upon  them  the  power  to  pass  ordinances  regulating,  to  a 
reasonable  extent,  the  mode  in  which  the  traffic  of  the  place  Bhall 
be  conducted;  but  they  can  exercise  no  powers  in  this  respect  not 
conferred.2  Laws  requiring  articles  to  be  inspected  or  weighed  and 
measured  before  being  sold  are  in  the  nature  of  police  regulations, 
and  are  valid  in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  provisions. 
When  reasonable  in  their  nature,  they  are  not  regarded  as  being  in 
restraint  of  trade.3 


1  Willc.  Corp.  142,  pi.  332. 

-  Nightingale,  In  re,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
168  ;  Stokes  v.  New  York,  14  Wend.  (X. 
Y.)  87;  Raleigh  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones 
(N.  C. )  Law,  49;  Chicago  v.  Quimby, 
38  111.  274  (1858);  Howe  v.  Norris,  12 
Allen  ( Mass. ),  82  ;  Libby  v.  Downey,  5 
Allen  (Mass.),  299;  Collins  v.  Louisville, 
2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.),  134  (1841).  Power  to 
appoint  measurers  of  wood,  and  affix  a 
reasonable  allowance  to  them,  does  not 
justify  the  imposition  of  a  tax  for  revenue. 
lb.  The  legislature  created  a  board  of 
railroad  and  warehouse  commissioners 
composed  of  three  persons,  appointed  by 
the  governor  and  con  firmed  by  the 
senate  for  the  term  of  two  years,  and  em- 
powered them  to  fix  the  rate  of  charges 
for  the  inspection  of  grain  in  cities.  The 
court  sustained  this  legislation.  It  re- 
garded  the  board  as  a  quasi  public  corpora- 
tion, and  held  that  it  was  competent  for 
the  legislature  to  delegate  the  power  of 
inspection  to  it,  instead  of  to  the  corporate 
authorities  of  the  city  of  Chicago,  and 
that  the  official  bond  of  such  inspector 
was  a  valid  obligation  against  him  and  his 
sureties.  People  v.  Harper,  91  111.  357 
(1878),  distinguishing  it  from  People  v. 
Salomon,  51  111.  50,  and  other  cases  hold- 
ing, under  the  Constitution  of  Illinois,  that 
local  and  municipal  taxation  can  only  be 
imposed  by  the  local  "  corporate  authori- 
ties." 

8  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  596;  Raleigh  v. 
Sorrell,  supra;  Stokes  v.  New  York, 
supra;  Paige  v.  Fazackerly,  36  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  392;  Mayor,  Sett,  of  New  York 
p.  Nichols,  4  Hill  (X.  Y.),  209  (1843); 
compare  Mayor  v.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith 
(N.  Y.),  156;    Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  Wend. 


(N.  Y.)  237  ;  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  12 
Wis.  673.  The  system  of  inspection  laws, 
ami  the  hosts  of  officers  which  they  en- 
gendered,  were  considered  by  the  constitu- 
tional convention  of  Nemo  York  to  entail 
annoyances  and  burdens  upon  the  com- 
munity sufficient  to  outweigh  any  benefits 
resulting  from  them  ;  and  the  Constitution 
of  1846  (art.  V.  sec.  viii.)  abolished  all 
such  offices  and  forbade  the  legislature  to 
re-create  them,  in  this  language  :  "  All 
offices  for  the  weighing,  measuring,  cull- 
ing, or  inspecting  of  any  merchandise, 
produce,  manufacture,  or  commodity 
whatever,  are  hereby  abolished,  and  no 
such  offices  shall  hereafter  be  created  by 
law."  See  Tinkham  v.  Tapscott,  17  N.  Y. 
144,  147  (1858),  where  the  origin,  scope, 
and  purpose  of  this  provision  are  very 
satisfactorily  discussed  by  Dcnio,  J.  In 
Illinois  it  is  held  that  inspection  power 
conferred  upon  a  board  of  trade,  to  be  ex- 
ercised when  requested  by  its  members, 
may  co-exist  with  like  power  in  the  city 
authorities,  to  be  exercised  in  all  cases 
when  requested.  Chicago  r.  Quimby,  38 
111.  274  (1858). 

The  following  cases  are  referred  to  as 
showing  the  solicitude  of  the  law  to  pre- 
serve the  public  health  ;  but  in  this  coun- 
try the  power  of  municipal  corporations 
in  this  respect  depends  on  their  charters 
or  other  legislative  provision. 

Knowingly  to  expose  for  sale  in  a  pub- 
lic market  meat  which  is  not  lit  for  human 
food  is  indictable.  Kegina  r.  Stevenson, 
3  F.  &  F.  106.  So  knowingly  taking  unfit 
meat  to  public  market  for  sale.  The 
Queen  v.  Jarvis,  3  F.  &  F.  108.  But  in 
either  event  the  knowledge  of  the  unfit- 
ness of  the  food  is  essential  to  the  creation 


464  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  393 

§  391  (324).  "Weighing.  —  Power  to  a  city  "to  regulate  the  pub- 
lic market,  and  to  pass  such  other  ordinances  as  shall  seem  meet  for 
the  improvement  and  good  government  of  the  city,"  authorizes  an 
ordinance  requiring  oats,  hay,  &c,  to  be  weigh  d  by  the  'public  weigh- 
muster  before  being  offered  for  sale,  and  imposing  a  penalty  for  its 
violation.1 

§  392  (325).  Same  subject. — A  grant  to  the  common  council 
of  "  all  po wers,# rights,  &c,  incident  to  municipal  corporations  and 
necessary  to  the  proper  government  of  the  same,"  might  authorize  a 
city  to  prevent  the  sale  of  bread  made  out  of  unwholesome  flour,  and, 
as  a  consequence,  to  provide  for  its  inspection,  but  it  would  not  give 
the  ] tower  to  regulate  the  assize,  that  is,  the  weight  and  price  of 
bread,  for  the  latter  is  a  power  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
proper  government  of  a  city.  Power,  however,  to  a  city,  "  to  regu- 
late everything  which  relates  to  bakers,"  does  authorize  an  ordi- 
nance regulating  the  weight,  size,  and,  it  seems,  the  price,  of  bread, 
and  the  forfeiture  of  bread  illegally  baked  ;  and  such  an  ordinance, 
it  has  been  held,  is  not  in  violation  of  any  provision  of  the  Consti- 
tution of   Louisiana.2 

§  393  (326).  Police  Regulations  respecting  the  Public  Peace  and 
Safety  ;    Use  of  Streets.  —  Our  city  governments  usually  possess  the 

of  the  oll'ence.     Regina  v.  Crawley,  3  F.  &  and  the  payment  of  his  salary.     1  Jones, 

F.  109.     The  offence  is  a  nuisance  at  com-  49,  supra.     Construction  of  ordinance  as 

mon  law.     Shillito  v.  Thompson,  L.    11.  1  to  weighing  hay  on  public  scales.     Gass  v. 

Q.    B.    Div.    12.     Each  single  act  of  ex-  Greenville,  4  Sneed  (Tenn.),  62;   Yates 

posure  of  tainted  meat  is  a  distinct  offence,  v.   Milwaukee,    12  Wis.    752.     Construc- 

Hartley,    In  re,   31   L.  J.  M.  C.  232.      A  tion  of  statute  as  to  mode  of  measuring 

salesman    who   sells  in   a  public   market  grain.      Frazier  v.  Warfield,  13  Md.  279. 

meat  which  is  afterwards  found  to  be  unlit  Of  ordinance  as  to  survey  of  lumber  before 

for   human   food,    but    which    he  has  no  sale.    Briggs  v.  Boat,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  287. 

means  of  knowing  or  reason   to    suspect  An  ordinance  requiring  that  every  person 

was  other  than  good  and  wholesome  meat,  selling  meat  or  articles  of  provision  by 

is  not  liable  to  an  action  upon  an  implied  retail,  whether  by  weight,  count,  or  meas- 

warranty  or  for  money  had   and   received,  ure,   should  provide  himself  with  scales, 

Emmerton  v.  Mathews,   7  H.  &  N.  586  ;  weights,  and  measures,  but  that  no  spring 

l.i.i  a  person  who   sends  animals  destined  balance,  spring  scale,  spring  steelyards,  or 

for  human  loud  to  a  public  market  for  sale  spring  weighing  machine  should  be  used 

impliedly  represents  that  they  are,   so  far  for  any  market  purpose,  was  held  valid. 

as  lie   knows,  not  infected  with  any  con-  Sm  11  and  Belleville,  In  re,  30  Upper  Can. 

tagious  disea  e  dangerous  to  life  or  health.  Q.  B.  81. 

i  Raleigh   v.    Sorrell,   1  Jones  (N.  C.)  2  Guillotte  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 

Law,  19  (1853)  ;  approving  Nightingale's  432(1857)  ;  Taige  r.  Fazackerly,  36  Barb. 

.  1 1  Pick.  (Mass.)  168  ;  Stokes  r.  ( lor-  (N.  Y.)  392.     But  as  to  forfeiture,  quaere, 

potation  of  New  York,  11  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  in    absence   of   express   power,    and    see 

87.     This  power  was  also  held  to  authorize  Phillips  v.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481  ;  Mobile 

the  creation  of  the  office  of  weighmaster  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala.  139. 


§  393 


ORDINANCES  :     PUBLIC    SAFETY. 


it;:, 


power,  either  by  express  grant  or  by  virtue  of  their  authority,  to 
make  by-laws  relating  to  the  public  safety  and  good  order  of  the 
inhabitants,  to  regulate   the  mte  of  speed  of  travel  in  the  />> 
street*;  the  route  or  streets  over  which  omnibuses,   stage  i 
drays,  &c,  may  run ;  the  time  of  day  in   which  the  streets  may  be 
used  for  certain  purposes;  to  interdict   stoppages   in   the  stive' 
the  delay  of  others  ;  to  exclude  vehicles  of  all   kinds  from  entering 
upon  or  passing  over  the  sidewalks,  &c.     The   public  safety  and 
convenience  may  require   regulations  of  this   character;  hut  they 
must  not,  unless  made  by  virtue  of  specific  authority,  be  unrea- 
sonable or  improperly  in  restraint  of  trade.1      Power   to   make   by- 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)  562  (1848),  where  the  subject  of 
the  power  of  cities  over  streets,  partic- 
ularly in  reference  to  omnibuses,  is  fully 
considered  by  Mr.  Justice  Dewey ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Robertson,  5  Cash.  (Mass.) 
438  (1850),  as  to  stoppages  in  streets  con- 
trary to  ordinance  ;  Baker  v.  City  of  Bos- 
ton, 12  Pick.  (Mass.)  184  (1831)  ;  Van- 
derbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  349; 
lb.  3S5  ;  Austin  v.  Murray,  16  Pick. 
|  \l  iss. )  126  ;  St.  Paul  v.  Smith,  27  Minn. 
364.  A  regulation  or  ordinance  prohibit- 
ing the  stoppage  of  vehicles  in  a  public 
street  for  a  longer  time  than  twenty  min- 
utes is  a  valid  police  regulation.  Com- 
monwealth v.  Brooks,  109  Mass.  355  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Fenton,  139  Mass.  195. 
The  license  of  a  hawker  or  peddler  does 
not  authorize  him  to  violate  such  an  ordi- 
nance. Commonwealth  v.  Fenton,  supra  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Lagorio,  141  Mass.  81. 
Power  to  a  city  "to  regulate  the  running 
of  railroad  cars"  authorizes  the  adoption 
of  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  propulsion 
of  cars  by  steam  within  the  corporate 
limits.  Buffalo  &  N.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Buffalo, 
5  Hill  (N.    Y.),   209   (1843). 

Power  to  the  city  of  Kiehmond  to 
make  "'ordinances,  not  contrary  to  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  State,  as 
shall  be  thought  necessary  for  the  good 
ordering  and  government "  of  its  inhab- 
itants, was  considered  by  the  Supreme 
Couri  of  the  United  States  to  imply  the 
power  to  ordain  and  establish  suitable 
police  regulations,  and  that  includes  the 
power  to  prohibit  the  use  of  locomotive 
engines  propelled  by  steam  on  the  public 
streets,  when  such  action  does  not  iuter- 
vol.  i.  —  30 


fere  with  any  vested  rights  ;   and  legis- 
lative   authority    to   a    sj ified    railway 

company  to  construct  its  road  "from 
some  point  within  the  corporation  of 
Kiehmond  to  be  approved  by  the  com- 
mon council,"  does  not  give  it  a  vested 
light  to  the  use  of  a  particular  stre 
from  municipal  control,  when  the  city,  in 
consenting  to  such  use,  reserved  its  char- 
tered powers  in  that  behalf.  Richmond, 
F.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Richmond,  9.6  U.  S. 
521  (1877).  Special  charter  construed  to 
authorize  an  ordinance  for  filling  a  street, 
although  it  is  covered  by  a  plank  road 
laid  under  special  legislative  authority. 
State  r.  Jersey  City,  ~2  Dutch.  (N.J.)  HI; 
post,  chapter  on  Streets,  sec.  713.  In 
Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352  | 
a  lawful  arrangement  between  a  railroad 
company  and  an  omnibus  company  as  to 
the  delivery  of  passengers  was  held  to  be 
beyond  municipal  interference.  Cities  hav- 
ing exclusive  control  of  streets  may  take 
such  precautions  as  are  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  their  inhabitants  in  the  use  of 
them,  as  by  erecting  <\ 
crossings  or  by  permitting  the  railroad 
company  to  erect  them.  Textor  v.  Balti- 
more &0.  R.  R.  Co.,  59  Md.  63. 

Charter  power  to  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  require  railroad  companies  ! 
their  respective  railroads  within  the  muni- 
cipal   limits,    to   keep   flagmen    at    street 
crossings,  and  to  pr 

injury  to  persons  and  property  in  the  use 
of  such  railroads,  confers  plenary  police 
powers  over  railroads  within  the  corporate 
limits  to  provide  protection  against  inju- 
person  and  property  ;  and  the  grant 
of  a  right  of  way  to  a  railroad  company  by 


166 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§394 


laws  for  "  the  good  rule  and  government "  of  the  borough  {ante,  sec. 
,  has  reference  to  the  government  of  the  borough  as  a  corpo- 
!i.  and  the  making  of  regulations  for  carrying  into  effect  the 
purposes  for  which  it  was  incorporated.  {Post,  sec.  408.)  General 
powers  of  this  character,  without  more,  do  not  enable  a  town  council 
to  carry  out  any  unreasonable  ideas  of  general  good  government,  and 
t>>  impose  penalties  for  the  doing  of  things  which  are  not  prohibited 
by  any  public  statute,  nor  by  the  common  law.1 

§  394  (327).  Same  subject.  Salutary  By-Laws.  —  Under  a  gen- 
eral power  to  make  "  needful  and  salutary  by-laws,"  a  city  ordinance 
of  Bostou,  requiring  the  tenant  or  occupant,  or,  in  case  there  shall 
be  no  tenant,  the  owners  of  buildings  bordering  on  certain  streets, 
to  clear  the  snow  from  the  sidewalks  adjoining  their  respective  build- 
in;!*,  is  reasonable  and  valid.  It  was  objected  against  this  ordi- 
nance that  it  violated  the   fundamental  maxim  that  all  burdens  and 


an  ordinance  which  provides  that  the  com- 
pany shall  erect  suitable  fences,  &<•.,  is 
ii' >t  ;i  mere  contract,  but  is  an  exercise  of 
the  right  of  municipal  legislation,  and  as 
such  lias  the  force  of  law  within  the  eor- 
te  limits.  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Central 
B.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228  (1883).  The 
duty  thus  devolved  on  the  railroad  is  one 
due,  nut  to  the  city  as  a  municipal  body, 
bul  to  the  public  considered  as  composed 
of  individuals,  and  each  person  specially 
injured  by  breach  of  the  obligation  is  en- 
titled to  his  individual  compensation,  and 
to  ":  a  lion  for  its  recovery.  lb.  and 
cases  cited. 

A  by-law  prohibiting  rapid  driving  in 
Ity  by  carters  and  others  is 
not  in  restraint  of  trade,  and  is  reasonable 
and  valid  ;  and  in  a  prosecution  for  its 
violation,  it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  that 
any  individual  was  actually  endangered 
by  the  fast  driving.  As  the  mayor  and 
aldermen  have  no  authority  to  give  a  per- 
son permission  to  violate  an  ordinance, 
evidence  of  such  permission,  as  well  as 
evidence  of  the  defendant's  general  char- 
as  a  careful  driver,  is  inadmissible. 
Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3  Pick. 
(M.ks.)  462  (1826);  Commonwealth  v. 
Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  570(1848); 
Washington  V.  Nashville,  I  Swan  (Tenn.), 
177.  Commented  on.  McBean  v.  Chand- 
ler,  9   Hcisk.    (Tenn.)   349   (1872)  ;  post, 


chapter  on  Streets,  sec.  713.  Where  an 
intent  to  injure  is  not  made  an  essential 
ingredient  of  the  offence  of  rapid  driving 
under  the  ordinance  the  intent  necessary 
to  a  criminal  assault  and  battery  is  not 
supplied  by  a  mere  intent  to  violate  the 
ordinance.  Commonwealth  v.  Adams, 
114  .Mass.  323  ;  8.  c.  19  Am.  Hep.  362. 

An  ordinance  prohibiting  "night-walk- 
ing" is  not  "class  legislation"  but  a 
proper  police  regulation.  Braddy  v.  Mil- 
ledgeville,  74  Ga.  516. 

There  is  no  obligation,  in  the  absence 
of  a  valid  municipal  by-law  or  statute,  on 
the  part  of  people  to  keep  roofs  clear  of 
snoiv,  or  to  detain  the  snow  so  that  it  can- 
not slide  into  the  street,  though  there 
may  be,  it  seems,  such  a  faulty  construc- 
tion of  roof  as,  on  proof  thereof,  would 
involve  a  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
owner  or  occupier  for  accidents.  Lazarus 
v.  Toronto.  19  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  13,  per 
Robinson,  C.  J.  Power  to  local  board  to 
provide  for  the  removal  of  "dirt,  ashes, 
rubbish,  filth,  dung,  and  soil"  does  not 
authorize  a  by-law  for  the  removal  of 
snow.  Reg.  v.  Wood,  5  E.  &.  B.  49. 
Infra,  sec.  394,  note.  See  post,  chap, 
xxiii. 

1  Addison  on  Torts,  34  ;  Rex  .  West- 
wood,  4  B.  &  C.  781  ;  Reg.  v.  Wood,  5 
Kll.  &  BL  55  ;  post,  sees.  396,  408. 


§396  ORDINANCES:    POLICE  POWER.  $67 

taxes  laid  upon  the  people  for  the  public  good  shall  be  equal.  The 
objection  was  overruled.  And  it  was  justly  regarded  by  the  court 
as  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation,  requiring  a  duty  to  be  per- 
formed highly  salutary  and  advantageous  to  tbe  citizens  of  a  popu- 
lous and  closely  built  city,  and  imposed  upon  the  persons  named 
because  they  are  so  situated  that  they  can  promptly  and  con- 
veniently perform  it ;  and  it  is  laid  not  upon  a  few,  but  upon  a 
numerous  class,  and  equally  upon  all  who  arc  within  the  descrij>- 
tion  composing  the  class  and  who  commonly  derive  a  peculiar  bene- 
fit from  the  duty  required.  It  would  doubtless  he  otherwise  if  the 
ordinance  arbitrarily  imposed  this  duty  upon  the  mechanics  or 
merchants,  or  any  other  class  of  citizens  between  whose  convenience 
and  the  labor  required  there  is  no  natural  relation.1 

§395  (328).  Same  subject. — The  power  to  make  "salutary  by- 
laws "  with  respect  to  the  use  of  streets,  will,  it  seems,  authorize  a 
city  to  pass  by-laws  regulating  the  removal  of  buildings  and  the 
temporary  use  of  the  streets  and  highways  for  that  purpose.2 

§  396  (329).  Ordinances  under  Police  Power  and  General  Wel- 
fare Clause. —  Other  illustrations  of  what  a  municipal  corporation 
may  do  under  fin-  general  welfare  clause  in  its  organic  act,  or  undt  r 
its  police  power  or  its  implied  right  to  pass  by-laws,  or  under  a  gen- 
eral grant  of  authority  for  that  purpose,  may  be  here  given. 

Under  authority  "to  ordain  and  publish  such  acts,  laws,  and 
regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 

1  Goddard,  ///  re,  1<*>  Pick.  (Mass.)  504  than  any  other  citizen.     Gridley  v.  Bloom- 

(1S35)  ;  Union  Railway  Co.  v.  Cambridge,  ington,  SS  111.  554;  supra,  sec.  393,  note. 
11  Allen  (Mass.),  287;  Kirby  V,  Boylston  An  ordinance  requiring  personal  labor 

Market   Assoc,    14    Gray    (.Mass.),    252  ;  upon  streets,  or,  in  lieu  thereof,  payment 

post,    chap,    xxiii.,   note   and    cases    cited,  of  a   specified  sum,  hell  valid;  held  also 

The  same  power  held  to  authorize  an  ordi-  that  labor  so  required    is    not   "invol- 

nance  to  prevent  the  placing  of  show  boards  untary  servitude"  within  the  meaning  of 

and    signs  upon  the   side-walks  so    as   to  the    Constitution    of    Kansas    or    of    the 

obstruct   them,   and  also    to    prevent    the  United   States.     In  re  Dassler,  35   Kan. 

carrying  of  placards  and  signs  on  the  side-  678. 

walk  for  the  purpose  of  displaying  them.  -  Day  V.  Green,   4  Gush.    (Mass.)  433, 

As  the  tendency  of  this  is  to  coliect  crowds  437,  per  Shaw,  C.J.     And  where  such  a 

and  thus  to  interfere  with  tbe  use  of  tbe  by-law  prohibits   the   moving  without   a 

side-walks  by  the  public,  such  an  ordinance  license  granted  by  the  mayor  and  alder' 

is   not   unreasonable.     Commonwealth   v.  men,  a  license  granted   by  the   mayor  is 

McCafferty,  1  15  Mass.  384  (1888).  void,  even  though  the  board  of  aldermen, 

In    Winds  it   is  held    that   a   city  has  by  a  vote,  bad   previously  undertaken   to 

no  power  by  ordinance  to  compel  an  abut-  delegate   the  power  to  grant  such  license 

ter,   under   penalty,    to   remove    the    snow  to  the  mayor  alone.      The  by  daw  content* 

from  the  sidewalk  within  a  certain  time,  plates  that  the  mayor  and  aldermen  should 

He  has  no  more  interest  in  such  removal  act  unitedly  as  one  body.     lb. 


408 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§397 


Stale,  as  shall  be  needful  to  the  good  order  of  the  city,"  it  eau,  says 
Howard,  J.,  "subject  to  these  restrictions  and  certain  statute  regula- 
tions, establish  all  suitable  ordinances  for  administering  the  govern- 
ment of  the  city,  the  preservation  of  the  health  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  the  convenient  transaction  of  business  within  its  limits,  and 
for  the  performance  of  the  general  duties  required  by  law  of  munici- 
pal corporations."  l 


8  397    (330).      Same    subject.       Observance    of    the    Sabbath. — 

Tower  to  pass  such  ordinances  "to  maintain  the  peace,  good  govern- 
ment, and  order  of  the  city,  and  the  trade,  commerce,  and  manu- 
factures thereof,  as  the  council  may  deem  expedient,  not  repugnant 
to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  State,"  authorizes  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of  stores,  simps,  and  places  of  business  on 
Sunday,  if  its  provisions  do  not  conflict  with  State  legislation.2    But 


i   Per  Howard,  J.,  State  v.  Merrill,  37 
Me.  (2  Heath)  329  (1853).     Such  would 
undoubtedly  bo  the  proper  construction  if 
this  were  the  only  power  given  to  the  city 
to  pass  ordinances  or  by-laws.     It  should 
thru    be    somewhat    liberally   construed. 
But  if  such   a  general   grant  is  given  in 
connection  with,  or  at  the  end  of,  a  long 
list   of  specific   powers,    perhaps    so    ex- 
tended  a  construction  might  not  then  be 
clue  to  it.      The  power  conferred   by   the 
general  welfare  clause  is  restricted  by  ref- 
erence to  other  provisions  of  the  charter 
or  constituent    act.       Montgomery    City 
Council  v.  Montgomery  &  W.  PI.  R.  Co., 
31    Ala.    76    (1857);  Mount    Pleasant   v. 
Breeze,    11    Iowa,    399,    400    (1860),   per 
Wright,    J.      Under  the  general    welfare 
elan-''  a  city  may  require  sellers  of  meat, 
&c,  to  take  out.  licenses.     Kinsley  v.  Chi- 
cago,  121   111.   359    (1888).     The   general 
welfare  clause  has  been  held  to  confer  power 
to  prevent  the  keeping  of  bawdy-houses. 
81  ite  v.  Williams,  11  S.  Q.  288.     See  ante, 
.  376,  393  ;  post,  sees.  432-436. 
A   city   government    under   the    usual 
grants  of  power  has  the  general  authority 
to  so  regulate  the  use  and  enjoyment  of 
private  property  in  the  city  as  to  prevent 
its  proving  pernicious  to  the  citizens  gen- 
erally, and    may,  when  the  use  to  which 
the  owner  devotes  his  property  becomes  a 
cmce,  compel  him  to  cease  so  to  use  it, 
and   punish  him  for  refusing  to  obey  its 
ordinances    and    regulations     concerning 


such  use.     Louisville  City  Railway  Co.  v. 
Louisville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415  (1871). 

The  statute  of  California,  authorizing 
supervisors  of  San  Francisco  "to  make 
all  regulations  which  may  be  necessary  or 
expedient  for  the  preservation  of  the  pub- 
lic health,"  is  within  the  constitutional 
power  of  the  legislature  to  enact  ;  and 
under  it  the  supervisors  may  pass  an  ordi- 
nance against  feeding  cmvs  on  distillery 
slops,  and  vending  the  milk  of  cows  thus 
fed.  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43  Cal.  242 
(1872);  ante,  sees.  141,  144,  369,  374,  379. 
A  common  council  has  power  to  adopt 
a  penal  ordinance  requiring  auctioneers  to 
procure  licenses  from  the  city.  This  power 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation. 
Go  hen  v.  Kern,  63  Ind.  46S;  Kinsley  v. 
Chicago,  124  111.  359  (1888).  See  further, 
Index,  title  License. 

2  St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94 
(1856);  see  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo.  330  ; 
Stater.  Ambs  (constitutionality  of  Sunday 
laws  affirmed),  20  Mo.  214;  s.  r.  Frolick- 
stein  v.  Mobile,  40  Ala.  725(1367);  Hud- 
son v.  Geary,  4  R.  I.  485  (1857);  Specht 
v.  Commonwealth,  8  Pa.  St.  312  ;  Cincin- 
nati v.  Rice,  15  Ohio,  225  ;  Karwisch  v. 
Atlanta,  44  Ga.  204  (1871);  McFherson 
v.  Chebanse,  114  111.  46.  In  the  case  of 
the  City  Council  v.  Benjamin,  2  Stroh. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  508  (1846),  it  was  decided 
by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  South  Carolina 
that  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Charleston, 
prohibiting  "public  exposures   for  sales, 


§  399  ordinances:   good  order  clause;  trees  in  streets.    169 

the  general  welfare  clause  does  not  authorize  a  city  to  construct,  or 
aid  in  constructing,  a  plank  road  or  toll  bridge  built  by  a  private 

company  beyond  the  corporate  limits  of  the  city.1 

§  308   (331).     Limitation    of    Power    under    the    General   Welfare 

Clause.  —  The  general  welfare  clause  to  pass  ordinances  for  the  good 
government,  &c,  of  the  corporation  does  not  authorize  an  ordinance 

requiring-  the  proprietor  of  a  theatre,  circus,  or  other  exhibition 
licensed  by  the  corporation,  to  pay  a  peace  or  police  officer  of  the 
place  two  dollars,  or  any  sum,  for  each  night's  attendance  upon  such 
place  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  order.  Such  an  ordinance  is  un- 
reasonable, and  can  only  be  passed  when  clearly  authorized.2  Under 
such  a  clause  an  ordinance  subjecting  to  a  fine  "any  person  whose 
known  character  is  that  of  a  prostitute,"  was  held  to  be  unlawful.3 

§  399  (332).  Good  Order  Clause  ;  Trees  in  Streets.  —  Where  a 
city  corporation  is  authorized  "  to  ordain  such  laws  not  inconsistent 
with  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  State  as  shall  be  needful  to  the 
good  order  of  the  city,"  it  may  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a  penalty 
upon  any  person  who  shall  "  mutilate  or  destroy  any  ornamental  tree 
planted  in  any  of  the  streets,  lanes,  or  other  public  places  within  the 
limits  of  the  city."  Such  an  ordinance  is  not  inconsistent  with  a 
State  law  punishing  the  malicious  or  wanton  destruction  of  trees 

or  sales  of  merchandise,  on  Sunday,"  was  limits,  the  sale  of  liquor  on  Sunday, 
not  a  violation  of  that  section  of  the  State  Megowan  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Met.  (Ky.) 
Constitution  which  declares  that  "the  free  3  (1S59)  ;  State  v.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215 
exercise  and  enjoyment  of  religious  pro-  (18(59).  In  Shreveport  (city  of)  v.  Levy, 
fession  or  worship,  without  discrimination  26  La.  An.  671  (187-1)  ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep. 
or  preference,  shall  forever  hereafter  be  553,  an  ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of 
allowed  within  this  State  to  all  mankind."  goods  on  Sunday,  hut  excepting  those  per- 
In  that  case  the  defendant  was  a  Jew,  and  sons  keeping  their  places  closed  on  Satur- 
the  city  was  not  denied  to  be  possessed  of  day,  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional  as 
all  the  power  on  the  subject  which  the  giving  to  Jews  a  privilege  denied  to 
legislature  could  constitutionally  bestow,  others.  Power  to  make  rules  for  the  good 
In  the  case  of  Columbia  v.  Duke  and  order  and  public  peace  of  a  city  held  to 
Marks,  cited  2  Strob.  530,  and  approved,  imply  power  to  ilicemen.  Stair 
a  similar  decision  was  made  at  nisi  prius  v.  Sims,  16  S.  C.  4S6.  A  mere  power  to 
by  Mr.  Justice  Martin.  And  in  this  last  "secure  the  health,  peace,  and  inn- 
case  it  was  further  ruled,  that  power  in  ment  of  the  city  "  held  not  to  authorize 
the  charter  to  "establish  such  by-laws  as  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  open 
may  tend  to  the  quiet,  peace,  safety,  and  of  stores  on  Sunday.  Corvallis  v.  Carlile, 
good  order  of  the  inhabitants,"  authorized  10  Orejj.  139. 

the  passage  of  such  an  ordinance.     Under         J  Montgomery  City  Council  v.    Mont- 

f  full  power  to  pass  such  ordinances  as  the  gomery   £  W.    PI.    R.    Co.,    31   Ala.    7o' 

city  council  shall  deem  expedient  for  the  (1857)  ;  ante,  sec.  161. 
government  of  the  city,  not  contrary  to  2  Waters  V.  Leech,  3  Ark.  110  (1840)  ; 

the  Constitution  of  the  State  or  the  United  supra,  sec.  319;  post,  ^r<\  663. 
States,"  a  city  may  prohibit,    within   its  3  Buell  v.  State,  45  Ark.  336. 


470  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  401 

CTowine  for  ornament  <>r  use.  ruder  the  ordinance  it  is  not  neces- 
s.iia  bo  allege  or  prove  that  the  mutilation  was  malicious  or  wanton, 
and  it  would  seem  to  be  considered  that  it  was  no  defence  that  the 
tree  alleged  to  be  mutilated  was  upon  the  street  in  front  of  the  lot  of 
the  accused,  who  owned,  subject  to  the  public  easement,  ad  medium 
Jih' in  rice.1 

§  400  (333).  Regulation  of  Saloons,  &c,  under  General  Welfare 
Clause. — Under  a  general  power  to  pass  "any  other  by-laws  for  the 
well-being  of  the  city,"  its  council  may,  by  ordinance,  prohibit 
sah h ms,  restaurants,  and  other  places  of  public  entertainment,  to  be 
kept  open  after  ten  o'clock  at  night.  The  objections  that  such  a  by- 
law was  unreasonable,  and  deprived  the  citizen  of  the  constitutional 
light  of  "acquiring  property,"  were  not  considered  to  be  well  taken. 
1 1  regulates,  but  does  not  deprive  the  party  of  his  rights.2  Under 
similar  powers  an  ordinance  confining  the  carrying  on  of  the  laun- 
dry business  to  a  certain  portion  of  a  city,  is  a  police  regulation 
and  reasonable.3 

§  401  (334).  Powers  under  Authority  to  regulate  the  Police.  — 
l'ower  "to  regulate  the  police  of  the  city,"  and  to  pass  ordinances 
not  inconsistent  with  law,  authorizes  an  ordinance  for  arresting  and 
fining  vagrants,  although,  by  the  general  law  of  the  State,  vagrants 
may  be  proceeded  against  before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  the  court 
considering  that  this  did  not  forbid  the  corporation  to  make  a 
local  regulation  on  the  same  subject  not  in  conflict  with  the  gen- 
eral law.4 

1  State  t>.   Merrill,  37   Mo.    (2   Heath)  terfere   with    the    unlimited   exercise    of 

329  (1853).     Contra,  as  to  righl  of  adjoin-  private  rights."     Per  Bell,  J.,  in  State  v. 

ing   owner.      Lancaster  v.    Richardson,    4  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  428  ;  State  v.  Welch, 

Lansing  (N.  V.),  136  (tS71)  ;  sec  post,  sec.  36  Conn.  215  (1869).     In  farther  support 

663,  note.     The  case  in  Maine  is  a  quite  of  text,  Platteville  v.    Bell,   43  Wis.  488 

liberal    construction  of  the  words  "good  (1878);  Staats  v.  Washington,  45  N.  J.  L. 

order."     But   it    is  necessary    that   cities  (16  Vroom)  318  ;  Staates  v.  Washington, 

shouM    have  such   an  authority,  and  the  44  N.  J.  L.  (15  Vroom)  605. 

power  to  pass  the  ordinance  could,  perhaps,  B  Matter  of  Hang  Kie,  69  Cal.  149;  see 

be   sustained   as    incidental  to  the   power  Index,  tit.  Laundry. 

of  the   city   over  its   streets   and  public  *  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz,  11  Mo.  61  (1857); 

pis  es.    Post,  chapter  on  Streets.     Further  distinguished  from  Jefferson  City  v.  Court- 

i    bo   hade  trees.     Post,  sec.  663,  note.  mire,    9  Mo.  692,  which  was  a  summary 

-  The  State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  II.  426  proceeding  for  an  in  dirt  all  c  offence.     See 

(1859);    following  and  approving  on  this  State   v.   Cowan,   29  Mo.   330;   St.  Louis 

point,  State  v.  Clark,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  v.  Schoenbnsh,  (Mo.)  8  S.  W.   Rep.  791; 

170;    Morris  v.   Rome  City  Council,    10  8.  0.  95  Mo.   618  (1888);  Byers  v.  Com- 

532;   Budson  V.   Geary,   4  R.  I.   485.  monwealth,  42  Pa.  St.  89,  per  Strong,  J.  ; 

"  It  is  an  unavoidable  consequence  of  city  Shafer  v.  Mumma,   17   Md.  331   (1861); 

ordinances,  that  they  in  some  degree  iu-  supra,  sec.  440  ;  post,  sec.  427,  note. 


§403 


ORDINANCES    UNDER   THE    POLICE    POWEB. 


471 


§  402  (335).  Same  subject.  —  By  virtue  of  its  police  power  a 
municipal  corporation  may  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a  fine  upon 
the  owner  of  any  animal  found  astray  or  at  large  within  the  limits 
of  the  corporation.1 

§  403  (33G).  Power  under  Authority  to  preserve  Good  Order,  &c. 
—  If  a  municipal  corporation  has,  by  its  charter,  power  to  pass  ordi- 
nances to  preserve  the  peace  and  good  order  of  the  place,  this  gives 
it  authority  to  provide  for  the  punishment,  in  the  manner  allowed 
by  its  charter,  of  persons  who  shall  rescue,  or  attempt  to  rescue 
prisoners  from  the  lawful  custody  of  municipal  officers.2  But  the 
general  power,  though  expressly  conferred,  to  enact  by-laws  for 
the  good  government  of  the  town,  does  not  confer  the  power  to  l>  vy 
taxes  of  any  kind,  not  even  upon  retailers  of  ardent  spirits.3 


A  statute  by  which  "  two  or  more  over- 
seers of  the  town  "  were  authorized  to 
commit  to  the  workhouse,  until  discharged 
by  law,  by  writing  under  their  hands,  to 
be  there  employed  and  governed  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  and  orders  of  the  house, 
&c,  "all  persons,  able  of  body  to  work, 
and  not  having  estate  or  means  other- 
wise to  maintain  themselves,  who  refuse 
or  neglect  to  do  so,  live  a  dissolute,  va- 
grant life,  and  exercise  no  ordinary  call- 
ing or  lawful  business  sufficient  to  gain 
an  honest  livelihood,"  does  not  violate 
the  constitutional  right  to  "  life  and  lib- 
erty," or  the  right,  in  "criminal  proceed- 
ings, to  be  heard  by  counsel,  confronted 
with  witnesses,"  &c.  The  court  did  not 
regard  it  as  a  criminal  proceeding,  but  as 
a  reformatory  or  correctional  one,  so  far 
as  the  person  proceeded  against  was  con- 
cerned, and  designed  to  protect  the  com- 
munity from  becoming  chargeable  with 
the  person's  support.  Nott's  Case,  11 
Me.  (2  Fairf.)  208  (1834)  ;  s.  p.  Portland 
v.  Bangor,  42  Me.  403  (1856),  Rice,  J., 
dissenting.  It  is  now  admitted  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Maine  that  this  statute 
is  in  conflict  with  the  14th  amendment  of 
the  Constitution,  "  That  no  State  shall 
deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,"  &c, 
"  without  due  process  of  law,"  and  that 
Nott's  Case  and  Portland  V.  Bangor,  supra, 
are  no  longer  the  law.  Now  there  can  be 
no  restraint  of  liberty  without  first  hav- 
ing a  judicial  investigation  of  the  charge. 


Portland  v.  Bangor,  65  Me.  120  (1876); 
s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  681.  See  Byers  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 42  Pa.  St.  89;  post,  sec.  427, 
note,  sec.  433.  In  a  late  case  in  Illinois, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  decided 
that  the  act  creating  the  Reform  School 
was  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  act,  so 
far  as  it  restrained  liberty  for  any  cause 
except  actual  crime,  was  in  violation  of 
the  Bill  of  Rights.  People  v.  Turner.  10 
Am.  Law  Keg.  (s.  s.)  366,  and  approving 
note  of  Judge  Redfield  :  s.  C.  55  111.  280  : 
People  v.  Weissenbach  (power  to  bind  out 
children),  60  N.  Y.  3S5. 

1  Municipality  p.  Blanc,  1  La.  An.  3S5 
(1846);  Case!'.  Hall,  21  111.  632;  Common- 
wealth w.  Bean,  14  Cray  (Mass.),  52;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Curtis,  9  Allen  (Mass.), 
266;  Roberts  v.  Ogle,  30  111.  459;  McKee 
v.  McKee,  S  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  433  (1848); 
Waco  v.  Powell  (hogs  at  large),  32  Texas, 
258  (1869);  Cartersville  v.  Lanham,  67  Ga. 
753  ;  ante,  see.  321,  note;  supra,  sec.  348. 
Construction  of  ordinance  prohibiting  the 

!  /  of  animals  to  run  at  large,  and 
what  must  be  shown  to  subject  a  person  to 
liability  under  such  an  ordinance.  Col- 
linsville  v.  Scanland,  58  111.  221  (1871); 
Kinder  >•.  Gillespie,  63  111.  SS  (1872). 

2  Independence  r.    Moor,-,  82  M 
(1862)  ;  St  Louis  v.  Schoenbush,  95  Mo. 
618  (1888). 

8  Comm'rs  of  Ashville  v.  Means,  7  Ire. 
(X.  C.  Lnw)  406  (1S47)  :  Burnett,  In  re, 
30  Ala.  461  (1S57);  post,  chap.  xix. 


\~-2 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  405 


§  ll'-i  (337).  General  Welfare  Clause  continued. — The  general 
welfare  clause,  in  a  charter  empowering  the  city  council  to  pass 
such  other  ordinances  as  appear  necessary  {"or  the  security  of  the 
city,  authorizes  an  ordinance  regulating  the  mode  of  keeping  and  the 
sale  of  gunpowder,  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation,  sucli  as  re- 
quiring  all  gunpowder  brought  into  the  city  to  be  conveyed  to  the 
public  magazine  of  the  city,  except  when  it  is  to  be  retailed,  and 
then  to  be  kept  in  limited  quantities  and  in  secure  canisters.  And 
it  was  so  held,  notwithstanding  the  point  was  made  in  argument 
that  the  general  welfare  clause  in  the  charter  could  not  enlarge  the 
powers  of  the  corporation  further  than  is  necessary  to  carry  into 
effect  the  specific  grants  of  power.1 

^  405  (338).  Public  Safety;  Fire  Limits.  —  Municipal  corpora- 
tions, with  general  power  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  their  inhabi- 
tants, may  prohibit  the  throwing  of  heavy  or  dangerous  articles  from 
thr  upper  stories  of  buildings  into  the  streets  or  open  spaces  near 
them,  where  persons  are  in  the  habit  of  passing;  and  may,  where 
this  is  consistent  with  the'general  and  special  legislation  applicable  to 
the  municipality,  establish  fire  limits,  and  prevent  erection  therein 
of  wooden  buildings? 


1  Williams  v.  Augusta  City  Council,  4 
Ga.  509  (1848);  Frederick  v.  Augusta 
City  Council,  5  Ga.  561,  where  the  charter 
of  Augusta  is  more  fully  given. 

In  California  if  has  been  held  that, 
under  such  a  power,  a  municipality  may 
prohibit  the  carrying  on  of  a  laundry 
within  the  city  limits  in  any  building  not 
constructed  of  brick  or  stone.  Matter  of 
Yick  Wo,  68  Cal.  294  ;  and  in  Missouri  a 
city  may,  under  the  general  welfare  clause, 
prohibit  cruelty  to  animals.  St.  Louis  v. 
Schoenbusch,  95  Mo.  618  (1888). 

-  City  Council  v.  Elford,  1  McMullan, 
(S.  C),  Law,  '234  (1841);  Brady  v.  N.  W. 
in  arance   Co.,  11   Mich.    42">  ;   Douglass 

v.   Con inwealth,  2  Rawle   (Pa.),   262  ; 

Wadleigh  v.  Gilrnan,  12  Me.  403;  Van- 

derbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  340,  352, 

"//'     .  J.,  arguendo.     Charleston 

ed,    27  W.  Va.  681,   quoting  text; 

King   v.  Davenport,  98  111.  305  ;  Baum- 

•  r  v.    I  la  t  v.  Kid   Ind.  .ri7f>  ;    Stingier 

iickel,  117  Pa.  St.  326;  Knoxvillc  v. 
Bi  J,  12  Lea,  121  ;  holding  also  thai  the 

rcise  of  this  power  does  not  "impair 
the  obligation  of  a  contract,"  where  a  con- 


tract  to  build  was  made  before  the  passage 
of  the  ordinance.  In  Pye  v.  Peterson,  45 
Tex.  312  (1876);  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  608, 
the  conclusion  was  reached  in  view  of  the 
legislation  of  the  State  that  a  general  grant 
of  power  to  a  city  "  to  ordain  such  ordi- 
nances, not  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of 
the  State,  as  shall  be  needful  for  the  govern- 
ment, interests,  welfare,  and  good  order  of 
the  corporation,"  did  not  authorize  the 
city  to  establish  fire  limits  and  to  prevent 
the  erection  of  wooden  buildings  within 
such  limits.  The  text  is  referred  to,  and 
it  is  admitted  that  it  is  supported  by  Wad- 
leigh v.  Oilman,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Mayor  of  Hudson  v.  Thome  is  con- 
sidered as  opposed  to  it.  Of  course  the 
question  in  each  case  must  be  decided  in 
view  of  all  the  legislation  of  the  State 
hearing  upon  it.  The  text  in  this  edition 
has  been  slightly  modified.  The  preven- 
tion of  fires  in  towns  and  cities  is  pecu- 
liarly a  matter  for  local  regulation,  and  is 
universally  so  regarded.  Ante,  sees.  141, 
143.  It  belongs  to  the  ordinary  police 
powers  of  a  city;  and  unless  such  a  course 
is  inconsistent  with  the  legislation  of  the 


§  406 


ordinances:   public  safety  ;   hoistways. 


473 


§400    (339).    Public    Safety;    Hoistways.  —  Under    authority   to 
make  police  regulations,  or  to  \kiss  by-laws  for  the  good  rule  and 


State  touching  the  subject  (as  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Gould  shows  it  to  have  been  in  Texas), 
it  seems  to  us  to  be  presumptively  author- 
ized by  a  general  grant  of  power  to  provide 
for  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  in- 
habitants. 

A  power  to  establish  fire  limtis  should 
be  strictly  construed  in  favor  of  the  owners 
of  buildings  which  are  subject  to  be  re- 
moved. Louisville  v.  Webster,  108  111. 
414. 

An  ordinance  establishing  fire  limits  is 
not  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  United  States  Constitution  ; 
nor  is  it  oppressive,  unreasonable,  or 
special  in  its  operation  ;  it  is  not  an  un- 
warrantable delegation  of  power  to  muni- 
cipal officers.  Ex  parte  Fiske,  72  Cal. 
12.5.  An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  erec- 
tion of  wooden  buildings  within  prescribed 
limits  does  not  violate  either  the  Consti- 
tution of  Pennsylvania  or  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Klingler  v.  Bickel,  117 
Pa.  St.  326.  In  an  action  of  trespass  the 
officers  of  a  city  may  justify  the  demolition 
of  a  wooden  building  in  course  of  construc- 
tion in  violation  of  the  ordinance.  Ibid., 
distinguishing  Fields  v.  Stokley,  99  Pa. 
St.  306. 

A  court  of  equity  will  not  enjoin  the 
erection  of  a  wooden  building  within  the 
fire  limits  although  such  erection  is  for- 
bidden by  ordinance.  St.  Johns  (village 
of)  v.  MeFarlan,  33  Mich.  72  (1875);  s.  c. 
20  Am.  Rep.  671.  Marston,  J.  says  :  "A 
court  of  chancery  has  no  jurisdiction  to 
restrain  the  threatened  violation  of  a 
village  ordinance,  unless  the  act  threat- 
ened to  be  done,  if  carried  out,  will  be  a 
nuisance.  ...  If  a  proper  ordinance  was 
framed  with  an  appropriate  penalty,  we 
think  the  remedy  at  law  would  be  found 
adequate."  Compare  City  Council  v. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  (Ala.),  4  Southern 
Rep.  626 ;  see  Forcheimer  v.  Port  of 
Mobile  (Ala.),  lb.  112. 

Whether  the  municipality  may  resort  to 
equity  to  aid'  it  in  enforcing  its  public 
duties:  Equity  will  not  enjoin,  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  municipality  itself,  even 
where  the  ordinance  directs  such  a  suit  to 


be  brought  against  any  person  about  to 
erect  a  wooden  building   contrary  to  its 

provisions.  Waupun  v.  Moore,  31  Wis. 
450  (1874);  s.  0.  L7Am.Rep.  146.  Lyon, 
J.,  says  that  "equity  will  nol  Lend  its 
aid  to  enforce  by  injunction  the  by-laws 
or  ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation, 

lining  an  act,  unless  the  acl  Ls  si 
to  be  a  nuisance  per  se.     High  on  [njunc. 
sec.  788  ;  Hudson  v.  Thome,  7  Paige, 261 ; 
Phillips  v.  Allen,  11  Pa.  St.  181." 

In  Massachusetts,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  city  or  town  is  held  entitled  to  main- 
tain a  bill  in  equity  to  prevent  the  carry- 
ing on  of  trades  or  occupation-,  therein 
which  are  intrinsically  nuisances,  con- 
trary to  the  regulations  which  the  town 
or  city,  by  delegated  authority  from  the 
legislature,  is  authorized  to  make.  Win- 
throp  v.  Farrar  (offensive  trade),  11  Allen 
(Mass.),  398.  So  where  a  statute  pro- 
hibited the  use,  in  cities  and  towns  of  a 
specified  size,  of  any  building  not  then  so 
in  use,  for  carrying  on  the  business  of 
"slaughtering  cattle,"  &c,  without  the 
permission  of  the  municipal  or  town 
authorities,  it  was  held  that  the  act  was 
constitutional  as  an  exercise  of  the  police 
power,  and  that  the  town  or  city  might, 
in  the  corporate  name,  file  a  bill  in  equity 
to  restrain  the  use  of  a  building  therein 
for  the  prohibited  purpose,  where  the 
required  consent  of  the  local  authorities 
had  not  been  obtained.  'Watertown  v. 
Mayo,  109  Mass.  305  (1S72)  ;  s.  C.  12  Am. 
Rep.  694.  No  solid  reason,  in  the  au- 
thor's judgment,  exists,  why,  in  proper 
cases,  a  municipal  corporation  may  not 
resort  to  a  court  of  equity  to  aid  it  in 
enforcing  its  public  duties  to  preserve 
the  health  and  property  of  the  inhabi- 
tants ;  and  by  proper  cases  is  meant  those 
which  fall  within  some  recognized  head  of 
equity  jurisdiction.     Ante,  sec.  375,  note. 

In  Connecticut,  where  the  city  charter 
authorized  the  common  council  of  a  city 
to  make  ordinances  to  protect  a  city  from 
fire,  and  to  establish  districts  within 
which  it  should  not  bo  lawful  without  a 
license  to  erect,  enlarge,  or  place  any 
wooden  buildiuLT,  the  council  passed  an 
ordinance  establishing  a  fire  district  and 


474 


MUNICIPAL   COIiPOKATIONS. 


§  40G 


government  of  the  corporation,  it  has  the  power  to  require  hoisticays 
le  of  stores  (usually  places  ul'  public  result)  to  be  enclosed  by  a 


Iding  the  erection  or  placing  of  any 

« len    building  therein,  without  li 

giveu  by  the  board  of  aldermen,  declaring 
b  building  should  I"'  deemed  a 
common  nuisance,  and  making  it  the 
duty  of  certain  officers  after  reasonable 
notice,  tn  abate  it  ;  and  it  was  held  that 
the  ordinance  was  fully  authorized  by  the 
charter  and  was  reasonable.  Hine  v. 
New  Haven,  40  Conn.  478(1873).     In  the 

of  a  building  erecti  d  « tthout  license 
within  the  fire  limits  of  a  city  in  violation 
of  such  an  ordinance,   LI   is  Dot  sufficient 

■i  for  the  interference  of  a  court  of 
equity  by  injunction,  at  the  instance  of  the 
owner,  that  he  had  obtained  the  consent 
individually  of  a  majority  of  the  alder- 
men, notice  being  given  him  thai  tin- 
board  when  in  session  might  refuse  its 
nt,  as  it  afterwards  did  ;  nor  that  lie 
had,  after  placing  the  building,  covered 
it  with  a  sheathing  of  iron  and  tinned  the 
roof,    before   proceedings   were    instituted 

it  him,  and  had  by  further  work 
upon  it  during  the  pendency  of  the  pro- 
ceedings made  it  substantially  fire-proof. 
The  city  authorities  were  considered  by 
thi  court  to  be  the  proper  judges  as  to 
how  far  these  facts  should  affect  their 
action.  The  court  expressed  the  further 
view  that  the  prompt  enforcement  of  an 
ordinance  establishing  fire  limits  in  a 
city  is  important  to  the  public  safety, 
and  a  court  of  equity  ought  not  to  inter- 
fere, in  a  ease  like  that  before  the  court, 
by  injunction  to  prevent  such  enforce- 
ment, but  leave  the  party  aggrieved  to 
his  legal  remedy,  if  he  is  entitled  to  any 
edy.  Nbi  was  it  a  reason  for  the  in- 
terference of  chancery  that  the  building 
erected  in  sue),  fire  limits  had  become  real 

■ .  since  it  had  become  so  by  the  un- 
lawful ad  of  the  owner,  and  was  such  only 
in  the  mosl  technical  sense,  and  the  value 
of  the  building  could  be  easily  ascertained 
and  proved.  Ih.  City  enjoined  at  instance 
of  owner  from  Buch  an  enforcement  of  lire 
limit  ordinance  as  would  violate  the  owner's 
legal   rights.     City  Council  v.  Louisville 

R.  R.  Co.   (Ala. ).   l  South  Rep.  626. 

C pare  Dunham  p.  New  Britain  (Conn.), 

11  At.  Rep.  354. 


Where  the  ordinance   passed   under  the 

authority  above  referred  to  provided  that 

no  person  shall  build  or  enlarge  any 
building  within  the  lire  limits,  without  a 
license  first  issued  by  the  fire  marshal, 
for  which  a  license  fa  of  fifty  a  nts  was  re- 
quired  to  be  paid,  it  was  held  that  the 
license  fee  thus  required  was  not  a  reve- 
nue tax,  in  any  proper  sense,  but  rather  a 
reasonable  sum  collected  of  the  party 
interested  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  in 
part  the  expense  of  issuing  and  recording 
the  license,  and  that  the  power  to  require 
such  a  fee  was  conferred  by  the  charter 
by  intendment,  as  convenient,  if  not  essen- 
tial to  full  enjoyment  of  the  powers  ex- 
pressly granted.  Welch  v.  Hotchkiss,  39 
Conn.  140  (1872). 

As  to  license  fee,  see  ante,  sees,  357,  358  ; 
Kinsley  v.  Chicago,  124  111.  359  (1888), 
holding  that  a  license  fee  may  he  exacted 
under  a  mere  power  to  regulate  a  calling 
or  business  without  express  power  of  taxa- 
tion. Such  a  fee  is  not  illegal  for  being 
in  excess  of  the  necessary  or  probable  ex- 
pense of  issuing  the  license  and  inspecting 
the  business.  In  Chicago  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.,  126  111.  276  (1888),  it  was  held  that 
an  ordinance  prohibiting  foreign  insur- 
ance companies  from  doing  business  in  a 
city,  without  taking  out  a  license  which 
called  for  the  payment  of  two  per  cent  of 
their  gross  receipts  from  business  done  in 
the  city,  was  not  sustainable  as  an  exercise 
of  the  police  power  granted  to  the  city  by 
its  charter.  New  I  Irleans  v.  Great  South 
Tel.  Co.,  40  La.  An.  41  ;  State  v.  Hilbert 
(license  fees  on  cars),  72  Wis.  184  ;  s.  c. 
39  North  West.  Rep.  326.  Post,  chap,  on 
Taxation. 

In-tance  of  a  want  of  power  to  restrict 
erection  of  wooden  buildings.  Hudson  V. 
Thome,  7  Paige,  261  ;  Pye  v.  Peterson,  4 
Tex.  312  ;  Alexander  v.  Greenville  T.  C, 
54  Miss.  659  ;  approving  text.  Cities 
may  constitutionally  be  authorized  to  pre- 
vent the. erection  of  wooden  buildings  in  cer- 
tain port imist hereof.  Respublicav. Duquet, 
2  Yeates  (Pa.),  493.  In  Wadleigh  v.  Gil- 
man,  supra,  it  was  decided  that  the  removal 
of  a  wooden  building  to  the  prohibited  dis- 
trict, or  even  from  one  part  of  the  district 


§407 


ORDINANCES  I  PRESERVATION  OP  OEDEE. 


475 


railing,  and  closed  by  a  trap-door  after  business  hours  each  day.  It 
was  justly  regarded  as  a  reasonable  police  regulation  not  unneces- 
sarily interfering  with  private  rights.1 


§  407    (340).     Preservation    of    Order.  — 

turbances  and  disorderly  assemblages,  and 
eminent  of  the  city,"  authorizes  it  to  take 
peace  and  to  protect  the  lives  and  property 
acts  of  the  city  in  procuring  a  loan  of  arms 
their  return  are  valid  and  binding  upon  it.2 
the  peace  and  quiet  of  the  place  authorizes 


Power  "  to  prevent  dis- 
maintain  the  -food  gov- 
measures  to  present   the 

of  the  citizens,  and   the 

and  giving  a  bond   for 

Authority  to  preserve 

an  ordinance  forbidding 


to  another,  was  an  "erection  "  within  the 
meaning  of  the  term  " erection,"  as  used 
in  the  ordinance.  "The  mischief,"  says 
Weston,  C.  J.,  "did  not  consist  in  the  act 
of  erecting,  but  in  the  continuance  of  the 
erection.  The  ordinance  did  not  meddle 
with  erections  as  they  stood  ;  this  would 
have  transcended  their  power."  DilFer- 
ence  between  "erecting"  and  "repair- 
ing." Brady  v.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Mich. 
425,  -149,  opinion  of  Campbell,  J.;  City 
Couueil  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  (Ala.),  4 
South.  Rep.  626  ;  Carroll  v.  Lynchburg 
(Va.),  6  South  East.  Rep.  133;  Brown 
t>.  Hunn,  27  Conn.  332  ;  Booth  v.  State,  4 
Conn.  65;  Tuttle  v.  State,  lb.  68;  Stewart 
v.  Commonwealth,  10  Watts  (Pa.),  306. 
Remedy  against  wrong-doer,  by  private 
action  in  favor  of  an  adjoining  owner 
specially  injured  by  a  violation  of  a  stat- 
ute in  relation  to  the  erection  of  wooden 
buildings.  Aldrich  v.  Howard,  7  R.  I. 
199.  See  Index  —  Fire.  Ante,  sec.  109. 
A  municipal  corporation  has  inherent 
power,  independent  of  legislative  grant,  to 
furl  iid  the  erection  within  the  densely  built 
up  parts  of  a  town,  and  compel  the  removal 
therefrom,  of  buildings  formed  of  combus- 
tible materials.  Monroe  v.  Hoffman,  29 
La.  An.  651.  An  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  erection  or  enlargement  of  any  building 
except  with  brick  or  stone  ;  that  no  wooden 
building  should  be  enlarged  without  a  per- 
mit from  the  local  authorities,  was  sus- 
tained. McCloskey  v.  Kreling  (CaL),  18 
Pac.  Rep.  433  (1888).  A  municipality  is 
under  no  implied  or  common-law  liability 
in  damages  for  a  loss  caused  by  a  (ire  ori- 
ginating in  a  wooden  building  erected  and 
maintained  iu  known  violation  of  an  ordi- 


nance. Hines  v.  Charlotte  (Mich.),  40 
N.  W.  Rep.  333  ;  post,  chap,  xxiii. 

1  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  v.  Wil- 
liams, 15  N.  Y.  502  (1859).  Johnson,  J., 
observes  :  "  The  danger  is  not  confined  to 
the  owner  and  ordinary  occupants  of  the 
building.  The  ordinance,  in  that  respect, 
stands  on  the  same  footing  as  a  regulation 
prohibiting  a  well  or  cistern  in  a  man's 
yard  unprotected  by  curb  or  cover,  the 
reasonableness  of  which  could  not  be 
doubted.  In  case  of  fire,  these  openings 
would  tend  directly  and  powerfully  to 
allow  the  fire  to  extend  through  all  parts 
of  the  building,  and  if  left  uncovered, 
would  also  tend  to  endanger  those  whom 
duty  might  require  to  enter  to  effect  the 
extinguishment  of  the  fire."  Paige,  J., 
considered  the  ordinance  the  same  in 
principle  as  fire  laws,  prescribing  the 
height,  thickness  of  walls,  and  materials 
of  buildings  within  the  city. 

3  State  v.  Buffalo,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  434 
(1842)  ;  New  Orleans  v.  Costello,  14  La. 
An.  37.  An  ordinance  against  disorderly 
conduct  has  no  reference  to  a  simple  tres- 
pass on  a  vacant  lot,  though  committed 
in  an  attempt  to  assert  an  adverse  right 
to  the  property.  Mobile  v.  Barton,  47 
Ala.  84  (1S72).  A  municipal  legislative 
body,  empowered  by  law  to  prohibit  or 
suppress  practices  against  good  morals  or 
public  decency,  may,  by  ordinance,  punish 
the  utterance  of  profane  language,  whether 
uttered  frequently  or  only  once  by  the 
same  person.  The  decision  of  the  council 
that  the  use  of  profane  language  is  against 
good  morals  will  not  be  judicially  reviewed. 
Delaney,  Li  re,  43  CaL  478  (1S72). 


17(3  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  408 

"all   disorderly  shouting,  dancing,  &c,  in  the   streets  and   public 
places/'  though  such  conduct  violates  no  existing  Slate  law.1 

Mode  of  enforcing  Ordinances. 
§  408    (341  ).   In  England  ;   Civil  Actions  and  Complaints.  —  In  the 

old  corporations  in  England,  by-laws  were  usually  made  in  virtue  of 
their  implied  power ;  they  did  not  extend  to  matters  criminal  in 
their  nature,  and  could  only  be  enforced,  unless  by  virtue  of  a  stat- 
ute or  valid  custom,  by  lines,  or  pecuniary  penalties,  commonly  for 
a  small  sum,  and  always,  or  almost  always,  in  a  fixed  or  certain 
int.2  So,  hy  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835,  the 
council  are  empowered  to  make  such  by-laws  ;is  to  them  shall  seem 
meet  for  the  good  rule  and  government  of  the  borough,  and  fur  the 
prevention  and  suppression  of  all  such  nuisances  as  are  not  punish- 
al'le  by  act  of  parliament  in  force  in  the  borough,  and  to  appoint 
such  fines  as  they  shall  deem  necessary  for  the  prevention  and  sup- 
pression of  such  offences,  with  the  proviso  that  no  fines  shall  exceed 
the  sum  of  five  pounds.3  The  act  provides  that  prosecutions  for  a 
breach  of  by-laws  made  under  it  shall  be  commenced  within  three 
months  after  the  commission  of  the  offence ;  that  the  charge  shall 
be  made  on  oath  ;  that  a  summons  shall  issue  and  be  served,  with 
power  to  the  magistrate  to  proceed  without  the  appearance  of  the 
defendant,  or  to  issue  a  warrant  for  his  arrest ;  that  if  convicted,  the 
penalty  shall  Vie  paid,  either  immediately  or  within  such  period  as 
the  magistrate  shall  think  fit;  that  it  may  be  levied  by  distress  and 
sale  of  the  goods  and  chattels  of  the  offender,  and  for  want  of  suf- 
ficient distress  the  offender  may  be  imprisoned  for  a  term  not  ex- 
ceeding one  month  ;  the  imprisonment  to  cease  upon  payment  of 
the  Bum  due.4  It  is  suggested  that  the  remedy  thus  prescribed  is 
cumulative,  and  will  not  debar  the  corporation  from  availing  itself 

1  Washington  v.  Frank,  1  Jones  (N.  C.)  held  valid.     Lane,  ex  parte,  76  Cal.  587  ; 

Law,  -    te  !'.    Debnam,   98  N.  <\  s.  c.  18  Pac.  Rep.  677. 

712;    State   v.    Cainan,    94    X.   C.    880;         2  Gee  v.   Wilden,   Lutw.  1320,  1324; 

construction   of  ordinance   in    respect   to  Wood  v.  Searl,  J.   Bridg.    139;  Piper  v. 

irbing  public  peace.  —  Charivari,  St.  Chappcll,  14  M.   &  W.   624;   Rawlinson 

C       !      v.  Meyer,  58  Mo.  86.     As  to  what  on  Corp.   665,  note.     Post,  sec.  424  et  seq. 

tiona    of    tins    kind    are    nori'ssary,  See  post,  chapter   on    Municipal    Courts, 

"much,"  says  the  court,  "must  be  left  to  sects.  426,  427,  432  ft  scq. 
tli-    judgment    mid    discretion"    of   the         »  5  and  6  Wm.  IV.,  chap,  lxxvi.,  sec. 

corporate    authorities.       Washington    v.  90.     Ante,  sees.  35,  336,  337,   393 ;  post, 

\      ■  ■     I  Joi         N    C.)  haw,   436  ;  ante,  sec.  426. 

v.  Bill,    13   Ire.   (N.   C.  *  5  and  6  Wm.  IV.,  chap,  lxxvi.,  sec, 

',   chap.   xiii.      Ordinance  139;  sees.  187-193;  supra,  sec.  266. 
prohibiting  the  visiting  of  gambling  houses 


§  410  ORDINANCES  ',     ACTIONS   TO    ENFORCE.  477 

of  the  usual  common-law  mode  of  enforcing  a  by-law  by  action  of 
debt  or  assumpsit.1  But  the  poiut  seems  not  to  have  been  yet 
adjudged. 

§  409  (342).  Same  subject.  —  Aside  from  statutory  regulation, 
the  general  method  of  enforcing  a  by-law  in  England  is,  as  just 
stated,  by  bringing,  in  the  name  of  the  proper  party  or  corporation, 
an  action,  in  the  proper  court,  against  the  person  who  has  violated 
the  by-law,  to  recover  the  penalty  which  it  imposes  ;  and  this  action 
may  be  either  debt  or  assumpsit.  By  the  common  law,  assumpsit  may 
be  maintained  for  the  breach  of  any  duty  which  the  defendant  has 
been  legally  liable  to  perform  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  the  law  imply- 
ing a  promise  to  perform  the  particular  act,  and  hence  no  principle 
was  violated  in  holding  that  assumpsit  would  lie  to  recover  the  penalty 
of  a  by-law.  As  the  penalty  was  for  a  sum  certain,  and  was  con- 
sidered to  be  in  the  nature  of  liquidated  damages,  an  action  of  debt 
would  also  lie  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  penalty  ;  but  where  the 
by-law  itself  provided  that  the  penalty  should  be  recovered  by  debt, 
then  that  form  of  action  alone  could  be  maintained.  But,  aside 
from  statute  authority  or  a  valid  custom,  it  was  not  competent  for 
the  by-law  to  provide  that  its  penalty  should  be  recovered  by  "  dis- 
tress and  sale  "  of  goods,  that  being  contrary  to  the  common  law.2 

§  410  (343).  Same  subject.  In  America.  — In  this  country,  the 
courts  hold  that  where  the  mode  of  enforcement  is  prescribed  by  the 
charter,  that  mode  must  be  pursued;3  but   if  the  mode  or  form  of 

1  Eawlinson  on  Corp.  (5th  erl. )  167,  213,  per  Nott,  J.  ;  Brookville  v.  Gagle,  73 
note.     See  Adley  v.    Reeves,    2   Maule  &     Ind.  117  ;  supra,  sees.  336-316. 

Sel.  61;  Bodwic  v.  Fennell,  1  Wils.  233.  3  Weeks  v.  Forman,  1  Harris.  (N.  J.) 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Grant  is  of  opin-  237  (1837)  ;  State  v.  Zeigler,  3  Vroom  (32 

ion   that   the   remedy   prescribed    by  the  N.   J.   L. ),   262  ;   Ewbanks  v.   Ashley,  36 

act  is  exclusive,  and  supersedes  the  com-  111.    177  (1861)  ;  Israel  v.  Jacksonville,  1 

mon-law    remedy    of    debt   or  assumpsit  Scam.  (2  111.)  290  ;  Williamson  v.  Com- 

for   the   amount  of  the   fine   or  penalty,  monwealth,    4   B.    Hon.    (Ky. )   146,   151 

Grant  on  Corp.    364  ;    supra,    sees.    337,  (1843).      An  action  may  be  brought  for 

341.  the  fines  and  penalties  incurred   for  the 

2  Willc.  164-181  ;  1  Saund.  PI.  &  Ev.  violation  of  ordinances,  and  it  is  not 
683  ;  2  Wheat.  Selw.  1178  ;  2  Chitty  PI.  necessary  that  the  fine  be  assessed  before 
401,  where  form  of  declaration  in  debt  is  the  suit  is  brought.  Kingu.  Jacksonville, 
given;  Adley  v.  Reeves,  2  M.  &  S.  60.  2  Scam.  (3  111.)  306.  In  Weeks  v.  Fore- 
The  law  implies  a  promise  on  the  part  of  man,  1  Harris.  (N.  J.)  237  (1S37),  it  was 
a  corporator  to  pay  all  penalties  incurred  held  that  although  certain  corporate  offi- 
for  his  violation  of  by-laws  ;  and  if  the  cers  were  ex-officio  justices  of  the  peace 
mode  of  enforcing  such  penalties  is  not  within  the  city,  with  power  to  take  eoLrni- 
pointed  out,  the  corporation  may  sue  zance  of  violations  of  bydaws,  they  could 
therefor  in  any  competent  court.  Colum-  not  entertain  or  try  actions  of  debt,  to 
bia   v.    Harrison,    2    Mill   Const.    (S.   C.)  recover  a  debt  or  penalty  for  a  breach  of 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§410 


action  is  not  prescribed,  then  the  recovery  of  the  penalty  or  fine  for 
the  violation  of  a  valid  municipal  ordinance  may  be  as  at  common 
law,  by  an  action  of  debt  or  assumpsit,  or  where  these  forms  are  abro- 
1.  by  a  civil  action  in  substance  the  same.1  And  where  such 
an  action  is  brought,  the  proceeding  is  civil  and  not  criminal,  and 
the  rules  of  procedure  in  civil  cases,  unless  otherwise  provided,  are 
applicable  to  it.2  The  penalties  to  ordinances  are  often  fixed  upon 
a  movable  scale;  and  this  would  appear  to  be  done  under  the  sup- 
position  that  they  will  be  enforced,  not  by  a  common-law  action  in 
the  common-law  courts  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  but  by 
a  complaint  or  proceeding  before  the  proper  municipal  magistrate, 
who  will,  within  the  prescribed  limits,  determine  the  amount  of  the 
fine  or  penalty  to  be  paid,  by  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case.3 


an  ordinance,  although  it  was  conceded 
that  they  bad  jurisdiction  of  the  quasi 
criminal  proceeding  founded  upon  a  com- 
plaint or  information,  resulting  in  what  is 
technically  called  a  conviction;  but  quaere. 

i,  Bees.  336-353. 
»  Ewbanks  v.  Ashley,  3'5  111.178(1864); 
Israel  '■•  Jacksonville,  1  Scam.  (2  IH.) 
290;  Coatea  v.  Mayor,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.) 
585,608  (1827).  Unless  it  is  otherwise 
provided  by  statute  <>r  charter,  it  is  con- 
!  thai  corporations  have  an  inherent 
power  to  provide  i*< > i*  the  recovery  of  a 
penalty  by  an  action  of  debt  in  their  own 
court-;.  Hesketh  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr. 
1858;  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa. 
(Pen.  &  W.)  253.  Where  a  city,  by  ordi- 
nance, requires  the  taking  out  of  licenses 
to  carry  on  business,  it  has  no  right  of 
action  for  the  amount  of  such  licenses  be- 
fore they  are  taken  out,  but  is  confined 
to  enforcing  the  penalty  for  doing  business 
without  license.  Santa  Cruz  v.  Santa 
Cruz  R.  R.  Co.,  56  CaL  143  ;  supra,  sec. 
341. 

-  Tb.  ;  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  1  La, 
An.  335  ;  Lewiston  >•.  Proctor,  27  111.  414 
I  (uincy  v.  Ballance,  30  111.  185  ; 
Davenport  o.  Bird,  34  Iowa.  524  (1872)  ; 
Williamson  v.  Commonwealth,  A  B.  Mod. 
(Ky.)  1  16,  151   (1843)  ;  Jenkins  v.  Chey- 

.  I  Wv.  Ter.  287  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Vert, 
M      204  ;  Mill  r  v.  O'Reilly,  84   Ind. 

.  Brophy  v.  Perth  Amboy,  44  N.J.  L. 
217,  approving  I 

7.  341.     Court  held  not 
to  be  authorized  to  inquire  into  the  reason- 


ableness of  an  ordinance  fixing  a  fine  with- 
in the  prescribed  statutory  limit.  Ilaynes 
v.  Cape  May,  50  N.  J.  L.  55  ;  8.  p.  11 
Cent.  Rep.  578.  If  the  statute  under 
which  the  conviction  takes  place  applies 
the  penalty  with  certainty,  it  is  suffi- 
cient for  the  justice  to  award  the  penalty 
to  be  paid  and  applied  according  to  law. 
Queen  v.  Barrett,  1  Salk.  383  ;  The 
King  v.  Seale,  8  East,  573  ;  The  King  v. 
Thompson,  2  T.  B.  18  ;  The  King  v. 
Hyde.  21  L.J.  Mag.  Cas.  94  ;  Boothroyd, 
In  re,  15  M.  &  W.  1  ;  The  Queen  v.  Crid- 
land,  7  E.  &  B.  853  ;  The  Queen  v.  John- 
son, 8  Q.  B.  102  ;  see  also  The  King  v. 
Glossop,  4  B.  &  Aid.  616;  Brown  v.  Nichol- 
son,  5  C.  B.  N.  s.  468 ;  Seamen's  Hos- 
pital v.  Liverpool,  4  Ex.  ISO  ;  Wray  v. 
Ellis,  1  E.  k  E.  276.  If  there  be  any 
materia]  variance  between  the  conviction 
and  the  statute  as  to  the  appropriation  of 
the  penalty,  the  conviction  will  be  bad. 
Griffith  v.  Harries,  2  M.  &  W.  335;  Chad- 
dock  v.  Wilhraham  ct  al.,  5  C.  B.  645; 
Harr.  Mimic.  Man.  (Canada),  5th  ed.  313, 
314.  A  city  ordinance  prescribing  a  term 
of  imprisonment  which  may,  but  does  not 
necessarily  exceed  that  authorized  by  the 
Constitution,  may  be  enforced  within  the 
constitutional  limit.  Keokuk  v.  Dressell, 
47  Iowa,  597.  Ordinance  held  void  because 
the  line  or  penalty  was  uncertain  in  amount, 
the  provision  being  thai  the  offender  should 
be  fined  not  exceeding  five  dollars,  and  one 
dollar  for  each  day's  negled  to  do  a  cerl  tin 
act.  State  v.  Rice  (N.  C),  2  Sou'! 
Rep.  180. 


§  411  ORDINANCES  :     PROCEEDINGS   TO    ENFORCE.  479 

§  411  (344).  Nature  of  Proceeding,  Civil  or  Criminal.  —  Where, 
instead  of  a  civil  action  to  recover  the  pecuniary  tine  or  penalty,  the 
proceeding  is  in  the  nature  of  a  complaint  for  the  violation  of  the 
ordinance,  this  has  sometimes  been  considered  to  be  a  criminal  or 
quasi  criminal,  and  not  a  civil,  proceeding.  The  cases  on  this  .sub- 
ject are  not  harmonious,  but  the  difference  in  them  depends,  to  a 
large  extent,  upon  the  character  of  the  act  or  offence  charged,  the 
nature  of  the  charter,  and  of  the  legislation  in  the  particular  State 
as  to  the  extent  of  jurisdiction  intended  to  be  conferred  upon  the 
municipal  authorities.1  The  Constitution  of  Georgia  declares  that 
"trial  by  jury,  as  heretofore  used  in  this  State,  shall  remain  invio- 
late." It  was  claimed  that  the  legislature  could  not  constitutionally 
confer  on  the  city  council  the  power  to  pass  an  ordinance  inflicting 
a  fine  for  its  violation,  where  the  guilt  of  a  party  was  to  be  tried  by 
the  council,  without  a  jury.  The  court  held  that  the  objection  was 
not  sound,  observing  that  violations  of  ordinances  are  not  criminal 
cases  within  the  meaning  of  the  State  Constitution,  and  "  that,  inas- 
much as  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  existed  in  England,  and  was 
secured  by  Magna  Charta,  and  municipal  corporations  in  that  coun- 
try enforced  their  by-laws  by  pecuniary  penalties  in  a  summary 
manner,  and  the  same  right  being  conferred  upon  similar  corpora- 
tions in  this  State  anterior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and 
constantly  exercised,  '  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  as  heretofore  used 
in  this  State,'  was  not  violated  by  the  city  council  of  Augusta,  by 
the  imposition  of  the  penalty  for  the  breach  of  the  local  police  regu- 
lations of  that  city."  2 

1  Wayne  County  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich.  R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  316;  Flint  River 
390;  People  v.  Detroit,  18  Mich.  445;  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Foster,  5  Ga.  194 ;  Floyd 
Davenport  v.  Bird,  34  Iowa,  524  (1372)  ;  v.  Comm'rs,  &e.,  14  Ga.  354;  ante,  sec. 
Charleston  v.  Oliver,  16  S.  G.  47,  which  432  ct  seq.,  and  notes;  Kip  v.  Paterson, 
was  an  action  for  carrying  on  business  2  Dutch.  (X.  J.)  298  ;  Keeler  v.  Milledge, 
without  license,  in  which  the  municipal  4  Zab.  (24  X.  J.  L.)  142;  Shafer  v. 
court  held  the  defendant  liable  "for  the  Muinma,  17  Md.  331.  "Summary  con- 
amount  of  the  license  and  penalty,  and,  victions  for  petty  offences  against  stat- 
in default  of  payment,  to  an  imprisonment  utes  were  always  sustained,  and  they  were 
of  thirty  days."  The  court  said  that  never  supposed  to  be  in  conflict  with  the 
"where,  as  in  this  case,  no  mode  of  en-  common-law  right  to  a  trial  by  jury." 
forcement  is  prescribed  by  the  charter,  we  Per  Strong,  J.,  Byers  v.  Commonwealth, 
see  no  reason  why  the  mode  pursued  in  42  Pa.  St.  89,  94  (1S62).  In  the  case 
this  case  is  not  sufficient,"  citing  the  text,  last  cited,  the  extent  of  the  right  of  jury 
See  chapter  on  Municipal  Courts,  post,  trial  at  common  law  is  learnedly  examined 
sec.  427,  and  note,  sec.  432  ct  seq.,  and  by  Mr.  Justice  Strong.  See,  also,  Dun- 
notes  ;  supra,  sees.  347,  366,  368,  and  more's  Appeal.  52  Pa,  St.  374;  Rhiues  v. 
note.  Clark,    51   Pa.   St.   96   (1865).      Compare 

-  Williams  v.  Augusta  (gunpowder  or-  Plimpton  v.  Somerset,  33  Vt.  283  (1860); 

dinance),  4  Ga.  509  (184S),  per   Warner,  see:  post,  Municipal  Courts,  sec.  432  et  seq. 

J.,  approving  Low  v.  Comm'rs  of  Pilotage,  History    of    Courts    of    Summary    Juris- 


480 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§412 


>;  412      345  .     Same   subject.     In   Massachusetts.  —  Oil    the   other 

hand,  in  Massachusetts,  prosecutions  for  breaches  of  by-laws  or  ordi- 
nances made  to  enforce  police  regulations  are  regarded  as  substan- 
tially 'public  prosecutions,  and  in  such  prosecutions  it  is  competent, 
though  confessed  not  to  be  very  just,  to  disallow  the  defendant 
Applying  this  doctrine,  it  is  held  that  a  statute  providing 
that  prosecutions  for  violations  of  city  ordinances  in  the  name  of 
the  State  or  commonwealth  is  not  unconstitutional,  notwithstanding 
the  result  is  thai  the  defendant  does  not  recover  costs  on  acquittal.1 


diction  in  England  and  extent  of  their 
powers  under  the  Summary  Jurisdiction 
A.  i  of  L879,  see  1  Stephen,  Hist,  of  Crim- 
inal Law,  chap.  iv.  A  statute  requiring 
security  for  costs,  in  prosecutions  for 
"  pen  ."  does  nol  embrace  pros- 

ecutions under  city  ordinances  which  im- 
I  penalties  t"<  >r  their  violation,  such 
ordinances  nol  being  "statutes"  within 
the  meaning  of  the  act.  Lewiston  v. 
Proctor,  27  111.  41  I  (1860);  s.  p.  Quincy 
v.  Ballance,  30  111.  1-."..  Further,  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  proceeding  and  kind  of 
process.  Alton  v.  Kirsch,  68  111.  261 
(1873);  and  see,  also,  Municipality  v. 
I  ing,  I  L  i.  An.  335  ;  Ewbanks  v. 
Ashley,  36  111.  177;  Wayne  County 
v.  Drtn.it.  17  Mich.  390  ;  People  v.  De- 
troit, 18  Mich.  -It.".,  construing  the  phra  e 
••penal  laws,"  as  used  in  the  Mich 
Constitution.  Phrase  "municipal  fine," 
in  the  Constitution  of  California,  con- 
strued. People  v.  Johnson,  30  I  !al.  98 
(1866).  Violations  of  ordinances  impos- 
lines  and  penalties  arc  in  the  nature 
of  torts,  and  actions  for  such  violations 
may  be  prosecuted  against  one  or  more 
of  the  offending  parties  ;  they  need  not  all 
be  joined.  Jacksonville  v.  Holland,  L9 
111.  271  (1857).  The  defendant  in  such 
a  prosecution  cannot  raise  the  que 
whether  the  charter  of  the  city  is  forfeit- 
.  Macomb,  7*;  111.  49  (1874). 
i  God  .  I,  In  re,  L6  Pick.  (M  iss.)  504 
5);  Commonwealth  v.  Worcester,  3 
Pick.  (Mass.)  162.  "  II,"  says  l  hief  Jus- 
tice £'iaw,  in  the  case  first  cited,  "  the 
i  i  nforce  a  private  right 
by  the  city,  there  would  be  weight  in  the 
tion,  and  it  would  stand  on  different 
grounds."     16   Pick.  Common- 

we  ilth  v.  Gay,  5  Pick.  I  Mass.)  44  ;  <  lom- 
monwcalth  v.  Fahey,  5  Cuah.  (Mass.)  408. 


Similar  observations  in  relation  to  making 

sidewalks,  by  Fun/,  .].,  in  Paxson  v.  Swi  et, 
1  J.  S.  Green  (N.  J.),  200  (1832).  So,  in 
New  Hampshire,  a  public  prosecution  for 
an  offence  made  penal  by  a  city  ordinance 
lieeau.se  of  its  supposed  evil  COnseiplcli'  s 
to  society  —  as,  for  example,  the  offence 
of  unlawfully  keeping  a  howling-alley  — 
is  considered  to  be  a  criminal,  and  not  a 
civil,  proceeding.  State  v.  Stearns,  11 
Fost.  (31  N.  II.)  106  (1855).  In  Ala- 
i  such  a  prosecution  is  considered 
quasi  criminal,  and  the  defendant  cannot 
testify  in  his  own  behalf  as  he  may  in  a 
civil  action.  Mobile  v.  Jones,  42  Ala. 
630  (1868);  Fink  v.  Milwaukee,  17  Wis. 
26  (1S63),  is  decided  upon  the  basis  that 
a  prosecution  of  a  party  for  the  violation 
of  a  city  ordinance,  where  the  penalty  is  a 
fine,  is  a  criminal  prosecution  to  which 
the  Bill  of  Rights  applies,  which  declares 
thai  "in  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the 
accused  shall  he  entitled  to  demand  the 
nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation  against 
him."  But  a  principle  so  broad,  it  is  be- 
lieved  by  the  author,  can  hardly  be  main- 
tained where  the  act  charged  is  not  a  crime 
at  common  law  or  in  its  essential  nature. 
See  chapter  on  Municipal  Courts,  post. 
In  Indiana  an  action  to  recover  the  pen- 
alty of  a  by-law,  though  a  warrant  for 
the  arrest  of  the  defendant  he  issued  and 
served,  is  considered  to  be  a  civil  suit,  and 
governed  by  the  rules  of  practice  in  such 
suits.  Goshen  v.  Croxton,  34  Ind.  239 
(1870),  and  i 

In  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622 
(1874),  it  was  decided  that  the  provision 
of  the  Constitution,  that  all  prosecutions 

shall  be  in  the  aai f  the  State,  did  not 

include  prosecutions  hy  a  municipality  in 
its  own  courts  for  a  violation  of  its  ordi- 
nances, and  that  such  prosecutions  might 


§413 


ORDINANCES  :     MODE    OF    PLEADING. 


481 


§  413  (346).  Mode  of  pleading  Ordinances.  —  The  courts,  unless 
they  are  the  courts  of  the  municipality,  do  not  judicially  notice  the  ordi- 
nances of  a  municipal  corporation,  unless  directed  by  charter  or  statute 
to  do  so.1  Therefore,  such  ordinances,  when  sought  to  be  enforced  by 
action,  or  when  set  up  by  the  defendant  as  a  protection,  should  be 
set  out  or  stated  in  substance  in  the  pleading.  It  bus  been  some- 
times decided  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  they  be  referred  to  gener- 
ally by  the  title  or  section.  It  is,  however,  believed  to  be  sufficient, 
in  the  absence  of  special  legislative  provision  prescribing  the  manner 
of  pleading,  to  set  forth  the  legal  substance  of  that  part  of  the  ordi- 
nance alleged  to  have  been  violated,  it  being  advisable,  for  purposes 
of  identification,  to  refer  also  to  the  title,  date,  and  section.  The 
liberal  rules  of  pleading  and  practice  which  characterize  modern 
judicial  proceedings  should  extend  to,  and  doubtless  would  be  held 
to  embrace,  suits  and  prosecutions  to  enforce  the  by-laws  or  ordinances 
of  municipal  corporations.2 


he  in  the  name  of  the  municipality.  But 
in  Neitzel  v.  Concordia,  14  Kan.  446 
(1875),  it  was  held,  without  professing  to 
overrule  the  previous  decision,  that  a  pros- 
ecution in  a  municipal  court,  under  a  city 
ordinance,  for  a  matter  made  penal  by 
the  laws  of  the  State  or  because  of  its  evil 
consequences,  was  a  criminal  proceeding. 
"Whether  the  rule  would  be  the  same  if 
the  prosecution  was  to  enforce  a  private 
right  of  the  city,  the  court  left  open  for 
further  consideration.  Ante,  sees.  366- 
369  ;  post,  sees.  429,  432. 

1  See  ante,  sec.  83.  Elizabethtown  v. 
Leffler,  23  111.  90;  Mooney  v.  Keunett,  19 
Mo.  551  (1854);  New  Orleans  v.  Boudro,  14 
La.  An.  303  (1859)  ;  Harker  v.  Mayor,  17 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  199  (1837)  ;  Case  v.  Mo- 
bile, 30  Ala.  538  (1857);  People  v.  Mayor, 
&c.  of  New  York,  7  How.  Pr.  R.  (N.  Y.) 
81  (1851);  Cox  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  431 
(1848);  Carvin  v.  Wells,  8  Iowa,  286; 
Goodrich  v.  Brown,  30  Iowa,  291  (1870); 
Austin  v.  Walton,  68  Tex.  507  ;  Wheeling 
v.  Black,  25  W.  Va.  266  ;  People  v.  Bu- 
chanan, 1  Idaho,  681.  In  England,  when 
an  action  on  a  by-law  founded  on  a  cus- 
tom is  brought  in  a  court  of  the  munici- 
paliiy  the  court  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  it,  but  in  an  action  in  the  Superior 
Courts  the  custom  and  the  by-law  must 
be  set  out,  for  these  courts  will  not  take 
notice  of  them.  Willc.  166,  pi.  403  ;  lb. 
172,  pi.  423;  lb.  173,  pi.  425;  Brad- 
VOL.  I.  —  31 


nox's  Case,  1  Vent.  196  ;  Barber  Surgeons 
v.  Pelson,  2  Lev.  252  ;  Norris  v.  Staps, 
Hob.  211.  In  Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2 
Iowa,  90,  it  was  held  that  the  mayor,  on 
whom  was  confei-red  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  violation  of  the  ordinances  of 
the  city,  was  authorized  to  take  judicial 
notice,  ex  officio,  of  the  city  ordinances. 
The  provision  of  a  city  charter  that  its 
published  and  printed  ordinances  shall  be 
received  in  evidence  in  all  courts  without 
proof  does  not  dispense  with  the  neces- 
sity of  making  them  part  of  the  record  in 
order  to  bring  them  to  the  knowledge  of 
an  appellate  court.  Cox  v.  St.  Louis,  11 
Mo.  431  (1848);  New  Orleans  v.  Boudro, 
14  La.  An.  303  (1859). 

2  Harker  v.  New  York,  17  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  199  (1837).  Text  cited,  Emporia 
v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622,  628  (1874).  See 
Stokes  v.  Corporation  of  New  York,  14 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  87  ;  Mooney  v.  Kennett, 
19  Mo.  551  (1854)  ;  Austin  v.  Walton,  6S 
Tex.  507;  ante,  sec.  356,  note.  In  justify- 
ing, the  defendant  must  set  out  in  his  plea 
or  answer  the  ordinance,  or  so  much  thereof 
as  will  show  on  what  the  defence  rests. 
lb.  ;  Keeler  v.  Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J. 
L.)  142  (1857).  It  is  sufficient  to 
tin'  substance  of  that  part  of  the  ordinance 
which  has  been  violated,  with  a  reference 
to  the  title,  date,  ami  section.  Tb.  Ap- 
proved, Kip  v.  Paterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
298.     Regularly,    the    by-law  or  its   sub- 


182 


MINICII'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


§414 


6  414  347).  Requisites  of  Complaints.  —  Under  a  charter  au- 
thorizing "complaint  "  bo  br  made  of  the  violation  of  ordinances,  but 
not  prescribing  the  mode  or  requisites,  a  complaint  is  not  in  the 
nature  of  an  information  by  a  common  informer,  and  the  same 
strictness  is  not  required  as  in  an  information  or  indictment,  "It 
is  sufficient  it'  it  sets  out  with  clearness  the  offence  charged,  and  the 
substance  of  that  part  of  the  ordinance  which  has  been  violated, 
with  a  reference  to  the  title,  date,  or  section."1 


.    should  be  s.-t   forth.     Case  v.  Mo- 
bil.-, 30   Ala.   538   (Ps.">7);    Charleston  v. 
(s.    c ),    164.      By-law 
need  not  be  pleaded  in  full;  complaint  is 
sufficient  if  it  refers  to  the  ordinance  and 

•  -  facts  showing  a  violation  thereof. 

.  76  <  !al.  587  ;  8.  o.  L8  Pac. 

1;  ].  »;77;  infra,  sec.  114, note.    Defective 

ing  of  an  ordinance  held  to  be  waived 
by  a  plea  of  nol  ind  going  to  trial 

ou  i  lie  merits.    Si  itet    rh  ckards,  21  Minn. 
:7.     In    'England,  the  by-law  itself  must 

illy  set  out  in  an  action  of  debt  upon 
it,  and  m>t  by  way  of  recital  ;  but  in  as- 

sit  upon  the  same  by-law,  latitude  is 
allowed.  Willcock,  173,  pi.  425.  But  in 
this  country  it  is  aid  thai  '"it  is  uot  ne- 
cessary  to  hold  to  the  strictness  anciently 
required."  Keeler  v.  Milledge,  4  Zabr. 
(24  N.  J.  L.)  142.  In  Missouri  by  stat- 
ute, lines  and  penalties  accruing  to  any 
town  may  be  recovered  by  civil  action  ; 
bul  the  complaint,  while  it  need  not  con- 
tain all  the  requisites  of  an  indictment, 
must  specify  the  offence  with  reasonable 
certainty.  St.  Louis  v.  Smith,  10  Mo. 
This  is  the  true  rule.  Hence  a 
aging  only  that  "  the  de- 
fendant committed  an  offence  [naming  it] 
trary  to  an  ordinance  of  the  town"  is 
insufficient.  Memphis  v.  O'Connor,  53 
Mo.  468  -1873).  Soacharge  that  "  the  de- 
fendant knowingly  asso.  iat.-.l  with  thi.  ves 
previous  to  Augusl  21,  1871,"  is  too  vague, 

do  pi  lci    being  named  and  the  na E 

the  thieves  oo1  being  given.     St.  Louis  v. 
Fitz,   53   Mo.   582   (1873).     In    Indiana, 

re  the  ad  nf  1867,  it  was  nee.  r  \  to 
file  with  the  complaint  a  copy  of  the  ordi- 
fcion  thereof  alleged  to  bave 
been  violated.  Green  v.  Indianapolis,  2."> 
In. I.  190;  Whitson  o.  Franklin,  34  Ind.  892 
(tn  demurr.  i  to  a  complaint 
which    .lues    not    set    out    the    ordinance 


alleged  to  be  violated,  but  refers  only  to 
the  number  of  the  section,  the  validity  of 
the  ordinance  was  presumed.  Frankfort  v. 
Aughe  (Ind.),  15  N.  E.  Rep.  802.  In 
Xi'i-ih  I'n-rolina,  it  is  held  not  to  be  neces- 
sary to  set  forth  an  ordinance  alleged  to 
have  lu-eii  violated  ;  it  is  sullieieiit  to  refer 
to  it  by  indicia,  pointing  it  out  with  rea- 
sonable certainty.  State  v.  Cainan,  94 
IS'.  0.  880.  Unless  required  by  law  or 
ordinance  a  complaint,  not  under  oath, 
will  not  necessarily  vitiate  the  proceed- 
ings if  the  magistrate  has  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject.  Alton  v.  Kirsch,  6S  111.  261 
(1873).  Several  breaches  of  an  ordi- 
nance may  lie  sued  for  in  one  suit,  if  the 
judgment  does  not  exceed  the  amount  of 
the  magistrate's  jurisdiction.  Hensoldt  v. 
Petersburg,  63  111.  Ill  (1872).  Where  a 
charter  provides  that  "a  warrant  shall 
issue  in  favor  of  a  city  .  .  .  for  a  viola- 
tion of  any  ordinance  when,  &c,  or  upon 
affirmation  by  the  city  attorney,  there  is 
no  authority  for  a  deputy  city  attorney 
to  swear  to  a  complaint  ;  power  thus 
provided  must  be  exercised  by  the  city 
attorney  in  person."  Kansas  City  v.  Flan- 
agan, 69  Mo.  22. 

i  Keel.r  r.  Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J. 
L.)  142  (1857).  Approved,  Kip  i'.  Pater- 
son,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298  ;  City  Council 
v.  Seeba,  4  Strob.  (S.  C.)  Law,  319  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Bean,  Thach.  (Mass.  Crim. 
Cas.)  85.  Compare  Fink  v.  Milwaukee, 
17  Wis.  26  (1863);  see,  also,  Common- 
wealth v.  Bean,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  52  ;  Deitz 
v.  City,  1  Col.  32:5  ;  Napman  v.  People, 
19  Midi.  352  (1869);  Goshen  v.  Croxton, 
34  Ind.  239  (1870)  ;  Frankfort  v.  Aughe 
(Ind.),  15  N.  K.  Rep.  802;  Whitson  v. 
Franklin,  34  Ind.  392  (1870)  ;  State  v. 
Cainan,  94  N.  C.  880  ;  Nodim-  v.  Union, 
13  Oreg.  587.  Where  the  process  did  not 
state   what  ordinance  had  been  violated, 


§415 


ORDINANCES  :     REQUISITES    OF    COMPLAINTS. 


483 


§  415  (348).  Same  subject. — In  an  action  or  proceeding  to  re- 
cover a  penalty  for  the  violation  of  a  by-law  or  ordinance  of  a  cor- 
poration, the  declaration  or  complaint  should  state  facts  which  make 
the  liability  of  the  defendant  distinctly  to  appear.1     And  regularly, 


nor  the  time  or  manner,  the  proceedings 
were  held  defective.  State  v.  Trenton,  7 
Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),  283;  Henderson- 
ville  v.  McMinn,  82  N.  C.  532.  The  com- 
plaint need  not  state  the  number  of  the 
section  violated.  Meyer  v.  Bridgeton, 
8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.)  160.  The  ordinance 
need  not  be  recited  in  full.  Emporia  v. 
Volmer,  12  Kan.  622(1871)  ;  Goldthwaite 
v.  Montgomery,  50  Ala.  486  (1874)  ;  St. 
Louis  v.  Smith,  10  Mo.  438.  Supra,  sec. 
413,  and  note.  An  allegation  in  a  plead- 
ing that  an  ordinance  was  duly  passed 
held  to  imply,  by  necessity,  that  all 
essential  antecedents  for  its  legal  enact- 
ment had  been  observed.  Becker  v.  Wash- 
ington, 94  Mo.  375  (1888).  By  statute, 
prosecutions  for  the  violations  of  the 
ordinances  of  Boston  may  be  prosecuted 
in  the  name  of  the  commonwealth  ;  and 
it  is  decided  that  in  a  complaint  for 
such  a  violation  it  is  not  sufficient  that  it 
concludes  "against  the  form  of  the  by- 
laws of  the  said  city,"  but  it  must  con- 
clude also  against  the  form  of  the  statute. 
Commonwealth  v.  Gay,  5  Pick.  (Mass.) 
44  (1327)  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Worcester, 
3  Pick.  (Mass.)  462  (1826).  Complaint 
must  be  in  the  name  of  the  treasurer  of  the 
city  or  town,  and  not  in  that  of  the  com- 
monwealth, for  violation  of  health  ordi- 
nances, since  the  statute  of  1849.  Ch. 
ccxi.  sec.  7  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Fahey,  5 
Cush.  (Mass.)  408  (1850).  Policemen, 
marshals,  and  other  officers  of  a  municipal 
corporation,  where  such  a  course  is  not  re- 
pugnant to  the  Constitution  or  general  law 
of  the  State,  may  be  empowered  by  an 
ordinance  to  arrest  offenders  without  war- 
r  n  ,  for  breaches  of  ordinances  committed 
in  their  presence.  Bryan  v.  Bates,  15  111. 
87  ;  Main  v.  McCarty,  15  111.  442  ;  State 
v.  Lafferty,  5  Harring.  (Del.)  491.  Ante, 
sees.  210,  211.  A  city  ordinance  provid- 
ing that  any  person  who  shall  refuse  to 
obey  an  order  at  a  fire  given  by  any  officer 
duly  authorized,  "  may  be  arrested  and 
detained  in  custody  until  the  fire  is  extin- 
guished," is  unconstitutional,  because  the 


person  is  deprived  of  his  liberty  without 
due  process  of  law,  and  because  his  right 
to  trial  by  jury  is  invaded.  The  court  dis- 
tinguish between  an  arrest  of  this  kind 
and  where  the  purpose  of  the  arrest  is  pre- 
liminary to  and  contemplates  a  judicial  ex- 
amination. Judson  v.  Reardon,  16  Minn. 
431  (1871).  Under  the  charter  of  Newark 
a  violator  of  an  ordinance  of  that  city  can- 
not, without  his  consent,  be  brought  into 
court  for  trial,  unless  by  a  warrant  or 
summons.  Newark  v.  Murphy,  40  N.  J. 
L.  145  ;  ante,  sees.  210,  211  ;  Mitchell  v. 
Lemon,  34  Md.  176  (1870);  Butolph  v. 
Blust,  5  Lansing  (X.  Y.),  84  (1871).  Re- 
quisites of  warrants  for  the  violation  of 
municipal  ordinances.  White  v.  Wash- 
ington, 2  Cranch  Cir.  C.  337.  Other 
cases  :  lb.  356  ;  lb.  459 ;  4  Cranch 
Cir.  C.  103  ;  lb.  582  ;  Prells  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 7  Kan.  426  (1871).  A  penalty 
cannot  be  imposed  without  notice.  Alex- 
andria v.  Bethlehem,  5  Dutch.  (N.J.)  375, 
377.  Sufficiency  of  notice  to  the  accused 
under  special  charter  provisions,  Keeler  v. 
Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  142.  Es- 
sentials of  summary  convictions.  Com- 
monwealth v.  Borden,  61  Pa.  St.  272. 

1  Saund.  PI.  &  Ev.  324  ;  Comyns  Dig. 
tit.  Pleader  (2  W.  11)  ;  Feltmakers  v. 
Davis,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  98  ;  Piper  v.  Chap- 
pell,  14  M.  &  W.  623  ;  Case  v.  Mobile,  30 
Ala.  538  (1857);  Coates  v.  Mayor,  7  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  585,  608  (1827),  where  the  sub- 
stance of  a  declaration  in  debt  is  given  ; 
Charleston  v.  Chur,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  164; 
Krickle  v.  Commonwealth,  1  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  361  (1841).  Pleader  need  not  neg- 
ative exception  in  a  proviso  to  the  en- 
acting clause  of  an  ordinance  or  in  a  sub- 
sequent section,  this  being  a  matter  of 
defence.  Lynch  v.  People.  16  Mich.  172 
(1868).  See  Roherson  v.  Lambertville,  9 
Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  69;  McC  ir  v. 
Bridgeton,  4  Vroom  (33  X.  J.  L.),  213; 
Farwell  ».  Smith,  1  Ilarr.  (X.  J.)  133. 
The  conviction  must  be  for  the  same  of- 
fence for  which  the  defendant  i  -  prosecuted, 
Columbus  i?.  Arnold,  30  Ga.  517. 


1^1  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §"116 

as  before  stated,  the  by-law  should  be  set  forth  or  its  substance 
i.  as  well  as  the  breach  and  the  plaintiff's  right  to  sue  for 
the  penalty.  But  where  the  charter  or  organic  act  of  the  corpora- 
tion will  be  judicially  noticed,  ii  cannot  be  necessary  to  set  out, 
as  it  has  been  beld  to  he  in  England,  the  authority  of  the  corporation 
to  make  the  by-law.1 

6    111)    (340).    Action  in  Corporate  Name  ;  Prescribed  Method  to  be 
strictly  followed  ;    Demand;    Notice.  — Where  the    penalty    is  given 

in  general  terms,  it  is  understood  to  be  to  the  use  of  the  corporation, 
and  the  action  or  prosecution  must  be  by  and  in  the  name  of  the 
corporation.3  In  England,  it  was  the  practice,  in  many  cases,  to  ap- 
point in  the  by-law  the  penalty  to  be  sued  for  in  the  name  of  the 
chamberlain,  treasurer,  or  some  other  officer  of  the  corporation;  and 
though  the  power  of  thus  suing  for  the  penalty  could  not  be 
given  to  a  mere  stranger,  yet  it  was  not  absolutely  necessary  that 
the  penalty  should  be  given  to  the  corporation,  but  it  might  be 
given  to  the  informer.3  Whenever  the  mode  of  enforcing  obedi- 
ence to  a  by-law  is  prescribed  by  such  by-law,  that  mode  must  be 
strictly  pursued,  and  the  plaintiff  (where  the  rules  of  common- 
law  pleading  prevail)  must  be  the  party  to  whom  the  penalty  is 
given.  Where  it  is  given  to  the  chamberlain  for  the  use  of  the 
corporation,  the  action  must  be  in  the  name  of  the  chamberlain,  and 
not  in  that  of  the  corporation.  And  when  the  chamberlain  may 
sue,  he  need  not  set  out  his  election  or  appointment,  but  may  aver 
generally  that  he  is  chamberlain,  and  set  forth  his  right  to  sue  and 
to  recover.4  Unless  the  ordinance  show  that  it  was  intended  that  no 
art  ion  for  a  penalty  should  lie  without  a  previous  demand,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  aver  one.5  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  aver  that  the  de- 
fendant bad  notice  of  the  ordinance,  for  this  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed with  respect  to  all  on  whom  it  is  binding.6 


1  Noma  v.  Steps,  Bob.  211.  4  Harris!    v.  Wakeman,  Say.  254  ;  Ex- 

2  Bodwic  i>.  Fennell,  1  Wils.  233;  eter  v.  Stem,  2  Show.  159.  Under  con- 
Vintners'  Co.  >•.  Passey,  1  Burr.  235;  stituent  act,  town  treasurer  held  entitled 
Glover,  313;  2  Kyd,  157;  Graves  v.  Col-  to  sue  in  his  own  name  for  penalties, 
by,  9  VI.  &  El.  356  ;  Williamson  v.  Com-  Watts  v.  Scott,  1  Dev.  (N.  C.)  291;  Com- 
monwealth, 1  B.  Mfon.  (Ky.)  146,  151  monwealth  v.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408 
(1843)  ;  ante,  chap.  viii.  (1850). 

er,313,  81  1,  315;  Peltmakers' Co.         r'  Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock,  3  Bos.  &  P. 

o.  D  ris,  I  B.  &  P.    101;  Bodwic  v.  Fen-  434,  437. 

nell,    1   Wils.  233;  Totterdell  v.  Glazby,         **'  London  v.  Bernardiston,  1  Lev.  16; 

2   WiN.    266;    FTesketh   v.    Braddock,    3  James  v.  Putney,  Cro.  Car.  498. 
Burr.  1848;  Wood  v.  Searl  Bridg.   1  11  ; 
Graves  ■•.  Colby,  9  Ad.  &  El.  356. 


§419 


ORDINANCES  :  PROCEDURE  TO  ENFORCE. 


485 


§417  (350).  Mode  of  Procedure,  Defences,  Evidence,  &c.  —  In 
prosecutions  to  enforce  ordinances,  the  ordinary  rules  of  evidence 
apply,  except  so  far  as  specially  modified  by  statute ;  and  it  is  not 
competent  for  a  municipal  corporation,  without  express  authority, 
to  make  or  alter  the  rules  of  evidence  or  of  law.1  It  is,  however, 
competent  for  a  city  to  provide  by  general  ordinance,  after  suit  com- 
menced to  recover  a  penalty  for  acting  without  a  license,  that  the 
granting  of  a  license,  though  by  its  terms  it  takes  effect  from  a  day 
previous  to  the  commission  of  the  offence,  shall  not  (as  might 
otherwise  be  the  case)  release  or  waive  the  penalty.2 

§  418  (351).  Corporate  Existence  not  to  be  questioned  in  such 
actions.  —  In  proceedings  to  enforce  ordinances,  the  illegality  of  the 
corporate  organization  cannot  be  shown  to  defeat  a  recovery ;  in 
such  a  collateral  proceeding,  evidence  that  the  corporation  is  acting 
as  such  is  all  that  is  required.3 

§  419  (352).  Ratification  of  Illegal  Ordinances  by  Legislature.  — 
The  legislature  may  ratify  ordinances  not  otherwise  binding;  and 
offenders  should  thereafter  be  prosecuted  under  the  ordinances,  and 
not  under  the  validating  act.4 


1  City  Council  v.  Dunn,  1  McCord 
(S.  C),  333  ;  Fitch  v.  Pinckard,  4  Scam. 
(5  111.)  78.  The  defendant's  admission  of 
a  violation  of  an  ordinance  is  competent 
evidence.  Columbia  v.  Harrison,  2  Const 
R.  (S.  C.)  213  (1818). 

'l  City  Council  v.  Schmidt,  11  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  343  ;  City  Council  v.  Covleis, 

2  Bailey  (S.  C. ),  189.  Commented  on  by 
O'Neall,  J.,  in  City  Council  v.  Feckman, 

3  Rich.  (S.  C. )  Law,  385.  And  see  case 
last  cited  as  to  other  circumstances,  in 
which  it  was  held  that  a  prior  penalty 
was  not  waived  by  a  subsequent  accept- 
ance of  the  amount  of  a  license  for"  a  year. 

A  license  granted  by  a  de  facto  officer 
of  a  municipal  corporation  is  valid  ;  if  the 
city  receives  and  retains  the  money,  it  is 
estopped  from  maintaining  an  action  for 
selling  liquor  without  license.  Martel  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  94  111.  67  (1880)  ;  s.  c.  21 
Alb.  L.  J.  195. 

Any  positive  acts  (infra  vires)  by  muni- 
cipal officers  which  may  have  induced 
the  action  of  the  adverse  party,  and  where 
it  would  be  inequitable  to  permit  the 
corporation  to  stultify  itself,  by  retracting 


what  its  officers  had  done,  will  work  an 
estoppel.  Martel  v.  East  St.  Louis,  94  111. 
67  ;  Roby  v.  Chicago,  64  111.  447  ;  Chi- 
cago, R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Joliet,  79 
111.  39  ;  Logan  County  v.  Lincoln,  81  111. 
156. 

3  Hamilton  v.  Carthage,  24  111.  22; 
Mendota  v.  Thompson,  20  111.  197  ;  Coles 
County  v.  Allison,  23  111.  437  ;  Decorah 
v.  Gillis,  10  Iowa,  234;  Kettering  v.  Jack- 
sonville, 50  111.  39  ;  Tisdale  v.  Minonk, 
46  111.  9  (1867);  Hardenbrook  v.  Ligouier, 
95  Ind.  70. 

4  Trnchelut  v.  City  Council,  1  Nott  & 
McC.  (S.  C.)  227  (1818)  :  Lennon  v.  New 
York,  55  N.  Y.  361  (1874)  ;  ante,  chap, 
iv.  sec.  79,  and  note.  Post,  sec.  544 ; 
Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319,  ap- 
proving text.  In  State  v.  Plainfield,  9 
Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L. ),  95,  where  an  ordi- 
nance was  void  for  want  of  proper  notice 
to  the  persons  interested,  it  was  held  that 
the  error  could  not  be  remedied  by  subse- 
quent legislation.  But  see  cases  cited  post, 
sec.  814,  note.  And  in  New  Jersey  also  it 
has  been  frequently  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture may   validate   informal   or   irregular 


4  m; 


MUNICIPAL    OOBPOEATIONS. 


§  420 


^    120    (353).     Ordinances  to  be  construed  reasonably. — In   prose- 

cuti  to  i  nt'orce  ordinances,  or  in  considering  the  ques- 

tion  of  their  validity,  courts  will  give  /Jam  a  reasonable  construction, 
and  will  incline  to  sustain  rather  than  to  overthrow  them;  and 
especially  is  this  so  whore  the  question  depends  upon  their  being 
mable  or  otherwise.  Tims,  if  by  one  construction  an  ordinance 
will  be  valid,  and  by  another  void,  the  courts  will,  if  possible,  adopt 
the  former.  But  an  ordinance  which  transcends  the  power  Tested 
in  the  body  winch  passed  it  is  void,  and  may  be  taken  advantage  of 
by  plea  or  answer  to  an  action  to  recover  the  penalty,  or  other  pro- 
ceedings to  enforce  it.1  Its  validity  may  also  be  tested  in  proper 
cases  by  suits  against  the  corporation  or  its  officers  for  acts  done 
under  it,2  or  by  a  return  to  a  mandamus  where  the  party  justifies  his 


municipal  action,  when  the  matters  dis- 
pensed  with  or  cured  did  not  relate  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts.  Bergi  □  u.  State, 
m  (32  N.  J.  L.),  490;  State  v 
Union,  I  Vroom  (33  N.  J.  L.),  350  ;  State 
i  N  rik,  E  vreora  (34  N.  J.  L.),  236. 
1  Commonwealth  v.  Robertson,  5  Cnsh. 
138,  1 12  ;  Vintners'  Co.  v.  Pas- 
sey,  1  Burr.  239;  Pointers'  Co.  v.  Phillips, 
.  N.  C.  314,  323;  Taylors  of  Ips- 
wich, 11  Rep.  54«;  N orris  v.  Staps,  Hob. 
211  ;  Tobacco,  &c.  Co.  v.  Woodrotfe,  7 
338;  Mbir  v.  Munday,  Sayer,  181, 
1  35  :  Rounds  v.  Mumford,  2  \l.  I.  154 
( 1 J52).  The  rules  for  the  construction  of 
ordinances  arc  the  same  as  for  statutes. 
Matter  of  Yick  Wo,  68  Cal.  294.  Where 
the  legislature  has  conferred  full  and  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction  on  a  municipal  corpor- 
ation over  a  certain  subject,  the  acta  of 
the  corporation  will  be  supported  by  every 
fair  intendment  and  presumption.  Balti- 
more v.  Clunet,  2'-',  M.I.  119  (1885).  The 
titir  and  the  body  of  the  ordinance  may 
lie  taken  together  to  give  it  the  necessary 
certainty  t<>  sustain  it.  Martindale  v. 
Palmer,  52  [nd.  Ill  (187(1).  In  view  of 
the  inartificial  character  of  town  by-laws, 
they  are  especially  entitled  to  a  reasonable 
construd  ion.  Whitlock  v.  West,  26  <  fonn. 
I"-;  ;  Willc.  Mun.  Corp.  159,  pL  382. 
with  penalties  are  nol  properly 
penal  statutes.  The  penalty  is  in  the 
nature  of  liquidated  damages,  established 
as  Buch  in  lieu  of  damages  which  a  court 
would  be  authorized  to  assess.  Therefore 
the  stiiet  rule,  by  which  the  validity  of 
penal  statutes  are  to  be  tested  are  not  to 


be  applied  to  the  by-laws  or  ordinances  of 
municipal  corporations.  It  is  well  re- 
marked that  "the  by-laws  of  very  few  of 
these  corporations  could  stand  such  a  test. 
They  should  receive  a  reasonable  construc- 
tion, ami  their  terms  must  not  he  strictly 
scrutinized  for  the  purpose  of  making  them 
void."  Per  East  is,  C.  J.,  Municipality  v. 
Cutting,  1  La.  An.  335;  Merriam  v.  New 
Orleans,  14  La.  An.  318;  s.  i\  Loze  v. 
.Mayor,  &c,  2  La.  427.  If,  however,  the 
ordinance  is,  in  its  nature,  highly  penal,  it 
will  and  ought  to  be  construed  strictly, 
and  it  must  clearly  embrace  the  offence 
charged.  Kriekle  v.  Commonwealth,  1 
B.  Mun.  (Ky.)  261  (1841).  See  also 
Pacific  v.  Seifert,  79  Mo.  210,  stating 
the  rule  in  Missouri  to  be  that  an  ordi- 
nance  "in  Us  nature  penal  must  bt  strictly 
construed,  and  its  provisions  cannot  be 
cairicd  beyond  its  express  terms."  In 
State  r.  Paris  Ry.  Co.,  55  Tex.  76,  the 
court,  referring  to  an  ordinance  author- 
izing a  railroad  company  to  extend  its 
track  to  a  certain  point,  said,  —  "There 
is  no  ambiguity  in  the  ordinance  author- 
izing its  explanation  by  parol  evidence  of 
representations  made  prior  to  its  passage, 
or  of  the  actual  intention  or  understanding 
of  those  by  whom  it  was  passed,  as  to  the 
precise  point  at  which  the  road  was  to  be 
constructed."  ( iontemporaneous  construc- 
tion often  of  great  weight  in  interpreting 
doubtful  provisions.  State  v.  Severance,- 
49  Mo.  401  (1872)  ;  ante,  sec.  93,  note  ; 
sec.  184,  note. 

2  Moir    V.    Munday,    Saver,    181,    185. 
St.  Charles  v.   Meyer,   58  Mo.   86  (1874). 


§421 


ORDINANCES    VOID    IN    PART. 


487 


refusal  to  comply  with  the  writ  on  the  ground  that  the  ordinance 
is  invalid,1  or,  as  elsewhere  shown,  in  cases  of  equitable  cognizance, 
by  bill  in  chancery  to  enjoin  proceedings  thereunder. 


§  421  (354).  Ordinances  void  in  part. — If  part  of  a  by-law  be 
void,  another  essential  and  connected  part  of  the  same  by-law  is  also 
void.2  But  it  must  be  essential  and  connected  to  have  this  effect.3 
Thus,  if  an  ordinance,  or  even  the  same  section  of  an  ordinance,  con- 
tains two  separate  prohibitions  relating  to  different  acts,  with  distinct 
penalties  for  each,  one  of  which  is  valid  and  the  other  void,  the 
ordinance  may  be  enforced  as  to  that  portion  of  it  which  is  valid.4 


See  protective  provisions  to  corporate  offi- 
cers and  agents  in  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions, Act  5  and  6  Wm.  IV.  chap,  lxxvi. 
sees.  132,  133.  In  the  Canadian  Munici- 
pal Act,  sec.  332  (Harrison's  Munic.  Man. 
5th  ed.  p.  238),  there  is  what  the  author 
would  suppose  to  be  a  very  useful  pro- 
vision to  test  summarily  the  validity  of 
by-laws,  to  the  effect  that  a  resident  of  a 
municipality  or  any  other  person  inter- 
ested in  a  by-law,  order,  or  resolution 
may,  within  one  year,  apply  to  either  of 
the  superior  courts  of  common  law  to 
have  it  quashed,  and  the  court,  after 
notice  to  the  corporation,  may  quash  the 
by-law,  order,  or  resolution,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  for  illegality  ;  and  it  is  further 
provided  (sec.  338),  that  in  case  anything 
has  been  done  under  such  illegal  by-law, 
order,  or  resolution,  which  gives  any  per- 
son a  right  of  action,  no  action  shall  be 
brought  until  one  month's  notice  thereof 
be  given  to  the  corporation,  and  such 
action  must  be  brought  against  the  corpo- 
ration and  not  against  any  person  acting 
under  the  by-law,  order,  or  resolution. 
Construction  of  provision,  see  Harrison's 
Mimic.  Man.  (5th  ed.)  pp.  239,  245. 

1  Rex  v.  Harrison,  3  Burr.  1322;  Grant 
on  Corp.  89.  An  ordinance  may  be  void 
for  uncertainty  in  its  provisions,  as,  for 
example,  one  which  alters  street  grades, 
without  referring  to  any  plan  or  establish- 
ing new  grades.  Kearney  v.  Andrews,  2 
Stock.  (N.  J.)  70. 

2  Austin  v.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
121,  126  (1834),  Com.  Dig.  By-law,  chap, 
vii.  ;  Rex  v.  Faversham  Fishermen's  Co., 
8  Durnford  &  East  Term  Ptep.  356. 
See  Commonwealth  v.   Stodder,    2  Cush. 


(Mass.)    562    (1848)  ;  Fisher   v.    McGirr, 

1  Gray  (Mass.),  1  ;  Warren  v.  Mayor,  &c, 

2  Gray  (Mass.),  84  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hitchings,  5  Gray  (Mass.),  482;  Hershoff 
v.  Beverly,  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vroom)  288. 

8  Villavaso  v.  Barthet,  39  La.  An.  247. 

4  Commonwealth  v.  Dow,  10  Met. 
(Mass.)  3S2  (1845)  ;  Amesbury  v.  Bow- 
ditch  M.  F.  Insurance  Co.,  6  Gray,  596  ; 
Warren  v.  Charlestown,  2  Gray,  84  ; 
Shelton  v.  Mobile  (market  ordinance), 
30  Ala.  540  (1857)  ;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1 
"Wend.  (N.  Y.)  237;  Thomas  v.  Mount 
Vernon,  9  Ohio,  290  ;  1  Stra.  469  ;  Sir  T. 
Raym.  2S8,  294  ;  Saver,  256  ;  1  B.  &  Ad. 
95  ;  7  Term  R.  549  ;  Staats  v.  Washing- 
ton, 45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vroom)  318;  Piqua 
v.  Zimmerlin,  35  Ohio  St.  507  ;  State  v. 
Kantler,  33  Minn.  69.  Where  a  charter 
authorized  the  penalty  of  fine  and  impris- 
onment, an  ordinance  imposing  in  addition 
thereto  "costs  of  prosecution"  was  de- 
clared void  as  to  such  addition,  but  valid 
as  to  the  remainder.  State  v.  Cantieny, 
34  Minn.  1.  "  If  a  by-law  be  entire,  each 
part  having  a  general  influence  over  the 
rest,  and  one  part  of  it  be  void,  the  entire 
by-law  is  void."  Willcock  on  Corp.  160, 
pi.  384  ;  approved,  Municipality  v.  Mor- 
gan, 1  La.  An.  Ill,  116  (1846)  ;  Ex  parte 
Mayor,  &c.  of  Florence,  78  Ala.  419 ; 
Rau  d.  Little  Rock,  34  Ark.  303.  "But 
if  a  by-law  consist  of  several  distinct  and 
independent  parte,  although  one  or  more 
of  them  may  be  void,  the  rest  are  equally 
valid  as  though  the  void  clauses  had  been 
omitted."  Willcock,  161,  pi.  3S9  ;  Fitz- 
acherly  v.  Wiltshire,  11  Mod.  353  ;  Lee  v. 
Walis,  1  Kenyon,  205.  In  a  leading 
Rex  v.  Faversham  Fishermen's  Co.,  8  D.  & 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


!55).  Proof  of  Ordinances.  —  When  not  specially  regu- 
by  charter  or  statute,  the  proof  of  ordinances  must  be  by  the 
production  of  the  originals  or  the  books  in  which  they  are  regis- 
tered, as  these  are  the  primary  evidence.1  Printed  copies,  or  au- 
thenticated copies,  are  often  made  competent  evidence  by  the 
Legislature. 


sj  423.    Presumption  of  Validity.  —  Where  authority  to  pass   an 
ordinance  on  a  given  subject  was  conditioned  that  it  should  be  first 


K.  T.  R.  856,   Lord  Kenyan  said  :  "With 
regard  to  the  form  of  the  by-law  indeed, 

i  .l  by-law  may  be  good  in  part  and 
bad  in  part,  yel  it  can  be  so  only  when  the 
two  parts  are  entire  and  distinct  from  each 
other."  Approved,  Municipality  v.  Morgan, 
1  l.i.  An.  Ill,  llo'  (1846).  The  tact  that 
certain  provisions  of  an  ordinance  are  void 
does  oot  authorize  the  court  to  declare 
void  those  provisions  which  relate  to  the 
subject-matter  of  the  ordinance,  when  they 
are  distinct  and  separate  from  tlm.se  which 
are  void  and  useless.     State  r.    Hardy,  7 

77.  It  is  stated  in  Grant  on  Cor- 
porations, 88,  that  it  is  "now  fully  settled 
thai  i  by-law  that  is  void  in  part  is  void 
wholly  ;  e.  g.  if  the  penalty  be  unreasonable 
of  the  by-law  is  vitiated  thereby, 
and  becomes  wholly  inoperative  and  null." 
Citing  Com.  Dig.  By-Law,  chap.  vii.  ; 
Colchestt  i    v.    Godwin,   Carter,   121  ;   El- 

w I  v.   Bullock,  6  Q.  B.   383;  Clarke  v. 

Tucket,  2  Vent.  182 ;  Rex  v.  Atwood, 
J  B.  &  Ad.  181.  Kut  the  rule  in  the  text 
is  well  sustained,  and  is  reasonable  ;  and 
it  is  not  true  that  the  void  part  of  a  by- 
law will  make  null  complete  and  indepen- 
dent parts  of  the  same  by-law  which  would 
I.  state  /•.  ( llarke,  54  Mo. 
17,    36   (1873).      The  act  authorizing  a 

•e  system  being  unconstitutional  in 
put.  30  that  the  scheme  adopted  could  not 
he   made   available,  the  undertaking  was 

L.      State  r.  Chamberlin,  8  Vroom 

..  .1.  L.),  388. 

1  Lumbard   v.    Aldrich,  8  N.  If.  31  ; 

o.  Chicago,  48  111.  498;  Moor  v. 

Xewlield,  \  Greenl.  (Me.)   11  ;   llallowell 

Bank   v.    Hamlin,   14  Mass.  178;  Case  of 

Thetford,  12  Yin.  Abr.  90  ;  ante,  see.  800, 

note  ;  infra,  sec.  423.     Stewart  v.  Clinton, 

7'.'   Mo.    0o3  ;  Tipton   v.    Norman,  72   Mo. 

080.     In    Information  against  Oliver,  21 


S.  C.  319,  McGowan,  J.,  said,  that  in  a 
municipal  court,  "  it  was  no  more  neces- 
sary to  offer  proof  of  a  public  ordinance, 
under  the  seal  of  the  city  council,  than  in 
the  courts  of  the  State  to  prove  a  public 
act  of  the  legislature.  Municipal  ordin- 
ances are  private  laws  when  brought  be- 
fore the  superior  judiciary  of  a  State,  but 
not  when  brought  before  a  city  court." 
See  chapter  on  Corporate  Records  and 
Documents,  ante,  sec.  293  et  seq.  Proof 
may  be  made  by  the  clerk  that  he  posted 
up  copies  of  an  ordinance  appearing  on 
the  records,  without  producing  such  copies 
or  accounting  for  their  absence.  Teft  v. 
Size,  5  Gilm.  (10  111.)  432.  As  to  pro- 
mulgation and  publication  of  ordinance. 
Charleston  v.  Chur,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  164  ; 
Battering  V.  Jacksonville,  50  111.  39;  Napa 
v.  Easterby  (Cab),  18  Pac.  Rep.  253; 
Nevin  v.  Roach  (Ky. ),  5  Southwest. 
Rep.  546;  Downing  v.  Miltonvale  (record 
of  ayes  and  nays)  (Kan.),  14  l'ac.  Rep. 
281;  Brophy  v.  Hyatt  (Col.)  (record  of 
ayes  and  nays),  15  Pac.  Rep.  399;  Sullivan 
v.  Leadville,  1 1  <  !ol.  483;  s.  c.  18  Pac.  Rep. 
736;  State  v.  Irvington  (what  is  sufficient 
publication),  50  N.  J.  L.  361;  supra,  sees. 
331-335  ;  infra,  sec.  423  ;  Chicago  &  A. 
R.  Co.  v.  Engle,  76  111.  317  (1875). 

Where  the  charter  provides  that  the 
printed  volume  of  City  Ordinances  shall 
be  evidence  in  nil  courts,  the  ordinances 
jtrinted  therein  will  be  judicially  noticed 
the  same  as  public  statutes.  Napmanv. 
People,  19  Mich.  352  (1869);  St.  Louis  v. 
St.  Louis  Railroad  Co.,  89  Mo.  44.  In 
Kansas  the  appellate  court,  upon  the  trial 
of  an  appeal  from  a  conviction  under  an 
ordinance,  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
existence  and  substance  of  the  ordinance. 
1  (owning  v.  Miltonvale,  36  Kan.  740;  ante, 
sec.  83. 


§  423  ORDINANCES  :    PRESUMPTION   OF   VALIDITY.  489 

submitted  to  the  voters  of  the  municipality  and  adopted  by  a  ma- 
jority vote,  in  a  prosecution  for  a  breach  thereof  it  was  held  that  the 
further  provision  of  the  charter,  that  an  ordinance  might  be  proved 
by  a  copy  thereof  duly  certified,  &c,  did  not  dispense  with  the 
necessity  of  proving  that  the  ordinance  was  submitted  to  the  voters 
and  adopted,  and  that  it  had  been  published  as  required,  by  law, 
the  only  effect  of  the  charter  provision  being  to  dispense  with  the 
production  of  the  original  ordinance  by  making  the  certified  copy 
evidence.1 

1  Schott  v.    The    People,    89   111.  195  presumptions  in  favor  of  the  validity  of 

(1878).     Scholfic Id,  J.,  adds  :  "Municipal  their  ordinances.     If  in  conformity  with 

corporations  exercise  only  delegated  and  the  express  or  necessarily  implied  grant  of 

limited   powers,    and,   in   the   absence  of  the    charter,   they    are    valid;   otherwise 

express  statutory  provisions  to  that  effect,  not." 
courts   are   authorized   to   indulge   in   no 


MUNICIPAL  COBPOBATIONS.  §  426 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

MUNICITAL   COURTS. 

Municipal  Ccntrts  in  England  and  at  Common  Law. 

§424  (35G).  At  Common  Law.  —  A  municipal  corporation  may,  at 
common  law,  enjoy  th  franchise  of  holding  a  court;  and  corporation 
or  municipal  courts,  which  were  local  or  inferior  tribunals,  were 
not  uncommou.1  They  were  treated  as  the  tribunals  of  the  corpora- 
tion ;  but  since  courts  of  justice  are  for  the  public  benefit,  words  in 
a  charter  permitting  the  corporation  to  hold  a  court  are  imperative.2 
Such  public  right  cannot  be  lost  by  a  non-user;  and  therefore  the 
mere  disuse,  for  two  hundred  years,  of  a  court  granted  to  a  corpora- 
tion by  charter  is  no  answer  to  a  rule  for  a  mandamus  commanding 
them  to  hold  it,  though  it  was  alleged  that  there  were  no  sufficient 
funds  for  the  purpose.3 

§425.  Jurisdiction;  Parties;  Jurors.  —  The  common-law  doctrine 
respecting  municipal  courts  was  settled  to  be  that  the  municipal  cor- 
poration could  bring  no  action  therein  against  a  stranger  where  the 
effect  would  be  to  benefit  the  corporation  or  increase  its  funds,  for 
that  would  be  to  make  the  corporation  itself  both  judge  and  party, 
which  an  inflexible  and  fundamental  maxim  of  the  common  law 
prohibited ;  and  the  same  principle  was  considered  to  operate  to  dis- 
qualify corporators  to  sit  as  jurors  in  such  cases ;  but  this  objection 
did  not  apply  when  both  parties  were  corporators.4 

§  420.  Existing  Borough  Courts.  —  The  English  Municipal  Cor- 
poration Act  of  1835  provides  for  the  establishment  of  borough  courts, 

1  Inst.  114;  4  Inst.  78,  224;  Cro.  Jac.  the   court   for  the  benefit   of  the  inhab- 

813;  Haddock's  Case,  Sir  Thomas  Kay-  itants.     1  b.;  Grant  on  Corp.  34. 

185.  3  Rex  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Wells,  4  Dowl. 

-  Rex  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Hastings,  5  B.  V.  C.  562. 

&Ald.  692,  n.    Thelaagnag  trter  '  Hi  >sketh  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr.   1856- 

'thal   the   mayor  may  for  the  pur-  1868;  cited  infra,  sec.  431,  note;  Grant 

hereafter  have  and   hold  and   have  on  Corp.  194;  London  v.  Wood,  12  Mod. 

power  to  hold  a  court  of  record,"  and  it  674;  1  Salk.  398;  Bosworth  v.  Budgen, 

held    thai    these  words,  though  per-  7  Mod.  461 ;  Beg.  v.  Rogers,  2  Ld.  Raym. 

ive    in    form,    were    imperative,  and  778  ;  Willc.  ou  Corp.  157,  165.    Seein/ro, 

that   the   corporation  was  bound  to  hold  sec.  431. 


§  426  a      MUNICIPAL   COURTS  :    INTRODUCTORY   OBSERVATIONS.  491 

defines  their  jurisdiction  and  powers,  makes  burgesses  or  citizens 
competent  jurors,  contains  an  express  provision  that  no  witness  or 
magistrate  shall  be  incompetent  or  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  being 
liable  to  contribute  to  the  fund  of  the  corporation,  and  regulates  in 
general  the  proceedings  therein  for  violation  of  by-laws  or  ordinances, 
and  the  collection  and  enforcement  of  penalties.1 

It  may,  however,  be  observed  that  under  the  act  the  power  to 
make  by-laws  is  limited,  and  does  not  extend  to  acts  criminal  in 
their  nature,  and  which  are  punishable  by  criminal  statutes  in  force 
throughout  the  realm. 

American  Corporation  Courts  ;  Constitutional  Provisions. 

§  426  a.  Introductory  Observations.  —  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the 
composite  type  of  the  usual  American  municipality  in  its  local  and 
private,  as  well  as  its  general  and  public  character,  distinctly  reveals 
itself.  Although  often  material  it  is  not  always  easy  to  trace  the  line 
of  demarcation.  To  ascertain  and  define  it  as  applicable  to  this  chap- 
ter we  have  to  resort  to  the  construction  which  well-known  provis- 
ions of  Magna  Charta  relating  to  personal  rights  and  liberty  have 
received  in  Great  Britain  and  here,  and  to  the  legislative  enactments 
and  polity  in  both  countries,  and  in  this  country  to  special  constitu- 
tional provisions  relating  thereto,  and  to  the  powers  and  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  judicial  tribunals.  The  subject  is  obviously  important. 
Statutory  provisions  concerning  the  constitution  and  powers  of  the 
municipal  government  and  those  of  the  local  tribunals,  especially 
provisions  authorizing  summary  proceedings  in  municipal  courts 
without  trial  by  jury  and  without  the  usual  formulae  of  an  adver- 
sary proceeding  in  the  superior  judicial  tribunals,  have  frequently 
been  found  to  be  in  conflict  with  organic  provisions  to  secure  funda- 
mental rights  of  property  and  the  liberty  of  the  citizen.  Summary 
powers,  properly  defined  and  limited,  are  essential  to  the  well-being 
of  local  communities,  and  when  thus  limited  and  defined  are  per- 
fectly consistent  with  the  liberty  of  the  citizen,  that  is,  liberty  regu- 
lated by  law,  which  is  the  only  true  liberty.  These  limits  must  be 
sought  largely  in  the  polity,  practice  and  traditions,  and  in  the  judi- 
cial judgments  in  England  and  in  this  country  relating  thereto,  in 

1  5  and  6  Wm.  IV.  chap,  lxxxvi,  sees,  lation  authorizing  the  infliction  of  suni- 

90,    91,    118-134,    270-341    (1835).     Mr.  mary  penalties  of  different  kinds  upon  a 

Justice    Stephen    traces     the     history    of  great  variety  of  offenders,  ending  in  the 

Borough  Courts  prior  to  the  act  of  1835,  Summary  Jurisdiction  Act  of  1879  (42  & 

and  states  the  changes  made  hy  that  act.  43  Vict.  chap.  49).     lb.,  chap.  iv.  p.  122. 

Hist.   Criminal  Law,  vol.  i.  chap.  iv.  p.  Post,  sec.  337  et  seq. 
116  et  seq.     He  also  summarizes  the  legis- 


Ml'XK'H'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


§427 


tin'  light  of  which    constitutional    provisions  must   be    construed. 

[.mis  have  therefore  been  taken  to  exhibit  in  the  text  the 

rial  doctrines  of  our  jurisprudence  on  these  subjects,  and  in  the 

furnish  the  reader  with  the  data  for  full  research,  critical 

[deration,  and  the  formation  of  his  own  conclusions. 

§  427  (357).  Creation,  Jurisdiction,  and  Powers. —  In  this  coun- 
try it  is  usual  to  provide  in  the  charter  or  organic  act  of  a  municipal 
corporation  for  a  local  or  special  tribunal,  called  by  different  names, 
such  as  the  mayor's  court,  recorder's  court,  city  court,  and  the  like; 
and  which  is  invested  with  jurisdiction  over  complaints  and  prosecu- 
tions for  the  violation  of  the  ordinances  of  the  corporation,  and  often, 
for  public  convenience,  with  special  civil  and  limited  criminal  juris- 
diction under  the  laws  of  the  State.  It  is  competent  for  the  legisla- 
ture to  provide  for  the  establishment  of  these  inferior  courts,  and  to 
invest  them  with  such  measure  of  power  and  jurisdiction  as  may  be 
deemed  expedient,  if  no  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  particu- 
lar State  be  infringed.1     It  may  also  abolish  them.2 

v.  State,  18  Ala.  521  (1821),  holding  the 
city  court  of  Mobile,  which  is  invested 
with  criminal  jurisdiction,  and  from  whose 
judgment  an  appeal  lies,  to  be  constitu- 
tional, and  defining  meaning  of  inferior 
court.  Perkins  v.  Corbin,  45  Ala.  103 
(1871),  holding  that  a  city  court  is  an 
inferior  court  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution,  which  may  be  created  and 
abolished  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature, 
and  that  the  abolition  of  the  court  carries 
with  it  the  office  of  the  Judge.  New 
Orleans  v.  Costello,  14  La.  An.  37  ;  Myers 
v.  People,  26  111.  173  ;  Davis  v.  Wool- 
nough,  9   Iowa,   104  ;  People  v.    Wilson, 

15  111.    389  ;   State  v.   Maynard,   14  111. 

419;    Beesman   v.    Peoria,    16    111.    484; 

1 1,, lines  v.  Fihlenburg,  54  111.  203  (1870); 

Van   Swartow   v.  Commonwealth,   24  Pa. 

St.  131  (1854)  ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn. 

166  ;  St.    Peter  v.   Bauer,    19  Minn.  327 

(1872)  ;  infra,   sec.    432,  note  ;  Burns  v. 

La  Grange,  17  Texas,  415  (1856)  ;  Slattery, 

In  re,  3  Ark.   484  ;  lb.   561  ;  Graham  v. 

State,    1    Pike    (1    Ark.),  171;    Floyd  v. 

I.ttonton  Comm'rs,   14  Ga.  354   (1853)  ; 

Bill    v.    Dalton,    72    Ga.    314;    State   v. 

Gutierrez,  15  La.  An.  190  ;  Muscatine  v. 

Steck,  7  Iowa,  505  ;  Richmond  Mayoralty 


1  Btate  v.  Mayor  of  Charleston,  12 
Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,"  480;  States  Helfrid, 
2  Notl  &  BIcCord  (S.  C),  233  (1820); 
infra,  sec.  432,  note;  Callahan  v,  New 
York,  66  N.  Y.  656  ;  People  v.  Curley,  5 
Col.  412. 

Const  r revisions  concerning  the 

/  powers,  local,  civil,  and 
criminal,  of  In  friar  Courts:  The  power 
conferred  on  police  magistrate  to  issue 
process  against  the  body  of  an  offender  is 
constitutional.  Brown  v.  Jerome,  102 
111.  371.  The  legislature  has  no  power 
to  confer  upon  local  municipal  courts 
a  jurisdiction  which  is  exclusive  of  that 
which,  by  the  Constitution,  is  given 
to  another  court.  Montross  v.  State,  61 
Miss.  12'.'.  Full  discussion  of  legislative 
power  >■■  create  inferior  cov/rts,  and  define 
jurisdiction.  Callahan  v.  New  York,  66 
X.  V.  656  :  Gray  v.  State,  2  Harring. 
(Del.)  76  (1835).  Mayor's  court  an 
rior  courl  within  meaning  of  State  Consti- 
tution, lb.;  Egleston  v.  City  Council,  1 
Mill  Const.  (S.  C.)  45.  As  to  official 
character  of  city  recorder,  lb.  ;  Schroder 
v.  Citv  Council,  2  Const.  R.  726;  s.  o.  3 
'  13  ;  post,  see.  430  :  Tesh  v.  Com- 
monwealth,  i   Dana(Ky.),  522;  Nugent 


2  Boyd  v.  Chambers,  78  Ky.  140  ;  State  v.  Henshaw,  76  Cal.  436  (1888). 


§428 


MUNICIPAL   COURTS  :     SUMMARY   TRIALS. 


493 


§  428    (358).    Summary  trials  for  Violationa  of   Ordinances.  —  We 
have  elsewhere  Shown  that  the  courts  have  uniformly  held  that  it 


Case,  19  Gratt.  (Va.)  673  (1870).  The 
superior  court  of  the  city  of  San  Francisco 
is  constitutional.    Seale  v.  Mitchell,  5  Cal. 

403  ;  Vassault  v.  Austin,  36  Cal.  691  ; 
Hickman  v.  O'Neal,  10  Cal.  294.  The 
Constitution  of  California  as  amended  in 
1362  authorized  the  legislature  to  establish 
"recorder's  or  other  inferior  courts  in  any 
incorporated  city  or  town  ;"  and  it  was 
held,  in  view  of  the  prior  decisions  in  the 
State  just  cited,  that  the  municipal  crim- 
inal court  of  the  city  and  county  of  San 
Francisco  was  an  inferior  court,  and  con- 
stitutional. People  v.  Nyland,  41  Cal. 
129  (1871)  ;  Stratman,  In  re,  39  Cal.  517 
(1870).  An  act  "to  provide  for  police 
courts  in  cities  having  30,000  and  under 
100,000  inhabitants"  sustained  as  against 
the  constitutional  objections  that  it  was 
"a  law  of  a  general  nature,"  and  was 
"not  uniform  in  its  operation,"  and  that 
its  title  was  not  sufficiently  explicit  and 
comprehensive.  People  v.  Henshaw,  76 
Cal.  436  (1838). 

The  Hustings  Court  of  Richmond  is 
constitutional.  Chahoon's  Case,  21  Gratt. 
(Va.)  822  (1871)  ;  Richmond  Mayoralty 
Case,  19  Gratt.  (Va.)  673  (1870).  Judi- 
ciary article  of  State  Constitution  of 
New  York  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  certain 
city  courts  construed.  Landers  v.  Staten 
Island  Railroad  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  450  (1873). 
Under  a  constitutional  provision  declar- 
ing that  "  the  judicial  power  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Supreme  Court,  in  district  courts, 
and  in  justices  of  the  peace,"  an  act  con- 
ferring judicial  powers  on  the  mayor  of  a 
city  was  considered  void,  and  it  was  held 
that  for  violations  of  its  ordinances  the 
corporation  should  resort  to  the  judicial 
tribunals  organized  under  the  Constitu- 
tion. Lafon  v.  Dufrocq,  9  La.  An.  350 
(1854).  But  see  The  State  v.  Young,  3 
Kan.  445  (1866),  where  a  provision  in  an 
organic  act  that  the  judicial  power  shall 
be  vested  exclusively  in  a  Supreme  Court, 
district,  probate,  and  justice  courts,  was 
held  not  to  prohibit  the  legislature  from 
establishing  municipal  courts  for  the  en- 
forcement of  municipal  regulations  and 
ordinances.  And  this  seems  to  be  the 
correct  view.     Shafer  v.  Murama,  17  Md. 


331.     In    Eutchings   v.    Scott,    4    Halst. 
(X.  J.)  218  ( 1827),  the  objection  was  made 
that  the   Legislature  could   not.   constitu- 
tionally confer   the   powers  of  justices  of 
the  peace  on  the  mayor,  recorder,  or  alder- 
men  of  a  city,  or  borough,  the  argument 
being  that  since  the  Constitution  provided 
for  the  appointment  of  justices  of  the  peace 
only,  and  not  for  corporate  officers,   offi- 
cers exercising  the  authority  and  powers 
of  a   justice  of  the  peace  should  be  ap- 
pointed as  such  ;    but  the  objection  was 
not  sustained.     In  Illinois,  mayors  of  cit- 
ies cannot,  it  was  held,  be  constitutionally 
invested  with  judicial  power.     The  State, 
&c.  v.  Maynard,  14  III.  420;  Beesman  v. 
Peoria,  16  111.    484.     By  the  general  law 
of  Indiana  of  1857,  for  the  incorporation 
of  cities,  mayors,  in  addition  to  their  du- 
ties proper,  have,    "within  the  limits  of 
cities,    the   jurisdiction  and  powers  of  a 
justice   of  the  peace  in  all  matters,  civil 
and   criminal,  arising   under  the  laws  of 
the  State,  and  for  crimes  and  misdemean- 
ors  a   jurisdiction    co-extensive  with  the 
county."     The  Constitution  of  the   same 
State  (art.  VII,  sec.  16)  declared  that  "no 
person  elected  to  any  judicial  office  shall, 
during  the  term,  be  eligible  to  any  office 
of  trust  or  profit  under  the  State,  other 
than  a  judicial  office."     One  Wallace  was 
elected  mayor  of  Indianapolis,  and  within 
his  term  he  resigned  and  received  a  ma- 
jority of  votes  for  sheriff  of  the  county. 
It   was   held   by   the    Supreme    Court  of 
Indiana  (Waldo  v.  Wallace,   12  Ind.  569 
(1859)  ;  Gulick  v.  New,  14  Ind.  93)  that 
Wallace    was    a     "judicial    officer,"    and 
therefore  ineligible  to  the  office  of  sberilf  ; 
that  the  voters  of  the  county  were  charge- 
able witli  notice  of  his  ineligibility  ;  that 
votes  cast  for  him  were  therefore  ineffect- 
ual, and  that   his  competitor,  having  re- 
ceived the  greatest  number  of  legal  votes, 
though  not  a  majority  of  the  ballots,  was 
duly  elected.     Notwithstanding  the  great 
consideration  which  these   cases  received, 
the  author  ventures  with  great    deference 
to  state  that  it  is  by  no  means  clear  to  his 
mind  that  the  mayor  was  a   "judicial  offi- 
cer." within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitu- 
tion.     See,    as   bearing   upon   the   above 


MUNICIPAL    CUlil'ORATIONS. 


§428 


mpetent  for  the  State  legislatures  to  create  municipal  corpora- 
with  powers  of  local  government,  and  to  authorize  them   to 


■:,  and  illustrative  of  the  nature  of 
a  tyor,  How  emaker, 

"j  Ind.  Ill  ( 1871 );  Morrison  v.  McDonald, 
21  Me.  550  (1842)  ;  State  v.  Maynard,  14 
[11.  U9  |  L8i3);  Commonwealth  ».  Dallas, 
229 ;  8.  o.  more  fully,  3  VTeates 
;  State  r.   Wilmington, 
3  Harring.  (Del.)  294  |  L839).    Authority 
:  ■  inder  a  statute  investing  him 

with  the  powers  of  a  justice  of  the  peace. 
.  .'  1  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.) 

109  ;    1    Harr.    (X.    J.)    237  ;    Howe    i>. 
Plainfield,   8   V*room  (37  N.  J.  L.),  145  ; 
Zi  gler,  3  Vroom  (32  N.  J.  L.), 
;  I  lined,  McConvill  v.  Jersey  City, 
in  Vroom  (39  X.  J.  L.),  38,  42  ;  Bain  v. 
11,  82  Ala.  304  ;  Robinson  v.  r,  nton 
I  ,49  Ark.  4(J.     See  Baton  Rouge  v. 

i  ;,   I  5  La,  An.  208.   A  constit\ 

m  as  to  eligibility  "  to  the  q 
of  any   court   of  the  State,"  &c, 
and  requiring  a  two  years'  residence  "in 
the  division,  circuit,  or  county,"  was  con- 
to  have  no  reference  to  the  office 
rder   of   a    city.      The    People   v. 
Wilson,   L5  11L  389. 

In  Michigan,  under  constitutional  pro- 
visions dividing  the  State/   into  judicial 
i    tablishing   circuit   courts 
courts  of  general  original  jurisdic- 
tion,  but  authorizing  the  establishment, 
by  the  legislature,  of  municipal  courts  in 
//  Id,  thai  the  original  purpose  of 
such  municipal  courts  was  not  to  destroy 
rially  chauge  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  circuits,  but  to  relieve  them  of  part 
ot  the  increased  litigation  resulting  from 
tli  of  large  cities.     Such  courts 
cannot  have,  in  any  class  of  cases,  a  juris- 
diction territorially  coextensive  with  the 
limits   of  the   county,  much    less   of  the 
entire    State.      They    wen-    designed    to 
he  wants  of  the  cities  wherein  they 
iblished.     A   statute   which  gives 
a  municipal  court  jurisdiction,  where  ori- 
ginal  process    is   served  within  the  city, 
party   is    a   resident,    or 
where    service    is    had    anywhere   in   the 
county,  if  plaintiff  resides  in  the  city,  is 
titntional  and  void.    Grand  Rapids, 
X.  &  I ..  S.  It.  Co.  v.  Gray,  38  Mich.   401 


The  Constitution  of  Nevada  provided 
that  "the  Legislature  may  also  establish 
courts  for  municipal  purposes  only,  in  in- 
corporated cities  and  towns,"  and  it  was 
held  that  an  act  authorizing  the  city  re- 
corder to  exercise  the  duties  of  commit- 
ting magistrates  in  respect  to  offences 
againsl  the  public  laws  of  the  state  was  in 
conflict  with  the  Constitution.  M 
v.  Storey  Co.,  5  New  244.  The  Consti- 
tution of  Maryland  contains  a  provision 
that  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  State  shall 
ted  in  a  court  of  appeals,  in  circuit 
courts,  in  such  courts  tor  the  city  of  Balti- 
more as  may  be  hereafter  prescribed,  and 
in  justices  of  the  peace  ;"  and  it  was  held 
that  the  legislature  might  authorize  mu- 
nicipal courts  to  try  ami  punish  disorderly 
persons  and  lewd  women  within  the  cor- 
porate limits,  and  generally  to  authorize 
the  corporate  authorities  to  exercise  police 
powers,  which  were  distinguished  from  the 
ordinary  judiciary  powers  of  the  State. 
Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331  (1861). 
Further  as  to  construction  of  Constitution 
of  Maryland  as  to  judicial  powers  of 
mayors.  Hagerstown  v.  Dechert,  32  Md. 
3Gi»  (1869). 

Under  the  Constitution  of  North  Caro- 
lina "special  courts"  are  authorized  "for 
the  trial  of  misdemeanors  in  cities  and 
towns  where  they  may  be  nece 
and  it  was  held  to  be  no  objection  to  an 
act  of  the  Legislature  that  it  did  not  au- 
thorize the  officers  of  such  court  to  try 
charged  with  misdemeanors,  but 
only  to  bind  them  over.  State  p.  Pen- 
der, 66  N.  C.  313  (1872).  But  under  the 
Constitution  the  legislature  cannot  confer 
upon  mayors  the  judicial  powers  of  jus- 
tices of  the  peace  in  civil  actions.  Eden- 
ton  v.  Wool,  65  N.  C.  379. 

The  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of 
Massachusetts  of  1821  provided  thai  "no 
jud  '  of  any  court  of  this  commonwealth 
shall  at  the  same  time  hold  the  office  of 
governor,  &c,  or  have  a  seat  in  the  senate 
or  house  Of  representatives."  A  judge 
of  a  police  court  for  the  city  of  Lynn  was 
ele.-ted  a  member  of  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives, and  took  his  seat  as  Mich.  Po- 
lice courts  were  created  after  the  adoption 


§  429         MUNICIPAL    COURTS  ;    STATUTE   LAW    AND    BY-LAWS.  495 


adopt  ordinances  or  by-laws,  with  appropriate  penalties  for  their  vio- 
lation. The  power  to  do  this  includes,  by  fair  implication,  the 
power  to  authorize  violations  of  ordinances  (where  the  acts  are  not 
criminal  in  their  nature,  or  within  the  meaning  of  constitutional  pro- 
visions requiring  an  indictment  and  securing  the  right  to  a  jury  trial) 
to  be  tried  and  determined  in  a  summary  manner  by  a  local  or  cor- 
poration tribunal.1 

§  429.  How  and  in  what  Name  prosecuted.  —  The  distinction  be- 
tween statute  law  and  municipal  by-laws  has  been  pointed  out,  and 
the  subject  of  concurrent  prohibitions  of  the  same  act  by  the  general 
law  and  by  the  local  ordinances  of  a  municipality  treated  in  the  chap- 
ter on  Ordinances.  The  distinction  is  there  drawn,  and  is  to  be  ob- 
served, between  acts  not  essentially- criminal,  relating  to  municipal 
police  and  regulation,  and  those  intrinsically  criminal,  and  which  are 
made  punishable  as  public  offences  by  the  general  laws  of  the  State. 
The  pecuniary  penalties  which  are  annexed  to  violations  of  the  for- 


of  the  constitutional  amendment  in  ques- 
tion, and  were  vested  at  first  with  the  same 
civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction  as  justices 
of  the  peace.  The  courts  thus  established 
were  organized  judicial  tribunals,  having 
attributes  and  exercising  judicial  functions 
independently  of  the  magistrates  desig- 
nated to  hold  them,  and  were  thus  distin- 
guished from  justices  of  the  peace,  on 
whom  personally  certain  judicial  powers 
are  conferred  by  law;  and  the  judges  of 
such  courts  must,  by  the  Constitution,  be 
appointed  during  good  behavior  instead 
of  for  seven  years,  as  in  the  case  of  jus- 
tices of  the  peace.  It  was  held  that  a 
■police  court  is  a  court  of  the  commonwealth 
within  the  constitutional  amendment,  and 
that  the  judge  thereof  vacated  his  office  as 
such  judge  by  accepting  another  official 
trust  incompatible  therewith.  Common- 
wealth v.  Hawkes  (quo  warranto),  123 
Mass.  525  (1878).  Mr.  Chief  Justice 
Grays  opinion  is  highly  instructive. 

In  Wisconsin,  says  Ryan,  C.  J.,  in 
State  v.  Lock  wood,  43  Wis.  403  (1878), 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  upon  information 
or  indictment  for  crime  is  secured  by  the 
Constitution,  and  cannot  be  waived  ;  and 
the  trial  of  an  information  by  a  judge  of 
a  municipal  court  without  a  jury  was 
held  not  to  be  a  legal  trial,  and  the  judg- 
ment of  the  municipal  magistrate  was 
declared   to   be   void.     The   chief  justice 


says  in  substance  that  a  plea  of  not  guilty 
to  an  information  or  indictment  for  crime, 
whether  felony  or  misdemeanor,  puts  the 
accused  upon  the  country,  and  can  be  tried 
by  a  jury  only.  The  rule  is  universal  as 
to  felonies  ;  not  quite  so  as  to  misdemean- 
ors. But  the  current  of  authority  appears 
to  apply  it  to  both  classes  of  crime  ;  and 
this  court  holds  that  to  be  safer  and  better 
alike  in  principle  and  practice.  Cooley's 
Const.  Lim.  319,  410,  n.  ■  Proffatt's  Jury 
Tr.  sec.  113  ;  Neales  v.  State,  10  Mo.  498; 
State  v.  Mansfield,  41  Mo.  470  ;  Common- 
wealth v.  Shaw,  1  Pittsburg  (Pa.),  492. 
In  the  latter  case  will  be  found  a  collection 
of  authorities  bearing  on  the  question  of 
waiver  of  the  right  to  a  jury  trial  in  crim- 
inal cases. 

The  Constitution  of  Illinois  of  1870  pro- 
vides that  "the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  as 
heretofore  enjoyed,  shall  remain  inviolate." 
Under  this  provision  the  vagrant  act,  deny- 
ing to  persons  arrested  for  vagrancy  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  was  considered  by 
McAllister,  J.,  in  view  of  the  previous 
legislation  and  constitutional  provisions 
referred  to  by  him,  to  be  unconstitutional. 
Scully  and  O'Leary,  In  re,  11  Chicago 
Legal  News,  27  (1878).  See  ante,  sec. 
401  ;  post,  sec.  433.  Defendant  may  waive 
statute  provision.  State  v.  Kaufman,  51 
Iowa,  578. 

1  Infra,  sec.  432  et  seq ;  ante,  sec.  368. 


196 


MUNICIPAL   COBPOBATIONS. 


mer  class  the  legislature  may,  we  think,  authorize  the  corporation  to 
■■■a  name,  by  civil  action  or  by  complaint,  and  provis- 
ioo  need  not  Decessarily  be  made  that  they  shall  be  prosecuted  in 
the  name  of  the  people  or  of  the  Statu.1 


'•  Barter  v.  <  lommonwealth,  ">  Pa.  (  P(  d. 
&  W.)  'J."'^  ;  Weeks  v.   Forman,   1    Harri- 

.s,ui  (N.  J.)i  237  ;  Ewbanks  v.  Ashley,  36 
111.  177  ;  Williams  o.  Augusta,  1  Ga 9  ; 

I  ,ic.(  !ommissioners,  1  I  I  la.  35  I  ;  Kip 
p.  Pati  rson,  'J  Duti  h.  (N.  .1.)  298  ;  Lew- 
iston   v.    Proctor,    23   111.    rS-tt  ;   State    v. 

i. n,  8  Mich.  1 LO.  SeeState  v.  Strains, 

II  Post  (81  N.  II.)  1  < >*j  ;  Goddard,  Peti- 
tioner, l''>  Pick.  (Mass.)  504  ;  Fink  v.  Mil- 
wauki  e,  17  Wis.  26  ;  sees.  411,  412 
and  .  ec.  131  ei  seq.,  and  cases 
in  notes.  'I'ln'  legislature  may  enact  that 
suits  for  the  \  iolation  of  municipal  ordi- 
nances shall  !"•  prosecuted  in  the  name  of 
the  people  of  the  State.  Pillsbury  v. 
Brown,   17  Cal.  478  (1874). 

The  Constitution  of  the  State  of  Towa 
contains  this  provision:  "The  style  of 
all  process  Bhall  he  'The  State  of  Iowa,' 
and  ill  prosecutions  shall  he  conducted  in 

the    ii. Hue    and    hy    the    authority    of    the 

same."  Constitution  of  towa,  Ait.  V. 
sec.  8.  The  charter  of  the  city  of  Daven- 
in  terms  authorized  prosecutions  for 
violations  of  municipal  ordinances  to  be 
instituted  in  the  name  of  the-  city,  ami 
it  was  contended  that  tins  portion  of  the 
charter  was  in  conflict  with  the  above 
quoted  provision  of  the  Constitution.  But 
the  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  of  Dav- 
enport v.  Bird,  34  lowa,  524  (1871),  held 
otherwise,  it  was  a  prosecution  in  the 
name  of  the  city  against  the  defendant 
for  a  violation  of  an  ordinance  of  a  po- 
lice    nature,    hut   for  which,    under    the 

charter,  the  city  was   authorized  to  punish 

bj   i  limited  I'm.'  and  imprisonment.     In 
giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Milk  r,  .1., 
■    "  ].,  it  I  under  the  Con- 

tioti,  that    all    pn  for  viola- 

tions of  municipal  police  ordinances  shall 

h    lucted  i7i  the  name  and  by  the  <m- 

thority  of  He  State  of  Towa  ?  Or,  in  other 
words,  is  thai   clause  of  the  city  charter 

„!'     |  .     which     directs     that    'all 

suits,  actions,  and  prosecutions  he  insti- 
tute,!, commenced,  and  prosecuted   in  the 

l  the  city  of  Davenport,'  in  conlliet 


with  the  constitutional  provision  before 
referred  to.'  We  are  "I  opinion  that  it  is 
not.  This  clause  of  the  Constitution  oc- 
curs in  Art.  V.,  which  treats  of  the  judi- 
cial department  of  the  government.  This 
article  vests  ami  i  judicial   power 

of  the  State,  establishes  the  tenure  of 
office  of  the  judges,  and  defines  the  mode 
of  their  election  ;  fixes  their  salary  and 
limits  the  number  of  judicial  districts  ; 
provides  for  the  election  of  an  attorney- 
general,  and  other  matters  pertaining  to 
the  judicial  arm  of  the  State,  anions  which 
is  the  clause  under  consideration.  From 
all  this  it  seems  manifest  that  the  re- 
quirement 'that  all  prosecutions  shall  be 
conducted  in  the  name  of  "The  State  of 
towa,"  '  contemplates  such  criminal  prose- 
cutions as  shall  be  instituted  and  prose- 
cuted before  the  tribunals  which  are 
provided  for  in  that  article  of  the  Consti- 
tution under  the  statutes  of  the  State.  It 
is  fitting  and  appropriate  that  prosecu- 
tions for  violations  of  the  criminal  laws 
of  the  State  should  be  carried  on  in  the 
name  of  the  government.  But  there  is 
no  fitness  or  propriety  in  requiring  the 
State  to  be  a  party  to  every  petty  prose- 
cution under  the  police  regulations  of  a 
municipal  corporation.  Such  a  construc- 
tion of  this  article  of  the  Constitution 
seems  to  us  to  be  unwarranted,  ami  not  in- 
tended by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution. 
It  was  held  hy  the  Supreme  Court  of  Penn- 
sylvania  that  the  word  'process,'  in  the 
12th  section  of  the  5th  article  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  State,  which  provides  that 
'the  style  of  all  process  shall  he  the  Com- 
monwealth of  /'< nnsylvamnj  was  intended 
to  refer  to  such  writs  only  as  should  be- 
come  necessary  to  be  issued  in  the  course 
of  the  exercise  of  that  judicial  power  which 
is  established  and  provided  for  in  the  ar- 
ticle of  the  Constitution,  and  forms  exclu- 
sively the  subject-matter  of  it.  On  the 
same  principle,  we  arc  of  opinion  that  the 
word  '  prosecutions,'  in  the  8th  section  of 
art.  V.  of  our  Constitution,  was  intended 
to  refer  only  to  such  criminal  prosecutions 


§431      MUNICIPAL    COURTS:     JUDGES,    JURORS,    AND    WITNESSES.      497 

§  430  (359).  Constitutional  Limitations  on  Jurisdiction  ;  Powers. 
—  In  creating  local  tribunals,  hoimrr,  and  in  'prescribing  ti- 
jurisdiction,  the  legislature  should  keep  in  view  two  cardinal  con- 
siderations: First.  That  these  inferior  courts  will  have  only  .such 
jurisdiction,  and  can  exercise  only  such  powers,  as  are  expressly  gi 
or  necessarily  implied,  and  that  fair  doubts  as  to  the  extent  of  juris- 
diction are  resolved  against  the  corporation;  to  this  effect  are  all  the 
authorities.  Second.  Regard  must  also  be  had  to  constitutional  pro- 
visions intended  to  secure  the  liberty  and  to  protect  the  rights  of 
the  citizen.  The  State  Constitutions  contain  the  substance  of  the 
clauses  of  Magna  Charta  to  the  effect  that  no  citizen  shall  be  de- 
prived of  life,  liberty,  or  property  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or 
by  the  law  of  the  land,  and  also  provisions,  more  or  less  extensive, 
securing  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  These  and  other  requirements  of 
the  fundamental  law  cannot  be  violated  in  acts  of  the  legislature 
establishing  and  fixing  the  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation  court  or 
tribunal.1 

Citizens  competent  to  be  Local  Judges,  Jurors,  and  Witnesses. 

§431  (360).  Municipal  Judges,  Jurors,  and  Witnesses.  —  The 
maxim  of  the  common  law  above  adverted  to,  that  no  one  shall  be  a 
judge  in  his  own  case}  has  no  just  application  to  legislation  creating 
municipal  courts,  and  investing  them  with  jurisdiction  to  try  com- 
plaints for  breaches  of  municipal  ordinances.  The  mayor,  though  a 
citizen  of  the  corporation,  may  be  clothed  with  judicial  powers  of 
this  character,  and  the  inhabitants,  though  interested  in  a  minute 
degree  in  the  recovery,  are,  or  at  least  may  be  declared,  competent 
witnesses.  In  this  respect  the  common-law  rules  have  not  been 
adopted  and  applied  by  the  American  courts  to  our  municipal  cor- 
porations ;3  or  the  courts  have  considered  the  common-law  doctrine 

under  State  laws  as  should  be  cognizable  imprisonment ;  but  quaere.     Brownville  v. 

by   the  judicial  power,    which    is   estab-  Cook,  4  Neb.  101  (1875).     As  to  mode  of 

lished  and   provided  for  in  that  article,  enforcement  of  ordinances  and  requisites 

and  that  it  was  not  intended  to  include  of  complaints,  oicU  'chapter  on  Ordinances, 

prosecutions   under   ordinances  of  muni-  sees.  408-412,  and  notes. 
cipal   corporations  cognizable  before  local  1  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  1  Bay  (S.  C), 

police  magistrates."     And  the  same  view  382  (1794)  ;  Slaughter  v.  People,  2  I 

is  held  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Ken-  (Mich.)  334  (1842).     Ante,  sec.  427,  note 

tucky.     Williamson  v.   Commonwealth,  4  and  ruses;    post,   see.  432.     A   municipal 

B.   Mon.  (Ky.)  146  (1843).      But  in  Ne-  court  cannot  sit  outside  the  limits  of  the 

brasha  the  Constitution  provides  that  "all  city.      Hershoff  v.   Beverly,  43  X.  J.  L. 

process  and  other  proceedings  shall  run  in  139. 
the  name  of  the  State,"  and  this  was  held  2  Supra,  sec  425. 

to  include  prosecutions   under   municipal  '  Thomas    v.    Mount   Vernon,  f>   Ohio, 

ordinances,  where  the  penalty  was  fine  and  290    (1839);    Commonwealth    v.   bead,   1 
vol.  i.  —  32 


I'.'S 


MINICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§431 


as  to  the  disqualifying  effect  of  interest  upon  jurors  and  witnesses 
as  ex]  ressly  or  impliedly  abrogated  by  the  usual  legislative  or  char- 
ter provisions  for  the  constitution  of  municipal  courts,  and  confer- 
ring upon  them  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  try  certain  actions  and 
proceedings  by  and  againsl  the  municipality.  But  a  distinction  has 
been  well  drawn  between  corporation  courts  proper  and  the  general 
courts  of  record  ;  and  in  respect  of  ordinary  actions  in  the  latter 
class  of  courts,  a  taxpayer  of  a  municipality  is  incompetent  to  serve 
as  a  juror  where  the  municipality  is  a  party,  unless  made  competent 
by  legislative  provision,  expressly  or  by  implication.1 


Gray  (Mass.),  475;  Lexington  v.  Long, 
8]  Mo.  369  (1861);  Commonwealth  v. 
Ryan,  5  Mass.  90  ;  Cooley  Const.  Lim. 
410,  412;  Wheeling  v.  Black,  25  W.  Va. 
266. 

In  the  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  364   (1845),  the  defendant, 
dent  of  the  city,   was  prosecuted 
in  the  city  court,  established  by  ad  of  the 
itnre,  for  violation  of  a  city  ordinance. 
The  defendant  made  the  point  that,  as  the 
judge  of  that  court,  the  sheriff",  ami  jurors 
were  corporators,  and  therefore  interested 
in  the  penalty,   they  were  incompetent  to 
try  the  cause.     In  holding  this  objection 
unsound,  the  Court  of  Appeals,  after  allud- 
ing to    Besketh    v.    Braddock,    3    Burr. 
1847,   cited   ante,   sec.    42f>,   relied  on  by 
the  defendant,  remarks:    "The  statutory 
authority  given  to  the  city  court  to  try  all 
offenders  against  city    ordinances  impli- 
edly  dec!  i  notwithstanding  the 
common-law   objection,  it  was  right  and 
proper  to  give  it  the  power  to  enforce  the 
city   laws  against  all  offenders.     The  in- 
i   is  too  minute,  too  slight  to  excite 
insl    a    defendant  ;    for   the 
judge,  sheriff,  ami  Jim-mis  are  members  of  a 
.-ami  members. 
What  interest  of  value  have  they  in  a  fine 
of  twenty  dollars?     It  would  put  a  most 
( oiinenl    calculator    to   greal     trouble  to 
lain  the  vi  -rain  of  inter  il 
which  each  of  these  gentlemen  might  ha\  e. 
To  remove  so  shadowy  and  slight  an  ob- 
tui  e  thoughl  proper  to 
the   the   city   court,    consisting  of   its 
"■,    clerk,    sheriff,    and    jurors,    with 
authority  to  try    the   defendant,  and   he 
cannot  now  object  to  it."     Per  O'Neall,  J., 
( !ity  •  Council  v.   Pepper,   1    Rich.  (S.  C. ) 
La.'.                   I.".).     City  Council  v.  King, 


4  McCord  (S.  c.)487;  Corwein  v.  Barnes, 
11  Johns.  (N.  V.)  76  (1814).  The  mayor 
is  not  disqualified  from  presiding  in  the 
mayor's  court,  before  which  the  proceedings 
are  held,  by  the  fact  that  he  is  the  owner 
of  a  lot  on  the  street  sought  to  be  widened. 
Lexington  v.  Long,  31  Mo.  369  (1861). 
The  mayor  and  council  having  jurisdic- 
tion to  declare  what  is  a  nuisance,  the 
fact  that  they  have  employed  an  attorney 
to  prosecute  a  case  does  not  disqualify 
them,  nor  does  the  interest  which  they 
have  in  common  with  other  citizens. 
Montezuma  v.  Minor,  73  Ga.  484. 

i  Diveny  v.  Elmira,  51  N.  Y.  506 
(137-°>).  This  was  action  of  tort  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State  against  the 
city  of  Elmira  for  damages  to  the  plaintiff 
caused  by  a  defective  sidewalk,  which  the 
city  was  bound  to  repair.  The  question 
was  whether  a  taxpayer  of  the  city  was  a 
competent  juror.  It  was  held  by  the  Com- 
mission of  Appeals  that  at  common  law  the 
interest  of  such  a  juror  would  he  a  suffi- 
cient objection  unless  removed  by  statute, 
and  that  as  respects  the  defendant  city  it 
had  not  been  thus  removed.  Mr.  Com- 
missioner Earl,  in  delivering  the  judgment 
of  the  court,  said  :  "The  charter  of  Elmira 
provides  for  the  election  of  justices  of  the 
peace,  clothed  with  authority  to  hear  and 
try  actions  in  the  same  manner  as  justices 
of  towns,  and  the  city  may  sue  before  such 
justices  to  recover  penalties  and  forfeitures, 
and  such  suits  must  be  tried  like  civil 
actions  before  justices  of  towns.  The 
defendants  in  such  action  may,  of  course, 
demand  jury  trials,  and  jurors  must  be 
summoned  from  the  city,  and  cannot  be 
summoned  elsewhere.  Hence,  it  may  be 
well  that  in  such  actions  before  justices  of 
the   peace   the  incompetency  of  juries  on 


§432   municipal  courts:  summary  procedure;  jury  trial.  499 


Summary  Proceedings  may,  in  Certain  Cases,  be  authorized.  —  Jury 

Trial. 

§  432  (361).  Summary  Procedure;  Jury  Trial. —  Proceedings  for 
the  violation  of  munu-ipul  ordinances  are  frequently  summary  in 
their  character,  and  it  has  been  made  a  question  how  lar  statutes  or 
charters  authorizing  such  proceedings  are  valid,  especially  where  no 
provision  is  made  for  trial  by  jury.  This  must  depend  upon  the 
nature  of  the  act  or  omission,  and  upon  the  Constitution  of  the  State 
and  the  extent  to  which  the  power  of  the  legislature  is  therein  re- 
stricted. Offences  against  ordinances  properly  made  in  virtue  of 
the  implied  or  incidental  power  of  the  corporation,  or  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  legitimate  police  authority  for  the  preservation  of  the 
peace,  good  order,  safety,  and  health  of  the  place  and  which  relate 
to  minor  acts  and  matters  not  embraced  in  the  public  criminal 
statutes  of  the  State,  are  not  usually  or  properly  regarded  as  crim  i- 
nal}  and  hence  need  not  necessarily  be  prosecuted  by  indictment  or 
tried  by  a  jury.2     An  act  of  the  legislature  authorizing  the  arrest 


account  of  interest  is,  by  implication, 
removed,  for  otherwise  the  justices  would 
be  practically  deprived  of  jurisdiction  to 
try  the  causes  which  are  authorized  to  be 
commenced  before  them.  Commonwealth 
v.  Ryan,  5  Mass.  90.  But  there  is  no  such 
practical  difficulty  in  courts  of  record  held 
in  the  city ;  and  hence  there  is  no  reason 
for  holding  that  in  actions  tried  in  them, 
in  which  the  city  is  interested,  the  incom- 
petency of  jurors  on  account  of  interest 
has  been  removed.  I  therefore  conclude 
that  the  common-law  rule  of  incompetency 
on  account  of  interest  applied  to  these 
jurors,  and  that  they  were  properly  chal- 
lenged and  excluded.  Whatever  incon- 
venience may  flow  from  such  a  holding 
may  be  remedied  by  the  legislature.  We 
must  administer  the  law  as  we  find  it." 
51  N.  Y.  512.  And  it  lias  also  been  else- 
where decided  that  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  against  a  municipality,  a  resident 
taxpayer  is  not  competent  to  sit  as  a  juror 
if  challenged  for  cause.  Fulweiler  v. 
St.  Louis,  61  Mo.  479  (1S76)  ;  Rose  v. 
St.  Charles,  49  Mo.  509  ;  Johnson  v. 
Americus,  46  Ga.  80  ;  but  under  the  code 
of  Georgia  this  rule  does  not  obtain.  Car- 
tersville  v.  Lyon,  69  Ga.  577  ;  see  Omaha 
v.  Olmstead,  5  Neb.  446  (1877).  One  who 
is  specially  interested  in  having  a  street 


laid  out  held  not  disqualified  to  act  as  a 
juror  in  proceedings  for  the  taking  of  pri- 
vate property  for  the  purposes  of  the 
street.  Kundinger  v.  Saginaw,  5'J  Midi. 
355.  See  Kemper  v.  Louisville,  14  Bush 
(Ky.),  87. 

By  statute  of  Massachusetts  an  inhabi- 
tant of  the  city  of  Boston  is  competent  as 
a  juror  in  such  cases,  but  this  provision 
does  not  make  a  member  of  the  common 
council  of  that  city  competent.  Boston  v. 
Baldwin,  139  Mass.  31;-).  The  inhabitants 
of  a  town  are  not  disqualified  from  serving 
as  grand  jurors  in  presenting  an  indictment 
for  forgery  with  intent  to  defraud  the  town, 
—  the  interest  is  too  remote  and  is  differ- 
ent from  a  direct  financial  interest.  Com- 
monwealth v.  Brown,  147  Mass.  585  (1888). 
Knowlton,  J.,  reviews  the  cases  and  con- 
siders the  question  with  care.  Juror  not 
disqualified  to  sit  on  a  trial  for  a  violation 
of  the  ordinance  of  his  own  city.  State  v. 
Wells,  it;  Iowa,  662. 

i  Ex  parte  Hollwedell,  74  Mo.  395. 

■!■  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  c,a. 509(1848); 
approved,  Floyd  o.  Commissioners,  14  Ga. 
358  (1853)  ;  Vason  v.  Augusta,  38  Ga.  542 
(lS'isi  ;  post,  sec.  II  1.  and  notes  ;  State  ''. 
Guttierrez,  15  La.  An.  L90 ;  Tierney  '•. 
Dodge,  9  Minn.  !*'•;.  169  ;  seeSt  Peter  o. 
Bauer,  19  Minn.   327.   332,  (1872),  where 


500 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§432 


of  professional  thieves  and  burglars  frequenting  any  railroad  depot 
in   the  city   of  Philadelphia,  and   their  commitment   by  the 

mayor,  without  a  trial  by  jury,  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  pro- 
:i   of  the  Constitution    of  the  State   which   guarantees   "that 

trial  by  jury  shall   be  as  heretofore,  and  the  right  thereof  remain 

m\  iolate."  l 


the  text  is  cited  and  the  subject  considered 
by  RipL  y,  U.  J.;  I  lommonwealth, 

4J  Pa.   5t.    J9  .   ;  Bish.  Cr.  Pr.  sec.   758  ; 
State   v.    Conlin,    27    \'t.   318.     Thus,  in 
held  that  legislative  au- 
municipal  couita  to  punish  vio- 
lations of  ordinances  by  a  i  and 
imprisonment,    without    providing   for  a 
trial   by  jury,  is  oot   in  conflict  with   the 
mal  provision  that   "the  right 
of  trial   by  jury  shall  remain  inviolate.*' 

W huff,  33  X.  J.  Law,  213 

hnson  o.  Barclaj',  1  Han-.  (N.J.) 
1  ;  v.  p.  Howe  o.   Plain  field,  8  Vroom  (37 
N.  .1.  I,.),  1  15  ;   People  v.  Justices,  74  N. 
V.   106  ;   1-  Alb.   Law  Jour.  254  (1878)  ; 
366,  1-12,  113,  427  el  scq. ;  State 
,  29  Miun,   145;   Mankatov.  Arnold, 
36  Minn.  62;   ExparU  Schmidt,  24  S.  C. 
Lng  text );  Moundsville  v.  Foun- 
tain, 27  W.  \a.    L82,  204  ;   Hill  v.  Mayor 
of  Dalton,  72  Ga.   314;  Dively  v.  Cedar 
I        .   21    Iowa,  565  ;   Davenport  G.   L.  & 
C.  Co.  v.  Davenport,  13  Iowa,  229  ;  State 
ipeka,  36  Kan.  76;   Monroe  t\  Mi 
1. 1.  An.  IK'2;  see  also  Hollenbeck  v. 
Marshalltown,  62  Iowa,  21. 

Treating  of  this  subject,  Mr.  Sedgwick 

"Exten  Lve    and   summary   police 

powers  are  constantly  exercised  in  all  the 

t lie  Union  for  the   repression  of 

breaches  of  the  peace  and  petty  offences  ; 

and    these   statutes  arc  not  supposed    to 

conflict  with  th nstitutional  provisions 

iring  to  thi  trial   by  jury." 

and  Const.   Law,  548,  549;  Cooley 
.   I  im.  596.     Whal  offences  may  he 
1  againsl  in  England   in  a  sum- 
mary manner  are  determined   by  acts  of 

i  t,  and  the  later  arts  include  ■ ■ 

crime,     l  Stephen,  Hist. 
i  hap.  iv.  pp.  122-126.     In  Wil- 
liam   v.  Augii  ta,  supra,  proceedings  before 
a  city  council  for  violations  of  its  ordi- 
dthough  punishable  by  fine,  were 
idered   not    to   be    ''criminal  cases" 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  of 


Georgia,    vesting    the  jurisdiction   of  all 

•  iu  tribunals  other  than  cor- 
poration courts,  the  court  being  of  opinion 
that  the  term  "criminal  cases,"  as  used  in 

the  I  -i  n  mi  ion,  had  reference  to  such  act3 

ami  omissions  as  arc  in  violation  of  the 
ties  of  the  State,  ami  not  to  viola- 
tions of  local  ordinances  made  for  the 
internal  police  ami  government  of  the  city. 
In  this  State  the  settled  rule  is  that  the 
same  act  cannot  he  twice  punished,  — ■ 
once  by  the  municipality  and  once  by  the 
State, — and  the  rule  is  adopted  that  the 
municipal  power  ends  where  the  right  to 
indict  under  State  authority  exists,  as  any 
other  rule  would  deprive  the  accused  of 
lie  light  to  a  jury  trial.  Jenkins  v. 
Thomasville,  35  Ga.  145  (1866)  ;  Vason  v. 
Augusta,  supra;  Savannah  v.  Hussey,  21 
Ga.  80  (18;")7);  ante,  sec.  316,  note.  So 
in  Michigan  :  Slaughter  v.  People,  2  Doug. 
(Mich.)  334  (1842).  Otherwise  in  Ken- 
fin-/.-)/:  Williamson  r.  Commonwealth,  4 
11.  Mon.  (Ky.)  1  If,  (1843).  Where  a  char- 
ter vested  in  a  municipal  officer  "  all  the 
power  and  jurisdiction  given  to  trial  jus- 
tices" in  the  State,  it  was  held  that  per- 
sons charged  with  violations  of  ordinances 
were  entitled  to  a  trial  by  jury  ami  to  an 
appeal.  Beaufort  v.  Ohlandt,  24  S.  C. 
158;  Lexington  v.  Wise,  Tb.  163;  ante, 
sees.  316,  366,  411,  428  et  seq. 

1  Byers  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St. 
89.  In  this  case  the  extent  of  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury  at  common  law  is  thor- 
oughly examined  in  a  valuable  opinion 
by  Strong,  J.,  afterwards  one  of  the 
justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  validity  of  sum- 
mary convictions  sustained.  See  chapter 
on  Ordinances,   ante,  sees.  366,  408,  411. 

The  doctrine  may  he  considered    as   settled 

iii   Pennsylvania  that    municipal  corpora- 
ire    not    within    the    constitutional 
guaranty  of  jury  trial,  and  that  the  right 

to  a  trial  by  jury  may  he  withheld  by  the 
legislature  from  new  offences,  and  from  new 


§  433       MUNICIPAL   COURTS  :     THE   FOURTEENTH    AMENDMENT.  501 


§  433.  Magna  Charta  ;  The  Fourteenth  Amendment.  —  The  Four- 
teenth Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  contains  a 
provision  similar  to  that  found  in  many  of  the  State  Constitutions, 
"that  no  State  shall  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  &c,  without 
due  process  of  law."  1  Thus  the  principles  of  Magna  Charta,  mem- 
orable in  their  assertion,  historic  in  their  associations,  and  luminous 
with  the  light  of  liberty,  are  part  of  the  fundamental  law  of  this 
country,  and  they  cannot  be  contravened  in  the  powers  granted  to 
municipalities,  nor  in  the  jurisdiction  with  which  municipal  courts 
are  invested,  or  in  the  proceedings  therein  authorized.2     One  of  the 


jurisdictions  created  by  statute  without 
common-law  powers,  and  from  proceed- 
ings out  of  the  course  of  the  common  laic. 
Rhines  v.  Clark,  51  Pa.  St.  96  (1865), 
per  Woodward,  C.  J.  ;  Dunmore's  Ap- 
peal, 52  Pa.  St.  374  (1S66)  ;  Ewing  v. 
Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  384  (1862)  ;  Van  Swar- 
tow  v.  Commonwealth,  24  Pa.  St.  131 
(1854).  See  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3 
Pa.  (Pen.  &  W.)  253  (1831);  post.  sec. 
438,  and  note.  Such  a  constitutional 
provision  does  not  apply  in  New  York  to 
petty  offences  made  triable  by  statute  before 
a  court  of  special  sessions.  People  v. 
Justices,  74  N.  Y.  406  (1878)  ;  18  Alb. 
Law  Jour.  254.  A  different  view  is,  to 
some  extent,  taken  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Vermont  under  the  Constitution  of  that 
State,  whose  language  is,  that  "  when  an 
issue  of  fact  proper  for  cognizance  of  a 
jury  shall  be  joined  in  a  court  of  law,  the 
parties  have  a  right  to  trial  by  jury  which 
ought  to  be  held  sacred."  In  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  a  public  corporation,  although 
the  liability  on  the  corporation  be  created 
by  statute,  is  entitled  to  a  jury  trial,  and 
therefore  a  statute  providing  for  a  com- 
pulsory and  final  reference  of  a  case  in 
its  nature  one  at  common  law,  is  void  ; 
and  the  Constitution  applies  to  all  contro- 
versies fit  to  be  tried  by  a  jury,  although 
the  particular  right  was  created  by  statute 
enacted  after  the  adoption  of  the  Consti- 
tution. Plimpton  v.  Somerset,  33  Vt.  283 
(1S60).  It  would,  perhaps,  be  going  too 
far  to  say  that  municipal  corporations  are 
not  in  any  case  within  the  constitutional 
guaranty  of  a  trial  by  jury,  and  yet  it 
would  not  follow  that  provision  might 
not  be  made  for  the  trial  in  a  summary 
way,  before  municipal  courts,  of  petty  or 
police    offences.      People    v.    Justices,   74 


N.  V.  406;  18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  254 
(1878)  ;  ante,  chap.  iv.  ;  supra,  sees.  366- 
368,  411,  412;  infra,  sees.  434-438. 

1  Construed  Portland  v.  Bangor  (va- 
grants), 65  Me.  120  (1876)  ;  s.  c.  20  Am. 
Rep.  681  ;  ante,  sec.  401. 

2  The  words  referred  to  in  the  text,  in 
substance  the  same  as  Article  39  of  Magna 
Charta,  are  the  "essential  clauses,"  being 
those  that  "protect  the  personal  liberty 
and  property  of  all  freemen  by  giving 
security  from  arbitrary  imprisonment  and 
arbitrary  spoliation."  Hallam  Mid.  Ages, 
II.  324.  "These  three  words  [nu(- 
lus  liber  homo]  are  worth,"  says  Lord 
Chatham,  "all  the  classics."  In  time 
they  came  to  embrace  every  person  in  the 
realm.  The  eloquent  eulogium  of  Sir 
James  Mackintosh  upon  Magna  Charta  is 
well  known.  He  justly  says  that  whoever 
appreciates  it  "  is  sacredly  bound  to  -peak 
with  reverential  gratitude  of  the  authors 
of  the  Great  Charter.  To  have  produced 
it,  to  have  preserved  it,  to  have  matured 
it,  constitute  the  immortal  claim  of  Eng- 
land upon  the  esteem  of  mankind."  In 
enumerating  its  advantages  and  its  bless- 
ings, it  seems  to  the  author  that  Sir  James 
has  omitted  to  notice  its  crowning  glory, 
and  that  is  its  assertion  of  the  principle  of 
such  priceless  value  to  mankind  which 
Magna  Charta  alike  in  its  origin  and  in 
its  general  and  specific  provisions  declares 
and  illustrates,  and  which  is  the  founda- 
tion principle  of  English  ami  American 
liberty,  viz. :  that  the  Law  as  distinguished 
from  arbitrary  power  or  discretionary  au- 
thority is  supreme  over  all  ;  that  all  per- 
sons from  those  in  the  highest  station  to 
the  humblest  individual  are  equally  en- 
titled to  its  protection  and  are  equally 
bound    to   render  it  obedience  ;    that   all 


Mi.M«  [PAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  433 

questions  which  most  frequently  arises  is  whether  the  defendant  is 
.,/  to  a  trial  by  jury,  and  the  cases  on  this  subject  cannot  all 
be  reconciled.1  The  general  principles  applicable  to  its  solution, 
however,  are  plain.  Violations  of  municipal  by-laws  proper,  such 
as  fall  within  the  description  of  municipal  police  regulations,  as  for 
example  those  concerning  markets,  streets,  waterworks,  city  officers, 
and  which  relate  to  acts  and  omissions  that  are  not  embraced  in 
the  general  criminal  legislation  of  the  State,  the  legislature  may 
authorize  to  be  prosecuted  in  a  summary  manner  by  and  in  the 
name  of  the  corporation,  and  need  not  provide  for  atrial  by  jury. 
Such  ads  and  omissions  are  not  crimes  or  misdemeanors  to  which 
the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury  extends.2 

In  England  violations  of  municipal  by-laws  where  the  penalty  is 
a  fine,  or  by  authority  of  Parliament  a  Wue  and  imprisonment,  have 
always  been  prosecuted  in  a  summary  manner,  although  Magna 
Charta  secures  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  Summary  prosecutions, 
however,  have  always  been,  it  is  believed,  in  virtue  of  Acts  of  Parlia- 
ment.8 The  distinction  there  is  between  offences  known  as  picas  of 
the  crown,  where  the  trial  must  be  by  jury,  and  petty  offences  pun- 
ishable by  fine  or  amerciament  in  the  inferior  jurisdictions.4  And 
a  by-law  with  appropriate  penalties  is  not  necessarily  invalid,  be- 
cause the  party  may  also  be  indicted  for  the  same  act.5  So  here 
where  the  act  or  omission  sought  to  be  punished  by  imprisonment 
under  a  municipal  ordinance  is  in  its  nature  not  peculiarly  an  of- 
fence against  the  municipality,  but  rather  against  the  public  at 
large,  and  where  it  falls  within  the  legal  or  common-law  notion  of  a 
crime  or  misdemeanor,  and  especially  where,  being  of  such  a  nature, 
it  is  embraced  in  the  criminal  code  of  the  State,  then  the  constitu- 
tional guarantees  intended  to  secure  the  liberty  of  the  citizen  and 
the  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  cannot  be  evaded  by  the  nature  of  the 
powers  vested  in  the  municipal  corporation  or  the  nature  of  the 

men  are  governed  by  the  general   law  of         2  Text  quoted  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 

the  landand  by  thai  alone,  and  are  amena-  the  United  States  in  Callan  v.  Wilson,  127 

ble  only  to  that  law aa  administered  in  the  U.   S.   540(1888);   where,   however,  the 

Judi  ;  thai   the  entire  structure  crime  in  question  —  conspiracy  —  was  held 

of  oui  polity,  Con  titutions,  and  laws  rests  not  to  be  included  in  the  class  referred  to 

upon    the  righl  of   the   individual  to  the  in  the  text.     See  also  State  v.  Powell,  97 

secui  ajoymenl  of  his  freedom  and  N.  C.  417,  and  post,  sec.  439. 

Ids  property  ;  thai  the  individual  is  every-         3  1  Stephen  Hist.  Crim.  Law,  chap.  iv. 

thin  -  and  the  government  nothing  except  p.  122. 

so  far  as  it  is  an  institution  that  protects         4  Ante,  sec.  368,  and  authorities  cited 

his  liberties  and  his  rights.  in  note. 

i  j„-  ,.,,d  casesinnote;         5  Grant  on  Corp.  82;   ante,  sec.  368, 

108-414,  and  notes;  sees.  427,  428-  note. 


§  433       MUNICIPAL   COURTS  :     THE    FOURTEENTH    AMENDMENT. 


503 


jurisdiction  conferred  upon  the  municipal  courts.1  If  no  imprison- 
ment for  the  violation  of  the  municipal  regulation  is  authorized,  it  is 
clear  that  the  prosecution  is  not  criminal,  and  there  is  no  constitu- 
tional right  to  a  trial  by  jury.  But  if  a  limited  imprisonment  on 
default  of  paying  a  fine,  or  even  as  part  of  the  punishment,  is  au- 
thorized by  the  legislature,  this  does  nut  necessarily  make  the  case, 
if  it  be  for  a  violation  of  a  mere  municipal  regulation,  one  to  which 
the  right  of  a  trial  by  jury  extends.  The  question  depends  rather, 
we  think,  upon  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  offence.  It  is  very  gener- 
ally agreed  in  this  country  that  certain  minor  or  petty  offences  may 
be  summarily  prosecuted  and  tried  without  indictment  or  a  jury, 
but  there  is  a  class  of  cases  so  near  boundary  line  that  the  courts 
have  differed  as  to  which  side  of  it  they  belong.2     On  the  principles 


1  In  re  Rolfs,  30  Kan.  758,  quoting 
text,  and  holding  that  maintaining  a  nui- 
sance—  as  keeping  a  hog-pen — being  at 
common  law  a  criminal  offence  for  which 
fine  and  imprisonment  may  be  imposed, 
one  accused  thereof  is  entitled  to  a  jury, 
in  a  trial  before  a  police-judge  under  an 
ordinance  of  the  city.  Stebbins  v.  Mayer 
(Kan.),  16  Pac.  Rep.  745. 

2  Ante,  sees.  366,  368  and  note,  408 
et  seq.,  414,  427,  423.  In  England,  under 
various  Acts  of  Parliament  from  an  early 
period,  certain  magistrates  have  been 
authorized  "  to  inflict  in  a  summary  way 
penalties  of  different  kinds  upon  a  great 
variety  of  offenders.  These  penalties  have 
consisted  in  the  infliction  of  fines  of 
greater  or  less  amount,  and  sometimes  in 
imprisonment,  and  occasionally  in  setting 
the  offender  in  the  stocks.  Most  offences 
created  by  legislation  of  this  sort  have 
consisted  in  the  violation  of  rules  laid 
down  for  some  administrative  purpose, 
and  so  belong  rather  to  administrative  law 
than  to  criminal  law  as  usually  under- 
stood." 1  Stephen  Hist.  Cr.  Law,  chap. 
iv.  p.  122.  In  the  later  acts  in  England 
the  summary  powers  of  magistrates  "  in 
cases  of  serious  crimes  have  been  consider- 
ably enlarged."  lb.  The  following  refer- 
ence to  some  additional  authorities,  Eng- 
lish and  Canadian,  respecting  the  question, 

What  is  a  crime?  is  taken  from  Chief 
Justice  Harrison's  Municipal  Manual  for 
the  Province  of  Ontario  (5th  ed.  1878),  p. 
812:  — 

"  If  imprisonment  may  in  the  first  in- 
stance follow  the  conviction,  the  proceed- 


ing is  in  general  looked  upon  as  a  criminal 
one.  Per  Piatt,  B.,  Attorney-General  v. 
Radloff,  10  Exchq.  84.  There  are  many 
crimes,  properly  so  called,  which  are  liable 
to  be  punished  on  summary  conviction. 
1  Steph.  Hist.  Cr.  Law,  chap.  iv.  p.  122. 
But  there  are  a  vast  number  of  acts,  which 
in  no  sense  are  crimes,  which  are  also 
punishable  ;  such,  for  instance,  as  keeping 
open  house  after  certain  hours,  and  a 
variety  of  breaches  of  police  regulations 
which  will  readily  occur  to  the  mind  of  any 
one.  Per  Banm  Martin,  s.  c.  96.  Where 
the  proceeding  is  conducted  with  a  view 
and  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  redress 
for  the  violation  of  a  private  right  only, 
the  proceeding  is  a  civil  one  ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  where  the  proceeding  is  di- 
rected for  the  punishment  of  an  offence 
which  militates  against  the  general  in- 
terest of  the  community,  and  for  the 
punishment  of  the  infraction  of  some 
public  duty,  such  proceeding  is  a  crim- 
inal proceeding.  Per  Sir  Alexander  Cock- 
burn,  in  arguing  same  case,  p.  86.  It  is 
not  an  easy  matter  to  draw  a  line,  and  so 
be  able  to  decide  on  which  side  of  it  each 
case  should  be  placed.  Reference  may  be 
made  to  the  following  cases  :  Attorney- 
General  v.  Bowman,  2  B.  &  P.  532,  n.  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Siddon,  1  C.  &  J. 
220  ;  Huntley  v.  Luscombe,  2  B.  &  P. 
530  ;  Rackham  v.  Bluck,  9  Q.  B.  691  ; 
Cobbett  v.  Slowman,  9  Exchq.  633  ;  Eg- 
giugton,  In  re,  2  E.  &  B.  717  ;  Sweeney  v. 
Spooner,  3  B.  &  S.  329  ;  Reeve  v.  Wood, 
5  B.  &  S.  364  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Sulli- 
van, 32  L.  J.   Exchq.  92  ;  Easton's  Case, 


I  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  435 

here  laid  down  those  which   most   commonly  present  themselves 
may  be  satisfactorily  determined. 

vj    1 .".  I.     362  .     Criminal    Charges;     Jury    Trial.  —  Where    the    legis- 

lature  undertakes  bo  confer  upon  the  courts  of  the  corporation,  or 
where  the  corpoi  ks  to  give  to  its  court  summary  jurisdiction 

i/or  acts  which  are  indictable,  or  are  criminal  offences,  it 
not  unfrequently  happens  that  some  provision  of  the  Constitution, 
designed  to  protect  the  rights  or  liberty  of  the  citizen,  is  violated. 
Thus,  umlcr  a  Constitution  declaring  "  that  no  freeman  shall  be  put 
to  answer anv  criminal  charge  but  by  indictment,"  &c,  and  "that  no 
freeman  shall  be  convicted  of  any  crime  but  by  the  unanimous  ver- 
dict of  a  jury  of  -nod  and  lawful  men  in  open  court,  as  heretofore 
an  art  of  the  legislature  which  gives  to  an  officer  of  an  in- 
corporated town  tin'  power  of  trying  assaults  and  batteries,  or 
■  crimes,  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  North 
Carolina,  void,  because  it  violates  both  of  these  provisions  of  the 
Constitution.1 

§  135  363).  Same  subject.  —  A  similar  view  was  taken  in  the 
Stair  of  Arkansas,  the  Constitution  of  which  provided  that  "no 
man  shall  be  put  to  answer  any  criminal  charge  but  by  present- 
ment, indictment,  or  impeachment ; "  and  it  was  held  that  the  legis- 
lature could  not  confer  upon  the  corporation  courts  of  a  city  the 
power  to  punish  an  assault  and  battery  —  this  being  a  criminal 
charge  —  without  presentment  or  indictment;  and  it  was  conse- 
quently decided  that  the  judgment  of  conviction  of  such  a  court  for 
an  assault  and  battery  is  coram  non  judice,  and  constitutes  no  bar 
to  a  prosecution  by  indictment  in  the  courts  of  the  State  for  the 
same  offence.2 

12  A.  &  R,  645;  Cattell  r.  [reson,  F...  R.  &  "the  mayors,  recorders,  &c,  maybe  com- 

I     91  :  Mordeti  v.    Porter,  7  C.  B.  n.  s.  missioned,  and  the   legislature  may  vest 

641  ;    Heme  r.  Garton,   2    E.   &  E.  66;  in    them    such   criminal   jurisdiction    as 

r  '•.  Green,  2  B.  &  S.  299  ;  Lucas  &  may  be  necessary  for  the  punishment  of 

McGlashan,    /-/   re,  29  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  minor  crimes  and   offences,  as  the  police 

Queen  v.   Boardman,  30  Upper  and  g I  order  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans 

;  ;  The  Queen  v.  Roddy,  41  may  require."     It  was  held  that  art.  103 

C       Q.  I'..  2IM."  laid  down  the  general  rule,  to  which  art 

1  Stal  \    ('  )    Law,  121    was   an    exception,   and    thai    under 

i       See   Tierney    v.     Dodge,    '.•  the    latter  article    it   was  competent   for 

Minn.   166  (1864).      The  Constitution  of  the   legislature  to  provide  for  the  prose- 

(arl    L08)  requires  thai  "prose-  cution    of   minor    offences,    without    in- 

1  ill  be  by  indictment  orinforma-  dictment  or  jury  trial,  in  the  Recorder's 

tion.     The  accused   shall   have   b     ipeedy  Court.     State  v.  Guttierrez,   15  La.   An. 

trinl   by  an   impartial  jury  of  the   ricin-  190  (1860). 

Another  article  (124)  provides  that         a  Rector  v.  State,  6  Ark.  (1  Eng.)  187 


§  437      MUNICIPAL   COURTS  I    CRIMINAL   CHARGES  ;    JURY   TRIAL.      505 

§436  (364).  Same  subject.  —  The  same  doctrine  was  declared 
iu  Michigan.  The  Constitution  of  the  State  contained  a  provision 
that  "  no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  criminal  offence  unless 
on  the  presentment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  cases  cognizable  by 
justices  of  the  peace,"  &c.  ;  and  by  the  statutes  of  the  Statu,  the 
keeping  of  a  bawdy -house  was  declared  to  be  an  offence  punishable 
by  fine  and  imprisonment.  Under  this  state  of  the  law  the  city  of 
Detroit  was  empowered  by  the  legislature  "to  make  all  such  by- 
laws and  ordinances  as  may  be  deemed  expedient  by  the  common 
council  for  effectually  preventing  and  suppressing  houses  of  ill-fame 
within  the  limits  of  the  city."  It  was  held  that  the  term  "  criminal 
offence"  in  the  Constitution  included  both  felonies  and  misde- 
meanors, and  embraced  the  offence  (which  was  such  both  at  com- 
mon law  and  by  the  statute  of  the  State)  of  keeping  a  house  of 
ill-fame  ;  and  therefore  an  ordinance  of  the  common  council  pre- 
scribing the  punishment  for  keeping  such  a  house  within  the  city 
and  providing  for  the  trial  and  conviction  of  the  offenders  in  the 
municipal  court  without  indictment,  was  unconstitutional,  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  resting  upon  the  principle  that,  under  the  con- 
stitutional provision  quoted,  there  could  be  no  summary  conviction 
under  an  ordinance  for  that  which  is  a  criminal  offence  by  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  the  State.1 

§  437  (365).  Same  subject.  —  So,  by  the  Constitution  of  Texas, 
it  is  provided  that  "in  all  cases  in  which  justices  of  the  peace  or 

(1845)  ;  Durr  v.  Howard,  v6  Ark.  461  ;  as  to  an  ordinance  against  opium  dens, 
Lewis  v.  State,  21  Ark.  211.  It  is  held  as  precisely  the  same  acts  are  made 
in  the  same.  State  that  a  corporation  court  punishable  by  the  Penal  Code.  Re  Sic,  73 
may  punish  a  person  for  using  obscene  Cal.  142  (1887h  In  Kentucky,  the  Con- 
language  in  the  streets,  because  such  an  stitution  of  which  provides  that  "  no  per- 
offence  is  not  declared  criminal  by  any  son  shall,  for  any  indictable  offence,  be 
statute  of  the  State.  Slattery,  In  re,  3  proceeded  against  criminally  by  informa- 
Ark.  484.  tion,"  and  that  "all  prosecutions  shall  be 
1  People*;.  Slaughter,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  carried  on  in  the  name  and  by  the  au- 
334  (1842),  note  ;  and  see  Welch  v.  People,  thority  of  the  commonwealth,"  the  legis- 
Ib.  332  (1846).  Under  the  present  Con-  lature  may  authorize  a  city  corporation 
stitution  of  California  an  ordinance  prohi-  to  proceed  in  its  name  against  offendera 
biting  persons  from  visiting,  for  purposes  of  for  violating  its  ordinances,  and  punish 
prostitution,  houses  of  ill-fame,  was  sus-  them  by  fine,  although  the  ofFena  .  as  in 
tained,  the  same  "not  being  in  conflict  the  case  before  the  court  (an  assault  and 
with  the  general  laws  "  of  the  State.  Re  battery),  is  indictable  under  the  laws  of 
Johnson,  73  Cal.  228  (1887).  So  as  to  the  State.  The  court  regarded  the  pro- 
ordinance  to  suppress  tippling-houses.  Re  ceeding  in  the  name  of  the  corporation  as 
Campbell,  74  Cal.  20  (1887).  So  as  to  of  &quasi  civil  or  penal  nature  and  not  as 
ordinance  making  it  unlawful  to  visit  a  criminal.  Williamson  v.  Commonwealth, 
place  for  the  practice  of  gambling.  Lane,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146  (1843)  ;  ante,  sees. 
Ex  parte,    76    Cal.    587.     But   otherwise  88,  411,  429  ;  supra,  sec.  432,  note. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  438 

rior  tribunals  shall  have  jurisdiction  of  causes  where  the  penalty 

is  fine  and  imprisonment  (except  in  cases  of  contempl  ,  the  accused 

have  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,"  and  under  this   it  was  held 

mayor's  court  could  not  constitutionally  be  Invested  with 

er  to  try  summarily,  and  without  a  jury,  a  person  for  assault 

in    violation    of    the   ordinances   of  the   corporation, 

the  mayor  was  authorized  to  impose  a  iine.1 

§438  (366).  Same  subject.  —  In  Zylstra  v.  The  Corporation  of 
rleston,  it  appeared  that  the  organic  act  of  the  city  gave  to  the 
common  council  power  to  affix  and  levy  fines  for  all  offences  against 
their  by-laws,  and  there  was  no  limitation  of  the  amount  of  the  fines. 
In  this  respect  the  charter  was  silent.  The  "Court  of  Wardens" 
(the  corporation  tribunal)  had  the  power  expressly  given  to  it  to 
commit  for  tines  and  penalties.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
corporation  of  Charleston  passed  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
of  the  tradi  of  candle  and  socqy  making  within  the  limits 
of  the  city,  under  a  penalty  of  £100.  Zylstra  was  prosecuted  in 
the  ('unit  of  Wardens — composed  of  members  of  the  city  coun- 
cil—  for  a  violation  of  this  by-law,  and  fined  by  this  court  £loO. 
On  his  motion  to  obtain  a  prohibition  it  was  held,  under  the 
istitution  of  that  State,  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  of 
Wardens  were  void,  nut  being  according  to  the  lex  terrce  recog- 
nized by  Magna  Charta,&nd  expressly  adopted  by  the  State  Con- 
stitution. And  the  judges  who  expressed  themselves  on  that 
point  were  of  opinion,  under  the  State  Constitution,  that  that  tri- 
bunal could  not  be  invested  with  a  jurisdiction  greater  than  that 
i rise.!  by  justices  of  the  peace,  unless  there  was  provision  for 
Becuring  a  trial  by  jury,  which  in  the  instance  before  the  court 
had  not  been  made.2 

1  Barns  v.  La   Grange,    17  Texas,  415     and  void."     Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3 
(1856);  B.   r.  Smith  p.  San   Antonio,  lb.     Pa.   (Pen.  &  W.)  253  (1831). 

A  statute  providing  for  summary  con- 

2  Zyl  •  C  ton,  1    Bay  (S.  C),     viction    for  a    new  offence  before  inferior 

794).  jurisdictions,    without    a    .jury,    does    not 

In  holding  that  the  charter  of  the  city     violate  the  provision  of  the  Constitution 

of     I  did     not    Confer    upon    t  In-      thai   "trial    by  jury  shall  lie  as  hiniofore, 

councils   the   righl  to  veal  in  the  mayor  and  the  righl   thereof  remain  inviolate." 

and  aldermen  juri  diction  to  convict  sum-  Van  Swartow   v.  Commonwealth,  24  Pa. 

marily,  and  imprison  in  default  of  payment  St.    LSI    (1854).     Ante,  sec.    432,   note; 

of  the   penalty  affixed    to  an   ordinance,  Rhines  v.  Clark,  51  Pa.  St.  96.    See,  also, 

0        ,  C.   J.,  remarked  :    "Now,  if  the  Boring  v.    Williams,  17  Ala.  510;  Times 

•  i   even  purported  to  confer  a  power  v.  'the  State,  2'i  Ala.  165;  Powers,  In  re, 

to  imprison  on  summary  conviction  (for  a  25  Vt.  261  ;   Murphy  v.   People,  2  Cow. 

emeanor)   and    without    appeal    to   a  (X.  Y.)  815;    Shirley  v.   Lunenburg,    11 

jury,  it  wo                                   Ltutional  Mass.  37'J. 


§439 


MUNICIPAL   COURTS  !     JURY   TRIAL. 


i07 


§  439  (367).  Where  the  Right  of  a  Jury  Trial  is  given  by 
Appeal.  —  It  has,  however,  been  decided  in  the  courts  of  seA 
of  the  States  that  although  the  charge  or  matter  in  the  municipal 
or  local  courts  be  one  in  respect  of  which  the  party  is  by  the  Con- 
stitution entitled  to  a  trial  by  jury,  yet  if  by  an  appeal,  < ■! 
with  no  unreasonable  restrictions,  he  can  have  such  atrial  as  a  matter 
of  right  in  the  appellate  court,  this  is  sufficient,  and  his  constitu- 
tional right  to  a  jury  trial  is  not  invaded  by  the  summary  proceed- 
ing in  the  first  instance.1  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
has,  however,  very  recently  emphatically  disapproved  of  this  doc- 
trine, in  a  case  where  the  charge  against  the  defendant  was  criminal 
in  its  nature,  affecting  the  public  at  large,  and  was  not  one  of 
the  class  of  petty  offences  which,  at  the  common  law,  may  be 
proceeded  against  summarily,  without  a  jury.2  The  question  came 
before  the  court  upon  an  application  for  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
in  favor  of  one  who  had  been  convicted  in  the  Police  Court  of 
the  District  of  Columbia,  of  the  offence  of  conspiracy,  without  a 
jury   which  he  had  duly  demanded.3      The   distinction  is  sharply 


As  to  the  right,  under  particular  con- 
stitutional and  statutory  provisions,  to  a 
jury  trial,  for  violations  of  municipal  by- 
laws. Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12  Ohio  St. 
121  ;  Work  v.  State,  2  Ohio  St.  296  ;  Gray 
v.  State,  2  Hairing.  (Del.)  76  (1836); 
Low  v.  Commissioners  of  Pilotage,  R.  M. 
Charlt.  (Ga.)  302;  Green  v.  Savannah,  lb. 
368,  371;  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  Ga.  509. 
Approved,  Floyd  v.  Eatonton  Comm'rs, 
14  Ga.  354  (1853)  ;  State  v.  Guttierrez,  15 
La.  Au.  190  ;  Trigally  v.  Memphis,  6 
Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382  (1869);  Andarson  v. 
O'Donnell,  7  Southeast.  Rep.  524.  Ante, 
sees.  427,  432. 

Jurisdiction  of  mayor  s,  recorder's,  and 
police  courts  under  statutes  or  special  char- 
ters. Commonwealth  v.  Pindar,  11  Met. 
(Mass.)  539  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Roark, 
8  Cush.  (Mass.)  210  ;  Same  v.  Emery,  11 
Cush.  (Mass.)  406;  Elder  v.  Dwight 
Manufacturing  Co.,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  201  ; 
State  t>.  Ricker,  32  N.  H.  179  ;  Myers  v. 
People,  26  111.  173  ;  Rice  v.  State,  3  Kan. 
141  ;  State  v.  Young,  3  Kan.  445  ;  Malone 
v.  Murphy,  2  Kan.  250  ;  Gray  v.  State,  2 
Hairing.  (Del.)  76  ;  Hatchings  v.  Scott,  4 
Halst.  (N.  J.)  218  ;  Cincinnati  v.  Gwvnne, 
10  Ohio,  192  ;  14  Ohio,  250,  403  ;  Markle 
v.  Akron,  14  Ohio,  586  ;  Weeks  v.  For- 
man,  1  Harris.  (N.  J.)  237  ;  Truchelut  v. 


City  Council,  1  Nott  &  McC.  227  ;  Thorn- 
ton v.  Smith,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  R.  106; 
McMullen  v.  City  Council,  1  Bay  (S.  C), 
46 ;  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  lb.  382  ; 
Willis  v.  Boonville,  28  Mo.  543  ;  Fayette 
v.  Shafroth,  25  Mo.  445  ;  Sill  v.  Corning, 
15  N.  Y.  297 ;  Landers  v.  Staten  Island 
Railroad  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  450  (1873)  ;  Good- 
rich v.  Brown,  30  la.  291  (1870)  ;  Penn- 
sylvania Hall,  In  re,  5  Pa.  St.  204(1847); 
Alexander  v.  Bennett,  60  N.  Y.  204(1875). 
Extent  of  jurisdiction  territory dhj. 
State  v.  Clegg,  27  Conn.  593  ;  Covill  v. 
Phy  (process),  26  111.  432  ;  State  v. 
McArthur,  13  Wis.  383  ;  Hoag  v.  Lamont, 
60  N.  Y.  96  (1875). 

1  Stewart  v.  Mayor,  7  Md.  501  ;  Mor- 
ford  v.  Barnes,  8  Yerger  (Tenn.),  444  ; 
McDonald  v.  Scliell,  6  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  240  ;  Beers  v.  Beers,  4  Conn.  535  ; 
Jones  v.  Robhins,  8  Gray  Mas*.),  329; 
Dorgan  v.  Boston,  12  Allen  (Mass.),  223  ; 
Sedg.  St.  and  Const.  Law,  549  ;  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  410.  Text  cited  and  followed. 
Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622,  631 
(1874);  post,  sec.  813. 

2  Callan  t;.  Wilson,  127  U.  S.  540 
(1888). 

3  ('allan  c.  Wilson,  supra.  Mr.  Justice 
Harlan,  delivering  in  this  case  t)w  opinion 
of  the  court,  said:     "  It  [conspiracy]  is  an 


- 


MUNICIPAL    COIIPOIIATIONS. 


§  440 


drawn  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  cited,  between  offences 
Qtially  criminal,  affecting  the  public  at  large,  and  petty 
offences  which  at  the  common  law  may  be  proceeded  against  in 
a  summary  manner,  which  latter  would  include  violations  of  muni- 
cipal ordinances  concerning  local  affairs  in  respect  of  matters  non- 
iiual  in  their  nature.  This  distinction  would  appear  to  be 
Bound,  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  consonant  with 
the  established  and  traditionary  regard  of  our  jurisprudence  for 
the  rights  of  the  citizen  and  for  the  trial  by  jury  in  criminal  cases. 
To- this  extent  only  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  in 
necessary  conflict  with  the  judgments  of  the  State  courts  referred 
to  in  the  text.1 

ij  440  368).  Revisory  Power  of  the  Superior  Courta ;  Review 
of  Proceedings  by  Superior  Tribunals.  —  With  respect  to  in- 
ferior jurisdictions,  the  right  to  review  their  proceedings  by  the 
superior   tribunals  will   not   be  taken   away  unless   the   intention 


offence  of  a  grave  character,  affecting  the 
public  at  large,  and  we  are  unable  to  hold 
that  barged  with  having  com- 

1  ii  in  this  District  is  not  entitled 
to  a  jury,  when  put  upon  nis  trial.  The 
jurisdiction  of  the  Police  Court,  as  denned 
by  existing  statutes,  does  not  extend  to 
the  trial  of  infamous  crimes  or  offences 
punishable  by  imprisonment  in  the  peni- 
try.  1  Jut  the  argument  made  in  be- 
half nf  the  government,  implies  that  if 
bould  provide  the  Police  Court 
with  a  grand  jury,  and  authorize  that 
court  to  try,  without  a  petit  jury,  all  per- 

indi  ted  -  even  for  crimes  punish- 
able by  confinement  in  the  penitentiary  — 
such  legislation  would  no1  be  an  invasion 
of  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
provided  the  accused,  alter  being  tried 
and  sentenced  in  the  Police  Court,  is 
'i  an  unobstructed  right  of  appeal  to, 
and  trial  by  jury  in,  another  court  to 
which  the  case  may  be  taken.  We  can- 
not  assent  to  that  interpretation  of  the 
C        til  nt  ion.       ESxcepI     in    that   class    or 

i    .s  called    petty   offences, 
which,    according   to    the   common    law, 

l"'    proc led    against     summarily 

in    any    tribun  con  it  ituted    for 

be  guarantee  of  an  impar- 
tial jury   to  the  accused   in   a    criminal 
ution,  conducted  either  in  the  name, 


or  by  or  under  the  authority,  of  the  United 
States,  secures  to  him  the  right  to  enjoy 
that  mode  of  trial  from  the  first  moment, 
and  in  whatever  court  he  is  put  on  trial 
for  the  offence  charged.  In  such  cases  a 
judgment  of  conviction,  not  based  upon  a 
verdict  of  guilty  by  a  jury,  is  void.  To 
accord  to  the  accused  a  right  to  be  tried 
by  a  jury,  in  an  appellate  court,  after  he 
has  been  once  fully  tried  otherwise  than 
by  a  jury,  in  the  court  of  original  jurisdic- 
tion, and  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  or  be 
imprisoned  for  not  paying  it,  does  not 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  I  '(institu- 
tion. When,  therefore,  the  appellant  was 
brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
District,  and  the  fact  was  disclosed  that 
be  had  been  adjudged  guilty  of  the  crime 
of  conspiracy  charged  in  the  information 
in  this  case,  without  ever  having  been 
tried  by  a  jury,  he  should  have  been  re- 
stored to  bis  liberty."  The  Supreme 
Court  of  the  District  had  previously  ex- 
pressed its  doubt  upon  the  question.  In 
re  Fry,  3  Mackey,  (D.  C.  135.  See  also 
In  re  Dana,  7  Benedict,  1. 

1  It  is  certainly  very  difficult  to  define 
in  view  of  the  English  legislation  what 
are  such  petty  offences.  1  Stephen,  Hist. 
<'i.  Law,  chap.  iv.  p.  122,  where  the  his- 
tory and  character  of  such  legislation  are 
given. 


440 


MUNICIPAL    COURTS  :     REVISORY    POWER    OVER. 


509 


of  the  legislature  to  this  effect  is  expressed  with  unequivocal 
clearness.  The  authorities  cited  in  the  note  will  show  the  great 
length  to  which  the  courts  go  in  preserving  the  right  to  review 
the  proceedings  of  subordinate  tribunals,  administered  frequently 
by  men  without  professional  or  judicial  knowledge  or  experience, 
A  declaration  by  the  statute  concerning  an  inferior  tribunal, 
that  its  proceedings  "  shall  be  final  and  conclusive"  or  "  without 
appeal"  &c,  will  not  deprive  a  party  of  the  right  of  review  by 
certiorari,   error,    or    the    proper    proceeding.1      13ut    where    it    is 


1  Rex  v.  Commissioners,  2  Keeble,  43 ; 
Rex  v.  Moreley,  2  Burr.  1040  ;  Lawton  v. 
Commissioners,  2  Caines  (N.  Y. ),  179, 
181  ;  Starr  v.  Trustees,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
564  ;  People  v.  Mayor,  2  Hill  (N".  Y.),  9; 
Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn.  166  ;  Heath, 
In  re,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  42,  52,  and  cases 
cited  and  reviewed  by  Cowen,  J.;  Camden 
v.  Bloch,  65  Ala.  236. 

A  kindred  subject  is  treated  in  the 
chapter  on  Municipal  Officers:  "  Special 
Tribunal  to  determine  Election  Contests 
for  Municipal  Offices,"  ante,  sec.  200, 
and  it  is  there  shown  that  the  ordinary 
constitutional  provision  that  the  judicial 
power  shall  be  vested  in  certain  courts 
does  not  disable  the  legislature  from  pro 
viding  that  the  council  of  municipal  cor 
porations  may  finally  determine  the  valid 
ity  of  the  election  of  corporation  officers 
New  Orleans  v.  Morgan,  7  Martin  (La.) 
N.  s.  1,-9  Martin,  repr.  381  ;  State  v, 
Fitzgerald,  44  Mo.  425  (1869)  ;  Ewing  v, 
Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  384  ;  State  v.  Johnson 
17  Ark.  407.  But  the  supervisory  juris^ 
diction  of  the  superior  courts  will  not  be 
held  to  be  taken  away  by  mere  negative 
words.  Grier  v.  Shackleford,  Const.  Rep. 
642  ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  supra ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  MeCloskey,  2  Rawle  (Pa.), 
369  ;  Strahl,  In  re,  16  Iowa,  369  ;  State 
v.  Funck,  17  Iowa,  365  ;  Bateman  v. 
Megowan,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  533  ;  Wammack 
v.  Hollovvay,  2  Ala.  31  ;  Hummer  v. 
Hummer,  3  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  42;  State 
v.  Marlow,  15  Ohio  St.  114;  Attorney- 
General  v.  Corporation  of  Poole,  4  Mylne 
&  Cr.  17  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Aspinall, 
2  Mylne  &  Cr.  613;  Parr  v.  Attorney- 
General,  8  CI.  &  F.  409  ;  Taylor  v.  Ameri- 
cus,  39  Ga.  59  ;  State  v.  Kempf,  69  Wis. 
470  ;  post,  chaps,  xx.  xxi. ,  xxii.;  post,  sec. 
926. 


The  Supreme   Court  of  Michigan,    in 

reviewing,  on  certiorari,  the  legality  of  a 
conviction  of  a  defendant  in  the  recorder's 
court  on  a  complaint  for  violating  a  muni- 
cipal ordinance,  speaking  of  the  extent  of 
the  revisory  power  of  tlie  superior  tribu- 
nals,  and  the  nature  and  purposes  of  the 
municipal  tribunals,  says:  "The  power 
of  reviewing  upon  certiorari  judicial  pro- 
ceedings of  inferior  tribunals  and  bodies 
not  according  to  the  course  of  the  common 
law  has  been  long  exercised  in  England, 
as  well  as  in  this  country.  The  power  has 
been  jealously  maintained,  and  has  been 
deemed  necessary  to  prevent  oppression. 
There  are  certain  classes  of  questions 
which,  by  common  understanding,  from 
time  immemorial  belong  to  the  course  of 
the  judicial  inquiry  under  the  laws  of  the 
land.  The  common  law  and  the  various 
charters  and  bills  of  rights  recognized  and 
assured  the  right  to  such  an  inquiry  ;  and 
the  Constitution,  in  apportioning  the  judi- 
cial power,  as  well  as  in  affirming  the  im- 
munity of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  lias 
always  been  understood  to  guarantee  to 
each  citizen  the  right  to  have  his  title  to 
property,  and  other  legal  privileges,  de- 
termined by  the  general  tribunals  of  the 
State.  These  municipal  courts,  so  far  as 
they  act  under  city  by-laws,  are  not  de- 
signed to  decide  between  man  and  man, 
or  to  administer  general  laws.  Tiny  are 
ordained  to  prevent  disorder  in  matters  ot 
local  convenience,  and  to  regulate  the  use 
of  public  and  quasi  public  easements,  so 
as  to  prevent  confusion.  If  in  exercising 
this  power  they  can  incidentally  decide 
upon  the  rights  of  private  property  so  as 
to  determine  its  enjoyment  without  re- 
view, there  would  seem  to  be  a  practical 
annihilation  of  the  eight  to  resort  to  the 
general   tribunals  and  the  common   law." 


510  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  441 

I  ired  with  respecl  to  a  court  of  genera]  and  superior  jurisdiction, 

e  C  >uri  of  New  York,  that  its  action  (for  example 

in   confirming  appraisements  for  opening  streets,  or  under  a  rail- 

;  act)  "  shall  bt  final  and  conclusive  upon  the  parties  interested 
and  upon  all  other  persons,"  the  right  of  appeal,  which  would 
otherwise  exist,  from  the  decision  of  such  court  to  a  still  higher 

mal,  as  to  the  Court  of  Appeals,  is  destroyed.1  A  charter 
provision  to  the  effect  that  appeals  and  writs  of  error  from 
judgments  of  the  mayor,  in  cases  arising  under  the  charter,  should 
only  be  allowed  in  cases  where  the  tine  was  over  five  dollars, 
was  considered  as  evincing  the  legislative  intention  that  in  cases 
where  the  fine  was  under  that  sum  the  judgment  should  be 
final,  and  hence  a  writ  of  prohibition  will  not  lie  to  restrain  its 
collection,  nor  can  it  be  reviewed  on  certiorari.2 

§441  (369).  Same  subject.  —  In  Virginia  it  is  decided  that 
in  a  proceeding  before  the  mayor  or  a  justice  to  impose  a  penalty 
on  a  party  for  obstructing  a  street,  the  mayor  or  justice  cannot, 
if  the  defendant  bona  fide  sets  up  title  to  the  land  claimed  as 
a  street,  inquire  into  the  validity  of  the  claim,  the  court  holding 
that  by  the  principles  of  the  common  law  (which  are  not  changed 
by  the  statutes),  a  bona  fide  assertion  of  title  to  property  or  to 
an  incorporeal  hereditament  or  real  franchise  ousted  the  juris- 
diction of  these  inferior  magistrates  or  tribunals.3 

Per    C                  J.,    Jackson    v.  People,   9  2  Wertheimer    v.    Boonville,     29    Mo. 

Mich.  Ill,  117  (1860).     Further  see  chap.  254(1860). 

xxii.  2  *cq.  8  Warwick  v.  Mayo,  15  Gratt.  (Va.) 
An  appeal  from  inferior  tribunals  does  528  (1860).  To  the  same  effect,  see  Jack- 
not  exisl  unless  plainly  given.  People  v.  son  v.  People,  9  Mich.  Ill  (1860);  Grand 
Police  Justice,  7  Mich.  456  ;  Conboy  v.  Rapids  v.  Hughes,  15  Mich.  54  (1866). 
1  City,  2  Iowa,  90  ;  Muscatine  v.  See  chapter  on  Streets.  "What  record  oj 
Stick.  7  [owa,  505  :  Dubuque  v.  Rebman,  conviction  before  corporation  officers  or 
1  [owa,  III;  McGarty  v.  Deming,  51  courts  should  show.  Keeler  v.  Milledge, 
1  a.  122,  where,  however,  the  charter  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  142;  Muscatine  v. 
denied  the  right  of  an  appeal.  Certiorari,  Steck,  7  Iowa,  505;  Buck  v.  Danzen- 
ou  the  other  hand,  will  lie  unless  plainly  hacker,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  359  ;  St. 
denied,  or  other  specific  remedy  be  given.  Peter  v.  Bauer,  19  Minn.  327  (1872); 
Cunningham  v.  Squires,   'J  West  Va.  122  Goldthwaite  v.  Montgomery,  50  Ala.  486 

611,   and  chap.  xxii.  on  (1874).      See  chap.  xxii.  post. 

Remedies  against  Illegal  Corporate  Acts,  A  town  officer  who  holds  in  custody  a 

person  committed  by  a  verbal  order  of  a 

•  'land  Walker  Streets,  Jn  re,  12  police  magistrate  for  non-payment  of  a  fine 

.  (2  Kirn.)  406  (1855)  ;  New  York,  imposed   for  the  breach  of  a  town  ordi- 

1   li.  Co.    v.  Marvin,   11  N.  Y    (1  nance,   acts  not   only    without   authority 

but  in  violation  of  law.     Odell  Trustees 
v.  Schroeder,  58  111.  353  (1871). 


§  442  SUBJECT   OUTLINED.  511 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

CONTRACTS. 

§  442  (370).  Subject  outlined.  —  The  mode  of  enforcing  the  con- 
tracts of  municipal  corporations  will  be  considered  hereafter.1  In 
this  chapter  we  shall  treat,  in  the  order  below  indicated,  of  the 
power  of  such  corporations  to  make  contracts  of  different  kinds,  the 
mode  of  exercising  the  power,  and  the  effect  of  transcending  it. 

1.  Extent  of  Power  to  contract,  and  how  conferred  —  sees.  443- 
448. 

2.  Mode  of  exercising  the  Power  —  sec.  449. 

3.  Seal  not  necessary  unless  required  —  May  be  concluded  by 
Vote  or  Ordinance  —  sees.  450,  451. 

4.  When  Corporation  bound  by  Contracts  made  by  Agents  — 
Mode  of  Execution  —  sees.  452-456. 

5.  Contracts   beyond   Corporate  Powers  void  —  Ultra    Vires  a 
Defence  —  sees.  457,  458. 

6.  Implied  Contracts  —  When  Deducible  —  sees.  459,  460. 

7.  Ratification  of  Unauthorized  Contract  —  sees.  463-465. 

8.  Provision  requiring  Letting  to  Lowest  Bidder  —  sees.  466- 
470. 

9.  Contract  of  Suretyship  —  sec.  471. 

10.  Rights  and  Liabilities  as  respects  Authorized  Contracts  — 
Illustrations  —  Cases  mentioned  —  Power  to  settle  Disputed  Claims 
—  To  give  Extra  Compensation  —  To  employ  Attorneys  —  sees. 
472-479. 

11.  Contracts  for  Public  Works  —  Rights  of  Contractors  —  sees. 
480-483. 

12.  Same  —  Corporate  Control  under  Stipulation  to  that  effect  — 
sees.  480-483. 

13.  Evidences  of  Indebtedness  —  Negotiable  Bonds  —  sees.  484, 
485. 

14.  Ordinary  Warrants  or  Orders  —  Their  Legal  Nature  —  sees. 
487,  488. 

15.  Liability  of  Indorsers  thereof —  sec.  489. 

1  See  post,  chaps,  xx.,  xxii.,  xxiii.  contracts  made  hy  municipal  corporations. 
Legislative  power  over  and  in  respect  of    See  chaps,  iv.,  vii.,  and  nil,  ante. 


512  MUNICIPAL   COBPORATIONS.  §  443 

16.  I  '    and   Cancellation   of  Orders  and  Warrants,  —  sec. 

17.  l:    hts  and  Remedies  of  Holders  thereof — sees.  501,  502. 

—  Ultra  Vires  —  Fraud  —  Want  of  Consid- 
- 
L9.    Orders  payable  out  of  a  Particular  Fund  —  sec.  505. 

20.  I  »t  on  Corporate  Indebtedness  —  sec.  506. 

21.  Railroad  Aid  Bonds  —  Course  of  Decision  in  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court  —  sees.  51 1- 

22.  Leading  Cases   in   National  Supreme  Court  on  the  Subject 
noticed  —  2 1  -53  i. 

23.  Decisions  in  State  Courts  referred  to  —  Conclusions  stated  — 
sees.  550-55  1. 

§    1  !•"•        71  ).    Extent  of  Power  to  make  Contracts;  and  how  con- 
ferred.—  In  determining  the  extent  of  th  power  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration  to  make  contracts,  and  in  ascertaining  the  mode  in  which  the 
power  is  to  be  exercised,  the  importance  of  a  careful  study  of  the  char- 
ter or  incorporating  act,  and  of  the  general  legislation  of  the  State 
on  the  subject,  if  there  be  any,  cannot  be  too  strongly  urged.     Where 
there  are  express   provisions  on  the  subject,  these  will,  of  course, 
measure,  as  far  as  they  extend,  the  authority  of  the  corporation.     The 
power  to  make  contracts,  and  to  sue  and  be  sued  thereon,  is  usually 
conferred,  in  general  terms,  in  the  incorporating  act.     But  where  the 
conferred  in  this  manner  it  is  nol  to  be  construed  as  author- 
izing the  making  of  contracts  of  all  descriptions,  but  only  such  as 
ore  necessary  and  usual,  lit  and  proper,  to  enable  the  corporation  to 
8ecur>-  or  to  cany  into  effect  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  created  ; 
and  the  extent  of  the  power  will  depend  upon  the  other  provisions 
er  prescribing  the  matters  in  respect  of  which  the  corpo- 
ration is  authorized  to  act.     To  the  extent  necessary  to  execute  the 
ial  powers  and  functions  with  which  it  is  endowed  by  its  charter, 
then-  is,  indeed,  an  implied  or  incidental  authority  to  contract  obli- 
ons,  and  to  sue  and  be  sued  in  the  corporate  name.1 

1  1   Kyd,   69,  70;  2  Kenl  Com.    221;  v.  Worcester,  9  Exch.  457  (1854).   Indian- 

110,  271  ;  Galena  v.  apolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  896, 

18    1,1.  428  (1868);    Straus  v.  approving  text;  Montgomery  County  v. 

Ohio   Si.    69  (1855);  Barber,    45   Ala.    237    (1871);   Smith  v. 

Mien    51;  Doi    la  Stephan,  66  Md.  881;  Galveston  v.  Loonie, 

>•     '•  N     .    l  17    (1869)  ;  54  Tex.  517. 

.  Detroit,  12  Mich.  279;  Bank  er  general   authority  to  make  all 

7   Cranch,    299  contracts  necessary   for   its  welfare,  a  city 

hi  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La,  may  contrad   For  water-works.     Cabot  v. 

B  d  v.  Aahton-nn-  Rome,  28  Ga.  50;  see  Wells  o.  Atlanta, 

L858)  ;  Nowell  4U  Ga.  07.    A  contract  granting  the  cxclu- 


444 


CONTRACTS  :     EFFECT   OF   FIDUCIARY    RELATIONS. 


513 


§  444.     Contracts  •with  Municipal  Officers  ;    Fiduciary  Relations.  — 

It  is  a  well  established  and  salutary  doctrine  that  he   who  is  en- 


sive  right  to  furnish  water  to  a  city,  made 
under  a  power  "to  provide  a  supply  of 
water,"  sustained,  and  the  city  was  en- 
joined from  granting  the  right  to  lay  pipes 
to  another  company,  on  the  ground  that 
its  power  was  exhausted.  Atlantic  City 
Water- Works  v.  Atlantic  City,  39  N.  J. 
Eq.  (12  Stew.)  367.  See  Index,  titles, 
Monopolies ;  Water  and  Water-  Works. 
Duty  and  power  of  municipality  as  owner 
of  water-works.  McKnighti?.  New  Orleans, 
24  La.  An.  412  (1872);  Grants  Daven- 
port, 36  Iowa,  396  (1873);  Hale  v.  Hough- 
ton, 8  Mich.  458.  May  contract  for 
lighting  streets,  &c,  Indianapolis  v.  Indi- 
anapolis Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396.  For  gra- 
ding streets.  Sturtevant  v.  Alton,  3  Mc- 
Lean, 393.  To  build  sidewalks.  Wyan- 
dotte v.  Zeitz,  21  Kan.  649  ;  Lawrence  v. 
Killam,  11  Kan.  512,  approving  text. 
For  "  breakivater  "  to  protect  streets  of  a 
city  on  the  lake.  Miller  v.  Milwaukee,  14 
Wis.  642  ;  approved,  arguendo,  by  Cole, 
J.,  in  Clason  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  316, 
321  (1872).  Supra,  sec.  261,  note.  Le- 
gislative power  over  municipal  contracts. 
Ante,  chap.  iv. ;  Grant  v.  Davenport,  36 
Iowa,  396  (1873).     Post,  sec.  544. 

The  city  of  Richmond  possessed,  un- 
der its  charter,  all  the  powers  of  munici- 
pal corporations,  including  the  power  "to 
contract  and  be  contracted  with,"  and 
its  council  was  specially  empowered  "to 
pass  all  by-laws  which  they  shall  deem 
necessary  for  the  peace,  comfort,  conven- 
ience, good  order,  good  morals,  health, 
or  safety  of  the  city,  or  of  the  people  or 
property  therein."  In  April,  1865,  in 
anticipation  of  the  evacuation  of  the  city 
by  the  confederate  army  and  the  entry  of 
the  national  forces,  the  city  council  ordered 
the  destruction  of  all  the  liquor  in  the  city, 
and  pledged  the  faith  of  the  city  for  the 
payment  of  its  value.  It  was  decided  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals  that  under  the  pro- 
vision of  the  charter  above  mentioned  the 
council  had  authority  to  make  the  order 
and  pledge,  and  hence  the  city  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  value  of  liquor  destroyed 
under  the  order  of  the  council.  Jones  v. 
Richmond,  18  Gratt.  (Va.)  517  (1S6S). 
The  same  question  upon  the  same  resolu- 
vol.  i.  —  33 


tions  of  the  city  council  was  presented  to 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  Rich- 
mond v.  Smith,  15  Wall.  429  (1872);  and 
it  followed,  without  examination  into  its 
correctness,  the  exposition  of  the  ■ 
given  by  the  State  court  in  Jones  v.  Rich- 
mond, supra.  Upon  the  general  principles 
of  construction,  the  author  doubts  whel  her 
the  order  for  the  destruction  of  the  liquors 
was  within  the  scope  of  the  corporate  pow- 
ers of  the  city.  Ante,  sees.  89,  90,  91, 
and  notes.  Contract  made  by  a  city,  un- 
der government  therein  set  up  by  the 
United  States  military  authority,  held 
valid.  Prather  v.  New  Orleans,  24  La. 
An.  41.  Special  prohibition  in  a  city 
charter  construed  to  extend  to  all  con- 
tracts of  sale  to  the  city.  Gregory  r. 
Jersey  City,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  390. 
Where  an  executory  contract  with  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  is  not  in  its  nature 
necessarily  personal,  as,  for  example,  a 
contract  for  cleaning  streets,  it  may.  cer- 
tainly with  the  assent,  express  or  implied, 
of  the  city,  be  assigned,  if  there  be  no  re- 
striction on  the  right,  and  the  city  retains 
the  personal  obligation  of  the  original  con- 
tractor and  of  his  sureties.  Devlin  v.  New 
York,  63  N.  Y.  8  (1875). 

No  corporation  can  make  a  valid  con- 
tract not  to  exercise  part  of  the  franchise 
committed  to  it  by  the  State  for  public 
purposes.  St.  Louis  v.  St.  Louis  Gaslight 
Co.,  5  Mo.  App.  484,  529.  See  opinion 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  on  Ap- 
peal, in  the  case  last  cited  ;  and  see 
sees.  96,  97,  357,  and  post,  sees.  716,  780; 
see  also  Index,  title  Delegation  of  Public 
Poxoers. 

In  The  Maggie  P.,  25  Fed.  Pep.  202,  it 
appeared  that  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  which, 
by  its  charter,  had  general  control 
harbor  and  improvements  thi  rein,  includ- 
ing power  "to  keep  the  wharf  and  the 
river  along  the  shore  free  from  wrecks  and 
other  improper  obstructions,"  entered  into 
a  contract  with  the  owner  of  a  stei 
which  had  sunk,  to  use  the  city's  harbor 
boat  in  pumping  out  the  wreck,  for  a  con- 
sideration ;  and  the  question  was  presented 
whether  the  city  could  be  held  liable  for 
damages  caused  by  its  failure  to  carry  out 


,1 1 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  444 


,1   wjth    the    business  of  others  cannot   be   allowed  to   make 
:.   object   of  pecuniary  profit  to  himself.     This  rule 
end  on  reasoning  technical  in  its  character,  and  is  not 
|  in  its  application,     li   is  based  upon  principles  of  reason,  of 
lity,  and  of  public  policy.     It   has  its  foundation  in  the  very 
a  of  our  nature,  for  it  has  authoritatively  heen  declared 
i  man  cannol  3erve  two  masters,  and  is  recognized  and  enforced 
wherever  a  well-regulated  system  of  jurisprudence  prevails.1     The 
]aw  wjj]  in  .,,  permit  persons  who  have  undertaken  a  character 

or  a  charge  to  change  or  invert  that  character  by  leaving  it  and  act- 
ing for  themselves  in  a  business  in  which  their  character  binds 
a  to  act  for  others.  The  application  of  the  rule  may  in  some 
instances  appear  to  bear  hard  upon  individuals  who  have  committed 
oo  mural  wrong;  but  it  is  essential  to  the  keeping  of  all  parties 
filling  a  fiduciary  character  to  their  duty,  to  preserve  the  rule  in  its 
v,  and  to  apply  it  to  every  case  which  justly  falls  within  its 
principle.2      The    principle    generally  applicable  to  all  oilicers  and 


the  contract.     /' -■  io  r,  J.,  said  :  "  I  Bup- 
.   .mii  make  no  contract  for  the 
•1  i  purely  public  duty,  —such  a 
contract  as  in  case  of  performance  it  can 
enforce  compensation  for,  or  for  non-per- 
formance elf   to  liability.      It 
cannot  use  public  funds  in  any  such  direc- 
tion. ...  At  the  same  time,  when  it  has 
in   its    possession    instrumentalities,   and 
Rmployees  for   the  purpose  of  dis- 
chai                   public  duty,  I  see  no  rea- 
,|,\.  when  ncies  of  public 
(Until                 require  the  use  of  those  in- 
and  employees,  it  may  not 
make  a  valid  contract  to  use  them  in  some 
private   service.    .    .    .     And.     gen 

king,  when  public  duty  docs  no!  in- 
service,  a  city  may 
make  a  valid  contract  for  the  use  of  it 
Btmi  in    the    latter.    .    .    .   The 

mony  Bhows  that  the  tgh  its 

officers,  lias  been  in  the  habit  of  making 
hi  1  receiving  compensation 
.  and   haviti  busi- 

baving  received 

•  lie  in  its 
•    tl   there  was  m 
ized  by  ordinance  to  make  this 

B  I  Grant  (Canada), 

fully  considered. 

In     ..in.-  of  the  £  nave  been 


enacted  declaring  void  all  contracts  made 
by  municipal  corporations  with  their  offi- 
cers. In  Indiana  such  a  statute  was 
strictly  enforced.  Case  v.  Johnson,  i)l 
Ind.  477  ;  approved  Benton  v.  Hamilton, 
110  Ind.  294. 

2  Port  v.  Russell,  36  Ind.  60  ;  s.  c.  10 
Am.  Rep.  5  ;  Board  of  Comm'rs  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 1 1  Ind.  509  ;s.  C.  15  Am.  Rep.  245  ; 
Macon  v.  Huff,  60  Ga.  221  ;  York  Braid- 
ings Co.  v.  Mackenzie,  8  Brown,  P.  C. 
42  ;  Liquidators,  &C.  v.  Coleman,  L.  R. 
6  K.  &  I.  App.  0.  139;  Aberdeen  R.  Co. 
v.  Blaikie,  1  Macq.  App.  Cases,  461.  See 
full  review  of  authorities  in  Gardner  r.  Og- 
den,  22  N.  V.  332  ;  Butts  v.  Wood,  37 
N.  Y.  317,  and  cases  cited;  McGregor  v. 
Logansport,  7'.'  End.  166;  Fort  Wayne  v. 
Rosenthal,  75  Ind.  156;  Emigranl  Co.  v. 
Wright  Co.,  97  U.  S.  339  (1877).  In  this 
case  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  by  Mr.  Justice  Miller,  in  declaring 
a  contract  void,  say  :  "  It  appears  thai  foi 
some  time  before  this  contracl  was  made 
the  county  had  heen  urging  her  claim  to 
mp  lands  before  the  department  at 
ton,  through  Mr.  S.  who  acted 
aa  hi  i  agent.  A  shorl  time  before  this 
contract  was  made  Mr.  S.  informed  the 
authorities  of  the  county  that  their  claim 
had  heen  rejected,  and  that  this  rejection 
was  accompanied  by  the  announcement  of 


§  444  CONTRACTS  :     EFFECT   OF    FIDUCIARY   RELATIONS.  515 

directors  of  a  corporation  is  that  they  cannot  enter  into  contracts 
with  such  corporation  to  do  any  work  for  it,  nor  can  they  subse- 
quently derive  any  benefit  personally  from  such  contract.1  To  deny 
the  application  of  the  rule  to  municipal  bodies  would,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Canadian  chancery  court,  whose  views  we  adopt  and  approve, 
be  to  deprive  the  rule  of  much  of  its  value;  for  the  well  working  of 
the  municipal  system,  through  which  a  large  portion  of  the  affairs 
of  the  country  are  administered,  must  depend  very  much  upon  the 
freedom  from  abuse  with  which  they  are  conducted.  Nothing  can 
more  tend  to  correct  the  tendency  to  abuse  than  to  make  abuses  un- 
profitable to  those  who  engage  in  them,  and  to  have  them  stamped 
as  abuses  in  courts  of  justice.  The  tendency  to  abuse  may  indeed 
be  in  part  corrected  by  public  opinion ;  but  public  opinion  itself  is 
acted  upon  by  the  mode  in  which  courts  deal  with  such  abuses  as 
are  brought  within  their  cognizance.  Accordingly,  where  in  the 
case  just  referred  to,  the  mayor  of  a  city  secretly  contracted  to  purchase 
at  a  discount,  a  large  amount  of  the  debentures  of  the  city,  which  were 
expected  to  be  issued  under  a  future  by-law  of  the  city  council,  and 
was  himself  afterwards  an  active  party  in  procuring  and  giving  effect 
to  the  by-law  which  was  subsequently  passed,  the  court  of  chancery 
held  him  to  be  a  trustee  for  the  city  of  the  profit  he  derived  from 

a  rule  which    left   but  little  to  hope  for  to  the  supervisors.     We  are  not  convinced 

on  the  part  of  the  county.     Very  shortly  that  any  false  representations  were  made 

after  this  Mr.  C,  as  the  agent  of  the  end-  by  the  agents  or  officers  of  the  emigrant 

grant  company,   made   his   appearance  in  company.     But  the  impression  made  upon 

Wright  County  and  procured  the  contract  us  by  the  whole   testimony   is    that   the 

we  have  mentioned.      As  soon  as  this  was  officers  and  citizens  of  the  county  were  in 

done,  Mr.  S.,  as  the  agent  of  the  emigrant  gross  ignorance  of  the  nature  and  value  of 

company,  by  the  assistance,  as  he  says,  of  what  tbey  were  selling  ;  that  the  emigrant 

able  lawyers,   and  in  the   cases   of  other  company,  on  the  other  hand,   were   well 

counties   with    whom    the   company   had  informed  in  regard  to  both,  and  withheld 

similar  contracts,  inaugurated  proceedings  this  information  unfairly  from  the  officers 

to   procure    the   reversal  of  the  rule  an-  of  the  county.      That  the  sudden  change  of 

nounced  by  the  department.     Succeeding  the  relationship  of  Mr.  8.  from  an  unsuc- 

in  this  he  presented  the  renewed  claim  of  cessfid  agent  of  the  count;/  to  a  successful 

Wright  County,  and  secured  the  allowance  agent  of  the  company  requires  an  explana- 

of  several  hundred  acres  still  unsold  in  the  tion  which  has  not  been  satisfactorily  given. 

county,  and  money  and  scrip  for  six  thou-  That  the   fort  that  all  parties  knew  they 

sand  acres  to  be  located  elsewhere  in  lieu  were  dealing  with  a  twist  fund  devoted  by 

of  swamp  lands  sold  by  the  government,  the  donor  to  a  specific  purpose  demanded 

It  is  not  a  violent  presumption,  under  all  the  utmost  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the 

the  circumstances  of  this  case,  that  when,  purchaser.     That  so  far  from  this  there  is 

just  after  Mr.  S.  had  made  the  impression  a  provision  for  a  diversion  of  the  fund  to 

on  the  supervisors  of  Wright  County  that  other  purposes,  a  gross  inadequacy  of  con- 

their  case  was  hopeless,  Mr.   C.  appeared  sideration,  and  a  successful  speculation  at 

in  Wright  County,  he  had  sumo  informa-  the  expense  of  the  rights  of  the  public." 

tion  of  a  different  character  on  which  ho  1  Cases,  supra,  note  2. 
acted,  and  which  was  not  communicated 


.10 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§444 


[      ■■  ■       tion.1     So,  where  a  member  of  a  municipal  corporation 
ed  witii  anothei  party  to  take  a  contract  from  the  corporation 
for  the  execution  of  certain  works  in  his  name,  the  profits  whereof 
to  be  divided  between  the  parties,  it  was  held  that  such  a  eon- 
was  m  contravention  of  law,  and  the  court  of  chancery  refused 
to  enforce  the  agreement  for  a  partnership.2     An  action  at  law  on  a 
contract  for  the  sale  of  goods  by  a  trading  partnership,  of  which  a 
member  is  also  a  member  of  the  municipal  council,  may,  where  the 
contracl  is  cot  executed,  be  resisted  on  the  ground  that  one  of  the 
plaintiffs  is  a  member  of  the  municipal  council.8     A  distinction  to 
be  borne  in  mind    is  this:  if  the  contract  is  void  as  against  public 
policy  or  is  ultra  vires  in  the  true  and  strict  sense  of  that  expres- 
sion, there  can  be  uo  recovery  based  on  the  executory  provisions  of 
the  contract  ;  but  if  it  has  been  executed  in  whole  or  in  part,  there 
may  be  an  estoppel   or  other  ground   of  recovery  based  upon  what 
been  done.     It  is  obvious,  however,  that  when  such  is  the  case  the 
right  of  recovery  is  not  upon  the  contract,  but  upon  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances independent  of  the  notion  that  the  contract  is  valid.4 


1  Toronto  v.  Bowes,  1  Grant  (Canada), 

Bins  v.  Swindle,  fi  Grant  (Canada), 

nmmings  o  Saux,  30  La.  An.  2u7; 
Doll  i    -  5  Ohio  St.  445. 

■  iwn  v.  Lindsay,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
509.  A  contract  made  by  a  mayor,  while, 
in  offii < .  •'.  to  lease  a 

'.-  for  five  years,  and  for  an  annual 

Sinn  paid  him  to  keep  the  park  in  repair, 

-   //.  I  /,  •  i  be  against  public  policy  and 

void.     Macon  v.  Huff,  60  Ga.  221.     Bui 

'   bad   been  ratified  by 

eqnent    mayor    and    council,    ami 

anas  expended   by  the   conl 
in  fencing,  draining,  and  ornamenting  the 
park,   a  court    of  chancery  will    m 
aside  the  contract  without  compelling  the 

do  equity.     lb.     Tl 
Commission  of   App  ils  regarded  an  act 
of  the  legislature  making  it  unlawful  for 
a  member  <'f  the  common  council  to  be- 

i    contractor    ander   any    contract 
authorized  by  the  council,  and  <l 
such  o  id  at  the  instance 

of  the  ratory  of  the  com- 

mon  law,   which  da  of   public 

from  contract- 
A< .  ordingly  where  the 
plaintiff,  a  member  of  the  council,  voted 
r»r  .i  lL.iuluticju  tu  appropria 


celebrate  the  Fourth  of  July,  under  which 
resolution  a  committee  of  the  memln'rs 
employed  the  plaintiff  to  furnish  horses 
and  carriages  for  the  celebration,  it  was 
held  (assuming  the  appropriation  of 
money  for  this  purpose  to  be  valid  under 
the  charterj  thai  the  plaintiff's  employ- 
ment was  against  public  policy  and  void, 
and  that  he  could  not  recover  against  the 
city  for  the  fair  value  of  the  use  of  the 
horses  and  carriages  furnished  by  him. 
Smith  v.  Albany,  til  X.  Y.  411  (1875*).  But 
a   coi  '  ered    into  with   an    officer 

of  the  corporation,  whereby  such  officer 
agreed  to  keep  the  streets  in  repair,  was 
held  valid.  Albrights  Chester  T.  C,  9 
Rich.  (S.  C.)  Law,  399.  See,  also,  Central 
E.  &  B.  Co,  v.  Claghorn,  Speers  Eq.  545, 
562  ;  ante,  sec.  283,  note  ;  see.  292  ;  Law- 
rence v.  Killam.  11  Kan.  499  (1873). 

4  Thomas  v.  West  Jersey  K.  R.  Co.  101 
TJ.  S.  71  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  St. 
Louis,  A.  &  T.  II.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290. 
( !ompare  1  litchcock  v.  I  lab  eston,  96  U.  S. 
341,  quot.  i  rhe  cases,  however, 

are  conflicting  upon  the  point  whether  the 

i ,  ■  i  \  maj   not  he  upon  the  contract,  if 

there  be  a  righl   of  recovery  at  all.     In 

Morawetz  on  Corporations  (2d  ed.)  sees. 

,  689-706,  the  leading  authorities 

as  to  private  corporations  are  collected  and 


§  447  CONTRACTS  :     POWER    OF   PUBLIC    OFFICERS.  517 

^  445.  Powers  of  Public  Agents  and  Officers  to  make  Contracts.  — 
Public  corporations  may  by  their  officers  and  properly  authorized 
agents  make  contracts  the  same  as  individuals  and  other  corpora- 
tions, in  matters  that  appertain  to  the  corporation;  being  artificial 
persons,  they  cannot  contract  in  any  other  way.1  Public  oilicers 
or  agents  are  held  more  strictly  within  their  prescribed  powers 
than  private  general  agents;  and  a  contract  made  by  a  public 
agent  within  the  apparent  scope  of  his  powers  does  not  bind  his 
principal  in  the  absence  of  actual  authority.2  There  is  a  broad 
distinction  between  the  acts  of  an  officer  or  agent  of  a  public 
municipal  corporation  and  those  of  an  agent  for  a  private  individual. 
In  cases  of  public  agents  the  public  corporation  is  not  bound  unless 
it  manifestly  appears  that  the  agent  is  acting  within  the  scope  of 
his  authority,  or  he  is  held  out  as  having  authority  to  do  the 
act,  or  is  employed  in  his  capacity  as  a  public  agent  to  make  the 
declaration  or  representation  for  the  government.3 

§  446.  Contracts  in  Respect  of  Drainage.  —  Although  the  general 
doctrine  is  that  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  usually  exercise  its 
powers  beyond  its  corporate  limits,  yet  this  right  may  be  given 
either  expressly  or  by  implication ;  and  a  city  with  express  author- 
ity to  provide  drainage  was  held,  in  the  absence  of  any  restriction, 
to  possess  the  implied  power,  in  order  to  find  an  outlet  for  sewage 
beyond  its  limits,  to  make  a  contract  with  an  adjoining  landowner 
giving  it  such  an  outlet.4 

§  447  (372).  Implied  and  Incidental  Powers  ;  Market  Powers  ; 
All  persons  bound  to  take  Notice  of  Extent  of  Corporate  Powers.  — 
If  a  municipal  corporation  is  authorized  to  erect  markets,  it  may 
contract  to  buy,  or  may  receive  a  grant  of,  land  on  which  to  place 
market  buildings,  and  it  may  make  contracts  for  the  erection  of 
market-houses.  As  it  is  the  general  practice,  in  granting  muni- 
cipal charters  and  in  general  acts  for  the  incorporation  of  towns 
and  cities,  to  enumerate  their  powers  and  define  their  duties,  it 
will  suffice  in  this  place  to  remark  generally  that  the  authority 
to  enter  into  contracts  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  into  effect 
their  powers  and  discharge  their  duties  is  impliedly  given  to  such 
corporations.     But  this  implied  authority  is  only  co-extensive  with 

commented  on.     See  ib.  sees.  621,  718,  as  s  Baltimore  v.  Musgrave,  48  Md.  272  ; 

to  muneipal  corporations.  infra,  sec.  450,  note. 

1  Louisville  City  R.  Co.  v.  Louisville,  4  Coldwater  v.  Tucker,  36  Mich.  474 
8  Bush  (Ky.),  415  (1S71).  (1877);  s.  c.   24  Am.  Rep.   601.    Ante, 

2  Parsel  v.  Barms,  25  Ark.  231  ;  Wil-  sees.  354,  355,  35C,  as  to  extent  of  corpor- 
liams  v.  Peyton's  Lessee,  4  Wheat.  77.  ate  jurisdiction. 


118 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§447 


md  duties  of  the  corporation;  and  if  any  greater  au- 

;  timed  it   must  be  sought  for  in  an  express  01  special 

from   the   legislature.     It    is   scarcely    necessary    to   observe 

no  conti  be  made  by  a  corporation  which  is  prohibited 

darter  or  by  the  statute  law  of  the  State.1     And  it   is  a 

ii  ral  and  fundamental  principle  of  law  that  all  persons  contract- 

with  a  municipal  corporation  must  at  their  peril  inquin    into 

th  power  of  the  corporation  or  of  its  officers  to  make  the  contract; 

mtract   beyond  the  scope  of  the  corporate  power  is  void, 

although   it  be  under  the  seal  of  the  corporation.2    This  principle 

ia  more  strictly  applied,  and  properly  so,  than  in  the  law  oi  private 


B  iwman,   39    Miss.    67 1 
|  ;  Indianapolis  v.   Indianapolis  l 
66   Ind.  396,  citing  text.     Conti 
to  violate  the  charter,  or  to  bargain  away 
.    of  legislative 
!  in  a  municipality  or  its 
officers,  in  reference  to  public  trusts,  are 
void.    /'.  :  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall. 
349  ( L870),  in  which   notes  issui  d  bj  the 
money  in  contraven- 
of  law  were  adjudged   void,  and  the 
city  held  nol  to  be  liabli  either  in  special 
mpsil  ;  Morgan  o.  Menzies, 
,1.  341.     In  this  case  the  statute  hav- 
ing exempted  cities,  &c.  from  giving  bond 
in  civil  actions,  a  bond  in  attachment  pro- 
inga  given  by  a  city  was  held  void. 
.  89-92,  and  cases  there  cited  ; 
post,         487,  and  cases  cited. 

-  Marsh   v.    Fulton    I  ounty,   10  Wall. 
67»".  (1870);  •  89 ;  infra,  sec  157; 

I  .   o worth*  Rankin,  2 Kan.  357(1864); 
V,\   i.  I  itte  p.  Z(  itz.  21  K;mi.  649;   Horn  v. 

i ■,  80  MA  21S  (1868)  ;  Bridgeport 

r.  II-.  atomic  R.  '  o.,  15  Conn.  475,  493; 

II  ,13  Sm.  &  Mar.  (21 
0);  Taftr.  Pittsford,  28  Vt. 

pinery  City  Council  v, 

W.  P.  I:.  Co  ,81  Ala.  76(1857);  Pa., 

It.  A   m  C     •■    Dandridge,  8 

■■  '■ 
2Denio  (N.  Y.  ),  I  L0  ;  Baltimore  ».  I 
'•!  !.  276,  282    1861);  B 

L;  ]    11  v.   Wareham, 

7   "  (1844);  Branham  v. 

.1    e,  24   CaL   I  M  C03   v. 

B  '  17,  approving  text ;  Stur- 

• 
9.  y  L  85,  ill  (1868);Bateman 


v.  Ashton,  3  Hurl.  &  Nor.  W,  ;  State  v. 

Haskell,  20  Iowa,  276  ;  Baltimore  v.  Mus- 
grave,  48  Md.  472;  Peoples.  Baraga,  39 
Mich.  554  ;  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  In  S. 
C.  Ill,  approving  text;  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  Tex.  532;  Baby  v.  Baby,  5  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  510  ;  Richmond  v.  Municipality,  8 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  567;  Campbell  v.  Elma, 
13  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  296;  Standly  v. 
Perry,  2-\  Grant  (U.C.),  507;  Craycraft  v. 
Selvage,  10  Bush  (Ky.),  696  (1874)  ; 
Treadwayr.  Schnauber,  1  Dak.  Ter.  236  ; 
Ouachita  P.  J.  v.  Monroe,  37  La.  An. 
641  ;  Laycock  v.  Baton  Rouge,  35  La.  An. 
475  ;  Knit  in:,'  v.  Kansas,  84  Mo.  415. 
Within  the  scope  of  its  power  a  corpora* 
tion  may  contract  to  do  an  act  <(t  anyplace 
oilier  than  the  one  where  it  is  located. 
Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smedes,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
662;  Maddoxv.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56. 
Or  prospectivi  in  its  terms.  Davenport  v. 
Hallowell,  10  Me.  317.  As  to  corporate 
seal.  Ante,  sec.  190.  Where  a  public  cor- 
poration, transcending  its  legal  power, 
assumes  to  direel  its  officers  For  exam- 
ple, commissioners  of  highways  —  to 
bring  an  action  in  their  own  names,  or  in 
their  name  of  office,  against  third  persons 
for  trespas  es  upon  the  highways,  and  the 
net  ion  is  accordingly  brought  and  the 
officers  are  defeated,  they  cannot  sustain 
an  a  I  ion  against  the  corporation  to  be 
bursed  their  costs  and  expenses  ;  and 
the  reason  is,  that  the  action  of  a  corpo- 
ration directing  such  a  suit  to  be  brought, 
b  Lug  in  excess  of  its  lawful  power,  is 
void,  and  cannol  be  the  foundation  of  any 
contract,  express  or  implied.  Cornell  v. 
Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  510;  ante,  sec 
117. 


§  448 


CONTRACTS  :  SCOPE  OF  POWER  TO  CONTRACT. 


519 


corporations.  So,  also,  those  dealing  with  the  agent  of  a  municipal 
corporation  are  likewise  bound  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent 
of  his  authority.  This  is  certainly  so  in  all  cases  where  this 
authority  is  special  and  of  record,  or  conferred  by  statute.  The 
fact  that  in  such  a  case  the  agent  made  false  representations  in 
relation  to  his  authority  and  what  he  had  already  done,  will  not 
aid  those  who  trusted  to  such  representations,  to  establish  a 
liability  on  the  part  of  his  corporate  principal.1 

§  448.  Scope  of  Power  to  Contract.  —  Although  it  is  true,  as 
stated  in  the  last  section,  that  a  contract  made  by  a  municipality 
in  violation  of  an  express  legislative  prohibition  is  void,  yet,  in  the 
absence  of  special  legislative  restriction,  the  municipal  authorities 
possess  the  same  power  as  other  debtors  to  make  a  new  contract 
in  any  proper  form,  purging  the  former  contract  of  its  illegality. 
This  principle  is  distinctly  affirmed  and  well  illustrated  in  a 
judgment  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  A  city,  in 
vioiation  of  local  statutes  forbidding  the  issue,  circulation,  or  receipt  of 
scrip  or  currency  intended  to  circulate  as  money,  issued  such  cur- 
rency,  engraved  in  the  similitude  of  bank-paper,  and   by    means 


i  Baltimore  v.  Eschbach,  18  Md.  276, 
282  ;  Baltimore  v.  Reynolds,  20  Md.  1 
(1862) ;  Delafield  v.  Stale  of  Illinois,  2 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  159,  174  ;  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
192  (1841);  affirming  s.  c,  8  Paige,  531, 
restraining  unauthorized  sale  of  bonds. 
Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.),  110  ; 
3  Comst.  430  ;  2  Barb.  104  ;  Supervisors, 
&e.  v.  Bates,  17  N.  Y.  242  (1858).  This 
case  also  determines  how  far,  in  such  a 
case,  the  sureties  of  such  an  agent  or 
officer  are  liable  for  his  acts.  And  see 
cases  cited  lb.  p.  245.  Chemung  Canal 
Bank  v.  Chemung  Co.  Sup.,  5  Denio,  517; 
Overseers,  &c.  of  Norwich  v.  Overseers,  &c. 
of  Pharsalia,  15  N.  Y.  341  ;  Albany  v. 
Cuulitf,  2  Comst.  178,  per  Strong,  J.  ; 
Marsh  i'.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676 
(1870);  Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach, 
37  Cal.  543  (1869);  Swift  v.  Williams- 
burg, 24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  427  ;  Hague 
v.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527  ;  State  v. 
Mayor,  &c,  29  Md.  85,  111  ;  Horn  v.  Bal- 
timore, 30  Md.  218  (1868)  ;  Thomas  v. 
Richmond,  12  Wall.  349  1870),  per  Brad- 
ley, J.  ;  Ford  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
63  N.  Y.  640  (1875);  Stoneburgh  v. Bright- 
on, 5  Upper  Can.  L.  J.  3S  ;  Belleview  i\ 


Holm,  82  Ky.  1  ;  Farnsworth  v.  Paw- 
tucket,  13  R.  I.  82. 

Special  and  limited  authority  to  bor- 
row money  conferred  upon  the  town  treas- 
urer, when  exercised,  is  exhausted,  and 
the  town  is  not  liable  for  money  he  sub- 
sequently borrows  and  converts  to  his  own 
use,  although  he  assumed  to  act,  and  was, 
by  the  lender,  supposed  to  be  acting  under 
the  authority  conferred  upon  him.  Sav- 
ings Bank  v.  Winchester,  8  Allen  (Ma--. ), 
109  (1864);  ante,  sec.  117. 

So  in  Upper  Canada  it  is  held  that 
an  individual  dealing  with  a  corporation 
through  its  council  or  the  members  of  the 
governing  body,  is  hound  to  notice  the 
objects  and  limits  of  their  powers,  and 
the  manner  in  which  those  powers  are  to 
be  exercised,  since  their  acts,  when  beyond 
the  scope  of  their  authority  or  done  in  a 
manner  unauthorized,  are  in  general  nu- 
gatory and  not  binding  on  the  corpora- 
tion. Ramsay  ct  al.  v.  The  Western  Dis- 
tviet  Council,  4  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  374; 
Silsby  v.  Dunville.  31  Upper  Can.  C.  P. 
3(il;  Ilarr.  Manual  (5th  ed.)  p.  12;  Mora- 
wetz  on  Corp.  (2d  ed.)  sees.  o'21,  "IS. 


MlMi'IPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§449 


;  valid  d  nst    itself;   subsequently  the   holders 

of  this  illegal  currency,  al  the  instance  of  the  city,  surrendered 
ame,  and  received  therefor  new  obligations  of  the  city  in  the 
forms  of  bonds,  to  which  there  was  no  legal  objection  except  that 
the  consideration  was  illegal;  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  that  the  city  was  liable  on  the  new  bunds.1 

^  449  373).  Mode  of  exercising  the  Power. — Kcspecting  the 
■'<  i/i  which  contracts  by  corporations  should  be  made,  it  is 
important  to  observe  that  when,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the  mode 
of  contracting  is  specially  and  plainly  prescribed  and  limited, 
that  mode  is  exclusive  and  must  be  pursued,  or  the  contract  will 
not  bind  the  corporation  ;2  but  the  courts  have  sometimes  regarded 


1  Little   Rock  v.   Merchants'  National 

L878)  ;  8.  c.  below, 

■     Dillon,    299.      The   statement   of   the 

to  tl  e  of  the  statutes 

Irkansas  in  this   regard   is  accurate. 

Mr.  J  fi  pported  the  judgment 

of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 

by  the  following  argument  :  — 

••  h  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  who- 
ever i-  capable  of  entering  into  an  ordi- 
contract  to  obtain  or  receive  the 
means  with  which  to  build  houses  or 
wharves  or  the  likr,  may,  as  a  general 
ruli-,  bind  himself  by  an  admission  of 
his  obligation.  The  capacity  to  make 
is  at  the  basis  of  the  liability* 
The   tii  st    liabi]  city    was  dis- 

i    by   it.      It    had    gone   beyond   its 
it  said,  in  making  a  debt  in  the 
.  of  bank-notes.     If  it  had  not  denied 
power,  judgmenl    and    an   execution 
mighl  havi  in  I  it.  and  tl"  en  d- 

would    have    obtained    his    money. 
■•■    of    non-resistance    every 
■  !i   retains,   and  continues   to  n  tain. 
He  der  at  any  time,  and  eon* 

i  admit   what   the  momenl    b  fore 
e  denied,     in    187 1    the  city   of  Little 

;  .     '    We     Will 

the   tran-  iction   of    its    illegality, 
h  id  the  authority  to  accept  from  you 

'    ' "  tii. n    of    at ints   r ived    by 

for  legitimate  purposes  the  sums  in 
tion.  We  did  so  receive  and  ex- 
i  for  legitimate  purposes.  We  bi  red 
in  making  the  paymenl  to  you  in  an  ob- 
onable  form.  We  now  pay  our  just 
and  lawful  debt  by  cancelling  the  bank- 


notes issued  by  us,  and  delivering  to  you 
obligations  in  the  form  of  bonds,  to  which 
form  there  is  no  legal  objection.'"  See, 
also,  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
350;  Nashville  ».  Ray,  19  Wall.  168;  Police 
Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  570;  Mullarky 
r.  Cedar  Fulls,  19  Iowa,  24  ;  Sykes  v. 
Lafferry,  27 Ark.  407;  Wrightp,  Mushes, 
13  Ind.  113.  See  also  the  cases  cited  post, 
sec.  487,  note.  Where  a  city  burrowed 
money  of  a  bank  upon  its  note  al  usu- 
rious interest,  and  the  bank  had  subse- 
quently cancelled  the  illegal  note,  had 
refunded  the  excessive  interest,  and  re- 
ceived a  new  note  for  a  lawful  amount,  the 
new  note  is  valid.  Miller  v.  Hull,  4  Denio 
(X.  Y.),  lot  ;  Kent  v.  Walton,  7  Wend. 
(X.  V.)  256.  So  it  has  been  held  that 
where  the  consideration  of  a  contract  de- 
clared void  by  statute  is  morally  good,  4 

repeal  Of   the  statute  will   Validate  the  COI1- 

traet.  Washburn  r.  Franklin,  35  Barb. 
(X.  V.)  599;  13  Abb.  P.  R.  140,  same 
Infra,  sec.  487,  note, 
a  People  v.  Weber,  89  111.  347  ;  Bryan 
v.  Page,  51  Tex.  532,  approving  text  j 
Francis  v.  Troy,  71  X.  Y.  338  ;  State  v. 
Passaic,  41  N.  J.  L.  90;  Perriue  v.  Fair, 
2  Zabr.  ('22  N.  .T.  L. )  356  ;  Canon  v.  Mar- 
tin,  2  Dutch.  (N.J.)  594;  State©,  Hudson, 
6  Dutch,  (N.  J.)  104;  State  v.  Marion 
County,  21  Kan.  419;  Garvey,  In  re,  77 
N.  Y.  528  ;  Smith  v.  Newburgh,  77  N.  Y. 
180  ;  Alb,,  v.  Galveston,  51  Tex.  302  ; 
Dore  V.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  IS  ;  F.utler  v. 
Xevin,  88  111.  575;  Kansas  City  v.  Flan- 
agan, 69  Mo.  22  ;  Bentley  v.  County 
Coinin'rs,  25  Minn.  259;  Fulton  v.  Lincoln, 


§449 


CONTRACTS  !     MODE   OF   EXERCISING    THE   POWER. 


521 


provisions  on  this  subject  as  directory.  Thus,  where  the  charter 
directed  the  mode  iu  which  moneys  should  be  drawn  from  the 
treasury  to  be  by  an  order  of  the  council,  signed  by  the  mayor, 
such  an  order,  issued  upon  a  memorandum  in  the  minutes  of  the 
corporation,  without  a  formal  order  being  entered,  was  adjudgi  ! 
a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  charter.1  But  unless  the  mode  be 
prescribed  and  limited,  valid  contracts  within  the  scope  of  the 
corporate  powers  may  be  made,  as  we  shall  see,  otherwise  than 
under  seal  or  in  writing.  A  contract  with  a  municipal  corpor- 
ation, which  by  its  terms  is  not  to  be  performed  within  one  year 


9  Neb.  358  ;  Hurford  v.  Omaha,  4  Neb. 
350  ;  Reis  v.  Graff,  51  Cal.  86  ;  Addis  v. 
Pittsburgh,  85  Pa.  St.  379  ;  McDonald  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23 
(1876);  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  144  ;  Leaven- 
worth v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357  ;  McCoy  v. 
Brant,  53  Cal.  247,  approving  text ;  Mur- 
phy v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky. ),  189 
(1S72);  post,  sec.  481,  note  ;  Montgomery 
County  v.  Barber,  45  Ala.  237  ;  Terre 
Haute  v.  Lake,  43  Ind.  480;  Head  v. 
Prov.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Cranch,  127  (1804). 
White  v.  New  Orleans,  15  La.  An.  667  ; 
infra,  sec.  466  ;  Dey  v.  Jersey  City,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  412  (1869)  ;  Baltimore  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 20  Md.  1  ;  Town  of  Durango  v. 
Pennington,  8  Col.  257  ;  Worthington  v. 
Covington,  82  Ky.  265  ;  Laycock  v.  Baton 
Rouge,  35  La.  An.  475  ;  North  Pac.  L.  & 
M.  Co.  v.  E.  Portland,  14  Oreg.  3  ;  Los  An- 
geles Gas  Co.  v.  Toberman,  61  Cal.  199. 
Speaking  of  this  subject  in  a  case  above 
cited,  Marshall,  C.  J.,  says  :  "  The  act  of 
incorporation  is  to  them  an  enabling  act ; 
it  gives  them  all  the  power  they  possess  ; 
it  enables  them  to  contract,  and  when  it 
prescribes  to  them  a  mode  of  contracting, 
they  must  observe  that  mode,  or  the  in- 
strument no  more  creates  a  contract  than 
if  the  body  had  never  been  incorporated." 
Approved,  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dand- 
ridge,  12  Wheat.  64,  68  (1827)  ;  see,  also, 
Augell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec.  253  ;  Diggle  v. 
Railway  Co.,  5  Exch.  442  ;  Homersham  v. 
Wolv.,  &c.  Co.,  4  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  426  ; 
Frend  v.  Dennett,  4  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  576  ; 
Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 
12  ;  Trustees  v.  Cherry,  8  Ohio  St.  564 
(1858);  Bladen  v.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St. 
464  ;  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal. 
591  ;  Pimental  v.  San  Francisco,  21  Cal. 


351  ;  Zottman  v.  San  Francisco,  20  Cal. 
96  ;  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  ■!'>'>, 
282,  opinion  of  Field,  C.  J.;  post,  chapter 
on  Taxation  and  Local  Assessments.  If  a 
corporation  sue  upon  a  contract  though  it 
be  executory  on  their  part,  and  not  exe- 
cuted, this  amounts  to  a  conclusive  admis- 
sion that  the  contract  was  duly  entered 
into  by  them.  Grant  on  Corp.  63  ;  5 
Man.  &  G.,  192.  A  contract  by  a  city  witli 
a  street  railway  company  held  not  con- 
cluded, something  remaining  to  be  done. 
People's  Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Memphis  City  R. 
Co.,  10  Wall.  38.  Where  a  charter  limits 
the  exercise  of  power  the  mayor  and  coun- 
cil cannot,  in  a  different  mode,  make  a 
valid  contract,  nor  can  they,  by  any  sub- 
sequent approval  or  conduct,  impart  valid- 
ity to  such  contract,  nor  would  the  law 
imply  any  such  contract  :  the  law  never 
implies  an  obligation  to  do  that  which  it 
forbids  the  party  to  agree  to  do.  Bryan  v. 
Page,  51  Tex.  532  ;  s.  p.  Francis  v.  Troy, 
74  N.  Y.  338.  In  the  absence  of  proof  of 
bad  faith,  or  of  a  usurpation  of  authority, 
or  that  a  public  loss  or  private  injustice 
will  result  from  a  contract  made  by  a 
municipal  council  without  complying 
strictly  with  charter  provisions,  the  State 
will  not  be  warranted  in  interfering  to  set 
it  aside.  Attorney-General  v.  Detroit,  55 
Mich.  181. 

1  Kellcv  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Brooklyn,  4 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  263  (1843)  ;  see  Neiffer  v. 
Bank,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  162;  Pennington 
v.  Taniere,  12  Q.  B.  998,  1013  ;  Maddox 
v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky. )  56;  ante,  sec. 
291.  Under  charter,  executory  contracts 
for  grading,  &c,  must  be  in  writing. 
Starkey  v.  Minneapolis,  19  Minn.  203 
(1872). 


. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§450 


i  the  making  thereof,  is  within  the  statute  of  frauds;  but  an 

entry   in   the  official    minutes  of   the  corporation  of  a    resolution 

\y  the  governing  body   expressing  the  terms  of  the  con- 

.    by  the  rink,  constitutes  a  note  or  memorandum  in 

writing  sufficienl  to  take   the   case   out  of  the    statute  and    to    bind 

the  i orporation.1 

sj    150     374  .     Seal    not    Necessary;      How    concluded. —  Modem 

decisions  have  established  the  law  to  be,  that  the  contracts  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations  need  not  I"  under  seal  unless  the  charter  or 
other  legislative  enactment  so  requires.2  The  authorized  body  of 
a  municipal  corporation  may  bind  it  by  an  ordinance,  which  in 
favor  of  private  persons  interested  therein  may,  if  so  intended, 
rate  a  -  a  contract  ; 3  or  they  may  hind  it  by  a  resolution,  or  by  vote 
clothe  it-  officers,  agents,  or  committees,  with  power  to  act  for  it; 
and  a  contract  made  by  persons  thus  appointed  by  the  corporation, 
though  by  parol  (unless  it  be  one  which  the  law  requires  to  be 
in  v,  riting  .  will  bind  it.4 

1  Argus  (',,.  r.  Albany,  55  N.  Y.  495  21  111.  76  (1859)  ;  Western  Sav.  F.  Soc.  v. 
(1874), &  n>er  and  Rapallo,  J  J.,  dissenting.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175;  lb.  185; 
Municipal   corporations  may  contract    by     Clark  v.  Washington,  12  Wheat.  40(1827); 


parol  through  their  duly  authorized 
agents,  and  such  conl  racts  cannot  be 
I  «  ithout  the  consent  of  the  par- 
ties i"  1»-  affected  thereby.  Duncombc 
i  Tl  •  City  of  Fort  Dodge,  :5s  Iowa,  281 
(1874). 


Hamilton  v.  Newcastle  &  l>.  li.  Co.,  9 
IimI.  359  ;  Ross  v.  Madison,  1  Ind.  281 
(1848)  ;  Bellmyer  v.  Marshalltown,  44 
Iowa,  564  (1876)  ;  Chattanooga  v.  Geiler, 
13  Lea,  (ill  ;  where  a  contract  is  accepted 
unconditionally  by  the  resolution  of  a  city 


iper  o.  Springport,  104  IT.  S.  501;  council  the  proceedings  by  which  the  reso- 

Halbul   v.   Forresl  City,  34  Ark.  246.     A  lution   was  adopted    are   presumed   to  be 

written  proposal  by  a  town  to  have  work  regular.     Over  ».  Greenfield,  107  Ind.  281. 

done,  a  written  hi*!  to  do  it  and  a  written  Not  essential  thai  rote  of  directors  appear 

:    the  bid,  held  to  constitute  on   the  record.      Story  Agency,  sec.   52, 

ther  a  sufficienl  contract.      Wiles*,  where  it  is  said  that,  "  as  the  appointment 

II      .ill  [nd.  :;71  (1887).  of  an  agent  of  a  corporation  may  not  always 

ol  a  contract,  made  by  be  evidenced  by    written   vote,  it  is  now 

an   ordinance,   cannot    !>c  impaired  by  a  the  settled  doctrine  — at  least  in  America 

.  though  it  be  author-  — thai    it    may  be   inferred  and   implied 

ized  b                      I  irter.     Ante,  sec.  314.  from  the  adoption  or  recognition  of  the 

i  market  were,  acts  of  the   agent   by  the    corporation." 

by  ordinance,  appropriated  to  pay  munici-  Post,    sec.    459.     And  when   this   is  the 

pal  bonds,  a  later  ordinance  passed  under  ease  an  action  of  assumpsit  lies  against 

inted  by  a  new  charter,  diverting  such  corporation  upon  an  express  or  im- 

I .ir ei  1  void.     Fazende  plied  promise.     Post,  sec.  459.     Parolcon- 

II                I   Fi  1    Rep.  95.     A   '  .  Bee.  trad    by    council    with    city    physician. 

1;  and  chaps,  iv.  and  vii.,  Selma  v.    Mullen,    46  Ala.    411   (1871). 

itive   power  See  also,  Broom  Com.  on  Com.  Law,  561- 

C  rporations.  570;  Montgomery  Co.  i\  Barber,  45  Ala. 

ming  v.  Gn    oil  ,  16  How.  (!'.  8.)  237  (1877). 

L92j  Abbey  o.  Bil-  In  Fleckner  v.   United  States    Bank, 

;    Alton    v.  Mulledy,  B  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  338,  357  (1823),  it  was 


§451 


CONTRACTS  \     MODE    OF    EXERCISING    POWER. 


523 


§  451  (375).  Mode  of  exercising  Power.  —  The  assent  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  to  the  variation  or  modification  of  a  contract  need 
not  necessarily  be  expressed  by  the  formal  action  or  resolution  of 
the  common  council ;  but  it  may  be  implied  from  acts  relating  to 
the  contract  work  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  contract;1    but 


urged  that  a  corporation  could  not  author- 
ize any  act  to  be  done  by  an  agent  by  a 
mere  vote  of  the  directors,  but  only  by  an 
appointment  under  its  corporate  seal.  But 
the  court  declared  that  such  a  doctrine, 
whatever  may  have  been  its  original  cor- 
rectness as  applied  to  common-law  cor- 
porations, had  "  no  application  to  modern 
corporations  created  by  statute,  whose 
charters  contemplate  the  business  of  the 
corporation  to  be  transacted  by  a  special 
body  or  board  of  directors.  And  the  acts 
of  such  a  body  or  board,  evidenced  by  a 
written  vote,  are  as  completely  binding 
upon  the  corporation,  and  as  complete 
authority  to  their  agents,  as  the  utmost 
solemn  acts  done  under  the  corporate 
seal."  Per  Story,  J.  Further,  as  to  com- 
mon seal,  see  ante,  sec.  190.  Authority 
of  agent,  in  absence  of  special  restriction, 
may  be  given  by  parol  or  inferred  from 
acts*  Detroit  v.  Jackson,  1  Doug.  ( Mich. ) 
106.     See  ante,  sec.  190  ;  infra,  sec.  459. 

A  provision  in  the  organic  act  of  a 
city,  that  "on  the  passage  of  every  by- 
law or  order  to  enter  into  a  contract  by 
the  council,  the  ayes  and  nays  shall  be 
called  and  recorded,"  prescribes  how  the 
order  to  contract  shall  be  made  and  evi- 
denced when  directed  by  the  council,  but 
it  is  not  a  limitation  on  the  power  of  au- 
thorized agents  to  make  a  contract  by 
parol.  Indianola  v.  Jones,  29  Iowa,  282 
(1870)  ;  ante,  sec.  291  ;  Baker  v.  Johnson 
Co.  (parol  contract),  33  Iowa,  151. 

Contract  may  be  concluded  by  ordinance 
or  action  of  the  council  (accepting  pro- 
posals), without  signature  by  parties. 
People  v.  San  Francisco,  27  Cal.  655 
(1865)  ;  Sacramento  v.  Kirk,  7  Cal.  419  ; 
Logansport  v.  Blakemore,  17  Ind.  318. 
How  shown.  San  Antonio  v.  Lewis, 
9  Texas,  69.  In  Indianapolis  v.  Skeen, 
17  Ind.  628  (1861),  it  was  held  that  third 
persons  dealing  with  an  agent  of  the  city 
appointed  by  the  council  "  to  negotiate  its 
bonds  at  not  less  than"  a  specified  rate, 
were  not  obliged  to  look  to  the  records  of 


the  council  for  either  his  appointment  or 
his  instructions,  since  they  were  not  neces- 
sarily of  record  there  ;  but  persons  deal- 
ing with  such  an  agent  are,  of  course, 
bound  to  ascertain  the  fact  of  his  appoint- 
ment and  the  extent  of  his  authority,  but 
not  his  private  instructions.  Authority 
of  agent  to  negotiate  sales  of  bonds.  Cady 
v.  Watertown,  18  Wis.  322. 

1  Messenger  v.  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  196 
(1860).  Where  certain  work  is  stipulated 
to  be  done  under  the  direction  of  a  street 
commissioner  of  a  city,  this  officer  has 
authority,  without  a  vote  of  the  council, 
to  authorize  extra  work  to  be  done,  or  ma- 
terials to  be  furnished,  where  these  are 
rendered  necessary  by  the  action  of  the 
city  authorities  subsequent  to  the  making 
of  the  contract,  and  where,  without  such 
extra  work  or  materials,  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the 
contract.  lb.  Modification  of  contracts 
by  unauthorized  officers  not  binding  upon 
the  corporation.  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
of  New  York,  22  N.  Y.  162  (1860)  ;  Hague 
v.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527  ;  O'Hara 
v.  New  Orleans,  30  La.  An.  pt.  1,  152. 
As  to  changes  in  contracts  by  parol,  see 
Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee,  21  "Wis.  217 
(1866)  ;  compare  Sacramento  v.  Kirk,  7 
Cal.  419 ;  infra,  sec.  459.  Acceptance  by 
city  of  proposals  to  it,  see  Springfield  v. 
Harris,  107  Mass.  532  (1871).  Where  a 
city  made  a  contract  with  a  gas  com- 
pany for  a  year,  and  continued  to  observe 
its  terms  in  subsequent  years  without 
renewing  it,  and  then  made  a  new  con- 
tract for  a  year,  which  was  likewise 
observed  in  later  years  without  being  form- 
ally renewed,  it  was  held  that  the  city  was 
under  an  implied  obligation  to  pay  for  gas 
for  an  entire  year,  when  it  had  accepted 
gas  for  a  considerable  portion  of  that  year. 
Taylor  v.  Lambertville,  43  N.  J.  Eq. 
(16  Stew.)  107. 

Defendant's  council  passed  a  resolution 
ordering  a  public  square  to  be  graded,  and 
plaintilf,  under  an  agreement  with  defend- 


-1 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§452 


the  contract  is  mad-'  by  ordinance  in  the  prescribed  statutory 
can  only  be  repealed  or  annulled  in  the  same  manner.1 


§    \  6).     Contracts  made  by  Agents  ;   Mode  of   Execution. — 

\y.  ,.,  era  or  agents  of  a  corporation,  duly  appointed,  and  acting 

within  the  scope  of  their  authority,2  in  executing  an  instrument  in 
behalf  of  the  corporation  sign  their  own  names  and  affix  (heir  own 
,  such  seals  are  simply  nugatory,  and  the  instrument,  according 
to  the  weight  of  modern  judicial  opinion,  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
simpL  contract  of  the  corporation,  and  will  bind  the  corporation  and 
not  the  individuals  executing  it,  where  the  purpose  to  act  for  the 
corporation  is  manifest  from  the  whole  paper,  and  where  there  are 
no  words  evincing  an  intention  to  assume  a  personal  liability.3 


.  advanced  the  money  for  the 
work,  which  was  done  in  a  satisfactory 
manner.  Held,  thai  a  subsequent  resolu- 
tion, of  which  plaintiff  had  no  notice, 
limiting  the  expenditure,  would  uot  defeat 
recovery  of  an  amount  expended  in  excess 
of  that  limit.  Dnncombev.  Fort  Dodge, 
38  Iowa,  281  (1874). 

i  T(  rre   Haute   v,    Lake,    43  Ind.   480 
(1873)  ;  Norte  Paci  ic  L.  k  M.  Co. 

v.  East  Portland,  14  Oreg.  3. 

-  "The  genera]  rule  is  unquestionable 
thru  ;i  municipal  corporation  is  aol  bound 
unauthorized  ac1  of  an  individual, 
whether  an  officer  of  the  corporation  or  a 
mere  private  person.  Bui  the  corporation 
with  third  persons  as  to  jus- 
tify them  in  assuming  the  existence  of  an 
authority  in  another   which   in   fact  has 

never  1 a  given."     Andrews,  J,     Davies 

•      M  &c.   of  New   York,   93  N.  Y. 

260.     This  principle,  it  is  supposed,  would 

tpplicable  where  the  matter  so  dealt 

with   was  under  all   circumstances  ultra 

■  ■  corporate  power.     Where  a  com- 

mpowered  to  conl  racl  for  the 

erection  of  a  building  al  a  price  not  to  ■  rxeed 

held  they  had  no 

icontracl  for  a  larger  sum,  ami  that 

iontracting   with    them    was 

bound  t'>  t.ik<-  notice  of  the  extenl  of  their 

r  rn   .    v.   Town  of  Bridgeport, 

ma   H2.  ' 

R  .  Detroit,  &c,  12  Mich. 

M      1,    6    Mi>  li.    lo?  ; 

Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  Qottschalk,  1  l  Pet. 

l.    260,   276, 

B  ink  of  Columbia  v. 


Cranch,  299,  307;  Hatch  v.  Barr,  1  Hani. 
(Ohio)  390;  Baker  v.  Chambles,  4  G. 
Greene  (Iowa),  428  ;  Lyon  v.  Adamson,  7 
Iowa,  509  ;  1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  602  ;  Mott 
v.  Hicks,  i  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  513,  534;  Blan- 
Chard  V.  Blackstone,  102  Mass.  343;  Stan- 
ton v.  Camp  (contract  signed  individually 
with  addition  of  "committee"),  4  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  274;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Bank 
of  Columbia,  5  Wheat.  326  ;  Hopkins  v. 
Mehaffy,  11  Serg.  &  Eawle  (Pa.),  126; 
Angell  &  Ames,  sees.  293,  295;  Gale  v. 
Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344  (1871)  ;  Burrill 
v.  Boston,  2  ClitFord  C.  C.  590  (1867). 
To  justify  the  setting  aside  of  a  contract 
made  by  an  agent  of  a  municipal  corpora* 
tion  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  the  fraud 
must  be  clearly  proved  :  circumstantial 
evidence,  if  relied  upon,  must  be  such  as 
is  not  fairly  reconcilable  with  any  other 
theory  than  one  of  fraud  by  the  agent. 
Baird  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  96 
N.  Y.  567.  Where  a  town  clothes  its 
agent,  or  its  committee,  with  full  poxuer 
to  make  a  contract,  and  it  is  accordingly 
made,  it  is  valid  ami  binding,  notwith- 
standing there  has  been  no  formal  accept* 
ance  by  a  vote,  or  even  if  it  be  afterwards 
rejected  by  the  corporation.  Davenport 
v.  Hallowell,  10  Me.  317;  Junkins  v. 
School  District,  39  Me.  220  (1855) :  Wil- 
lard  r.  Xewhuiyport,  12  Pick.  (Mass.) 
227;  Kingsbury*.  School  District,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  !'!>  (1846). 

The  selectmen  of  towns  in  Massachusetts 
have  no  authority  to  construct  a  way  and 
pledge  the  credit  of  the  town  therefor, 
unless  they  are  authorized  by  a  vote  of  the 


5-1.33 


CONTRACTS  :     EXECUTION    BY   AGENTS. 


525 


§  453  (377).  Same  subject.  Illustrations.  —  A  few  cases  will  be 
referred  to,  illustrating  the  rule  just  stated.  A  contract  in  relation 
to  the  survey  of  a  city,  a  subject  exclusively  appertaining  to  the 
corporation,  was  entered  into  "  between  T.  Van  V.,  J.  W.,  C.  I).  C, 
a  committee  appointed  by  the  corporation  of  the  city  of  Albany  for 
that  purpose,  of  the  first  part,  and  John  11.,  Jr.,  of  the  second  part." 
The  parties  of  the  first  part  agreed  to  pay  for  the  work  to  be  done, 
and  signed  their  individual  names  and  affixed  their  individual  seals 
to  the  agreement.  The  authority  of  the  committee  to  act  for  the 
corporation  and  to  make  the  contract  being  conceded,  it  was  ruled 
that  they  were  not  personally  liable,  and  that  it  must  be  enforced 
by  and  against  the  corporation.1     In  another  case,  a  contract  for  the 


town.  Bean  v.  Hyde  Park,  143  Mass. 
245. 

Where  school  directors  gave  an  author- 
ized bond  for  borrowed  money,  in  their 
individual  names,  as  school  directors, 
though  signed  and  sealed  in  their  indi- 
vidual names,  the  corporation,  and  not 
the  individuals,  are  liable  thereon.  Hei- 
delberg School  Dist.  v.  Horst,  62  Pa.  St. 
301  (1869). 

The  power  of  a  committee,  appointed  by 
a  vote  of  a  town  in  Massachusetts  "  to  let 
out  and  superintend  the  making "  of  a 
highway,  is  completely  executed  by  the 
making  of  a  contract  with  a  third  person 
embracing  the  whole  subject-matter  of  the 
vote,  and  by  the  superintending  of  the  con- 
struction of  the  highway.  And  therefore, 
if  the  person  contracted  with  fails  to  com- 
plete the  road  according  to  his  contract, 
this  is  a  matter  for  the  town  to  deal  with, 
and  the  committee  have  no  power,  without 
new  authority  from  the  town,  to  enter 
into  a  contract  with  another  person  for  its 
completion.  If  they  do  so,  and  pay  money 
in  pursuance  thereof,  the  town  is  not 
liable  to  them  therefor.  Nor  is  it  liable 
if  they  transcend  their  power,  and  make  a 
contract  for  a  more  expensive  road  than 
they  were  authorized  to  do.  Keyes  v. 
Westford,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  273  (1835). 
Power  of  New  England  toivns,  ante,  sees. 
29,  30  ;  post,  sec.  961. 

Power  to  a  town  committee  "to superin- 
tend the  building  of  a  house  for  the  town," 
was  adjudged  to  include  the  power  to 
make  the  necessary  contracts,  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  any  other  or  special  com- 
mittee or   agent   was  appointed  for  that 


purpose,  the  court  being  of  opinion  that 
the  making  of  contracts  was  essential  to 
the  building  of  the  house.  Damon  v. 
Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345  (1824);  ante 
chaps,  ix.,  x.  Majority  of  committee  mast 
sign  contract.  So  held,  Curtis  v.  Portland, 
59  Me.  483  (1871) ;  ante,  sec.  283,  and  note, 
as  to  powers  of  a  majority  of  committee; 
post,  sec.  455,  note. 

It  has  been  held  in  Upper  Canada, 
where  work  was  done  under  a  contract  not 
made  with  the  corporation,  or  any  of  its 
known  officers,  but  merely  with  persons 
assuming  to  act  as  a  duly  appointed  com- 
mittee, that  no  action  would  lie  against 
the  corporation.  Stoneburgh  v.  The  Mu- 
nicipality of  Brighton,  5  Upper  Can.  Law 
J.  38.  No  action  can  be  sustained  for  a 
breach  of  duty  against  the  head  of  a  cor- 
poration in  not  applying  the  seal  to  make 
a  contract  between  a  corporation  and  an 
individual,  founded  on  a  refusal  which,  if 
there  had  been  a  previous  valid  contract, 
would  have  constituted  a  breach  of  it  ;  in 
other  words,  there  cannot  be  a  remedy 
against  the  head  of  a  corporation,  equiva- 
lent to  a  remedy  on  the  contract  against 
the  corporation,  had  the  contract  been 
duly  made  so  as  to  create  a  valid  and  bind- 
ing agreement.  Fair  v.  Moore,  3  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  484  ;  Harrison  Munic.  Manual 
for  Upper  Can.  (5th  ed.)  p.  12. 

1  Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  60  (1821)  ;  compare,  hovrever, 
Fullam  v.  Brookfield,  9  Allen  (Mass.),  1 
(1864),  where  the  court  denies  the  doctrine 
of  Randall  v.  Van  Vechten  ;  Bank,  &c.  v. 
Patterson,  7  Craneh,  299,  and  certain  dicta 
in  Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass. )  345. 


MrNK'Il'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


§454 


repair  of  an  engine  house  of  a  city  was  entered  into  by  the  inspector 
of  the   fire  department   in   his  own   name,  describing   himself  as 
•■<;.  N   S.,  inspector,  &c,  of  the  first  part,"  and  signed  in  the  same 
[j  in  tact,  made  for  and  on  account  of  the  city,  and  it 

was  held  that  the  city  was  Liable  thereon,  although  its  agent  did  not 
use  it-  name  in  contracting,  the  court  being  of  opinion,  however, 
that  tl  face  showed  it  was  made  for  the  city.1 


§    154   (378).    Same   subject.      Illustration.  —  So,  where   on   a   sale 

of  real  property  by  a  corporation,  a  memorandum  of  the  sale  was 
signed  by  the  parties,  on  which  it  was  stated  that  the  sale  was  made 
•  A.  B.,  the  purchaser,  and  that  he,  C.  D.,  "  mayor  of  the  corpora- 
tion, in  behalf  of  himself  and  the  rest  of  the  burgesses  and  common- 
alty <>t  thf  borough  of  Caermarthen,  do  mutually  agree  to  perform 
and  fulfil,  on  each  of  their  parts  respectively,  the  conditions  of  the 
sale,"  and  then  came  the  signature  of  the  purchaser,  and  of  "  C.  D., 
Mayor,"  it  was  held  that  the  agreement  was  that  of  the,  corporation, 
and  not  tlmt  of  the  mayor  personally ;  and  that,  consequently,  the 
mayor  could  not  sue  thereon.2 


But  the  text  states  the  prevailing  Ameri- 
can rule.     Sec  also   Dubois  V.   Canal  Co. 
4  Wend.  (N.  V.)  285  ;  Worrell  v.  Munn, 
1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  229  ;   Ford  v.  Williams, 
i.  (13  N.  V.)  577,  585  ;  Richardson 
Co.,  22  Cal.  150. 
1   Robinson   v.  St.    Louis,  28  Mo.  488 
Where  the  corporate  name  of  a 
:  nt  and  t  rustees  of 
the  village  "I  <;,"  a  contrad   reciting  that 
.mil  trustees 

<>r  tie'  "  corporation  "  of  G ,  held,  to 

warrant  a  Timlin!,'  that  the  contract  was 
the  1»' ii '1  officially.  Parr  v. 
Greenbush,  72  N.  Y.  463.  In  1870  a 
village  board,  without  advertising  for  pro- 
:  with   P.  to  lay  a  side- 

walk in    May,   1871;  the   work,    however, 
ed,   owing  to  the  failure  of 
•    irni  ih  the  gravel  and  grad- 
required  by  the  contract  and   P.'s 
ition.     In  1873  the  board  passed  a 

|uiring    P.  to    ■ ,  and   if 

re\  ami  grading  be  not 

nish  the  Bame  aim  elf ; 

i    he    furnished    the    materials 

.   the  work.     In   1-71   the  village 

■     nded        to  require  the 

for  pro]      lis  for  grad- 

any     sidewalk,    and     to 


award  any  contract  therefor  to  the  lowest 
ladder.  In  an  action  by  P.  for  labor  and 
materials,  in  pursuance  of  the  resolution, 
&c. —  Held,  1.  That  no  abandonment  of 
the  contract  was  established.  2.  That 
the  contract  was  not  affected  by  the  sub- 
sequenl  amendment.  3.  That  the  resolu- 
tion was  illegal,  and  no  recovery  could  be 
had  by  P.  for  the  gravel  and  grading, 
either  upon  contract  or  upon  the  quantum 
meruit.  lb.  Where  A.,  B.,  and  C,  a 
committee  appointed  by  a  meeting  of  citi- 
zens, make  a  contract  with  D.,  signing 
the  contract  as  a  committee,  and  affixing 
their  seals  thereto,  they  make  themselves 
personally  liable  under  the  contract.  The 
only  effect  of  the  word  "committee"  is 
like  that  of  "executor"  in  a  personal 
obligation,  to  identify  the  transaction,  not 
to  qualify  the  act.  Ularn  v.  Boyd,  87 
Pa.  St.  477. 

2  Bowen  v.  Morris,  2  Taunt.  374,  387. 
The  case  of  Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford 
C.  R.  R.  590  (1807),  presents  also  an  in- 
hi  which  it  was  considered  that  a 
contrad  signed  bythemayor  was  one  in- 
tended to  be  made  on  behalf  of  the  cor- 
poration.  But  in  Providence  v.  Miller, 
11  K.  I.  272  (1876);  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 
453,  a  contract  under  seal  between  certain 


§  456  SPECIALTY   CONTRACTS.  527 

§  455  (379).  Action  must  be  Corporate,  not  Individual.  —  But 
the  action  or  contract  of  the  officers  of  a  public  corporation  in  their 
individual  capacity  is  not  binding  upon  the  corporate  body.1  For 
example:  If  the  selectmen  of  a  town  in  New  England,  as  individ- 
uals, request  a  citizen  to  furnish  supplies  to  a  public  enemy,  to  pre- 
vent violence  to  the  town,  this  gives  no  legal  right  of  recovery 
against  the  town;  and  as  the  transaction  was  wholly  beyond  the 
official  duty  of  selectmen,  or  the  duty  of  the  town  as  a  corporation, 
it  was  doubted  whether  a  regular  vote  to  pay  the  plaintiff  would 
have  been  legal,  though  it  was  admitted  that  a  voluntary  agreement 
among  the  inhabitants  to  this  effect  would  have  been  binding,  being 
founded  on  a  meritorious  consideration,  as  it  was  their  property,  and 
not  that  of  the  town,  which  was  in  danger.2 

§  456  (380).  Specialty  Contracts.  —  "While  the  agent  of  a  public 
corporation,  who  by  its  vote  or  authority  contracts  for  its  use,  can- 
not bind  the  corporation  by  making  a  contract  by  deed,  yet  if  such 
agent  had  authority  to  make  the  contract,  it  is  binding  upon  the 
corporation  as  evidence  of  such  contract.  It  follows  that  a  contract 
of  an  agent  or  committee  of  a  town,  under  his  or  their  own  seals, 
cannot  be  declared  on,  in  covenant  or  debt,  as  the  deed  of  the  town. 
The  form  of  the  remedy  against  the  town3  is  for  damages,  or  in 

persons  of  the  first  part  and  one  Doyle  "  in  Mason  v.  Bristol,   10  N.  H.   36  ;  Hanover 

behalf  of  the  city,"   party  of  the  second  v.  Eaton,  3  N".  H.  38.     Powers  of  towns 

part,  Doyle  being  the  mayor,  and  the  con-  in   New  England.      Ante,   sees.   29,   30  ; 

tract   relating  to  municipal  matters,  was  supra,,  sec.  452,  note. 

held  upon  its  face  to  be  the  contract  of  Contracts  made  by  a   majority   of  the 

Doyle  personally,  and  not  that  of  the  city,  board  of  aldermen,    without    any  official 

1  Haliburton  v.  Frankford,  14  Mass.  action  of  the  city  council,  are  not  binding 
214  (1817)  ;  Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  upon  the  city  ;  so  decided  where  counsel 
Gray  (Mass.),  12(1856).  were  thus  employed  who   rendered   legal 

2  Haliburton  v.  Frankford,  supra ;  services  beneficial  to  the  corporation. 
Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272  (1816);  Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  12 
Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford  0.  C.  R.  590  (1856)  ;  see,  also,  Sikes  v.  Hatfield,  13 
(1867)  ;  ante,  sec.  30.  A  majority  of  se-  Gray  (Mass.),  347  (1859);  see  chapter  on 
lectmen  may,  by  statute,  bind  a  town  in  Corporate  Meetings,  ante.  A  contract 
New  Hampshire  by  their  written  contract  entered  into  by  a  board  of  supervisors,  for 
when  acting  within  the  limits  of  their  and  on  behalf  of  the  county,  and  signed 
authority.  But  a  contract  signed  by  one  by  the  chairman  of  the  board,  is  the  con- 
only  of  the  selectmen  in  his  own  name,  tract  of  the  county.  Babcock  v.  Good- 
"for  the  selectmen,"  does  not  bind  the  rich,  47  Cal.  488  (1S74). 

town,  nor  will    it  be  rendered  valid   by  3  Randall  v.  Van   Vechten,  19  Johns, 

proof  that   another   selectman  authorized  (X.  Y.)  60,  65  (1821)  ;  Damon  v.  Granby 

him  so  to  sign  the  contract,  or  by  proof  2    Pick.    (Mass.),   345    (1S24)  ;    compare 

that  such  was  the  practice  in  the   town.  Fullam  v.  Brookfield,  9  Allen   (Mass.),  1; 

If  the  corporate  name   had  been  affixed  by  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson's  Adminis- 

one,  such  proof  might  have  been  sufficient,  trator,  7  Cranch,  299,  and  rule  as  stated 

Andover  v.   Grafton,   7  N.  H.   298,  305  :  by  Story,  J.,  306  (1813)  ;  Clark  v.  Cuck- 


528 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  457 


Although  in  Damon  p.Granby1  it  was  left  an  open  ques- 
ther  a  vote  of  a  town  having  no  corporate  seal,  expressly 
authorizin  ;  an  agent  to  make  a  deed  of  land,  or  other  contract, 
'.  would,  if  executed  according  to  the  power,  become  tech- 
v  the  deed  of  the  town,  no  substantial  reason  is  perceived  why 
such  an  instrument,  thus  executed,  should  not  be  treated  as  having 
all  the  attributes  and  qualities  of  a  sealed  instrument.     If  the  cor- 
poration, however,  has  a  common  seal,  which  is  the  case  with  towns 
in  many  of  the  States,  and  with  cities  generally,  and  it  is  affixed  to 
an  instrument  in  pursuance  of  the  vote  of  the  corporation,  or  by  the 
proper  officer,  such  an  instrument  is,  beyond  doubt,  technically  the 
</,->/  of  the  corporation? 

§  457  381).  Contracts  in  Excess  of  Corporate  Power;  Ultra 
Vires  as  a  Defence.  —  The  general  principle  of  law  is  settled  be- 
yond controversy,  that  the  agents,  officers,  or  even  city  council  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  cannot  hind  the  corporation  by  any  contract 
which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  its  powers,  or  entirely  foreign  to  the 
purposes  of  the  corporation,  or  which  (not  being  legislatively  au- 
thorized) is  against  public  policy.  This  doctrine  grows  out  of  the 
nature  of  such  institutions,  and  rests  upon  reasonable  and  solid 
grounds.  The  inhabitants  are  the  corporators  ;  the  officers  are  but 
the  public  agents  of  the  corporation.3  The  duties  and  powers  of  the 
officers  or  public  agents  of  the  corporation  are  prescribed  by  statute 
or  charter,  which  all  persons  not  only  may  know,  but  are  bound  to 
know.  The  opposite  doctrine  would  be  fraught  with  such  danger 
and  accompanied  with  such  abuse  that  it  would  soon  end  in  the 
ruin  of  municipalities,  or  be  legislatively  overthrown.  These  con- 
siderations vindicate  both  the  reasonableness  and  necessity  of  the 
rule  that  the  corporation  is  bound  only  when  its  agents  or  officers, 
by  whom  it  can  alone  act,  if  it  acts  at  all,  keep  within  the  limits  of 

field  Cnion,   11  F.n£.   Law  and   Eq.  442;  Fullam  v.  Brookfield,  9  Allen  (Mass.),  1. 

Pennington  v.  Taniere,  12  Queen's  B.  1011.  Corporate  seal.      Ante,    sees.  190,    192; 

:  be  maintained  againsl  a  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  10  S.  C.  141,  approv- 

ict  with  the  water  commis-  ingtext.     An  agreement  in  writing  by  an 

;   the  city,   although   the     tatute  attornej  to  refer  a  certain  cause  acted  on 

contracts    should    be  by  the  court  was  held  to  hind  his  client. 

binding  upon  and  be  considered  as  done  Brooks   v.   New  Durham,   55  N.  H.  559 

and   council.       Keeheyv.  (1875). 

:  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  362;  ante,  3  Halbut  v.  Forrest  City,  34  Ark.  246; 

Miller,  11  K,   I.  272;  Oubrer.  Donaldsonville,  33  La.  An.  386; 

\n,.  Rep.  i"  Pugh  r.  Little  Rock,  35  Ark.  7:>  (approv- 

1   Dai >.  Granby,   2   Pick.   (Miss.)  ing  text),  where  an  ordinance  authorizing 

845,  352(1824).  the  issue  of  certificates  of  indebtedness  at 

ndall    v.   Van    Vechten,    19  a  discount  was  held  not  admissible  as  evi- 

Johns.  (N.  Y.  L821).     But  see  dence  against  the  city. 


§457 


CONTRACTS :     DEFENCE  OF  ULTRA  VIRES. 


529 


the  chartered  authority  of  the  corporation.1  The  history  of  the 
workings  of  municipal  bodies  has  demonstrated  the  salutary  nature 
of  this  principle,  and  that  it  is  the  part  of  true  wisdom  to  keep  the 
corporate  wings  clipped  down  to  the  lawful  standard.2  It  results 
from  this  doctrine  that  contracts  not  authorized  by  the  charter  or 
by  other  legislative  act,  that  is,  not  within  the  scope  of  the  powers 
of  the  corporation  under  any  circumstances,  are  void,  and  in  actions 
thereon  the  corporation  may  successfully  interpose  the  plea  of  ultra 
vires,  setting  up  as  a  defence  its  own  want  of  power  under  its 
charter  or  constituent  statute  to  enter  into  the  contract.3     In  favor 


1  Text  approved.  City  of  Eufala  v.  Mc- 
Nab,  67  Ala.  5S8  ;  Fort  Wayne  v.  Lehr, 
88  Ind.  62  ;  Pine  Civil  Township  v.  Huber 
Manuf.  Co.,  83  Ind.  121  ;  Cowdrey  v. 
Caneadea,  16  Fed.  Rep.  532. 

2  This  subject  is  touched  upon  in  the 
concluding  portion  of  chap,  i.,  ante.  Prin- 
ciple of  construction  of  corporate  powers. 
Ante,  sees.  89-92.  See  also  ante,  sec.  447. 
Lyddy  v.  Long  Island  City,  104  N.  Y.  218 
(contractor  chargeable  with  notice  of  limi- 
tations upon  agent's  authority);  Appeal  of 
Whelen,  108  Pa.  St.  162. 

B  Post,  chap,  xxiii.,  sec.  935,  where  the 
subject  of  ultra  vires  is  further  considered ; 
and  see  also  the  following  cases  :  Cheeney 
v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53  (1875),  citing 
text ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676  (1870);  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall. 
349(1S70);  Bridgeport  v.  Housatonnc  Rail- 
road Co..  15  Conn.  475,  493  (1843);  Bur- 
rill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford  C.  C.  590  (1867); 
Martin  v.  Brooklyn,  1  Hill,  545  ;  Nor- 
wich Overseers,  &c.  u.  New  Berlin,  &c,  18 
Johns.  382  ;  Donovan  v.  New  York,  33 
N.  Y.  291  ;  Seibrecht  v.  New  Orleans,  12 
La.  An.  496  (1857)  ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines, 
19  Iowa,  199,  209  (1865);  Loker  v.  Brook- 
line,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  343,  348;  Phila- 
delphia v.  Flanigen,  47  Pa.  St.  21;  Paris  Tp. 
Tr.  v.  Cherry,  8  O.  St.  564  ;  Hague  v.  Phil- 
adelphia, 4S  Pa.  St.  527  ;  Albany  v.  Cunliff, 
2  Comst.  (2  N.  Y.)  165  (1849),  reversing 
s.  c.  2  Barb.  190;  Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  165  (1834);  Hodges  v.  Buf- 
falo, 2  Denio  (N.  Y.)  110  (1846)  ;  Hal- 
stead  v.  New  York,  3  N.  Y.  430  (1850)  ; 
Martin  v.  Mayor,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  545; 
Boom  v.  Utica,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  104  ;  Cor- 
nell v.  Guilford,  1  Penio  (N.  Y.),  510; 
Borland  v.  Mayor,  &e.,  of  New  York,  1 
Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  27  (1847);  Dill  v.  Ware- 
vol.  i.  —  34 


ham,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  438  (1844);  Vincent 
v.  Nantucket,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  103,  105 
(1858),  per  Merrick,  J.  ;  Stetson  v.  Kemp- 
ton,  13  Mass.  272  ;  Parsons  v.  Inhabitants 
of  Goshen,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  396  ;  Wood 
v.  Lynn,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  108  (1861); 
Spalding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  71  ; 
Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  45  Me.  496  (1S58)  ; 
s.  c.  41  Me.  363;  Western  College  v.  Cleve- 
land, 12  Ohio,  375  ;  Tippecanoe  Co.  Com- 
m'rs  v.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403  (1855);  Inhabitants 
v.  Weir,  9  Ind.  224  (1857);  Sinead  v.  In- 
dianapolis, P.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  11  Ind.  104 
(1858);  Brady  v.  New  York,  20  N.  Y.  312; 
Appleby  v.  New  York,  15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
428  ;  Estep  v.  Keokuk  County,  18  Iowa, 
199,  and  cases  cited  by  Cole,  J.  ;  Clark  v. 
Polk  County,  19  Iowa,  248  (1865);  supra, 
sec.  447 ;  post,  sec.  935 ;  Berry  v.  Superior 
City,  23  Wis.  64  (1870);  McDonald  v. 
New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23  (1876)  ;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  Rep.  144  ;  Maupin  v.  Franklin  Co., 
67  Mo.  327  ;  Driftwood  Val.  Turnp.  Co.  v. 
Bartholomew  County  Comm'rs,  72  Ind, 
226  ;  New  Jersey  &  N.  E.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Fire 
Comm'rs,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  117;  Laycock  v. 
Baton  Rouge,  35  La.  An.  475  ;  Lincoln  v. 
Stockton,  75  Me.  141  ;  Earley's  Appeal, 
103  Pa.  St.  273,  where  the  purchase  from 
a  third  party  of  a  judgment  against  a  cred- 
itor of  a  city  for  the  purpose  of  setting  it 
off  against  his  claim  was  held  ultra  vires 
and  void.  Salt  Lake  City  r.  Hollister,  118 
U.  S.  256,  affirming  s.  c.  3  Utah,  200;  but, 
in  this  case  the  city,  having  engaged  in  the 
business  of  distilling  liquors  without  power 
so  to  do,  was  held  liable  for  the  (  oited 
States  taxes  thereon.  In  Illinois  it  is  held 
that,  where  a  municipal  corporation  enters 
into  a  contract  which,  although  not  ex- 
pressly  authorized  by  its  charter,  is  not 
in  violation  of  the  charter  or  of  any  stat« 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  457 


of,7.  holders  of  negotiable  securities,  the  corporation  may  be 

avail  itself  of  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  power  con- 
1;  but  it  may  always  show  that  under  no  circumstances  had 
the  corporation  power  to  make  a  contracl  of  the  character  in  ques- 
tion. This  subject  has  been  already  referred  to,  and  will  be  con- 
reel  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  the  present  chapter.1  The  mere 
fact,  however,  that  a  city,  in  making  a  contract  for  a  public  im- 
provement  within  its  corporate  powers,  promises  to  make  pay- 
ment in  negotiable  bonds,  which  it  has  no  power  to  issue,  does  not 


1       thereby  induced  the  other 
party  to  it   to  expend  money  in  the  per- 
formance "!  his  pari  of  it,  the  municipal 
ration  may  I"-  held  liable.     East  St. 
lis  <  las  1>.  &  C.  Co., 
U  5.     S  vpra,  sec.  ill.    <  lorporation 
qsI  unauthorized  contract, 
although  its  s<  al  is  attached  to  it.     Leaven- 
worth v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  358  (1864);  ante, 
192. 
Mr.  Justice  Coulter,  in  delivering  the 
< <l >i 1 1 i< >n  in  Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkin, 
1  i   Pa.  St   81,  expresses  the  opinion  that 
a  municipal  corporation  may  be  liable  for 
the  .  of  its  officers, 

!  are  publicly  entered  into  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  people,  and  not  ob- 
jected to  until  after  the  rights  of  third 
ive  attached.     Such  a  principle 
Is  beli  ■  ■■■•!  d  i"  be  both  unsafe  and  unsound  ; 
ily  true  and  Bafe  view  being  thai  all 
onnd   to  take  notice  of  the 
powers  and  authority  which  the  law  con- 
apon  theofficeraof  such  corporations. 
I  oker  v.  Brookline,  13  Pick.  (Mas-.) 
Any  liability   in   such   cases  must, 
ling  to  tli"  present  weight  of  author- 
ity, be  independent  of  the  contract,  and  can- 
not. '■  ?!  based  upon  the 
racl  to  enforce  il  i  executory  provisions. 
a,    Bee.    ill.     Auditing  and  paying 
■   of  a  claim    presented,   accompanied 
Irility  for  the  residue, 
pporal  ion  from  coi 
the  residue,  evpn  though  it  be  upon 
".  hii  h  show  the  Conner  allowance 
P<  nple  v.  N.  7. 
Sup.,  1   Hill  (N.  V.).  862  (1841).     In  an 
ntracl  for  doing  work  which 
tion  had  the  powei  to 
i  defence  thai  the  city  ought 
i            idopted  son,  means 


of  accomplishing  the    purpose    in   view. 
Livingston  v.  Pippin,  31  Ala.  542  (1S58). 

The  case  of  The  State  v.  Buffalo,  2 
11  ill  (N.  Y.)  434,  determines  an  interest- 
ing point.  Arms  belonging  to  the  State 
were  loaned  to  the  city  authorities  to 
supple  !  disorderly  assemblages.  The 
keeper    of    the    arsenal    had    no    right    to 

make   the   loan,   but  it  was  made   in    >_ d 

faith,  and  the  bond  of  the  city  taken  for 
their  return  on  demand.  The  city  being 
sued  on  this  bond  made  the  point  that  it 
wa  void  for  illegality  ;  but  the  court  re- 
garded it  rather  as  a  bona  fide  excess  of 
authority  simply,  and  held  that  though 
the  loan  was  unauthorized  the  State  might 
waive  the  tort  committed  on  the  property 
and  seek  a  remedy  upon  the  bond.  See 
infra,  sec.  458,  and  note. 

The  ] lower  of  State  building  commis- 
sioners to  discharge  at  their  discretion 
the  building  superintendent  whom  they 
employ  is  vested  in  them  for  the  public 
Benefit,  and  they  cannot  be  divested  of 
that  power  by  any  contract  entered  into  by 
them  with  the  person  so  employed,  where 
such  contract  is  not  ratified  by  the  legis- 
lature. If  the  legislature,  with  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  contract  entered  into  by  the 
commissioners  with  the  plaintiff,  and  of 
all  the  facts  relating  thereto,  recognizes 
and  ad  upon  it,  making  appropriations 
to  com]  lei  •  the  building  in  question  upon 
its  assumed  validity,  that  will  constitute 
a  ratification  of  the  contract  ;  but  such 
ratification    can    be   shown   only  by  some 

action    Of   both    houses    by   statute    or    I'cso- 

lution.  Shipman  v.  The  State,  43  Wis. 
381  (1877). 

1  Ante,  Bee.  1(53  ;  infra,  sees.  511—553  ; 
Moore  v.  New  York,  73  N.  Y.  238, 
approving  text. 


§457 


CONTRACTS  :     DEFENCE    OF  ULTRA  VIRES. 


531 


make  the  entire  contract  ultra  vires ;  and  therefore  if  work  be  done 
under  such  contract  the  city  will  be  liable  therefor.1 


1  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
341  (1S77).  In  this  case  the  city  made  a  con- 
tract with  the  plaintiffs  to  pave  streets.  It 
had  the  power  to  make  a  valid  contract  for 
this  purpose  :  but  the  city  having  in  the 
contract  agreed  to  make  payment  for  the 
work  in  negotiable  city  bonds  payable  at 
a  future  day,  it  was  objected  that,  since 
no  express  power  was  given  to  issue  bonds 
for  this  purpose,  the  whole  contract  was 
therefore  inoperative  and  void  ;  and  the 
lower  court  so  decided,  and  its  ruling  was 
supposed  to  be  supported  by  the  cases  of 
Tenzas  Parish  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15 
Wall.  570,  and  Memphis  v.  Ray,  19 
Wall.  468.  [See  ante,  sees.  117-126.] 
But  the  Supreme  Court  held  otherwise, 
and  in  giving  its  judgment  on  this  point, 
Mr.  Justice  Strong  observed  :  "In  the 
view  which  we  shall  take  of  the  present 
case,  it  is  perhaps  not  necessary  to  inquire 
whether  those  cases  justify  the  court's  con- 
clusion ;  for  if  it  were  conceded  that  the 
city  had  no  lawful  authority  to  issue  the 
bonds  described  in  the  ordinance  and  men- 
tioned in  the  contract,  it  docs  not  follow 
that  the  contract  was  wholly  illegal  and 
void,  or  that  the  plaintiffs  have  no  rights 
under  it.  They  are  not  suing  upon  the 
bonds,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  their 
success  that  they  should  assert  the  validity 
of  those  instruments.  It  is  enough  for 
them  that  the  city  council  have  power  to 
enter  into  a  contract  for  the  improvement 
of  the  sidewalks  ;  that  such  a  contract  was 
made  with  them  ;  that  under  it  they  have 
proceeded  to  furnish  materials  and  do 
work,  as  well  as  to  assume  liabilities ; 
that  the  city  has  received  and  now  en- 
joys the  benefit  of  what  they  have  done 
ami  furnished  ;  that  for  these  things  the 
city  promised  to  pay  ;  and  that  after  hav- 
ing received  the  benefit  of  the  contract  the 
city  has  broken  it.  It  matters  not  that 
the  promise  was  to  pay  in  a  manner  not 
authorized  by  law.  If  payments  cannot 
be  made  in  bonds  because  their  issue  is 
ultra  vires,  it  would  be  sanctioning  rank 
injustice  to  hold  that  payment  need  not 
be  made  at  all.  Such  is  not  the  law. 
The  contract  between  the  parties  is  in 
force  so   far  as  it  is  lawful.     There  may 


be  a  difference  between  the  case  of  an 
engagement,  made  by  a  corporation  to  do 
an  act  expressly  prohibited  by  its  charter, 
or  some  other  law,  and  a  case  of  where 
legislative  power  to  do  the  act  has  not 
been  granted.  Such  a  distinction  is  as- 
serted in  some  decisions.  But  tic-  pre  ent 
is  not  a  case  in  which  the  issue  of  the 
bonds  was  prohibited  by  any  statute.  At 
most,  the  issue  was  unauthorized  ;  at 
most,  there  was  a  defect  of  power.  The 
promise  to  give  bonds  to  the  plaintiffs  in 
payment  of  what  they  undertook  to  do 
was,  therefore,  at  farthest,  only  ultra  vires; 
and  in  such  a  case,  though  specific  per- 
formance of  an  engagement  to  do  a  thing 
transgressive  of  its  corporate  power  may 
not  be  enforced,  the  corporation  can  be 
held  liable  on  its  contract.  Having  re- 
ceived benefits  at  the  expense  of  the  other 
contracting  party,  it  cannot  object  that  it 
was  not  empowered  to  perform  what  it 
promised  in  return,  in  the  mode  in  which 
it  promised  to  perform.  This  was  directly 
ruled  in  The  State  Board  of  Agriculture  v. 
The  Citizens'  Street  Railway  Co.,  47  Irid. 
407.  There  it  was  held  that  '  although 
there  may  be  a  defect  of  power  in  a  cor- 
poration to  make  a  contract,  yet  if  a  con- 
tract made  by  it  is  not  in  violation  of  its 
charter,  or  of  any  statute  prohibiting  it, 
and  the  corporation  has  by  its  promise 
induced  a  party  relying  on  the  promise 
and  in  execution  of  the  contract  to  ex- 
pend money,  and  perform  his  part  thereof, 
the  corporation  is  liable  on  the  contract.' 
See,  also,  substantially  to  the  same  effect, 
Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkin,  14  Pa.  St. 
81  ;  and,  more  or  less  in  point,  Maber  v. 
Chicago,  38  111.  266;  Oneida  Bank  v.  On- 
tario Bank,  21  N.  Y.  495  ;  Argenti  r.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  256;  Silver  Lake  Bank 
v.  North,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  373."  But 
qaccrc  as  to  the  liability  in  such  case  being 
on  the  contract.  See  ante,  sees.  89-91, 
444  ;  post,  sec.  459,  note.  A  charter  pro- 
vision that  after  a  pavement  has  been  laid 
at  the  expense  of  the  abutter,  "the  city 
shall  take  charge  of  and  keep  the  same  in 
repair,  without  further  assessment,"  is  not 
a  ri)ii tract  exempting  (hi  owners  from  future 
assessments.     State  v.   Newark,  8  Vroom, 


Ml  Mi  ll'  \l.   CORPORATIONS. 


§458 


Contracts  ultra  vires  or  invalid. —  Agreeably  to  the 

■  principles,  a  corporation  cannot  maintain  an  action  on 
tract  which  is  invalid,  as  where  a  city,  without 
authority,  loaned  its  bonds  to  a  private  company,  and  took  from  it 
nal  bond,  conditioned  for  tin;  faithful  application  of  the  city 
bonds  to  payment  for  works  which  the  city  had  no  power  to  construct 
or  assist  iii  constructing  '  The  remedy  in  such  ease  must  be  in  some 
other  form  than  in  an  action  to  enforce  the  contract.  So,  a  contract 
by  a  city  to  waive  its  right  to  go  on  with  the  laying  out  of  a  street  or 
not,  as  it  might  choose,  is,  it  seems,  against  public  policy,  and  it 
La  void  it'  it  amounts  to  a  surrender  of  its  legislative  discretion.2 
So,  a  promise  to  pay  a  public  corporation,  or  its  agents,  a  premium 
for  doing  their  duty  is  illegal  and  void;  and  a  contract  will  not  be 
sustained  which  tends  to  restrain  or  control  the  unbiased  judgment 
nf  public  officers.  But  a  promise  by  individuals  to  pay  a  portion  of 
thi  expenses  of  public  improvements  does  not  necessarily  fall  within 
this  principle,  and  such  a  promise  is  not  void  as  being  against  public 
policy;  and  if  the  promisors  have  a  peculiar  and  local  interest  in 
the  improvement,  their  promise  is  not  void  for  want  of  consideration, 
and  may  beenforced  againsl   them.3     So,  on  the  other  hand,  a  party 


N.  -I.  L.),  reversing  s.  c.  6  Vroom, 
168. 

1  city  CouncU  r.  Plank  Road  I 
Ala.  7''>  '  l  357  i  See  Wetumpka  v.  Win- 
\; ...  651  :  II  ilstead  v.  New  York, 
:;  N.  V.  430  ;  8.  o.  5  Barb.  218;  Bridge- 
port v.  Ftou8atonuc  R.  •  '<>.,  15  Conn. 
475,  193.  Bu1  see  State  v.  Buffalo,  2 
Hill  (X.  V  ).  134,  cited  supra  in  note  to 
Where  .-.  city  having,  without 
proper  authority,  guaranteed  the  payment 
nf  railroad  bonds  whirl,  were  secured  by  a 

i   I        ome  1 1 wner  nf  the 

bonds  from  having  paid  them  a1  maturity, 
I  that,  v  hile  the  city  might  have 
Fully  contested  its  liability  on  the 
v.-t  th.-  wanl  <>t'  authority  to 
an  tee  th.-  bonds  did  nol  affecl  the  lien  cre- 
ated by  the  deed   i  ■<   as  against 
other  creditors  of  the  railroad  comp  ay. 
1!          Alexandria  &   W.  I;.  Co.,  20  Fed. 
Rep.  l                                     to  suretyship. 
M  irtin  v   Mayor.&c,  1  Hill  (N.  V.), 
97.      A.  t..  pvh/ic 
1  >hio   Life    Ins.   &,  T.    I  !o.    i>. 
Co.,  11    Bumph. 
(Term.)  1  :  ante,  chap.  scii. ;  Indianapolis 
v.   Indiana]                         l     I '...,  66  Ind. 
iting  text 


Corrupt  agreements  with  aldermen,  to 
influence  them  to  a  particular  course  in 
the  discharge  of  oflicial  duties,  are,  of 
course,  void,  no  matter  to  whom  executed. 
(  ook  r.  Shipman,  24  111.  614. 

Contracts  with  m un icipal  officers.  Ante, 
sees.  283,  292,  4  11. 

s  Townsend  r.  Hoyle,  20  Conn.  1  (1849). 
Tin  case  In. Lis  that  a  promise  by  tin-  de- 
fendants to  pay  the  city  the  expense  of 
laying  a  certain  street  was  binding  ;  and 
Ellsworth,  .'.,  in  delivering  the  opinion, 
said  :  "  We  cannol  issi  ut  t.>  the  proposi- 
t ii .ii  that  a  promise  by  individuals  t<.  pay 
a  part  of  tin'  expenses  of  public  improve- 
ments, ordered  by  public  authority,  is,  of 
course,  illegal  ami  v..id.  The  amount  or 
cost  may  properly  enough  enter  into  the 
question  of  expediency  or  necessity.  If 
made  in  one  way  or  in  one  place,  it.  will 
be  much  better  for  the  public,  though 
more  expensive ;  but  individuals  specially 
benefited  stand  ready,  by  giving  their 
land,  their  money,  or  their  labor,  t..  meet 
M  expense.  Will  these  promises' 
be  void,  as  being  without  consideration  or 
againsl  public  policy!  We  think  not." 
S.e  chapter  on  Streets,  post;  Springfield 
v.  Harris,   ll)7   Mass.   532.     An  arrange- 


§  159 


IMPLIED    CONTRACTS. 


533 


making  with  a  city  a  contract  which  is  ultra  vires  is  not  estoj*/' ed 
when  sued  thereon  by  the  corporation  for  damages,  to  set  up  its  want 
of  authority  to  make  it.1 

§  459  (383).  Implied  Contracts.  —  The  present  state  of  the 
authorities  clearly  justifies  the  opinion  of  Chancellor  Kent,  thai 
corporations  may  be  bound  by  implied  contracts  within  the  scope 
of  their  powers,  to  be  deduced  by  inference  from  authorized  cor- 
porate acts,  without  either  a  vote,  or  deed,  or  writing.2     This  doc- 


ument or  combination  among  the  parties 
applying,  whereby  a  few  individuals,  de- 
sirous of  causing  paving  and  grading  to 
be  done,  procured  the  signatures  of  others 
to  the  application  by  paying  them  a  con- 
sideration therefor,  directly  or  indirectly, 
is  a  fraud  in  law  and  contrary  to  public 
policy.  Howard  v.  The  Church,  18  Md. 
451.  If  executory,  such  an  agreement  can- 
not be  enforced.  Maguire  v.  Smock,  42 
lnd.  1  (1873)  ;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  353.  A 
written  promise  to  pay  into  the  county 
treasury  a  certain  sum  of  money,  upon  the 
condition  that  the  county  commissioners, 
who  had  removed  the  county  court-house 
from  the  public  square,  and  were  build- 
ing a  new  court-house  elsewhere,  would 
remove  it  back  to  said  square,  which 
offer  was  accepted  by  said  commissioners, 
who  entered  on  their  records  an  order  for 
such  relocation,  was  not  void  as  against 
public  policy,  though  the  commissioners 
were  not  expressly  authorized  by  statute 
to  receive  such  donations.  Stilson  v.  Law- 
rence Co.,  52  lnd.  213  (1876)  ;  State  v. 
Johnson's  Admr.,  52  lnd.  197  (1876); 
post,  sec.  596. 

1  Montgomery  City  Council  v.  Mont- 
gomery &  W.  PI.  R.  Co.,  31  Ala.  76  (1857); 
Penn.,  Del.  &  Md.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  248,  319, 
320  ;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
110.  If  a  corporation  has  received  money 
in  advance  on  a  contract  void  on  account 
of  want  of  authority  to  make  it,  and  after- 
wards refuses  to  fulfil  the  contract,  the 
party  advancing  the  money  may,  without 
demand,  recover  it  back  in  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received.  Dill  v.  Ware- 
ham,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  438  (1S44).  In  tins 
case  the  corporate  defendant  undertook, 
without  authority,  to  transfer  to  the  plain- 
tiff the  right  of  taking  oysters  within  its 


limits  ;  contract  held  wholly  void.  See 
also,  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  CaL 
591  ;  infra,  sees.  459,  460  ;  compare  Herzo 
v.  San  Francisco,  33  Cal.  134.  That  the 
contract  of  agents  within  the  scope  of  cor- 
porate power  may  be  ratiiied,  or  a  contract 
implied  from  the  enjoyment  of  the  benefit 
of  the  consideration.  San  Francisco  Gas 
Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453  (1858), 
opinion  of  Field,  J.  ;  Backman  v.  Charles- 
town,  42  N.  H.  125 ;  see  Bissell  v.  Bail- 
road  Co.,  22  N.  Y.  258  ;  post,  sees.  935- 
938. 

2  2  Kent  Com.  291  ;  Bank  of  Columbia 
v.  Patterson,  7  Cranch,  299  (1813)  (a  lead- 
ing American  case) ;  Mott  v.  Hicks,  ]  Cow. 
(N.  Y. )  513 ;  Dunn  v.  Rector,  &c,  1 4  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  118;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Dandridge, 
12  Wheat.  74  ;  Perkins  v.  Wash.  Ins.  Co., 
4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  645  ;  Davenport  v.  Peoria 
Insurance  Co.,  17  Iowa,  276,  and  cases 
cited  by  Cole,  J.  ;  American  Insurance  Co. 
v.  Oakley,  9  Paige  (X.  Y. ),  496;  MagiU 
v.  Kauffman,  4  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  317  ; 
Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 
60  ;  Wayne  County  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich. 
390  ;  Lesley  v.  White,  1  Speers  (S.  C. ) 
Law,  31  ;  Canaan  v.  Derush,  47  N.  H. 
212  ;  Lebanon  v.  Heath,  lb.  353  ;  Adams 
vr  Farnsworth,  15  Gray  (Mass.),  423; 
Shrewsbury  v.  Brown,  25  Vt.  197  ;  Gas- 
sett  v.  Andover,  lb.  342  ;  Peterson  v. 
Mayor,  &c,  of  New  York,  17  N.  Y.  449, 
453  (1858)  ;  Danforth  v.  Schoharie  Turn- 
pike Co.,  12  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  227  ;  Angell 
&  Ames,  sec.  237  ;  Maher  v.  Chien^o,  38 
111.  266;  Frankfort  Bridge  Co.  v.  Frank- 
fort, 18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  11  :  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  Tex.  532  ;  State  Board  v.  Aberdeen, 
56  Miss.  518,  approving  text  ;  Taylor  v. 
Lambertville,  43  X.  J.  Eq.  (16  Stew.)  107 
(for  brief  statement  of  facts  of  this  case, 
see  sec.  451,  note);  supra,  sec.  450;  Broom, 


534 


MlMCIi'AL    CORPORATIONS. 


459 


trine  is  applicable  equally  to  public  and  private  corporations,  but  in 
applying  it,  however,  cure  must  be  taken  Dot  to  violate  other  princi- 
of  law.1  Thus  it  is  obvious  that  an  implied  promise  cannot  be 
I  a  corporation,  where  by  its  charter  it  can  only  contract 
in  a  prescribed  way,  except  it  be  a  promise  for  money  received  or 
property  appropriated  under  the  contract.2  So,  where  the  corporation 
orders  local  street  improvements  to  he  made,  for  which  the  abutters 


Commentaries    on  Com.    Law,    561-570, 
the    I  ogli  ifa    casi  a    are    collected. 
Ii  i  will  be  interested  in  the  letter 
ol   Mr.  Ju  i  to  Mr.  Justice  Cole- 

on  tin-  Bubject  of  corporate  liability 
for  tliu  parol  contracts,  intra  vires,  of  the 
autl  ats  of  th<-  corporation.     2 

6  Life  and  Letters,  335,  337.  He 
tin  re  adds,  whal  is  now  settled  law,  "  that 
all  duties  imposed  upon  a  corporation  by 
law,  and  all  services  performed  at  its  re- 
quest, raise  implied  promises  binding  on 
the  corporation,  if,  of  course,  no  statute 
he  thereby  infringed."     lb. 

1  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  k* .  of  New  York, 
17  N.  V.  I!:'.  453  ;  Poultney  w.  Wells,  1 
Aiken  (Vt.),  180.  Where  a  city  con- 
tracted   with  a   railroad    company  to   do 

in  work,  and  the  company  employed 

as  tu  ill)  it,  there  is  no  implied  con- 
■  on  tie  pari  of  tin-  city  to  pay  them, 
although  tie-  city  saw  them  at  work. 
Alton  v.  Mulledy,  21  111.  76  (1859). 
When  contracts  can  only  he  proved  by 
the  rcord  ;  and  when  there  is  no  implica- 
tion as  to  contracts  ;  and  when  they  must 
appear  by  the  records  of  the  corporate 
proceedings.  See  Crump  v.  Colfax  Co. 
Supervisors,    52   Miss.    107  ;    Huntington 

ity   Comm'rs   v.   Boyle,   9   End.   296; 

rick  v.  Butterworth,  17  Ind.  129  . 
iSt  Louis  v.  Cleland,  1  Mo.  84;  Alton  v. 
Mulledy,  21  111.  76  i  1859)  ;  San  Antonio 
v.  (m.1,1, 1,  :;i  Tex.   7<;  ;   People  v.    Fulton 

.  1  Barb.  (N.  V.)  56  ;  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  T  582  .  Gilbert  v.  New  Haven,  40 
Conn.   L02  (1 

i   request.     "No 

II  can  make  him-'  If  a  creditor  of  an- 
other by  voluntarily  discharging  a  duty 
whi  to  thai  other."     Strong,  J., 

in  Salsbury  v.    Philadelphia,    44  Pa.   St. 
more  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  1 3  ; 
;.   :;.",   [nd.   19 
(187").  In  Seibrecht  p.  New  Orleans,  12  La. 


An.  4(J6,  (1S57),  carpets  were  furnished  for 
certain  corporation  courts,  by  order  of  the 
clerks  or  judges,  hut  without  any  author- 
ity of  the  common  council,  and  were  worn 
out  before  the  plaintiff  |  i  isented  Ids  hill. 
It  was  contended  that  the  city  was  liable 
ex  cequo  et  bono,  having  used,  and  not  re- 
turned the  carpets  ;  hut  it  did  not  appear 
that  the  council  knew  that  they  had  been 
purchased  for  the  city,  and  were  being 
used  in  its  buildings.  The  court  denii  1 
the  liability,  saying  that  "the  only  safe 
rule  is  to  hold  that  the  city  cannot  be 
bound  for  any  contract  made  without  its 
authorization,  expressed  by  a  resolution 
of  the  common  council."  That  an  unau- 
thorized contract,  however  advantageous, 
does  not  hind  the  corporation,  see  Loker 
v.  Brooklme,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  343  ;  Jones 
v.  Lancaster,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  149;  WTood 
r.  Waterville,  5  Mass.  294. 

A  contract  was  implied  on  the  part  of 
a  city,  which  was  bound  to  support  its 
paupers,  and  which  had  refused  to  pay  a 
person  who  had  furnished  a  pauper  with 
necessaries.  Seagraves  v.  Alton,  13  111. 
371.  Here  it  will  be  noticed  that  there 
was  an  express  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 
city  to  support  the  pauper,  and  yet  a 
promise  was  implied.  This  implication  is 
a  pure  fiction  to  support  what  the  court 
regarded  as  a  just  claim.  A  contract 
made  by  one  member  of  a  committee  or 
county  board  for  services  which  are  au- 
thorized to  be  obtained  is  not  obligatory 
on  the  municipality.  The  power  is  vested 
in  the  whole  body,  and  no  one  member 
can  bind  the  corporation.  Bentley  v. 
i'(,.  Comm'rs,  25  Minn.  259. 

2  McSpedon  v.  Mayor  of  New  York, 
7  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  601;  McCracken  v.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  591  ;  Pimental  v.  San 
Francisco,  21  Cal.  351;  Dickinson  v. 
hkeepsie,  75  N.  Y.  65;  Richardson 
v.  County  of  Grant,  27  Fed.  Hep.  495. 


§459 


IMPLIED    CONTRACTS. 


535 


arc  the  parties  ultimately  liable,  and  which  by  the  charter  must  be 
made  in  a  prescribed  mode, if  made  without  any  contractor  a  valid 
one,  the  doctrine  of  implied  liability  does  not  apply  in  favor  of 
the  contractor,  unless,  indeed,  the  corporation  has  collected  tin- 
amount  from  the  adjoining  owners  and  has  it  in  its  treasury.1 


1  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal. 
255,  opinion  of  Field,  C.  J.  A  municipal 
corporation  was  holden  liable,  under  its 
charter,  upon  an  implied  assumpsit  to 
collect  and  pay  over  assessments  awarded 
to  property  owners  for  the  opening  of  a 
street.  Wheeler  v.  Chicago,  24  111.  105 
(1860);  see  infra,  sees.  466,  4S0,  483; 
Sangamon  Co.  v.  Springfield,  63  111.  66 
(1872).  "Where  a  contractor  has  entered 
into  a  contract  in  good  faith,  relying  upon 
the  regularity  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
common  council,  the  city,  having  received 
the  benefit  of  the  performance,  is  estopped 
from  questioning  the  regularity  in  that 
regard.  Moore  v.  New  York,  73  N.  Y. 
238.  Where  certificates  of  assessments 
against  property  owned  by  the  State  for  a 
sewer  tax,  were  declared  void  for  want  of 
power  in  the  city  to  make  the  assessment, 
it  was  held  that  the  city  was  liable  to  tho 
contractor  for  the  amount  thereof.  Polk 
County  Savings  Bank  v.  State,  69  Iowa, 
24.  So  also  .where  assessments  are  void 
for  other  reasons,  the  municipality  has 
been  held  liable.  Scolield  v.  Council 
Bluffs,  68  Iowa,  695.  Compare  Bucroft 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  63  Iowa,  646.  Post, 
sec.  480.  But  where  a  contractor  for  the 
improvement  of  streets  agreed  that  he 
would  not  look  to  the  town  in  any  event 
for  compensation,  and  it  was  afterwards 
decided  that  the  contract  was  ultra  vires 
and  void,  and  that  the  lot-owners  were  not 
liable  for  the  work,  it  was  held  that  the 
town  was  not  .liable  to  him,  by  reason  of 
its  inherent  poiver  to  improve  streets.  Belle- 
view  t'.  Hohn,  82  Ky.  1.  Post,  sees.  467, 
480.  So  where  the  charter  of  a  city  de- 
clared that  it  should  not  be  liable  in  any 
manner  for  local  improvements  which  are 
made  a  charge  upon  the  adjacent  property  ; 
and  the  council  by  a  resolution  which  was 
a  nullity,  because  of  the  non-concurrence 
of  the  mayor,  ordered  a  certain  local  im- 
provement to  be  made,  and  the  work  let 
to  the  plaintiff,  who  did  it,  and  failed  to 
collect  the  same  (by  reason  of  the  nullity 


of  the  resolution)  from  the  adjoining  own- 
ers (Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  187"J)  ; 
and  having  expended  a  considerable  sum 
in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  charge  the 
abutting  property,  he  brought  suit  against 
the  city  to  recover  the  sum  so  expended 
in  testing  the  validity  of  the  resolution  of 
the  council.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mis- 
souri field  that  tho  city  was  not  liable, 
distinguishing  Clayburgh  v.  Chicago,  25 
111.  535,  and  Fisher  v.  St.  Louis,  44  Mo. 
482;  Saxton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153 
(1875).  In  Kentucky  it  is  held  there  is 
no  liability  unless  the  city  has  the  right 
to  proceed  to  make  property- holders  liable. 
But  if  the  nature  or  ownership  of  the  ad- 
jacent property  is  such  that  no  steps  which 
could  have  been  taken  would  have  ren- 
dered it  or  its  owner  liable,  then  the  city 
must  pay  for  the  improvement,  or  it  will 
have  as  to  such  work  no  means  of  exe- 
cuting its  general  power  to  improve  all 
streets.  Caldwell  v.  Rupert,  10  Bush 
(Ky. ),  179;  Louisville  v.  Xevin,  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  549  ;  Ciaycraft  v.  Selvage,  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  696(1874"). 

Where  a  city,  organized  and  acting 
under  a  general  law,  which  provides  : 
"  The  city  shall  be  liable  to  the  contractors 
for  so  much  tliereof  only  as  is  occupied  by 
public  grounds  of  the  city  bordering  there- 
on, and  the  crossings  of  streets  and  alleys," 
makes  a  contract  for  the  improvement  of 
a  street  at  the  expense  of  the  property- 
holders,  and  the  contractor  does  the  work 
in  whole  or  in  part,  and  the  engineer  re- 
fuses to  make  an  estimate,  and  the  council 
refuses  to  issue  precepts  upon  the  proper 
application  against  the  property  holders,  a 
suit  cannot  bo  maintained  by  the  con- 
tractor against  the  city  for  damages.  The 
remedy  in  such  case  is  by  mandate  to 
compel  the  engineer  and  council  to  per- 
form their  duties.  Greencastle  v.  Allen, 
43  Ind.  347  (1873).  If  the  members  of 
the  common  council  of  a  city,  in  passing 
an  ordinance  and  letting  a  contract  for 
the  improvement  of  a  street,  act  in  good 


[I  [PAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  4G0 

:  i.     Same  subject.  —  "The  doctrine  of  implied  muni- 

Mr.  Chief  Justice   Field,  in  a  case  where  the 

subject   underwent  very  thorough   examination,  "applies  to  cases 

money  or  other  property  of  a  party  is  received  under  such 

imstances  that  the  general  law,  Lndep<  udent  of  express  contract, 
iuiposi  9  the  obligation  upon  the  city  to  do  justice  with  respect 
to  the  same.  It  the  city  obtain  money  of  another  by  mistake,  or 
without  authority  of  law,  it  is  her  duty  to  refund  it,  —  not  from 
any  contracl  by   her  on   the  subject,  but   from  the 

iral  obligatiou  t<>  do  justice  which  hinds  all  persons,  whether 
natural  or  artificial.1  If  the  city  obtain  other  property  which  does 
Dot  belong  to  her,  it  is  her  duty  to  restore  it;  or  if  used  by  her, 
:  nider  an  equivalent  to  the  true  owner,  from  the  like  general 
obligation  :  the  law,  which  always  intends  justice,  implies  a  promise. 
I  •  srence  to  money  or  other  property,  it  is  not  difficult  to  deter- 
mine in  any  particular  case  whether  a  liability  with  respect  to  the 
s.iuie  has  attached  to  the  city.  The  money  must  have  gone  into 
her  treasury,  or  been  appropriated  by  her;2  and  when  it  is  property 
other  than  money,  it  must  have  been  used  by  her,  or  be  under  her 
control.     But  with  reference  to  services  n  ndi  red,  the  case  is  different. 

i  acceptance  must  be  evidenced  by  ordinance  [or  express  cor- 
porate  action]  to  that  effect.  If  not  originally  authorized,  no  lia- 
bility can  attach  upon  any  ground  of  implied  contract.  The 
acceptance,  upon  which  alone  the  obligation  to  pay  could  arise, 
would   he  wanting." 

let  a  misapprehension,  they  and  relying  upon  such  promise  and  in  execu- 

*    ctor,    as  well   as   the   adjacent  tion  of  the  contract,  to  expend  money  and 

owner  "f  real  estate,  believing  the  street  perform  his  part  of  the  contract,  the  cor- 

within  the  corporate   limits  of  the  poration   is  liable  on  the  contract.     The 

having  like  knowledge  State  Board  of  Agriculture  v.   The  Citi- 

witb  the  members  of  the   council,   they  zens'   Streel     Railway   Co.,    47   Ind.   407 

,     liable  for  the  cost  of  such  (1874).     See  on  this  point  and  as  to  this 

improvement,  though  the  place  where  the  case  supra,  sec.  457,  note. 

is  made  is  aot  within  the  corporate  *  See  Dowell*.  Portland,  13  Oreg.  248. 

limits     Newman   v.    Sylvester,    42   Ind.  2  The  power  of  the  Massachusetts  Unions 

to  appropriate  money  is  derived  wholly  from 

li  is  the  general  doctrine  that  corpora-  the  statutes  (ante,  sec.  SO),  and  when  they 

■  hi-  ate  confined  to  a  particular  mode  of  creaU 

.  and  such    implied   powers  ing  a  debt,  the  mode  is  a  limitation  of  the 

•  are  n                             le  them  to  exer-  power.      One,  therefore,  who  loans  money 

ted,  and  no  to  a  town  treasurer  in  a  manner  not  au- 

-  there  may  be  a  de-  thorized  by  statute  has  no  right  of  action 

'   powei   in  a  corporation  to  make  a  against  the  town   to  recover  it,  although 

tde  by  it   is  not  the  money  was  used  in  paying  the  debts 

in  violation  of  the  charter  of  the  corpora-  of   the   town.      Agawam   Nat'l   Bank  v. 

Hon                   ■  rte  prohibiting  it.  and  the  South  Hadley,  128  Mass.  503. 

a  by  its  promise  induced  a  party, 


§461 


IMPLIED   CONTRACTS. 


537 


§  461.  Same  subject.  — "As  a  general  rule,  undoubtedly,  a  city- 
corporation  is  only  liable  upon  express  emit  facts,  authorized  by 
ordinance  [or  other  due  corporate  proceedings].  The  exceptions 
relate  to  liabilities  from  the  use  of  money  or  other  property  which 
does  not  belong  to  her,  or  to  liabilities  springing  from  the  neglect 
of  duties  imposed  by  the  charter,  from  which  injuries  to  parties  are 
produced.  There  are  limitations  even  to  these  exceptions  in  many 
instances,  as  where  property  or  money  is  received  in  disregard  of 
positive  prohibitions  ;  as,  for  example,  the  city  would  not  be  liable 
for  moneys  received  upon  the  issuance  of  bills  of  credit,  —  as  this 
would  be,  in  effect,  to  support  a  proceeding  in  direct  contravention 
of  the  inhibition  of  the  charter."  i  But  it  may  in  a  proper  case  make 
a  new  contract  purging  a  former  contract  of  its  illegality.2  Nor  is  a 
city  liable  for  money  received  for  notes  issued  by  it  to  circulate  as 
money,  in  violation  of  an  express  statute  and  the  public  policy  of  the 
State.3 


1  Per  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Argenti  v.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  255,  282  (1860).  Where 
statute  provisions  enacted  to  prevent  the 
making  of  certain  contracts  are  disregarded 
and  a  contract  made  without  observing 
them,  the  contractor  cannot  recover  the 
value  of  articles  supplied  under  the  con- 
tract upon  an  implied  liability  ;  in  such  a 
case  no  liability  can  be  implied.  McDon- 
ald v.  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23  ;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  Rep.  144,  commenting  on  Nelson  v. 
New  York,  63  N.  Y.  535  ;  and  Argenti  v. 
San  Francisco,  supra. 

"The  law,"  says  an  eminent  judge, 
"  never  implies  a  promise  to  pay  unless 
some  duty  creates  such  an  obligation,  and 
more  especially  it  never  implies  a  promise 
to  do  an  act  contrary  to  duty  or  contrary 
to  law.  Assumpsit  may  be  maintained 
against  a  municipal  corporation  in  certain 
cases  upon  an  implied  promise,  but  the 
better  opinion  is  that  a  promise  to  pay 
can  never  be  implied  in  a  case  where  the 
corporation  possesses  no  power  to  con- 
tract." Per  Clifford,  J.,  in  Burrill  v. 
Boston,  2  Clifford  C.  C.  590,  596  (1867). 
The  subject  is  farther  expounded  by  the 
same  learned  justice  in  his  opinion  in  The 
Collector  v.  Hubbard,  12  Wall.  1,  12 
(1370).  See,  also,  Curtis  v.  Fiedler,  2 
Black  (TJ.  S.),  478  ;  Murphy  v.  Louisville, 
9  Bush  (Ky.),  189  (1872). 

See  on  subject  of  implied  liability,  the 
judgment  of  the   United  States  Supreme 


Court  in  City  of  Louisiana  v.  Wood,  102 
TJ.  S.  294  ;  see  sees.  159  and  93S,  where 
the  subject  is  further  considered  ;  and  see 
Litchfield  v.  Ballon,  114  U.  S.  190.  Mor- 
awetz  on  Corp.  (2d  ed. )  sees.  689-706,  714- 
724,  collects  and  reviews  the  authorities 
as  to  the  rights  and  obligations  arising  out 
of  the  performance  or  part  performance  of 
contracts  in  excess  of  corporate  power. 

2  Little  Rock  v.  Mereh.  Nat.  Bank,  98 
TJ.  S.  308,  quoted  supra,  sec.  448,  note. 

3  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349 
(1870).  The  principles  upon  which  the 
decision  rests  are  admirably  stated  in  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  BracUt  i/.  <  !he<  aey 
v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53  (1875),  citing 
text  ;  State  Board  v.  Aberdeen,  56  Miss. 
51S  (approving  text);  Brown  v.  Belleville, 
30  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  37:1  ;  Went  worth  v. 
Hamilton,  34  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  585; 
Brown  v.  Lindsey,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
509  ;  Parsons  v.  Monmouth,  70  Me.  262 
(1879).  approving  text.  Supra,  sec.  448  ; 
post,  sec.  938. 

In  Cheeney  v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53 
(1875),  it  was  held  that  a  municipal  eorpo- 
ration  is  not  liable  upon  a  warrant  issued 
to  a  bank-note  company  in  payment  of  a 
debt  to  the  company  for  engraving  and 
printing  on  bank-note  paper  notes  paya- 
ble to  bearer,  to  be  put  into  circulation 
by  the  corporation  as  money  without  au- 
thority of  law.  The  court  held  that  there 
could  be  no  implied  assumpsit  in  such  a 


3 


Ml'NICII'AL    COKI'OKATIONS. 


§  462 


2.    Contracts;   Ultra  Vires  ;   Assumpsit.  —  "Whore  a  city,  with- 
out authority  of  Law,  issued  its  bonds  in  exchange  for  the  bonds  of 
mpany,  winch  remain  wholly  unpaid,  the  city  is  not  Ka- 
li its   bonds.      It'  in  .such  case  value  has  been  received  by  the 
the  remedy,  if  any  i  xists  under  the  special  circumstances,  must 
be  for  the  money  or  property  received  without  consideration.1 

Albert  Cheese  Co.  v.  Leeming,  31  U.  C.  C. 
J'.  272.  One  of  some  moment  has  been 
created  with  regard  to  municipal  corpora- 
tions. It  is  that  such  a  corporation  is  liable 
to  be  sued  in  an  action  of  debt  on  simple 
contract  for  the  price  of  goods  furnished, 
or  labor  done  at  their  request  and  accepted 
by  them.  Fetterly  v.  The  Municipality  of 
Russell  and  Cambridge,  14  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  433.  Though  in  such  a  case  there 
be  no  contract  under  seal,  the  law  implies 
an  undertaking  by  a  corporation  to  pay 
for  Labor  and  materials  employed  in  their 
service,  and  of  which  they  have  accepted 
and  are  enjoying  the  benefit,  provided  the 
purpose  for  which  the  labor  and  materials 
have  been  applied  is  one  clearly  within  the 
legitimate  object  of  their  charter.  Bart- 
lett  v.  The  Municipality  of  Amherstbnrg, 

I  I  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  152  ;  Fetterly  v.  The 
Municipality  of  Russell  and  Cambridge, 

II  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  433;  Pirn  v.  The 
Municipal  Council  of  Ontario,  9  Upper 
Can.  C*.  P.  302  ;  Perry  v.  The  Corporation 
of  Ottawa,  23  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  391  ; 
Brown   v.   Belleville,  30  Upper   Can.  Q. 

B.  373  ;  Wentworth  v.  Hamilton,  34 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  585  ;  Brown  v.  Lind- 
say, 35  lb.  509.  The  exception,  how- 
ever,  does  not  extend  to  executory  con- 
tracts, such  as  work,  &c,  to  be  done, 
but  is  confined  to  work  in  fact  done  and 
accepted.  McLean  v.  The  Town  Coun- 
cil of  the  Town  of  Brantford,  16  Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  347  ;  Wingate  v.  The  Ennis- 
killen  Oil  Refining  Co.,   14  Upper  Can. 

C.  P.  379  ;  Mayor,  &c.  v.  Hardwick, 
L.  R.  9  Exch.  13  ;  Austin  v.  Guardians, 
&c,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  91;  Houck  v.  Whitty, 
1  l  Grant,  671." 

1  Thomas   v.   Port   Hudson,    27  Mich. 
320  (187:;).     In  this  case  Cooley,  J.,  ob- 


oi     A 
City  v.  McClurkan,  11  Pa.  St.  81,  and  de- 
r'p  it  Lyceum,  5  1J. 
Mon.  (Ivy.) 

ility. —  City 

d  to  it  with  knowl- 

the  council,  though  no  ordinance 

I         1  authorizing  it  to 

be  furnished.      <bi>  Co.  v.  San  Francisco, 

9  Cal.  153,    166  (1858),  opinion  of  Field, 

.1.     li  i  eitj    sells  its  void  bonds,  there  is 

an  implied  assumpsit   to  repay  t! 

chase-money.     Paul  v.  Ki  Dosha,  22  Wis. 

266  (1867).     See  and  compare   Litchfield 

v.  Ballou,  111  U.  S.  L90.    Assumpsit  held 

to  lie  against  a  city   which  had  availed 

itself  of  the  property  and  services  of  an 

individual  in  ;t  sick. 

Nashville  v.  Toney,  10  Lea,  643.      Where 

a  bridge  corporation  wa  I  by  the 

■  boi  ities  to  communicate  to  them 

■  is  upon  which  the  city  m 

tach  its  water-pipes  to  the  bridge,  to  carry 

the  water  from  one  side  of  the  river  to  the 

other,     which    the     bridge    company   an- 

.  fixing  a  sum,  upon  which  the  city 

council    took   no  action,  but  proceeded   to 

extend    the    water-works   and    used  the 

bridge,  the  court  held  the  city  was  liable. 

.  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

57).     Broom  Commentaries  on  Com. 

17,  v,  here  the  Eng  are  cited 

in  which  corporations  have  been  held  liable 

■  i  fits  resulting 

i  •  i  ulai  cont  S  i    McDonald 

t>.N  '■  376);  s.  c.  ii:! 

Am.    Rep.   1  1 1.    Folgi  r,    J.,    suggi 

of  implied    liability  ;   post,   sees, 

Chief  Justice  II  irrison,  in  bis  excellent 
"Municipal  Manual  for  Upper  Canada," 
has  digested   the  decisions  in  the  Province 


""  the  subject  ol  the  power  of  corporations  serves  :  "  A  municipal  corporation  has  no 

atract.      !!•  ■-■'•■■     (5th  ed.  p.  11),  "It  general    authority    to    exchange    promises 

principle  applicable  to  all  corporations  with   other  corporations  or  persons;   its 

that  they  ma                 I    under  seal.     To  contracts,  to  be  valid,  must  be  within  the 

is  principle  there  are  some  exceptions,  scope  of  the  authority  conferred  upon  it 


§463 


RATIFICATION    OP    UNAUTHORIZED    CONTRACT. 


539 


§463  (385).  Ratification  of  Unauthorized  Contract. — A  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  ratify  the  unauthorized  acts  and  contracts  "I 
its  agents  or  officers,  which  are  within  the  scope  of  the  corporate  powers, 
hut  not  otherwise.  Ratification  may  frequently  he  interred  from  acqui- 
escence alter  knowledge  of  all  the  material  facts,  or  from  acts  incon- 
sistent with  any  other  supposition.  The  same  principle  is  applicable 
to  corporations  as  to  individuals.1    But  a  subsequent  ratiticatiun  cannot 


by  law,  and  for  municipal  purposes.     And 

if,  under  pretence  of  law,  its  ofliccrs  in  its 
name  obtain  money,  property,  or  rights 
in  action  which  equitably  belong  to  an- 
other, the  fact  may  entitle  the  party  to 
the  proper  remedy,  but  it  cannot  make 
good  bonds  issued  in  violation  of  law, 
unless  it  is  to  be  held  [which  i3  not  the 
law]  that  the  power  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions to  make  legal  promises  is  co-exten- 
sive with  that  of  individuals,  and  that 
any  contracts  they  may  make  are  valid 
where  it  can  be  said  that  anything  of 
value  was  given  or  inconvenience  sub- 
mitted to  in  exchange." 

If  the  consideration  received  under  an 
ultra  vires  contract  can  be  restored,  equity 
will  not  relieve  a  municipal  corporation 
from  the  contract  without  providing  for 
its  restoration.  Turner  v.  Cruzen,  70 
Iowa,  202.  See  Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  114 
U.  S.  190,  where  bonds  were  issued  by  a 
city  in  excess  of  a  constitutional  limita- 
tion, and  the  holder  was  adjudged  to  have 
no  remedy  against  the  city.  Post,  sec. 
529  a. 

i  People  v.  Swift,  31  Cal.  26  (1866)  ; 
Blen  v.  Bear  River  Co.,  20  Cal.  602 
(1862)  ;  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  17  N.  Y.  449, 
453  (1858),  and  authorities  cited,  revers- 
ing s.  c.  4  E.  D.  Smith,  413  ;  San  Fran- 
cisco Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisoo,  9  Cal.  453  ; 
Hoyt  v.  Thompson,  19  N.  Y.  207,  218 
(1859)  ;  Clarke  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181 
(1873)  ;  Howe  v.  Keeler,  27  Conn.  538  ; 
Emerson  v.  Newberry,  13  Pick.  (Mass.) 
377  ;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
110  (1846)  ;  5  Denio  (N.  Y.)  567  ;  People 
v.  Flagg,  17  N.  Y.  584  ;  s.  c.  16  How. 
(N.  Y.)  Pr.  36;  Brady  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  20  N.  Y.  312  ;  affirming  s.  c. 
2  Bosw.  173  ;  Delafield  v.  State  of  Illinois, 
2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  159,  176  (1841);  s.  c.  8 
Paige,  531,  and  26  Wend.  192;  Mills  v. 
Gleason,  11  Wis.  470  (1860)  ;  s.  c.  8  Am. 


Law   Peg.    693;  Dubuque   Fem.  Coll 
v.  Dubuque,   13   Iowa.    555  ;    fiierriuk   v. 
Plank  [load  Co.,  11  Iowa,  74,  per  WrigM, 

J.  ;  Detroit  v.  Jackson,  1  Doug.  (Mich.) 
106;  Crawshaw  v.  Roxbury,  7  Gray 
(Mass.),  374;  Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford 
C.  C.  590  (1867)  ;  Albany  National  Bank 
v.  Albany,  92  N.  Y.  363  ;  City  v.  Hays, 
93  Pa.  St.  72;  Galveston  v.  Morton,  53 
Tex.  409;  Strong  w.  District  of  Columbia, 
1  Mackey,  265 ;  Town  of  Durango  v. 
Pennington,  8  Col.  257  ;  Town  of  Bruce 
v.  Dickey,  116  111.  527  ;  Morris  County  v. 
Hinchman,  31  Kan.  729  ;  Lincoln  r.  Stock- 
ton, 75  Me.  141 ;  Davis  v.  Mayor  of 
Jackson,  61  Mich.  530  ;  Schmidt  v.  County 
of  Stearns,  34  Minn.  112 ;  Kinsley  v. 
Norris,  60  N.  H.  131  (a  vote  authorizing 
an  attorney  to  compromise  or  settle  suits 
held  a  ratification  of  authority  to  com- 
mence them)  ;  Moore  v.  Albany,  98  N.  Y. 
396 ;  Lewis  v.  Shreveport,  108  U.  S.  282 
(a  city  cannot  ratify  a  subscription  to  a 
railroad,  which  it  had  no  power  to  make, 
unless  authorized  to  do  so  by  statute). 
Mere  silence  on  the  part  of  a  town  will 
not  create  a  ratification.  Otis  v.  Stock- 
ton, 76  Me.  506 ;  post,  sec.  779,  note. 

A  municipal  corporation  may  ratify  un- 
authorized expenditures,  not  ultra  » 
which  they  deem  beneficial  to  it,  ami  such 
ratification,  as  in  the  case  of  natural  per- 
sons, is  equivalent  to  previous  authority. 
Backman  r.  Charlestown,  42  N.  H.  125  ; 
Harris  v.  Canaan  School  District,  8  Fost. 
(28  N.  H.)  65;  Wilson  v.  Chester  School 
District,  32  N.  H.  118;  Keyser  v.  Suna- 
pee  Charitable  School  District,  35  N.  H. 
477  ;  Episcopal  Society  v.  Dedham  Episco- 
pal Church,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  372  ;  Bank  of 
( lolumbia  v.  Patterson,  7  ( 'ranch.  299  ;  Ran- 
dall v.  Van  Vcchton,  19.Tohns.  (X.  Y.)  60  ; 
Trotl  v.  Warren,  2  Fairf.  (11  Me.)  227 ; 
Topsham  V.  Rogers,  42  Vt.  199  ;  People  v. 
Swift,  31   Cal.  26.     In  DeGrave  v.  Mon- 


540  MrXM'IPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  4G4 

make  valM  an  unlawful  act  without  the  scope  of  corporate  authority. 
An  absolute  excess  of  authority  by  the  officers  of  a  corporation,  in 
violation  of  law,  cannot  be  upheld  ;  and  where  the  officers  of  such  a 
body  fail  to  pursue  the  requirements  of  a  statutory  enactment  undei 
which  they  are  acting,  the  corporation  is  not  bound.  In  such  cases 
the  statute  must  be  strictly  followed  ;  and  a  person  who  deals  with 
a  municipal  body  is  obliged  to  see  that  its  charter  has  been  fully 
complied  with:  when  this  is  not  done,  no  subsequent  act  of  the  cor- 
poration  can  make  an  ultra  vires  contract  effective.1  The  employ- 
ment, however,  by  a  municipal  council,  of  an  attorney  to  defend  a 
in  charged  with  an  assault,  does  not  adopt  his  act  so  as  to 
lender  the  city  liable  for  the  damages  recovered  against  him.2 

ij  1 1 >4  (386).  Assent  and  Ratification. — Where  work  done  for  a 
corporation  without  complete  legal  authorization  is  for  a  corporate 
purpose  and  is  beneficial  to  it,  and  the  juice  reasonable,  strong  evi- 
d<  nee  of  the  assent  of  the  corporation  is  not  required  ;  but  such  assent 
must  he  shown.  Ratification  of  the  acts  of  a  committee  in  building 
upon  the  land  of  a  school  district  a  more  expensive  house  than  they 
were  authorized  to  do  by  the  vote  of  the  corporation  cannot  be  in- 
ferred from  the  mere  fact  that  the  school  is  kept  in  it  for  a  few 
weeks,  there  being  no  evidence  that  the  corporation  had  knowledge 
of  the  over-expenditure,  or  had  taken  any  action  on  the  subject.3 

mouth,  19  Eng.  C.  L.  300,  it  was  held  that  (N.  Y.)   48;   Brown  v.    Mayor,   63  XT.  Y. 

the  examination  of  weights  ami  measures,  239;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 

which    had    been  ordered  by  a  mayor  de  110;  McDonald  v.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.   23; 

.  ami  which  were  the  subject  of  the  Smith    v.     Newburgh,    77    XT.    Y.    130  ; 

conti  '.    it  a  inciting  of  the  Green   v.  Cape    May,    41  N.  J.  L.   45,  ap- 

and    the   subsequent   use  of  proving  text  ;   Taymouth  v.  Koehler,  35 

boi f  them,  recognized  the  contract  for  Mich.  22;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall. 

their  purchase  and  made  the  corporation  676;  llorton  v.  Thompson,  71  N.  Y.  513; 

liable  to  pay  for  them.     As  to  ratification  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591; 

of  contracts  for  lord  improvements  when  Ashbury  Railway  Carriage  &  Iron  Co.  v. 

primarily  a  charge   or,  the  city,  see  Eiche,   L.   R.   7    E.  &    I.   App.  C.   653; 

Murphy  r.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189  Lewis  v.  Shreveport,  108  U.  S.  282;  Scott 

(1872  c.  481,  note;  infra,  sees.  v.   Shreveport,    20    Fed.   Rep.  714;   San 

l  Broom  Commentaries  on  Com.  Diego  Water  Co.  v.  San  Diego,   59  Cal. 

Law,  567.     A  vote  ratifying  an  unauthor-  517;  Bank  v.  Statesville,  84  X.  C.   169; 

ized  contrad  cannot  I  I  at  a  sul>-  City  of  Laredo  v.  Macdonnell,   52  Tex. 

•it  meeting.     Brown  v.  Winterport,  511. 

2  Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.),- 

U     ie  Co.  v.  Van  Dusan,  172  (1861)  ;  post,  sees.  479,975  ;  Mooreu 

'     v.  Arrighi,  54  Mayor,    73   N.   Y.   238,  approving  text  ; 

e.  St.  Paul,  n  Minn.  174;  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  352  ;  Wilhelm   v. 

Philadelphia,    48  Pa.  St.  528;  Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa,  254,  approving  text. 

v.  Mayor,  20  X.  Y.  312;  Bryan  v.  3  Wilson  v.  School  District,  32  N.  H. 

P    ■  ■  :'  T  P  •   i  on  >:  Mayor,  17  118  (1855).     See,  further,   as  to  effect    <f 

18  Barb,  ua    as  a  ratification,  Kingman  v.  School 


§465 


contracts:    assent  and  ratification. 


541 


§  405  (387).  Same  subject.  —  The  ratification,  whatever  its 
form,  must  be  by  the  principal  or  by  authorized  agents.  This  is  well 
illustrated  by  a  case  where,  by  statute,  certain  agents  or  officers  of  a 
State  were  authorized  to  borrow  money  for  public  use,  and  for  that 
purpose  to  sell  its  bonds  at  not  less  than  their  par.  value.  They  ex- 
ceeded their  power  by  selling  for  less  than  par,  and  on  credit.     It 


District,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  425  ;  Davis  v. 
School  District,  24  Me.  349  ;  Lane  v. 
School  District,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  462; 
Chaplin  v.  Hill,  24  Vt.  (1  Dean)  628; 
Fisher  v.  School  District,  4  Cush.  (Mass.) 
494  ;  Tat't  v.  Montague,  14  Mass.  285 ; 
Keyser  v.  School  District,  35  N.  H.  477  ; 
Pratt  v.  Swanton,  15  Vt.  147  (use  of 
bridge  by  public). 

In  Wilson  v.  School  District,  above 
cited,  Mr.  Justice  Bell  well  remarks  :  "In 
most  cases  where  work  and  labor  is  per- 
formed upon  real  estate  by  contract,  the 
mere  fact  that  the  owner  makes  use  of  the 
building  or  structure  built  upon  his  land 
furnishes  no  evidence  of  approval  or  ac- 
ceptance, because  he  has  no  choice  to 
reject  it.  Alone,  the  use  of  such  build- 
ings gives  no  evidence  of  acceptance. 
Accompanied  by  silence  and  absence  of 
complaint,  where  to  complain  would  be 
natural  and  suitable,  or  by  any  circum- 
stance indicating  acquiescence,  it  would 
be  sufficient."  32  N.  H.  125.  As  to  ef- 
fect of  acceptance  of  public  work  by  the 
agents  of  the  town,  see  Wadleigh  v.  Sut- 
ton, 6  N.  H.  15  (1832).  Of  school-house 
built  upon  a  quantum  meruit  employment 
by  a  committee,  but  without  a  legal  con- 
tract. Kimball  v.  School  District,  28  Vt. 
8  (1855).  See,  also,  Corwin  v.  Wallace,  17 
Iowa,  334  ;  Zottman  v.  San  Francisco,  20 
Cal.  96  (valuable  discussion)  :  approved, 
Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189 
(1872)  ;  Jordan  v.  School  District,  38  Me. 
164  (1S54)  ;  Reichard  v.  Warren  County, 
31  Iowa,  331  (1871).  Surveyor  of  high- 
ways cannot  recover  of  the  town  for  work 
voluntarily  performed,  there  being  no 
contract,  not  even  if  beneficial.  Sikes  v. 
Hatfield,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  347  (1859); 
infra,  sec.  466. 

A  public  corporation  is  not  liable  for 
work  done  against,  or  even  without,  its 
direction  or  authority  (such  as  building  a 
bridge,  road,  school-house,  &c),  although 


these  are  afterwards  used  by  the  public 
or  the  district.      Loker  v.   Brookline,   13 

Pick.  (Mass.)  343(1832);  Knowlton  v.  In- 
habitants, &c,  14  Me.  (2  Shep.)  25,  where 
note  critique  on,  and  remarks  of  .!/■  '/•  n, 
C.  J.,  as  to  Hayden  v.  Madison,  7  Greenl. 
(Me.)  79  ;  Morrell  v.  Dixfield,  30  Me.  (16 
Shep.)  157,  160;  Davis  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 24  Me.  (10  Shep.)  349;  Hayward 
v.  School  District,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  419 
(1848);  lb.  426  ;  Moor  v.  Cornville,  13  Me. 
293  (1836)  (where  the  action  was  brought 
by  the  surveyor  or  supervisor  of  high- 
ways, who  built  a  bridge  without  pur- 
suing the  course  pointed  out  by  law)  ; 
Allen  v.  Cooper,  22  Me.  133  (deciding 
that  the  power  of  a  committee  with  au- 
thority to  contract  to  make  a  road,  does 
not  embrace  power  to  accept  the  work  or 
waive  performance).  But  if  the  work  be 
done  under  belief  of  authority,  as  where 
it  was  performed  under  a  contract  with  a 
committee  who  assumed  to  have  author- 
ity, but  who,  in  fact,  had  none,  then  if 
the  corporation  accept  it,  or  even  know- 
ingly avail  itself  of  it,  it  will  be  liable 
to  pay  a  reasonable  compensation  ;  and  a 
promise  thus  to  pay  may  be  implied  on 
the  part  of  a  corporation  from  the  acts  of 
its  general  agent,  or  an  agent  with  powers 
of  a  general  character [?].  Abbot  V.  Her- 
man, 7  Me.  (Greenl.)  IIS  ;  Hayden  v. 
Madison,  lb.  79.  "Perhaps  these  two 
cases  carry  the  doctrine  of  the  implied 
responsibility  of  corporations  as  far  as  it 
ought  to  be  carried."  Per  Emery,  J.,  in 
Ruby  v.  Abysin.  Society,  15  Me.  306,  308 
(1839).  As  to  extent  of  powers  of  New 
England  towns,  see  ante,  sees.  29,  30. 
And  see,  particularly,  Jordan  v.  8 
District,  and  other  cases  cited,  supra  ; 
Baltimore  v.  Reynolds,  20  Md.  1  (1862)  ; 
Bague  c.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527  ; 
Moore  v.  Mayor,  73  N.  Y.  238,  approving 
text. 


542 


MINICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  t65 


contended  that  this  contract  was  ratified,  because  the  governor, 
he  knew  of  the  contract,  signed  the  bonds  and  caused  them  to 
be  delivered,  and  because  the  auditor  and  some  of  the  other  State 
officers  acted  under  the  contracts,  drawing  money  and  receiving  pay- 
ments. But  it  was  held  that  these  officials  were  likewise  agents  of 
limited  authority  ;  that,  as  they  would  have  had  no  power  to  make 
the  contracts  originally,  they  could  not  ratify  them;  that  ratifica- 
tion  must  come  from  the  principal,  —  the  State,  represented  by  its 

lature.1 


i  Delafield  v.  State  of  Illinois,  2  Hill 
(N.  v.-,  L59,  17.'.  where  difference  be- 
:  itification  by  a  State  and  by  other 
or  by  individuals  is  clearly 
set  forth  by  Branson,  J.  :  affirming  8.  c.  8 
Paige,  531  ;  s.  c.  further,  26  Wend.  192. 
In  further  illustration  of  the  text,  see 
Hague  v.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527  ; 
Hotchin  v.  Kent,  8  Mich.  526;  Murphy  v. 
|  die,    9  B  ish    (Ky.),    1-'.'    (1872)  ; 

Marsh    v.    Fulton  County,   10   Wall.   676 
.  (a    leading   case   in   the  Supreme 
<  of  the  United  States  on  the  subject 

of  ratification);  Dubuque   Fern.  College  v. 
Dubuqu  ,    13  Iowa,  555  ;   Estey  v.  Inhab- 
oinster,    97    Mass.    324  ; 
Branham    v.  San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585  ;  At- 
torney-General v.    Lathrop,  24    Mich.  235 
Wilhelm    v.    Cedar   Comity,    50 
case  of  the  City  [of  St. 
Louis]  v.  Armstrong,  56  Mo.  298  (1874), 
e  in  which  the  city  was 
arts  of  its  officers  by 
availing  itself  of  the  benefit  of  their  acts. 
The   case  was   this  :  The  city  wished  to 
build  a  sewer  through  the  defendant's  lot; 
ondemn  or  get  his 

,  li msented  on  condition  that 

he  could  have  three  years  in  which  to  pay 
his  proportion  of  the  cost  of  the 
the  officers  of  the  city,  without  any  ex- 
l  ■  thoi  I.    T        iwer  was 

thi    three  yea 
the  city  sued  the  defendant   for  his  por- 
tion of  the  co  '  of  the  3ewer ;  and  it  was 
held    thai     the     suit     was     prematurely 
!  thai  the  city,  by  using  the 
lut's  land   under  the  agreemenl  of 
md  by  that  agreement. 
What  '■■  lights  if  the 

i   put  the  defendant  in  statu  quo, 

the    right    of     way,     and 

•  U  fore  bringing   rail 


for  the  cost  of  the  sewer,  was  a  question 
not  involved,  and  not  decided. 

In  applying  the  doctrine  that  unauthor- 
ized corporate  acts  may  be  ratified,  other 
principles  of  law  must  he  borne  in  mind. 
The  care  which,  in  this  respect,  should 
be  observed,  is  very  clearly  set  forth  by 
Denio,  J.,  in  giving  judgment  in  Peterson 
v.  .Mayor,  &e.  of  New  York,  17  N.  Y. 
149,  154  (1858).  "  For  instance,  no  sort 
of  ratification  can  make  good  an  act  with- 
out the  scope  of  the  corporate,  authority. 
So  where  the  charter  or  a  statute  binding 
upon  the  corporation  has  committed  a  class 
of  acts  to  particular  officers  or  agents, 
other  than  the  governing  body,  or  where 
it  has  prescribed  certain  formalities  as 
conditions  to  the  performance  of  any  de- 
scription of  corporate  business,  the  proper 
functionaries  must  act,  and  the  designated 
forms  must  be  observed,  and  generally  no 
act  of  recognition  can  supply  a  defect  in 
these  respects."  Brady  v.  Mayor,  &c,  20 
X.  Y.  312;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  110;  17  N.  Y.  584;  Gates  v. 
Hancock,  45  N.  H.  528  ;  Reilly  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 60  Pa.  St.  467  ;  supra,  sees.  463, 
464  ;  Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  County,  50  Iowa 
254. 

Where  the  corporation  can  only  act  hy 
orrlinancr,  the  ratification  must  be  by  or- 
dinance.  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco, 
16  Cal.  591  (1860)  ;  Pimental  v.  San 
Francisco,  21  Cal.  351  ;  Cross  v.  Morris- 
town,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  305  (1867)  ;  ante, 
chap.  xii. 

Legislature  may,  within  constitutional 
limits,  ratify  or  authorize  ratification. 
Campbell  u  Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194;  Super- 
visors v.  Schenck,  lb.  772  ;  Keithsburg  '•. 
Frick,  34  111.  405;  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11 
Wis.  470;  Winn  v.  Macon,  21  Ga.  275; 
Grogan    v.     San     Francisco,   18    Cal.  590 


§466 


CONTRACTS  '.     LETTING    TO    THE    LOWEST    BIDDER. 


543 


§  466  (388).   Letting  to  the  Lowest  Bidder.  —  Where  the  charter 
or  incorporating  act  requires  the  officers  of  the  city  to  award 
tracts  to  the  lowed  bidder,  a  contract  made  in  violation  of  its  require- 
ments is  illegal;  and  in  an  action  brought  on  such  contract  for  the 
work,  the  city  may  plead  its  illegality  in  defence;1  and  neither  the 


(1861)  ;  Hasbrouckw.  Milwaukee,  'Jl  Wis. 
217  (1866);  Mills  v.  Charleton,  29  Wis. 
400(1872);  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  576  and 
note  ;  ante,  sec.  79';  sec.  161,  note.  In 
Shawnee  County  v.  Carter,  2  Kan.  115 
(1863),  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  held 
invalid,  as  not  being  within  the  rightful 
scope  of  legislative  power,  an  act  of  the 
legislature  which  declared  valid  and  bind- 
ing bonds  which  had  been  issued  by  the 
county  officers  on  account  of  the  county 
courtdiouse,  and  which  bonds  were  not  en- 
forceable against  the  county  because  dif- 
fering in  form  and  substance  from  the 
warrants  authorized  by  the  statute.  Such 
a  strict  limitation  on  legislative  power  is 
not  generally  asserted.  See,  on  this  point 
chap.  iv.  ante,  and  post,  sec.  544. 

1  Brady  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
20  N.  Y.  (6  Smith)  312  (1859).  It  is 
intimated  that  it  is  not  essential  to  the 
defence  that  the  city  should  show  a  fraudu- 
lent collusion  between  the  bidder  and  the 
officers  awarding  the  contract.  Whether 
the  city  is  liable  on  a  quantum  meruit  to 
one  who  has  bona  fide  performed  labor  un- 
der a  void  contract,  where  the  work  has 
been  accepted  and  used,  was  not  deter- 
mined, lb.;  s.  c.  2  Bosw.  173  ;  7  Abb.  Pr. 
R.  234;  16  Abb.  Pr.  R.  432.  As  further  il- 
lustrating the  text,  see  People  v.  Flagg,  17 
N.  Y.  584  ;  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  &c,  17 
N.  Y.  457,  referring  to  but  expressing  no 
opinion  upon  Christopher  v.  Mayor,  &c, 
13  Barb.  (X.  V.)  567  ;  Appleby  v.  Mayor, 
&c,  15  How.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  428;  Harlem 
Gas  Co.  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  33 
N.  Y.  389  ;  Maeey  v.  Titcombe,  19  Ind. 
135(1862);  Bonesteel  r.  Mayor,  &c,  22 
N.  Y.  162  ;  Smith  v.  Mayor,  &c,  21  How. 
(N.  Y.)  Pr.  1  ;  Greene  v.  Mayor,  60  N.  Y. 
303  (137.")  :  reversing  s.  c.  1  Hun,  29  ; 
Yarnold  ».  Lawrence,  15  Kan.  126  (1S75); 
Dickinson  v.  Poughkeepsie,  75  N.  Y.  65, 
citing  text  ;  Eager,  In  re,  46  N.  Y.  100  ; 
Nasi,  I?.  St.  Paul,  8  Minn.  172(1863);  s.  c. 
11  Minn.  171  ;  White  v.  New  Orleans,  15 
La.  An.  667  ;  State  v.  Barlow,  48  Mo.  17 


(1871)  ;  post,  sec.  832,  note;  Breevorl  v. 
Detroit,  24  Mich.  322  (1872)  ;  M  ty  <-. 
Detroit,  2  Mich.  N.  1'.  Rep.  235  (1871); 
Shaw  v.  Trenton,  49  X.  J.  Law,  339  ; 
State  r.  Trenton  (N.  J.),  12  At.  Rep.  902 
(1888);  Trenton  v.  Shaw  (N.  J.),  10  At. 
Rep.  273  (1SS7)  ;  Davenport  v.  Klein- 
schmidt  (contract  to  take  water),  Mont., 
13  Pac.  Rep.  249.  There  can  be  no  recov- 
ery againsl  a  municipal  corporati  in  for  ■  e- 
tra  work  where  tin?  officers  who  requested 
it  to  be  done  had  no  authority.  Hague  v. 
Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527;  O'Hara  v. 
New  Orleans,  30  La.  An.  152  ;  Addis  v. 
Pittsburg,  85  Pa.  St.  379  (1877)  ;  Bone- 
steel  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  22  N.  Y. 
162.  Thus  a  contract  by  S.  to  erect  a 
building  for  a  city  stipulated  that  the  work 
should  be  done  according  to  certain  plans 
and  specifications;  that  a  certain  commit- 
tee, or  the  architect,  might  direct  in  writing 
any  deviations  therefrom,  in  which  casesuch 
sums  of  money  should  be  added  to  or  de- 
ducted from  the  agreed  juice  as  the  parties 
should  judge  the  increase  or  diminut  inn  to 
be  worth,  and  that  no  alterations  should 
be  paid  for  unless  directed  in  writing.  In 
excavating,  the  soil  was  found  by  the 
architect  to  require  piles  to  be  driven  to 
secure  a  firm  foundation  ;  whereupon  he 
furnished  piling  plans,  directed  S.  to  do 
the  work,  and  orally  promised  him  that 
he  should  be  paid  for  it.  //<  '■',  that  the 
city  was  not  bound  by  the  architect's  oral 
promise.  Stuart  v.  Cambridge,  125  Mass. 
102. 

If  the  lowest  bidder  is  required  to  give 
security  and  the  law  requires  publ lc  notice 
>*als,  any  contract  withoul  a  com- 
pliance with  the  law  is  unauthorized  and 
void.  Dickinson  v.  Poughkeepsie,  71  N. 
Y.  65  ;  Eager,  In  re,  46  N.  Y.  100  ;  Max- 
well v.  Stanislaus,  53  Cal.  389. 

A  provision  that  the  •'commissioners 
shall  in  no  case  proceed  with  tin-  construc- 
tion of  any  sewer  except  upon  advertise- 
ment" to  be  let  to  the  lowi  >1  bidder, 
applies  only  to  a  contract  for  original  con- 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§467 


municipality  nor  its    subordinate  officers  can  make  a  binding  con- 

>,h  work  except  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of 

I  tw.1     So  where  the  charter  requires  any  sale  or  lease  of  the  real 

ite  of  a  city  to  be  made  at  public  a  action  to  the  highest  bidder,  an 

f  the  council  of  the  city  making  a  lease  of  a  portion  of  its 

,  upon  the  payment  of  a  rent  reserved,  is  void.2 

§  407   (389).    Lowest    Bidder ;    Patented    Inventions.  —  The    Su- 

preme  Court  of  Michigan  has  affirmed,  while  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Wisconsin  and  of  other  States  have  denied,  the  proposition  that 
where  a  city  charter  provides  that  no  contraets  shall  be  made  by  the 
city  except  with  the  lowest  bidder,  after  advertisement  of  proposals, 
it  does  not  prohibit  the  corporation  from  contracting  to  lay  Nicholson 
pavement,  though  the  right  to  lay  it  is  patented  and  owned  by  a 


Btruction.  If  the  original  contractor 
as  the  work,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
re-advertise  and  lei  to  the  lowesl  bidder, 
the  original  contractor  being  liable  for  the 
of  rust  over  his  conl  racl  price. 
L  53  X.  Y.  100  (1    73). 

Where  contracts  for  public  work  are 
required  by  law  to  l»j  made  by  advertising 
Is  and  specifications,  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  competitive  bidding,  such 
specifications  must  be  definite  as  to  the 
quantity  as  well  as  the  quality  of  m 
required,  or  the  contract  will  be  void. 
Biglerr.  New  York,  5  Abb.  (X.  Y.)  N. 
51. 

New  York  Art  of  1 8S6, 
chap.  142,  requiring  sale  at  auction  by 
municipal  corporations  of  right  to  build 
and  operate  railways  on  streets  to  the 
iih!  !  r.  See  People  v.  Barnard, 
110  X.  Y.  :.  I-  I1S88). 

paving  is  not  defective 
in  not  distinguishing  between  the  portions 
nf  the  improvement  chargeable  to  tin-  lots 
i.  -  on  tin'    street,   ami  the  portion 

■  :  he  city,  where  the  relative 
idy     been     fixed. 
Beniteauv.  Detroit,  tl  Mich.  11''.     Rem- 
edy of  Follmer   v.   Nuckolls 
'!  u'k  v.   Day- 
ton, /''.  192.     Whether,  when  theworkis 
i  thai  ii<  ultimate  cost 
cannot  be  fori  >een,  there  can  he  any  choice 
McBrian  v.  Grand 
Rapids,  56  Mi  Q.  95. 


The  New  York  city  charter  of  1873, 
containing  a  provision  similar  to  that 
stated  in  the  text,  was  construed  to  re- 
quire a  submission  for  competition  of 
every  important  item  of  a  contemplated 
work.  Matter  of  Merriam,  84  N.  Y.  596. 
Where  the  charter  is  imperative  that  con- 
tracts for  public  works  should  be  let  to 
the  lowest  bidder  and  the  lowest  bidder 
withdraws  his  hid,  it  is  the  duty  to  adver- 
tise again  and  not  to  award  the  contract 
to  the  next  lowest  bidder.  Twiss  v.  Port 
Huron,  63  Mich.  528  (1886)  ;  s.  c.  30 
X.  W.  Rep.  177. 

1  Addis  v.  Pittsburg,  85  Pa.  St.  379 
(1877). 

2  San  Francisco  &  Oakland  R.  Co.  v. 
Oakland,  43  Oal.  502  (1872). 

Where  the  charter  requires  that  all 
work  for  the  city  shall  be  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  after  a  prescribed  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  of  letting  shall  have  been 
given,  and  requires  that  similar  notice 
shall  be  given  where  work  is  re-let,  an 
nit nt  upon  a  lot  for  work  done  is 
void  if  the  contrad  was  let  or  re-let  with- 
out notice.  Mitchell  v.  Milwaukee,  18 
Wis.  92  (1864)  ;  see,  also,  Wells  v.  Burn- 
ham,  2o  Wis.  112  ;  Ilasbrouek  v.  Milwau- 
ki  e,  21  Wis.  217  (1866).  Owner  may,  in 
suidi  ease,  restrain  the  sale.  lb.  The  con- 
'  must  be  the  same  that  was  advertised. 
Nash  v.  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174. 


§  4G8     contracts:  lowest  bidder;  patented  inventions.       545 

single  firm.     The  question  is  close;  but  there  seems,  so  far,  to  be  a 
tendency  in  the  courts  to  adopt  the  Wisconsin  view.1 

§468  (390).  Same  subject.  —  When;  the  municipal  authorities 
were  required  by  law  to  advertise  for  sealed  'proposals  for  making 

local  improvements,  and  award  the  work  to  the  lowest  n 
bidder,  to  publish  a  notice  of  the  award,  and  to  allow  the  owners  of 
the  major  part  of  the  frontage  to  take  the  contract  upon  tin;  same 
terms  if  they  should  desire,  the  court  were  of  opinion  that  the  city 
authorities  had  no  power  to  do  work  which  could  not  be  contracted 
for  in  this  mode,  or  which  the  abutters  could  not  themselves  per- 
form, and  that  the  award  of  a  contract  for  a  patented  pavement  to 
the  assignee  of  the  patentee,  who  had  the  exclusive  right  to  lay  the 
same,  was  unauthorized,  and  the  contract  void.2 

As  the  purpose  of  such  a  provision  in  the  charter  is  to  secure, 
through  competition,  the  most  advantageous  terms,  something  is 
necessarily  left  to  the  discretion,  to  be  fairly  exercised  of  course,  of 


l  Dean  v.  Charlton,  23  "Wis.  590  (1869); 
Nicholson  Pavement  Co.  v.  Painter,  35  Cal. 
699  ;  Hobart  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich.  246 
(1868).  Dean  v.  Charlton,  supra,  was 
approved  by  Sutherland,  J.,  in  Dolan  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  4  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  s.) 
397  (1S68),  and  followed  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Louisiana  in  Burgess  v.  Jefferson, 
21  La.  An.  143  (1869),  in  which  it  appeared 
that  the  contractors  with  the  city  had  the 
exclusive  right  to  lay  the  patented  pave- 
ment in  the  State.  But  under  provisions 
of  law  relating  to  the  city  of  New  York, 
which  require  all  work  to  be  done  and 
supplies  to  be  furnished  to  be  by  contract, 
where  the  expenditure  will  exceed  §1,000, 
and  which  direct  all  contracts  to  be  made 
or  let,  after  advertisement,  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  the  city  council  is  not,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  prohibited 
from  making  or  paving  a  street  in  the 
manner  or  witli  materials  which  do  not 
admit  of  competitive  bids.  Dugro,  In  re, 
50  N.  Y.  513  (1873).  The  subject  is 
discussed  by  Brewer,  J.,  in  Yarnold  v. 
Lawrence,  15  Kan.  126  (1875),  who  in- 
clined to  the  Michigan  view,  but  the 
question  was  not  decided  by  the  court. 
Further,  as  to  rights  of  lowest  bidders,  see 
Attorney-General  v.  Detroit,  41  Mich.  224; 
s.  c.  12  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  149;  see 
also  Detroit  v.  Robinson,  42  Mich.  198  ; 
vol.  i.  —  35 


Detroit  v.  Robinson,  38  Mich.  10S  ;  jyosf, 
sees.  468,  870,  note,  909,  791,  note, 
to  Dean  v.  Charlton,  supra,  see  Mills  v. 
Charleston,  29  Wis.  400,  and  D 
Borchenius,  30  Wis.  236,  the  legislature 
having  validated  tlie  assessment.  Post, 
sec.  814  and  note.  See,  also,  Eager,  ///  re, 
46  N.  Y.  100  (1871).  Liability  of  city 
to  patentee  to  pay  him  "royalty."  Bige- 
low  v.  Louisville,  3  Fish.  Pat.  Cas.  602 
(1869)  ;  post,  sec.  966.  Where  a 
does  not  require  a  contract  to  be  let  to  the 
lowest  bidder  after  advertising  for  propo- 
sals at  the  expense  of  abutters,  although 
such  contracts  may  be  made  by  private 
agreement  with  the  city,  they  must  be 
fairly  made  at  reasonable  prices,  with  due 
regard  to  the  lot-owners'  interests,  or  equity 
will  relieve  against  them.  Cook  v.  Racine, 
49  Wis.  243;  s.  c.  5  X.  W.  Rep. 

2  Nicholson  Pavement  Company  v. 
Painter,  35  Cal.  699  (1868).  This  case 
was  decided  before  Dean  v.  CI 
supra,  and  the  "pinion  of  Sand  •  .  J., 
in  its  genera]  scope,  sustains  the  view  of 
the  Wisconsin  court  :  and  approving  of 
the  language  of  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Zottman's 
C  .  -Jo  Cal.  102,  treats  "the 
constituting  the  measure  of  the  power." 
Post,  chap.  xix.  ;  ante,  sec.  98  ;  post,  sec. 
669. 


546  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  g  470 

council,  in  the  adoption  of  the  course  which  will  best  attain 
end;  and  it  does  not  contravene  this  restriction  to  call  forbids 
;  utting  down  various  kinds  of  wood  and  stone  pavements,  some 
patented  and  some  not,  and  afterwards,  when  all  the  proposals  are 
in,  selecting  the  one  which  is  relatively  the  lowest  or  the  most  satis- 
factory, all  things  considered;  hut  when  the  kind  is  thus  selected, 
thf  lowest  responsible  biddeT  who  has  the  lawful  power  to  perform 
his  undertaking,  lias  the  absolute  legal  right  to  have  the  contract 
awarded  to  him.1 

^  t69  391).  Lowest  Bidder  ;  Exclusive  Right.  —  In  an  action  on 
.i  contract  for  lighting  certain  streets  in  New  York  City  with  gas,  it 
appeared  that  the  company  hail,  by  law,  the  exclusive  rigid  to  fur- 
nish  that  part  of  the  city  with  gas.  The  charter  of  the  city,  how- 
required  all  contracts  for  wants  and  supplies  beyond  a  certain 
value,  which  the  contract  in  suit  exceeded,  to  be  Id  to  the  loivest 
bidder,  and  the  contract  not  being  so  let,  it  was  claimed  to  be  void. 
It  was  held  that  since  the  company  had  the  exclusive  right  to  fur- 
nish the  gas  (which  prevented  competition),  the  provision  of  the 
charter  requiring  contracts  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  (with  a 
view  to  secure  competition)  was  inapplicable,  and  the  contract  was 
tained  under  the  general  corporate  power  of  the  city  to  contract 
for  the  lighting  of  its  streets.2 

§  470  f392).    "When  Contract  completed.  —  Although  notice  has 
pvhiisJied  inviting  proposals  to  do  public  work,  yet  the  contract 
is  incomplete  until  the  proposal  is  actually  accepted,  and  the  cor- 
poration  inviting  the  proposal  is  not,  it  seems,  liable  to  damages 
for  ■  to  accept  on  offer,  even  though  it  be  the  lowest  regular 

r  made.     It  is  certainly  not  thus  liable  where  the  notice  and  the 
proposals  with  respect  to  the  amount  and  form  of  the  security,  do 

1  Attorney-l                 Detroit,  41  Mich.  8  Harlem  Has  Co.  v.   New  York,   33 

221  ;  s.  o.  12  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s.)  March,  X.  Y.  309.     Where  a  city  has  authority  to 

.   p.  1  1'.'.     Remedy  of  lowest  bidder  contract  therefor,  it  cannot  resist  payment 

when  contract  is  awarded  to  another.   lb.;  for  gaslight   furnished,    because  of  illegal 

Kelly    >•■   Chicago,    62   111.    279    (1S71);  as  to  the  particular  fund  from 

chap.  xxii.  sec.  '.'17.  which   payment    would  be  made.       The 

onncil  of  a  city  held                  10  consideration  of  such  promises  being  legal, 

powi                                                ling  (if  a  the  [nice  would  he  payable,  if  nut  other- 

■  until  they  fust,  shall  have  enacted  wise,   out  of  the  general  fund;  and  the 

rdinance   f"r  the  said   improvement,  objectionable  provisions  may  be  rejected, 

tract   1       let    to    tin-  ami  the  rest  of  the  contract  permitted  to 

.    ittcr  publication  <>f  notice  stand.      Nebraska  City  v.  Nebraska  Gas 

■petition.     Fulton  v.  Lincoln,  Co.,  9  Neb.  339. 

i»  Neb. 


§471 


CONTRACTS   OF   SURETYSHIP. 


547 


not  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  ordinances  of  the  city,  and 
where  these  provided  that  contracts  should  not  be  executed  until 
laid  before  the  common  council.1  The  rule  against  combination  to 
prevent  bidding  at  auction  sales  applies  to  proposals  for  government 
work,  in  response  to  a  call  therefor,  aiming  at  a  contract  with  the 
lowest  bidder;  and  a  combination  of  contractors  whereby  the  privi- 
lege of  bidding  is  secured  by  one,  without  competition,  is  against 
public  policy  and  illegal  ;  and  if  it  results  in  a  letting  at  unreason- 
able prices,  it  authorizes  a  rejection  of  the  proposal  or  a  repudiation 
of  the  contract.2 


§  471  (393).  Contracts  of  Suretyship.  —  A  municipal  corpora- 
tion cannot,  without  legislative  authority,  become  surety  for  another 
corporation  or  an  individual ;  cannot  guarantee  the  bonds  or  obliga- 
tions of  another,  or  make  accommodation  indorsements.  Such  an 
authority  cannot  be  implied  or  deduced  from  the  general  and  usual 
powers  conferred  upon  such  corporations.     Although  such  a  corpo- 


1  Smith  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
ION.  Y.  (6  Said.)  504  (1853),  affirming 
s.  c.  4  Sandf.  S.  C.  R.  221.  "The  notice 
inviting  proposals  to  do  the  work,"  says 
Willard,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  (10  N.  Y.  504),  "did 
not,  in  my  judgment,  bind  the  street  com- 
missioner of  the  corporation  to  accept, 
at  all  events,  the  lowest  bid,  even  though 
in  all  respects  formal.  Until  the  bid  is 
accepted  by  some  act  on  the  part  of  the 
corporation,  no  obligatory  contract  was 
created."  See,  also,  People  v.  Croton 
Aqueduct  Board,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  240; 
Greene  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  60 
N.  Y.  303  (IS 75) ;  State  v.  Directors,  &c, 
5  Ohio  St.  234  (1855);  Altemus  v.  Mayor, 
&c,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  446;  Argenti  v.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  255  ;  Wiggins  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 2  Brews.  (Pa.)  444;  lb.  443; 
Keogh  v.  Wilmington,  4  Del.  Ch.  491. 

A  board  of  commissioners  charged  with 
the  duty  of  contracting  for  a  public  work 
need  not  call  for  bids  or  proposals  unless 
expressly  required.  But  if  they  choose 
to  invite  competition,  they  may,  after 
accepting  a  bid,  alter  the  specifications 
furnished  by  the  bidder  before  executing 
the  contract ;  and  this  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  competing  bidders.  Kingsley  v. 
Brooklyn,  5  Abb.  (N.  Y. )  N.  Gas.  1. 
The  duties  and  liabilities  of  a  city  and 
its  officers  under  a  contract  for  the  build- 


ing of  extensive  water-works,  considered. 
A  provision  in  the  act  authorizing  the 
work,  for  the  preliminary  adoption  of  a 
"plan"  therefor  by  the  city,  does  not 
prevent  subsequent  changes  in  the  details 
of  the  work.  And  where,  after  alterations 
had  been  made  and  extra  work  directed 
during  the  progress  of  the  undertaking, 
the  contractors  were  stopped  by  the  city 
before  completing  it,  —  Held,  that  they 
could  recover  for  work  done  up  to  the 
limits  of  the  appropriation  authorized  by 
the  act,  though  the  work  was  incomplete, 
the  legislature  having  recognized  the 
necessity  of  further  outlay  by  an  act 
authorizing  an  additional  appropriation. 
Where  a  public  work  is,  under  a  s 
to  be  contracted  for  by  city  officers  ac- 
cording to  a  plan  to  be  adopted  by  the 
city,  with  a  proviso  that  the  whole  ex- 
pense shall  not  exceed  a  certain  sum,  to 
be  raised  by  issuing  city  bonds,  a  contract 
for  doing  the  work  for  a  sum  within  that 
amount  is  valid,  although  it  reserves 
authority  to  the  officers  directing  the  work 
to  make  such  changes  of  detail  as  may  be 
necessary,  and  fix  th>'  price  of  whatever 
extra  work  may  be  required.     fl>. 

Further  as  to  lawesA  bidder,  see  chapter 
on    Mandamus,  post,  sec.  832,  no1 

1027,   note. 

2  People  v.  Stephens,  71  N.  Y.  527. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§472 


:i  may  have  power  directly  to  accomplish  a  certain  object,  and 
itself  expend  its  revenues  or  money  therefor,  yet  this  does  not  give 
,,r  include  the  power  to  lend  its  credit  to  another  who  may  be  em- 
I  the  same  object.  Expending  money  by  a  city 
council,  as  agents  or  administrators  of  their  constituents,  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  binding  their  constituents  by  a  contract  of 
suretyship,  —  "a  contract  which  carries  with  it  a  lesion  by  its  very 
nature."  Thus,  the  indorsement  of  the  bonds  of  a  street  railroad 
company  in  a  city,  by  the  city  authorities,  is  not  within  the  ordinary 
administrative  powers  of  the  corporation,  and  requires  express  legis- 
lative grant.1 

§    \~'2  (394).    Authorized  Contracts  ;  Rights  and  Liabilities.  — But 
with  respect  to  authorized  contracts  a  municipal  corporation  has  the 

enable  them  to  execute  private  enter- 
prises. Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
199,  224  (1865)  ;  1  Parsons  X.  &  B.  166  ; 
Smead  v.  Indianapolis,  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  11 
Ind.  104. 

The  power  to  borrow  money  for  any  pub- 
lic purpose  does  not  authorize  the  loan  of 
the  credit  of  the  city.  Chamberlain  v. 
Burlington,  19  Iowa,  395  ;  contra,  Rogers 
v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654,  four  ju 
dissenting.  In  Button  v.  Aurora,  114  111. 
138,  Scholfield,  J.,  said  :  "  Having  power 
to  borrow  money,  the  power  to  issue  bonds 
therefor  results  as  a  necessary  incident." 
Ante,  sec.  117.  And  see  Meyer  v.  Mus- 
catine, 1  Wall.  384.  The  author  can 
but  think  that  power  to  a  corporation  to 
borrow  money  should  not  be  construed  to 
give  the  power  to  loan  its  credit,  but  only 
to  borrow  money  for  legitimate  and  proper 
municipal  objects,  as  shown  by  the  chai 
or  constituent  act  of  the  corporation.  See 
Payne  v.  Brecon,  3  Hurl.  &  Nor.  572  ; 
,  sec.  117  ;  Bateman  v.  Mid- Wales 
Railway  Co.,  Law  Rep.  1  C.  P.  C.  510. 
!  ower  to  guarantee  payment  of  authorized 
contracts.  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall. 
289  (1873).  If  city  pays  its  unauthorized 
guaranty  it  is  subrogated  to  the  rights 
and  lien  of  the  creditor.  Supra,  sec.  458, 
corporations  cannot  without 
legislative  sanction  guarantee  obligations 
which  are  beyond  the  scope  of  their  char- 
tered powers.  Davis  v.  Old  Colony  R.  P. 
Co.,  131  Mass.  258.  Morawetz  on  Corp. 
(2d  ed.)  423. 


i   Louisiana     State     Bank    v.     Orleans 
Navigation  Co.,  3  La.  An.  294  (1848).    In 
this  case   the   municipal   corporation   was 
sought  to  be  made  liable  upon  its  guar- 
.    of  bonds  issued  by  the  Navigation 
p. my,  which  the  mayor,  in  the  name 
of    the  municipality,    was  authorized,    by 
I  if   the  council,   to  in- 

dorse. It  was  held  that  the  council  trans- 
cended its  powers,  and  the  guaranty  did 
not  impose  <>uy  legal  obligation  upon  the 
municipality.  The  disability  of  such  cor- 
poi  itions,  without  express  power,  to  enter 
into  contracts  of  suretyship  is  shown  in 
the   i  ive  opinion   de- 

livered bj  ■  J.     See,  also,  Blake 

v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  Macon,  53  Ga.  172  (1874). 
In  this  case  MeCay,  L,  says:  "The  ob- 
i  municipal   corporation  arc,    in 
the  main,  the  preservation  of  order,  and 
the  doing  of  such  acts  for  the  public  good 
well  be  'lone  by  private  enter- 
Bui   here  is  a  private  enterprise; 
and   it   is   insisted    that   it   is   within   the 
pe  of  municipal  power  not  to  build  a 
dd,  by  a  donation  of 

the  credit  of  the  city,  a  privat irpora- 

tion  to  build  it,  and  to  t  ike  the  profits  of 
it.  We  do  not  think  this  is  within  the 
ordinary  Bcope  of  municipal  authority, 
noi  ithorities,  as  we  belies 

I  carrying  the  objects  of  a  corporation 
far.     We  are  char  thai  the  proposi  d 
indoi 

A  municipal  corporation  has  no 
;»,?/•■  r  to  hnd  its  credit  or  make  accommo- 
dation paper  lor  the  benefit  of  citizens,  to 


§  473  CONTRACTS  :     POWER   TO    CONTRACT   ILLUSTRATED.  549 

same  rights  and  remedies,  and  is  bound  thereby  and  may  be  sued 
thereon  in  the  same  manner  as  individuals.1  Thus,  if  such  a  cor- 
poration, duly  empowered,  enters  into  a  partnership  relation  with 

private  individuals  with  respect  to  the  profits  to  be  derived  from  a 
market-house,  its  rights,  especially  as  regards  the  copartners  and 
financial  administration  of  the  partnership  property,  are  not  different 
from  those  of  an  ordinary  partner.2 

§  473.  Power  to  Contract  illustrated.  —  A  city  incorporated 
under  the  general  law  of  Indiana  has  power,  with  respect  to  the  light- 
ing of  its  streets  and  public  buildings,  &c.,  to  contract  with  a  gas 
company  on  that  subject,  and  may  exercise  such  power  within  the 
limits  of  its  franchise  according  to  its  own  discretion.  Such  a  con- 
tract, when  made,  must  be  regarded  as  made  by  such  city  in  the 
exercise  of  its  power  to  contract  and  not  in  its  power  to  legislate, 
although  the  power  to  make  the  contract  be  authorized  by  an  ordi- 
nance. And  when;  by  the  terms  of  such  contract,  the  city  is  not 
restricted  from  the  legitimate  exercise  of  its  public  power  touching 
the  subject-matter  thereof,  but  expressly  reserves  its  administrative 
authority  to  keep  the  posts,  lamps,  and  burners  in  good  repair  if 
the  company  should  fail  to  do  so,  and  also  reserves  the  right  to  test 
the  quality  of  the  gas  furnished  by  said  company,  and  the  capacity 
of  the  burners  at  all  times,  and  is  not  restricted  from  extending  its 
streets,  establishing  an  additional  number  of  lamps,  obtaining  gas 
from  other  sources,  or  establishing  its  own  gas-works  as  the  public 
interests  may  require,  such  contract,  not  being  a  restriction  upon  its 
legislative  power  nor  fraudulent  nor  against  public  policy,  is  valid 

1  Corporations    may     make     contracts  2  New  Orleans  v.  Guillotte,  12  La.  An. 

within    the  powers   expressly  granted  by  818  (1857).     In  New  Orleans  v.  St.  Louis 

the  acts  of   their    creation    and   the   im-  Church,    11    La.   An.    '244   (1856),  it   was 

plied  powers  incidental  and  necessary  to  contended  by  the  counsel  for  the  city  that 

the  execution  of  such   expressed    powers  even  if  certain  resolutions,  in  favor  of  the 

and  the  performance  of  the  duties  enjoined  defendants,  allowing  them  to  establish  a 

upon  them.     For  these  purposes  it  will  be  cemetery  within  the  city,  amounted  to  a 

bound  to  perform  them  the  same  as  indi-  contract,   and  though   their  repeal  be  not 

viduals.     Hight  v.  Monroe  Co.,   68   Ind.  justified  by  the  facts,  and  be  a  violation  of 

576;  Seibrecht  v.    New  Orleans,    12   La.  the  contract  by  the  city,  yet  that  the  lat- 

An.  496  ;  Strauss  v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  ter  has  the  power  to  violate  its  contracts, 

59  ;    Douglass  v.   Virginia  City,   5  Nev.  and  the  defendants   have  no  redress  ex- 

147;  Hayward  v.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212;  cepl  in  an  action  for  damages.     But  this 

McCabe  v.   Fountain  Co.,   46  Ind.   380  ;  doctrine  was  rejected  by  the  court,  which 

Burnett  v.  Abbott,  51   Ind.  2.">4  ;  Gordon  declared    it  to  be   as   "unsound    as   ii    is 

v.   Dearborn  Co.,  52  Ind.    322  ;    Jackson  novel,"   since  a  liability    for   damages    is 

Co.  v.  Applewhite,  62  Ind.  464;  Jennings  "the  very  opposite  of  a  recognition  of  a 

Co.  v.  Verbarg,  63  Ind.  107;  Indianapolis  right  to  violate  the  contract."     Per  Biir 

v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  6Q  Ind.  396,  eit-  chanaa,  J. 
ing  and  approving  text. 


Ml '.\n  [PAL   COBPOBATTONS.  §  476 

and  binding  upon  such  city,  and  may  be  enforced  Ln  the  same  man- 

ntract  of  a  person  or  business  corporation,  and  cannot 

be   repealed,   impaired,   or   changed   by  the  city,  by  ordinance  or 

S  i7i  395).  Same  subject.  —  So  where  a  municipal  corpora- 
ting  within  the  scope  of  its  powers,  in  order  to  secwre  the 
ied  an  ordinance  whereby  the  gas-works 
and  their  income  were  placed  in  the  hands  of  trustees  for  the  benefit 
of  those  who  loaned  money  to  execute  the  undertaking,  such  ordi- 
nance is  a  controi-i,  and  cannot  be  violated  by  the  city,  although  it 
may  deem  it  for  the  interest  of  its  eitizens  to  do  so  ;  nor  is  it  in  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  its  violation.2 

^  17  ■  (396).  Same  subject.  —  So  where  the  mayor  and  council 
have,  by  the  charter,  power  to  make,  in  their  corporate  capacity, 
all  siuh  contracts  as  they  may  deem  necessary  for  the  welfare  of 
the  corporation,  they  may  contract  to  sell  stock  owned  by  the  city  in 
a  private  corporation,  to  enable  the  city  to  pay  its  debts;  and  the 
discretionary  power  with  which  the  mayor  and  council  are  in- 
A  cannot,  when  bona  fide  exercised,  be  controlled  by  a  court 
of  equity,  at   the  instance  of  property  owners  and  taxpayers.3 

vj  476     397      Same   subject.  —  Tower   to   a   city    corporation   to 
]<or  cpense  of  the  owners  and  recover  the  amount 

from  thrm  if  they  fail  themselves  to  pay  when  required  by  ordi- 
oance,  gives  the  corporation  the  power  to  /o/njhase  paving  materials 
and  incur  a  debl  for  that  purpose;  and  in  a  suit  by  the  vendor  of 
h  materials  against  the  corporation,  it  is  no  defence  that  the 
council  had  not  passed  an  ordinance  before  they  purchased  the 
materials,  requiring  the  owners  to  pave:  ibis  is  a  matter  to  which 
a  creditor  is  not  bound  to  look.  The  question  would  be  different 
if  the  city  had  sought  to  make  the  lot-owner  liable  for  the  cost  of 
paving;  in  Buch  case,  it  must  show  a  strict  compliance  with  the 
lirements  of  it  3  1  harter  ' 


1  Indianapolis  p.  India  1       (',,.,  (1856);  followed  and  text  approved,  Shan- 

-.  Gardner,  '.'7  non  v.  O'Boyle,  51  Ind.  565  (1S76);  Ath- 

l'"l-  '•  'us   v.    Carnak,    75   Ga.    429;  Adams  v. 

Fund    Society    v.  Rome,   .".'.'  Ga.   771 ;  ante,  sec.  94;   post, 

lelphia,  81  Pa.  St,  I'  Same  chapter  on  Corporate  Property,  sec.  575  ; 

.  358)  ;  Indian-  post,  chap.  xx. ;  Bush  v.  Carbondale,  78  111.  ■ 

I  66   Ind.  71  (1875). 

■1    approving   texl  ;    ante,         1  Bigelow   ».  Perth  Amboy,  1  Dutch. 
(N.  J.J297  (1855);  post,  chap.  xix. 
Iambus,    19    Ga.    471 


§477     contracts:  settlement  of  disputed  claims,  etc. 


>51 


§  477   (398).    Settlement     of     Disputed     Claims,     &c.  —  Growing 

out   of  its  authority    to    create   debts   and    to    incur   liabilities,    a 
municipal  corporation  has  power  to  settle  disputed  claims  against 

it,  and  an  agreement  to  pay  these  is  not  void   for  want    of  c 
eration.1     If  it  has  obtained   a   contract  which,  by    mistake   or  a 
Change   of  circumstances,   it    deems  to   operate    oppressively   upon 
the  other  party,  an  agreement  to  make  an  additional  compen 
or  to  modify  or  annul  it,  is  not  invalid  for  want  of  consideration.2 


1  Augusta  v.  Leadbetter,  16  Me.  (5 
(1839);  Bean  v.  Jay,  23  Me.  117,  121 
(1843);  People  v.  Supervisors,  27  Cal.  655; 
People  v.  Coon,  25  Cal.  648.  A  municipal 
corporation  has  power  to  settle  disputed 
claims.  In  this  case  the  acceptance  by  a 
city  council  of  $100  in  payment  of  a  judg- 
ment for  $200  obtained  before  a  justice  of 
the  peace,  from  which  the  defendant  was 
about  to  appeal,  was  held  a  proper  exercise 
of  corporate  power.  Agnew  v.  Brail,  124 
111.  312  (1888).  A  town  board  of  super- 
visors held  to  have  no  power,  unless  ex- 
pressly conferred,  to  discharge  a  judgment 
in  favor  of  the  town  except  upon  full  pay- 
ment thereof,  nor  to  allow  credits  upon  it  of 
sums  not  allowed  by  the  court.  Butternut 
v.  O'Malley,  50  Wis.  329.  It  may  annex 
conditions  to  a  proposal  of  settlement,  and 
is  not  liable  unless  the  conditions  are  met. 
Merrill  v.  Dixfield,  30  Me.  157  (1S49).  A 
municipality  may,  without  special  grant, 
issue  new  bonds  in  the.  place  of  old  bonds 
which  had  been  issued  according  to  law. 
Rogan  v.  Watertown,  30  Wis.  259  (1S79). 
Bonds  issued  to  raise  money  to  pay  bonds 
of  an  older  issue  will  be  declared  valid  in 
equity,  though  the  statute  authorizing 
them  required  the  recall  and  cancellation 
of  the  old  bonds  before  their  issue.  State 
v.  Columbia,  12  S.  C.  370.  Where  new 
bonds  were  issued  to  replace  old  ones,  a 
recital  by  the  mayor  and  council  in  a  pro- 
clamation submitting  the  question  of  issu- 
ing them  to  a  vote,  that  they  were  assured 
the  old  bonds  wonld  be  surrendered,  was 
held  not  to  be  a  condition  for  issuing  the 
new  bonds  ;  if  otherwise  lawful  they  were 
valid  obligations.  Sullivan  v.  Walton, 
20  Fla.  552;  Infra,  see.  504,  note. 

2  Bean  v.  Jay,  23  Me.  117,  121;  Meech 
v.  Buffalo,  29  N.  Y.  198  (1864).  Further, 
as  to  consideration,  Baileyville  v.  Lowell, 
20  Me.   178  (1841)  ;  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7 


Pick.  (Mass.)  18  (1828),  valuable  opinion 
of  Parker,  C.  J.;  see  People  v.  Stout,  28 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  349  ;  ante,  chap,  iv.  sec.  7o. 
The  power  to  sue  and  be  sued  gives  to  a 
corporation  the  right  to  settle  or  compro- 
mise claims.  Where  a  city  has  a  judg- 
ment, from  which  an  appeal  is  about  t<>  be 
taken,  the  council  may,  if  done  in  good 
faith,  cancel  the  judgment  on  the  payment 
of  costs  ;  and  such  an  agreement,  when 
executed,  is  binding  upon  the  corporation. 
Petersburg  v.  Mappin,  14  111.  193  (185-')  : 
Orleans  Co.  Sup.  v.  Bowen,  4  Lansing 
(N.  Y.),  24.  The  cases  above  cited  in  this 
note  arc  reviewed  by  Richardson,  ' '.  J.,  in 
Barnes  v.  District  of  Columbia,  22  Court 
of  Claims  Rep.  366  (1887),  and  the  con- 
clusion reached  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
text  did  not  apply  to  the  case  before 
court,  under  the  legislation  of  Congress  as 
to  the  power  of  the  Board  of  Public 
Works  of  the  District  of  Columbia  to 
make  contracts,  under  which  it  is  held  that 
such  legislation  provides  how  contracts 
by  the  Board  for  public  improvements 
shall  he  made,  and  that  if  there  is  mate- 
rial departure  from  the  requirements  of 
the  statute  the  contract  is  not  binding. 
South  Boston  Iron  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  IIS 
U.  S.  37,  affirming  18  Court  of  Claims, 
165  ;  Brown  v.  District  of  Columbia,  127 
U.  S.  579  (1S87).  In  Co  isiana  the  pres- 
ident of  a  police  jury  has  no  power  to  in- 
stitute a  suit  in  its  behalf  without  special 
authority  conferred,  by  ordinance  or  resolu- 
tion, and  parol  testimony  is  not  ad  miss 
to  prove  either.  Police  Jury  of  Ouachita 
v.  Mo;, rue.  38  l.a.  An.  630.  The  legisla- 
ture may  authorize  municipal  corporations 
to  sue,  without  payment  of  costs  or  com- 
plying with  other  requirements  inn 
upon  natural  persons  or  private  corpora- 
tions. In  this  case  an  appeal  by  a  city 
without   haying  given  a  supersedeas  bond 


552  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  478 

own  may  make  a  contract  with  a  creditor  whereby  the  latter 
agrees  to  discount  or  throw  off  a  portion  of  his  debt,  and  such  an 
agreement,  it'  founded  on  a  sufficient  consideration,  will  be  en- 
forced.1 


§  ITS.  Power  to  arbitrate  Claims.  —  As  a  general  proposition, 
municipal  corporations  have,  unless  specially  restricted,  the  same 
powers  to  liquidate  claims  and  indebtedness  that  natural  persous 
have,  and  from  that  source  proceeds  power  to  adjust  all  disputed 
claims,  and  when  the  amount  is  ascertained  to  pay  the  same  as 
other  indebtedness.  It  would  seem  to  follow  therefrom  that  a 
municipal  corporation,  unless  disabled  by  positive  law,  could  sub- 
nut  to  arbitration  all  unsettled  claims  with  the  same  liability  to 
perform  the  award  as  would  rest  upon  a  natural  person,  provided, 
of  course,  that  such  power  be  exercised  by  ordinance  or  resolution 
of  the  corporate  authorities.2  It  is  no  objection  to  the  validity 
of  such  ordinance  that  it  was  passed  at  a  meeting  of  the  city  council 
at  which  all  members  were  not  notified  to  be  present,  provided 
that  the  ordinance  be  approved  at  a  subsequent  regular  meeting. 
Nor  is  the  ordinance  an  act  ultra  vires  the  corporation,  although 
the  work  for  which  damages  are  claimed  was  done  outside  of  the 
city  limits,  provided  it  is  a  part  of  a  work  which  the  corporation 
has  power  to  perform.3  In  some  cases  it  is  held  that  a  city  has 
no  ]  »ower  to  submit  to  arbitration  claims  for  damages  arising  under 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.4 

was  sustained.     Holmes  v.  Mattoon,  111  and  set  them  off  against  his  debt  is  not 

111.  37.  unconstitutional  for  divesting  creditors- of 

1  Baileyville   >'•    Lowell,    20    Me.    178  their  vested  rights,   or  as  impairing  the 

U).     In   this  case,  the  town,  against  obligations  of  contracts.     Amy  v.  Shelby 

which  the  creditor  had  an  execution,  had  County  Taxing  District,  114   V.  S.  387. 

the  option,   and   was  authorized,  1"  raise         2  Text  approved,  Springfield  v.  Walker, 

the  money  by  loan  or  by  assessmenl  ;  and  42  Ohio  St.  543,  holding  also  that  muni- 

if  in  the  latter  mode,  either  at  once  or  by  cipal  corporations  are   "persons"   within 

instalments.     If  not  raised  and  paid,  the  the  meaning  of  the  statute  of  Ohio  —  R.  S. 

is  authorized  to  cause  the  prop-  sec.  4947  —concerning  arbitrations. 

he    inhabitants  to  be  distrained         :i  City  of  Shawneetown  v.  Baker,  85 

upon  his  writ.      It  was  held  under  these  111.    563;    Dix   v.   Dummerston,    19    Vt. 

circumstances,  thai  an  agreement   by  the  263  ;    Griswold   v.   Stonington,   5   Conn. 

creditor,  which  was  accepted  and  complied  367;  Alexandria  Canal  Co.   v.   Swann,  5 

with  by  the  town,  thai  if  the  town  would  How.  (U.S.)  83.     Power  exists  unless  the 

at  one*   assess  the  amount  required,   and  corporation  be  disabled.    Eldon  Tp.,  hire, 

I  the  same,  he  would  abate  a  portion  6    Upper    Can.    Law    Jour.    207;    Brant 

of  his  debt,  was  founded  upon  a  sufficient  County,  In  re,  19  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  450; 

consideration,  and  was  binding  upon  him.  District  Township  of  Walnut  v.  Rankin, 

A  statute  which  allows  a  debtor  of  a  muni-  70  Iowa,  65. 

cipal  corporation  to  procure  its  obligations  4  Post,  chap.  xvi. 


§479 


CONTRACTS    WITH    ATTORNEYS. 


553 


§479  (399).  Contracts  with  Attorneys. —  Resulting  also  from 
the  power  to  make  contracts,  to  own  property,  and  to  incur 
liabilities,  is  the  authority  in  a  municipal  corporation,  in  the 
absence  of  express  or  implied  restriction,  to  employ  an  attorney  ' 


1  Smith  v.  Sacramento,  13  Cal.  531; 
State  v.  Paterson,  40  N..I.  L.  lv>'>.  May 
employ,  unless  specially  restricted,  an 
attorney  in  addition  to  the  city  al 
lb.  The  employment  of  outside  counsel 
must,  of  course,  be  duly  authorized  by  the 
municipality.  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20 
Wall.  289,  321  (187:'.);  Memphis  v.  Mams, 
9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  51S  (1872)  ;  s.  c.  24  Am. 
Rep.  331  ;  Clark  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181, 
(1872);  Ellis  r.  Washoe  Co.,  7  Nev.  291  ; 
Butternut  v.  O'Malley,  50  Wis.  333  (to 
make  substitution)  ;  Roper  v.  Laurinburg, 
90  N.  C.  427  (counsel  employed  to  defend 
police  officers  in  actions  for  false  imprison- 
ment); Waterbury  v.  Laredo,  60  Tex.  519, 
where  a  power  to  establish  ferries  was 
held  to  imply  a  power  to  employ  counsel 
to  represent  the  city  in  a  matter  involving 
their  establishment,  and  to  secure  his  fees. 
Ante,  sec.  147  ;  see  Horublower  v.  Duden, 
35  Cal.  664  ;  compare  Clough  v.  Hart,  8 
Kan.  487.  This  case  holds  that  there  is 
prima  facie,  if  not  absolutely,  an  implied 
restriction  upon  city  and  county  corpora- 
tions to  employ  other  attorneys  to  perform 
the  precise  duties,  as  prescribed  by  law,  of 
the  city  and  county  attorneys  elected  by 
the  people  or  provided  for  by  incorporating 
statutes.  Compare  Thacher  v.  Jefferson 
Co.,  13  Kan.  182,  and  cases  cited;  Hugg 
i'.  Camden  (right  to  employ  counsel  in  ad- 
dition to  the  city  solicitor),  29  N.  J.  Eq. 
(2  Stewart)  6  (1878).  Where  a  charter 
gave  power  to  a  municipal  corporation  to 
employ  an  attorney  when  necessary,  and  a 
subsequent,  statute  provided  for  a  law  de- 
partment, and  a  chief  officer  to  be  called 
Attorney  and  Counsel,  with  a  salary,  the 
department  to  have  charge  of  and  conduct 
all  the  law  business  of  the  corporation,  it 
was  held  that  the  subsequent  statute  was 
an  implied  repeal  of  the  power  to  employ 
an  attorney  under  the  charter.  Lyddy  v. 
Long  Island  City,  104  N.  Y.  218(1887). 
A  municipal  corporation  which  has  em- 
ployed an  attorney  to  f\\r  a  bill  seeking  to 
destroy  by  suit  the  existence  of  the  cor- 
poration itself,  cannot  apply  the  corporate 


funds  in  paymenl  i  I  'aniel 

v.  Memphis,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  582 
(1851) ;  ant ,  sec.  1  17  ;  post,  sec.  910, 
oote.  A  municipal  corporation  has  no 
power  to  emp  I  to  defend  a  suit 

ely  directed  against  its 
its  object  be  to  enjoin  them  from 
performing  their  official  functions  and  to 
appoint  a  receiver  of  its  corporate  prop- 
erty. Smith  v.  Nashville,  4  Lea  (Tenn.), 
69;  ante,  sec.  147.  When  suit  is  brought 
in  the  name  of  a  municipal  corporation 
without  authority  it  may  be  dismissed,  on 
motion  of  the  defendant,  or  by  the  court  of 
its  own  motion  when  its  attention  is  called 
to  the  fact.  Kankakee  v.  Kankakee  >& 
Ind.  R.  B.  Co.,  115  111.  88. 

Unless  there  is  some  special  res  i 
the  corporation  may  incur  liability  to  com- 
pensate' an  attorney  employed  by  it  to  con- 
duct or  defend  suits  which  relate  to  the 
due  performance  of  the  duties  or  trusts 
with  which,  in  its  corporate  capacity,  it 
is  charged  by  law.  Attorney-General  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  Norwich,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  106; 
Lewis  v.  .Mayor,  &c.  of  Rochester,  9  Com. 
B.  (n.  s.)  4ul  (1860)  ;  ante,  sec.  147.  A 
city  owning  stock  in  a  railroad  company  in 
another  State  may,  in  virtue  of  such  own- 
ership, unless  specially  restricted,  employ 
counsel  to  attend  to  its  interests  in  such 
State.  Memphis  v.  Adams,  supra.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  hold  that  no 
action  will  lie  against  a  city  having  "the 
general  powers  of  municipal  corporations 
at  common  law,"  to  recover  compi  i 
for  services  of  counsel  to  aid  in  cr 
igainst  persons  who  had 
been  officers  of  the  city,  for  offences  com- 
mitted under  color  of  their  official  duties, 
resulting  in  pecuniary  injury  to  the  city. 
Butler  v.  Milwaukee,  15  Wis.  493  Va 
Indiana  a  county  board  has  no  power  to 
employ  counsel  to  conduct  criminal  prose- 
cutions, and  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay 
for  services  rendered.  Flight  v.  Monroe 
Co.,  68  Ind.  575  :  Ripley  Co.  v.  Ward,  69 
Ind.  441  ;  Grant  Co.  v.  Bradford,  72  Ind. 
455.     In  Iowa,   the  board  of  supervisors 


554 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§479 


to  conduct  or  defend  suits  in  which  the  corporation  is  interested 
in  its  corporate  capacity;  and  the  corporation  is  bound  to  pay  for 
services  rendered  by  him  on  due  employment,  without  an  express 
vote  to  that  effect.1  If  a  corporation  attorney,  alter  his  term  of 
office  has  expired,  continues  in  the  management  of  suits  in  which 
the  corporation  is  interested,  without  objection  from,  and  with  the 
knowledge  of,  the  corporation  and  of  his  successor,  he  may,  it  has 
been  held,  recover  for  such  services.2  An  attorney  was  employed 
upon  a  quantum  meruit  by  the  city  to  conduct  a  case  to  a  final 
termination,  and  pending  the  litigation  was  appointed  city  coun- 
sellor, when  it  became  his  official  duty  to  act  for  the  city;  and 
it  was  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  contract,  he  could 
not  recover  for  the  value  of  such  services  as  were  rendered  after 
his  appointment.  It  might  be  otherwise  if  the  original  employ- 
ment had  been  to  carry  the  suit  through  for  an  agreed  sum.3 


may  employ  special  agent  or  attorney  to 
assist  in  the  collection  of  taxes  not  collecti- 
1.1,-  by  county  treasurer  in  the  discharge  of 
his  duty.  Withelm  v.  Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa, 
524.  Compare  ante,  sec.  139,  and  cases 
there  cited,  as  to  power  to  oiler  rewards 
for  offenders.  Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen 
(Mass.),  172.  Cannot  recover  for  defend- 
ing pauper  criminals  in  Alabama.  Posey 
v.  Mobile  Co.,  50  Ala.  6  (1873).  A  duly 
qualified  city  attorney,  having  charge  of 
the  interests  of  a  city  in  its  legal  contro- 
versies, has  power  to  pray  an  appeal  from 
a  judgmenl  against  it,  and  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  perfect  the  same.  Con- 
nett  r.  Chicago,  lit  111.  233. 

1  Langdon  v.  Castleton,  30  Vt.  285 
(1858);  ante,  sec.  147. 

-  //..  :  see  Harrington  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 30  Vt.  1  •">".  ;  supra,  sec.  459,  as  to  im- 
plied contracts.  Compare Clough V.  Hart, 
8  Kan.  487.  Compensation  of  city  attorney. 
See  Carroll  v.  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  lit;  Orton 
v.  State,  12  Wis.  509;  also,  chapter  on 
Corporate  Officers,  a,ifr.  Liability  for 
attorney's  fee  under  charter  or  special 
statutes,  see  Brady  v.  Supervisors,  2 
Sandf.  S.  ('.  R.  460,  affirmed  10  N.  Y. 
(6  Seld.)  --''in  (1851),  for  reasons  given  by 
Oakley, 0.  •!.,  in  2  Sandf.  460  ;  Halstead  v. 
Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  3  Comst.  (3  N. 
Y.)  430  ;  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall. 
289(1873);  State  v.  New  Orleans,  20  La. 
An.  172  ;  Bright  v.  Hewes,   19  La.   An. 


666  ;  Parker  v.  Williamsburg,  13  How. 
Pr.  (N.  V.)  250;  Clough  v.  Hart,  supra, 
and  cases  cited  by  Valentine,  J.  Proof  of 
employment.      Butler  v.   Charlestown,  7 

Gray  (Mass.),  14;  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20 
Wall.  289,  321 ;  Memphis  v.  Adams,  9 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  0.  24  Am.  Rep. 
331  ;  Cass  Co.  v.  Ross,  46  Ind.  404(1874); 
McCabe  v.  Fountain  Co.,  46  Ind.  380. 

8  Detroit  v.  Whittemore,  27  Mich.  281 
(1873).  Construction  of  power  to  employ 
private  counsel.  lb.  In  employing  coun- 
sel the  board  of  county  commissioners 
acts  as  a  corporation,  and  like  other  cor- 
porations, may,  unless  the  statute  other- 
wise requires,  employ  agents  and  attorneys 
without  making  such  employment  a  mat- 
ter of  record,  but  this  must  be  done  by  the 
concurrent  act  of  a  majority  of  the  board  at 
a  legal  session.  Such  attorney  may  recover 
compensation  for  his  services.  MeCabe 
v.  Fountain  Co.  Comm'rs,  46  Ind.  380 
(1874).  The  city  council  under  the  laws  of 
Iowa,  while  acting  as  a  board  of  equaliza- 
tion, is  discharging  a  corporate  function  and 
acting  as  a  representative  of  the  city,  and 
if  its  action  is  appealed  from,  the  city  so- 
licitor is  justified  in  defending  it  in  the 
appellate  court;  for  which  service  he  is 
entitled  to  reasonable  compensation,  even 
though  the  service  or  the  compensation 
be  not  provided  for  by  city  ordinance. 
Kinnie  r.  Waverly,  42  Iowa,  437  (1876). 
Extra  compensation.     Ante,  sec.  233. 


§480 


CONTRACTS  FOE  LOCAL  IMPROVEMENTS. 


555 


§  480   (400).    Contracts   for   Local   Improvements. — A  municipal 

corporation  contracted  with  a  paver  to  do  certain  work  at  a  lixed 
price,  of  which  it  was  to  pay  one  third,  and  the  owners  of  the 
abutting  property  two  thirds.  It  was  judicially  determined  that 
the  proprietors  were,  in  law,  liable  to  pay  only  one  third;  and  it 
was  held,  in  an  action  by  the  paver  against  the  corporation,  that 
it  was  a  warrantor  for  the  remaining  one  third  ;  and  it  was  held 
liable  accordingly.1  But  where  the  charter  or  constituent  act  in 
reference  to  improving  streets  provides  that  the  city  shall  be  liable 
to  the  contractor  for  so  much  only  of  the  improvement  as  is  occupied 
by  streets  and  alleys  crossing  the  same,  and  that  the  owners  of 
adjacent  lots  shall  be  liable  for  the  rest,  the  city  is  not  liable  for 
the  deficiency  in  case  the  adjacent  property  does  not  sell  for 
enough  to  pay  the  assessment,  and  though  the  owner  be  a  non- 
resident.2 


1  Tounier  v.  Municipality,  5  La.  An. 
298.  So  where  a  city  by  ordinance  di- 
rected that  a  sewer  be  constructed,  recit- 
ing that  the  action  was  taken  upon  peti- 
tion of  a  majority  of  property  owners,  and 
the  work  was  discontinued  because  it  ap- 
peared that  a  majority  had  not  petitioned, 
the  city  was  held  to  be  liable  to  pay  for 
the  services  of  an  inspector  employed  by 
it  for  the  work,  on  the  ground  that  there 
was  an  implied  guaranty  that  the  petition 
was  sufficient.  Bill  v.  Denver,  29  Fed. 
Rep.  344.  See  also  Cronan  v.  Municipality, 
5  La.  An.  537,  where  by  the  construction 
of  the  contract,  the  city  was  held  liable  for 
the  whole  expense,  the  proprietors  having 
refused  to  make  payment.  A  contractor 
failing,  for  want  of  power  in  a  city,  to  be 
able  to  get  his  pay  from  special  assess- 
ments, the  city  was  held  liable  to  him,  it 
being  regarded  as  guaranteeing  that  it 
possessed  the  specific  powers  relied  on 
by  the  contractor  for  his  compensation. 
Maher  v.  Chicago,  38  111.  266  (1865); 
Scofield  v.  Council  Bluffs,  68  Iowa,  695  ; 
Bucroft  v.  Council  Bluffs,  63  Iowa,  646. 
But  see  Chicago  v.  People,  48  111.  416, 
where  the  first  case  is  explained  and  dis- 
tinguished. See  also  Reilly  r.  Philadel. 
phia,  60  Pa.  St.  467  ;  Sleeper  .v.  Bullen,  6 
Kan.  300  (1870);  Chicago  v.  People,  56 
111.  327  ;  Lowden  v.  Cincinnati,  2  Disney 
(Ohio),  203.  Right  of  contractor  to  sue  the 
corporate  n  where,  in  consequence  of  its 
neglect,  it  would  be  nugatory  to   proceed 


against  the  owners  of  the  property.  See 
Michel  v.  Police  Jury,  9  La.  An.  67  ;  New- 
comb  v.  Same,  4  Rob.  La.  233  ;  Michel 
v.  Same,  3  La.  An.  123 ;  Leavenworth  v. 
Mills,  6  Kan.  288(1870);  distinguished, 
Casey  v.  Leavenworth,  17  Kan.  189.  Com- 
pare Reock  v.  Newark,  33  N.  J.  L.  129. 
Further,  as  to  local  improvements,  see  chap. 
xix.  ;  post,  sec.  810;  supra,  sees.  459,  467. 
In  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289 
(1S73),  it  was  held  that  under  its  charter 
the  city  had  full  power  to  make  paving 
contracts,  and  to  pay  either  in  cash  or  in 
bonds,  or  both,  and  to  guarantee  payment 
of  the  assessment  bills  against  abutters. 
See  also,  Saxton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo. 
153  (1875).  Towers  for  electric  lights 
held  not  "local  improvements, "'  where  the 
lighting  system  is  not  owned  by  the  city. 
Putnam  v.  Grand  Rapids,  58  Mich.   116. 

-  New  Albany  v.  Sweeney  (construing 
General  Towns  and  Cities  Act),  L3  [nd. 
245  (1859)  ;  Lucas  v.  San  Francisco,  7 
Cal.  463;  Lovell  v.  St.  Paul,  10  Minn. 
290.  Contracts  with  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  construed  with  reference  to  the 
chartered  or  corporate  powers  of  the  city. 
13  Ind.  245,  supra. 

If  the  municipal  corporation 
the  contractor  to  collect  the  assessments 
from  the  abutting  owners,  a  failure  to 
do  so  will  render  it  liable.  Moi 
Dubuque,  28  [owa,  575  (1S70).  See,  how. 
ever,  Beard  v.  Brooklyn,  31  Barb.  (N.Y.) 
142;  Saxton  v.  St.  Joseph,    60   Mo.   153 


556 


Ml'NICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§481 


§481  (401).  Contracts  for  Local  or  Public  Improvements. — 
A  city  charter  required  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  property-owners 
to  make  certain  improvements,  which,  when  made,  were  chargeable 
upon  the  adjacent  property.  An  ordinance  provided  that  con- 
tractors doing  such  work  should  look  to  the  adjacent  property, 
and  not  to  the  city,  for  their  pay.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  city  entered  into  a  contract  with  the  plaintiff  to  grade  a  certain 
street,  the  plaintiff  agreeing  that  he  should  receive  his  pay  from  the 
adjoining  property.  The  plaintiff  performed  the  work;  and,  inas- 
much as  the  adjacent  owners  had  never  given  their  consent  to  the 
making  of  the  improvement,  he  sued  the  city  on  the  contract,  to 
recover  for  the  work  done;  and  it  was  held  that  the  action  could 
not  he  maintained.1 


(1S73);  Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488 
(1872).  A  creditor  of  a  municipality  is 
not  obliged  to  wait,  before  lie  sues,  until 
the  money  can  be  collected  from  the  land- 
owners benefited,  and  on  whom  the 
charter  imposes  the  expense  of  the  im- 
provement whence  his  claim  accrued. 
Little  v.  Union  Township  Committee,  40 
N.  J.  L.  397. 

1  Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357 
(1864)  ;  Swift  v.  Williamsburg,  24  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  427  ;  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12 
Mich.  279  ;  Johnson  v.  Common  Council, 
16  Ind.  227  ;  New  Albany  v.  Sweeney, 
13  Ind.  245  ;  Moylan  v.  New  Orleans,  32 
La.  An.  673. 

Where  the  contractor  has  agreed  to  look 
for  payment  to  the  lot  benefited,  or  to  the 
owner,  he  cannot  hold  the  city,  unless  it 
may  be  in  cases  where  the  whole  proceed- 
ing is  void,  or  the  city  neglects  its  duty. 
Kearney  v.  Covington,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  339. 
The  subject  is  very  fully  discussed  and  the 
previous  cases  in  the  State  commented  on 
in  Craycraft  v.  Selvage,  10  Bush  (Ky.), 
696  (1874);  Casey  v.  Leavenworth,  17 
Kan.  189  (1876);  Memphis  v.  Brown  (an 
important  case),  20  Wall.  289  (1873); 
Smith  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  63  (1864)  ; 
Finney  v.  Oshkosh,  lb.  220  ;  Chicago  v. 
People,  48  111.  416  ;  Ruppert  V.  Baltimore, 
23  Md.  184  ;  Louisville  v.  Henderson,  5 
Bush  (Ky.),  515  (1869). 

A  city  advertised  for  proposals  to  do 
certain  public  work,  and  the  plaintiff  made 
proposals,  which  were  accepted,  without 
qualification,  by  an  entry  on  city  records  ; 
and  it  was  decided  that  the  statement  in 


the  published  notice,  "the  expense  of  the 
work  to  be  assessed,"  &<■.,  was  part  of  the 
contract,  no  other  provision  for  payment 
having  been  made,  and  that  the  plaintiff 
could  not  maintain  an  action  against  the 
city  until  alter  the  assessment  and  collec- 
tion of  his  compensation,  or  until  it  or  its 
officers  failed  to  proceed  with  reasonable 
diligence,  after  the  expense  of  the  work 
was  ascertained,  to  make  and  collect  an 
assessment,  and  to  pay  over  money  thus 
collected.  Hunt  v.  Utica,  18  N.  Y.  442 
(1858). 

Extent  of  recovery  by  contractor  against 
abutter  where  the  work  is  done  in  a  man- 
ner inferior  to  that  stipulated  for  in  the 
contract.  Creamer  v.  Bates,  49  Mo.  523 
(1872). 

Further  as  to  the  rights  and  remedies  of 
the  contractor,  of  the  property-owner,  and 
the  liabilities  of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion. Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289 
(1874);  Smith  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  63  ; 
Foote  v.  Same,  lb.  270  ;  Bond  v.  Newark, 
19  N.  J.  E.p  376  ;  Fletcher  v.  Oshkosh,  18 
Wis.  228,  232  ;  Palmer  v.  Stump,  29  Ind. 
329  ;  McSpedon  v.  New  York,  7  Bosw. 
(N.  Y.)  601  ;  Eeilly  v.  Philadelphia,  60 
Pa.  St.  467  ;  Whalen  v.  La  Crosse,  16 
Wis.  271  ;  Flournoy  v.  Jeffersonville,  17 
Ind.  169;  Creighton  v.  Toledo,  18  Ohio 
St.  447  :  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12  Mich. 
279  ;  Buffalo  v.  Holloway,  7  N.  Y.  (3 
Seld.)  493  ;  Storrs  v.  [Jtica,  17  N.  Y.  104  ; 
Leavenworth  v.  Mills,  6  Kan.  288  (1870)  ; 
followed,  Leavenworth  v.  Stille,  13  Kan. 
539  (1S74),  and  distinguished  Casey  v. 
Leavenworth,  17  Kan.  189  (1876);  Sleeper 


482 


CONTRACTS  FOR  LOCAL  OR  PUBLIC  IMPROVEMENTS. 


-,.-,: 


§482  (402).  Same  subject.  —  Tt  has  been  several  times  decided 
that  where  the  expense  of  making  a  local  improvement  is  nol  to  be 
raised  by  a  general  tax,  but  solely  upon  the  property  benefited,  a 
failure  of  the,  corporal  ton,  though  it  is  only  the  agent  of  the  owners 
to  be  assessed,  to  discharge,  itsduty,  by  making  the  necessary  assess- 
ment, or  its  unreasonable  delay  in  collecting  and  paying  over  the 
money,  gives  the  contractor  a  right  to  recover  his  compensation  in 
an  action  against  the  corporation.  The  cases  on  the  point  are  con- 
flicting.1    The  right  to  a  general  judgment  should,  in  our  opinion, 


v.  Bullen,  6  Kan.  300  ;  Lansing  v.  Van 
Gorder,  24  Mich.  456  (1872);  post,  chapter 
on  Taxation  and  Local  Improvements  ; 
supra,  sec.  460  ;  infra,  sec.  810 ;  Hen- 
drick  v.  West  Springfield,  107  Mass.  541 ; 
Mayer  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  63 
N.  Y.  455  (1875) ;  Tone  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
New  York,  70  N.  Y.  157  (1877).  Assign- 
ment of  contract.  McCubbin  v.  Atchison, 
12  Kan.  166  ;  McGlne  v.  Philadelphia,  10 
Phila.  (Pa.)  348  ;  Perkinson  v.  St.  Louis, 
4  Mo.  App.  322.  Where  a  contractor  re- 
ceives assessment  bills  in  payment,  with 
the  right  to  use  the  name  of  the  city  in 
filing  liens  against  the  abutting  owners, 
such  owners  may  defend  by  questioning 
the  character  of  the  work  though  they  are 
not  nominal  parties  to  the  contract.  Erie 
City  v.  Butler,  120  Pa.  St.  374  (1888). 

An  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Louisville 
ordained  "  that  no  contract  should  be 
binding  on  the  city  until  it  is  approved 
by  both  boards  of  the  general  council,  and 
this  shall  be  necessary  to  make  a  contract 
complete  and  binding  upon  the  city."  A 
contract  was  made  for  a  certain  street  im- 
provement, which  was  signed  by  the 
mayor,  but  was  never  approved  by  both 
boards,  but  by  one  of  them  only.  If  the 
contract  had  been  executed  as  required 
by  the  ordinance,  the  contractor  would 
have  been  entitled  to  recover  against  the 
adjacent  property-holders  the  agreed  price. 
It  was  conceded  that  he  could  not  recover 
against  them,  because  the  contract  had  not 
been  thus  executed.  He  thereupon  sought 
to  make  the  city  liable  for  the  work  done  ; 
but  the  Court  of  Appeals,  distinguishing 
the  case  from  Kearney  v.  Covington,  1 
Met.  (Ky. )  345,  held  that  no  contract 
binding  on  the  city  was  ever  made,  and 
that  he  could  not  recoVer,  their  having 
been  no  ratification  of  the  contract.     Mur- 


phy v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189 
(1872).  Quantum  meruit  will  not  lie 
against  a  city  for  materials  furnished  lor 
a  public  work  under  a  contract  which  is 
void  as  not  in  conformity  with  statutes 
requiring  such  contracts  to  be  made  in  a 
particular  manner.  Bigler  v.  New  York, 
5  Abl).  (N.  Y.)  N.  Cas.  51.  When  city 
not  liable  on  contracts  of  police  and 
school  boards,  see  Swift  v.  New  York,  17 
Hun  (X.  Y.),  518;  Utica  v.  Miller,  62 
Ind.  230  ;  Jarvis  v.  Shelby,  62  Ind.  257  ; 
Crane  v.  Urbana,  2  111.  App.  559. 

As  to  implied  municipal  liability,  see 
the  important  opinion  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  in  Louisiana  (City  of)  v. 
Wood,  102  U.  S.  294  ;  compare  Litchfield 
v.  Ballou,  114  U.  S.  190.  Supra,  sees. 
460,  461,  and  notes. 

l  Beard  2>.  Brooklyn,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
142  (1860).  See  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12 
Mich.  279  (1864);  Cumming  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
of  Brooklyn,  11  Paige  (N.  Y. )  Ch.  596 
(1845);  Baker*.  Utica,  19  N.  Y.  (5  Smith) 
326  (1859)  ;  Green  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New 
York,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  503.  See,  gen- 
erally,  as  to  assessments  for  public  works, 
Doughty  v.  Hope,  3  Denio  (N.  Y. )  249  ; 
Manice  v.  New  York,  8  N.  Y.  120  ; 
People  v.  New  York,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
43  ;  8  Barb.  95  ;  23  Barb.  390.  Where 
the  contractor  agreed  with  the  city  to  take 
his  pay  out  of  assessments  when  collected, 
but  the  city  and  its  officers  failed  to  exer- 
cise its  duty  and  power  to  levy  and  collect 
the  assessments,  it  was  held  that  the  city 
was  liable  to  an  action  by  the  contractor 
for  the  damages  for  such  neglect  of  duty, 
i.  c,  the  contract  price,  he  having  per- 
formed the  contract  on  Ins  part.  Reilly 
i'.  Albany,  112  X.  Y.  30  (1SS9).  approving 
Cumming  v.  Brooklyn,  supra  :  Sage  v. 
Brooklyn,  89  N.  Y.  1S9  (1882);   Me( 'or- 


558 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


be  limited,  in  any  event,  to  cases  where  the  corporation  can  after- 
wards reimburse  itself  by  an  assessment.  For  why  should  all  be 
taxed  for  the  failure  of  the  council  to  do  its  duty  in  a  case  where  the 
contractor  has  a  plain  remedy,  by  mandamus,  to  compel  the  council 
to  make  the  necessary  assessment  and  proceed  in  the  collection 
thereof  with  the  requisite  diligence  ?x 

§  483  (403).  Same  subject.  Corporate  Control  by  Stipulation.  — 
An  agreement  by  a  contractor  to  execute  a  public  improvement,  under 
the  general  direction  and  supervision  of  a  committee  of  a  city,  makes 
such  committee  —  acting  reasonably  and  honestly,  not  arbitrarily 
and  capriciously  —  exclusively  the  judge,  not  only  as  to  materials 
and  manner,  but  also  as  to  the  time  of  doing  the  work.2     But  where 


mack  v.  Brooklyn,  108  N.  Y.  49  ;  Galves- 
ton v.  Heard,  54  Tex.  420.  Where  a  city 
fails  to  levy  a  tax,  or  refuses  to  issue  tax 
warrants  in  payment  of  a  contract  for  grad- 
ing and  improving  streets,  and  otherwise 
neglects  to  provide  means,  the  city  is  lia- 
ble, and  the  contractor  may,  in  an  action, 
recover  the  amount  due.  Atchison  v. 
Byrnes,  22  Kan.  65  ;  Craycraft  v.  Selvage, 
10  Bush  (Ky.),  696  (1874).  In  princi- 
ple sustaining  the  view  suggested  in  the 
text  :  Reock  v.  Newark,  33  N.  J.  L.  129  ; 
post,  chap,  xxiii.,  note.  And  see  opinion 
of  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Argenti  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 16  Cal.  255,  282  (I860);  post,  chap. 
xx.,  on  Mandamus.  Where  the  city  coun- 
cil can  only  legislate  in  conjunction  with 
the  mayor  as  part  of  the  law-making 
power,  if  the  council  order  local  improve- 
ments by  a  resolution  without  the  signa- 
ture or  concurrence  of  the  mayor,  and  the 
work  is  done  by  a  contractor  under  such 
authority,  he  cannot  recover  of  the  abutter 
(Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  1872),  nor 
from  the  city,  it  seems,  where  the  charter 
ill  .'lares  that  the  city  shall  in  no  manner 
be  liable  for  local  improvements.  Saxton 
v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153  (1875). 

1  Text  approved.  Town  of  Tipton  v. 
Jones,  77  hid.  307  ;  see,  however,  Reilly 
r.  Albany,  supra. 

2  Chapman  v.  Lowell,  4  Cush.  (Mass.) 
378  (1849),  relating  to  drains  in  the  streets 
of  the  city.  Certain  walls  were,  by  con- 
tract, to  be  constructed  under  the  super- 
vision and  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  specific 
city  officer  ;  they  were  so  constructed  and 


approved,  and  it  was  held  that  the  city 
was  concluded  by  the  action  of  the  offi- 
cer. Omaha  v.  Hammond,  94  U.  S.  98 
(1876).  As  to  power  of  chancery  to  cor- 
rect mistake  of  the  engineer  or  other  person 
whose  decision  both  parties  to  the  con- 
tract have  agreed  to  abide  by,  see  Bail- 
road  Co.  v.  Veeder,  17  Ohio,  385.  Where 
there  is  a  condition  precedent  that  con- 
tractor shall  have  certificate  of  perform- 
ance by  corporation.  See  Bowery  Na- 
tional Bank  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York, 
63  N.  Y.  336  (1875)  ;  Cameron,  In  re, 
50  N.  Y.  502  (1872).  Condition  precedent 
that  payment  was  not  to  be  made  to  con- 
tractor until  confirmation  of  the  assess- 
ment, and  whose  duty  to  have  confirma- 
tion made,  construed.  Tone  v.  Mayor,  &c. 
70  N.  Y.  157  (1877).  The  contract  be- 
tween the  contractor  and  the  city  provided 
that  the  contractor  should  be  entitled  to 
payment  when  the  work  was  accepted  by 
the  Board  of  Public  Works,  and  it  was  held 
that  the  contractor,  who  had,  in  fact, 
completed  his  work,  might  recover  of  the 
abutter,  although  a  majority  of  the  board 
refused  or  neglected  to  examine  or  accept 
the  work.  Neenan  v.  Donoghue,  50  Mo. 
493  (1872).  It  is  held  that  the  acceptance 
by  the  city  authorities  of  work  done  under 
a  contract  for  a  street  improvement  is  only 
prima  facie  evidence  that  the  work  has 
been  done  in  substantial  compliance  with 
the  terms  of  the  contract.  Gulick  v.  <  'on- 
nely,  42  Ind.  134  (1873);  but  see  Omaha 
v.  Hammond,  supra. 


§  485       CONTRACTS  :    TWO    CLASSES   OF   MUNICIPAL   SECURITIES.        559 

a  written  contract  has  been  entered  into  between  a  municipal  cor- 
poration and  a  contractor,  a  general  provision  of  an  ordinance  that 
the  work  shall  be  done  under  the  directions  of  certain  officers  confers 
no  authority  upon  them  essentially  to  change  or  modify  the  provis- 
ions of  the  contract.1  If,  in  a  contract  for  a  public  work,  the  corpo- 
ration employer  reserves  the  right  to  make  alterations  in  the  form, 
dimensions,  or  materials  of  the  work,  the  contractor  is  bound  by  any 
such  alterations  made  in  good  faith;  but  such  a  clause  does  not  au- 
thorize the  employer  to  annul  the  agreement,  or  to  stop  the  work  in 
an  unfinished  state.2 

§  484  (404).  Evidences  of  Indebtedness ;  Negotiable  Bonds.  — 
We  have  elsewhere  discussed  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  author- 
ize the  issue  of  municipal  bonds  in  aid  of  railway  and  other  like 
enterprises,3  and  have  also  considered  the  express  and  implied  power 
of  municipal  corporations  to  borrow  money  and  issue  obligations 
therefor.4  It  appropriately  belongs  to  this  place,  however,  to  no- 
tice more  at  length  the  different  kinds  of  corporate  evidences  of  debt, 
and  the  rights  and  remedies  of  the  holders  thereof,  and  to  this  gen- 
eral subject  will  the  remainder  of  the  present  chapter  be  devoted. 

§  485.  Two  Great  Classes  of  Municipal  Securities  :  1.  Ordinary 
Warrants  ;  2.  Negotiable  Bonds  ;  Form,  Execution,  and  Attributes  of 
each.  —  It  is  material  to  bear  in  mind  the  different  kinds  of  corpo- 
rate evidences  of  debt.  These  are  of  two  general  classes.  First, 
there  is  the  usual  municipal  or  county  warrant  or  order.  These  are 
commonly  drawn  by  one  or  more  of  the  officers  upon  the  treasurer, 
directing  him  to  pay  to  the  person  named,  or  bearer,  a  given  sum  of 

i  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  Comst.  (N.  Y.)  338  (1850).  Remedy  of 
York,  22  X.  Y.  162  (1860);  Bond  v.  New-  contractor,  and  measure  of  damages  in 
ark,  4  C.  E.  Green  (19  N.  J.  Eq.),  376;  such  a  case,  considered,  lb.  It  is  held, 
compare  Omaha  v.  Hammond,  94  U.  S.  in  Vermont,  that  a  person  who  has  con- 
98(1876).  But  the  authority  of  the  cor-  tracted  with  the  proper  town  officers  to 
poration  may  be  implied  from  its  having  build  a  road  cannot  proceed  with  his  con- 
by  its  own  act  rendered  extra  materials  tract  after  notice  of  an  appeal,  and  recover 
necessary  to  conform  the  work  to  the  of  a  town  therefor.  This  decision  is  1 
conditions  of  the  contract.  Messenger  upon  a  construction  of  tie'  statute  of  that 
v.  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  196  (1860);  see,  also,  State  by  which  the  appeal  is  intended  to 
Stuart  v.  Cambridge,  125  Mass.  102.  Ef-  stay  or  suspend  all  proceedings  toward 
feet  of  certificate  of  approval  of  a  city  offi-  building  the  road,  and  the  contractor  was 
cer  where,  by  the  contract,  the  work  is  to  bound  to  take  h  ject  to  the 
be  done  to  his  approval.  Bond  v.  Newark,  contingency  of  the  appeal  allowed  by  law. 
4  C.  E.  Green  (19  N.  J.  Eq. ),  376.  Taft  v.  Pittsford,  28  Vt.  2S6  (1856). 

As  to  reserved  right  to  discontinue  icork         8  Ante,  see.  119  ct  seq.,  and  see  post,  sec. 

and  annul  contract.     Bietry   r.   New  Or-  511  ct  seq. 
leans,  24  La.  An.  21  (1872).  4  Ante,  sec.  117  ct  seq.;  supra,  sec.  470, 

2  Clark  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York,  4  note. 


560  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  486 

money.  The  power  to  issue  them,  and  the  mode  in  which  it  is  to 
be  exercised,  are  usually  prescribed  by  charter  or  statute.  They  are 
vouchers  or  "  necessary  instruments  for  carrying  on  the  machinery 
of  municipal  administration  and  for  anticipating  the  collection  of 
tuxes,"1  out  of  which  they  must  bu  paid.  The  power  to  issue  such 
warrants  or  orders  may,  where;  not  expressly  conferred  or  denied,  be 
implied  as  incidental  to  carrying  out  the  objects  of  a  municipal  or 
public  corporation.  Second,  there  is  the  municipal  bond,  negotiable 
in  form,  payable  at  a  future  day,  intended  for  sale  in  the  market, 
issued  under  express  authority  of  the  legislature.2 

§  486.  Municipal  Bonds.  —  Such  bonds,  negotiable  in  form,  not- 
withstanding they  are  under  seal,  are  clothed  with  all  the  attributes 
of  commercial  paper,  pass  by  delivery  or  indorsement,  and  are  not 
subject  to  equities  (where  the  power  to  issue  them  exists)  in  the  hands 
of  holders  for  value  before  due,  without  notice.  Such  bonds  usually 
have  coupons  attached,  which  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  bond,  are 
likewise  negotiable,  may  be  detached  ami  held  separately  from  the 
bond,  and  the  holder  may  sue  thereon  in  his  own  name,  without  pro- 
ducing or  being  interested  in  the  bonds  to  which  they  were  originally 
attached.  Such  securities  are  made  to  raise  money  by  their  sale, 
and  this  object  would  be  defeated  if  they  were  subject  to  equities 
(where  the  power  to  issue  exists)  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide  holders. 
The  propositions  in  this  section  of  the  text  are  so  well  settled  as  to 
be  no  longer  open  to  question.3 

i  Per  Bradley,  J.,  in  Nashville  v.  Ray,  bonds),  16  Wall.  6  (1872);  Gould  v.  Ster- 

19  Wall.  468,  477  (1873).  ling,  23  N.  Y.  464;  s.  c.  1  Am.  Law  Keg. 

2  The    legislature    may    confer    upon  (n.  s.)  290,  and  note;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines, 

municipal  bonds  all  the  characteristics  of  19  Iowa,  199,  213  (1865),  and  cases  cited; 

commercial   paper,   such   as   negotiability  White   v.    Railroad   Co.,    21   How.   575  ; 

and  protection   in  the  hands  of  innocent  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Kern.  (13  N.  V.) 

holders  for  value.     Alvord  v.  Syracuse  Sav-  599;  s.  c.  4  Duer,   480;  Bank  v.   Rome, 

ings  Bank,  98  N.  Y.  599.  19  N.  Y.  20  ;  Aurora  v.  West,  22  Ind.  88; 

8  Mercer  County   v.   Hacket,  1  Wall.  Comm'rs  v.  Bright,  IS  Ind.  93;    Barrett 

83  (1863),  denying  Diamond  v.  Lawrence  v.  Schuyler  County,  44  Mo.  197;  DeVoss 

County.  37  Pa.  St.  353  ;   Meyer  v.  Musea-  V.  Richmond,  18  Graft.  338  ;  s.  c.   7  Am. 

tine,  1  Wall.  384  ;  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  Law    Reg.    (n.    s.)   589;    Lynchburg  v. 

lb.  175;  Moranw.  Miami  County,  2  Black,  Slaughter,  75  Va.   57;   Durant  v.  Iowa 

732   (1862)  ;  Clapp   V.    Cedar   County,    5  County,  Woolworth  C.  C.  R.  69  ;  State  v. 

Iowa,  15  ;   Morris  Canal  Co.  v.   Fisher,   1  Madison,    7    Wis.    688  ;    Clark    v.   Janes- 

Stockt.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  667(1855);  Craig  v.  ville,   10   Wis.    136    (1859);    Maddox  v. 

Vicksburg,     31    Miss.    216;    Jackson   v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56  (1859);  Eerr». 

Railroad  Co.,   48  Me.   147;  s.  c.   2  Am.  Corry,  105    Pa.    St.   282;  Ackley  School 

Law  Reg.  (n.  8.)  585;  s.  c.  lb.  748,  and  District  v.    Hall,    113   U.    S.  135;  New 

note  of  Judge   Redfield;  Chapin  v.   Rail-  Providence  v.    Halsey,    117    U.    S.    336; 

road  Co.,  8  Cray  (Mass.),  575:  Lynde  v.  Oubre  v.  Donaldsonville,  33  La.  An.  386; 

Winnebago    County     (Iowa    court-house  Martin  v.   Police  Jury,  32  La.  An.  1022. 


§487 


CONTRACTS:    CORPORATION    ORDERS    OB    WARRANTS. 


561 


§487    (40G).     Ordinary   Corporation    Orders    or     Warrants.  —  I'.ut 

ordinary  city,  county,  and  town  orders  or  warrants  are  in  some  re- 
spects different  from  bonds  of  the  character  just  mentioned,  and,  in 
the  author's  judgment,  the  better  opinion,  as  well  as  decided  weight 
of  authority,  is  that  there  is  no  implied  power  in  the  officers  of  a 
town,  county,  or  city  corporation  to  issue  warrants  or  orders  which 
shall  be  free  from  equities  in  the  hands  of  holders;  that  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  power  is  not  necessary  as  an  incident  to  po\ 
ordinarily  granted,  or  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the  corporation, 
and  would  be  attended  with  abuse  and  fraught  with  danger.  Ordi- 
nary warrants  or  orders,  negotiable  in  form,  may  be  made  by  the 
proper  officers  ;  and  in  many  of  the  States  such  instruments  may  be 


Municipal  bonds  payable  to  bearer  are 
negotiable  by  delivery.  Gardner  r.  Haney, 
86  Ind.  17  ;  Farr  v.  Lyons,  13  Fed.  Rep. 
377.     Post,  sec.  513. 

Coupons.  Coupons  attached  to  such 
bonds  are  negotiable,  and  the  holder  may 
sue  thereon  in  his  own  name  without  being 
interested  in  or  producing  the  bonds  to 
which  they  were  originally  attached. 
Thomson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall.  327 
(1865);  Murray  v.  Lardner,  2  Wall.  110 
(1864)  ;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21 
How.  539  (1858)  ;  Johnson  v.  Stark 
County,  24  111.  75;  Kenosha  v.  Lamson,  9 
Wall.  478  (1869);  Chicago,  B.  &Q.  R.  Co. 
v.  Otoe  County,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  338. 
Form  of  coupons,  &c,  post,  sec.  512,  note. 
Judgment  in  suit  on  coupons  or  for  in- 
terest, when  a  bar  to  subsequent  suit. 
Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Orleans  Nav. 
Co.,  3  La.  An.  294  ;  Beloit  v.  Morgan, 
7  Wall.  619  ;  Bissell  v.  Spring  Valley 
Township,  124  U.  S.  225  ;  compare  Crom- 
well v.  Sac  County,  96  U.  S.  51. 

An  action  on  a  coupon  Is  not  barred  in 
less  time  than  the  bond  to  which  it  was 
originally  attached.  Kenosha  v.  Lamson, 
supra;  Lexington  v.  Butler,  14  Wall.  282 
(1871).  Explained,  Clark  v.  Iowa  City, 
20  Wall.  5S3  (1S74).  How  declared  on. 
Ring  v.  County,  6  Iowa,  265  ;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Otoe  County,  supra ;  Wiley  v. 
Board,  &c,  11  Minn.  371.  The  better 
practice,  in  the  author's  judgment,  is  to 
set  out  in  the  declaration  the  bond  to 
which  the  coupon  in  suit  was  attached,  or 
to  allege  its  legal  effect  and  recitals. 

Municipal  corporations  may  plead  the 
statute  of  limitations  in  actions  against 
vol.  i.  — 36 


them  on  their  bonds  payable  at  a  fixed 
time.  De  Cordova  v.  Galveston,  4  Tex. 
470  (1849);  see  Underbill  v.  Sonora  Trs., 
17  Cal.  172  ;  Baker  v.  Johnson  Co.,  33 
Iowa,  151  ;  post,  sec.  668  et  scq. 

The  statute  of  limitations  commences  to 
ran  on  coupons  detached  from  the  bonds 
and  negotiated  separately,  from  the  time 
the  coupons  mature,  and  the  operation  of 
the  statute,  in  such  a  case,  is  not  deferred 
until  the  maturity  of  the  bonds  to  which 
the  coupons  belonged.  This  point  has 
been  expressly  adjudged  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  Clark  v.  Iowa  City,  20  Wall.  583 
(1874),  and  the  prior  decisions,  which  had 
been  supposed  to  hold  otherwise,  explained 
to  mean  only  that  when  the  bonds  were 
specialties,  the  coupons,  though  detached, 
partook  of  the  same  nature,  and  therefore 
the  same  statute  of  limitations  ap] 
both  the  coupons  and  the  bonds  ;  that  is, 
if  the  bonds  were  specialties,  so  were  the 
coupons,  and  the  statute  of  limitations  as 
to  sealed  instruments,  and  not  the  more 
restricted  statute  applicable  to  simple  con- 
tracts, applied.  Kenosha  r.  Lamson,  9 
Wall.  477  ;  Lexington  v.  Butler,  14  Wall. 
282.  The  statute  also  begins  to  run  on 
coupons  from  the  time  they  respectively 
mature,  although  they  remain 
the  bond  which  represents  the  principal 
debt.  Amy  v.  Dubuque,  98  V.  S.  470  ; 
Nash  v.  Eldorado  Co.,  24  Fed.  Re] 
As  to  negotiability  of  coupons  which  are 
due  detached  from  bonds  not  due.  Thomp- 
son v.  Perrine,  106  U.  S.  5S9.  Payment 
of  bonds  does  not  extinguish  de 
coupons  no1  paid.  Bank  v.  Hartford,  &c. 
R.  It.  Co.,  8  R.  I.  375. 


562 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§487 


transferred  by  delivery  or  indorsement,  and  the  holder  sue  thereon 
in  his  own  name;  yet  they  are  not  commercial  or  negotiable  paper 
in  the  hands  of  holders,  so  as  to  exclude  inquiry  into  the  legality 
of  their  issue,  or  to  preclude  defences  thereto.1  Ordinary  warrants 
drawn  by  one  officer  on  another  officer  of  the  same  corporation  are 
nol  bills  of  exchange,  as  such  bills  involve  the  idea  of  two  parties; 
bul  are  orders  by  the  corporation  on  itself,  —  mere  directions  to  the 
treasurer  to  pay  the  amount  to  the  bearer.2 


1  Emery  v.  Mariaville,  56  Me.  315  ; 
Shirk  v.  Pulaski  Co.,  4  Dillon,  209,  213 
(ls77),  and  cases  cited;  Clark  v.  Des 
Moines,  lit  [0wa,  199,  211-214  (1865),  and 
cited;  Clark  v.  Polk  County,  lb. 
248;  .Matins  v.  Cameron,  62  Mo.  504 
(1876)  ;  People  V.  County,  11  Cal.  170 
(1858)  ;  Sturtevant  v.  Liberty,  46  Me. 
47.7;  Smith  V.  Cheshire,  13  Cray  (Mass.), 
31S  (1859)  ;  Andover  v.  Grafton,  7  N.  H. 
298  (1834);  compare,  however,  Bank  v. 
Farmington,  41  N.  II.  32  ;  Daltymple  ». 
Whittingham,  26  Vt.  345  ;  Inhabitants  v. 
Weir,  9  Ind.  224  (1857) ;  Connersville  v. 
Connersville  Hydraulic  Co.,  86  Ind.  184  ; 
School  District  v.  Thompson,  5  Minn.  280 
(1861)  ;  s.  P.  Goodnow  v.  Commissioners, 
11  lb.  31  (1865);  Hyde  v.  Franklin,  27 
Vt.  185  (1855)  ;  approved,  Taft  v.  Pitts- 
ford,  28  Vt.  286  ;  Halstead  v.  Mayor,  3 
Comst.  (3  N.  Y.)  430  ;  s.  c.  5  Barb.  218; 
The  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666,  and 
reasoning  of  Mr.  Justice  Miller  ;  People  v. 
Gray,  23  Cal.  125;  lb.  447;  Hubbard  v. 
Lyndon,  28  Wis.  674  (1871).  Warrants, 
duly  signed  and  sealed,  are  prima  facie 
valid,  but  open  to  defences.  Commis- 
sioners v.  Keller,  6  Kan.  510  ;  Commis- 
sioners v.  Day,  19  Ind.  540  (1862)  ;  People 
t;.  Johnson,  100  111.  537  ;  infra,  sec.  502. 
Transferee  or  holder  may  sue  in  his  own 
name.  Emery  v.  Mariaville,  56  Me.  315  ; 
Crawford  County  v.  Wilson,  2  Eng.  (7 
Ark.)  214  ;  Clark  V.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
199;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County,  3  Iowa, 
467  ;  Clark  v.  Polk  County,  19  Iowa,  248  ; 
Int.  Bank  v.  Franklin  Co.,  65  Mo.  105 
(1877).  (  Uherwise  in  Massachusetts.  Smith 
v.  Cheshire,  13  Cray  (Mass.),  318,  treat- 
ing a  town  order,  payable  to  bearer,  as 
a  mere  chose  in  action,  which  could  not 
be  enforced  in  the  name  of  an  assignee. 
s.  P.  O'Donnell  v.  City,  7  Phil.  (Pa.)  234. 
In  many  of  the  States,  "the  real  party  in 


interest "  mny  sue  in  his  own  name.  In 
Vermont,  as  to  right  of  holder  of  town 
and  county  orders  to  sue  in  his  own  name, 
see  Dalrymple  v.  Whittingham,  26  Vt. 
345  ;  compare  Taft  v.  Pittsford,  28  Vt. 
286,  289;  Hyde  v.  Franklin,  27  Vt.  185. 
Right  of  indorsee  to  sue  or  enforce  by  man- 
damus in  his  own  name.  Kelly  v.  Mayor, 
&c,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  263;  Clark  v.  School 
District,  3  K.  I.  199;  Moss  v.  Oakley,  2 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  265  ;  Commissioners?'.  Day, 
19  Ind.  450;  Dively  v.  Cedar  Falls,  21 
Iowa,  565  ;  Justices  v.  Orr,  12  Ga.  137. 
Statutory  form  of  assignment  must  be  ob- 
served. Int.  Bank  i>.  Franklin  Co.,  65  Mo. 
105  (1877)  ;  post,  chap.  xx.  sec.  849. 

2  Miller  v.  Thompson,  3  Man.  &  Gr. 
576;  Fairchild  v.  Ogdensburg,  C.  &R.  Co., 
15  N.  Y.  337;  Bull  v.  Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570, 
572  ;  Clark  v.  Polk  County,  19  Iowa,  247  ; 
Hasey  v.  "White  Pigeon  Beet  Sugar  Co., 
1  Doug.  (Mich.)  193;  Dana  r.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 19  Cal.  486  ;  Bibb  County  Inf.  C 
Justices  v.  Orr,  12  Ga.  137.  Municipal 
certiiicates  of  indebtedness  are  not  "bills 
of  credit"  within  the  meaning  of  the  pro- 
hibition (art.  1,  sec.  10)  of  the  National 
Constitution  (Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police, 
15  Md.  376,  1859),  and  possess  no  ele- 
ments of  commercial  paper.  Chandler  v. 
Bay  St.  Louis,  57  Miss.  327.  As  a  county 
warrant  is  an  instrument  by  which  the 
money,  property,  or  rights  of  a  county 
may  be  affected,  it  is  such  an  one  as  may 
/  forged.  State  v.  Feidey,  18  Mo.  445 
(1853).  Requisites  of  indictment  in  such 
a  case.  H>.  Without  the  sanction  of  the 
county  board  the  clerk  has  no  authority 
to  issue,  or  the  treasurer  to  pay  or  coun- 
tersign, any  warrant.  People  v.  Klopke, 
92  111.  134. 

Bonds  issued  by  the  city  of  Little  Rock 
on  bank-note  paper,  engraved  with  vig- 
nettes, in  the  similitude  of  bank-bills,  in- 


§488 


CONTRACTS 


POWER   TO    MAKE    NEGOTIABLE    PAPER. 


563 


§  488  (407).  Power  to  make  and  issue  Negotiable  Paper.  —  Bank- 
ing and  trading  corporations  have  implied  or  incidental  power  to 
make  negotiable  paper  ;l  and  the  same  rule  has,  in  some  cases,  been 
applied  to  municipal  corporations.  The  ordinary  warrants  of  such 
corporations,  it  is  clear,  do  not  cut  off  equities,  and  it  is  doubtful 
whether  they  have  an  incidental  power  to  make  paper  which  shall 
have  this  effect.2  The  subject  lias  been  discussed  in  a  previous 
chapter.3 

Orleans,  23  La.  An.  5  (1871);  Clark  V. 
Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199  (1865) ;  Dively 
v.  Cedar  Falls,  21  [owa,  565  :  8.  c.  27  Iowa, 
227;  Black  v.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621  (1874)  ; 
Cheeney  v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53  (1874)  ; 
Hackettstown  ads.  Swackhamer,  37  N. 
J.  L.  191  (1874);  Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch. 
(X.  J.)  221. 

1  McCullough  v.  Moss,  5  Denio  (X.Y.i, 
567  ;  Straus  v.  Eagle  Insurance  Co.,  5 
Ohio  St.  59;  Mott«.  Hicks,  lCow.  (N.Y.) 
513;  Attorney-General  v.  L.  &F.  [us.  Co., 
9  Paige  (X.  Y.),  Cli.  470  ;  2  Kent  Com. 
299;  1  Parsons  N.  &  B.  165;  Clark  v. 
Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  212  ;  ante,  sees.  117, 
118;  Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch.  (N.J.) 
221.  Morawetz  on  Corp.  (2d  ed.)  sees. 
350-352.     Post,  see.  507. 

'2  Kelley  v.  Brooklyn,  4  Hill  (X.  Y.), 
263  ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199 
213  ;  Came  v.  Brigham,  39  Me.  39  ; 
Clarke  v.  School  District,  3  R.  I.  199  ; 
Goodnow  v.  Remsey  Co.  Comm'rs,  11 
Minn.  31  ;  Burrton  v.  Harvey  Co.  Sav- 
ings Bauk,  28  Kan.  390  ;  Carleton  v. 
Washington,  3S  Kan.  726:  Little  Rock 
r  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank.  98  U.  S 
citing  and  approving  texl  cs.  117- 

127.  In  Indiana  the  common-law  doc- 
trine that  a  corporation  could  not  make  a 


tended  to  circulate  as  money,  were  held 
to  be  illegal  and  void  under  the  legisla- 
tion of  Arkansas,  both  l>y  the  State  and 
Federal  courts.  Lindsey  v.  Rottaken,  32 
Ark.  619  (1878)  ;  Jones  v.  Little  Ruck,  25 
Ark.  301  (1868);  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Little  Rock,  5  Dillon,  299(1878);  s.  c.  98 
IT.  S.  308.  In  the  last-named  case  it  was 
decided  that  this  illegal  money  having 
been  paid  out  by  the  city  to  bona  fide 
creditors  for  valid  claims,  and  the  city 
having  afterwards  called  it  in,  and  hy  the 
action  of  the  municipal  council  acknowl- 
edged an  indebtedness  for  the  amount  to 
the  holders  and  promised  to  pay  the  same, 
it  was  liable  on  such  acknowledgmenl  and 
new  promise.  In  Jones  v.  Little  Rock, 
supra,  the  court  refused  to  interfere  by 
injunction  at  the  instance  of  a  taxpayer 
to  prevent  that  city  from  issuing  paper  of 
this  character. 

Liability  as  respects  scrip  issued  to  cir~ 
culate  as  money.  Thomas  .  Richmond, 
12  Wall.  349  (1870),  and  in  which  the  city- 
was  held  not  to  be  liable.  See  on  this 
subject,  supra,  sec.  443,  note,  sec.  448, 
and,  also,  Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkan, 
14  Pa.  St.  81  (1850);  Jones  t\  Little  Rock, 
25  Ark.  3(U  ;  Miller  v.  Lynchburg,  20 
Gratt.   (Va.)  330  (1871);  Smith  v.   New 


8  The  author's  views  are  expressed  and 
the  cases  on  the  subject  are  referred  to, 
ec.  117  et  seq.,  and  are  approved  in 
Parsons  v.  Monmouth,  70  Me.  262  (1879). 
,-  trrr  "  to  issue  county  orders  " 
gives  no  authority  to  issue  negotiable  bonds 
payable  at  a  future  day,  with  interest 
coupons  attached.  The  difference  is  sub- 
stantial. Goodnow  v.  Comm'rs,  11  Minn. 
31  (1865).  County  Comm'i 
2  Kan.  115  (I860)";  Hull  r.  County,  12 
Iowa,  142.  Statutory  form  of  county  war- 
rants held  to    be   directory,    and    a    mere 


departure  from  this  form  is  no  defence  to 
an  action  on  the  warrant.  Young 
den  County,  19  Mo.  309  (is:,  i).  A  m- 
tract  made  by  a  county  with  another  party, 
in  which  the  county  agrees  to  pay  for 
services  rendered,  in  county  warrants,  is 
in  effect  a  contract  payable  in  money,  and 
is  not  void.  Babcock  v.  Goodrich,  17  Cal. 
488  (1874). 

Express  authority  to  a  city  to  sul 
k,  to  be  paid  for  by  " 
loan,"   authorizes   it    to   issue    neg         La 
bonds  with  coupons  attached,  such   '       r- 


564 


M  I '  N ICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§§  489-499 


§§  489-499  (408).  Liability  of  Indorser  of  Warrants. — "Warrants 

or  aiders  of  a  municipal  corporation  for  the  unconditional  payment 


promissory  note  is  exploded,  and  corpora- 
tions can  now  make  contracts  intra  vires 
in  writing  not  under  seal.  Municipal  and 
corporations  can  make  in  a  proper 
i  promissory  note  (citing  Ketchnm  v. 
Buffalo,  11  X.  V.  356  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Evansville,  15  Ind.  395);  a  promissory 
note  of  a  school  township  in  payment  for 
building  a  school-house  held  valid.  Shef- 
field School  Tp.  i>.  Andress,  56  Ind. 
157(1877).  See  Douglass  v.  Virginia  City, 
5  Nevada  R.,  117  (1S69),  as  to  power  to 
make  notes  unless  specially  restricted. 
Power  to  I'm  id  debts  and  to  issue  new  bonds, 
notes,  or  evidences  of  indebtedness.  Ga- 
lena v.  Corwith,  48  111.  423.  An  action 
cannot  be  maintained  against  a  city  on  a 


tifieates  of  loan"  and  "bonds"  being 
considered  identical.  Amey  v.  Allegheny 
City,  '24  How.  (U.  S.)  364  (1860);  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh  (power  "to 
borrow  money"),  34  Pa.  St.  496,  511; 
Same  v.  Same,  41  Pa.  St.  27S.  Power  by 
public  corporations  to  issue  negotiable 
bunds  may  be  inferred  from  the  power  to 
subscribe  for  stock  in  railroad  companies 
and  to  make  payment  for  it  in  bonds. 
Curtis  v.  Butler  County,  24  How.  (U.  S.) 
435  ;  Bushnell  v.  Beloit,  10  Wis.  195. 
Express  legislative  authority  to  a  city  to 
subscribe  for  stuck  in  a  railroad  "as  fully 
as  any  individual,"  authorizes  the  issue  by 
the  city  of  negotiable  bonds  in  payment 
t  lull  tor.  Seybert  v.  Pittsburgh,  1  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  272  (1863);  approving  Common- 
wealth v.  Same,  41  Pa.  St.  278  ;  Rogers  v. 
Burlington  (power  to  "borrow  money  for 
any  public  purpose"),  3  Wall.  654  (1865); 
Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  385;  Mitchell 
v.  Burlington,  4  Wall.  270.  By  resolu- 
tion, the  council  authorized  the  mayor  to 
borrow  money  of  a  bank,  and  execute  the 
7)'ifr  of  the  corporation  therefor,  instead  of 
which  he  executed  the  bond  of  the  corpora- 
tion under  the  seal  of  the  corporation.  In 
an  action  on  this  bond  by  the  payee,  it 
was  held  that  the  corporation  could  plead 
non  est  factum,  since  the  act  of  the  mayor 
in  executing  a  writing  obligatory  instead 
of  a  note  did  not  bind  the  corporation. 


demand  payable  out  of  a  fund  over  which 
its  charter  gives  a  board  of  education  con- 
trol to  the  exclusion  of  the  municipal  offi- 
cers. Crane  v.  Urbana,  2  111.  App.  559. 
That  public  corporations  have  no  author- 
ity to  make  and  place  in  market  commer- 
cial paper  without  express  power.  See 
Hewitt  v.  School  Dist.,  91  111.  528  ;  Super- 
visors v.  Farwell,  25  111.  181  ;  Clark  v. 
Hancock  Co.,  27  III.  305  ;  Marshall  Co. 
v.  Cook,  38  111.  44  ;  Wiley  v.  Silliman, 
62  111.  170;  Harding  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65 
111.  90;  McWhorteru  People,  65  111.  290; 
Big  Grove  v.  Wells,  65  111.  263  ;  Williams- 
port  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  St.  487 
(1877),  quoted  ante,  sees.  120,  121.  Ante, 
sees.  117-125.     Post,  see.  507,  507  a. 


Little  Rock  v.  State  Bank,  3  Eng.  (8  Ark.) 
227  ;  see  Damon  v.  Gran  by,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
345  ;  Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns. 
(X.  Y.)  60  ;  Bank  v.  Patterson,  7  Cranch, 
299  ;  Head  v.  Prov.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Cranch, 
127.  Where  towns  were  required  "  to 
purchase  "  liquors,  and  the  selectmen  were 
indictable  if  they  failed  to  make  provision 
for  executing  the  law,  it  was  held  that  a 
town  might  give  a  negotiable  note  for 
liquors  actually  purchased,  and  that  the 
town  could  not  defend  against  it  in  the 
hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder,  on  the  ground 
that  the  liquors  were  sold  in  violation  of 
the  law  of  the  State.  Great  Falls  Bank  v. 
Farmington,  41  X.  H.  32  (1860).  What 
an  indorsee  is  bound  to  inquire  about, 
stated,     lb.  42. 

The  general  doctrines  of  the  text  in  sec- 
tions 485-488  are  coincident  with  the 
views  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  the  case  of  the  Police  Jury  v.  Britton, 
15  Wall.  566  (1872),  where  it  was  held 
that  county  officers  in  Louisiana,  with  the 
usual  powers  of  such  officers,  have  no  im- 
plied authority  to  issue  negotiable  paper 
(bonds  witli  coupons),  payable  in  the  future, 
to  raise  money  or  to  fund  an  existing  debt, 
which  will  cut  off  equities  in  the  hands  of 
bona  fide  holders.  Such  a  power  is  not 
necessarily  incident  to  the  power  to  make 
specified  expenditures  or  improvements, 
though   it   may  be  implied   from  certain 


§  501 


WARRANTS  :   RIGHTS   AND   REMEDIES   OF    HOLDER. 


565 


of  money  to  a  person  named,  or  order,  or  to  bearer,  have  the  character 
of  negotiable  paper,  so  far,  at  least,  as  to  reader  parties  indorsing 
them  liable  as  indorscrs.1 

§  500  (409).  Payment  and  Cancellation  of  Warrants.  —  Pay- 
ment by  the  treasurer  or  proper  officer  of  a  municipal  corporation 

of  its  orders  or  warrants  ipso  facto  extinguishes  them.  If  lent. 
reissued,  or  put  into  circulation  again  by  the  officer,  after  he  hud 
once  obtained  credit  therefor,  they  are  not  valid  securities,  not  even, 
it  seems,  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder.2 

§  501  (410).  Rights  and  Remedies  of  Holder  of  Warrants.  — 
A  creditor  of  a  town  is  not  bound  to  receive  an  order  on  the  treas- 
urer, but  may  sue  upon   his  original  cause  of  action.3     But  if  he 


express  powers,  as,  for  example,  the  power 
to  borrow  money.  After  stating  other 
instances  in  which  the  power  has  been 
implied,  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  observes : 
"But  in  our  judgment  these  implications 
should  not  be  encouraged  or  extended  be- 
yond the  fair  inferences  to  be  gathered  from 
the  circumstances  of  each  case.  It  would 
be  an  anomaly,  justly  to  be  deprecated,  for 
all  our  limited  territorial  boards,  charged 
with  certain  objects  of  necessary  local 
administration,  to  become  fountains  of 
commercial  issues,  capable  of  floating  about 
in  the  financial  whirlpools  of  our  large 
cities."  15  Wall.  572.  But  see,  on  this 
point  of  the  incidental  power  of  municipal 
corporations  to  borrow  money,  and  to  issue 
commercial  paper,  the  later  case  of  Mayor 
of  Nashville  ».  Ray,  19  Wall.  468  (1873) ; 
ante,  sec.  117  et  seq.,  and  notes  ;  Ster- 
ling v.  West  Feliciana,  26  La.  An.  59 
(1874).    Post,  sees.  507,  507  a. 

1  Bull  v.  Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570  (1861). 
In  this  case  the  action  was  by  an  indorsee 
against  the  defendant  as  indorser  of  the 
following  instrument :  — 

Milwaukee,  Aug.  1,  1859. 
The   treasurer   will,  on   or   before   the 
1st  day  of  February  next,  pay  to  the  order 
of  E.  Sims,  fifty  dollars,  out  of  any  funds 
belonging   to   the   city  not  before   sp 

•iated,  the  same  having  been  this 
day  allowed  for  dredging,  and  chargeable 
to  the  general  city  fund. 

H.  L.  Pace,  Mayor. 
R.  R.  Lynch,  Clerk. 


It  was  held  that  the  defendant  incurred 
the  responsibility  of  an  indorser  of  negotia- 
ble paper,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  not 
bound  to  show  the  existence  of  funds  in 
the  city  treasury  sufficient  to  pay  the  war- 
rants, and  not  specially  appropriated  at 
the  time  of  its  maturity.  Campbell  v. 
Polk  County,  3  Iowa,  467  ;  Hodges  v. 
Shuler,  22  N.  Y.  114;  Fairchild  t>.  Ogdens- 
burgh,  &c.  Railroad  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  337. 
Compare  as  to  liability  of  indorser,  Keller 
v.  Hicks,  22  Cal.  457. 

2  Canal  Lank  v.  Supervisors,  5  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  517  (1848).  In  this  case  it  was 
held  that  where,  without  any  fraudulent 
intent,  the  holder  of  valid  county  orders 
exchanged  them  with  the  treasurer  for 
others  which  were  in  fact  pud,  but  which 
had  never  been  allowed  him  in  his  ac- 
counts, the  debt  represented  by  the  valid 
orders  was  not  extinguished,  and  was  a 
sufficient  consideration  to  support  a  set- 
tlement with  the  county  allowing  it.  As 
to  illegal  orders  in  hands  of  bona  fide 
holder.  Halstead  v.  The  Mayor,  &C  of 
New  York,  3  Coinst.  (N.  Y.)  430,  affirm- 
ing s.  c.  5  Barb.  218  ;  Mayor  of  Nash- 
ville v.  Kay  (import. int.  case),  19  Wall. 
468  (1S73).  A  municipal  corporation  is 
not  liable  for  the  increased  face  \ 
warrants  which  the  clerk  has  fraudulently 
raised  after  issuance.  Chandler  v.  Bay 
St.  Louis,  .".7  Mich.  327.  Payment  to 
bearer  in  good  faith  exonerates  the  cor- 
poration. Sweet  v.  Carver  Co.,  16  Minn. 
106  (1871). 

3  Benson   v.  Carmel,  S  Greenl.  (8  M     I 


566 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§503 


does  receive  such  an  order  he  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  present- 
ing it  to  the  treasurer  upon  whom  it  is  drawn,  or  of  alleging  facts 
which  excuse  presentment,  before  he  can  maintain  an  action  upon 
it.  As  such  an  instrument  is,  in  effect,  an  order  by  the  debtor  on 
himself,  it'  presented  and  payment  be  refused,  the  town  is  liable 
instantly,  and   without  notice  of  non-payment.1 

§502  (411).  Presumption  of  Liability.  —  County  and  city  orders 
signed  by  the  proper  officers  art  prima  facie  hauling  and  legal. 
These  officers' will  be  presumed  to  have  done  their  duty.  Such  orders 
make  a  prima  fat  'it  cause  of  action.  Impeachment  must  come  from 
the  defendant.2 

§  503.  Warrants  not  Negotiable  Paper.  —  Such  warrants  or  orders 
drawn   for  ordinary  municipal   expenses  arc  not  intended  to  have  the 


112;  Willey  v.  Greenfield,  30  Me.  452 
(1S49)-  No  misapplication  of  a  special 
fund  by  the  officers  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration can  defeat  the  rights  of  creditors 
entitled  to  be  paid  therefrom.  Statu  v. 
Pilsbury,  30  La.  An.  705. 

1  Vainer  v.  Nobleborough,  2  Greenl. 
(2  Me.)  121,  where  Mellen,  C.  J.,  says  : 
"No  sound  reason  can  be  given  why  a 
town  should  be  subjected  to  the  perplex- 
ity of  costs  of  an  action  before  the  payee 
of  an  order  will  do  his  duty  and  request 
the  payment.  .  .  .  There  is  an  implied 
engagement  to  conform  to  established 
usage,  and  present  the  order  for  pay- 
ment." Benson  v.  Carmel,  supra;  Pease 
v.  Cornish,  19  Me.  (1  Appl.)  191  (1841). 
An  action  cannot  be  maintained  on  war- 
rants drawn  on  a  municipal  treasurer, 
without  allegation  and  proof  of  their  pres- 
entation to  him,  or  of  facts  which  will 
excuse  the  presentation.  Central  v.  Wil- 
coxen,  3  Col.  566  ;  East  Union  v.  Ryan, 
86  Pa.  St.  459.  As  to  mode  of  present- 
ment. Steel  v.  Davis  County,  2  G.  Greene 
(Iowa),  469;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County, 
3  Iowa,  467.  Where  the  payee  lias  ac- 
cepted county  orders  for  a  debl  against  the 
county,  and  has  parted  with  such  orders, 
he  cannot  sue  the  county  for  the  original 
debt.  Crawford  County  v.  Wilson,  2  Eng. 
(7  Ark.)  214  (1846).  See  Allison  v.  Ju- 
niata County,  50  Pa.  St.  351.  An  unpaid 
and  dishonored  warrant  on  the  corporation 
treasurer  is  not,  prima  facie  at  least,  an 


extinguishment  or  novation  of  the  original 
debt.  Goldschmidt  v.  New  Orleans,  5  La. 
An.  436  ;  Short  v.  New  Orleans,  4  La.  An. 
281. 

2  Floyd  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Day,  19  Ind. 
450  (1S62)  ;  Hamilton  v.  Newcastle  & 
1  >.  R.  Co.,  9  Ind.  359  ;  Leavenworth 
County  Comm'rs  v.  Keller,  6  Kan.  510 
(1870);  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
211  (1865);  Cheeney  v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo. 
53  (1875)  ;  Connersville  v.  Connersville 
Hydraulic  Co.,  86  Ind.  1S4.  Such  debts 
"  do  not  stand  on  the  footing  of  those  con- 
tracted under  a  special  conditional  grant  of 
power."  Comm'rs  c.  Day,  supra;  People 
v.  Mead,  24  N.  Y.  114  ;  ante,  chap.  ix.  sec. 
213  ;  supra,  sec.  487.  County  warrants  are 
valid  instruments  only  when  the  board  of 
supervisors  had  legal  authority  to  issue 
them,  or  to  contract  the  obligation  on  which 
they  were  founded,  and  are  not  binding 
when  issued  in  violation  of  law  or  in 
fulfilment  of  a  contract  that  the  board 
was  prohibited  from  making.  See  cases, 
supra,  in  this  note  ;  Sault  Ste.  Marie  v. 
Van  Dusan,  40  Mich.  429  ;  Jefferson 
County  v.  Arrighi,  54  Miss.  668  ;  Nash  v. 
St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174;  People  v.  Flagg, 
17  N.  Y.  589;  Brady  v.  New  York,  20 
N.  Y.  312  :  Hague  v.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa. 
528.  A  law  creating  the  liability  of  a 
county  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  ex- 
action  of  payment  from  the  county.  Hess 
v.  Pegg,  7  Nev.  23  (1871). 


§504  contracts:  warrants;  defences.  567 

qualities  of  commercial  paper,  but  are  instruments  authorized  for 
convenient  use  in  conducting  the  current  and  ordinary  business  of 
the  corporation  and  as  a  means  of  anticipating  its  ordinary  revenue 
It  would  overwhelm  municipalities  with  rum  to  hold  that  such 
warrants  or  orders  have  the  qualities  of  negotiable  paper,  especially 
that  quality  which  protects  an  innocent  holder  for  value  from 
defences  of  which  he  lias  qo  notice,  actual  or  constructive.  All 
holders  of  such  warrants  or  orders,  even  when  payable  to  order  or 
bearer,  stand  in  the  shoes  of  the  payee,  and  their  rights  and  remedies 
are  often  essentially  different  from  those  of  the  holders  of  authorized 
negotiable  municipal  bonds.  Such  is  the  sound  doctrine,  and  such 
is  the  doctrine  of  the  authorities  almost  without  exception.1 

Without  express  authority  from  the  legislature  a  municipality 
cannot  discount  its  warrants  to  its  creditors  so  as  to  make  them 
equivalent  to  cash,  or  issue  warrants  for  more  than  the  sum  act- 
ually due  the  claimant;  and  as  to  the  excess  they  are  void,  and 
the  holder  will  be  treated  only  as  the  equitable  assignee  of  the 
valid  legal  claim  of  the  payee.2 

§  504  (412).  Defences.  —  A  municipal  corporation  is  not  estopped 
after  a  warrant  upon  its  treasury  has  been  issued,  to  set  up  the 
defence  of  ultra  vires,  or  fraud,  or  want  or  failure  of  consideration.2 
And  it  may  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  to  cancel  warrants  illegally 

1  Carroll   Co.    Sup.    v.    U.   S.    (nature  York,    3  N.    Y.    430  ;  Brown  v.   Utica,   2 
of  warrants  and  remedy),    IS  Wall.   71;  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  104;  Anthony   v.  Adams, 
Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4   Dillon,   209,  1    Met.    (Mas.)    286.      The   allowanci 
213  (1877),  and  cases  cited  ;  Clark  v.  Des  a  claim   by  a  county    hoard    is    not    final 
Moines,  19  Iowa,    199  ;    Mayor  of  Nash-  ami  conclusive.     Such  allowance  is  p 
ville    w.    Ray,    19    Wall.    468  ;    United  facie  evidence   of   the  correctness  of  tic- 
States   v.  Miller  County,   4   Dillon,    233  claim  ;"  but,"  says  Kingman,  C.  J.,  " 
(1878).  settlement  of  an   account  by  the  county 

2  Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4  Dillon,  board  is  not  more  sacred  than  a  settlement 
209    (1877);    Goyne    v.    Ashley    County,  made  by  individuals."    The  court  thei 

31   Ark.   552  (1876);  Bauer  v.   Franklin  held,  and  properly  so,  that  the  allowan 

County,  51  Mo.   205    (1873).     "The  fla-  a  claim  by  the  county  was  not  an 

grant  abuses,"  which,  as  Wagner,  J.,  says,  turn  in  the  sense  that  it  would  conclude 

in  the  case  last  cited,   would  follow  any     th »unty  as  to  the  amount  allowed  when 

other  doctrine,  are  well  exemplified  in  Shirk  sued  upon  the  warrant  drawn  in  pursuance 

v.  Pulaski  County.    Foster  v.  Coleman.  10  of  such  allowance.      Comm'rs  v.  Keller,  6 

Cal.  278  ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  Kan.   510  ;  Nashville    r.   Ray,    19    Wall. 

199.  46S   (1873);    Shirk  v.   Pulaski  County,    4 

8  Thomas  r.  Richmond  (scrip  to  circu-  Dillon.  209  (1877);  Cheeney  r.  Brookfield, 

late  as  m  mey),  12  Wall.  349  (1870);  Web-  60  Mo.  53  (1875);  post,  chap,  xxiii. 

sterCountyfl.  Taylor,  19  Iowa,  117  (1865);  rants  may.  it  seems,  be  usurious.     I 

Clark   v.    Des  Moines,  Tb.   199;  Clark   v.  r.    Des    Moines,    supra; 

PolkCounty,  Tb.  248  ;   Hodges  r.  Buffalo,  note. 
2  Denio  (X.  Y.),   110;  Halstead  v.   New 


568 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


§  505 


issued.1      Taxpayers   may  enjoin   the  issue  of  illegal  warrants  or 
scrip.2 

§  505  (413).  Payable  out  of  a  Particular  Fund.  —  If  by  law  a 
particular  claim  is  to  be  paid  oat  of  a  special  fund,  a  warrant  or 
order  issued  therefor  should  be  made  payable  out  of  such  fund ;  if 
made  payable  from  the  treasury  generally  by  the  officers  issuing  it, 
the  corporation  is  not  bound  by  their  act.8  An  order  or  warrant, 
concluding  with  the  words  "  and  charge  the  same  to  the  account  of 
Union  Avenue,"  is  payable  out  of  the  particular  fund  indicated,  and 
is  not  a  claim  against  the  corporation.4  But  the  distinction  must 
be  observed  between  orders  payable  out  of  a  particular  fund,  and 
those  which  evidence  a  general  corporate  liability,  but  are  directed 
to  be  charged  to  a  particular  account.5 


1  Pulaski  County   v.   Lincoln,    4    Eng. 
(9  Ark.)  320  (1849);   Webster  County  v. 

or,  19  Iowa,  117  ;  Paris  Tp.  Trs.  v. 
C  lerry,  8  Ohio  St.  564  (185b);  Glasten- 

r.  McDonald,  44  Vt.  450  (1872).  In 
Mississippi  a  board  known  as  the  board  of 
police  are  authorized  by  law  to  audit  and 
allow,  upon  due  proof,  all  claims  against 
the  county  ;  and  comities  in  that  State 
cannol  be  sued  directly.  The  action  of 
the  board  in  allowing  claims  for  matters  of 
county  charge,  and  in  ordering  wan-ants 
to  issue  therefor,  is  final  and  conclusive  on 
the  county,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  until 
it  is  reversed  or  vacated.  Carroll  v. 
Board,  &c.,  28  Miss.  (6  Cush.)  38  (1854). 
I'.nt  the  weight  of  authority  is  otherwise. 
Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4  Dillon,  209 
(1877).  Etft  ■  i  of  issuing  new  orders  for  old. 
<  <■  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
199  :  Chemung  Canal  Bank  v.  Chemung 
Co.  Sup.,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.),  517  ;  Lake  v. 
Tmsteps,  t  Denio  (N.  Y.),  520;  Shirk  v. 
Pulaski  County,  1  Dillon,  209(1877).  On 
wan-ants  or  orders  the  statute  of  limitations 
does  not  begin  to  run  until  payment  is 
denied.  Justices  of  Bibb  Co.  Inferior 
( 'ourt  v.  Orr,  12  Ga.  137  (1852).  See  Carroll 
v.  Tishamingo  County  Board  of  Police,  28 
38;  De  Cordova  v.  Galveston 
(bonds),  4  Tex.  470  ;  Kenosha  v.  Lamson 
(  coupons),  9  Wall.  478  ;   supra,  sec  487, 

:  Baker  v.  Johnson  County,  33  Iowa, 
151.  In  Nebraska,  county  warrants  are 
in)'  within  the  limitation  statutes.  Brewer 
v.  Otoe  County,  1  Neb.  373. 

2  Colburn  v.  Chattanooga,  Tenn.  ;  s.  c. 


17  Am.  Law  Reg.  n.  s.  191  ;  post,  sees. 
914,  921,  923. 

3  Tippecanoe  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Cox,  6 
Ind.  403  ;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County.  49 
Mo.  211  (1872);  Boro  v.  Phillips  County, 
4  Dillon,  216,  223  (1877),  citing  U-\t;post, 
chap.  xx. 

4  Lake  v.  Williamsburgh,  4  Denio, 
520  (1847),  remedy  of  holder  discussed; 
distinguished  from  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  &c.  of 
Brooklyn,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  263;  and  see 
McCullough  v.  Brooklyn,  23  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  458;  Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  165  ;  Argenti  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 16  Cal.  255,  and  note  remarks  of 
Field,  C.  J.  ;  Martini'.  San  Francisco,  lb. 
285;  Kingsberry  v.  Pettis  Co.,  48  Mo. 
207  (1871).     An  instrument  in  this  form  : 

December,  31,  1836. 
City    of  Brooklyn,    ss.      To  the   City 
Treasurer.     Pay  A.  L.  or  order  Si 500  for 
award  No.  7,  and  charge  to  Bedford  road 
assessment,  &c. 

J.  T.,  Mayor. 
A.  G.  S.,  Clerk. 

Held,  1st.  Negotiable,  and  not  payable 
out  of  any  special  fund.  2d.  The  corpora- 
tion wasnot  discharged  by  failure  to  present 
and  give  notice,  no  damage  or  injury  being 
sustained  in  consequence  of  the  omission. 
Kelley  v.  Brooklyn,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  263 
(1843);  Steel  v.  Davis  County,  2  G.  Greene 
(Iowa),  169;  Campbell  V.  Polk  County, 
3  Iowa,  467. 

5  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199, 
222;    Kd wards    on    Bills,    143;    Pease    v. 


§506     contracts:  interest  on  corporate  indebtedness.       5G9 

§  506  (414).  Interest  on  Corporate  Indebtedness.  —  The  rule  in 
respect  to  interest  on  debts  against  municipal  corporations  does  not 
ordinarily  differ  from  that  which  applies  to  individuals.1  Under 
the  Missouri  statute,  providing  generally  that  creditors  shall  be  al- 
lowed interest  at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent  per  annum,  &c,  it  is  held 
that  county  warrants  draw  interest  alter  presentment  to  the  treasury 
and  refusal  of  payment  by  the  treasurer,  the  court  regarding  the 
general  statute  as  to  interest  broad  enough  to  embrace  all  debtors, 
counties  as  well  as  individuals.2  But  in  Illinois  it  is  held  that  the 
debts  of  municipal  corporations  are  payable  at  the  treasury  of  the 
body;  that  interest  on  coupons  —  that  is,  interest  on  interest  —  can- 
not be  recovered,  unless  there  be  a  special  agreement  to  that  effect, 
since  such  corporations  are  not  named  in  the  act  regulating  interest. 
The  court  remarks  :  "  Whatever  power  these  corporations  may  pos- 
sess to  contract  for  the  payment  of  interest,  in  the  absence  of  any 
express  legislation  on  the  subject,  we  are  of  opinion  that  their  in- 
debtedness, in  the  absence  of  such  agreement,  does  not  bear  inter- 
est.3 If  such  instruments  (coupons)  could  in  any  event  draw  interest 
without  an  express  agreement,  it  could  only  be  after  a  proper  de- 
mand of  payment.  Until  a  demand  is  made,  such  a  body  is  not  in 
default.  They  are  not  like  individuals,  bound  to  seek  their  creditors 
to  make  payments  of  their  indebtedness."  4     The  general  and  sound 

Cornish,  19  Me.  191  ;  Campbell  v.  Polk  18  Wis.  367.  If  under  authority  to  issue 
Co.,  3  Iowa,  467  ;  Union  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  bonds  with  eight  per  cent  interest,  bonds 
Mason,  9  Ind.  97  ;  Bayerque  v.  San  Fran-  be  issued  drawing  twelve  per  cent,  they 
cisco,  1  McAll.  C.  C.  R.  175  ;  Bull  v.  are  valid  and  bear  interest  at  the  statu- 
Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570  ;  Montague  v.  Horan,  tory  rate.  Quincy  v.  Warfield,  25  111. 
12  Wis.  599.  In  an  action  on  a  county  317.  Usury.  That  usury  can  be  pred- 
order  payable  out  of  the  three  per  cent  icated  of  a  sale  or  issue  by  a  corpora- 
fund,  "  as  fast  as  the  same  shall  accrue  to  tion  of  its  securities,  see  Danville  v. 
the  county,"  it  must  be  alleged  that  the  Sutherlin,  20  Gratt.  (Va.)  555  (1871)  ; 
county  has  received  money  from  the  speci-  Lynchburg  v.  Norvell,  20  Gratt.  (Va.) 
fie  fund  named  applicable  to  the  order  in  601  (1871)  ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
suit,  or  that  the  order  was  fraudulently  199.  May  be  made  payable  outside  the 
drawn  upon  a  fund  in  which  the  county  State.  Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  384  ; 
had  no  assets.  Union  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Maddox  v.  Graham,  '_'  Met.  (K'v.)  56. 
Mason,  9  Ind.  97  (1857).  See  chapter  on  »  Soutli  Park  Commissioners  v.  Dun- 
Mandamus,  post.  levy,  91  111.  49  ;   Pekin  v.  Reynolds,  31 

1  Langdon   v.    Castleton,    30   Vt.    285  111.529;  People  v.  Salomon,   51   111.   52; 
(action  on  book  account).  Chicago   v.    People,    56    111.   327    (1870); 

2  Robbins  v.  County  Court,  3  Mo.  57  Chicago  v.  Allcock,  86  111.  384  ;  Cook  0. 
(1831);  State  v.  Pacific,  61  Mo.  155  South  Park  Commissioners,  fit  111.  115. 
(1875).  In  Iowa,  coupons  on  county  and  4  Pekin  v.  Reynolds,  31  111.  529  (1S63); 
city  bonds  are  held  to  draw  interest.  B.  P.  Chicago  v.  People,  56  111.  327  (1870); 
Rogers  v.  Lee  County,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  People  v.  Tazewell  County.  22  111.  117  ; 
529.     See  Evansville,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans-  Johnson    v.    Stark    County,    24    111.     75. 

ville,  15  Ind.   395  ;  Hollingsworth  v.  De-  But  if  made  payable  at  a  pla< ther  than 

troit,  3  McLean,  472;  Pruyn  v.  Milwaukee,  the  treasury,  the  bonds  are  not  void,  but 


570  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §  507 

view,  however,  is  that  coupons  when  due  are  regarded  as  in  the 
nature  of  an  independenl  claim,  and  draw  simple  interest,  and  only 
simple  interest,  unless  otherwise  expressly  provided,  from  the  date 
of  maturity.1 

§  507.  Implied  Power  to  borrow  Money  and  issue  Commercial 
or    Negotiable    Paper    considered.  —  Much    Conflict   of    Opinion    has 

existed  in  the  American  courts  touching  the  implied  power  of  pub- 
lic and  municipal  corporations  to  issue  commercial  or  negotiable  in- 
struments, that  is,  instruments  free  from  equities  in  the  hands  of 
innocent  holders  for  value.  In  respect  of  public  or  quasi  corpora- 
tions, such  as  counties,  &c,  as  distinguished  from  municipal  cor- 
porations proper,  the  general  current  of  authority  is  against  the 
proposition  that,  as  ordinarily  organized,  they  possess  any  such  im- 
plied power.  And  the  power  is  not  incident  to  the  authority  to 
make  specified  expenditures  or  to  make  local  improvements,  hut  it 
may  he  implied,  where  there  is  nothing  to  rebut  it,  from  other 
powers,  such  as  the  express  power  to  borrow  money.2 

But  in  view  of  the  more  complex  and  diversified  powers  usually 
conferred  upon  chartered  or  municipal  corporations  proper,  there 
has  been  a  stronger  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  courts  to  hold  that 

only  this  provision  in  them.     Sherlock  v.  tion  in  the  official  paper,  to  present  the 

Winnetka,  68  111.  530  (1873).     Post,  sec.  same  for  payment,  and  thai  interest  would 

514,  note.     In  Madison  County  v.  Bartlett,  cease  after  a  certain  day.     It  did  not  appear 

1  Seam.  ('2  111.)  67,  it  was  held  that  coun-  that   plaintiff  knew  of  such  publication, 

ties  were  uo1  liable  to  pay  interest  on  their  though   duly  made.     It  was  held  that  the 

orders  or   warrants,    not   being   named  in  city  was  Liable  for  interest  on  the  warrants 

the  statute  regulating  interest,  and   the  owned  by  plaintiff  down  to  the  time  of  their 

.  non-law  not  allowing  it  to  be  recov-  presentation.      Read  r.  Buffalo,  7t  N.  Y. 

ered.     So    in    Pennsylvania.     Allison   v.  463.     Nor  can  it  set  up  in  bar  of  an  action 

County,    50    Pa.   St.   351.      In   that  State  to  recover  a  debt  due  from  it,  that  it  was 

a  county  is  not  suable  on  its  warrants,  but  once  willing   and   offered  to  pay  it  ;   nor 

suit  must  be  on  original  claim.     lb.     In  can  it  stop  interest  upon  its  obligations 

coupons  due  semi-annually  have  been  by  publishing  a  notice  in  a  newspaper  that 

held  to  bear  inten  -i  after  maturity.     Wil-  such  interest  will  cease  after  a  certain 

il,  23  Fed.  Rep.  129.     In  Cali-  when  the  warrants  bear  interest,    lb.;  see, 

nia    when    uo   provision    is   made   for  also,  Hummel  v.  Brown,  24  Pa.  St.  811. 
interest,  both  municipal   bonds  and  their  1  Supra,  sec.  486. 

coupons  bear  interesl    after   maturity   at         '-'  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  566 

the  rate  fixed  by  law,  whether  the  coupons  (1872).     The  ordinary  powers  possessed  by 

are  detached  or  not.     Nash  v.  El   Dorado  counties,  as  agencies  of  the  State  in  the 

t  Fed.  Rep.  252  ;  post,  chap,  xx.  administration    of  public  affairs,    do  not 

issued  warrants  or  orders  on  its  give  the  incidental  authority  to  issue  nego- 

trea  ible  when  funds  should  be  liable  bonds  and  coupons.     See  Lynde  v. 

collected   therefor  from  certain   tax  sales,  Winnebago  County,  16  Wall.  6. 
with  interest.     The  funds  being  collected         Distinction  between  public  and  mwmcu 

the  common  council  ordered  the  treasurer  pal  corporations,  in  the  sense  referred  to 

to  notify  holders  of  warrants,  by  publica-  in  the  text,  see  ante,  sees.  22,  54,  58,  66. 


§507  contracts:  negotiable  paper.  571 

such  corporations,  as  usually  existing  in  this  country,  have  an  inci- 
dental or  implied  power  to  issue  commercial  securities.  The  line 
of  argument  is  substantially  this  :  Trading  and  commercial  corpo- 
rations have  this  power  as  an  incidental  means  of  effecting  their 
objects,  why  not  municipal  corporations  as  well?  Municipal  corpo- 
rations are  clothed  with  large  powers,  which  naturally,  if  aot  aei 
sarily,  oblige  them  to  use  credit  or  to  create  debts;  therefore,  if 
they  may  create  debts,  they  may  borrow  the  money  to  pay  them  ; 
and  if  they  may  borrow  money,  they  have  the  incidental  power  to 
do  like  other  borrowers,  namely,  give  a  negotiable  bill,  note,  or  bond 
therefor.  The  whole  argument  is,  in  our  judgment,  unsound.  It  is 
true  that  in  this  country  private  business  corporations  are  usually 
considered  to  have  the  incidental  power  to  borrow  money  or  give 
negotiable  paper  as  an  evidence  of  their  indebtedness,  but  in  Eng- 
land it  is  held  that  express  power  is  necessary  to  enable  even  rail- 
way corporations  to  draw,  indorse,  or  accept  bills  of  exchange.1  But 
admit  that  the  American  doctrine  is  otherwise,2  and  that  it  is 
rightly  so,  still  there  is  no  resemblance  between  private  and  public 
or  municipal  corporations  in  this  regard.  The  latter  are  simply 
agencies  of  government.  They  are  not  organized  for  trading,  com- 
mercial, or  business  purposes.  They  have,  in  general,  but  one  mode 
of  meeting  their  liabilities,  and  that  is  by  taxation,  and  it  is  upon 
this  resource  that  creditors  must  be  taken  to  rely.  For  hundreds 
of  years  in  England  such  corporations  have  existed,  without  it  ever 
being  contended  that  they  could,  without  express  authority,  issue 
commercial  paper.  Private  corporations  are  much  more  vigilant 
and  watchful  of  their  interests  than  it  is  possible  for  public  or  mu- 
nicipal corporations  to  be.  The  frauds  which  unscrupulous  officers 
will  be  enabled  successfully  to  practise,  if  an  implied  and  unguarded 
power  to  issue  negotiable  securities  is  recognized,  and  which  the 
corporation  or  the  citizen  will  be  helpless  to  prevent,  is  a  strong 
argument  against  the  judicial  establishment  of  any  such  power. 
And  the  argument  is  unanswerable,  when  it  is  remembered  that  in 
ascertaining  the  extent  of  corporate  powers  there  is  no  rule  of  safety 
but  the  rule  of  strict  construction  ;3  and  that  such  an  implied  power 
is  not  necessary,  however  convenient  it  may  be  at  times,  to  enable 
the  corporation  to  exercise  its  ordinary  and  usual  express  powers, 

1  See  observations  of  Byles,  J.,  in  Bate-  and  Bills,  165;  ante,  sec.  4SS  ;  Desmond 

man  v.  Mid- Wales  Railway  Co.,  Law  Rep.  v.   Jefferson,    19  Fed.   Rep.    4S3,   holding 

1  C.  P.  510  (1866).     Ante,  sec.  488.  that  a  power  to  purchase  property  —  as  a 

3  Stratton  v.  Allen,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  229  ;  fire-engine  —  implies  power  to  issue  uego« 

McCullough  v.   Moss,   5  Dcnio  (N.   Y. ),  tiable  bonds  for  the  purpose. 

567  ;  Straus  v.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  3  Ante,  sees.  89,  90,  91. 
59 ;  2  Kent's  Com.  229 ;  1  Parsons'  Notes 


572  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  507  a 

or  to  carry  into  effect  the  purposes  for  which  the  corporation  is 
created. 

§  T>07  ct.  Same  subject.  The  Author's  Conclusions.  —  We  regard 
as  alike  unsound  and  dangerous  the  doctrine  that  a  public  or  munic- 
ipal corporation  possesses  the  implied  power  to  borrow  money  for  its 
ordinary  purposes,  and  as  incidental  thereto  the  power  to  issue  com- 
mercial securities,  that  is,  paper  which  cuts  off  defences  when  it  is 
in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value  acquired  before  it  is  due.  The 
cases  on  this  subject  are  conflicting,  but  the  tendency  is  towards 
the  view  above  presented.  The  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  in  a 
case  before  referred  to,1  evinces  a  thorough  comprehension  of  the 
whole  question,  and,  in  our  judgment,  is  sound  in  every  proposition 
it  advances,  and  must  become  the  law  of  this  country.  This  view 
is  confirmed  by  the  almost  invariable  legislative  practice  in  the 
States  to  confer,  when  it  is  deemed  expedient,  upon  municipalities 
and  public  corporations,  in  express  terms,  the  power  to  borrow 
money  or  to  issue  negotiable  bonds  or  securities  ;  and  it  is  of  in- 
struments thus  authorized  that  we  now  proceed  to  treat.  It  is  an 
undisputed  doctrine  that  the  power  of  public  and  municipal  corpo- 
rations to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  railway  companies  and  to  issue 
bonds  therefor  must  be  expressly  conferred.12     The  Supreme  Court  of 

1  The  Mayor  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  478  and  the  issue  of  bonds  in  payment  therefor, 
(1873).  It  is  difficult  to  understand  on  see  McClure  v.  Oxford,  94  U.  S.  429  ; 
what  ground  the  dissenting  judges  in  this  Anderson  County  v.  Beal,  113  U.  S.  227  ; 
case  regarded  the  corporation  warrants  as  Crow  v.  Oxford,  119  U.  S.  215.  Tennessee  : 
"negotiable  securities  of  a  commercial  Kelley  v.  Milan,  127  U.  S.  139;  s.  c.  below, 
character."  The  cases  are  almost  uniform  21  Fed.  Rep.  842;  Taylor  v.  Ypsilanti, 
to  the  effect  that  such  instruments  do  not  105  U.  S.  60  (where  by  the  vote  authoriz- 
partake  of  the  nature  of  commercial  paper,  ing  a  subscription,  consent  was  given  upon 
except  that  by  usage  and  custom,  and  certain  conditions).  Nebraska:  Read  v. 
sometimes  by  legislative  enactment,  they  Plattsmouth,  107  U.  S.  568  ;  State  v. 
pass  by  delivery.     Post,  sec.  509.  Babcock,  19  Neb.  230;  s.  c.  Id.  223.     As 

2  The  cases  on  this  point  are  collected  to  liability  of  counties  in  Nebraska  for  bonds 
in  sec.  161,  note.  See  further  on  this  issued  by  precincts  and  the  remedy  in  such 
subject,  ante,  sec.  117  ct  seq.  cases,  see  Davenport  v.  County  of  Dodge, 

Particular  Statutes  Construed.    Illinois:  105  U.  S.  237;  Blair  v.  Cuming  County, 

Harter   v.    Kernochan,    103   U.    S.    562  ;  111  U.  S.  363  ;  Rosenbaum  v.  Bauer,  120 

approved  Pana  v.  Bowler,  107  U.  S.  529  ;  U.    S.    450;  Nemaha   County   v.    Frank, 

Kankakee  v.  jEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  106  U.  S.  120  U.  S.  41.     Infra,  sec.  509.     Califor- 

668;  Prairie  vi,  Lloyd,  97111.  179;  Wind-  nia:    Liebman  v.  San  Francisco,  24  Fed. 

sor  v.   Hallett,   97   111.  204  ;    Douglas   v.  Rep.   705.      Missouri :  Ogden  v.   Daviess 

Niantic  Sav.  Bank,  97  111.  228.     Kansas:  County,  102  U.  S.  634  ;  Tipton  v.  Rogers 

Lewis  v.  Barbour  Co.  Comm'rs,  105  U.  S.  Loc.  Works,  103  U.  S.  523.     New  York: 

739 ;    Bard    v.    Augusta,    30    Fed.     Rep.  Thompson   v.    Perrine,    103   U.    S.    806  ; 

906.       For    construction   of   the    general  approved  Same  v.   Same,  106  U.  S.  589  ; 

statute  of  Kansas  concerning  the  subserip-  Red  Rock  v.  Henry,  106  U.  S.  596.    Louisi- 

tiou  by  municipalities  for  stock  of  railroads  ana:  Hall  v.  New  Orleans,  19  Fed.  Rep. 


§  508  CONTRACTS  '.    RAILWAY   AID   BONDS.  573 

the  United  States  has  repeatedly  adjudged  that  the  grant  of  power 
to  a  municipal  corporation  to  appropriate  moneys  in  aid  of  the  con- 
struction of  a  railroad,  where  the  power  is  accompanied  with  a 
provision  directing  the  levy  and  collection  of  taxes  to  meet  such 
appropriation,  and  prescribing  no  other  mode  of  payment,  gives  no 
power,  but  excludes  it,  to  issue  negotiable  bonds  in  payment  of  such 
appropriation.1 

§  508.  Taxation  limited  to  Public  Purposes ;  "What  are  Such ; 
Aid  to  Railways  ;  Bonds  to  be  paid  by  Taxation,  for  What  Purposes 
authorized.  —  After  the  numerous  judgments  of  courts  of  the  highest 
authority  to  that  effect,  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  settled  doctrine  of 
American  law  that  no  tax  can  be  authorized  by  the  legislature  for 
any  purpose  which  is  essentially  private,  or,  to  state  the  propo- 
sition in  other  words,  for  any  but  a  public  purpose?  What  is  a 
public  purpose  may  not  always  be  easy  to  determine;  but  when 
determined,  it  constitutes  the  boundary  of  the  power  of  taxation. 
Whether  taxation  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways  owned  by 
private  corporations  is  taxation  for  a  public  purpose  is  a  question 
which  has  been  decided  by  the  courts  of  last  resort  in  almost  every 
State  in  the  Union,  and  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.3 
Although  the  doctrine  of  the  constitutionality  of  such  taxation  has 
been  vigorously  combated,  still  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  great 
preponderance  of  the  judicial  judgments  has  been  on  the  side  of  the 

870  (a  special  law  relating  to  New  Orleans),  aid  a  company  in  improving  the  water- 
Alabama :  Winters  v.  Montgomery,  65  power  of  the  river  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
Ala.  403  (special  law  relating  to  Mont-  pelling  public  grist-mills,  held  to  be.  issued 
gornery).  to  aid  in  constructing  a  "work  of  internal 

1  Claiborne  County  w.  Brooks,  111  U.  S.  improvement,"  within  the  meaning  of  the 
400,  406;  Wells  v.  Pontotoc  Co.  Sup.,  102  statute  in  question.  Blair  v.  Cuming 
U.  S.  631,  632  ;  Ogden  v.  Daviess  County,  County,  111  U.  S.  363.  Aliter  as  to  steam 
lb. ,  634,  639;  Concord  v.  Robinson,  121  grist-mills,  Osborne  v.  County  of  Adams, 
U.  S.  165  (1886).  106  U.  S.  181  ;  s.  c.  109  U.  S.  1  ;  see  and 

2  Loan  Assoc,  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655;  compare  Township  of  Burlington  v.  Beas- 
Curtis  v.  Whipple,  24  Wis.  350  ;  Whiting  ley,  94  U".  S.  310  ;  post,  sec.  736,  and  cases 
v.  S.  &  F.  R.  Co.,  25  Wis.  167  ;  Allen  v.  cited  ;  Cooley  on  Taxation,  chap,  iv., 
Inhab.  of  Jay,  60  Me.  124;  Jenkins  v.  "where  the  purposes  for  which  taxes  may 
Andover,  103  Mass.  94  ;  Lowell  v.  Boston,  be  laid"  are  enumerated,  and  illustrated 
111  Mass.  454  ;  Pray  v.  Northern  Liberties,  by  the  adjudicated  cases. 

31    Pa.    St.    69  ;    Mayor   of    New   York,  8  Ante,  sees.   153,  157  ;  Rogers  v.  Bur- 

In  re,  11  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  77  ;  Camden  v.  lington,  3  Wall.  654  ;  Marshall  Co.  Sup. 

Allen,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  398  ;  Sharpless  v.  v.   Schenck,   5  Wall.  772,  779  ;  Olcott  v. 

Mayor  of  Phila.,  21  Pa.  St.  147;  Hanson  v.  Fond  du  Lac  Sup.,  16  Wall.  678 ;  Burling- 

Vernon,  27  Iowa,  47  ;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.,  ton  &  Mo.  River  R.   Co.  v.  Otoe  Co.,  16 

129,    175,    214;    Parkersburg  v.    Brown,  Wall.  667  ;  Citizens'  Sav.  &  Loan  Assoc. 

106  U.   S.   487  (manufactories)  ;    City  of  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall.  655  ;  Pine  Grove  Tp. 

Eufaula  v.  McNab,  67  Ala.  588.      Infra,  v.  Talcott,  19  Wall.  6Q6  (1S73). 
sec.  510.     Bonds  issued  under  a  statute  to 


574  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  509 

competency  of  such  legislation,  in  the  ttbsence  of  special  constitu- 
tional restraint.1  And  therefore  the  legislature  may  authorize  sub- 
scriptions by  municipalities  to  the  stock  of  railway  corporations,  or 
donations  to  them,  and  provide  for  the  payment  of  such  subscrip- 
tions or  donations2  by  the  issue  and  sale  of  the  negotiable  bonds  of 
the  municipality.  lint  a  statute  which  authorizes  the  issue  of  bonds 
to  be  paid  by  taxation  to  aid  certain  individuals  or  classes,  or  in  aid 
of  the  manufacturing  enterprise  of  individuals  or  private  corpora- 
tions, is  void,  this  being,  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule,  a  private, 
as  distinguished  from  a  public  purpose,  although  in  a  remote  or 
collal  i  ral  way  the  local  public  might  be  benefited  thereby.3  The 
exi  cution  of  the  powers  of  local  government  and  administration  or- 
dinarily conferred  upon  municipal  corporations,  such  as  improving 
highways  and  streets,  constructing  water-works,  gas-works,  markets, 
]  reserving  the  public  health,  and  the  like,  are  of  course  public  pur- 
poses;  and  upon  legislative  authority  being  given,  negotiable  bonds 
may  be  issued  therefor.  What  will  constitute  sufficient  authority 
for  the  issue  of  such  bonds  will  be  considered  further  on. 

§  500.  Different  Classes  of  Bonds  ;  Implied  and  Express  Power  to 
issue;  Recitals;  Mode  of  Pleading.  —  Negotiable  securities  of  the 
kind  here  referred  to  have  been  issued  by  municipal  corporations 
proper  (generally  under  an  express  power  to  aid  railways,  or  for  gas- 
works, water-works,  or  specified  local  improvements,  but  sometimes 
under  an  implied  power)  ;  and  by  counties,  usually  under  express 
power  (generally  to  aid  railways,  or  for  public  buildings,  bridges, 
or  improvements4);  and  by  organized  townships  which  are  parts  of 

1  In  Pine  Grove  Township  v.  Talcott,  or  donations,  or  loans  of  credit  to  private 
lit  Wall.  666,  G77,  Mr.  Justice  Swayne  corporations.  Cleburne  v.  Gulf,  Colorado, 
says  that,  such  Legislation  has  been  sus-  &  S.  F.  Ry.,  66  Tex.  457;  ante,  sec.  157. 
tained  in  nineteen  out  of  twenty-one  3  Authority  to  borrow  money  "to  be 
Stairs.  As  respects  Legislative  power,  expended  in  developing  the  natural  advan- 
donations  and  subscriptions  for  stock  stand  tagesofa  city  for  manufacturing  purposes" 
on  the  same  ground.  Town  of  Queens-  docs  not  warrant  the  issue  of  bonds  as  a 
bury  v.  Culver,  19  Wall.  83  (1873).  donation  to  an  individual  to  aid  in  devel- 

[f  it  be  allowable  to  judge  of  a  Legal  oping  the  water  power  of  tbe  city.     One 

principle  by  its  fruits,  the  dissenting  and  who  holds  such  bonds  with  notice  of  tbe 

minority  judges  on  this  question  will  Bnd  facts  cannot  recover  upon  them.     Ottawa 

much  to  confirm  the  conviction  that  their  v.  Carey,  108  U.  S.  110  ;  ante,  sec.  161. 
views    were   sound.     I'ut    it    is   useless  to  4  Iii    several    of  the    States    power   is 

fight  that  battle  over  again;  it  lias  been  given  to  municipalities  or  counties  to  issue 

fonghl  and  lost.      All  that  is  left  is  the  bonds  to  aid  works  of  "internal  improve- 

contemplation  and  contrast  of  what  might  ment."     And  under  this  generic  term,  the- 

have  been  and  what  is.  question   has  arisen,    What  are  works  of 

2  Wood  v.  Oxford,  97  N.  C.  227.  The  internal  improvement?  The  Supreme 
Constitution  of  Texas  prohibits  municipal  Court  of  Alabama,  in  defining  the  phrase 

rations   from  making  appropriations     "internal  improvements,"  says  :  "Where 


§  509 


CONTRACTS:     RAILWAY    AID    BONDS. 


575 


counties,  under  express  authority,  and  usually  as  a  means  of  aiding 
the  construction  of  railways;  and  by  school  districts,  under  express 
power,  tn  raise  money  to  erect  school-houses.  In  some  of  the  West- 
ern States,  counties  have  been  legislatively  made  the  agents  for 
the  inhabitants  of  non-incorporated  townships,  and  in  Missouri  for 
"strips  of  territory"  to  issue  bonds  in  the  name  of  the  county,  but 
to  be  paid  out  of  the  property  within  the  specified  township  or  des- 
ignated territorial  limits  or  strip  of  country.1  Reference  is  made  to 
this  subject  here  in  order  to  observe  that  where  the  bonds  or  securi- 
ties are  issued  under  an  express  power,  the  legislative  act,  being  the 
only  source  of  the  authority,  measures  and  limits  the  power  it  con- 
fers,2 and  the  same  principle  applies  to  the  instruments  issued  under 


internal  improvements  under  State  au- 
thority are  spoken  of,  it  is  universally 
understood  that  works  within  the  State, 
by  which  the  public  are  supposed  to  be 
benefited,  are  intended  ;  such  as  the  im- 
provements of  highways  and  channels  of 
travel  and  commerce."  Wetumpka  v. 
Winter,  29  Ala.  660. 

The  legislature  of  Nebraska  passed  an 
act  "  That  any  county  or  city  in  the  State 
of  Nebraska  is  hereby  authorized  to  issue 
bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  any 
railroad  or  other  work  of  internal  improve- 
ment, to  an  amount  to  be  determined  by 
the  county  commissioners  of  such  county, 
or  the  city  council  of  such  city,  not  ex- 
ceeding ten  per  cent  of  the  assessed  valua- 
tion of  all  taxable  property  in  said  county 
or  city,  provided  the  county  commissioners 
or  city  council  shall  first  submit  the  ques- 
tion of  issuing  bonds  to  a  vote  of  the  legal 
voters  of  said  county  or  city,  in  the  manner 
provided  by  chapter  ix.  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  State  of  Nebraska  for  sub- 
mitting to  the  people  of  a  county  the 
question  of  borrowing  money."  Session 
Laws  of  1869,  page  92.  Under  this  act, 
a  county  and  a  precinct  issued  bonds  to 
build  a  bridge  across  the  Platte  River, 
and  on  an  application  by  a  taxpayer  to 
restrain  the  collection  of  taxes  levied 
to  pay  interest  on  such  bonds,  the  Su- 
preme  Court  of  Nebraska,  construing  the 
ab  ive  act  in  the  light  of  the  legislation  of 
the  State,  held  that  a  bridge  was  a  work 
of  "  internal  improvement  "  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  and  that  under  the 
power  to  aid,  the  county  might  itself  con- 
struct the  bridge.      Union  Pacific  Railroad 


Co.  v.  Colfax  County,  4  Neb.  450  (1876); 
s.  c.  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  287  ;  infra,  sec. 
510,  and  note. 

In  Montana  it  is  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture may  authorize  the  creation  of  couuty 
indebtedness  for  public  roads.  Wilcox  v. 
Deer  Lodge  Co.,  2  Mont.  T.  574. 

1  Construction  of  the  Missouri  tov 
railway  aid  act  of  March  23,  1868,  and 
the  rights  and  remedies  of  the  bondholder. 
Jordan  v.  Cass  Co.,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  185; 
Same  v.  Same,  Id.  245  ;  Washburn  v. 
Cass  Co.,  Id.  251  ;  Harshman  r.  Rates 
County,  Id.  150  ;  92  U.  S.  569  (1S75)  ; 
s.  c.  3  Cent.  Law  Jour  367,  referred  to  at 
large,  infra.  Construction  of  Kansas  legis- 
lation. Thayer  v.  Montgomery  Co.,  3  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  R.  389,  and  n 

Precinct  bonds,  supra,  sec.  507,  note. 

2  Thus  a  power  to  issue  bonds  of  §1000, 
each  bearing  interest  at  six  per  cent,  will 
not  authorize  the  issue  of  bonds  of  a  dif- 
ferent amount  and  at  a  greater  rate  of  in- 
terest, as  eight  per  cent.  Taxpayers  of 
Milan  v.  Tennessee  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  11 
Lea,  329.  A  power  to  subscribe  to  the 
stock  of  a  railroad  a  certain  sum  "  payable 
in  not  exceeding  four  years  by  annual 
assessments,"  and  authorizing  the  issue  of 
bonds  in  anticipation  of  the  collections, 
held  not  to  warrant  the  issue  of  bonds 
payable  in  ten  years.  Norton  v.  Dyers- 
burg,  127  U.  S.  160.  In  this  ease  it  was 
contended  thai  the  town  should  be  held 
liable  as  upon  non-negotiable  bonds  or 
notes,  treating  the  issue  of  the  negotiable 
bonds  as  an  excess  of  authority  only,  and 
not  invalidating  the  loan  as  agreed  upon. 
But   the   court   said  :   '"It  is    i  sufficient 


576  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  509 

statutory  authority  by  any  of  these  classes  of  corporations,  or  quasi 
corporations.  But  in  respect  to  all  these  corporations  and  quasi  cor- 
porations, except,  possibly,  municipal  or  chartered  corporations 
proper,  there  is,  we  suppose,  no  solid  ground  to  contend  that  they 
have  any  inherent  or  general  power  to  issue  commercial  securities, 
and  the  true  doctrine  is  that  they  can  only  do  so  by  virtue  of  ex- 
press Legislative  authority,  which  must  exist  in  fact  and  which  ought 
regularly  to  be  recited  in  the  bond.  And  in  respect  to  municipal 
or  chartered  corporations,  our  opinion,  as  shown  in  a  preceding 
section,  is  that  they  also  have  no  such  inherent  power,  and  no  power 
whatever  except  so  far  as  conferred  expressly  or  by  fair  implication. 
This  is  an  important  principle  ;  and  it  results  therefrom  that  there  is 
no  presumption  in  favor  of  the  power  to  issue  such  securities,  espe- 
cially on  the  part  of  quasi  corporations;  and  it  would  seem  to  follow 
that  if  the  bonds  of  municipal  or  public  corporations  contain  no 
recital  as  to  the  authority  for  their  issue  or  their  purpose,  there 
is  no  presumption  in  favor  of  their  validity,  and  it  devolves  on 
the  holder  to  aver  and  show  by  evidence  aliunde  that  the  bonds 
were  issued  for  some  purpose  authorized  by  statute.  And  hence, 
also,  as  a  matter  of  pleading,  the  authority  or  power  to  issue  the 
bonds  in  suit  ought  to  appear  on  the  face  of  the  declaration,  or 
by  some  recital  in  the  bonds  made  part  thereof ;  that  is,  it  should 
thus  appear  that  they  were  issued  for  some  purpose  authorized  by 
statute.1 

answer  to  this  proposition  to  say  that  this  Mode  of  pleading  defences.     The  plea  of 

suit  is  brought  solely  for  a  recovery  upon  the  general  issue  in  assumpsit  in   States 

the  bonds  and  coupons,  and  no  question  where  that  mode  of  pleading  is  yet  allow  ed, 

growing  out  of  the  liability  of  the  town  for  puts  in  issue  the  question  of  the  authority 

the  subscription  to  the  stock  can  be   in-  of  the  ollicers  to  issue  the  bonds  and  the 

quired  into  in  this  suit."  bma  fides  of  the  plaintiff,  but  presump- 

1  Thayer  v.  Montgomery  Co.,  3  Dillon  tively  the  plaintiff  is  a  holder  for  value 
C.  C.  R.  389,  and  note  ;  Kennard  v.  Cass  before  maturity,  without  notice;  the  con- 
County,  lh.  117;  Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  trary  must  be  shown  by  the  defendant. 
Wall.  468.  Chambers  County  v.  Clews,  21  Wall.  317 

Mode  of declaring  on  bonds  and  coupons.  (1874)  ;  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13 
Kennard  v.  Cass  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  Wall.  297.  Special  plea  erroneously  held 
R.  147,  and  cases  cited  in  note  on  p.  150  ;  bad  considered  as  amounting  to  the  gen- 
Thayer  v.  Montgomery  County,  supra.  A  oral  issue;  and  as  the  erroneous  ruling 
declaration  on  bonds  against  a  municipal  was  harmless,  the  judgment  was  not  re- 
corporation  having  no  general  authority  versed.  lb.  Answer  denying  that  plain- 
to  issue  commercial  paper,  to  be  sufficient  tiff  is  the  owner,  holder,  or  bearer  of  the 
on  demurrer,  must  show,  either  by  aver-  coupons  in  suit  good  on  general  demurrer, 
ment  or  in  the  copies  of  the  bonds  an-  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297. 
nexed,  that  the  defendanl  had  power  to  Proof  of  execution  of  bond  when  denied 
issue  them.  It  is  not  sufficienl  to  allege  under  oath.  Under  the  legislation  of  Ah 
generally  that  it  had  full  power  and  au-  abama,  non  assumpsit  does  not  involve  the 
thorityto  execute  the  bonds.  Hopper  r.  factum  of  the  bonds.  Chambers  County 
Covington,  118  U.  S.  148.  v.  Clews,  21  Wall.  317  (187-1).     Corpora- 


§510 


contracts:  internal  improvement  BONDS. 


577 


§  510.     Bridges   as   "Works  of   Internal    Improvement;    Validity  of 

Bonds  issued  therefor.  —  In  many  Stales  negotiable  securities  have 
been  issued  under  .statute  provisions  authorizing  the  making  of  inter- 
nal improvements.  In  a  case  in  the  Supreme  (Joint  of  the  United 
States  l  the  question  arose  as  to  whether  a  toll-bridge  was  a  work  of 


tion  may  plead  nil  debet  and  non  est 
/actum.  Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar,  15 
Wall.  355  (1872).  Defence  of  non  est 
/actum  sustained.  Coler  v.  Cleburne,  131 
U.  S.  162  (1889).  Here  the  statute  pro- 
vided for  the  issue  of  bonds  by  cities,  and 
directed  that  such  bonds  should  be  signed 
by  the  mayor,  and  by  him  forwarded  to  the 
Comptroller  of  the  State  for  registration, 
and  a  city,  by  proper  ordinance,  authorized 
the  issue  of  bonds  for  water-works.  The 
bonds  were  dated  Janurary  1,  1884.  The 
term  of  the  mayor  then  in  office  expired 
in  April  following,  and  he  was  succeeded 
by  a  new  officer.  In  July,  1884,  the  com- 
mon council,  by  resolution,  requested  the 
ex-mayor,  whose  name  had  been  engraved 
on  the  coupons,  to  sign  the  bonds.  He 
did  so,  adding  the  word  "Mayor"  after 
his  signature,  and  forwarded  the  bonds  to 
the  Comptroller,  who  duly  registered  them. 
In  an  action  upon  coupons  brought  by  a 
bona  fide  holder  for  value,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  held  that  as  the 
statute  provided  for  the  signing  and  for- 
warding of  the  bonds  by  the  mayor,  the 
mayor  at  the  time  of  signing  was  the  only 
officer  having  power  to  sign  and  forward 
them,  and  that  the  city  could  not  designate 
any  other  person  to  act  in  his  stead. 
"  Bona  fide  purchasers  of  municipal  bonds 
must,"  said  the  court,  "take  the  risk  of 
the  official  character  of  those  who  execute 
them."  The  city  is  not  estopped  from 
defending  upon  the  facts,  and  these  facts 
established  its  plea  of  non  est  /action.  This 
case  is  controlled  by  the  principle  of  An- 
thony v.  County  of  Jasper,  101  U.  S.  693, 
and  is  to  be  distinguished  from  Wcyauwega 
V.  Ayling,  99  U.  S.  112,  and  is  held  to  be 
analogous  to  Amy  v.  Watertown,  No.  1, 
130  U.  S.  301. 

Remedy  at  law.  A  corporation  cannot 
be  relieved  against  its  bond  in  equity  if 
the  ground  for  relief  shows  a  complete  d  - 
fence  or  an  adequate  remedy  at  law.  ( •  rand 
Chute  v.  Winegar  (case  in  equitv),  15 
Wall.  373. 

vol.  i.  —  37 


1  Dodge  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Chandler,  96 
TJ.  S.  205  (1S77J.  Works  of  intt  i 
provement  defined.  Fremont  Building 
Assoc,  v.  Sherwin,  6  Neb.  4  {.  -7 
lington  Tp.  v.  Beasley,  94  I.  S.  310  ; 
Guernsey  v.  Burlington  Tp.,  4  Dillon,  372 
(1877)  ;  Lewis  v.  Sherman  Co.  Com 
Fed.  Rep.  269;  ante,  sec.  509,  note.  In  the 
opinion  of  the  court  in  The  County  Com- 
m'rs v.  Chandler,  supra,  it  is  said  :  "In 
approaching  the  solution  of  these  qui  3- 
tions,  the  first  inquiry  that  naturally  pr<  - 
sents  itself  is,  whether  a  toll-bridge,  like 
that  referred  to,  is  a  public  bridg 
hence  a  work  of  internal  improv 
And  we  can  hardly  refrain  from  express- 
ing surprise  that  there  should  be  any 
doubt  on  the  subject.  What  was  the 
bridge  built  for,  if  not  fit  for  public  nse  ' 
Certainly  not  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
spanning  the  Platte  River  as  an  archi- 
tectural ornament,  however  beuutiful  it 
may  be  as  a  work  of  art  ;  nor  for  the  pri- 
vate use  of  the  common  council  and  their 
families  ;  nor  even  for  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  citizens  of  Fremont.  All  persons,  of 
whatever  place,  condition,  or  quality,  are 
entitled  to  use  it  as  a  public  thoroughfare 
for  crossing  the  river.  The  fact  that  they 
are  required  to  pay  toll  for  its  use  does  not 
affect  the  question  in  the  slightest 
Turnpikes  are  public  highways,  notwith- 
standing the  exaction  of  toll  for  passing 
on  them.  Railroads  are  public  highways, 
ami  are  the  only  works  of  internal  improve- 
ment specially  named  in  the  Act  ;  yet  no 
one  can  travel  on  them  without  paying 
toll.  Railroads,  turnpikes,  bridges,  ferries, 
are  all  things  of  public  concern,  and  the 
right  to  nvct  them  is  a  public  right.  If 
it  be  conceded  to  a  private  individual 
or  corporation,  it  is  conceded  as  a  public 
franchise  ;  and  the  right  to  take  toll  is 
granted  as  a  compensation  for  erecting  the 
work,  and  relieving  the  public  ti 
from  the  burden  thereof.  Those  wh 
such  franchises  are  agents  of  the  public. 
They  have,  it  is  true,  a  private  interest  in 


578 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§511 


■  mal  improvement  for  which  bonds  might  under  the  statute  legally 
be  issued  to  aid  in  building.  The  court  held  that  "all  bridges  in- 
tended and  used  as  thoroughfares  are  public  highways,  whether  sub- 
ject to  toll  or  not,  and  that  county  bunds  which  have  been  issued 
under  a  statute  authorizing  the  issue  of  such  bonds  in  aid  of  an 
internal  improvement  are  valid  when  given  for  the  building  of  a 
bridge  which  is  a  thoroughfare,  though  tolls  are  charged  thereon 
by  the  county.  Whether  the  county  has  the  right  to  demand  tolls 
over  a  bridge  which  is  a  thoroughfare  will  not  affect  the  validity  of 
county  bonds  issued  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  bridge." 

§  511.  The  Law  of  Railroad  Aid  Bonds  ;  the  Law  on  this  Subject 
as  developed  in  the  Federal  Courts.  —  Where  the  policy  of  burden- 
ing the  future  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  legislature,  the  courts 
have  tu  deal  with  the  legal  rights  of  the  municipality  on  the  one 
hand  and  with  those  of  the  holders  of  its  obligations  on  the  other. 
The  determination  of  their  legal  rights  involves  incpairies  as  com- 


the  tolls  ;  but  the  works  are  public  and 
subject  to  public  regulation,  and  the  entire 
public  has  the  right  to  use  them.  These 
principles  are  so  elementary  in  the  corn- 
law  that  we  can  hardly  open  our  books 
without  seeing  them  recognized  or  illus- 
trated. Of  course  there  may  be  private 
bridges  as  there  may  he  private  ways,  and 
they  are  put  in  the  same  category  by  the 
text-writers  ;  but  all  bridges  intended  and 

I  as  thoroughfares  are  public  highways, 
whether  subject  to  toll  or  not.  Regularly, 
all  public  bridges  are  a  county  charge,  and 
the  county  is  hound  to  ereel  and  maintain 
them  ;  but  others  may  be  charged  with 
this  duty,  and  a  toll  is  the  commonest  of 
means  for  obtaining  compensation  for  its 
performance.  In  Angel]  on  Highways  it 
is  said  that  public  bridges  may  he  divided 
into  three  classes:  'First,  those  which 
belong  to  the  public,  as  State,  county,  or 
township  bridges,  over  which  all  people 
have  a  right  to  pass  without  or  with  pay- 
ing toll  :  these  are  1  mil t  by  public  author- 

il  tie-  public  expense,  either  of  the 
State   itself  or  of  a  district   or  portion  of 

State.  Secondly,  those  which  have 
built  by  companies  (like  turnpike 
ami  railroad  companies),  or  at  tin'  expen  le 
of  private  individuals,  over  which  all  per- 
sons hive  a  right  to  pass  on  the  payment 
of  a   toll    fixed  by   law.     Thirdly,    those 


which  have  been  built  by  private  individ- 
uals, and  which  have  been  surrendered 
or  dedicated  to  the  use  of  the  public' 
Chancellor  Kent  says,  'The  privilege  of 
making  a  road  or  establishing  a  ferry,  and 
taking  tolls  for  the  use  of  the  same,  is  a  fran- 
chise, and  the  public  have  an  interest  in 
the  same  ;  and  the  owners  of  the  franchise 
are  answerable  in  damages  if  they  should 
refuse  to  transport  an  individual  without 
any  reasonable  excuse,  upon  being  paid  or 
tendered  the  usual  rate  of  fare.'  In  the 
same  connection  he  enumerates  in  this 
class  of  franchises,  ferries,  bridges,  turn- 
pikes, and  railroads.  In  our  judgment  the 
bridge  in  question  is  a  public  bridge  and  a 
work  of  internal  improvement  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute."  In  Dawsnn  Co. 
v.  McNamar,  10  Neb.  276  (1880);  s.  c. 
4  N.  W.  I!.  991,  it  was  held  that  under 
the  statute  of  Nebraska  a  court-house  is  not 
an  internal  improvement,  and  that  a  recital 
in  the  bonds  that  they  were  issued  under 
.  ifity  of  the  aforesaid  "  internal  im- 
provement acts"  did  not  invalidate  the 
bonds,  inasmuch  as  there  was  implied 
authority  found  elsewhere  in  the  Ait, 
whose  provisions  had  been  substantially 
observed.  Steam  grist-mill  not  an  internal 
improvement.  Supra,  sec.  508,  note. 
Water-power  far  public  grist-mill  is  such 
a  work.     Supra,  sec.  508,  note. 


§511 


CONTRACTS:    RAILWAY    AID    BONDS. 


579 


plicated  as  they  are  important.  The  law  on  this  subject  is  sub- 
stantially the  growth  of  the  last  few  years.  The  decisions  in  the 
various  State  and  Federal  courts  are  very  numerous,  and  on  some 
points   conflicting.1      It   is   impossible,  were  it  even   desirable,  to 


1  Ante,  chap.  vi.  sec.  153  et  seq.  Since 
the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Michigan,  in  The  People  v.  Township 
Board  of  Salem,  20  Mich.  452;  s.  c.  9 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (s.  s.)  487,  before  men- 
tioned {ante,  sec.  L57),  the  question  arose 
in  the  United  States  circuit  court  for 
the  Western  district  of  Michigan,  in  an 
action  on  municipal  railway  aid  bonds, 
whether  the  Federal  court  was  concluded 
by  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  State,  and  if  not,  whether  the 
holder  of  bonds  issue'd  in  full  compliance 
with  the  statute  could  recover  thereon. 
Emmons,  Circuit  Judge,  in  an  elaborate 
opinion,  holds,  as  to  bonds  issued  before 
the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
State,  that  the  Federal  courts  are  not  con- 
cluded thereby,  and  that  the  constitution- 
al power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
their  issue,  in  the  absence  of  special  lim- 
itations, must  be  regarded  as  settled,  at 
least  as  respects  the  Federal  tribunals. 
The  opinion  displays  great  research  and 
learning,  and  will  be  found  reported  un- 
der the  name  of  Talcott  v.  Township  of 
Pine  Grove,  vol.  i.  Bench  and  Bar  (\.  s. ), 
50  (1872).  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mich- 
adheres  to  its  opinion  on  this  sub- 
ject in  the  later  case  of  The  People  v. 
State  Treasurer,  23  Mich.  499.  The 
course  of  reasoning  of  Emmons,  J.,  in  this 
case  is  coincident  with  that  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  in  the 
case  of  Olcott  v.  Fond  du  Lac  Sup.,  16 
Wall.  678  (1872).  In  the  case  just  men- 
tioned the  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States,  sitting  in  Wisconsin,  decided  that 
since  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State 
had  held  a  certain  act  under  which  the 
bonds  in  question  were  issued  to  be  un- 
constitutional, and  had  never  holden  oth- 
erwise, that  this  construction,  though 
gi      i    after   the   bonds   were   issued,   was 

tig  upon  or  should  be  followed  bj 
Federal  courts.     But  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  was  of  the  opinion 
that,   inasmuch    as    the    decision    of    the 
Stat-   Supreme  Court  was  not  based  upon 


any  special  and  peculiar  provision  of  the 
State  Constitution,  but  upon  general  prin- 
ciples of  law,  and  relate!  to  contracts,  the 
case  was  not  one  in  which  the  decision  of 
the  State  court  had  any  other  than  a 
persuasive  force  ;  and  it  reversed  the 
judgment  of  the  circuit  court,  and  held 
that  the  bonds  could  be  enforced. 

Rights  in  respect  of  negotiable  ' 
accruing  under  a  construction  given  by 
the  highest  court  of  the  State  will  not  be 
affected  in  the  Federal  court  by  a  subse- 
quent change  of  decisions  in  the  v 
court.  Anderson  v.  Santa  Anna,  116  1".  S. 
356  (1885).  In  suits  upon  negotiable 
bonds  issued  before  any  construction  of 
the  State  laws  by  the  State  Supreme 
Court,  the  subsequent  construction  of 
those  laws  by  such  court  is  not  conclusive 
on  the  Federal  courts.  Anderson  v.  Santa 
Anna,  si/ /in/.  A  constitutional  provision 
requiring  that  two-thirds  of  the  qualified 
voters  shall  assent  requires  only  two-thirds 
of  those  actually  voting  at  the  election. 
Carroll  County  v.  Smith,  111  U.  S.  5 
following  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers, 
16  Wall.  644;  County  ol  Cass  v.  John- 
ston, 95  U.  S.  360  [ante,  sec.  14,  note)  ; 
disregarding  Hawkins  o.  Carroll  Com 
50  Miss.  735,  the  bondholders'  rights  hav- 
ing been  acquired  before  such  decision  was 
made.    /'  ft,  sees.  515,  517,  and  cases, cited 

In  Gilchrist  v.  Little  Rock.  1  Dill 
C.  R.  261,  and  in  Ranlett  v.  Leavenworth, 
lb.  263,  the  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States  for  the  eighth  circuit,  prior  to  any 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Courts  of  the 
States  of  Arkansas  and  Ka  isas  as  to 
constitutional  validity  of  municipal  rail- 
way aid  bonds,  declined  to  pronounce 
such  bonds  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide  hold- 
ers to  be  void  for  the  want  of  authority 
in  thi  islatnre  to  authorize  their 

issue.      History 

King    V.     Wilson, 

1  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  555.     The  word  "aid" 

as   used    in    the    statute  of  in- 

s  the  power  to  make  "donations"  to 

railroads.     State  v.  Babcock,  19  Neb.  230. 


580  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  512 

compass  within  the  limits  of  a  single  chapter  all  the  learning, 
and  bo  refer  to  all  the  casus,  upon  the  subject  of  municipal  secur- 
ities. It  will  not  be  attempted.  By  reason  of  the  greater  favor 
with  which  the  rights  of  the  holders  of  such  securities  have  been 
arded  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  the  volume 
of  municipal  bond  litigation  has  of  late  years  taken  place  in  the 
Federal  courts.  It  is,  therefore,  uecessary  to  consider  the  law 
on  this  subject  as  determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States;  and  our  object  will  be  to  show  exactly  the  doc- 
trines and  principles  which  have  received  the  sanction  of  that 
tribunal,  and  to  illustrate,  as  far  as  needful,  their  application  in 
particular  instances,  referring  incidentally  or  for  further  illus- 
tration to  the  decisions  of  the  State  courts  on  the  subjects  or 
topics  discussed.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has 
upheld  the  rights  of  the  holders  of  municipal  securities  with  a 
strong  hand,  and  has  set  a  face  of  flint  against  repudiation,  even 
when  made  on  legal  grounds  deemed  solid  by  the  State  courts,  as 
well  as  by  municipalities  which  had  been  deceived  and  defrauded. 
That  such  securities  have  any  general  value  left  is  largely  due 
to  the  course  of  adjudication  in  respect  thereto  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  and  the  reliance  which  is  felt  by  the  public  that  it  will 
stand  firmly  by  the  doctrines  it  has  so  frequently  asserted.1 

§512.  Form  of  Bond;  Condition. — Municipal  bonds,  in  the 
usual  form,  containing  words  of  negotiability,  with  coupons 
attached,  are  absolute,  and  not  conditional,  promises  to  pay,  and 
hence  are  negotiable  ivith  all  the  incidents  of  negotiability.  Such 
bonds  are  held  to  be  negotiable  notwithstanding  they  contain 
such  a  recital  as  the  following :  "  This  bond  is  issued  for  the 
purpose  of  subscribing  to  the  capital  stock  of  the  Fort  Scott  and 
Allen  County  Eailroad,  and  for  the  construction  of  the  same  through 
the  said  township,  in  pursuance  of  and  in  accordance  with  an  act 
of  the  legislature  of  the  State  of  Kansas,  entitled  '  An  Act  to 
enable  municipal  townships  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  any  railroad, 
and  to  provide  for  the  payment  of   the  same,  approved  February 

1   "The    Federal    courts,    whieh    liave  tion  were  a  doubtful  one,  a  construction 

with  greal  unanimity  sustained  the  valid-  should  be  given  to  the  statute  which  up- 

ity  of  municipal   bonds,   should   hesitate  holds  the  bonds,   rather  than  one  which 

long  before  accepting  the  forced  and  nar-  turns  them   to  ashes  in  the  hands  of  the 

row  interpretation   contended   for  by  the  ht,,i<i  fni,-  holder."      Coxc,  J.,  in  Rich  v.- 

defendant.     These  solemn  obligations,  is-  Town  of    Mentz,   18   Fed.   Rep.    52.     To 

sued  to  invite  the  investors  of  the  world,  same  effect,  Shelley  v.  Charles  County,  17 

should  not  be  invalidated  except  for  grave  Fed.  Rep.  909,  per  McCrary,  J. 
and  serious  infirmities.     Even  if  the  ipxes- 


512 


contracts:    railway  aid  bonds. 


581 


25,  1870;'  and  for  the  payment  of  the  said  sum  of  money  and 
accruing  interest  thereon,  in  manner  aforesaid,  upon  the  performance 
of  the  said  condition,  the  faith  of  the  aforesaid  Humboldt  Township, 
as  also  its  property,  revenue,  and  resources,  is  pledged;"  the  court 
holding  that  the  construction  of  the  road  through  the  township 
was  not  a  condition  upon  which  payment  was  to  he  made.1 


1  Humboldt  Township  v.  Long,  92 
U.  S.  644  (1875)  ;  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  494. 
Infra,  sec.  513,  and  note.  In  giving  its 
judgment,  in  the  case  above  cited,  the 
court  says  :  "  Relying  upon  this  clause 
of  the  certificate,  the  township  contend 
that  the  construction  of  the  railroad 
through  the  township  was  a  coin  lit  ion 
upon  which  the  payment  was  agreed  to 
be  made.  We  think,  however,  this  is  not 
the  true  construction  of  the  contract. 
The  construction  of  the  road  as  well  as 
the  subscription  for  stock  was  mentioned 
in  the  recital  as  the  reasons  why  the  town- 
ship entered  into  the  contract,  not  as  con- 
ditions upon  which  its  performance  was 
made  to  depend.  It  was  for  the  purpose 
of  subscribing,  and  to  aid  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  road,  that  the  bond  was  given. 
The  words  '  upon  the  performance  of  the 
said  condition  '  cannot,  then,  refer  to  any- 
thing mentioned  in  the  recital,  for  there 
is  no  condition  there.  A  much  more 
reasonable  construction  is,  that  they  refer 
to  a  former  part  of  the  bond,  where  the 
annual  interest  is  stipulated  to  be  payable 
at  a  banker's,  'on  the  presentation  and 
surrender  of  the  respective  interest  cou- 
pons.' Such  presentation  and  surrender 
is  the  only  condition  mentioned  in  the 
instrument.  But  that  stipulation  pre- 
sents no  such  contingency  as  destroys  the 
negotiability  of  the  instrument,  It  is 
what  is  always  implied  in  every  promis- 
sory note  or  bill  of  exchange,  that  it  is  to 
be  presented,  and  surrendered  when  paid. 
As  well  might  it  be  said  that  a  note  pay- 
able on  demand  is  payable  upon  a.  contin- 
gency, and  therefore  non-negotiable,  as  to 
affirm  that  one  payable  on  its  presentation 
and  surrender  is,  for  that  reason,  destitute 
of  negotiability."  See  also,  Hotchkiss  v. 
Nat.  Banks,  -21  Wall.  354  (1874).  As  to 
form  of  bonds,  seal,  place  of  payment  and 
a,  see  cases  cited  Daniel  on  Neg. 
Instr.,  sees.  1492-1499.     Cannot  be  issued 


in  blank  as  to  date.     Jackson  Co.  Sup.  v. 
Brush,   77  111.  59  (1875). 

I'oucr  to  substitute  other  bonds.  Lynde 
v.  Winnebago  County,  16  Wall.  6;  McKee 
t;.  Vernon,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  210. 

Coupons;  Form  of  Instrument.  — Ma- 
ker suable  thereon  in  assumpsit,  where 
the  bonds  are  made  by  the  defendant  cor- 
poration and  refer  to  the  coupon,  though 
the  latter,  signed  by  the  agents  of  the  cor- 
poration, is  in  the  form  of  an  order  or 
check  on  a  bank  named  therein.  Town 
of  Queensbury  v.  Culver,  19  Wall.  83 
(1S73).  Cases  as  to  the  form  of  coupons, 
see  Daniel  on  Neg.  Instr.,  sees.  1492- 
1496.  May  be  made  payable  beyond  lim- 
its of  the  State,  unless  specially  restrained 
by  statute.  Lynde  v.  Winnebago  County, 
16  Wall.  6.  Coupons  when  severed  from 
the  bonds  are  independent  claims  and  may 
be  sued  on  as  such.  Knox  Co.  Comm'rs 
v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  546. 
sec.  486,  note.  Limitations  of  actions  on. 
Clark  v.  Iowa  City,  20  Wall.  583  /  supra, 
sec.  486,  note.  When  payable  to  bearer 
or  order  are  negotiable  instruments.  lb.; 
Aurora  City  v.  West,  7  Wall.  82;  Gel- 
pecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175.  Instance 
where  form  of  coupon  was  held  not  to  give 
it  a  negotiable  character.  Myers  v.  York, 
&c.  K.  R.  Co.  43  Me.  282;  but  quaere,  and 
see  Woods  v.  Lawrence  County,  1  Black, 
386. 

Ifi,r  signed.  — The  coupons,  where  the 
bonds  are  properly  signed  and  sealed,  may 
d  by  a  printed  facsimile  of  the 
maker's  autograph,  adopted  for  the  pur- 
pose, although  there  is  do  statute  author- 
izing it.  Pennington  v.  Baehr,  48  Cal. 
565  ;  s.  c.  2  Cent.  Caw  Jour.  92  ;  see 
McKee  v.  Vernon  Co.,  3  Dillon  C.  C. 
R.  210  ;  Lynde  v.  County,  16  Wall.  6  ; 
State  '■.  Terrebonne  Parish  Police  Jury 
30  La.  An.  287  ;  Neeley  *-.  Yorkville,  10 
S.  C.  141.  Mistakes  corrected  in 
Where  a  town  voted   to  issue  railway  aid 


582 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§513 


§513.  Such  Bonds  are  Negotiable  Securities. — The  following 
doctrines  are  too  well  settled  to  be  any  Longer  open  to  question.  A 
bona  fide  purchaser  of  negotiable  paper  for  value,  before  maturity, 

takes  it  freed  from  all  infirmities  in  its  origin,  unless  it  is  absolutely 
void  for  want  of  power  in  the  maker  to  issue  it,  or  its  circulation 
is  by  law  prohibited.  Municipal  bonds,  payable  to  bearer,  are 
subject  to  the  same  rules  as  other  negotiable  paper.1  A  purchaser 
of  a  municipal  bond  from  a  buna  fide  holder,  who  obtained  it  for 
value  before  maturity,  takes  it  free  from  equities,  though  he  him- 
self may  have  had  notice  thereof.2  An  overdue  and  unpaid  coupon 
for  interest,  attached  to  a  municipal  bond  which  has  several  years 
to  run,  does  not  render  the  bond  and  the  subsequently  maturing 
coupons  dishonored  paper,  so  as  to  subject  them,  in  the  hands  of 
an  innocent  purchaser  for  value,  to  defences  good  against  the 
original   holder.3     A   bona  fide   purchaser  for  value  of   negotiable 


1. ni ids  to  run  20  years,  with  the  right  to 
pay  them  in  10  years,  and  the  bonds  were 
printed  and  issued,  by  mistake,  without 
the  option  clause,  a  proceeding  in  equity 
to  correct  them,  brought  by  the  town 
against  holders  who  had  purchased  them 
with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  was  sus- 
tained. Town  of  Essex  v.  Day,  52  Conn. 
483. 

1  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51 
(1877);  ante,  sec.  512;  Baes  v.  Hewitt, 
20  Wis.  460  ;  Gorgier  v.  Mieville,  3  B. 
&  C.  45  ;  Brooks  v.  Mitchell,  9  M.  &  W. 
15  ;  Goodwin  v.  Robarts,  L.  R.  1  App. 
Cas.  476  ;  Goodman  v.  Harvey,  4  A.  &  E. 
870;  Burnham  v.  Brown,  23  Me.  400; 
Oridge  v.  Sherborne,  11  M.  &  W.  374; 
United  States  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  Co., 
91  U.  S.  72  ;  Miller  v.  Race,  1  Burr.  452  ; 
White  v.  V.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  21  How.  575; 
Moran  v.  Miami  County,  2  Black,  722 
(1862)  ;  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1 
Wall.  83  ;  Gi  lpcke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall. 
17.r,  ;  San  Antonio  v.  Lane,  32  Tex.  405  ; 
Lexington  v.  Butler,  14  Wall.  282  ;  St. 
Joseph  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644  (1872)  ; 
Humboldt  v.  Long,  92  U.  S.  642  ;  Macon 
Co.  v.  Shores,  97  U.  S.  272  ;  Calhoun  Co. 
Sup.  v.  Galbrkith,  99  U.  S.  214;  Comm'rs 
v.  Block,  99  U.  S.  686  ;  Block  v.  Bourbon 
Co.  Comm'rs,  99  U.  S.  686;  Marshall 
Co.  Sup.  v.  Schenck,  5  Wall.  784;  New 
Providence  v.  Halsey,  117  U.  S.  336  ; 
Ottawa  v.  Fir  !  Nat.  Bank  of  Portsmouth, 
105  U.  S.  342  ;  AVilson  County  v.  Third 


Nat.  Bank  of  Nashville,  103  U.  S.  770  ; 
Burleigh  r.  Rochester,  5  Fed.  Rep.  667. 
A  municipal  bond  in  the  usual  form  is  not 
rendered  non-negotiable  by  a  provision 
that  it  should  be  "payable  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  obligor  at  any  time  before  due." 
Ackley  School  District  v.  Hall,  113  U.  S. 
135(1884).  Supra,  sec.  512.  Bondspay- 
able  on  the  completion  of  a  railroad  and  to 
bearer  only,  held  not  negotiable  as  being 
payable  on  a  contingency  which  might 
never  happen,  and  for  want  of  certainty 
as  to  the  payee.  Blackmail  v.  Lehman, 
63  Ala.  547.  As  to  negotiability  of  cou- 
pons which  are  due,  detached  from  mu- 
nicipal bonds  not  due,  see  Thompson  v. 
Perrine,  106  U.  S.  589.  An  ordinary  mu- 
nicipal bond,  negotiable  in  form,  is  "a 
promissory  note  negotiable  by  the  law 
merchant,"  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act 
of  March  3,  1875,  which  allows  instru- 
ments of  that  class  to  be  sued  on  in  the 
Federal  courts,  by  an  assignee,  notwith- 
standing the  assignor  could  not  have  sued 
thereon  in  such  courts  if  no  assignment 
had  been  made.  New  Providence  v. 
Halsey,  117  U.  S.  336  (1885)  ;  Ackley 
School  District  v.  Hall,  113  U.  S.  135. 
Colorable  and  collusive  transfers  to  citizen 
of  another  State  of  bonds  and  coupons  will 
not  give  the  Federal  court  jurisdiction. 
Farmington  v.  Pillsbury,  114  U.  S.  138. 

2  Cromwell  v.   Sac  Co.,   96    U.   S.  51 
(1877).     Ante,  sec.  486. 

3  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,    96  U.  S.  51 


§515 


CONTRACTS  \     MUNICIPAL    BOND    CASES. 


583 


securities  before  their  maturity  may  recover  against  the  maker  the 
full  amount  of  them,  though  he  may  have  paid  for  them  less  than 
their  par  value.1 

§  514.  Lis  Pendens  not  applicable.  —  Another  doctrine  estab- 
lished in  reference  to  such  securities  is  that  the  principle  of  lis 
pendens  is  not  applicable  thereto.  There  may  be  actions  pend- 
ing regarding  the  bonds,  but  this  will  not  affect  the  purchaser  with 
constructive  notice.  It  is  a  general  rule  that  all  persons  dealing, 
with  real  property  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  a  suit  pending  with 
regard  to  the  title  thereof,  and  will,  at  their  peril,  purchase  the 
the  same  from  any  of  the  parties  to  the  suit.  But  this  rule  does 
not  apply  to  negotiable  securities  purchased  before  maturity.2 

§  515.  Course  of  Decision  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  —  In  municipal  bond  cases  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  does  not  hold  itself  concluded  by  decisions  of  the 
State  courts  made  after  the  bonds  have  been  negotiated,  unless 
possibly  where  the  question  is  one  exclusively  depending  upon  the 
construction  of  local  and  peculiar  provisions  of  the  State  Consti- 
tution or  enactments.3     It  has  rejected,  when  necessary  to  protect 


(1877)  ;  Goodman  v.  Simonds,  20  How. 
343;  Murray  v.  Lardner,  2  Wall.  110;  Nat. 
Bank  of  N.  A.  v.  Kirby,  108  Mass.  497. 

i  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51 
(1877)  ;  Lay  v.  Wissman,  36  Iowa,  305  ; 
Nat.  Bank  of  Midi.  v.  Green,  33  Iowa,  140  ; 
Park  Bank  v.  Watson,  42  N.  Y.  490; 
Fowler  v.  Strickland,  107  Mass.  552  ; 
Stoddard  v.  Kimball,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  469  ; 
Allaire  v.  Hartshorne,  1  Zab.  (21  N.  J.  L.) 
665  ;  Williams  v.  Smith,  2  Hill  (X.  Y.), 
301  ;  Chicopee  Bank  v.  Chapin,  8  Met. 
(Mass.)  40.  As  to  power  of  a  city  or  muni- 
cipality to  sell,  or  to  agree  to  sell,  or  dis- 
pose of  its  bonds  or  obligations  for  less 
than  their  par  value.  Memphis  v.  Rrown, 
20  Wall.  289  (1873)  ;  Shirk  v.  Pulaski 
County,  4  Dillon,  209  (1877)  ;  Mayor  of 
Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468  (1873). 

2  Leitch  v.  Wells,  48  N.  Y.  586  ;  Stone 
v.  Elliott,  11  Ohio  St.  252  ;  Kieffer  v. 
Ehler,  18  Pa.  St.  388;  Durant  v.  Iowa 
Co.,  1  Woolw.  69  ;  Winston  v.  Westfeldt, 
22  Ala.  760  ;  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  16 
Wall.  678  ;  National  Lank  v.  Texas,  '20 
Wall.  72  ;  Minns  v.  West,  3S  Ga.  18  ; 
Warren  v.  Marcy,  97  U.  S.  96  ;  Warren  v. 
Post,  97  U.  S.  110;  Warren  i».  Portsmouth 


Sav.  Bank,  97  U.  S.  110;  Orleans  v.  Piatt, 
99  U.  S.  676;  Cass  Co.  v.  Gillette,  100 
U.  S.  585.  The  pendency  of  a  suit  relating 
to  the  validity  of  negotiable  paper  not  yet 
due  is  not  constructive  notice  to  subse- 
quent holders  thereof  before  maturity;  and 
this  rule  cannot  be  changed  by  State  Laws 
or  decisions,  so  as  to  affect  the  rights  of 
persons  outside  the  State.  Enfield  <•.  Jor- 
dan, 119  U.  S.  680  (1886).  Si 
County  v.  Hill,  132  (J.  S.  107  (1S89). 
Although  it  is  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Illinois  that  a  municipal  corj> 
cannot  lawfully  make  its  obligations  paya- 
ble at  any  other  place  than  the  office  <>f  the 
treasurer  (ante,  sec.  506,  note),  yet  if  thus 
made  payable,  it  does  not  affect  the  valid- 
ity of  the  bond,  or  charge  the  bona  fide 
holder  with  notice  of  judicial  proceedings 
between  a  previous  holder  and  a  municipal- 
ity so  as  to  work  an  estoppel.  Enfield  v. 
Jordan,  supra. 

8  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175 
(1865);  Havemeyer  v.  Iowa  County,  8 
Wall.  294;  Thompson  v.  Lee  County,  lb. 
327;  Lee  County  r.  Rogers,  7  Wall.  181. 
See  particularly  on  this  point,  01 
Fond  du  Lac  Sup.,  16  Wall.  676  (  I 


."-  l 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§515 


the  bona  fide  holders  of  such  securities,  narrow  and  rigid  construc- 
tions of  statutes  and  charters  authorizing  the  creation  of  such  debts.1 


Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575,  explained; 
Carroll  <'<>.  Sup.  v.  United  States,  18 
Wall.  71;  Chicago  v.  Sheldon,  9  Wall. 
-><>:   Pine  Grove  Tp.  v.  Talcott,   19  Wall. 

.  Ehnwood  v.  Marcy,  92  I'.  S.  289 
11875)  ;  Anders. in  y.  Santa  Anna,  116 
U.  S.  356;  Claiborne  County  v.  Brooks, 
111  U.  S.  400  ;  Taylor  v.  Ypsilanti,  105 
U.S.  60,  following  Douglass  v.  county  of 
Pike,  lO'l  U.  S.  677,  whi  re  Chief  Justice 
Waite  s&id,  "Tl  if  the  parties  are 

to  be  determined  according  to  the  law  as 
it  was  judicially  construed  to  1"-  when  the 
bonds  in  question  were  put  on  the  market 
as  commercial   paper."      New    Buffalo  v. 

ibria  Iron  Co.,  105  U.  S.  73  ;  Ralls 
County  v.  Douglass,  105  IT.  S.  728;  Foote 
v.  Johnson  Co.,  5  Dill.  208  (1878)  ;  Cass 
Co.  r.  Johnson,  95  U.  S.  360;  Cutler  v. 
Board,  &c.,  56  Miss.  115;  Vicksburg  v. 
Lombard,  51  .Miss.  126  ;  ante,  sec.  511  ; 
post,  sec.  517  ;  Kenosha  v.  Lamson,  9 
Wall.  477;  Campbell  v.  Kenosha,  5  Wall. 
194  (1866).     Read   last   two  cases  in  con- 

Lon  with  Foster  v.  Kenosha,  12  Wis. 
616,  which,  in  effect,  is  overruled  or  dis- 
regarded. See  on  this  point  Steines  v. 
Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  167  ;  Columbia 
County  v.  King,  13  Fla.  451. 

I  n  speaking  of  the  force  of  the  State  court 
decisions  in  the  Federal  courts  in  this  class 

tses,  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  in  Venice  v. 
Murdock,  92  IT.  S.  494  (1875),  holds  this 
language  :  "  It  is  argued,  however,  that 
the  New  York  decisions  (Starin  v.  Genoa; 
Gould  v.  Sterling,  23  N.  Y.  439,  456)  are 
judicial  constructions  of  a  statute  of  that 
.  and,  therefore,  that  they  furnish  a 
rule  by  which  we  must  he  guided.     The 

ment  would  have  force  if  the  decisions, 
in  fact,  presented  a  clear  case  of  statutory 

traction.  But  they  do  not.  They 
are  not  attempts  at  interpretation.  They 
would  apply  as  well  to  the  execution  of 
powers  or  authorities  granted   by  private 

his  as  they  do  to  the  issue  of  bonds 
under  the  statute  of  April  16,  1852.  They 
assert  genera]  principles,  to  wit,  that  per- 
sons empowered  to  borrowmoney  and  give 

1  therefor,  for  the  purpose  of  paying 
it  to  an  improvement  company,  are  not 
authorized  to  deliver  the  bonds  directly  to 


the  company, — a  doctrine  denied  in  this 
court,  ii  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  even  in  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
New  York.  People  v.  Mead,  21  N.  Y.  124  ; 
The  Town  of  Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb. 
597.     They   assert,    also,    that    where  an 

authority  is  given  to  an  officer  to  execute 
and  issue  bonds  (on  the  assent  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  voters  of  a  town,  the  assent 
to  be  obtained  by  the  officer,  and  filed  in 
a  public  office,  with  an  affidavit  verifying 
the  assent),  the  verification  amounts  to 
nothing,  subserves  no  purpose,  and  that 
a  bona  fide  holder  of  the  bonds  is  bound  to 
prove  that  the  requisite  number  of  voters 
did  actually  assent.  They  assert  this  as 
a  general  proposition.  They  do  not  as- 
sert that  the  statute  so  declares,  or  that 
such  is  even  its  implied  requisition.  There 
is,  therefore,  before  us  no  such  case  of  the 
construction  of  a  State  statute  by  State 
courts  as  requires  us  to  yield  our  own  con- 
victions of  the  right,  and  blindly  follow 
the  lead  of  others,  eminent  as  we  freely 
concede  they  are."     Infra,  sec.  517. 

Where  a  railroad  company  procured 
negotiable  bonds  to  be  issued  by  a  town 
under  a  statute,  which  was  afterwards  de- 
clared unconstitutional,  and  the  railroad 
sold  and  transferred  them  to  citizens  of 
another  State,  who,  in  an  action  in  the 
Federal  court,  fixed  the  liability  of  the 
town  for  the  whole  issue,  it  was  held 
that  the  town  had  a  good  cause  of  action 
against  the  railroad  company  for  the 
amount  of  the  bonds  and  interest,  on  the 
ground  that  its  act  in  procuring  and  nego- 
tiating the  bonds  was  without  authority  of 
law  and  wrongful.  Town  of  Plainview  v. 
Winona  &  St.  Peter  R.  R.  Co.,  36  Minn. 
505.  The  soundness  of  this  conclusion  is, 
perhaps,  not  so  obvious  as  to  prevent  re- 
agitation  of  the  question.  In  State  v. 
Holladay,  72  Mo.  499,  it  was  held  that 
where  a  State  court  had  declared  certain 
bonds  issued  in  aid  of  a  railroad  void  and 
the  courts  of  the  United  States  afterwards 
held  them  valid,  the  State  court  cannot 
deem  them  such  absolute  nullities  as  not 
to  be  tin-  subject  of  compromise. 

1  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  supra  ;  Meyer 
v.  Muscatine  (charter  authorizing  harrow- 


§515  contracts:  municipal  bond  cases.  585 

Against  such  holders  it  has  given  no  favor  to  defences  based  upon 
mere  irregularities  in  the  issue  of  the  bonds  or  upon  non-compliance 
with  preliminary  requirements,  not  going  to  the  question  of 
power  to  issue  them.1  It  has  held  that  the  circuit  courts  of 
the  United  States  were  clothed  with  full  authority,  by  mandamus 
or  otherwise,  to  enforce  the  collection  of  judgments  rendere  I 
therein  on  such  bonds,  and  that  this  authority  could  not  be  in- 
terfered with  to  the  injury  of  the  creditor,  either  by  the  legislature 
or  the  judiciary  of  the  States/*  It  has  upheld  and  protected  the 
rights  of  such  creditors  with  a  firm  hand,  disregarding,  at  times, 
it  would  seem,  or  holding  to  be  inapplicable,  principles  which  it 
applied  in  other  cases,  and  asserting  the  jurisdiction  and  authority 
of  the  Federal  courts  with  such  striking  energy  and  vigor  as  appar- 
ently, but  perhaps  not  actually,  to  trench  upon  the  lawful  rights  of 
the  States  and  the  acknowledged  powers  of  the  State  tribunals. 
Upon  the  whole,  however,  there  is  little  doubt  that  its  course  has 
had  the  approval  of  the  profession  in  general  and  of  the  public,  and 
the  result  ought  to  teach  municipalities  the  lesson  that  if,  having 
the  power  conferred  upon  them,  they  issue  negotiable  securities, 
they  cannot  escape  payment  if  these  find  their  way  into  the  hands 
of  innocent  purchasers.  Unfortunately,  as  will  presently  appear, 
the  decisions  upon  this  important  subject  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  nation  and  those  in  some  of  the  State  courts  are  not  in  all 
respects  harmonious.3 

ing  of  money),  1  Wall.  384  ;  Rogers  v.  power  to  aid  railways  are  considered  in  a 
Burlington,  3  Wall.  654  ;  Van  Hostrup  previous  chapter.  Distinction  between 
v.  Madison  City,  1  Wall.  291  ;  Seybert  v.  municipal  "donation"  to  a  railroad  coin- 
Pittsburg,  lb.  272.  If  the  Supreme  Court  pany  and  a  municipal  "subscription"  to 
cannot  be  said  to  have  adopted  liberal  con-  its  stock.  Hamilton  County  v.  State,  115 
structions  of  statutes  authorizing  the  issue  Ind.  64  (1888);  s.  c.  22  Eng.  &  Am.  Corp. 
of  bonds,  it  may  be  indisputably  affirmed  Cases,  108,  and  note;  15  West.  Rep.  329. 
that  it  has,  in  such  cases,  held  the  munici-  Reference  to  decisions  construing  State 
pality  firmly  to  the  practical  construction  statutes  authorizing  municipal  aid  to  rail- 
it  had  put  upon  the  enabling  acts.  ways,  as  to  requisites  of  petitions,    notice, 

1  Knox  County  v.  Aspimvall,  21  How.  regularity,  and  sufficiency  of  electioi 
539;  Moran  v.  Comm'rs,  2  Black,  722  ;  22  Eng.  &  Am.  Corp.  Cases,  19,  note,  47, 
Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  287  ;  note,  54,  note,  71,  note.  The  United 
Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676  States  Circuit  Court  for  the  Northern  Dis- 
(1870)  ;  Louisiana  v.  Wood,  102  U.  S.  trict  of  Ohio,  before  Jackson,  J.,  in  the 
294.  case  of  Fellows  v.   Walker,    Auditor,   39 

2  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535  ;  Fed.  Rep.  651,  refused  to  enjoin  the  issue 
Galena  v.  Amy,  5  Wall.  705  ;  Riggs  v.  of  municipal  bonds  under  an  act  author- 
Johnson  County,  6  Wall.  166  ;  Butz  v.  izing  the  issue  of  such  bonds  by  the  city 
Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575.  See,  also,  post,  of  Toledo  to  secure  nn  for  public 
chap.  xx.  on  Mandamus,  and  cases  there  and  private  use.  The  court  considered 
cited.  tin'  objeel  authorized  by  the  act  to  be  a 

3  The  general  questions  relating  to  the  public,    as  distinguished    from  a   private, 


586  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  517 

§  516  (416  a).  Same  subject. —  Under  the  line  of  decision  in 
the  several  States  heretofore  adverted  to,  sustaining  the  constitution- 
ality of  municipal  railway  aid  bonds,1  millions  upon  millions  of  these 
securities  have  been  issued  by  townships,  counties,  and  cities  in 
the  different  Stales,  and  sooner  or  later  their  issue  has  been  often 
followed  by  attempts  to  escape  payment  The  misrepresentations 
which  have  oftentimes  induced  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  and  the 
disappointment  arising  from  the  over-estimated  benefits  of  the  rail- 
Ls  to  the  localities  which  aided  their  construction,  make  the 
attempts  to  avoid  payment  of  the  bonds  not  unnatural,  and  more 
excusable  than  they  would  otherwise  be.  The  judicial  history  of 
these  attempts  is  found  in  the  law  reports  of  the  different  States 
and  in  those  of  the  Federal  tribunals;  and  a  comparison  of  their 
judgments  shows  such  a  diversity  of  opinion  upon  some  important 
questions  connected  with  such  securities  as  to  render  it  most  ex- 
pedient to  refer  separately  to  the  decisions  of  the  two  classes  of 
courts.  It  is  particularly  material  to  notice  with  some  fulness 
and  cave  the  opinions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
since,  for  the  reasons  ahove  mentioned,  the  course  of  this  tribunal 
ami  of  the  State  tribunals  has  been  such  as  to  draw  to  the  Federal 
courts  in  most  of  the  States  nearly  all  of  the  litigation  arising 
from  this  source.  Wherein  the  State  courts  and  the  Federal  courts 
differ,  and  wherein  they  agree,  will  best  appear  by  referring  to 
some  of  the  principal  adjudications. 

§517  (416  b).  Iowa  Muncipal  Bond  Cases.  —  In  the  well-known 
Iowa  municipal  railway  aid  bond  cases,2  the  bonds  were  issued  after 
the  State  Supreme  Court  had  affirmed  the  constitutional  power  of 
the  legislature  to  authorize  their  issue,  and  before  the  same  court 
had  reversed  its  holding  in  this  respect;  and  in  these  cases  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  held  it  was  at  liberty  to  take,  and 

t,  and  that  no  sufficient  case  of  clear  of  the  State  and  Federal  courts  upon  the 

and  irreparable  injury  was  shown  to  just i-  subject  of  municipal  railway  aid  bonds  in 

fy  tlic  enjoining  of  the  issue  of  the  bonds.  Iowa.     That  obligations  of  contracts  can- 

Ante,  chap.  vi.  sec.  15Z  et  seq,  not  be  impaired   by  subsequent  decisions, 

1  Ante,  sec.  153  et  seq.  see,  also,  Chicago  v.  Sheldon,  9  Wall.  50  ; 

2  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175  City  v.  Lamson,  lb.  477  (1869)  ;  County  of 
(1S65);  Thomson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall.  Randolph  v.  Post,  93  U.  S.  502  ;  Am.  I,. 
327  (1865)  :  Havemeyer  v.  Iowa  County,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bruce,  105  U.  S.  328  ;  Pana  v. 
V..  'j'.- 1  :  I.  ■  o.  Burlington,  lb.  654  Bowler,  107  U.  S.  529;  Oregon  r.  Jen- 
(1865);  Mitchell  v.  Burlington,  4  Wall,  nings,  119  U.  S.  74;  Concord  v.  Robin- 
270;  ante,  sec.  516;  LeeCountyu  Rogers,  son,  121  IT.  S.  165.  The  five  cases  last 
7  Wall.  1  SI  (1868);  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  cited,  distinguished  in  German  Sav.  Bank 
Wall.575.  Kingt>.  Wilson,  1  Dillon  C.C.  v.  Franklin  Co.,  12S  U.  S.  526  (1888); 
555  (1871),  gives  a  review  of  the  decisions  Parmlee  v.  Chicago,  60  111.  267  (1871). 


§  51.7  CONTRACTS  [    IOWA   MUNICIPAL   BOND   CASES.  587 

it  did  take,  the  view  which  obtained  in  the  highest  judicial  tribunal 
of  the  State  at  the  time  the  bonds  were  issued  ;  and  hence  it  ad- 
judged that  the  bonds  were  landing  upon  and  enforceable  against  the 
municipalities  and  counties,  although  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 
was  at  the  same  time  holding  that,  under  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  Iowa,  the  bonds  were  utterly  void.  Subsequently  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  went  further,  and  held  that  such  bonds 
in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders  are  valid,  although  the  State  Su- 
preme Court  had  held  otherwise,  the  latter  basing  its  judgment, 
however,  upon  the  general  principles  of  the  law,  and  not  upon  any 
special  and  peculiar  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  State.1  it 
seems  to  be  the  doctrine  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  upon 
this  subject,  that  it  is  not  concluded  by  the  decisions  of  the  State 
courts  in  any  case  where  they  are  first  made  after  the  bonds  are  issued 
and  have  been  sold  in  the  markets  ;  and  such  is  undoubtedly  its 
doctrine  in  all  cases  relating  to  this  class  of  securities,  where  the 
questions  involved  do  not  turn  upon  the  construction  of  peculiar 
provisions  of  the  State  Constitution  and  laws.2  It  has  not  decided 
that  it  would  hold  valid  bonds  issued  after  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
State  had  held  them  to  be  invalid,  and  it  would  not  probably  so  hold, 
since  such  a  doctrine  is  not  necessary  to  protect  the  innocent  owners 
of  such  securities,  and  would  involve  the  consequence  of  the  Federal 
courts  setting  up  a  policy  in  a  State  contrary  to  its  Constitution  and 
laws  as  expounded  by  its  authorized  and  rightful  tribunals.3 

1  Olcott  v.  Fond  du  Lac  Sup.,  16  Wall,  preme  Court,  says  :  "This  interpretation 
678  (1872) ;  ante,  sec.  511,  note.  [of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois]  accom- 

2  Ante,  sec.  515,  and  note.  panied  all  bonds  subsequently  issued  into 

3  Kinc;  v.  Wilson,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  the  hands  of  whoever  took  them,  whether 
555  (1S71)  ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Iola,  2  a  bona  fide  holder  or  not  This  court  must 
Dillon  C.  C.  R.  353  (1873).  See,  how-  recognize  this  decision  of  the  Supreme 
ever,  on  this  subject,  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  Court  of  Illinois  as  an  authoritative  con- 
8  Wall.  575  (1869)  ;  Olcott  v.  Fond  du  struction  of  the  statute,  made  before  the 
Lac  Sup.,  16  Wall.  578.  bonds  [in  suit]  were  issued,  and  to  be  fol- 

Since  the  text  was  written  the  Supreme  lowed  by  this  court."     Douglass  v.  County 

Court  of  the  United  States  has  distinctly  of  Pike,  101  U.  S.  677  ;  Bur-.-.-  v.  Sdig- 

decided,  in  accordance  with  the  prediction  man,    107    U.   S.    20  ;    Green    County   v. 

therein,    that  as  to  bonds  issued  after  a  Conness,    109    U.    S.    104  ;    Anderson   v. 

construction  of  the  State  statute  by  the  Santa  Anna,  116  U.  S.  356.     In  Douglass 

Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  such  construe-  v.  County  of   Pike,   supra,   Waite,   C.   J. 

tion  is  authoritative  and  binding  upon  the  (p.  6S7)  says  :  "  After  a  statute  has  been 

Federal  courts.     This  subject  is  fully  ex-  settled  by  judicial  construction,  the  con- 

amined  and  discussed  in  German  Saw  Bank  struction  becomes,  so  far  as  contract  rights 

v.  Franklin  County  (111.),  128  U.  S.  526,  acquired  under  it  are  concerned,  as  much 

538  (1S8S).     In  this  case  bonds  were  is-  a  part  of  the  statute  as  the  text  itself." 

sued  after  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  Ante,  sees.  511,  515,  and  notes;  post,  sec. 

had  construed  the  act  under  which  they  525,  note;  Scotland  County  v.  Hill,  132 

were  issued.    Referring  to  this,  Mr.  Justice  U.  S.  107  (1S89). 
Blatchford,  giving  the  opinion  of  the  Su- 


588  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  519 

§  518  ( 1 1 1"1  c).  General  Result  stated.  —  As  preliminary  to  a  more 
immediate  view  of  some  of  the  leading  cases  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  upon  municipal  railway  aid  securities, 
it  may  be  observed  that  the  general  result  of  its  decisions  has  been 
very  clearly  summarized  in  one  of  its  judgments  relating  to  bonds 
of  this  character.  "  Bonds,  payable  to  bearer,"  says  the  learned  jus- 
tice who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court,  "  issued  by  a  municipal 
corporation  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad,  if  issued  in  pur- 
suance of  a  power  conferred  by  the  legislature,  arc  valid  commercial 
instruments  ;  but  if  issued  by  such  a  corporation  which  possessed  no 
power  from  the  legislature  to  grant  such  aid,  they  are  invalid,  even 
in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders.  Such  a  power  is  frequently  con- 
ferred to  be  exercised  in  a  special  manner,  or  subject  to  certain  regu- 
lations, conditions,  or  qualifications ;  but  if  it  appears  that  the  bonds 
issued  show  by  their  recitals  that  the  power  was  exercised  in  the 
manner  required  by  the  legislature,  and  that  the  bonds  were  issued 
in  conformity  with  those  regulations  and  pursuant  to  those  conditions 
and  qualifications,  proof  that  any  or  all  of  those  recitals  are  incorrect 
will  not  constitute  a  defence  to  the  corporation  in  a  suit  on  the 
bonds  or  coupons,  if  it  appears  that  it  was  the  sole  province  of  the 
municipal  officers  who  executed  the  bonds  to  decide  whether  or  not 
there  had  been  an  antecedent  compliance  with  the  regulation,  condi- 
tion, or  qualification  which  it  is  alleged  was  not  fulfilled."  1 

It  is  definitely  settled  by  this  court  that  mere  irregularities  in  the 
exercise  of  the  power  will  not  avail  as  a  defence  against  an  innocent 
holder  for  value,  and  that  the  only  defence  open  against  such  a 
holder  is  the  want  of  power  to  issue  the  bonds.  Obviously,  then,  the 
most  important  inquiries  to  be  considered  are  those  which  relate 
to  the  question,  when  the  power  exists  or  arises ;  who  is  to  decide 
whether  it  existed  or  had  arisen  when  the  bonds  were  issued ;  and 
what  will  estop  the  corporation  which  issued  them  to  set  up  in  de- 
fence a  non-compliance  with  antecedent  or  preliminary  conditions  : 
and  it  is  these  inquiries  that  we  shall  seek  to  illustrate  by  a  reference 
to  the  leading  decisions  of  the  courts  in  cases  which  have  arisen  for 
judgment. 

§  510.  Condition  precedent  to  Exercise  of  Power;  Popular  Vote  ; 
Non-compliance  with    Condition   Precedent;   Recital;    restraining  Is- 

i  St.  Jo  ']'h  Township  v.  Rogers,  16  this  subject,  ns  well  as  the  impossibility- 
Wall.  644  (ls7_),  opinion  by  Clifford,  J.  of  otherwise  presenting  i1  with  the  requis- 
[n  general  throughoul  this  work  the  author  ite  fulness  and  accuracy,  has  induced  him 
has  nol  referred  at  length  in  the  text  to  to  depart  to  some  extent  from  his  usual 
particular  cases,   but  the  importance  of  course. 


§  519     CONTRACTS  :     MUNICIPAL    BONDS  ;    CONDITIONS   OF    ISSUE.     589 

sue  of  Bonds.  —  Generally,  the  power  of  the  municipality,  county,  or 
other  local  civil  subdivision  of  the  State,  to  subscribe  for  the 

of  railway  companies,  ami  issue  bonds  in  payment,  is  conferred  upon 
certain  officers,  not  absolutely  but  on  the  condition  of  a  previous  ap- 
proving popular  vole,  or  the  assent  of  a  majority  or  of  some  greater 
proportion  of  the  resident  taxpayers.  If  this  sanction  is  given,  then 
the  otlieers,  by  the  usual  legislation,  are  authorized  to  make  the  sub- 
scription and  to  issue  bonds  in  payment  then  lor.  A  very  common 
defence  to  such  bonds  consists  in  a  denial  that  the  condition  prece- 
dent, i.e.,  the  approving  vote,  the  assent  of  the  taxpayers,  or  what- 
ever else  it  may  be,  has,  in  fact,  been  complied  with;  and  hence, 
as  contended,  the  power  to  issue  the  bonds  did  not  exist,  or  never 


arose 


Where  the  legislation  is  of  this  character,  —  namely,  requiring 
compliance  with  some  such  condition  before  issuing  the  bonds,  — 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  does  not  hold,  as  we  under- 
stand its  decisions,  that  the  power  can  be  rightfully  exercised 
unless  the  condition  precedent  has  been  performed.  As  between 
the  immediate  parties,  the  municipality  and  the  railroad  company, 
doubtless,  the  inquiry  is  open,  and  fully  open,  whether  the  condition 
on  which  the  rightful  exercise  of  the  power  depends  has  been  com- 
plied with ;  and  if  it  has  not  been,  on  clue  application  the  issue  of 
the  bonds  will  be  enjoined,'2  or  if  they  are  in  the  hands  of  the  ori- 
ginal party  or  of  holders  with  notice,  an  action  to  enforce  the  bonds 
may,  if  no  estoppel  exists,  be  successfully  defended.3  "Want  of 
power  is  a  good  defence  against  a  railroad  company,  endeavoring  to 
enforce  by  mandamus  the  execution  and  delivery  to  it  of  such  bonds 
by  the  municipality.4     In  a  suit  by  the  payee,  or  by  a  person  not 

1  Mere  informalities  in  the  returns  of  laid  and  the  cars  running  on  sections  of 
such  an  election  not  prejudicing  substan-  ten  miles  each,  "provided,  the  eastern 
tial  rights,  failing  to  comply  with  statu-  terminus,  general  ollices,  and  headquarters 
tory  requirements  which  are  directory  only,  of  said  railroad  should  be  in"  the  city, 
and  clerical  errors,  will  not  defeat  an  appro-  the  court  refused  a  writ  of  ma 

priation   in  aid  of  a   railroad.     Irwin    v.  compel  their  issue,  for  the  reason  that  it 

Lowe,  89  Ind.  540.     Further,  as  to  statu-  did  not  appear  that  these  conditions  had 

torv  requirements  in  respect  of  municipal  been  fulfilled.     State  v.  Minneapolis,   32 

bond  elections,  see  State  v.  Harris  (Mo.),  Min.  501. 

23  Eng.  &  Am.  Corp.  Cases,  43,  47,  note,  As  to  the  duty  of  enjoining  the  issue  of 

and  cases.     In  the  case  of  State  v.  Harris,  bonds  on  the  pain  of  being  estopped  to  set 

supra,  the  statute  of  Missouri  was  con-  up  irregularities   in    the   exercise  of  the 

strued  to  require  two-thirds  of  the  qualified  power,  see  post,  sees.  547,  548. 

voters  of  the  county  to  attend,  not  merely  3  Chambers  County  v.  (lews,  21  Wall. 

two-thirds  of  the  votes  actually  cast.    But  317,  321   (1S74>  ;    Madison    v.  Smith,  S3 

see  ante,  sec.  44,  note,  157,  note.  Ind.  502,  approving  the  text. 

2  So  where  a  city  voted  to  issue  bonds  4  Lamoille  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Fairfield, 
in  aid  of  a  railway  when  the   track  was  51  Vt.  257. 


590  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  520 

an  innocoTit  holder,  there  is  no  legal  ground  for  maintaining  that  the 
action  of  the  local  officers  in  issuing  the  bonds,  or  any  recital  that 

they  may  make  therein,  will  conclude  the  question  whether  the 
condition  precedent  has  been  performed;  and  there  is  no  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of , the  United  States  in  conflict  with  this  state- 
ment of  the  law,  but  several  which  distinctly  establish  it.1 

§  520.  Estoppel  by  Recital  to  show  Non-compliance  with  Condi- 
tions Precedent;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall.  —  When  the  boll  is 
have  been  issued  and  sold  in  the  market,  and  before  maturity  have 
come  for  value,  and  without  notice,  into  the  hands  of  innocent 
holders,  another  element  of  great  importance  is,  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court,  introduced  into  the  transaction,  as 
respects  compliance  with  conditions  precedent,  —  the  element  of  estop- 
pel.  This  is  so  important  in  its  practical  relations  to  the  subject  as 
to  require  careful  and  minute  consideration.  Conceding  that  the 
rightful  exercise  of  the  power  to  issue  the  bonds  depends  upon  a 
condition  precedent,  for  example,  a  popular  vote  in  favor  of  the 
proposition,  when,  how,  and  by  whom  is  it  to  be  ascertained  whether 
the  condition  precedent  has  been  performed?  Is  it  to  be  ascertained, 
once  for  all,  before  the  bonds  are  issued  ?  Or  is  it  open  to  inquiry 
and  contestation  in  every  action  upon  a  coupon  or  bond  ?  Is  the 
municipality  estopped,  in  favor  of  a  bona  fide  holder  of  the  bonds, 
from  setting  up  this  defence  ?  and  in  what  cases  will  the  estoppel 
be  available  in  favor  of  the  holder?  These  are  grave  questions,  and 
cases  involving  them  have  been  frequently  before  the  Supreme 
Court,  —  the  first  and  leading  case  being  The  Commissioners  of 
Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall.2 

1  Chambers   County  v.   Clews,   supra,  is   essential."     lb.     Ante,  sec.   163,    and 

That  court  hits  .several  times  adverted  to  cases  cited. 

the  duty  of  the    corporation  or  taxpayer  Where,  by  statute,  the  signature  of  a 

to  interfere  by  injunction  to  restrain  the  particular  officer  is  essential  to  the  validity 

issue  of  bonds  where  the  statute  has  not  of  bonds  issued  in  payment  of  a  subscrip- 

beeu  complied  with.     Injunction  lies  to  re-  tion  to  railway  stock,  bonds  issued  without 

strni,i  issue  of  bonds  where  there  has  been  such  signature  are  not  the  bonds  of  the 

a   material  departure  from    the    statute,  municipality,  and  recitals  in  them  showing 

i'ni  m    Pac,   R.    Co.    v.    Lincoln  County,  the  provisions  of  the  statute  and  corapli- 

3    Dillon  C.   C.  R.  300  (1873);   Same  v.  ance  therewith  toill  not  estop  the  munici- 

Merrick  County,  lb.  359  ;  State  v.  Mont-  pality  from  denying  their  validity.    Bissell 

:v,  71   Ala.   226  :   McClure  V.  Oxford  v.  Spring  Valley  Township,  110  0.  S.  162. 

n  hip.    !>l    I'.    S.     120;     Portland    &  Mayor's    signature    held   to   be   essential; 

rd  Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hartford,  ex-mayor's  signature  insufficient.     Colerw. 

58  Me.  23.     "In  cases  arising  before  the  Cleburne,   131  U.  S.   162  (1889),  noted 

issue  of  the  bonds,  estoppel  has  no  place,  ante,  sec.  509,  note. 
and  the  sound  doctrine  is,  that  compliance         2  Commissioners   of   Knox   County   v. 

with  ah  substantial  or  material  conditions  Aspinwall,    21    How.    539    (1858).       See 


§521     CONTRACTS:     bonds;    KNOX    COUNTY    ?'.    ASPINWALL.  591 

§  521  (417).    The   Case  of  the   Commissioners  of   Knox   County  v. 

Aspinwali,1  respecting  the  liability  of  municipal  and  public  corpora- 
tions on  their  negotiable  railway  aid  bonds,  d<  i  be  particu- 
larly noticed,  as  it  stands  in  the  order  of  time  at  the  head  of  the 
important  line  of  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  this  subj 
The  action  was  bj&bonajide  holder  for  value  of  certain  coupons 
attached  to  negotiable  bonds  issued  by  Knox  County,  [ndiana,  in  | 
ment  of  a  subscription  to  railroad  stock.  The  defence  was  that  the 
bonds  were  not  binding  upon  the  county  because  the  county  commis- 
sioners possessed  no  power  to  execute  them.  By  statute,  the  county 
commissioners  were  authorized  "to  take  stock  in  the  railroad,  pay- 
able in  county  bonds,  such  as  had  been  issued,  provided  a  majority 
of  the  qualified  voters  of  said  county,  at  a  designated  election,  shall 
vote  for  the  same!'  The  ground  upon  which  the  want  of  power  to 
execute  the  bonds  was  placed  by  the  county  was  the  omission  to 
comply  with  the  requirement  of  the  statute  in  respect  to  the  notices 
for  the  election  (which  the  statute  provided  should  be  held  on  a 
fixed  day),  at  which  a  vote  was  to  be  taken  for  and  against  a  sub- 
scription to  the  stock  of  the  railroad  company.  It  was  admitted  in 
the  case  that  the  notices,  such  as  the  statute  prescribed,  were  not 
given ;  and  the  court  seemed  to  concede  "  that  this  would  be  deci- 
sive against  the  authority  of  the  county  to  issue  the  bonds,  were  it 
not  for  the  question  which  underlaid  it;  and  that  is,  Who  is  to 
determine  whether  or  not  the  election  has  been  properly  held,  and 
a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  favor  of  the  subscription  ?  ...  Is  it," 
the  court  inquires,  "  to  be  determined  by  the  court,  in  this  collateral 
way,  in  every  suit  upon  the  bond,  or  coupon  attached,  or  by  the 
board  of  commissioners,  as  a  duty  imposed  upon  it  before  making 
the  subscription  ? "  The  court  was  of  the  opinion,  and  so  decided, 
that  the  county  commissioners  were  the  proper  judges  whether  or 
not  a  majority  of  the  votes  in  the  county  had  been  cast  in  favor  of 
the  subscription  to  the  stock,  and  whether  or  not  the  election  had 
been  properly  held,  and  that  these  questions  cannot  be  determined 
collaterally  in  an  action  upon  the  bonds  or  coupons,  at  least  when 
brought  by  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.  The  court,  in  assigning 
the  reasons  for  this  holding,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Nelson, 
say :  "  The  right  of  the  board  [of  county  commissioners]  to  act  in 
execution  of  the  authority  [conferred  by  the  statute]  is  placed  upon 
the  fact  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  had  been  cast  in  favor  of  the 
subscription;  and  to  have  acted  without  first  ascertaining  it.  would 
have  been  a  clear  violation  of  duty  ;  and  the  ascertainment  of  the 

further  reference  to  this  case,  infra,  sec.  1  21  How.  539  (1858). 

524,  note. 


592  MUNICIPAL  COBPORATIONS.  §  522 

fact  was  necessarily  left  to  the  inquiry  and  judgment  of  the  board 
itself,  as  no  other  tribunal  was  provided  for  the  purpose.  The 
board  was  one,  from  its  organization  and  general  duties,  fit  and 
competent   to  be  the  depositary  of  the  trust  thus  confided  to  it. 

The  persons  composing  it  were  elected  by  the  county,  and  it  was 
already  invested  with  the  highest  functions  concerning  its  general 
police  and  fiscal  interests.  .  .  .  We  do  not  say,"  he  adds,  "that  the 
decision  of  the  board  would  he  conclusive  in  a  direct  proceeding  to 
inquire  into  the  tacts  previously  to  the  execution  of  the  power,  and 
before  the  rights  and  interests  of  third  parties  had  attached;  hut 
after  the  authority  has  been  executed,  the  stock  subscribed,  and  the 
bonds  issued  and  in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders,  it  would  be  too 
late,  even  in  a  direct  proceeding,  to  call  it  in  question.  Much  less 
can  it  be  called  in  question  to  the  prejudice  of  a  bona  fide  holder  of 
the  bonds  in  this  collateral  way."  1 

§  522  (418).  Comments  on  Knox  v.  Aspinwall.  —  The  author 
ventures  to  remark  that  he  believes  the  decision  upon  the  special 
facts  of  the  case  to  be  right,  and  for  the  reasons  thus  clearly  stated 
by  this  able  and  experienced  judge.  But  as  sustaining  the  decis- 
ion, a  further  position  by  way  of  argument  is  taken,  which,  unless 
it  is  to  be  understood  in  the  limited  sense  herein  suggested,  he  con- 
siders to  be  untenable,  of  a  most  dangerous  nature,  and  subversive 
of  an  important  principle  in  the  law  of  agency  applicable  both  to 
private  and  public  agents.  That  position  is  this  :  that  a  purchaser 
of  the  bonds  had  a  right  to  assume,  from  the  mere  fact  that  they 
were  issued,  that  the  condition  on  which  the  county  was  authorized 
to  issue  them  had  been  complied  with,  and  that  a  recital  in  the 
bonds  that  they  were  issued  in  pursuance  of  the  statute  amounts  to 
an  estoppel  in  pais  upon  the  corporation,  of  which  the  officers  issu- 
ing the  bonds  were  the  public  agents.  That  this  is  the. position  as- 
sumed by  the  court  will  appear  by  the  following  extract:  "Another 
answer,"  continues  Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  "  to  this  ground  of  defence 
is,  that  the  purchaser  of  the  bonds  had  a  right  to  assume  that  the 
vote  of  the  county,  which  was  made  a  condition  to  the  grant  of 
the  power,  had  been  obtained,  from  the  fact  of  the  subscription  by 
the  board  to  the  stock  of  the  railroad  company  and  the  issuing 
of  the  bonds.  The  bonds,  on  their  face,  import  a  compliance  with 
the  law  under  which  they  were  issued.  '  Tins  bond/  we  quote,  '  is 
issued  in  part  payment  of  a  subscription  of  $200,000,  by  the  said 
Knox  County,  to  the  capital  stock,  &c,  by  order  of  the  hoard  of 

1  Commissioners  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  544 ;  infra,  sec.  524, 
note. 


§522     CONTRACTS:    MUNICIPAL   BONDS;     KNOX    V.    ASPINWALL.       593 


commissioners,  in  pursuance  of  the  third  section  of  the 
passed  by  the  general  assembly  <>i'  the  State  of  Indiana,  and  ap- 
proved Jan.  15,  L849.'  The  purchaser  was  not  bound  /<>  look  fur 
for  evidence  of  a  compliance  with  the  conditians  to  tin  grant  of  (hi 
power."  1  This  principle  lias  been  reiterated  and  this  case  frequently 
referred  to  and  followed,  and  one  of  the  two  grounds  on  which  it 
rests,  if  not  indeed  both  of  them,  still  has  the  approval  of  the  court, 
as  will  be  seen  by  its  subsequent  judgments.2 


1  lb.  545.  If  by  this  it  is  meant  that 
where  the  power  to  issue  bonds  is  given 
upon  the  condition  of  a  previous  majority 
vote  in  favor  of  the  proposition,  the  pub- 
lic or  municipal  officers  can,  where  in  point 
of  fact  no  vote  has  been  taken  or  the  propo- 
sition has  been  voted  down,  bind  the  county 
by  the  issue  of  bonds  with  false  recitals 
therein,  the  author  feels  bound  respectfully 
to  insist  that,  in  his  judgment,  the  princi- 
ple is  unsound,  and  certainly  it  is  one 
which  will  entail  needless  and  incalculable 
injury  upon  public  and  municipal  corpora- 
tions. These  securities,  it  is  true,  are 
intended  to  be  sold  in  distant  markets,  and 
therefore  it  cannot  reasonably  be  required 
that  purchasers  shall  be  affected  with  irreg- 
ularities, but  they  ought  to  be  held  to 
ascertain  whether  the  substantial  precedent 
conditions  of  the  power  have  been,  in  fact, 
complied  with,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  in 
the  power  of  public  officers,  unless  the  deci- 
sion of  this  question  is  by  statute  expressly 
or  at  least  plainly  committed  to  them,  to 
bind  the  corporation  for  which  they  act  by 
their  mere  statements  of  what  is  in  point 
of  fact  untrue. 

On  grounds  similar  to  those  here  sug- 
gested it  has  been  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  thai  bonds  issued  where 
an  election  is  required,  but  none  ever  held 
and  no  vote  taken,  are  void,  because  of 
want  of  power  to  issue  them,  —  void  in 
the  hands  of  all  persons;  but  they  may 
be  validated  by  the  legislature.  Steines 
v.  Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  167  (1871). 
Wagner,  J.,  in  this  case  reviews  the  prior 
adjudications  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  and  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
State  of  Missouri,  and  limits  the  language 
used  by  the  judges  to  the  facts  before 
them,  and  distinguishes  between  the  case 
of  irregularities  in  an  election  and  no  elec- 
tion whatever.  See,  also,  Carpenter  v. 
vol.  i.  —  38 


Latino,,,  51  Mo.  183  (1873).  But  see 
text,  sec.  524,  and  cases  cited  in  the  next 
note. 

-  The    cases    in    which    Knox    I 
Comm'rs  v.  Aspinwall  has  been  cited  and 
followed  or  applied,  are  :  Bissell  v.  ■'■ 
sonville,  24  How.  287  (1860);  Woods  v. 
Lawrence  County,   1    Black,  3S6   (1861); 
Moran  v.  Miami   County,   2   Black,    722, 
721  (1862);  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1 
Wall.  83  (1863);  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuqu  . 
175,   203;    Van    Hostrup  V.   Madison,   lb. 
291;    Meyer  v.  Muscatine,   lb.  384,   393; 
Cincinnati  v.  Morgan,  3  Wall.  '275:  1. 
v.  Burlington,   lb.   o'.",4;   Marshall  County 
Sup.   v.   Schenck,   5  Wall.    772    (lg 
Lexington  v.  Butler,  14  Wall.  2S1  (1871); 
Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar,    15  Wall.   371 
(1872);  Lynde  v.  Winnebago  Conn; v.   16 
Wall.    6 ;    Kenicott   v.    Jefferson    County 
Sup.,  lb.  452 ;    St.  Joseph  Tp.  o.   I 
lb.   644;    Pendleton    County  v.   Amy,    18 
Wall.  297;  Colorna  v.  Eaves,  92  U.  S.    184 
(1875)  ;     Venice    v.    Murdoch,    lb.    494 ; 
Moultrie  v.  Rockingham  T.  C.  Sav.  Bank, 
lb.  631;   Marcy  v.  Oswego  Tp.,  lb.    S37; 
Bumboldt    Tp.    v.    Long,   lb.    642:   Ran- 
dolph  County   v.    Post,    93   U.    S.    502; 
Callaway    County    v.     Foster,     lb. 
Leavenworth  County  v.  Barnes,  94  V.  S. 
70;    Douglas  County  Comm'rs  v.   Bolles, 
lb.  104:  Johnson  County  Comm'rs  r.  Jan- 
uary, lb.  202;    Same  v.  Thayer,  lb.  631; 
Scotland   County    v.    Thomas,    lb.    682  ; 
East  Lincoln  v.  Divenport,  lb.  801  :  I 
County  v.  Johnston,   95   I".  S.   860  ;  San 
Antonio  v.  Mehaffy,  96  IT.  S.  312  :  Sum' 
v.   Barnes,   lb.   316  ;    Warren    Count       v. 
Many,   97  U.  S.    96;    Macon   County  v. 
Shores,    lb.    272  ;  Nauvoo  v.   Bitter,   lb. 
389  ;  Daviess  County  v.    Huidekop  i 
IT.  S.   98  :  Schuyler   Conn 
P>.  169  ;  Hacketl  v.  Ottawa,  99  U.  S 
Weyauwega  r.  Ayling,  Tb.  112;  Call    an 


94 


MUNICIPAL  coi:i-oi:ations. 


§523 


§   523.  Author's  Statement  of  Rule.  —  Notwithstanding^  broad 
lang  of  the  op  bo  the  effect  that  where  under  any 


Sup.    ,-.  Galbraith,  lb.  214  ;  Wil- 

.His    v. 

76  (i  iting  b 
1  British  Bank  o.  Turquand,  6  El.  .v 

B      2   i;   Lyons  v.  Munson,  99  U. 

j  r.  Jasper  »  ounty,  101  I 

Boll    .    lb.    I  L9;    Pompton  v. 

I  fhion,  lb.  L96;  Douglass  v.  Pike 
County,  /  .  677;  Darlington  v.  Jackson 
County,  lb.  688;   Foote  v.  Pike  County, 

;  Menasha  t>.  Bazard,  102  r.  s.  81; 
Ottawa  v.  Portsmouth  Nat.  Bank,  1"."' 
U.  S.  842;  v  Bank  v.  Porter  Tp., 

,  10  U.   S.  6(  Cary  ».  ( 

Fed',   li.   199;  Third  Nat.  Bank  of  S;  i  i- 
cuse    v.  Falls,    15    Fed.    R.    783 

.  St.  Clair  County.  3 
Dillon,  C.  C.  1(33  (1874);  Huidekoper  v. 
Buchanan  County,  lb.  L75;  M  ■■ 
Green  Bay,  1  Biss.  C.  C.  292;  Smith  v. 
Clark  County,  54  Mo.  58,  i  1 ;  St.  Louis 
v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  217;  Wilkinson  v. 
Peru,  61  Iml.  1;  Black  v.  Cohen  and 
Shorter  v.  Elome,  52  G  i.  621  (1874);  Webb 
t7.  Heme  BayComui'rs,  L.  1!.  f>  Q.  B.  642; 

nperial   Land  <  !o.  of  Marseilles,  L. 

R.  11   Eq.   478;  Bargate  v.  Shortridge,  5 

CI.  II.  L.  C.  297;  and  a  certificate  ol  the 

proper  officer  thai    the   bonds    b  tve   been 

1  ind  the  signatures  are  genuine, 

t1  the  same  have  been  duly  regis- 

;  iiis  office  according  to  law,  cannot 
be  contradicted  by  evidence  that  there  was 
actually  ration  in  his  office.    Rock 

: 'p.  >■.  Strong,  96  U.  S   271. 

Estoppel  to  se1  up  irregul  irities  in  issue 

of  bond  of  the  subsequent  pay- 

M  irshall   <  'ounty  Sup. 

5  Wall.  77'J  :  compare  Marsh 

v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676  ;   Emir 

r's    Exrs.,    81    Kv.    52  ;    Aroma    v. 
Auditor,  15  Fed.  Rep.  si:1,;  Oswego  First 
Nat.   Bank  v.  Walcott,  7  Fed.   Re] 
Whiting  v.  Potter,  2  Fed.  Rep.  517  ;  Par- 
kersburg  v.    Brown,    106   U.  S.  487;    see 

rtsmputh  Sav.  Bank  v.  Springfield, 

Rep.  276. 

pt  /    by  former  final  j 
demurrer:  Where,  in  an  action  upi 

;u  bonds  issued  in  aid  of  a  railway, 
a  final  judgment  in  favor  of  the  munici- 
pality v  upon  plaintiff 's  demurrer 


to  its  answer  setting  up  facts  showing  that 
Is  were  <<•  ver  exet  uh  d  by  it,  the 
plaintiff  was  held  to  be  estopped  to  deny 
the    in  i'  determined   when   suing 

the  same  municipality  upon  other 
from  tin- Sinn-  bonds  subsequently  matur- 
ing. Bissell  v.  Spring  Valley  Township, 
124  I',  s.  225  ;  compare  Cromwell  v.  Sac 
County,  96  U.  S.  51.  The  former  action 
of  Bi  ell  on  oth  r  coupons  of  the  sa% 
of  bonds  is  reported  in  110  U.  S.  162. 
After  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  '  'ourt  in 
the  case  of  t  he  same  plaintiff  (reported  124 
U.  S.  25)  had  been  printed,  and  during 
the  term,  the  author,  having  been  em- 
ployed as  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  filed  a 
petition  and  argument  for  a  rehearing  of 
the  opinion  holding  the  judgment  in  the 

former    action    to    be    atoppel.      lie 

urged,  upon  an  examination  of  the  plead- 
ing in  the  tiisi  record,  (")  that  it  was  not 
adjudged  therein  that  the  bonds  were 
never  signed  by  the  proper  officer,  but  that 
it  was  only  adjudged  that  if  the  bonds 
were  registered  and  purchased  by  the 
plaintiff,  as  alleged  in  his  petition,  this  is 
in  law  no  answer  to  the  plea  that  the  clerk 
did  not  sign  the  bonds  or  authorize  any 
one  else  to  sign  them  for  him;  (/<)  thai  the 
adjudication  in  the  fust  suit  is  no  bar  to  a 
suit  upon  other  coupons  when  the  plaintiff 
propose  to  establish  as  a  fact  for  the  first 
time  that  the  clerk,  being  ill,  did  author- 
ize the  bonds  to  be  signed  in  his  name  by 
his  brother,  who  was  also  his  deputy,  and 
that  they  were  signed  accordingly.  The 
i  for  a  rehearing  was  overruled,  and 
no  further  opinion  was  filed.  The  impor- 
tance and  difficulty  of  the  question  seem 
to  justify  this  further  statement  concern- 
ing the  cause  which  does  not  appear  in  the 
reports.  The  extenl  to  which  the  docl  rine 
of  estoppel  is  seemingly  carried  in  this  case, 
the  author  suggests  with  deference,  goes 
beyond  the  line  of  the  principle  of  pre- 
vious adjudications  in  the  same  court,  and 
to  an  extenl  which  deserves  further  con- 
sideration as  to  its  soundness. 

Estoppel  by  retaining  proceeds  of  bonds. 
Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297 
(1871).     Post,  sec.  547. 


§524       CONTRACTS:    power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds. 


595 


circumstances  the  power  in  the  corporation  to   issue  negoti- 

able securities,  the  bona  fide  holder  has  the  right  to  presume  that  I 

were  duly  issued,  yet  when  the  facts  of  the  cases  in  which  such  lan- 
guage is  used  are  considered,  we  are  unable,  after  a  careful  review  of 
the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  to  say  that  they  Lay  down  the 
doctrine  that  merely  by  recital  in  the  bonds  the  corporation  will, 
under  all  circumstances,  in  favor  of  an  innocent  holder,  be  estopped 
from  showing  that  in  point  of  fact  no  election  whatever  was  holden, 
or  that  any  other  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise  of  the  po 
has  not  been  complied  with.  If  upon  a  true  construction  of  the 
legislative  enactment  conferring  the  authority,  the  corporation  or 
certain  officers,  or  a  given  body  or  tribunal,  are  invested  with 
power  to  decide  whether  the  condition  precedent  has  been  complied 
with,  then  it  may  well  be  that  their  recital  of  their  determination 
of  a  matter  in  pais  which  they  are  authorized  to  decide  will,  in 
favor  of  the  bondholder  for  value,  bind  the  corporation.1 

§  524.  Qualification  of  la3t  Section  by  the  Supreme  Court.  — 
"This,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  in  Coloma  v.  Evans,  referring  to 
the  language  of  the  author  in  the  last  preceding  section,  "  is  a  very 
cautious  statement  of  the  doctrine"  of  the  Supreme  Court.  And 
he  adds,  "  It  may  be  re-stated  in  a  slightly  different  form.  Where 
legislative  authority  has  been  given  to  a  municipality,  or  to  its 
officers,  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  of  a  railroad  company,  and  to 
issue  municipal  bonds  in  payment,  but  only  on  some  precedent 
condition,  such  as  a  popular  vote  favoring  the  subscription,  and 
where  it  may  be  gathered  from  the  legislative  enactment  that  the 
officers  of  the  municipality  were  invested  with    power   to   decide 

1  The  language  in  this  section  stands  as  and  the  vote  should  he  void  unless  the 

in  a  previous  edition  ;  but  it  must  now  be  road   should  be  completed  by  a  specified 

regarded   as   authoritatively  qualified   by  day,  and  the  bonds  specially  recited  that 

the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  it  was  so  completed,  though  the  fact  was 

United  Stairs,  referred  to  in  section  524.  otherwise.     Oregon   v.  Jennings  was  dis- 

See  Oregon  v.   Jennings,   119  U.  S.   74,  languished   in    German    Savings   Bank  v. 

where  Mr.  Justice  Blatchford  said,    "The  Franklin    County,    128    U.    S.    526,    543 

supervisor  and  town  clerk  .  .   .   were  the  (1888). 

persons  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  decid-  That  bonds  recite,  as  the  authority  for 

ing,  before  issuing  the  bonds,  whether  the  the  issue,  <*  wrong  act  of  the  I 

conditions  determined  &\   the  election  ex-     does  not  ni ssarily  invalidate  them,  it  it 

isted.     If  they  have  certified  to  that  effect  can  be  shown  thai    they  were  in  fact    is- 

in  the  bonds,  the  town  is  estopped  from  sued  under  an  act  conferring  the  power, 

asserting,   as  against   a  bona  fide  holder,  Anderson  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Beal,  113  1  .  S. 

that    the    conditions    prescribed    by   the  227  ;  Johnson  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  January,  94 

popular  vote   were   no1    complied  with."  U.  S  202,  distinguished;  Crow  v.  Oxford, 

In  tins    case   the  terms  of  the  vote  were  119  U.  S.  215  (1880). 
that     the    bonds    should    not    be    issued 


596  riCIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  §  ol!4 

whether  the  condition  precedent  has  been  complied  with,  their 
ta]  that  it  has  been,  made  in  the  bonds  issued  by  them  and 
held  by  a  bonaficU  purchaser,  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  and  binding 
upon  the  municipality,  for  the  recital  is  itself  a  decision  of  the  fact 
by  the  appointed  tribunal.1  In  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  it  ap- 
peared that  the  common  council  of  the  city  were  authorized  by 
the  legislature  to  subscribe  for  stuck  in  a  railroad  company,  and 
to  issue  bonds  for  the  subscription,  on  the  petition  of  three-fourths 
of  the  legal  voters  of  the  city.  The  council  adopted  a  resolution  to 
subscribe,  reciting  in  the  preamble  that  more  than  three-fourths 
of  the  legal  voters  had  petitioned  for  it,  and  authorized  the  mayor 
and  city  clerk  to  sign  and  deliver  bonds  for  the  sum  subscribed. 
The  bonds  recited  that  they  were  issued  by  authority  of  the  common 
council,  and  that  three-fourths  of  the  legal  voters  had  petitioned 
for  the  same,  as  required  by  the  charter.  In  a  suit  subsequently 
brought  by  an  innocent  holder  for  value,  to  recover  the  amount  of 
unpaid  coupons  for  interest,  it  was  held  inadmissible  for  the 
defendants  to  show  that  three-fourths  of  the  legal  voters  of  the 
city  had  not  signed  the  petition  for  the  stock  subscription.  A 
similar  ruling  was  made  in  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City,  and  in 
Mercer  County  v.  Hacket.  The  same  principle  has  recently  been 
asserted  in  this  court,  after  very  grave  consideration,  and  it  must 
be  considered  as  settled.  In  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Eogers,  it  is 
stated  thus :  '  Power  to  issue  bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction 
of  a  railroad  is  frequently  conferred  upon  a  municipality  in  a  special 
manner,  or  subject  to  certain  regulations,  conditions,  or  qualifications  ; 
but  if  it  appears  by  their  recitals  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in 
conformity  with  such  regulations  and  pursuant  to  such  conditions 
and  qualifications,  proof  that  any  or  all  these  recitals  were  incorrect 
will  not  constitute  a  defence  for  the  corporation  in  a  suit  on  the 
bonds  or  coupons,  if  it  appears  that  it  was  the  sole  province  of  the 
municipal  officers  who  executed  the  bonds  to  decide  whether  or  not 
there  had  been  an  antecedent  compliance  with  the  regulation,  con- 
dition, or  qualification,  which  it  is  alleged  was  not  fulfilled.'     There 

1  The  proposition  hire  stated  has  been  v.  Covington,  8  Fed.  Rep.  777;  Irwin  v. 

re-asserted    and    applied    in    subsequent  Town  of  Ontario,  S  Fed.  Rep.  49;  Phelps 

.    Anderson  County  v.  Beal,  113  U.  S.  v.    Lewiston,    15   Bhitchf.    131.     On   the 

227  ;  Dixon  County  v.   Field,  111  IT.  S.  other  hand  a  recital  of  facts  which  the 

83;    Northern  Bank  of  Toledo  v.  Porter  officers   had   no   authority   to  determine, 

Tp.,  110  U.  S.  608;  Buchanan  v.   Litch-  or  a  recital  of  matters   of  law,    will 

field,  102  D".  S.  278;  Lane  v.  Embden,  72  estop  the  municipal   corporation.     Dixon 

Me.  354  ;   Anderson  Co.  v.  Houston  &  G.  County  v.   Field,   111   U.  S.  83  ;  see  this 

K.  It.   II.  Co.,   52  Tex.   228;   Carrier  v.  case,  post,  sec.  529  a,  note. 
Shawangunk,  10  Fed.  Eep.  220  ;  Hopper 


§  524 


CONTRACTS:     POWER   TO   ISSUE    NEiiOTlAHLE    BONDS. 


597 


is  nothing  in  the  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County  at  all  inconsi 
with  the  rule  thus  asserted.  In  that  case  there  were  no  recital  i  in 
the  bonds,  and  there  was  no  decision  that  the  conditions  precedent 
to  a  subscription,  or  to  the  gift  of  authority  to  subscribe,  had  been 
performed.  The  question  was,  therefore,  open.  What  we  have 
said  disposes  of  the  present  case  without  the  necessity  of  particular 
consideration  of  the  matters  urged  in  the  argument  oi*  the  defendant 
below.  It  was  inadmissible  to  show  what  was  attempted  to  be 
shown;  and  even  if  it  had  been  admissible,  the  effort  to  assimilate 
the  case  to  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County  would  fail.  There  the  sub- 
scription was  for  the  stock  of  a  different  corporation  from  that  for 
which  the  people  had  voted."  * 


1  Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves,  92  U.  S. 
484.  In  this  case,  legislative  authority 
was  given  to  the  town  to  make  the  sub- 
scription and  issue  the  bonds  on  the  pre- 
vious sauction  of  a  popular  vote,  to  be 
ascertained,  as  the  court  construed  the 
enactment,  by  the  officers  of  the  town, 
who  were  empowered  to  execute  the  bonds. 
The  bonds  were  executed  in  due  form  by 
the  proper  officers,  and  duly  registered 
With  the  auditor  of  State.  They  contained 
the  recital  that  they  "are  issued  under 
and  by  virtue  of  the  act  incorporating  the 
railroad  company,"  approved  March  24, 
1869,  "  and  in  accordance  with  the  vote  of 
the  electors  of  said  township  of  Coloma,  at 
a  regular  election  held  July  28,  1869, 
in  accordance  icith  said  law." 

The  scope  and  effect  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  court  are  shown  by  the  brief  separate 
opinion  in  the  case,  given  by  Mr.  Justice 
Bradley,  who  says  :  — 

"  I  dissent  from  the  opinion  of  the 
court  in  this  case,  so  far  as  it  may  be  con- 
strued to  reaffirm  the  first  point  asserted 
in  the  case  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
to  wit,  that  the  mere  execution  of  a  bond 
by  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of  ascer- 
taining whether  a  condition  precedent  has 
been  performed  is  conclusive  proof  of  its 
performance.  If,  when  the  law  requires 
a  vote  of  taxpayers  before  bonds  can  be 
issued,  the  supervisor  of  a  township,  or 
the  judge  of  probate  of  a  county,  or  other 
officer  or  magistrate,  is  the  officer  desig- 
nated to  ascertain  whether  such  vote  has 
been  given,  and  is  also  the  proper  officer 
to  execute  and  who  does  execute  the 
bmnls  ;  and  if  the  bonds  themselves  con- 


tain a  statement  or  recital  that  such  vote 
has  been  given,  then  the  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser of  the  bonds  need  go  hack  no  fur- 
ther. He  has  a  right  to  rely  on  the 
statement  as  a  determination  of  the  ques- 
tion. But  a  mere  execution  and  issue  of 
the  bonds  without  such  recital  is  not,  in 
my  judgment,  conclusive.  It  may  be 
prima  facie  sufficient  ;  but  the  contrary 
may  be  shown.  This  seems  to  me  to  be 
the  true  distinction  to  be  taken  on  this 
subject,  and  I  do  not  think  that  the  con- 
trary has  ever  been  decided  by  this  court. 
There  have  been  various  dicta  to  the 
contrary,  but  the  cases,  when  carefully 
examined,  will  be  found  to  have  had  all 
the  prerequisites  necessary  to  sustain  the 
bonds,  according  to  my  view  of  the  case. 
This  view  was  distinctly  announced  by 
this  court  in  the  case  of  Lynde  v.  The 
County  of  Winnebago,  16  Wall.  6.  In 
the  case  now  under  consideration,  there 
is  a  sufficient  recital  in  the  bond  to  show 
that  the  prop.T  election  was  held  and  the 
proper  vote  given  ;  and  the  bond  was  exe- 
cuted by  the  officers  whose  duty  it  was 
to  ascertain  these  facts.  On  this  ground, 
and  this  alone,  1  concur  in  the  judgment 
of  the  court." 

In  the  same  case  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  in 
the  main  opinion,  after  resting  the  judg- 
ment on  the  principle  stated  in  the  text 
524),  makes  this  reference  to  the  case 
of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall  :  — 

"  Indeed,  some  of  our   decisions   have 
gone    fartfier.       In    the    leading    ease    of 
Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  '21  How. 
the  decision  was  rested  upon  two  grounds. 
One  of  them  was  that  the  mere  issue  of 


MUNICIPAL    COlil'UUATlONS. 


§525 


^  525.     Estoppel   by    Recital;   Failure   to   give   Notice  of    Election, 
or  Notice  for  the  Required  Time.  —  As  showing    the   application   and 

i  of  the  doi  trine  stated  in  the  preceding  sections  as  to  compli- 
ance with  conditions  precedent,  —  particularly  in  respect  of  the 
very  common  one  of  a  previous  election,  or  the  assent  of  a  given 
proportion  of  the  taxpayers,  —  a  brief  reference  may  be  made 
to  some  of  the  leading  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  in  which 
it  is  evident  that  the  whole  subjeel  again  underwent  thorough 
consideration.  In  Eumboldt  Township  v.  Long,  bonds  issued  under 
legislative  authority,  requiring  a  popular  vote  at  an  election  of 
which  thirty  days'  uotice  was  to  be  given,  and  which  contained 
a  recital  (made  by  the  officers  having  the  power,  as  construed,  to 
determine  whether  the  conditions  of  fact  had  been  complied  with, 
and  to  issue  the:  bonds)  to  the  effect  that  they  were  "  issued  in  pur- 
suance of  a  ml  in  accordana  with  the  act  of  the  legislature,"  stating 


the  bonds,  containing  a  recital  that  they 
were  issued  under  and  in  pursuance  of 
the  legislative  act,  was  a  sufficient  basis 
for  an  assumption  by  the  purchaser  that 
the  conditions  on  which  the  county  (iu 
that  case)  was  authorized  to  issue  them 
had  been  complied  with,  and  it  was  said 
the  purchaser  was  not  bound  to  look  far- 
ther tor  evidence  of  such  compliance, 
though  the  recital  did  not  affirm  it.  This 
position  was  supported  by  reference  to 
The  Royal  British  Bank  v.  Turquand, 
6  Ellis  &  Blackburn,  327,  a  case  in  the 
Exchequer  Chamber  which  fully  sustains 
it,  and  the  decision  in  which  was  con- 
curred in  by  all  the  judges.  This  posi- 
tion taken  in  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall 
has  been  more  than  once  reaffirmed  in 
this  court.  It  was  in  Moran  v.  Miami 
County,  2  Black,  732  ;  in  Mercer  County 
v.  Racket,  1  Wall.  8:5;  in  Supervisors*. 
Schenck,  5  "Wall.  784,  and  in  Meyer  v. 
Muscatine,  1  Wall.  384.  It  has  never 
been  overruled,  and  whatever  doubts  may 
have  1 ii  suggested  respecting  its  correct- 
ness to  the  full  extent  to  which  it  has 
sometimes  been  announced,  there  should 
be  no  doubt  of  the  entire  correctness  of  the 
other  rule  asserted  in  Knox  County  v. 
A  pin  wall.  That,  we  think,  has  been  so 
firmly  seated  in  reason  aud  authority  that 
it  cannot  be  shaken." 

In  further  explanation  we  may  add 
that  the  recital  in  Knox  County  v.  Aspin- 
wall was  iu  these  words:   "This  bond  is 


issued  in  part  payment  of  a  subscription  of 
$200,000,  by  the  said  Knox  County,  to  the 

capital  stock,  &c,  by  order  of  the  hoard 
of  commissioners,  in  pursuance  of  the  third 
seel  ion  of  the  act,  &c,  approved  January 
15,  18-19."  The  ac1  required  the  previous 
sanction  of  a  majority  "I'  tie'  qualified 
voters  of  the  county,  and  the  defence  was 
failure  to  comply  with  the  statute  in  re- 
spect to  the  notices  for  the  election.  Aud 
the  proposition  which  has  been  doubted 
elsewhere,  and  from  which  Mr.  Justice 
Bradley  dissents,  is  contained  in  the  fol- 
lowing sentence,  extracted  from  the  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Justice  Nelson  in  that  case, 
who,  after  quoting  the  foregoing  recital 
in  the  bond  (which,  it  will  be  seen,  does 
not  expressly  state  that  there  was  an  elec- 
tion), says:  "The  purchaser  was  not 
hound  to  look  further  for  evidence  of  a 
compliance  with  the  conditions  to  the 
grant  of  the  power."  In  Moran  v.  Miami 
County,  •-'  Black,  722,  732,  the  court  say  : 
"We  think  and  adjudge  that  the  recitals 
in  the  bonds  are  conclusive  [of  compliance 
with  the  precedent  condition],  constitut- 
ing an  estoppel  in  pais  upon  the  defend- 
ants in  this  suit."  Other  cases  to  the 
same  effect  in  the  Supreme  Court  will  be 
adverted  to  as  we  proceed.  In  Marcy  v. 
Oswego  Township,  92  U.  S.  638  (1875), 
the  doctrine  as  contained  in  the  text  (sec. 
521),  was  reasserted  almost  in  the  same 
language. 


§525 


contracts:   power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds. 


it,  were  held  not  to  be  invalid  in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value, 
before  due,  without  notice,  because  the  election   was  held   within   l 
than  thirty  days  after  the  date  of  the  order  providing  for  it.1 
principle  adopted,  and   the  reasoning  of  the   court   by  which  it   is 
sustained,  lead,  it  would  serm,  logically  to  the  conclusion  (although 
there  is,  perhaps,  no  case  in   the    Supreme  Court    where   the  J 
required  a  direct  decision  of  the    point)  that,  where  the   power  to 
issue  the  bonds  is  given   upon   the   condition  of  a  pr<  vote 

in  favor  of  the  proposition,   the   public  or   municipal  officers  i 
where  no  vote  whatever  has  been   taken,  or  il<<   proposition  has 
voted  dovm,  bind   the  county  or  municipality   by  the  falsi    /■>■  it 
in  such  unauthorized   bonds,  provided  they  are    issued   by  the   i 
cers  entrusted  by  the  statute  with  the  power.     Under  such  a  doctrine, 
limitations  upon   the  exercise   of  the   power,   intended    to    prevent 
fraud,  and  to  secure  a  compliance  with   the  conditions  upon  which 
the    bonds    are    authorized,  are    of  little    practical    value,  and    will 
frequently  prove  illusory.     So,  in  Coloma  v.  Eaves,  sxupra}  —  a  i 


1  Humboldt  Township  v.  Long,  92  (J.  S. 
642.  The  court  thus  state  the  ground 
of  its  decision:  "The  board  of  county 
commissioners,  who  caused  the  bonds  to 
be  issued,  were  constituted  the  authority 
to  determine  whether  the  conditions  of 
fact,  made  by  the  statute  precedent  to 
the  exercise  of  the  authority  granted  to 
execute  and  issue  the  bonds,  had  been 
performed,  and  their  recital  in  the  bonds 
issued  by  them  is  conclusive  in  a  suit 
against  the  township  brought  by  a  bona 
fide  holder."  (So  held,  also,  in  Marcy  v. 
Township  of  Oswego,  92  V .  S.  <::J8.)  "  In 
so  ruling  we  but  decided  what  had  often 
before  been  decided,  and  what  ought  to  be 
regarded  as  a  fixed  rule.  Applying  it  to 
the  solution  of  the  question  now  before 
us,  it  is  plain  that  the  bonds  arc  not  in- 
valid because  all  the  notice  of  the  popular 
election  was  not  given  which  the  legisla- 
tive act  directed.  The  election  was  a 
step  in  the  process  of  execution  of  the 
power  granted  to  issue  bonds  in  payment 
of  a  municipal  subscription  to  the  stock 
of  a  railroad  company.  It  did  not  itself 
confer  the  power.  Whither  that  step 
had  been  taken  or  not,  and  whether  the 
election  had  been  regularly  conducted, 
with  sufficient  notice,  and  whether  the 
requisite  majority  of  votes  had  been  cast 
in    favor   of    a   subscription,    and    conse- 


quent   bond    issue,  were  questions    which 
the  law  submitted  to  the  board  of  county 
commissioners,  and  which  it  was  n& 
for  them  to  answer  before  thi 
In  the  present  case  the  board  passed  upon 
them  and  issued  the  boi  ting  by 

the  recitals  that  they  were  issued  '  in  pur- 
suance of  and  in  accordance  with  t 
of  the    legislature.'       Thus   the   plaintiff 
below  took  them,    without  knowli  i 
any  irregularities  in  the  process   i 
which  the  legislative  authority  was  exer- 
cised,   and    relying    upon    the    assurance 
given    by  the    board   that  the   bonds   had 
been  issued  in  accordance  with   t] 
In    his    hands,    therefore,    they   are    valid 
instruments."     See  Town  of  Elmwood  v. 
Marcy,  92  U.  S.  289  (1875)  ;  St.  Joseph 
Township  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644  (1872); 
Anderson  Co.  Comm'rs  o.  Deal,  IK"!  t'.  S. 
•J-J7  ;    Lincoln   v.   Cambria    Iron  (\k,   103 
U.  S.   U2;  American  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bruce. 
105  !'■  S.  328,  distinguished  in  lal 

in  Saw  Bank  v.  Franklin  County, 
123  U.   S.   526,   541   (1SSS).      . 
517,  note. 

2  92   U.    S.    484  ;   followed   in    Tana   v. 
Bowler,  107  Y.  S.  529  .  distin- 

guished in  German  Sav.  Hank  v.  Franklin 
County,    128   U.   S.   526.     Sei 
Jersey  City,  18  Fed.  Hep.  719. 


600  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  525 

from  Illinois,  —  where  the  local  officers  of  the  town  were  empowered 
by  the  statute  to  issue  bonds,  provided  a  majority  of  the  voters 
of  the  town  voted  for  the  subscription,  —  which  fact,  the  statute 

provided,  shall    appear   by  the   state nt   of  the   town-clerk,  Bled 

with  the  county  clerk,  showing  the  vote  given,  the  amount  voted, 
and  the  rate  of  interest;  it  was  held,  in  favor  of  abonafidt  owner 
of  the  bonds  issued  containing  a  recital  of  an  election,  that  such  an 
owni  r  need  not  Lo  ik  beyond  the  recitals  made  in  the  bonds  by  the 
I  officers  authorized  to  issue  them  for  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
the  facts  in  pais  thus  recited,  the  decision  and  declaration  of  that  de- 
cision in  the  bonds  being  conclusive  upon  the  town.  The  court  said: 
"  Alter  all,  this  is  not  an  open  question,  as  between  a  bona  fide 
holder  of  the  bonds  and  the  township,  whether  all  the  prerequisites 
to  their  issue  have  been  complied  with.  Apart  from  and  beyond 
the  reasonable  presumption  that  the  oilicers  of  the  law,  the  town- 
ship officers,  discharged  their  duty,  the  matter  has  passed  into 
judgment.  The  persons  appointed  to  decide  whether  the  necessary 
prerequisites  to  their  issue  had  been  completed  have  decided  and 
certified  their  decision.  They  have  declared  the  contingency  to 
have  happened  on  the  occurrence  of  which  the  authority  to  issue 
the  bonds  was  complete.  Their  recitals  are  such  a  decision,  and 
beyond  those  a  bona  fide  purchaser  is  not  bound  to  look  for  evidence 
of  the  existence  of  things  in  pais.  He  is  bound  to  know  the  law 
conferring  upon  the  municipality  power  to  give  the  bonds  on  the 
happening  of  a  contingency,  but  whether  that  has  happened  or  not  is 
a  question  of  fact,  the  decision  of  which  is  by  the  law  confided 
to  others,  to  those  most  competent  to  decide  it,  and  which  the  pur- 
chaser is,  in  general,  in  no  condition  to  decide  for  himself."  The 
Supreme  Court,  while  asserting  its  adherence  to  the  previous  decis- 
ions on  this  subject,  has  declared  its  unwillingness  to  enlarge  or 
extend  them.1 

1   Recitals  by  officers  invested  with  an-  ity  to  issue  the  honds.     We   are  unwill« 

thority  to  determine   whether  precedent  ing  to   enlarge  or  extend  the  rule,    now 

conditions  have  been  performed,  that  the  established  by  numerous  decisions."     Mr. 

bonds  have  been  Is  ued  "in  pursucma  of,"  Justice  Harlan,  School  Districts.  Stone, 

or  "        conformity  with,"  <>v  "by  virtue  106  U.  S.  183;  see  also  Moulton  v.  Evans- 

of, "  or  "by  authority  of"  the  statute,  have  ville,  25   Fed.  Rep.  382.     A  recital  that 

been  held,  in  favor  of  bona  fide  purchasers  bonds   are    issued    "  under  "   the    provi- 

for  value,  to  import   full  compliance  with  sions  of  a  certain  statute  simply   asserts 

fcli     t  itute,  and  t"  preclude  inquiry  as  to  that  they  arc  subject  to  or  controlled  by 

whether  the  precedent  conditions  have  been  the  statute,  and  puts  a  purchaser  upon 

perfon 1  before    thi    bonds  were  issued,  notice  to  acquaint  himself  with  its  provi- 

"But  in  all  such  ca  a  careful  exam-  sions  and    limitations.     In  this  case  the 

iimtion  will  show,  the  recitals  fairly  im-  municipality  was  held  not  to  he  estopped 

ported   a  compliance,    in   all    substantial  from  showing  that  the  bonds  were  void  foi 

respects,  with  the  statute  giving  author-  conflicting  with  a  constitutional  provision 


§526 


contracts:   power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds. 


601 


§  526.  Condition  Precedent  ;  Onus  Probandi  ;  Estoppel  by 
Recital.  —  In  another  important  ea  e,  il  appeared  thai  Legis- 
lative authority  was  given  to  certain  officers  of  a  town  to  borrow 
money  to  aid  the  building  of  a  railway,  and  to  issue  bonds  there- 
for, provided  the  written  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  resident  tax- 
payers should  be  previously  obtained  by  .said  town  officers,  and 
tiled  in  the  county  clerk's  office,  with  an  affidavit  of  such  offii 
verifying  such  assent.  A  list  of  assenting  taxpayers  was  filed 
in  the  clerk's  office,  and  also  the  required  affidavit;  bonds  v 
issued,  and  were  in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value  :  on  the  trial 
the  question  arose  whether  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  signatures 
to  the  assent  to  be  genuine,  and  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  denying  Starin  v.  Genoa,  and  Gould  v. 
Sterling,  cited  in  the  note,  that  no  such  onus  rested  on  him ; 
that  the  town  officers  were  created  a  tribunal  to  determine  whether 
two-thirds  of  the  resident  taxpayers  had  assented,  and  that  on 
their  decision  the  purchaser  might  rely,  without  looking  further; 
and  that  the  town  was  concluded,  in  favor  of  an  innocent  holder, 
from  denying  that  the  condition  precedent  had  been  performed.1 


limiting  municipal  indebtedness,  which 
was  also  contained  in  the  statute.  Bates  v. 
Independent  School  District,  25  Fed.  Rep. 
192.  As  to  effect  of  the  constitutional 
provision  in  such  case,  see  infra,  sec.  529  a. 
A  recital  that  bonds  were  issued  "  in  pur- 
suance of  law  "  was  held  not  to  estop  the 
town  from  showing  that  it  did  not  have  a 
population  large  enough  to  be  within  the 
terras  of  a  certain  act,  it  not  appearing 
that  the  officers  issuing  the  bonds  were 
required  by  law  to  ascertain  the  population. 
Kelly  v.  Town  of  Milan,  21  Fed.  Rep.  842  ; 
but  compare  with  School  District  v.  Stone, 
supra.  Where  bonds  are  issued  under 
proper  authority,  with  recitals  showing 
that  they  conformed  to  the  requirements  of 
the  statutes  authorizing  their  issue, and  that 
the  city  was  liable  for  them,  the  city  is 
estopped  as  against  an  innocent  holder  for 
value  from  showing  that  it  had  imposed 
conditions  upon  its  liability,  even  when 
the  statute  provided  for  conditions,  and 
that  the  bonds  should  not  be  binding  until 
the  conditions  were  performed.  Am.  L. 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Brace,  105  U.  S.  328.  But 
this  case,  on  the  ground  that  its  recital 
of  compliance  with  the  statute  was  specific, 
and  on  the  further  ground  that  the  bonds 
were  issued  prior  to  the  decision  of  the 


Supreme  Court  of  the  State  adversely  con- 
struing the  statute,  was  distinguished  in 
German  Sav.  Bank  v.  Franklin  County, 
128  U.  S.  526,  541  (1888). 

i  Venice  u.  Murdoch,  92  t\  S.  494 
(1875)  ;  Rock  Creek  Tp.  v.  Strong,  96 
U.  S.  271;  Mobile  Sav.  Bank  v.  Oktib- 
beha Co.  Sup.,  24  Fed.  Hep.  110  :  McCall 
v.  Hancock,  10  Fed.  Rep.  8  ;  Montelair 
v.  Ramsdell,  107  U.  S.  147  (deciding 
also  that  a  holder  of  bonds  is  presumed 
to  have  acquired   them   for  value  and    in 

g 1    faith  ;    and    that     when    in    a   suit 

upon  them  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  show 
that  value  was  paid,  his  title  will  be 
sustained  if  be  proves  that  any  previous 
holder  paid  value)-  I»  The  People  V. 
Mead,  36  N.  Y.  224  (1S67),  the  decision 
in  Starin  v.  Genoa  and  Gould  i>.  Sterling, 
referred  to  in  the  text,  was  adhered  to 
by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York, 
although  the  court  admitted  it  was  con- 
trary to  the  decisions  "I  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  a-  to  the 
evidence  of  the  assent  of  the  taxpayers. 
In  Venice  r.  Murdock,  supra,  Mr.  Justice 
Strong,  speaking  of  Starin  v.  Genoa  and 
Could  o.  Sterling,  says :  "These decisions 
are  in  conflict  with  the  rulings  of  this 
court  in  Bisscll  V.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 


- 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§527 


§  527.  Estoppel  by  Recital  to  set  up  Defence  of  an  Over- 
issue contrary  to  the  Enabling  Act.  —  Among  the  limitations, 
or  attempted  limitations,  upon  the  exercise  of  the   power   to   issue 


2S7  ;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How. 
i  I  lounty  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall. 
83,  and  other  cases  which  we  have  cited. 
They  are  in  conflict  also  with  decisions  in 
other  State  courts.  Society  for  Savings  v. 
London,  29  Conn.  171  ;  Evanville, 
I.  &  C.  S.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Evansville,  15 
[nd.  395  :  Knox  County  Commissioners  v. 
Nichols,  14  t»hi„  St.  260.  We  have  care- 
fully considered  the  reasons  given  for  the 
judgments  in  the  New  Yorl  cases,  with- 
out being  convinced  by  them.  They  ignore 
the  paramount  purpose  for  which  tin'  bonds 
were  authorized  by  the  legislature,  and  they 
treat  the  written  assent  of  the  taxables 
as  the  authority  to  the  township  officers, 
when,  in  fact,  the  power  was  given  by  the 
legislature,  and  it  was  only  Left  to  the 
town  to  determine  by  the  action  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  resident  taxables  whether 
the  supervisors  ami  commissioners  might 
act  under  the  power.  In  Gould  v.  Ster- 
ling the  legislative  act  required  no  affi- 
davit to  be  tiled  with  a  statement  of  the 
niing  taxpayers,  and  in  Starin  v. 
Genoa  the  affidavit  filed  was  regarded  as 
merely  verifying  that  the  persons  whose 
names  appeared  on  the  assents  comprised 
two-thirds  of  all  the  resilient  taxpayers. 
But  it  is  obvious  that  if  no  more  than  this 
was  meant  by  the  required  affidavit,  it  was 
wholly  useless,  for  tin;  assessment  rolls  of 
the  township  would  have  .shown  as  much." 
The  ease,  Venire  r.  Murdock,  is  so  im- 
portant in  overturning,  so  far  as  the  fed- 
eral courts  are  concerned,  the  judgment 
of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York, 
and  as  respects  I  he  proposition  it  estab- 
lishes, that  we  reproduce  the  additional 
reasons  given  by  tie-  Supreme  Court  in 
support  of  its  judgment.  "It  is  very 
obvious,"  says  Strong,  •!.,  "  that  if  the  act 
of  the  legislature  which  authorized  an 
issue  of  bonds  in  aid  of  the  const  ruction 
of  the  railroad  on  the  written  assent  of 
two-thirds  of  the  resident  taxpayers  of 
the  town,  intended  that  the  holder  of  the 
bonds  should  be  under  obligation  to  prove 

by   parol  evidence  that    each  Case  of  I  he  two 

hundred  and  fifty-nine  names  signed  to  the 


written  assent  was  a  genuine  signature  of 
the  person  who  bore  the  name,  the  prof- 
fered aid  to  the  railroad  company  was  a 
delusion.  No  sane  person  would  have 
bought  a  bond  with  such  an  obligation 
resting  upon  him  whenever  he  called  lor 
payment  of  principal  or  interest.  If  such 
was  the  duty  of  the  holder,  it  was  always 
his  duty.  It  could  not  be  performed  once 
for  all.  The  bonds  retained  in  the  hands 
of  tin'  company  would  have  been  no  help 
in  the  construction  of  the  road.  It  was 
only  because  they  could  be  sold  that  they 
wen  valuable.  Only  thus  could  they  be 
applied  to  the  construction.  Yet  it  is  not 
to  be  doubted  the  legislature  had  in  view 
and  intended  to  give  substantial  aid  to  the 
railroad  company,  if  asufficient  number  of 
the  taxpayers  assented.  They  must  have 
contemplated  that  the  bonds  would  be 
offered  for  sale,  and  it  is  not  to  be  believed 
they  intended  to  impose  such  a  clog  upon 
their  salableness  as  would  rest  upon  it  if 
every  person  proposing  to  purchase  was  re- 
quired to  inquire  of  each  one  whose  name 
appeared  to  the  assent  whether  he  had  in 
fact  signed  it."  In  later  cases  the  Court  of 
Appeals  adheres  to  its  position.  Cagwin 
v.  Town  of  Hancock,  84  N.  Y.  532  ; 
Town  of  Lyons  v.  Chamberlain,  89  N.  Y. 
578  ;  Craig  v.  Town  of  Andes,  93  N.  Y. 
405  ;  infra,  sec.  550,  note.  In  a  suit 
by  taxpayers  to  declare  void  bonds  is- 
sued in  aid  of  a  railroad,  on  the  ground 
that  conditions  precedent  had  not  been 
complied  with,  the  burden  of  proof  is 
upon  the  plaintiffs.  Connor  v.  Green 
Pond,  W.  &  B.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  S.  C.  427. 
Wheic  the  validity  of  a  subscription  de- 
pends upon  its  ratification  "by a  majority 
of  the  taxpayers,"  proof  of  that  fact,  in  a 
suit  upon  bonds  which  recite  that  they 
were  issued  in  payment  of  the  subscrip- 
tions, may  be  made  by  the  poll  books  and 
the  proceedings  of  the  council,  showing 
the  result  by  a  certificate  of  the  election 
officers.  It  is  not  necessary  to  prove  that 
each  person  voting  was  a  lawful  voter. 
Hannibal  v.  Fauntleroy,  105  U.  S.  408. 


§527 


contracts:    limit  on  power  to  issue  bonds. 


603 


bonds,  one  not  unfrecpuently  provided  is  that  the  amount  voted 
or  issued  shall  not  exceed  a  specified  proportion  of  the  taxable 
property  of  the  municipality,  or  such  a  sum  as  will  require  a 
greater  levy  of  taxes  than  a  specified  rate  on  tin:  taxable  property 
to  pay  the  annual  interest  on  the  bonds.  The  effect  of  a  disre- 
gard of  a  statutory  limitation  of  this  eharacter  by  the  officers  en- 
trusted by  the  statute  with  the  exercise  of  the  power  came,  for  the 
first  time,  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  1875,  in  a  case  arising  under 
the  legislation  of  Kansas.1 


1  Marcy  v.  Township    of   Oswego,    92 
U.  S.    637.     The  legislative  provision   is 
essential  to  an  accurate  understanding  of 
the  opinion  and  judgment  of  the  court.   The 
act  of  the  legislature,   under  which    the 
bonds  purported  to  have  been  issued,  was 
passed  February  25,  1870.     Laws  of  Kan. 
1870,   p.   189.     The  first  section  enacted 
that  whenever  fifty  of  the  qualified  voters, 
being  freeholders,  of  any  municipal  town- 
ship in  any  county,   should  petition  the 
board   of   county    commissioners  of  such 
county  to  submit  to  the  qualified  voters  of 
the  township  a  proposition  to  take  stock 
in  the  name  of  such  township,  in  any  rail- 
road proposed  to  be  constructed  into  or 
through  the  township,  designating  in  the 
petition,  among  other  things,  the  amount 
of  stock  proposed  to  be  taken,  it  should  be 
the  duty  of  the  board  to  cause  an  election 
to  be  held  in  the  township  to  determine 
whether  such  subscription  should  be  made ; 
provided   that  the  amount  of  bonds  voted 
by  any  township  should  not  be  above  such 
a  sum   as  would  require  a  levy  of  more 
than  one  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  tax- 
able property  of  such  township  to  pay  the 
yearly    interest.     The  second   section  di- 
rected the  board  of  county  commissioners 
to  make  an  order  for  holding  the  election 
contemplated  in  the  preceding  section,  and 
to  specify  therein  the  amount  of  stock  pro- 
posed to  be  subscribed,  and  also  to  pre- 
scribe the  form  of  the  ballots  to  be  used. 
The    fifth  section   enacted  that  if  three- 
fifths  of  the  electors  voting  at  such  elec- 
tion should  vote  for  the  subscription,  the 
board  of  county  commissioners  should  order 
the  county  clerk  to  make  it  in  the  name  of 
the  township,  and  should  cause  such  bonds 
as  might  be  required  by  the  terms  of  the 
vote  and  subscription  to  be  issued  in  the 
name  of  such  township,   to  be  signed  by 


the  chairman  of  the  board,  and  attested 
by  the  clerk  under  the  seal  of  the 
county. 

In  Marcy  v.  Township  of  Oswego,  supra, 
the  bonds  to  which  the  coupons  were 
attached  contained  the  following  recital  : 
"  This  bond  is  executed  ami  issued  by  vir- 
tue of,  ami  in  accordance  with,  an  act  of 
the  legislature  of  the  said  State  of  Kan 
entitled  'An  act  to  enable  municipal 
townships  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  any 
railroad,  and  to  provide  for  the  payment 
of  the  same,  approved  February  25,  1870,' 
and  in  pursuance  of  and  in  accordance 
with  the  vote  of  three-fifths  of  the  legal 
voters  of  said  township  of  Oswego,  at  a 
special  election  duly  held  on  the  17th  day 
of  May,  A.  D.  1870."  Each  bond  also  de- 
clared that  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners of  the  county  of  Labette,  of  which 
county  the  township  of  Oswego  is  a  part, 
had  caused  it  to  be  issued  in  the  name 
and  in  behalf  of  said  township,  and  to  be 
signed  by  the  chairman  of  the  said  board 
of  county  commissioners,  and  attested  by 
the  county  clerk  of  the  said  county,  under 
its  seal.  Accordingly,  each  bond  was  thus 
signed,  attested,  and  sealed.  The  bonds 
were  registered  in  the  ollice  of  the  State 
auditor,  and  certified  by  him  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  an  net  of  the 
legislature.  His  certificate  on  the  back  of 
each  bond  declared  that  it  had  been  regu- 
larly and  legally  issued  ;  that  the  signa- 
tures thereto  were  genuine,  and  that  it 
had  been  duly  registered  in  accordance 
with  the  act  of  the  legislature. 

The  defence  to  the  bonds  was  that  there 
had  been  an  or- -rissu- ,  contrary  to  the 
statute.  The  Loud,  it  will  be  observed, 
contains  no  statement  on  this  point  ;  but 
it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  that  the 
above  quoted  recital  in  the  bonds  estoppel 


604 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§528 


8  528.  Same  subject. —  In  the  case  referred  to  in  the  last  section 
—  Marcy  v.  Township  of  Oswego, —  the  bonds  were  duly  executed, 
and  contained  a  recital  of  the  art,  and  that  they  were  issued  "in 
virtue  of  and  in  accordance"  with  it,  and  "  in  pursuance  of and 
accordance  with  the  vote  of  three-fifths  of  the  Legal  voters  of  tin- 
township,  at  an  election  held  on"  a  specified  day.  The  plain- 
tiff was  a  bona  fide  holder  I'm]' value,  without  notice.  The  defence 
was  that  the  bonds  were  voted  and  issued  at  one  time,  as  one  act, 
and  in  payment  of  one  subscription,  in  excess  of  the  amount  author- 


the   township   from   making  this  defence 
against  a  bona  fide  holder. 

The  case  of  Marcy  v.  Township  of  Os- 
wego  was  cited  and  approved  in  Humholdt 
Township  v.  Long,  92  U.  S.  642,  the  court 
i  »ring  :  — 

"There  is  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween this  ease  and  that.  The  assess- 
ment rolls  of  the  township  may  have  been 
proper  evidence  for  the  consideration  of 
the  board  of  county  commissioners  when 
they  were  inquiring  what  the  value  of  the 
taxable  property  of  the  township  was,  but 
the  bonds  are  not  invalid  in  the  hands 
of  a  bona  fide  holder  by  reason  of  their 
having  been  voted  ami  issued  in  excess  of 
the  statutory  limit,  as  shown  by  the  rolls. 
Whatever  may  be  the  right  of  the  town- 
ship, as  against  those  who  issued  the 
bonds,  it  cannot  be  set  up  against  a  bona 
fide  holder  of  the  bonds  that  the  amount 
issued  was  too  large,  in  the  face  of  the 
decision  of  the  board,  and  their  recital 
that  the  bonds  were  issued  pursuant  to 
and  in  accordance  with  the  act  of  1870." 
Compare  Daviess  County  v.  Dickinson, 
noted  infra,  and  see  Sherman  County  v. 
Simons,  109  U.  S.  735  ;  Potter  v.  CI 
Co.  Comm'rs,  33  Fed.  R.  614.  Recitals  m 
bond  held,  in  favor  of  a  bona  fide  holder, 
to  estop  the  debtor  municipality  to  set 
up  that  the  bond  was  issued  in  excess 
of  the  amount  authorized  by  statute. 
New  Providence  v.  Halsey,  117  U.  S.  336 
(1- -."■),  a  New  Jersey  ease,  in  which  the 
court  follows  the  decision  on  this  point  in 
ton  v.  New  Providence,  17  N.  J.  L. 
401,  and  Mutual  Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  c 
beth,  12  N.  J.  L.  235.  Bergen  Co. 
Freeholders  v.  Mer.  Ex.  Nat.  Bank  of  N.  Y. 
12  Fed.  Rep.  743.  See  also  supra,  sec. 
525,  and  note  ;  post,  sec.  529  a.     Negotia- 


ble bonds  containing  do  recitals, 

issued  in  excess  of  the  Dumber  of  bonds 

authorized  by  the  act,  and  as  security 
for  the  personal  debl  of  a  fiscal  officer  of 
the  corporation  to  the  original  holder, 
are  doI  binding  upon  the  corpoi 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Bergen  County.  115 
U.  S.  384  (1885).  Bonds  were  voted  to 
the  amount  of  S2.jn,C0U  ;  but  the  presid- 
ing judge  and  clerk  of  the  county  court 
issued  without  power  to  do  so  bonds  in 
excess  of  that  amount.  The  bonds  con- 
tained no  recital  on  their  face  as  to  the 
Act  under  which  they  were  issued,  but 
each  bond  had  a  certificate  thereon,  signed 
by  the  county  judge  only,  that  it  was 
issued  as  authorized  by  the  statute  (naming 
it )  and  by  an  order  of  the  county  court  in 
pursuance  thereof.  It  was  held  that  the 
bonds  in  excess  of  the  $250,0<hi  vri 
in  the  hands  of  even  bona  fide  holders 
for  value,  for  want  of  power  to  issue  them, 
and  that  the  county  was  not  estopped;  that 
the  bonds  to  the  amount  of  S250.(MM»  which 
were  valid  were  the  bonds  which  were  first 
delivered.  Daviess  County  v.  Dickinson, 
117  U.  S.  657  (1885).  Where  bonds  were 
issued  by  a  municipal  corporation  to  fund 
a  debt  part  of  which  only  was  in  excess  of 
the  constitutional  limitation,  it  was  held 
to  be  an  entire  and  indivisible  transaction, 
and  that  the  whole  issue  of  bonds  mis  void. 
On  this  point  the  court  says :  "  It  is  im- 
possible to  distinguish  the  valid  from  the 
invalid  portion  of  the  debt  secured  by 
the  bonds;  the  transaction  involved  in  the 
issue  of  the  bonds  was  entire  and  indivis- 
ible, and  therefore  the  whole  is  invalid." 
Millerstowii  Bor.  >'.  Frederick,  ill  Pa.  St. 
435,  441.  Compare  Daviess  County  v. 
Dickinson,  supra.  Infra,  Bees.  528,  529, 
529  a. 


§  528  CONTRACTS  :     LIMIT    ON   POWER   TO    ISSUE   BONDS.  605 

ized  by  the  statute.  The  circuit  justice  of  the  United  States  for 
the  circuit  distinguished  the  case  from  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
before  referred  to,  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  imposing  the 
limitation,  the  order  for  the  election,  the  proposition  submitted, 
the  order  for  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  and  the  latest  assessment  roll 
were  not,  properly,  matters  in  pais,  but  were  all  public,  all  open, 
all  accessible,  and  all  of  record,  and  if  consulted  by  the  pur- 
chaser would  have  shown  the  bonds  to  have  been  voted  and  issued 
in  violation  of  the  express  limitation  upon  the  power  contained 
in  the  statute.  But  the  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  was  reversed, 
three  judges  dissenting,  and  the  defence  held  unavailing.  The  case 
was  considered  to  fall  within  the  principle  of  the  previous  decisions. 
Mr.  Justice  Strong,  speaking  for  the  court,  after  stating  the  facts 
as  we  have  given  them,  observed  :  "  In  view  of  these  facts,  and 
of  the  decisions  heretofore  made  by  this  court,  the  question  cannot 
be  considered  an  open  one.  We  have  recently  reviewed  the  subject 
in  the  case  of  The  Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves  [supra],  and  reasserted 
what  had  been  decided  before;  namely,  that  where  legislative 
authority  has  been  given  to  a  municipality  to  subscribe  for  the 
stock  of  a  railroad  company,  and  to  issue  municipal  bonds  in  pay- 
ment of  the  subscription,  on  the  happening  of  some  precedent 
contingency  of  fact,  and  where  it  may  be  gathered  from  the  legis- 
lative enactment  that  the  officers  or  persons  designated  to  execute 
the  bonds  were  invested  with  power  to  decide  whether  the  con- 
tingency had  happened,  or  whether  the  fact  existed  which  was  a 
necessary  condition  precedent  to  any  subscription  or  issue  of  the 
bonds,  their  decision  is  final  in  a  suit  by  the  bona  fide  holder  of 
the  bonds  against  the  municipality,  and  a  recital  in  the  bonds 
that  the  requirements  of  the  legislative  act  have  been  complied 
with  is  conclusive.  And  this  is  more  emphatically  true  when  the 
fact  is  one  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of  the  persons  to  whom 
the  power  to  issue  the  bonds  has  been  conditionally  granted."  1 

1  In  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr.  Jus-  ness,  but  I  do  know  that  in  some  of  the 

tice  Miller  (with  whom  concurred  Davis  cases  tried  before  me  last  summer  in  Run- 

and  Field,  JJ. ),  the  view  of  the  court  is  sas  it  was  shown  that  the  first  and  only 

strongly  combated.      A  few  extracts  will  issue  of  such  bonds  exceeded  in  amount 

show  the  opinion  of  the  dissentients,  and  the  entire  value  of  the  taxable   property 

bring  iuto  clearer  relief  the  views  of  the  of  the  town,  as  shown  by  the  tax  list  of 

court  :  — ■  the  year  preceding  the  issue.     This  court 

"  In    the   cases   under   consideration,"  holds  that  such  a  showing  is  no  defence 

says  Miller,  J.,    "this  provision  of  the  to  the  bonds,  notwithstanding  the  express 

statute   was   wholly   disregarded.      I    am  prohibition  of  the  legislature.     It  is  there- 

not  sure  that  the  relative  amount  of  the  fore  clear  that,  so  long  as  this  doctrine  is 

bonds,  and  of  the  taxable  property  of  the  upheld,  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  legis- 

towns,  is  given  in  these  cases  with  exact-  lature  to  authorize  these  corporations  to 


Ml  NICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


5  529 


§  529.   Same  subject.. —  The   cases   referred   to  in  the  lasl   two 
afford,  perhaps,  a  mure;  striking  illustration  than  any  pre- 


bonds    under  any   special   rircuni- 
with  any  limitation  in  the  use 
of  the   power,  which   may  not    be  disre- 
garded with   impunity.      It    may  be  the 
o  prevent  the  issue  of  such 
bonds  altogether.      Bui  it  is  no1  for  this 
ictate  a  policy  for  the  States  on 
that  The  result  of  th 

is  a  most   extraordinary  one.     It   stands 
alone  in  the  construction  of  powers 
citically  granted,  whether  tin'   source  of 
the  power  be  a  State  constitution,  an  act 
of  tl.  ire,  a   resolution   of  a  cor- 

ly,  or  a  written  authority  given 
by  an  individual.  ...  No  such  principle 
has  ■  ipplied  by  this  court,  or  by 

any  other  court,  to  a  State,  to  the  United 
States,  to  private  corporations,  or  to  indi- 
viduals.    1  challenge  the  production  of  a 

in  winch  it  has  been  so  applied.  In 
the  Floyd  Acceptance  Cases,  7  Wall.  666, 
in  which  S       tary  of  War  had  ac 

cepted  time  drafts  drawn  on  him  by  a 
contractor,  which,  being  negotiable,  came 
into  tin  h !>  of  bona  fidU  purchasers  be- 
fore .lie-,  we  held  that  they  were  void  for 
want  of  authority  to  accept  them.  And 
this  been   cited    by   this  court 

more  than  once  without  question.  No  one 
would  think  for  a  moment  of  holding  that 
a  power  of  attorney  made  by  an  individ- 
ual cannot  he  so  limited  as  to  make  any 
one  dealing  with  the,  agent  hound  by  the 
limitation,  or  that  the  agent's  construc- 
tion of  his  power  hound  the  principal. 
Nor  has  it  ever  been  contended  that  an 
officer  of  a  private  i  orporal  ion  can,  by 
eding  his  authority,  when  that  au- 
thority is  express,  is  open  and  notorious, 
bind  the  corporation  which  he  professes 
to  represent.  The  simplicity  of  the  de- 
vice by  which  ihis  doctrine  is  upheld  as 
to  municipal  bonds  is  worthj  the  admi- 
ration of  all  who  wish  to  profit  by  tin' 
frauds  of  municipal  officers.  It  is  that, 
whenever  a  condition  or  limitation  is  im- 

i  upi  M  the  power  of  those  officers  in 
issuing  bonds,  they  are  the  sole  and  final 
judges  of  tic  extent  of  those  powers.  If 
they  '1  cide  to  issue  them,  the  law  pre- 
sumes  that  the  conditions   on  which    their 

powei     I  p  d  led  existed,  or  that  the  lim- 


itation Upon  the  exercise  of   the  poWcr  has 
been    complied    with  ;  an  ly  and 

particularly  if  they  make  a  false  rt 

■■  on  which  the  powej  depends,  in 
the  pap  i  ue,  this  false  n  cital  has 

tie-   ,  If  ing   a    power  which    had 

nee  without  it.     This  remarkable 
result   is  always  defended  on  tie 
that  the  paper  is  negotiable,  and  the  pur- 
chaser is  ignorant  of  the  falsehood.     Bui 

in  tie-  Floyd  Accepl  na     C       . 

held,    and    it    was    necessary  to   hold    so 

hit  the  inquiry  into  the  authority 
bj  which  negotiable  paper  was  issued 
was  just  the  same  as  if  it  wan    qo 

mil  that  if  no  such  authority  ex- 
isted, it  could  not  he  aided  by  giving  the 
paper  that  form.  In  county  bonds  it 
sci  uis  to  be  otherwise.  In  that  ease  the 
court  held  that  the  party  taking  such 
paper  was  bound  to  know  the  law  as  it 
affected  the  authority  of  the  officer  who 
issued  it.  Iii  county  bond  cases,  while 
this  principle  of  law  is  not  expressly  con- 
tradicted,  it  is  held  that  the  paper,  though 
issued  without  authority  of  law,  ami  in 
opposition  to  its  express  provisions,  is  still 
valid.  There  is  no  reason  in  tie 
of  the  condition  on  which  tin'  po 
pends  in  these  fases,  why  any  purchaser 
should  not  take  notice  of  its  existence  be- 
fore he  buys.  The  bonds  in  this  ca  e 
were  issued  at  one  time,  as  one  act,  of  one 
date,  ami  in  payment  of  one  subscription 
All  this  was  a  matter  of  record  in  the 
town   where  it   was  done. 

"So,  also,  the  valuation  of  all  the 
property  of  the  town  for  the  taxation  of 
the  year  before  the  bonds  were  issued, 
is  of  record  both  in  that  town  ami   in   the 

f  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which 
the  town  is  located.  A  purchaser  had 
but  to  write  to  the  township  clerk  or 
the  county  clerk  to  know  precisely  the 
amount  of  the  issue  of  bonds  and  the  value 
of  the  taxable  property  within  the  town- 
ship. In  the  matter  of  a  power  de- 
pending  on  these  facts,  in  air 
of  cases,  it  would  he  held  thai  before 
buying  tlese  bonds  the  purchase! 
look  to  those  matters  on  which  their 
validity   depended.      Tiny  are  all   public. 


§529  a 


contracts:    over-issue  of  BONDS. 


GOT 


viously  decided  by  that  court,  that  the  purchaser  may  implicitly 
rely  upon  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  made  by  the  proper  officers,  that 
the  authority  to  issue  them  has  arisen,  and  that  he  is  under  no 
obligation  to  consult  the  records  of  the  municipality,  and  is  not 
charged  with  constructive  notice  of  their  contents;  and  this,  too, 
it  will  be  observed,  where  the  recital  in  the  bonds  was  general  and 
not  specific  in  its  nature,  and  where  the  facts  which  would  have 
shown  the  issue  of  the  bonds  to  have  been  illegal  were  matters 
appearing  upon  the  public  records  of  the  township.1 

§  529  a.  No  estoppel  by  Recital  to  set  up  Defence  of  an  Overissue 
contrary  to  a  Constitutional  Limitation.  —  Peremptory  constitutional 
provisions  that  municipalities  shall  not  issue  bonds  exceeding  a 
specified  percentage  on  the  value  of  the  taxable  property  within 
the  municipality,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  official  assessments  or 
valuations  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  are  regarded  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  by  the  State  tribunals,  as 
fixing  a  limit  beyond  winch  the  power  to  issue  bonds  cannot  be 
legislatively  conferred ;  and  the  Supreme  Court  holds,  that  if  bonds 


all  open,  all  accessible  [see  on  the  point, 
sec.  529  a,  jiost,  and  note,  and  sec.  549,  and 
note],  —  the  statute,  the  ordinance  for  their 
issue,  the  latest  assessment  roll.  But  in 
favor  of  a  purchaser  of  municipal  bonds, 
all  this  is  to  be  disregarded  ;  and  a  debt 
contracted  without  authority  and  in  vio- 
lation of  express  statute  is  to  be  collected 
out  of  the  property  of  the  helpless  man 
who  owns  any  in  that  district.  I  say 
'  helpless  '  advisedly,  because  these  are 
not  his  agents.  They  are  the  officers  of 
the  law,  appointed  or  elected  without  his 
consent,  acting  contrary,  perhaps,  to  his 
wishes.  Surely  if  the  acts  of  any  class  of 
officers  should  be  valid  only  when  done  in 
conformity  to  law,  it  is  those  who  man- 
age the  affairs  of  towns,  counties,  and  vil- 
lages, in  creating  debts  which  not  they, 
but  the  property-owners,  must  pay.  ...  It 
is  easy  to  say,  and  looks  plausible  when 
said,  that  if  municipal  corporations  put 
bonds  on  the  market,  they  must  pay 
them  when  they  become  due.  But  it  is 
another  thing  to  say  that  when  an  officer 
created  by  the  law  exceeds  the  authority 
which  that  law  confers  upon  him,  ami  in 
open  violation  of  law  issues  these  bonds, 
the  owner  of  property  lying  within  the 
corporation    must   pay  them,   though   he 


had  no  part  whatever  in  their  issue  and 
no  power  to  prevent  it.  This  latter  is 
the  true  view  of  the  matter.  As  the 
corporation  could  only  exercise  such 
power  as  the  law  conferred,  the  issuing 
of  the  bonds  was  not  the  act  of  the  cor- 
poration. It  is  a  false  assumption  to  say 
that  the  corporation  put  them  on  the 
market.  If  one  of  two  innocent  persons 
must  suffer  for  the  unauthorized  act  of 
the  township  or  county  officers,  it  is  clear 
that  he  who  could,  before  parting  with 
his  money,  have  easily  ascertained  that 
they  were  unauthorized,  should  lose, 
rather  than  the  property-holder,  who 
might  not  know  anything  of  the  matter, 
or  if  he  did,  had  no  power  to  prevent  the 
wrong."  See,  also  Lewis  v.  Barbour  Co. 
Comm'rs,  3  Fed.  Rep.  191,  notes;  infra, 
sec.  531,  note.  Compare  with  later  case 
of  Daviess  County  v.  Dickinson,  117  U.  S. 
657  (1885),  supra,  sec.  527,  note. 

1  The  author  allows  this  section  to  stand 
as  in  the  last  edition.  The  Supreme 
Court  has  not  yet  overruled  the  proposi- 
tions therein  stated,  but  it  has  reached  a 
different  result  where  the  overissue  is  in 
violation  of  a  constitutional  provision,  as 
will  appear  by  the  next  section  (529  a), 
and  the  cases  there  cited. 


608  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  529  a 

be  issued  in  excess  of  such  limit,  they  are  void  in  the  hands  of 
bona  fid  holders,  notwithstanding  a  recital  therein  that  they  are 
ed  under  and  in  pursuance  of  the  Constitution  of  the  State,  in- 
asmuch us  such  recital  will  not  estop  the  municipality  from  show- 
ing that  the  bonds  were  issued  in  violation  of  the  constitutional 
limitation  ;  and  it'  this  be  shown  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  though 
he  be  a  holder  for  value  and  without  actual  notice  of  any  over- 
issue; —  ;it  hast,  this  Mas  so  held  in  a  case  where  the  bond  itself 
showed  on  its  face  the  total  aggregate  issue  of  bonds,  and  where 
the  issue  was  in  such  an  amount  as  that  if  compared  with  the 
assessment  roll  (itself  a  public  record,  which  everybody  is  bound 
to  notice),  the  fact  of  overissue  would  appear  upon  inspection  or  by 
arithmetical  calculation.  The  cases  on  this  subject  in  the  note 
arising  under  constitutional  limitations,  were  distinguished  on  the 
grounds  specially  stated  from  previous  cases  where  the  innocent 
holder  of  the  bond  was  allowed  to  recover,  notwithstanding  the 
bond  had  been  issued  in  excess  of  a  statutory  limitation  of  a  similar 
character.1  Constitutional  provisions  of  this  kind  are  of  recent 
origin,  and  were  ordained  the  more  effectually  to  prevent  the  creation 
of  extravagant  municipal  indebtedness.  The  Supreme  Court  doubt- 
less i'elt,  and  we  think  justly  felt,  the  force  of  the  consideration  that 
if  the  doctrines  of  that  court  in  respect  of  the  estoppels  created  by 
recitals  in  a  bond  were  extended  to  the  question  of  the  amount  or 
extent  of  municipal  indebtedness,  at  least  in  cases  where  such  amount 
could  be  ascertained  by  reference  to  a  public  record,  if  not  indeed  in 
all  cases,  would  be  to  defeat  or  render  practically  worthless  the  very 
purpose  of  the  constitutional  provision,  —  a  purpose  deemed  so  im- 
portant that  it  is  embodied  in  the  organic  law. 

We  have  sought  above  to  state  with  care  what  has  been  actually 
determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the 
several  cases  referred  to  in  the  note,  without  attempting  to  antici- 
pate future  applications  of  that  principle,  or  limitations  upon  it, 
in  cases  where  the  facts  are  different  from  those  of  the  cases  which 
have  been  thus  far  adjudged.2 

1  Supra,  sees.  527-529.  manner  or  for  any  purpose,  to  an  amount, 

2  Buchanan  v.  Litchfield,  102  IT.  S.  including  existing  indebtedness,  in  the 
278(1880);  Dixon  County  v.  Field,  111  aggregate  exceeding  five  per  centum  on  the 
U.  S.  83  (1883).  Buchanan  v.  Litch-  value  of  the  taxable  property  therein,  to 
field,  supra,  involved  the  construction  of  he  ascertained  by  the  last  assessment  for 
a  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  Illinois  State  and  county  taxes,  previous  to  the 
of  1870  (art.  9,  sec.  12),  which  ordains  incurring  of  such  indebtedness."  A  stat- 
t hat  "no  county,  city,  township,  school  ute  of  Illinois  authorized  cities  to  con- 
district,  or  other  municipal  corporation,  struct  water-works,  and  for  that  purpose 
shall  be  allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any  to  borrow  money  and  issue  bonds.     Bonds 


§530 


CONTRACTS  :     RECITALS    IN    MUNICIPAL    BONDS. 


coo 


§    530.   Estoppel  by  recital   of  Matter  of   Fact   e.    g.  Date   of   Sub- 
scription.—  The  effect  of  recitals  in  the  bonds,  and  of  statemenl 


were  issued  pursuant  to  the  statute,  each 
reciting  that  "it  is  issued  under  authority 
of  an  Act  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
State  of  Illinois  [describing  it],  and  in 
pursuance  of  an  ordinance  of  said  city  of 
Litchfield,  entitled  'An  Ordinance  to  pro- 
vide for  the  issuing  of  bonds  and  the 
construction  of  the  Litchfield  water- 
works.'" The  constitutional  provision 
above  mentioned  is  not  referred  to  in  the 
Statute  authorizing  the  issue  of  the  bonds, 
or  in  the  ordinance,  or  in  the  bonds.  At 
the  time  of  the  issue  of  the  bonds  the  in- 
debtedness of  the  city  already  exceeded 
the  constitutional  limit.  Suit  was  brought 
for  overdue  coupons  on  these  bonds  by  a 
bona  fide  holder  for  value,  without  any 
notice  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in  ex- 
cess of  the  constitutional  restriction.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  de- 
cided that  the  city  was  not  liable,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  could  not  invoke  the 
doctrine  of  estoppel ;  and  reference  was 
made  to  the  absence  of  an  express  state- 
ment in  the  bonds  themselves  that  the 
aggregate  indebtedness,  of  which  they 
were  a  part,  was  not  in  excess  of  the  con- 
stitutional limit.  In  answer  to  the  objec- 
tion that  the  city  was  estopped  to  moke  the 
defence,  the  court  says  (lb ,  p.  292)  : 
"  Any  different  conclusion  from  that  in- 
dicated would  extend  the  doctrines  of  this 
court  upon  the  subject  of  municipal  bonds 
further  than  would  be  consistent  with 
reason  and  sound  policy,  and  further  than 
we  are  now  willing  to  go.  The  present 
action  cannot  be  maintained,  unless  we 
should  hold  that  the  mere  fact  that  the 
bonds  were  issued,  without  any  recitals  of 
the  circumstances  bringing  them  within 
the  limit  fixed  by  the  Constitution,  was 
by  itself  conclusive  proof,  in  favor  of  a 
bona  fide  holder,  that  the  circumstances 
existed  which  authorized  them  to  be  is- 
sued.    We  cannot  so  hold." 

The  court  also  said  (p.  2S9) :  "The 
purchaser  of  the  bonds  was  certainly 
bound  to  take  notice,  not  only  of  the  con- 
stitutional limitation  upon  municipal  in- 
debtedness, but  of  such  facts  as  the 
authorized  official  assessments  disclosed 
concerning  the  valuation  of  the  taxable 
vol.  i.  — 39 


property  within   the  city  for  the  year  in 
u  hich   i  be  bond  \  were  i  ssued."     11   i 
no  means  clear  from  the  opinion  thai  a 
positive   recital    thai    the 
bond   issue  was   within  thi  ional 

limit    Would,     if    it     was    false,     avail 

holder.     The  language  of  the  i 
the  effect  of  such  a  recital,  thougl 

is  hypothetical  and  obiter;  and  I 
of  recitals  under  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision is  more  fully  considered  in  Dixon 
County  v.  Field,  infra.  Although  the 
court  distinguishes  Buchanan  v.  Litch- 
field from  previous  cases  where  the  over- 
issue of  bonds  was  contrary  to  a  statute 
limitation,  yet  alter  all  it  seems  to  indi- 
cate, to  some  extent,  a  recession  from  the 
high  water-line  of  the  case.-  from  which 
it  is  thus  distinguished. 

In  the  subsequent  case  from  Ohio  of 
the  Northern  Bank  of  Toledo  v.  Porter 
Township,  110  U.  S.  608  (1883),  not 
involving,  however,  any  constitutional 
limitation,  the  court,  considering  espei 
ly  the  scope  and  effect  of  a  recital  as  an 
estoppel,  decided  that  where  the  bond  re- 
cites that  it  is  issued  in  part  payment  of 
a  subscription  to  the  capital  stoi  1<  of  a 
railroad,  in  pursuance  of  the  several 
of  the  General  Assembly  and  a  vote  of 
the  qualified  electors  taken  in  pursuance 
thereof,  while  the  corporation  is  thereby 
estopped  by  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  from 
saying  that  no  township  election  was  held, 
or  that  it  was  not  called  or  conducted  in 
the  particular  mode  required  by  law,  it  is 
not  estopped  to  show  that  it  was  without 
legislative  authority  to  order  the  election 
and  to  issue  the  bonds.  "  The  question 
of  legislative  authority,"  said  the  court, 
"in  a  municipal  corporation  to  issue  bunds 
in  aid  of  a  railroad  company,  cannot  be 
concluded  by  mere  recitals  ;  but,  thep 
existing,  the  municipality  may  be  estopped 
by  the  recitals  to  prove  irregularity  in  the 
exercise  of  that  power  ;  or,  when  the  law 
prescribes  conditions  upon  the  exercise  of 
the  power  granted,  and  commits  to  the 
officers  of  such  municipality  the  deter- 
mination of  the  question  whether  those 
conditions  hi\e  been  performed,  the  cor- 
poration   will    also    be    estopped    by    the 


610 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  530 


the  records  of  the  county  which  issued  the  bonds,  is  considered  in 
The  Towd  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank.1     A  controllim* 


recitals  which  import  such  performam 
(11"  I  .  S.  619). 

The  principle  of  the   decision    in  the 

of    Buchanan    v.    Litchfield,    supra, 
opted    ind  followed   in   thi    Bubse- 
quenl    ase  of  Dixon  County  v.  Field,  111 
I'.  S.  83  (1S83),  arising  under  the 

Nebraska,  which 

rius  (art.  .\ii.,  sec.  2)   thai   "  uo  city, 

county,    town,    precinct,  municipality,  or 

other    subdivision    of    ill''    State,     shall 

nations  to   any  railroad  or 

other  work  of  internal  improvement,   an- 

a  proposition  so  to  '1"  shall  have  been 
first  submitted  to  the  qualified  electors 
thereof,  at  an  election  by  authority  of 
law  ;  provided,  that  such  donations  of 
imty,  with  the  donations  of  such  sub- 
division, in  the  aggregate  shall  not  ex  <  ■  1 
ten  per  cent  of  the  assessed  valuation  of 
such  county  ;  provided  further,  that  any 
city  or  county  may,  by  a  two-thirds  vote, 
increase  such  indebtedness  five  per  cent 
in  addition  to  such  ten  percent,  and  no 
bonds  or  other  evidences  of  ind<  btedness 
so  issued  shall  be  valid,  unless  the  same 
shall   have  endorsed   thereon  a  certificate 

d    by  the   secretary  and    auditor  of 

.  showing  that  the  same  is  issued 
pursuant  to  law."  Suit  was  brought  on 
bonds  issued  by  Dixon  County 
by  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.  The 
defence  was  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in 
violation  of  the  above-quoted  provision  of 
the  Constitution.  The  plaintiff  contended 
that  the  municipality  was  estopped  from 
ing  up  this  defence,  by  reason  of  the 

ils  iii  the  bonds,  ami  by  the  certificates 
of  tin-    lecretary  and   auditor  of  State  en- 

',  there., n.  There  were  eighty-seven 
bonds  issued  at  one  time  of  §1,000  earl,. 
Each  bond  conl  lined  a  n  cital  that  it 
"was  issued  m  i/n  pursuance  of 

rdeT  of  the  county  commissioners  of 

ounty  "f  Dixon,  and  authorized  at  an 
,  !  ction  held  in  >aid  county  on  the  27th 
of  December,  1S75,  and  under  and  by 
virtue  of  chapter  35  of  the  General  Stat- 
utes of  Nebraska  and  amendments  thereto 


(being  the  act  that  authorized  counties  to 
issue   bonds),  and  tfu    l  of  the 

Stati  (art.  12),  adopted  October,  A.  D. 
1875."  On  each  bond  was  also  endorsed 
the  certificate  oi  the  county  clerk,  that 
the  question  of  issuing  said  bonds  was 
duly  submitted  to  the  people  of  the 
county,    November  24,   L875,  as  follows: 

"  Shall  Dixon  COlinty  issue  to  the  ( '.  ( '. 
&  I'.-  II.  K.  R.  Company  $87,000  ten  per 
cent  twenty-year  bonds  .'  Which  was  de- 
cided in  the  affirmative  by  462  votes 
against  120."  There  was  also  endorsed 
on  the  bond  the  certificate  of  the  secretary 
and  auditor  of  the  State  of  Nebraska  that 
it  was  issued  pursuant  to  law.  In  point 
of  fact,  the  assessed  valuation  of  the 
county  of  Dixon  for  the  year  1875  was 
$587,331,  and  no  more  ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  amount  of  bonds  issued  was  more  than 
ten  per  cent  of  the  assessed  valuation  of 
the  county.  On  tic  principle  that  there 
must  hi'  authority  of  law  by  statute  for 
every  issue  of  bonds  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration ;  that  the  corporation  is  bound  by 
the  recitals  in  such  bonds  only  in  re.- pert 

of   facts    which     the    ci  1  pi  late    oliieers    had 

by  law  authority  to  determine  and  certify, 
hut  not  in  respect  of  facts  which  they 
had  no  authority  to  determine,  -  such  as, 
whether  the  amouul  of  the  bonds  in  that 
case  exceeded  the  const  it  ut  i<  u  ia  1  limitation, 
—  the  Supreme  Conrl  decided  that  the 
'county  was  not  liable,  saying:  "There 
was  mi  power  at  all  conferred  to  issue 
bonds  in  excess  of  an  amount  equal  to  ten 
per  rent  upon  the  assessed  valuation  of 
the  taxable  property  of  the  county.  The 
am. mnt  of  the  bonds  issued  was  known. 
It  is  stated  in  the  recital  itself.  It  was 
$87,000.  The  holder  of  each  bond  was 
apprised  of  that  fact.  The  amount  of  the 
assessed  value  of  the  taxable  property  in 
the  county  is  in  it  stated;  but,  ex  vi  termini, 
it  was  ascertainable  in  one  way  only,  and 
that  was  by  refer. nee  to  the  assessment 
itself,  a  public  record  equally  accessible  to 
all  intending  purch  era  of  bonds  as  will 
as  to  the  county  officers.     Nothing  in  the 


1  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank,  92  U.  S.  625  (1S75). 


§530 


CONTRACTS  :     RECITALS   IN    MUNICIPAL    BONDS. 


Gil 


question  in  the  case  was  whether  the  power  to  subscribe  for  stock 
and  issue  bonds  therefor,  given    by  the  act  March  26,   1869,  was 


way  of  inquiry,  ascertainment,  or  deter- 
mination  as  to  thai  fad  is  submitted  to 
the  county  officers.  The  fact,  as  it  is 
recorded  in  the  assessment  itself,  is  ex- 
trinsic, and  proves  itself  by  inspection, 
and  concludes  all  determinations  that  con- 
tradict it."  Dixon  County  v.  Field,  111 
U.  S.  83  (1883).  In  the  ease  next  cited, 
Potter  v.  Chaffee  County,  the  Circuit  Court 
distinguished  it  from  Dixon  County  v. 
Field. 

The  Constitution  of  Colorado  contains 
a  provision  that  no  county  shall  contract 
any  debt  by  loan,  in  any  form,  except  for 
public  buildings,  public  roads,  and  bridges, 
"and  such  indebtedness  contracted  in  any 
one  year  shall  not  exceed  the  rates  upon 
the,  taxable  property  in  such  county,  fol- 
lowing, to  wit  : "  (here  specifying  the 
rates).  The  legislature  of  Colorado  passed 
an  act  authorizing  counties  to  fund  their 
floating  indebtedness.  (Laws  Colorado, 
1881,  p.  85.)  In  pursuance  of  that  act, 
the  county  of  Chaffee  issued  bonds,  which 
contained  a  full  recital  showing  compli- 
ance with  all  the  provisions  of  the  funding 
act.  In  the  case  of  Potter  v.  Chaffee 
County,  U.  S.  Circuit  Court,  Colorado, 
1888  (33  Fed.  Rep.  614),  suit  was  brought 
against  the  county  of  Chaffee  on  such 
funding  bonds.  The  county  defended  on 
the  ground  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in 
exchange  for  county  warrants,  which  war- 
rants were  void  because  issued  in  the 
first  instance  in  violation  of  the  consti- 
tutional limitation,  above  quoted,  as  to 
county  indebtedness.  The  plaintiff  was  a 
bona  fide  holder  of  the  funding  bonds  in 
suit.  The  Circuit  Court,  reviewing  the 
cases  of  Buchanan  v.  Litchfield,  Dixon 
County  v.  Field,  Bank  of  Toledo  v.  Porter 
Township,  held  that  they  did  not  control 
the  case  before  it,  and  gave  judgment Jor 
the  plaintiff.  After  referring  to  Dixon 
County  v.  Field,  the  Circuit  Court, 
Brewer,  J.,  said:  "But  in  the  case  now 
before  this  court,  there  is  nothing  upon 
the  face  of  the  bond  which  shows  hmo 
many  bonds  were  to  hr  issued  or  how  large 
the  scries  was.  The  statute,  in  terms, 
gave  to  the  county  commissioners  the 
power  to    determine    the   amount   to   be 


issued  ;  and   no   man    could,  by  an   exam- 
ination of  the  bond,  gel   any  information 
as    to    the    amount    of    the    i 
comparing  anj    information  given   by  the 

bond    with   the   n  cord    ootice  of 

sessed   valuation,   know  that    the   county 

had   exceeded    il.     p0WI  I    m   the  issue  of    the 

bonds.  So  that,  taking  the  case  "I'  Dixon 
County  *.  Field  as  the  latest  annunciation 

of    the    Supreme    ('..lilt      ill     respect     tO     the 

rule  of  decision,  it  must  be  held  that  the 
county  is  estopped  from  pleading  in  this 
case  that  the  bond  was  issued  in  exchange 
for  a  void  warrant." 

Since  the  foregoing  was  written  and  as 
this  volume  passes  through  the  press,  the 
Supreme  ('i.iirt  of  the  United  States  has 
decided  the  cases  of  Lake  County  v.  Rollins 
(130  U.  S.  662)  and  Lake  County  v.  Gra- 
ham (//-.  674, 1S88).  In  the  case  first  cited 
the  Supreme  Court,  reversing  the  same  case 
below  (34  Fed.  Rep.  845),  held  that  the 
constitutional  provision  in  Colorado  was 
an  absolute  limitation  upon  the  power  of 
the  county  to  contract  any  and  all  in- 
debtedness, including  county  warrants  is- 
sued for  ordinary  county  expenses.  In 
the  second  case  the  same  principle  was 
a] i] died  to  funding  bonds  of  a  county 
negotiable  in  form  and  in  the  hands  of 
bona  fide  holders,  issued  under  the  author- 
ity of  a  funding  act  in  excess  of  the  con- 
stitutional limitation,  although  the  bond 
recited  that  all  of  the  provisions  and  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  had  been  fully 
complied  with  by  the  proper  officers  in  the 
issue  of  the  bonds,  and  that  such  issue  had 
been  authorized  by  a  vote  of  the  majority 
of  tie  duly  qualified  electors  of  the  county. 
The  bonds  in  suit  showed  that  they  were 
part  of  an  issue  amounting  to  S500,000, 
and  contained  no  reference  to  the  Consti- 
tution, and  no  statement  that  theconstitu- 
tional  requirements  had  been  observed.  In 
this  respect,  if  it  be  material,  the  bonds 
were  different  from  those  in  suit  in  tin- 
case  of  Potter  v.  Chaffee  County, 
and  this  circumstance  —ems  to  be  the  only 
one  to  distinguish  thai  case  from  Lake 
County  v.  Graham.  In  the  latter  case  the 
court  considered  the  principles  of  !>ixon 
County  v.  Field  applicabl  ise,  and 


012 


Ml-M'.'II'AL   CORPORATIONS. 


§530 


annulled  by  the   oew   Constitution  of  the  State  (which  took  effect 
July  l',  L870)  before  the  subscription  was  made,  or  a  valid  contract 


distinguished  it  from  cases  where  there  had 

ae  of   bonds   contrarj 
the  provisions  of  a  statute,  as  in  Sherman 
v  v.  Simons,  109  U.  S.  7:'.."',  and  i  >re- 
v.  Jeunings,  119  U.S.  74.    Lamar,  J., 
speaking  for  the  court,  said  :    "  The  qi 
tion  here  is  distinguishable  from  thai  in 
ims  relied  on  by  counsel  for  defendant 
in  error  [the  overissue  cases  contrary  to 
itute].     lu  this  case  the  standard  of 
validity  is  created  by  the  Constitution.    In 
that  standard  two  factors  are  to  be  con- 
sidered :  one  the  amounl  of  assessed  value, 
and  the  other  the  ratio  between  th< 
d  value  and  the  debt  proposed.    These 
:  tin-  exactions  of  the  <  'onstitution  it- 
uitliin   the  power  of  the 
Lture  i"  dispense  w ith  them,  either 
i  ly  or  indirectly,  by  the  creation  of 
linisterial    commission    whose   finding 
shall  be  taken  iii  lieu  of  the  tarts." 

The  author  may  be  permitted  to  observe 
thai  when   the  provisions  of  the  statutes 
under  which  the  overissue  eases  were  de- 
cided are  considered,  they  being  silent  as 
i"  the  creation  of  any  ministerial  commis- 
sion or  special  tribunal  to  decide  upon  the 
i. mi  of  indebtedness,  il  seems  to  be  not 
to  find  Logical  and  solid  grounds  for 
Listinction.      But    the   distinction    is 
made.     It  is  doubl less  a  sound  exposition 
1     i  stitution  ;  and  as  to  the  constitu- 
I  provision,  il  is  firmly  established  by 
the  judgments  of  the  State  tribunals,  as 
well  as  hy  those  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the   United  States.     What   effect    it   will 
ifter  have  upon  the  soundness  of  the 
decisions  sustaining   bonds   issued    under 
similar  circumstances,   but   in  excess  of  a 
like   statutory    limitation,    remains    to   be 
seen. 

A  holder  of  bonds  issued  in  violation  of 
sueh  a  constitutional  provision  is  practi- 
cally remediless.    The  public  policy  which 

underlies  the  const  it  ut  imial    liini1.it  i f 

ibove  mentioned,  was  upheld  by 
the  Supreme  <  lourt,  in  a  ease  where  the 
equities  of  the  creditor  strongly  appealed 
for  recognition  and  protection.  We  refei 
Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  114 
I  .  S,  I'.'o.  This  was  a  sequel  of  B  tchanan 
u.  Litchfield,  102  U.  S.  278.     AJfti  r  the  de- 


cision in  the  last-mentioned  ease,  holding 
the  bonds  t"  be  void,  suit  was  commenced 

'  be  city  of  Litchfield  by  Ballou,  a 
large  holder  of  the  bonds,  in  which  he  al- 
leged that  the  money  received  by  tl 
for  the  sale  to  him  of  these  bonds  was 
used  in  the  construction  of  a  system  of 
water-works  for  the  city,  of  which  the  city 
is  now  the  owner.  That  though  thi 
were  void,  as  held  iii  the  case  of  Buchanan 
v.  Litchfield,  yel  that  in  equity  the  city  is 
liabli  to  him  forth  money  it  received  from 
him  ;  and  since  by  the  use  of  that  money 
the  water-works  were  constructed,  he  asked 
for  a  decree  against  the  citj  for  the  amount, 
and  if  not  paid,  that  the  water-works  of 
the  city  be  sold  to  satisfy  the  decree.  It 
appeared  from  the  answei  and  pr 
the  pari  of  the  city,  thai  the  lands  on 
which  the  water-works  were  constructed 
were  boughl  and  paid  for  before  the  bonds 
were  issued  oi  voted,  and  much  of  the 
expense,  also,  of  the  construction  of  the 
water-works  was  paid  by  taxation,  and  by 
resources  of  the  city  other  than  the  water- 
works bonds.  A  decree  was  passed  as 
prayed,  in  the  courl  below,  which  decree 
was  reversed  by  the  Supreme  ( 'ourt  of  the 
United  States,  with  directions  to  dismiss 
the  bill.  TheSupreme  < '■  nrl  held  that  the 
prohibitions  of  tht  ( 'onst 
well  to  implied  contracts  to  repay  ih 
as  to   t  contracts  found   in   the 

Mr.  Justice  Miller's  language  on 
this  point  is  very  decisive.  "The Ian 
of  the  ( 'onstitution."  he  says,  "  is  that  no 
city,  ii,,  'shall  be  allowed  to  become  in- 
debted in  any  manner  or  for  any  purpose 
to  an  amount,  including  existing  indebt- 
edness, in  the  aggi  excei  ding  five 
per  centum  of  the  value  of  its  taxable 
property.'  It  shall  not  becomt  i 
Shall  not  incur  any  pecuniary  liability.  It 
shall  not  do  this  in  any  manner.  Neither 
by  bonds,  nor  notes,  nor  by  express  or  im- 
plied promises.  Nor  shall  it  be  done  for 
any  purpose.  No  matter  how  argent,  how 
useful,  how  unanimous  the  wish.  The 
prohibition  is  as  effectual  againsl  the  im- 
plied  as  the  express  promise,  and    is  as 

binding  in   a   court  of  chancery  as  a    court 
of  law.'*    The  decree  below  was  attempted 


I  :    ) 


CONTRACTS  :     RECITALS    IN    MUNICIPAL   BONDS. 


613 


to  subscribe  was  completed.  The  court  held  that,  in  point  of  fact 
a  legal  and  binding  subscription  was  made,  or  agreed  to  be  made, 
in  December,  1869,  and  hence  the  defence  of  want  of  legal  power 
failed ;  and  it  then  proceeded  to  view  the  case  as  affected  by 
estoppel,  the  plaintiff  being  a  bona  fide  holder  lor  value  without 
notice  of  any  defence.  The  opinion  was  expressed  that  a  recital 
in  the  bonds  that  the  subscription  was  made  in  December,  L869, 
being  the  recital  of  a  matter  of  fact,  and  a  fact,  too,  peculiarly, 
if  not  exclusively,  within  the  knowledge  of  the  board  of  supervisors, 
estopped  the  county  under  the  circumstances  to  set  up  that  the 
subscription  was  not  made  until  after  July  2,  1870,  when  then- 
authority  to  subscribe  had  expired.1     As  the  same  judgment  could 


to  bo  sustained,  on  the  theory  that  the  city 
was  in  possession  of  the  money  received  lor 
the  bonds,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  its 
equivalent  in  property  identified  as  having 
been  procured  with  this  money.  The  court 
held  that  this  theory  was  not  sustained  by 
the  proofs,  or  sustainable,  inasmuch  as  the 
money  received  by  the  city  from  the  bond- 
holders had  long  since  passed  out  of  its 
possession,  and  could  not  be  restored.  Also 
held  that  it  was  not  a  case  for  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principle  that  the  plaintiff's 
money  could  be  traced  into  property  and  a 
constructive  trust  fastened  upon  it,  since 
other  funds  raised  by  taxation  had  also 
gone  into  the  property,  which  had  been 
purchased  before  the  bonds  were  issued, 
or  were  public  streets  into  which  no 
property  of  the  complainant  had  entered. 
This  decision  seems  to  leave  the  holders 
of  the  bonds  remediless  notwithstanding 
their  strong  equities,  which  equities  there 
would  appear  to  be  no  difficulty  in  ordi- 
narily enforcing  in  equity  as  a  lien,  or  on 
the  principle  of  a  constructive  trust,  if  it 
were  it  not  for  the  effect  given  to  the  con- 
stitutional prohibition. 

Under  Art.  IX,  sec.  8,  Pennsylvania 
Constitution  of  1S74,  a  municipality  may 
incur  a  debt  or  increase  its  existing  debt 
to  an  amount  exceeding  two  per  cent  upon 
the  assessed  valuation  of  the  taxable  prop- 
erty therein,  if  the  whole  indebtedness  will 
not  thereby  exceed  seven  per  centum  of 
such  valuation.  This  limit  cannot  be  ex- 
ceeded, unless  the  municipality  procures 
the  assent  of  the  electors  in  the  manner 
provided  in  the  Constitution,  and  laws  re- 
lating thereto.     A  bond,  though  in  terms 


negotiable,  issued  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  fund  a  debt  incurred  contrary  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution,  is  void  even 
in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value.  M  fliers- 
town  v.  Frederick,  114  Pa.  St.  435  (18S6)  ; 
distinguishing  Kerr  v.  Corry,  105  Pa.  St. 
282  (1884),  where  the  power  to  issue  the 
bonds  existed,  but  the  bonds  themselves 
were  misapplied,  and  a  bona  fide  holder 
held  entitled  to  recover.  Purchasers  of 
bonds  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  offi- 
cial statement  required  by  the  statute  to 
be  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  proper  coun- 
ty relating  to  the  amount  of  municipal 
indebtedness  and  taxable  values.  If  no 
such  statement  is  filed  its  absence  should 
put  the  proposed  purchaser  on  inquiry, 
and  this  although  the  duty  of  making  and 
filing  such  statement  is  imposed  upon  the 
officers  of  the  municipality  as  a  personal 
duty,  and  this  although  it  will  not  operate 
against  the  municipality  as  an  adjudica- 
tion or  an  estoppel.  lb.  Construction  of 
constitutional  provision  limiting  municipal 
indebtedness,  see  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia, 
77  Pa.  St.  338,  351  (1875).  As  to  the 
construction  of  limitations  on  municipal 
indebtedness,  see  ante,  sees.  130-137  ;  In- 
dex, tit.  Limitation  mi  Indebted'* 
St.  Louis  v.  People,  124  111.  655  :  -Mr. 
Merryman's  Article  on  Limitations  on 
Municipal  Indebtedness,  21'  Central  Law 
Journal,  34C  (November,  1889). 

1  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank, 
92  U.S.  625  (1875)  ;  .539.    The 

point  is  so  material  that  we  subjoin  the 
opinion  delivered  by  strong,  J.,  on  this 
point.  He  says:  "There  is,  however, 
another   consideration    that   is   worthy  of 


61 1 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  530 


be  reached  on  the  ground   that   a 
been  ina  I  I  be  Constitul  ion 

whether  the  last  point  was  ;i  point 

The    findings   of    the   court    arc 
that  the  plaintiff  below  is  a  purchase)   of 

valuable   1 1 
having  purchased  them  before  their  ma- 
turity and  without  aotice  of  any  defence, 
re  executed  by  the  president   of 

rvisors  and  tin    county 

clerk.     They  recite  that   they  an  I 

by  tin-  county  of  Moultrie,  'in  pursuance 

□  oi  the  sum  of  eighty 

thousand  dollars   to   the  capi 

atur,  Sullivan,  and  .Matte 
road    Company,    made    by   the   board   of 
supervisors    <>l    said   county   of   Moultrie, 
,    /  .    A.    I ».    1  36 

if  an  act  "i  '.In1  General 
Assemb]  S        of  II  i«<    •.  ipproved 

March  26,  A.  D.  L869.'  Now,  if  it  be 
i  that  the  purchaser  of  bonds 
with  such  recitals  was  bound  to  look 
further  and  inquire  whal  was  the  author- 
ity for  the  issue,  where  was  be  to  look? 
Had  he  looked  to  the  act  of  the  G  aeral 
i  ily  of  March  26,  1869,  he  would 
have  found  plenary  authority  for 
subscription  and  for  the  issue  of  bonds 
in  payment  thereof,  li  he  was  hound  to 
know  that  the  constitutional  pro 
terminated  thai  authority  after  July  2, 
1870,  he  knew  thai  any  subscription  made 
before  that  time  continued  binding  not- 
withstanding the  Constitution,  and  that 
bonds  issued  in  payment  of  it  were,  there- 
fore, lawful.  If,  then,  he  had  inquired 
whether  a  subscription  had  been  made 
before  July  2,  1870,  at  the  only  place 
whnr  inquiry  should  have  been  made, 
namely,  at  the  records  of  the  board,  he 
would  have  found  an  order  to  subscribe, 
equivalent    t<  cription    made,    in 

December,  1869,  corresponding  with  the 
assertions  ol  the  recitals,  and  declared  by 
them  to  have  b  •  u  a  subscription.  He 
could  have  made  inquiry  nowhere  else 
with  any  prospect  of  learning  the  truth. 

Every  step  he  could  have  taken  assured 
him  that  the  recitals  wen-  true.  How, 
then,  can  the  county  be  permitted  to  set 
up  againsl  a  bona  fid*  holder  of  the  bonds 
thai  the  authoril  y  I  lubscriptrbn, 

with  all  its  legitimate  consequences,  had 


valid  contract  to  subscribe  had 
took  effect,  it  may  be  a  question 
really  adjudged  by  the  court. 

expired  before  the  subscription  was  made, 
in  the  face  of  the  re.  i  I  the  coun- 

ty records  '  Whether  it  had  expired  was 
a  mattei  of  fa<  .  not  of  law,  and  it  was 
peculiarly,  if  not  exclusively,  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  hoard  of  Bupervi 
After  having  assured  a  purchaser  that 
their  subscription  was  made  in  December, 

lMl'.i,    when    they    hail    power   to   make   it, 

it  would  he  tolerating  a  fraud  to  permit 
the  county  to  set  up.  when  called  u]  i  n 
for  payment,  thai  it  was  not  made  until 
after  July  2,  1870,  when  their  authority 
expired."  If  the  records  of  the  county 
had  contradicted  the  recitals  in  the  bond, 
and  had  affirmatively  shown  that  no  sub- 
scription  was  made  until  after  the  Con- 
stitution took  effect,  would  the  purchaser 
of  the  bonds  be  bound  to  notice  that  fact  ? 
S  »29  a,  and  note  ;  post,  sees. 

539,  540,  5  19. 

Purchaser  not  affected  by  statements  in 
county  records  contrary  to  recitals  in  the 
bonds  issued  by  the  county.  Nicolay  v. 
St.  Clair  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  K.  163 
(1874).  But  compare  sec.  529  a,  and  note. 
In  Aller  v.  Cameron,  lb.  198,  the  defend- 
ant town  was  held  estopped  to  set  up 
against  a  holder  of  its  bonds  for  valuo 
that  it  was  not  loyally  incorporated. 

Effect  of  recital  by  authorized  officers. 
See  also  Chambers  County  v.  Clews,  21 
Wall.  317,  321  ;  Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar, 
15  Wall.  355  ;  Lynde  v.  County  of  Win- 
nebago, 16  Wall.  6;  C.B.&Q.  li.  R.  Co.  v. 
Otoe  County,  16  Wall.  667;  MercerCounty 
V.  Ilaeket,  1  Wall,  83  ;  Woods  v.  Lawrence 
County,  1  Black,  386  ;  Gelpcke  v.  Du- 
buque,  1  Wall.  175;  Meyer  v.  Muscatine, 
lb.  3S4  ;  Kennicott  v.  Supervisors,  16 
Wall.  464.  Tin  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois 
refused  to  follow  the  ruling  in  the  last 
cited  case.  Scates  v.  King,  110  111.  456. 
A  recital  in  a  bond  issued  in  payment  of 
a  subscription  to  railway  stock,  that  it  is 
authorized  by  a  certain  statute,  will  not 
estop  the  municipal  corporation  from  as- 
sertingthat  the  issue  was  not  authorized  by 
a  proper  vote  as  required  by  law.  Carroll 
County  i;.  Smith,  111  U.  S.  556. 


§531  contracts:  bonds;   estoppel  j;y  recitals.  615 

§  5;51  (419)-  Rationale  of  Estoppel.  —  A  correct  view  of  this 
subject  would  seem  tu  be  this :  Uilieers  are  the  agents  of  the  cor- 
porate body;  and  the  ordinary  rules  and  principles  of  the  law  of 
agency  are  applicable  to  th<  ir  acts.  Their  unauthorized  acts  are  nut 
binding  upon  the  corporate  body  of  which  they  are  the  public 
agents  Ordinarily,  their  unauthorized  representation  that  I 
have  power  to  do  an  act  is  not  binding  upon  the  corporation  ;  that 
is,  the  question  is  as  to  their  power,  in  fnct  arid  in  law,  not  \ 
they  have  represented  it  to  be.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule, 
in  addition  to  the  one  hereinbefore  treated  of,  to  wit,  where  it  is 
the  sole  province  of  the  officers  who  issued  the  bonds  to  decide 
whether  conditions  precedent  have  been  complied  with,  is  where 
both  parties  have  not  equal  means  of  knowledge  as  to  the  extent 
and  scope  of  their  powers,  and  where  the  particular  character  of 
their  commission  and  authority  is,  from  its  nature  and  circum- 
stances, peculiarly  known  to  the  officer  or  agent ;  in  which  case  the- 
principal  will  or  maybe  bound  by  the  false  representations  of  the 
agent  respecting  his  authority,  and  its  extent  and  scope ;  but  where 
the  authority  to  act  is  solely  conferred  by  statute,  which,  in  effect 
is  the  letter  of  attorney  of  the  officer,  all  persons  must,  at  their 
peril,  see  that  the  act  of  the  agent  on  which  he  relies  is  within 
the  power  under  which  the  agent  acts ;  and  this  doctrine  is  recog- 
nized by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  some  of  its 
judgments.1  Accordingly,  bonds  issiied  in  violation  of  an  express 
statute  or  constitutional  provision  are  void,  though  in  the  hands 
of  innocent  holders  for  value.2  On  the  principle  that  there  can 
be  no  de  facto  officer  unless  there  is  a  dejure  office,  bonds  executed 

1  The  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666  v.  Richmond,  18  Gratt.  (Va.)339  (1868); 
(1868)  ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  s.  c.  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (n.  s.)  5S'J.  Upon 
676  (1870).  See,  also,  Clark  v.  Des  this  principle  it  was  held  that  the  legisla- 
Moines,  19  Iowa,  199,  210  (1865)  ;  Tread-  ture  may  make  the  negotiability  of  muni- 
well  v.  Commissioners,  11  Ohio  St.  183,  cipal  bonds  dependent  upon  their  delivery 
(1860),  reviewing  and  criticising  Knox  by  a  State  officer,  and  that  a  purchaser 
County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539.  See,  of  bonds  purporting  to  have  been  issued 
also,  Gould  v.  Sterling  (action  on  bonds),  under  a  statute  containing  such  a  condi- 
23  N.  Y.  464  ;  s.  c.  1  Am.  Law  Keg.  (x.  s.)  tion,  is  not  a  bona  fick  purchaser  without 
290,  and  note  of  Prof.  Dwight ;  Starin  v.  notice,  in  ease  the  bonds  are  fraudulently 
Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  452  ;  People  v.  Mead,  issued  without  being  delivered  by  the 
36  N.  Y.  224  ;  Dodge  v.  County  of  Platte,  designated  officer.  McGrary,  J.,  Lewis  v. 
82  N.  Y.  218.  United  States  v.  City  Bank  Barbour  Co.  Comm'rs,  3  Fed.  Rep.  191. 
of  Columbus,  21  How.  356  (1858),  is  a  2  Aspinwall  v.  Daviess  Co.  Com.,  22 
very  striking  illustration  of  the  general  How.  364;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  supra; 
principle  that  a  corporate  officer  cannot  Moore  V.  New  York,  73  N.  Y.  238,  approv- 
bind  the  corporation  by  his  unauthorized  ing  text.  As  to  bonds  issued  in  excess  of 
acts  or  representations  concerning  the  constitutional  and  statutory  limitations, 
authority  of  himself  or  others.     De  Voss  see  supra,  sees.  527-530. 


616 


MUNICIP  W.   COBPOBATIONS. 


by  persona  purporting  to  be  de  facto  officers  of  a  county  when  there 
was  no  lawful  statute  in  existence  creating  the  office,  are  absolutely 
void  for  want  of  power  to  issue  them.1 


§  532  (420).  Estoppel  by  Recitals  in  the  Bond;  Illustration. — 
in  a  subsequent  case,  similar  in  character,  the  common  council  of 
a  city  were,  by  virtue  of  various  statutes,  authorized  to  subscribe 
for  stock  in  a  railroad  company,  and  to  issue  bonds  in  payment 
therefor  on  the  petition  of  three-fourths  of  thelegal  voters  of  the  city. 
Before  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  the  council  decided  that  three-fourths 
of  the  citizens  had  petitioned,  and  the  bonds  themselves  thus  recited. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  that  the  council  was 
the  tribunal  to  decide  whether  the  requisite  number  had  petitioned; 
that  it  was  contemplated  that  this  question,  which  was  one  of  fact, 
should  he  ascertained  and  conclusively  settled  prior  to  the  issue  of 
the  bonds;  and  that  when  the  city  was  sued  upon  the  bonds  by 
innocent  holders  for  value,  parol  testimony  was  inadmissible  to  show 
that  the  petitioners  did  not  constitute  three-fourths  of  the  legal  voters 
of  the  city.2 


1  Ante,    sic    276;    Norton   v.    Shelby 
County,  IIS  U.   S.  425  (1SS5).      In  this 
case  it  appeared  that  the  administration  of 
local  matters  in  each  county  in  Tennessee 
had  for  nearly  a  century  been  vested  in  a 
County  Court,  or  as  often  called,  Quarterly 
Court,    composed  of  justices  of  the  peace 
elected   in  its   different   districts.     Power 
;  fco  the  County  Court  to  make  a 
subscription  and  issue  bonds  to  a  railroad 
company.     Uef  ce  the  power  was  executi  d 
the  legislature  passed  an  act  abolishing  the 
County  Court,  and  vesting  its  powers,  in- 
cluding the  power  to  subscribe  for  stock 
and    issue    bonds,    in  a  Board  of   County 
Commissioners.         The    County    Commis- 
sioners issued  the  bonds.     The  act  abolish- 
ing  the  Quarterly  Court  ami  creating  the 
County  I  '  uimissioners  was  held, 
i     ie  of  the  bonds,  to  be  uueon- 
!  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
■  of  Tennessee,  on  the  ground  that  the 
County  Court  was  one  of  the  institutions 
of  the  State  recognized  in  the  Constitution, 
aiel  that    the   ac1    creating  the  Hoard  of 
('ountv  Commissioners  and  conferring  on 
the  powers  of  the  County  or  Quarterly 
Court  was  unconstitutional  and  void  ;  and 
hence  it  was  held  by   the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  that  the  bonds  had 


no  validity  even  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide 
holders.  The  validity  of  the  bonds  was 
attempted  to  be  sustained  on  the  ground 
that  the  acts  of  the  County  Commissioners 
under  a  statute  subsequently  held  to  be 
unconstitutional,  were  to  be  regarded  as 
the  acts  of  officers  de  facto,  and  hence 
binding  in  favor  of  the  bona  fide  holders  of 
the  bonds.  But  the  Supreme  Court  de- 
cided otherwise ;  and,  in  a  very  learned  and 
elaborate  opinion,  reviewing  the  authori- 
ties, by  Mr.  Justice  Field,  it  is  held  : 
First,  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Federal 
Court  on  a  question  of  this  kind  to  follow 
the  decision  of  the  highest  court  of  the 
State.  Second,  that  there  could,  in  law, 
be  no  such  thing  as  an  officer  either  dt  jure 
or  de  facto  if  there  be  no  office  to  fill  ;  and 
that  the  act  attempting  to  create  the  office 
of  commissioners  never  became  a  law  and 
the  office  never  came  into  existen  e.  The 
view  of  the  court  on  this  point  is  tersely 
summed  up  in  this  sentence  (lb.,  442): 
"  An  unconstitutional  act  is  not  a  law  ;  it 
confers  no  rights  ;  it  imposes  no  duties  ; 
it  affords  no  protection;  it  creates  no  office; 
it  is,  in  legal  contemplation,  as  inoperative 
as  though  it  had  never  been  passed." 

2  Bissell    v.    Jeffersonville,    24    How. 
(U.  S.)  287  (1860),  approving  Knox  County 


§533 


contracts:    estoppel  i:y  recitals  IN  BOM). 


617 


§  533    (421).    Estoppel   by   Recitals    in    Eond  ;    Illustration.  —  In 
another    case,1    the    action  was    upon    coupons    payable  to  h 


v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539;  s.  P.  Evans- 
ville,  I.  &  C.   S.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.   Evans- 

ville,  15  Ind.  395  (1860)  ;  Moran  v. 
Miami  County,  2  Black,  7^2,  724  (1862)  ; 
Marshal]  County  Sup.  v.  Schenck,  5 
Wall.  772  (1866);  Rogers  v.  Burlington, 
3  Wall.  654  ;  Cincinnati  v.  Morgan,  lb. 
275;  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83; 
Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  lb.  385,  393,  per 
Swaync,  J.;  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall. 
175,  203  ;  Pendleton  Co.  v.  Amy,  13  Wall. 
297  (1871) ;  St.  Joseph  Township  v. 
Rogers,  16  Wall.  644  (1872).  In  the  case 
last  cited  it  was  insisted  that  the  bonds 
were  invalid  for  want  of  the  required  vote. 
One  of  the  answers  of  the  court  to  this 
objection  was  that  "  the  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture made  it  the  duty  of  the  supervisor 
who  executed  the  bonds  to  determine  the 
question  whether  an  election  was  held, 
and  whether  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast 
were  in  favor  of  the  subscription,  and  in- 
asmuch as  he  passed  upon  that  question 
and  subscribed  for  the  stock,  and  subse- 
quently executed  and  delivered  the  bonds, 
it  was  clearly  too  late  to  question  their 
validity,  where  it  appears,  as  in  this  case, 
that  they  are  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 
holder."  The  decision  in  the  case  referred 
to  in  the  text  is  clearly  right,  for  the  rea- 
son that  the  council  were  the  body  to 
decide  the  preliminary  fact,  and  because, 


also,  according  to  the  rule  bi 

the    fact   was   one   not  of  a  nature  to  be 

ascertained   by  purchasers  in  the  market 

to  whom  the  bonds  were  designed  to  be 

sold. 

Is.  —  Where  a  bond  re- 
cites that  it  is  issued  "  under  authority 
of"  an  act,  reciting  its  title,  such  recital 
estops  the  municipality  from  maki 
against  a  bona  fide  bolder  for  value, 
the  defence  that  the  road  was  not  com- 
pleted in  time.  Oregon  v.  Jennings,  119 
U.  S.  74  (1SS6).  To  the  effect  that  such 
a  recital  estops  a  town,  as  against  a  bona 
fide  holder  for  value,  from  showing  the 
conditions  imposed  on  its  liability  by  the 
vote  of  the  people  had  not  been  complied 
with,  although  the  statute  declared  that 
the  bonds  should  not  be  valid  and  binding 
until  compliance  with  such  conditions,  see 
Am.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bruce,  105  U.  S.  328. 
In  Pana  v.  Bowler,  107  U.  S.  529,  539, 
recitals  in  bonds  in  favor  of  a  bona  fide 
holder  were  held  elfectual  to  estop  the 
municipality,  as  against  an  alleged  defect 
in  the  mode  of  conducting  an  election  held 
prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
of  Illinois  of  1870,  the  bonds  being  issued 
after  its  adoption,  although  that  instru- 
ment forbade  the  issuing  of  the  bonds,  unless 
their  issue  should  have  been  authorized 
under  then  existing  laws  by  a  vote  of  the 


1  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall. 
83  (1863).  This  case,  and  the  case  of 
Woods  v.  Lawrence  County,  1  Black,  386, 
are  cited  by  Mr.  Justice  Hunt  in  the  case 
of  Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar,  15  Wall.  372 
(1872).  The  learned  justice  says  :  "  The 
same  principles  were  announced  in  Gel- 
pcke i>.  The  City  of  Dubuque,  1  Wall. 
175,  and  in  Meyer  v.  The  City  of  Musca- 
tine, lb.  384.  In  the  latter  case  the  court 
said  that  if  the  legal  authority  [that  is, 
the  legislative  enabling  Act]  was  suffi- 
ciently comprehensive,  a  bona  fide  holder 
for  value  has  a  right  to  presume  that  all 
prece  lent  requirements  have  been  com- 
plied with.  By  the  act  of  February  10, 
1854,  the  legislature  of  Wisconsin  author- 


ized the  supervisors  of  the  town  of  Grand 
Chute  to  make  a  plank-road  subscription 
to  the  amount  of  ten  thousand  dollars. 
The  bonds  in  question  were  signed  by  the 
chairman  of  the  board  of  supervisors  of 
that  town,  and  recited  that  the  subscrip- 
tion had  been  made  by  the  supervisors  of 
the  town,  and  that  these  bonds  were  issued 
in  pursuance  thereof,  for  the  pur] 
carrying  out  the  provisions  of  that  act. 
The  plaintiff  was  the  bona  fide  holder  for 
value  of  the  bonds  in  suit,  and  his  title 
accrued  before  their  maturity.  The  cases 
cited  are  an  answer  to  the  numerous  offers 
to  show  want  of  compliance  with  the  forms 
of  law,  or  to  show  fraud  in  their  own 
agents." 


618 


MCNRTPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§  533 


belonging  to   negotiable  bonds  issued  by  a  county  in  payment   of 
stock  subscribed  for  in  a  railroad  company.     By  an  act  of  assembly, 


le  prior  to  I  ion  of  the  Con- 

stitution. 

i  .i  bond  that  it  is  issued  in 
payment  of  a  subscription  by  a 

erred  to,  held  not  to  estop  tho 
municipality  to  show  that  the  issue  was 
not  authorized  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of 
the  voters  of  the  corporation,  as  required 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  State.  Carroll 
County  v.  Smith,  111  U.  S.  556.  Recitals 
in  bonds  that  they  were  issued  "  in  pursu- 
to  the  vote  of  the  electors  of  Anderson 
County,  September  13,  1869,"  held,  in  favor 
of  a/  holder  thereof,  to  be  equiv- 

alent to  a  statement  that  the  vote  was  one 
lawful  and  regular  in  form  ;  ami  that  evi- 
dence to  show  that  the  thirty  days'  notice 
of  the  election  required  by  the  statute  was 
not  given  was  uo1  available  to  the  municipal  - 
ity  as  a  defence.  Tin-  case  was  considered 
to  fall  within  Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves,  92 
U.  S.  484,  491  ;  Anderson  County  Com- 
missioners v.  Beal,  113  U.  S.  227  (1884). 
Where  the  Constitution  required  the  ques- 
tion of  local  taxation  to  he  submitted  to 
flu'  electors,  a  statute  which  empowered  the 
rs  to  authorize  a  town  to 
issue  bonds  in  aid  of  a  railroad,  was  de- 
clared  unconstitutional  and  void.  Har- 
rington v.  Plainview,  27  Minn.  224,  fol- 
lowed in  Plainview  v.  Winona  &  St.  Peter 
R.  R.  Co.,  36  .Minn.  505. 

As  to  proceedings  preliminary  to  issuing 
of  bonds.  Ante,  sees.  163,  515,  note;  Knox 
Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Nichols,  14  Ohio  St.  260  ; 
Atchison  v.  Butcher,  3  Kan.  104  (1865)  ; 
Mercer  County  v.  Ilacket,  1  Wall.  83 ; 
Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  6".  t  :  Moran 
v.  Miami  Co.,  2  Black,  722  ;  Flagg  v.  Pal- 
myra, 33  Mo.  440 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Allegheny  Co.  Comm'rs,  37  Pa.  St.  237  ; 
compare  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676  (1870);  Treadw*  11  v.  Hancock  Co. 
Comm'rs,  11  Ohio  St.  183  (1860)  ;  post, 
sec.  550  ;  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13 
Wall.  297  :  City  of  Lexington  v.  Butler, 
14  Wall.  284  ;  St.  Joseph  Township  v. 
Etogi  rs,  16  Wall.  644  (1872);  Grand  Chute 
r.    '  ■   Wall.    372   (1872)  ;   New 

Havi  Q,  M.  ,v  W.  R,  R.  Co. v.  Chatham,  42 

Where  authority  to  issue   town  bonds 


could  be  exercised  only  upon  the  petition 
of  a  majority  of  taxpayers,  "  not  including 
those  taxed  for  dogs  or  highway  tax  only," 
a  petition  stating  that  the  petitioners  were 
"  a  majority  of  the  taxpayers  of  the  town  " 
was  held  to  be  fatally  defective.  Town  of 
v.  Cook,  108  N.  Y.  504  (1SSS). 
AnU ,  sec.  515,  note. 

A  city  was  authorized  to  take  stock  in 
a  railroad  company  "on  the  petition  of 
two-thirds  of  lite  citizens,  who  arc  free- 
holders," &c.  Bonds  of  the  city  were 
duly  issued,  signed  by  the  propi 
and  attested  l>y  the  seal  of  the  city,  and 
on  their  face  recited  that  they  were  issued 
by  virtue  of  an  ordinance  of  the  city  mak- 
ing the  subscription.  The  minutes  of  the 
city  council  simply  stated  that  "the  free- 
holders of  the  city,  with  great  unanimity, 
had  petitioned,"  &c.  It  was  held  that 
the  city  council  were  the  proper  judg  i 
whether  or  not  the  required  number  had 
petitioned,  and  that  the  city,  as  against 
bona  Jicle  holders  for  value,  was  "con- 
cluded" by  the  ordinance  "as  to  any 
irregularities  that  may  have  existed  in 
carrying  into  execution  the  power  granted 
to  subscribe  the  stock  and  issue  the  bonds." 
Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City,  1  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  291  (1863)  ;  s.  p.  Meyer  v.  Mus- 
catine (whei'e  charter  required  "  a  majority 
of  two-thirds  of  the  votes  given  ")  Ih.  384, 
393  ;  Auroras.  West,  22  Ind.  8S  (1864)  ; 
contra,  People  v.  Mead,  36  N.  Y.  224. 
Post,  sec.  550,  note. 

Where  the  act  authorizing  <i  munici- 
pality to  issue  bonds  was  not  to  take  effect 
until  "  approved  by  two-thirds  of  the 
electors  present  at  a  city  meeting  held  for 
that  purpose,  and  a  copy  of  its  doings 
lodgi  d  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  State," 
bona  fide  purchasers  of  such  bonds  are  not 
bound  to  look  beyond  the  certificate  thus 
Lodged,  and  are  not  affected  by  the  action 
of  the  city,  refusing  at  prior  meetings  to 
approve  the  act.  Society  for  Savings  v. 
New  London,  29  Conn.  174  (1860). 

Fraud  in  tlie  election  authorizing  the 
subscription  must  be  set  up  before  rights 
have  accrued.  Butler  v.  Dunham,  27  111. 
474  ;  People  v.  San  F.  Sup.,  27  Cal.  655. 
Further  as  to  the  construction  of  powers 


§  533  contracts:    estoppel  by  recitals  in  bond.  619 

the  county  commissioners  were  authorized  to  subscribe  the  stock  and 
issue  tlie  bonds  only  upon  the  following  "  restrictions,  limitations,  and 
conditions,  ami  in  no  other  manner  or  way  whatever  : "  1.  "After, 
and  not  before,  the  amount  of  such  subscription  shall  have  been  des- 
ignated, advised,  ami  recommended  by  a  -rand  jury  of  the  county." 
2.  Said  "  bonds  shall,  in  no  case,  be  sold  by  the  railroad  company  at 
less  thanpar."  3.  That  the  acceptance  of  this  act  shall  be  deemed  the 
acceptance  of  another  act  fixing  the  gauges  of  railroads  in  the  county 
of  Erie.  The  plaintiff  was  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value,  of  a  number 
of  the  bonds  issued  by  the  county.  To  defeat  a  recovery,  the  county 
on  the  trial  offered  to  show,  not  that  no  recommendation  by  a 
grand  jury  was  ever  made,  but  that  no  stick  recommendation  was 
made  as  the  act  required.  The  following  was  the  recommendation  : 
The  grand  jury  "  would  recommend  (omitting  the  words  'designate 
and  advise')  the  commissioners  of  Mercer  County  to  subscribe  an 
amount  not  exceeding  §150,000,"  —  but  not  otherwise  designating 
the  amount.  The  bonds  referred  on  their  face  to  the  act  of  assembly 
and  its  date,  which  authorized  their  issue  and  recited  that  they  were 
issued  in  pursuance  thereof.  This  was  regarded  by  the  court  not  as 
an  offer  to  show  "  that  no  law  exists  to  authorize  their  issue,  but  as 
one  to  show  that  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  are  not  true,  and  to  show 
that  they  were  not  made  '  in  pursuance  of  the  acts  of  assembly'  au- 
thorizing them;"  and,  following  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 1  it  was 
adjudged  that  the  matters  thus  offered  to  be  shown  constituted  no 
defence  against  a  bona  fide  holder,  on  the  principle  that  "  where  bonds 
on  their  face  import  a  compliance  with  the  law  under  which  they 
were  issued,  the  purchaser  is  not  bound  to  look  further."  And  fol- 
lowing Woods  v.  Lawrence  County,2  it  was  also  ruled  that  it  was  no 
defence  against  such  a  holder  that  the  bonds  were  sold  by  the  rail- 
road company  for  less  than  par,  they  being  negotiable  and  the  plain- 
to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways,  see  ante,  the  law,  the  county  cannot  afterwards  deny 
chap.  vi.  sec.  153  ct  scq.  Ante,  sees.  515,  its  obligation  to  pay  the  amount  sub- 
519,  and  notes.  scribed.     In  a  suit  brought  to  recover  the 

1  Knox  Co.  Comm'rs  v.  Aspinwall,  21  arrears  of  interest  on  such  bonds,  it  is  not 
How.  539.  necessary  for  the  holder  to  show  that  the 

-  Woods  v.  Lawrence  County,  1  Black,  grand  jury  fixed  the  manner  and  terms  of 
386.  In  Woods  v.  Lawrence  County,  paying  for  the  stork  ;  nor  is  it  a  defence 
above  cited,  it  was  also  held  where  the  for  the  county  to  show  that  the  grand  jury 
statute  requires  the  grand  jury  to  fix  the  omitted  to  do  so.  It  is  enough  that  the 
amount  of  a  subscription  to  railroad  stock,  manner  and  terms  of  payment  were  agreed 
and  to  approve  of  it,  and  upon  their  re-  upon  between  the  company  ami  the  com- 
port being  filed  empowers  commissioners  missioners.  This  case,  among  others,  was 
to  carry  the  same  into  effect  by  making  its  cited  and  approved  in  Grand  Chute  v. 
subscription  in  the  name  of  the  county,  Winegar,  15  Wall.  372  (1S72)  ;  s.  c.  5 
that  if  these  things  be  done  agreeably  to     Chicago  Legal  News,  337. 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  535 

tiff  innocent.  Ami  it  was  also  decided  that  the  acceptance  by  the 
railroad  company  of  the  bonds  authorized  by  the  act  operated  per  sc 
as  an  acceptance  of  the  gauge  law. 

^  5  •">  I  422).  Estoppel  by  Recitals  in  the  Bond;  Illustration. — 
In  another  case,  authority  to  a  city  "to  take  stock  in  any  char- 
tered company  for  making  a  mad,  or  roads,  to  the  said  city"  was  held, 
in  favor  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  its  bonds,  to  authorize  it  to  sub- 
scribe to  a  railroad  which,  by  the  terms  of  its  charter,  and  in  fact 
did  not  terminate  at  said  city,  but  whose  nearest  terminus  was  forty- 
six  miles  distant,  it  appearing  that  there  was,  at  the  time  of  said 
subscription,  another  railroad  leading  from  that  terminus  to  the 
city.1  Authority  was  given  by  the  legislature  to  the  city  of  Mil- 
waukee to  issue  bonds  in  aid  of  a  railroad  company  specially  named, 
"  and  any  other  railroad  company  duly  incorporated  and  organized 
for  the  purpose  of  constructing  railroads  leading  from  the  city  of 
Milwaukee,"  &c,  and  it  was  held,  such  having  been  the  construction 
put  upon  it  by  the  city  authorities  at  the  time,  that  the  power  to 
issue  bonds  was  not  confined  to  comjxinics  then  in  existence,  but  ex- 
tended to  companies  afterwards  created.2 

S  535  (422  a).  Estoppel  by  Recital  in  Bond  ;  Illustration.  —  In 
another  case,3  the  city  v:as  held  liable  upon  bonds  issued  to  a  railway 
company  under  the  following  circumstances,  viz. :  The  legislature  au- 
thorized the  city  to  subscribe  on  the  condition  of  a  majority  vote ; 
the  city  embodied  three  conditions  in  the  proposition  submitted  to 
the  voters,  one  of  which  was  that  $1,000,000  should  be  subscribed 
by  other  parties;  the  vote  carried;  other  parties  did  not  subscribe 
the  $1,000,000 ;  the  city  refused  to  subscribe  and  issue  bonds,  but 

1  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City,  1  Wall,  construed  to  give  the  requisite  authority 
201  (1863);  see  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  to  issue  the  bonds  of  the  county  to  raise 
74  ;  8.  c.  22  Ind.  88,  96,  503.     The  deci-     money  to   build  a  court-house.     The  case 

ld  Van   Hostrup  v.  Madison  City  was  also  holds  that  it  was  competent  fur  the 

undoubtedly    influenced   by   tbe    natural  proper  county  official  (the  county  judge) 

desire  to  protect  the  holders  of  the  bonds,  to  visit  X>  w  York  for  purposes  connected 

Doubts  ran  but  be  entertained   that   the  with    the   disposition  of  the  bonds,   and 

Columbus  and  Shelby  Road,  distant  and  while  there,  and  out  of  his  jurisdiction,  to 

between  differenl  points,  was  a  road  lead-  issue  and  seal  new  bonds  with  a  new  seal 

ing  to  Madison.   Note  remarks  of  Nelson,  .1.  procuredat  the  time,  in  exchange  for  bonds 

Si     also  Kirkbride  v.  Lafayette  Co.,  108  already  issued,  but  not  yet  put  on  the  mar- 

U,  g,  208.  ket,    and   it    was   so   held    although    the 

2  James  v.  Milwaukee,  1G  Wall.  159  statute  of  the  State  provided  that  in  the 
Q872).  case  of  the  absi  ncc  of  that  officer  the  county 

In    Lynde    v.    Winnebago   County,    16     clerk  should  take  his  place. 
Wall.  6  (1872),  a  special  submission,  under         8  Lexington  v.   Butler,   14  Wall.    282 
the  laws  of  Iowa,  to  a  popular  vote,  was     (1871). 


§  537  CONTRACTS  :    ESTOPPEL    BY   RECITALS    IN    BOND.  G21 

was  compelled  to  do  so  by  a  mandamus  of  an  inferior  court,  whose 
judgment  was  afterwards  reversed  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the 
State,  which  held  that  the  city  had  no  authority  to  take  the  stuck  or 
issue  the  bonds  until  the  Sl,o0(>, nnn  had  Keen  subscribed  by  other 
parties.  Meanwhile,  however,  bonds  were  issued  by  the  city,  bear- 
ing its  seal  and  signed  by  its  mayor  and  clerk,  reciting  that  they 
were  duly  issued  under  a  specified  act  of  the  General  Assembly. 

§  53G.  Same  subject.  —  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
held  in  the  case  last  cited  that  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value  of  th 
bonds,  who  had  no  actual  notice  of  the  facts  relied  on  for  a  defence, 
could  recover  thereon.  Mr.  Justice  Clifford,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  makes  use  of  this  language  in  stating  the  ground  of  the 
judgment :  "  Admitted,  as  it  is,  that  the  corporation  defendants  pos- 
sessed the  power  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  and  issue  the  bonds,  it  is 
clear  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  upon  the  merits,  as  the 
repeated  decisions  of  this  court  have  established  the  rule  that  when 
a  corporation  has  power  under  any  circumstances  to  issue  negotiable 
securities,  the  bona  fide  holder  has  a  right  to  presume  that  they  were 
issued  under  the  circumstances  which  give  the  requisite  authority, 
and  that  they  are  no  more  liable  to  be  impeached  in  the  hands  01 
such  a  holder  than  any  other  commercial  paper."  By  the  expression 
that  it  is  admitted  that  the  city  "  possessed  the  power  to  subscribe 
for  the  stock  and  to  issue  the  bonds,"  reference  is  undoubtedly  made 
to  the  act  of  the  legislature  which  gave  this  power  on  condition  of  a 
majority  vote,  and  possibly  to  the  fact  that  it  was  admitted  in  the 
plea  that  the  vote  was  cast  in  favor  of  the  subscription,  for  other- 
wise it  seems  to  have  been  denied  that  the  power  existed  ;  and  that 
it  did  not  exist  as  between  the  city  and  the  railroad  corporation  was 
decided  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  State.  The  substance  of  the 
decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  this  case  would  seem 
to  be  that  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  the  bonds  had  a  right  to  presume 
that  the  condition  annexed  by  the  city  as  to  the  $1,000,000  of  other 
subscriptions  had  been  complied  with ;  and  thus  viewed,  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  rests  upon  grounds  whose  soundness  cannot  admit 
of  question.  It  is  not  an  authority  upon  its  essential  facts  in  favor 
of  the  proposition  that  if  the  bonds  had  been  issued  without  any 
vote,  or  attempt  at  a  vote,  they  would  have  been  binding,  in  the 
absence  of  estoppel  other  than  by  recitals,  or  in  the  absence  of  other 
ground  of  liability. 

§  537  (422  b).  Other  Grounds  of  Estoppel.  —  In  another  case,1  the 
authority  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  of  the  company  was  given  on  con- 

1  Pendleton  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297  (1S71). 


MUNICIPAL   C0BP0BATI0N8.  §  538 

dition  that  the  county  should  so  vote  by  a  majority  of  real  estatt  hold*  rs 
A  subscription  was  made  in  L853,  and  a  certificate 
of  stock  was  issued  bo  the  county,  which  was  received  by  it,  and  was 
still  owned  by  it  in  1869,  when  suit  was  brought.  It  did  not  appear 
that  the  bonds  contained  any  recitals  that  conditions  precedent  had 
been  complied  with,  or  that  the  county  had  subsequently  levied 
taxes  to  pay  interest  on  the  bonds.  The  county  set  up  as  a  defence 
that  there  was  no  power  to  issue  the  bonds,  because  no  vote  of  the 
people  had  ever  been  taken.  The  plaintiff  being  a  bona  fide  holder, 
it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover,  and  that  the  county  was 
estopped  to  set  up  thai  no  vote  was  had.  Theground  of  the  estoppel 
is  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Strong:  "The  county  received  in  ex- 
change  for  the  bonds  a  certificate  of  the  stock  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany,  which  it  held  about  seventeen  years  before  the  present  suit 
was  brought,  and  which  it  still  holds.  Having  exchanged  the  bonds 
for  the  stock,  we  think  the  county  cannot  retain  the  proceeds  of  the 
exchange,  and  assert  against  a  purchaser  of  the  bonds  for  value  that 
though  the  legislature  empowered  it  to  make  them,  and  put  them 
upon  the  market,  upon  certain  conditions,  they  were  issued  in  dis- 
regard of  the  conditions."  It  will  be  observed  that  if  the  court  had 
been  of  opinion  that  the  bonds  were  enforceable  in  the  hands  of  a 
holder  for  value  though  no  election  had  in  fact  ever  been  held,  the 
case  would  naturally  have  been  put  upon  that  ground. 

§  538.  "What  constitutes  Completed  Subscription  or  Contract  to 
subscribe. —  Interesting  questions  have  arisen  as  to  what  constii 
a  subscription  on  the  part  of  a  municipality  or  other  public  corpora- 
tion, or  a  valid  contract  to  subscribe,  to  the  stock  of  a  railroad 
company,  and  when  rights  are  vested  thereunder  which  cannot  be 
legislatively  impaired  without  the  consent  of  the  parties  in  interest. 
Where  a  precedent  popular  vote  is  required,  and  upon  such  vote 
authority  is  given  to  subscribe  for  the  stock,  the  vote  without  more 
not  constitute  a  contract  between  the  municipality  thus  author- 
ized to  subscribe  and  the  railroad  company.1 

1  Aspinwall  v.  Comity  of  .To  Daviess,  pany.  Bates  County  v.  Winters,  112  TT.  S. 
22  How.  ">'-t;  Town  of  Concord  v.  Ports-  325(1884).  Forwhal  isnei  corn- 
mouth  Savings  Bank,  92  TJ.  S.  625;  Harsh-  plete  a  valid  subscription,  see  Nugent  v. 
man  v.  Batet  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  Putnam  Co.  Sup.,  19  Wall.  241;  Moultrie 
i;,n,  162,  note;  8.  o.  affirmed  in  Supreme  County  <•.   Rockingham  'I'.  C.  Sa?    Bank, 

569  (1875)  :  ante,  sec.  70,  92  TJ.  S.  631  ;  infra,  sees.  53!',  540. 

and  cases  cited.     German  Bank  ?>   Frank-  The  rights  of  a  municipality  as  a  stock- 

lin  County,  L28  I'.  S.  526(1888).     Sub-  holder  in  a  railroad  company,  ami  whose 

scription  by  a  eounty  for  stork  held  to  be  stock  has  been  paid  for  by  the  bonds  of 

complete,  although  no  actual  subscription  the  municipality,  arc  no  greater  than  the 

was  made  on  the  stock  books  of  the  com-  rights  of  other  stockholders;   and  unless 


§539  contracts:    bonds;   want  of  power.  f!23 

§  539.  Same  subject.  Power  may  be  annulled  by  Constitutional 
Provision  or  Legislative  Action  before  Rights  become  vested  ;  Bonds 
in  Such  Case  are  void  in  Everybody's   Hands. —  As    illustrating   the 

necessity  of  a  continued  existent  of  the  'power  to  issue  the  bonds,   and 

as  showing  what  did  not  amount  to  a  completed  contract  1"  I 
power  was  repealed  by  a  constitutional  provision,  the  case  of  the 
Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank  may  usefully  be  re- 
ferred to.1  Chronologically  stated,  the  fart-  were  these:  The  bonds 
were  issued  under  the  act  of  March  7,  1867,  and  so  recited.  The 
act  enacted  that  certain  incorporated  towns  and  cities,  and  towns 
acting  under  the  township  organization  law  (among  which  it  was 
conceded  the  town  of  Concord  was  one),  should  be  and  were  sever- 
ally authorized  to  appropriate  such  sum  of  money  as  they  might 
deem  proper  to  the  Chicago,  Danville,  and  Yincennes  Railroad 
Company,  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  road  of  said  company, 
to  be  paid  to  the  company  as  soon  as  the  track  of  said  road  should 
have  been  located  and  constructed  through  said  city,  town,  or  town- 
ship respectively.  To  this  was  attached  the  following  proviso : 
"  Provided,  however,  that  the  proposition  to  appropriate  moneys  to 
said  company  shall  be  first  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  legal  voters 
of  said  respective  townships,  towns,  or  cities,  at  a  regular  annual  or 
special  meeting,  by  giving  at  least  ten  days'  notice  thereof ;  and  a 
vote  shall  be  taken  thereon  by  ballot  at  the  usual  place  of  election, 
and  if  the  majority  of  votes  cast  shall  be  in  favor  of  the  appropriar 

specially  authorized  by  the  legislature,  the  ship  upon  an  adjudication  by  the  Supreme 

railroad  company  lias  no  power,  when  re-  Court  of  the  State  that  the  law  authorizing 

ceiving  the  subscription  and    bonds,   to  the  issue  was  unconstitutional,  it  was  held, 

agree  to  put  the  municipality  in  a  better  in  a  suit  brought  by  the  railroad  thirteen 

position  than  other  stockholders,  as,   for  years  afterwards,  ami  after  the  decision  of 

example,  by  agreeing  to  pay  a  lived  rate  the  State  court  had  been  reversed  by  the 

of  interest  on  such  stock,  equivalent  in  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  that 

amount  to  the  interest  on  the  municipal  the  return  of  the  bonds  by  the  State  officer 

bonds  issued  in  payment  therefor.     Pitts-  and  their  retention  by  the  township  were 

burgh   &    S.    Railroad    Co.    v.    Allegheny  a  conversion  which   entitled   the   railroad 

I  ounty,  79  Pa.  St.  210  (1875)  ;  s.  c.   3  company  to  bring  suit  at  once,  but  that 

Cent.  Law  Jour.  204.      Instance  in  which  the  bill  brought  after  such  a  lapse  of  time 

was  legislative  authority  for  such  a  should  be  dismissed.    Young  v.  Clarendon 

contract,  see  ease  of  the  Pittsburgh   and  Tp.,  2'5  Fed.  Rep.  805. 
Connelsville  Railroad  Co.,  63  Pa.  St.  126.  I  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank, 

When  contract  to  subscribe  stock  'is  com-  02  lT.  S.    625  (1875)  ;   -  .  sec.  540, 

pleted.     Shelby  County  Court  v.  Cumber-  note.     Effect  of  the  constitutional  provi- 

land  &0.  Railroad  Co.,  s  Rush  (Ky.),  200,  sion  of  Illinois  of  July  2,  1870,  quoted  in 

300;  Chicago,  K.  & "W.  R.  R.  Co.  b  Osage  the  text,   see   German  Bank  v.   Franklin 

County,  38  Kan.  507.     Where  a  township  County,   128  U.  S.  526  (1888),   and 

delivered  its  bonds   in   escrow  to  a   State  there  cited,  in  Illinois  and  in  the  Su]  i 

r,  to  be  held  until  the  completion  of  Court  of  the  United  States,  construing  and 

the  road  in  aid  of  which  they  were  issued,  applying  the  same.     Post,  sees.  542,  550; 

and  the  officer  returned  them  to  the  town-  ante,  sec.  530. 


624  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  539 

tion,  then  the  same  shall  be  made,  otherwise  not."     The  second  sec- 
tion empowered  and  required  the  authorities  of  said  municipalities 
to  levy  and  collect  .a  tax,  and  make  such  provisions  as  might  be 
necessary  for  the  prompt   paymenl  of  the  appropriation  under  the 
provisions  of  the  law.    The  tov\  o  voted  on  the  20th  day  of  November, 
1869,  thai    n  would  make  a  donation,  provided  the  company  would 
run  its  railroad  through  the  town.     On  the  2Dth  of  June,  1870,  the 
company  gave  notice  of  its  acceptance  of  the  donation.     On  the  2d 
of  July,  1870,  the  new  Constitution  of  the  State  went  into  opera- 
tion, by  which   it  was  ordained  that  "no  city,  town,  township,  or 
other  municipality  shall  ever  become  subscribers  to  the  capital  stock 
of  any  railroad  or  private  corporation,  or  make  donation  to,  or  loan 
its  credit   in  aid  of,  such  corporation;  provided,  however,  that  the 
adoption  of  this  article  shall  not  he  construed  as  affecting  the  right 
of  any   such   municipality  to  make  such  subscriptions,  where  the 
same  have  been  authorized  under  existing  laws  by  a  vote  of  the 
people  of  such  municipalities  prior  to  such  adoption."     On  the  9th 
(lay  of  October,  1871,  the  bonds  in  suit  were  executed  and  deliv- 
ered as  a  donation  to  the  railroad  company  ;  and  the  question  was 
whether  there  was  any  existing  authority  to  make  the  donation  and 
issue  the  bonds.     The  Supreme  Court,  after  pointing  out  that  the 
authority  given  to  the  town  of  Concord  by  the  act  of  March  7, 
1867,  was  not  to  subscribe  for  stock,  but  to  make  an  appropria- 
tion or  donation,  which  distinction  is  also  taken  in  the  provision  of 
the  Constitution  above  quoted,  held  that  no  donation  could  be  made, 
under  the  act  of  18G7,  until  after  the  completion  of  the  location 
and  construction  of  the  road  through  the  town;  that  the  vote  of 
November  20,  1869,  in  favor  of  an  appropriation,  was  not  an  appro- 
priation or  donation;  that  the  power  to  make  such  donation  was 
annulled-  by  the  Constitution  on  July  2,  1870,  and  that  there  was 
at  that  date  no  contract  in  esse  between  the  town  and  the  railroad 
company   which  stood  in  the  way  of  the  operation  of  the  consti- 
tutional prohibition.     As  to  the  effect  of  the  vote  of  the  town,  of 
November  20,  1809,  and  the  acceptance  of  the  railroad  company  of 
dun.'  L;n,  1870  (both  of  which,  it  will  be  observed,  were  before  the 
Constitution    went  into  operation),  the  court  observed:    "But  the 
town  was  not  empowered  to  make  the  donation  until  the  road  was 
located  and  constructed  through  the  town.     It  had  no  authority  to 
make  a  contract  to  give  ;  and  the  acceptance  was  an  undertaking  to 
do  nothing  which  the  company  was  not  bound  to  do  before  the 
authority  of  the  town  to  make  a  donation,  or  to  engage  to  make  a 
donation,  came  into  existence.     What  is  called  the  acceptance  of 
the    railroad   company   cannot  be  construed  as   an  engagement   to 


§540  CONTRACTS:    bonds;   subscription  to  stock.  625 

locate  and  build  the  railroad  through  the  town.  It  amounted  to  do 
more  than  savin;.;,  '  [f  we  build  our  road  through  your  town,  we  will 
receive  your  gift.'  There  was,  therefore,  no  consideration  for  the 
town's  promise  to  give,  even  if  the  popular  vote  can  be  considered 
a  promise.  There  was  do  contract  to  be  impaired.  A  contract 
should  be  clearly  proved  before  it  invokes  the  protection  oi 
Federal  Constitution.  We  conclude,  then,  that  at  the  time  the 
nation  was  made,  there  was  no  authority  in  the  municipality  to 
make  a  donation  to  the  railroad  company,  and  consequently  no 
authority  to  issue  the  bouds.  It  follows  that  the  bonds  and  cou- 
pons are  void."  1 

§  540.  Same  subject.  Mode  of  Subscription  ;  when  Subscription 
Complete.  —  Power  by  legislative  act  to  the  board  of  supervisors  of  a 
county  to  subscribe  an  amount  not  exceeding  a  given  sum  to  the  stork 
of  a  specified  railroad  company,  and  to  issue  bonds  in  payment 
therefor,  without  requiring  the  sanction  of  a  popular  vote,  but  with 
a  proviso  that  the  bonds  shall  not  be  issued  until  the  road  is  open  for 
traffic,  gives  complete  authority  to  the  county  to  subscribe  for 
the  stock,  or  to  make  a  binding  agreement  to  subscribe  thereto] 
preparatory  to  a  final  subscription.  The  proviso  that  the  payment 
of  the  subscription  should  be  postponed  until  the  railroad  should  be 
opened  does  not  limit  the  power  to  subscribe,  or  to  enter  into  an 
agreement  to  make  the  subscription  before  the  road  is  completed. 
And  it  was  held  that  a  resolution  of  the  board  of  supervisors,  made 
when  the  power  to  subscribe  existed  or  had  arisen,  that  the  county 
subscribe  a  given  sum  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  road  of  the 
company,  without  any  subscription  on  the  books  of  the  company, 
amounted  to  a  subscription,  or,  at  all  events,  to  a  legal  undertaking 
to  subscribe,  which,  when  assented  to  or  accepted  by  the  company, 
became  a  binding  contract,  which  the  county  could  not  revoke,  and 
which  could  not  be  impaired  by  any  subsequent  prohibition  n\'  the 
Constitution  or  the  legislature  without  the  assent  of  the  railroad 
company.2 

1  In  Iowa  it  is  held  that  if  money  be  Ind.  1  ;  infra,  see.  540,  note.  A  muni- 
expended  before  the  repeal  of  a  statute,  cipal  corporation  which  issued  its  bonds  to 
upon  the  faith  of  the  tax  provided  for  by  a  railroad  company  formed  by  consolid  ting 
it,  the  repeal  does  not  invalidate  the  tax  two  other  companies  was  held  estop]  ed  to 
ami  it  may  be  collected.  B urges  v.  deny  the  validity  of  the  consolidation. 
Mabin,  70  Iowa,  633  ;  approved  Barthel  v.  Young  v.  Township  of  Clarendon,  26  Fed, 
Meader,  72  Iowa,  125.  Rep.  805.     See  infra,  sec.  541.     In. 

2  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav-  where  a  subscription  was  made  to  a  rail- 
ings Bank,  92  U.  S.  625  (1875);  Livings-  road  company  by  a  city,  payment  to  1' 
ton  County  v.  Portsmouth  Hank,  12S  U.  S.  made  when   ten   rail ps  of  the  railroad   was 
102,126  (1388);  Scott  v.  Hanshuer,   94  completed,  and  the  charter  pany 

vol.  i.  — 40 


626 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§540 


But  before  any  subscription  is  made,  or  before  any  contract  to 
subscribe  is  completed,  the  authority  to  subscribe  may  be  repealed 
or  taken  away  by  legislative  or  constitutional  provision.3  And  if 
the  authority  to  subscribe  depends  upon  a  precedent  vote  of  the 
people,  tin;  vote,  without  a  subscription  or  an  agreement  to  sub- 
scribe,  docs  nol  create  a  contract,  or  preclude  the  repeal  of  the 
authority  to  make  the  subscription:2  it  is  executory  until  the  sub- 


required  it  to  complete  its  line  in  fifteen 

year-,  11  was  held  that  an  extension  of  the 
time  within  which  the  line  could  be  com- 
pleted did  M"t  r<  lea  e  I  lie  subscription. 
Jacks  o.  City  of  Helena,   It  Ark.  213. 

1   Foi    the   effect    upon   incomplete  sub- 
scrip  >f  constitutional 

provisions  forbidding  or  limiting  the  power 
t.i  aid  railroads,  -  3ec.  5 !'-'.  note  ; 

ami.  I  loncord    v.     Robinson,     121 

('     S.    i  65,  distinguish  id,   G<  rraan  Bank 
v.  Franklin  County,   128  U.  S 
(1888)  ;   Katzenberger  v.   Aberdeen,    121 

-    17-2  ;  Oregon  v.  Jennings,  119  U.  S. 
71.  distinguished,  German  Bank  v.  Frank- 
lin Connty,  12S  I".  S.  526,  543(1888);  Nor- 
ton  v.  Shelby  County,  118  0".  S.  425.     The 
■  of  the  prohibition  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Missouri  of  1865,  of  municipal  sub- 
tions  in  aid  of  railways  without  the 
previous  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  quali- 
fied voters,  has  been  considered  in  many 
determined  in    the   State  courts  of 
ouri  and  in  the  Federal  courts.     The 
Slat.-  courts  first  held  that  the  effect  of  the 
c< institutional  provision  was  to  limit   the 
future  exercise  of  legislative  power,    hut 
ike  away  any  authority  granted 
and  in  existence  at  the  time  the  Constitu- 
tion of  Is'-'."'  went    into  operation.     Snb- 
:  ions    were  made  and    railway  bonds 
issued  when  this  construction    prevailed  ; 
and    the    Federal   courts   hell   thai    such 
bonds  were  valid.     The  Supreme  Court  of 
Mis  r"  anls   put  a  different  con- 

struction on  the  Constitution;  bu1  the 
Supren  e  •  lourl  of  the  United  States  de- 
clined t.i  reconsider  its  former  decisions,  to 
the  prejudice  of  bona  fide  holders  of  bonds 

issued  prior  to  tl hange  of  decision  in 

the  State  court.  The  cases  on  this  subiect 
are  reviewed  by  Mr.  Justice  Harlan,  in 
Scotland  County  v.  Hill,  132  U.  S.  107 
(1889). 

Illustrative  of  the  distinction  between 


the  operation  of  a  constitutional  limitation 
upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  and  of  a 
constitutional  inhibition  upon  a  mun 

e  of  Norton  v.  Brownsville, 
1  2:>  I '.  S.  479  (1888).  Here  an  act  of  Feb- 
ruary 8,  1870,  authorized  Brownsville  to 
issue  bond  in  aid  of  a  railroad  company 
on  a  majority  vote.  May  5,  1870,  the 
amended  Constitution  took  effect,  which 
ordained  thai  "  the  credit  of  no  city  shall 
be  given  or  loaned  to  or  in  aid  of  any  per- 
son or  corporation,  except  upon  an  election 
to  he  first  held  by  the  qualified  voters,  and 

ent  of  three-fourths  of  the  \ 
said  election."  May  11,  1870,  five  days 
after  the  amended  Constitution  took  effect, 
Ings  were  initiated  to  issue  bonds, 
and  an  election  was  held  under  the  act  of 
February  8,  I S7i>,  at  which  every  vote  was 
cast  for  the  issue  of  bonds.  The  bonds 
recited  that  they  were  issued  by  authority 
of  the  act  of  February  8,  1870.  It  was 
held  thai  the  power  to  issue  hoiids  under 
the  act  of  1870  not  having  been  acted 
upon  until  after  the  Constitution  of  1870 
went  into  effect,  sink  power  could  not  be 
exercised  without  further  legislation  in 
conformity  therewith  ;  the  effect  of  the 
utional  prohibition  being  to  annul 
all  unexecuted  powers  conferred  upon  the 
corporation.  Whether  this  would  have 
been  the  effed  If  the  terms  of  the  act  of 
L870  and  of  the  constitutional  amen  dim  ut 
had  nol  been  inconsistent,  quaere.  See  Jar- 
rolt  v.  Moberly,  103  V.  S.  580;  Kelley  v. 
Milan,  127  U.  S.  139,  154;  post,  sec.  851  a; 
Norton  v.  Taxing  Districl  of  Brownsville^ 
36  Fed.  Rep.  99  (TJ.  S.  Cir.  Ct.,  W.  D. 
Tenn.  1888). 

2  Aspinwall  v.  County  of  Jo  Daviess, 
22  How.  364  (1859)  ;  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis  Co.,  6  Kan.  256  (1870);  State  r. 
Saline  Co.,  45  Mo.  242  ;  Jeffries  v.  Law- 
rence, 42  Iowa,  498  (1876);  Bound  r. 
Wis.  C.  R.  Co.,  45  Wis.  543  ;  ante,  sec.  70; 


540     CONTRACTS:    bonds;   subscription  when  complete. 


027 


scription  is  actually  made.1     But  an  actual  manual  subscription  on 


post,  sec.  866,  note,  and  cases  there  cited; 
Harshman  v.  Bates  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C. 
R.  162,  note  ;  affirmed  92  l".  S.  579  ;  Ger- 
man Bank  v.  Franklin  County,  123  U.  S. 
526  ( 1888).  The  law  on  this  subj 
thus  stated  and  the  cases  referred  to  and 
distinguished,  by  Mi.  Justice  Str< 
The  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav- 
ings Bank,  supra  :  — 

"This  case  [although  between  the  same 
parties]  differs  very  materially  from  the 
case  of  The  Town  of  <  loncord  v.  The  Ports- 
mouth Savings  Bank,  No.  13,  ofthi 
[Supra,  sec.  539.]  In  that,  we  held  that 
the  1"  u ii Is  were  void  because  the  Legislative 
authority  to  issue  them  as  a  donation  to 

the  railroad  company  had  1 n  annulled 

by  the  Constitution  of  the  State  before 
the  donation  was  made.  .  .  .  But  a  sub- 
scription on  the  books  of  the  company  was 
isary,  forthat  which  amounted  to  a 
subscription  had  been  made  in  December, 
1869.  The  authorized  body  of  a  municipal 
corporation  may  hind  it  by  an  ordinance, 
which,  in  favor  of  private  persons  inter- 
ested therein,  may,  it'  so  intended,  operato 
as  a  contract,  or  they  may  hind  it  by  a 
resolution,  or  by  vote  clothe  its  officers 
with  power  to  act  for  it.  The  former  was 
the  clear  intention  in  this  ease.  The  board 
clothed  no  officer  with  power  to  act  for  it. 
The  resolution  to  subscribe  was  its  own 
act,  its  immediate  subscription.  Western 
Saving  Fund  Society  v.  The  City  of  Phil- 
adelphia, 31  Pa.  St.  175  ;  Sacramento  v. 
Kirk,  7  Cal.  419  ;  Logansport  u.  Blake- 
more,  17  Ind.  318.  In  Clarke  County 
Court  Jus.  v.  Paris,  W.  .t  Ivy.  R.  Tump. 
Co.,  11  Ben.  Monroe  (Ky.),  143,  it  was 
ruled  that  an  order  of  the  county  court, 
by  which  it  was  said  the  court  subscribed, 
on  behalf  of  <  llarke  <  lounty,  for  fifty  shares 
of  stock  in  the  turnpike  company,  if  con- 
curred in  by  a  competent  majority  of  the 
trates,  was  itself  a  subscription,  and 
bound  the  county.  There  was  no  subscrip- 
tion on  the  books  of  the  company;  hut  tho 
Couii  of  Appeals  said,  "  We  cannot,  there- 
fore, regard  this  order  as  a  mere  oiler  or 


scribe  the  fifty  shares  in  this 
parti  ulai  ro  i  L,  bu1   i  -  actually  takin 

tance  and  legal  effect  subscribing 
for  that  number  of  shares.     So  in  > 
v.  The  Supervisors  of  Putnam  County,  19 
Wall.  241,  it  was  said  that  t<> 

Hon  i,, i  a  c  mnty  to  stock  in  a 
railroad  company,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
t in  re  be  an  ad  of  manual  subscribing  on 

iks  of  the  company.      I 
lead   directly  to  the  conclusion  that   the 

action    of    tie-    1 rd    of    supervisors    in 

December,  1869,  was  in  substance  and  in 
legal  effect  a  subscription.  And  if  this 
conclusion  could  not  be  reached,  it  would 
make  but  little  difference  to  the  p 
case,  for  it  could  not  be  doubted  that  the 
action  of  the  board  was  at  least  an  under- 
taking to  subscribe,  and  this  was  a 
to  or  accepted  by  the  railroad  company. 
The  resolutions  were  entered  of  record  by 
the  clerk  and  president  of  the  railroad 
company,  and  the  company  made  an  ap- 
propriation of  the  bonds  to  be  n 
in  payment  of  the  subscription,  ty 
tract  madeon  the  15th  of  April,  1870.  In 
either  aspect  of  the  ease,  therefore,  there 
was  an  authorized  contract  existing  be- 
tween the  county  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany when  the  new  Constitution  came  into 
operation.  No  matter  whether  the  contract 
was  a  subscription  or  an  agreement  to  sub- 
scribe, it  was  not  annulled  or  impaired  by 
the  prohibitions  of  the  Constitution.  The 
delivery  of  the  bonds  was  no  more  than 
performance  of  the  contract.  For  these 
reasons,  it  is  in  vain  to  appeal  to  the  de- 
cisions made  in  Aspinwall  v.  The  County 
of  .To  Daviess.  22  How.  364,  and  Tl 
of  Concord  r.  The  Savings  Bank,  decided 
this  term.  In  neither  of  those  cases  was 
there  any  contract  made  before  the  author- 
ity to  make  one  was  annulled,  We  do  not 
assert  that  the  constitutional  provision  did 
not  abrogate  the  authority  of  the  b 
supervisors  to  make  a  subscription  for  rail- 
road stock.  <m  the  contrary,  we  think  it 
did.  But  we  hold  that  contracts  made 
under  the  power  while  it  was  in  existence 


1  77).  ,•  Cumberland  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  v.     (1874);  Shelby  Co.  Court  b    Cnm1 
Barren  C'\   Court,    10  Bush   (Ivy.),  604     &  O.  B    R.  Co.,  8  Bu 


628 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


5  541 


the  books  of  the  company  is  not  necessary  to  entitle  the  county  to 
the  stock,  or  to  bind  it  as  a  subscriber  thereto.1 


§    .ill.    Same  subject.      Completed  Subscription  ;   Effect  of  Consol- 
idation   of   Railway    Companies   on   validity    of    Subscription.  —  The 

authority  to  make  a  subscription  and  to  issue  bonds  in  payment 
therefor  may,  if  it  has  never  been  executed,be  revoked  by  any  event 
which  lias  the  legal  effect  to  extinguish  the  power.  Thus,  where 
the  power  to  subscribe  depends  upon  a  precedent  popular  vote  and 
the  vote  is  had  in  favor  of  Company  A,  which  under  a  general  law 
of  the  State  consolidated  with  Company  B,  and  formed  thereby  a 
new  company,  C,  which  consolidation  was  effected  lefore  any  sub- 
scription or  contract  for  subscription  was  made,  and  the  only  sub- 
scription made  was  to  the  consolidated  company,  without  any  new 
election,  it  was  held  that  the  subscription  was  unauthorized,  and 
that  the  bonds  which  recited  these  facts  were  void,  even  in  the 
hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.  The  ground  of  the  decision 
was  that  the  authority  to  make  the  subscription  ceased  with  the 
extinction  of  the  company  in  whose  favor  the  vote  was  had,  such 
extinction  being  .the  legal  consequence  of  the  consolidation.2     Tins 

This  is  sought  to  be  justified  on  the 
ground  that  the  former  company  became 
consolidated  with  another,  thereby  form- 
ing a  third,  to  whose  stock  the  subscrip- 
tion was  made.  This  consolidation  was 
effected  under  a  law  of  Missouri  authoriz- 
ing consolidations,  ami  declaring  that  the 
company  formed  from  two  companies 
should  be  entitled  to  all  the  powers, 
rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  which 
belong  to  either  :  and  it  is  contended  that 
this  provision  of  the  law  justified  the 
county  court  in  making  the  subscription 
without  further  authority  from  the  peo- 
ple of  the  township.  But  did  not  the 
authority  cease  by  the  extinction  of  the 
company  voted  for  ?  No  subscription 
had  been  made.  No  vested  right  had 
accrued  to  the  company.  The  case  of 
The  State  v.  Linn  County  Court,  44  Mo. 
504,  only  decides  that  if  the  county  court 
refuses  to  issue  bonds  after  making  a 
subscription,  :i  mandamus  will  lie  to  com- 
pel it  to  issue  them.  There  the  authori- 
ty had  been  executed  and  a  right  had. 
become  vested.  But  so  long  as  it  re- 
mains unexecuted,  the  occurrence  of  any 
event  which  creates  a  revocation  in  law 
will  extinguish  the    power.     The    extine- 


were  valid  contracts,  and  that  the  obliga- 
tions assumed  by  them  continued  after  the 
power  to  enter  into  such  contracts  was 
withdrawn.  The  operation  of  the  Consti- 
tution was  only  prospective.  Indeed,  ii 
is  expressly  ordained  in  its  schedule  that 
'all  rights,  actions,  prosecutions,  claims, 
and  contracts  of  the  State,  individuals, 
or  bodies  corporate,  shall  continue  to  he 
as  valid  as  if  this  Constitution  had  not 
been  adopted.'  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say  that,  under  the  act  of  the  general 
assembly,  the  authority  to  make  a  sub- 
scription was  coupled  with  an  authority 
and  a  duty  to  issue  county  bonds  for  the 
sum  subscribed.  No  action  of  the  board 
was  needed  after  the  subscription  was 
made." 

1  Cass  County  v.  Gillett,  100  U.  S. 
585. 

'-'  Earshman  v.  Bates  County,  92  TJ.  S. 
560  (1875).  The  grounds  of  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  on  this  point  are  thus 
succinctly  stated  by  Bradley,  J.:  — 

"  Another  objection  to  the  validity  of 
the  subscription  for  which  the  bonds  were 
given  in  this  ease  is,  that  the  township 
voted  a  subscription  to  one  company  and 
the  county  court  subscribed   tc*   another. 


§  S41 


contracts:  bonds  to  consolidated  railway. 


629 


case  differs  from  Nugent  v.  The  Supervisors  of  Putnam  County1  in 
the  material  circumstance  that  in  that  case  the  subscription  to  one 
of  the  constituent  companies  was  before  the  consolidation,  while  in 
thi  "tie  it  whs  afterwards  In  this  case  there  was  nothing  but  a 
bare  vote  before  the  consolidation,  which,  without  more,  creal 
contract  between  the  municipality  and  (he  railroad  company  ;  while 
in  the  Putnam  County  case  there  was  ;i  subscription  in  addition  to 
the  vote,  before  the  consolidation;  and  the  right,  bavin-  become 
vested  in  the  railroad  company,  may  bo  transferred  to  another  on  an 
authorized  consolidation  1  icing  effected.  Where  the  consolidation  is 
provided  for  or  contemplated  by  the  legislation  of  the  State  in  force 
when  the  subscription  is  made,  a  subsequent  consolidation,  in  pur- 
suance of  the  enactment,  does  not  have  the  effect  to  invalidate  the 
subscription.     This  principle  was  distinctly  settled  m  the  Putnam 


tion  of  the  company  in  whose  favor  the 
subscription  was  authorized  worked  such 
a  revocation.  The  law  authorizing  the 
consolidation  of  railroad  companies  does 
not  change  the  law  of  attorney  and  con- 
stituent. It  may  transfer  the  vested  rights 
of  one  railroad  company  to  another, 
upon  a  consolidation  being  effected  ;  but 
it  does  not  continue  in  existence  powers 
to  suhscrihe  for  stock  given  by  one  per- 
son to  another,  which,  by  the  general 
law,  are  extinguished  by  such  a  change. 
It  does  not  profess  to  do  so,  and  we  think 
it  does  not  do  so  by  implication.  As  suf- 
ficient notice  of  these  objections  is  con- 
tained in  the  recitals  of  the  bonds  them- 
selves to  put  the  bolder  on  inquiry,  we 
think  that  there  was  no  error  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  circuit  court  ;  and  it  is,  there- 
fore, affirmed." 

Same  case  in  circuit  court,  3  Dillon 
C.  C.  R.  150  ;  s  p.  McClure  .-.  Oxford, 
94  U.  S.  429;  Bates  County  v.  Winters,  97 
U.S.  83  (1877)  ;  S.  C.  again.  Ill'  I'.  S. 
325  (1SS4),  and  see  Livingston  County  v. 
Portsmouth  Bank,  128  U.  S.  102  (1888), 
where  the  same  statutes  are  considered, 
and  the  court  refused  to  apply  the  .: 
of  Harshman  v.  Bates  County,  92  I'.  S. 
569,  and  Bates  County  v.  Winters,!'?  U.  S. 
83.  See  supra,  sec.  540,  note  ;  State  v. 
Garroute,  67  Mo.  445,  where  the  court 
say  the  consolidation  docs  not  operate  to 
transfer  to  the  latter  the  franchises  and 
unexecuted  rights  of  former  companies 
so  as  10  authorize  a    subscription    to   be 


made  to  the  Hannibal  &  St.  Joseph  Rail- 
road Co.  without  a  popular  Voti 
such  subscription  is  void.  The  consolida- 
tion operated  an  extinction  of  the  original 
company,  and  the  power  to  subscribe 
thereto  perished  with  the  company.  In 
such  case  there  could  be  no  innocent 
purchasers  of  the  bonds.  lb.  See  refer- 
ence to  this  case  in  Livingston  County  v. 
Portsmouth  Bank,  128  U.  S.  p.  128  (1888). 
See  also  Menasha  v.  Hazard,  102  D".  S. 
81.  In  Iowa  it  is  held  that  the  alienation 
of  a  railroad  before  its  completion  works  a 
forfeiture  of  a  tax  voted  in  its  aid,  the 
□  being  ba  >i  d  upon  the  provisions 
of  a  statute  requiring  that  the  taxpayers 
shall  receivestock  in  the  corporation  to 
the  amount  of  taxes  paid  by  them.  II  id 
also,  that  the  collection  of  taxes  in  such 
,  ases  may  be  enjoined  at  the  suit  of  a  tax- 
payer. Manning  v.  Matthews,  66  Iowa, 
675  ;  Blunt  v.  Carpenter,  68  Iowa,  265. 

1  Nugent  v.  The  Supervisors  of  Put- 
nam County,  19  Wall.  241.  See  Kay  Co. 
v.  Vansycle,  96  V.  S.  675,  when-  a  sub- 
scription by  the  county  authorities  to 
another  company  was  sustained  and  the 
doctrine  of  estoppel  applied.  Sec'  also, 
Cass  Co.  v.  Gillett,  100  U  S.  585  :  Bar- 
ter  v.  Kernochan,  103  U.  S.  562.  One 
subscription  docs  no1  exhaust  the  power. 
People  >:  Waynesville,  SS  111.  469.  Ir- 
regularities no  defence.  Roberts  v.  Holies, 
101  U.  S.  119  ;  Empire  Tp,  v.  Darlington, 
101  U.  S.  87. 


630 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  542 


County  case  just  cited  ; '  and  such  existing  legislative  authority  to 
change  the  organization  controlled  the  decision,  and  constituted,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  court,  the  -round  of  distinction  between  that 

case  and  the  oft  cited  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County.-  Indeed, 
the  Supreme  Court  has  since  gone  further,  and  has  frequently  de- 
cided, where  at  the  date  of  the  vote  in  favor  of  the  constituent 
company  there  exists  a  statute  authorizing  its  consolidation  with 
another  company,  that  such  consolidation  does  not  necessarily  ex- 
tinguish the  power  to  subscribe  given  by  the  vote,  and  that  bonds 
issued  to  the  consolidated  company  under  such  vote  are,  or  might 
be  valid.3 


§  ."42.  There  must  be  a  Valid  Legislative  Act  as  the  Basis 
of  the  Power  ;  Construction  of  Special  Powers.  —  A  purchaser 
of  municipal  bonds  is  bound,  as  has  already  been  incidentally 
shown,  to  take  notice  of  any  inovisions  of  the  Constitution  or  legisla- 
tion of  the  State  relating  to  the  power  of  the  municipality  to  issue 
them;  and  if  the  act  conferring  the  power  is  in  conflict  with  the 
Constitution,  the  bonds  are  void,  even  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide 
holder  for  value.4     And  the  purchaser  must  also  notice  the  pro- 


1   19  Wall.   241.      The    principle    was 
followed  ami  applied  in  Thomas  v.  Scot- 
land County,  3   Dillon   C.  C.  R.  7  ;   s.  c.  _ 
94  U.  S.  682,  and   in   Washburn  v.  Cass 
County,  3  Dillon  CO.  R.  251,  and  the 

1 Is    held    valid    notwithstanding    tin; 

consolidation.  A  change  in  the  name  of 
the  company  will  no1  invalidate  the  sub- 
scription.    Reading  v.  Wedder,  66  111.  80. 

-  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676.  In  People  v.  Granville,  104  111.  285, 
an  act  providing  that  the  liability  of 
municipal  corporations  which  had  voted 
aid  to  railroads  should  < case  on  a  certain 
date,  after  which  no  bonds  should  be 
issued  in  virtue  of  any  previous  vote,  was 
held  to  be  a  statute  of  limitation,  not 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts;  and 
a  mandamus  to  compel  the  issue  of  bonds 
after  that  date  was  refused. 

8  County  of  Scotland  V.  Thomas,  94 
U.  S.  682  (1876), distinguishing  Harshman 
v.  Bates  County,  92  1'.  S.  569  ;  s.  P. 
Scotland  County  t>.  Hill.  132  U.  S.  107 
(1889);  !'■  I  Lincoln  v.  Davenport,  94  TJ.  S. 
(1876)  ;  Wilson  v.  Salamanca,  99 
r.  S.  499  (1878)  :  Menasha  ».  Hazard,  102 
U.  S.  81  (1880)  :  Harter  v.  Kernochan,  103 
U.  S.  562  (1880);  New  Buffalo  v.  Iron  Co. 


105  U.  S.  73  (1881).  The  cases  on  this 
subjeci  are  carefully  stated  and  considered 
by  Blatchford,  .1.,  in  Livingston  County  v. 
Portsmouth  Hank,  128  U.  S.  102  (1888), 
distinguishing  and  limiting,  if  not,  indeed, 
overruling  Harshman  v.  Bates  County. 
Ante,  sec.  540. 

4  Harshman  v.  Bates  County,  92  U.  S. 
569  (1875),  distinguished,  Hate.-,  County  v. 
Winters,  112  U.  S.  325;  Lamoille  Val.  II. 
R  Co.  v.  Fairfield,  51  Vt.  257:  Allen  v. 
Louisiana,  103  U.  S.  80  ;  Jarrolt  v. 
Moberly,  103  U.  S.  580;  Wells  v.  Pontotoc 
Co.  Sup.,  102  U.  S.  625  ;  Ogden  v.  Daviess 
( ',,.,  102  U.  S.  634;  supra,  sec.  529a; post, 
sec.  553.  As  the  decision  in  the  first  case 
is  supposed  to  invalidate  all  the  bonds  is- 
sued under  the  Township  Aid  Act  of  Mis- 
souri, of  March  23,  1868,  said  to  amount 
to  nearly  $3,000,000,  the  point  on  which 
the  act  was  decided  to  be  unconstitutional 
will  be  stated.  The  Constitution  of  1865, 
Ait.  II.  sec.  14,  prohibited  such  subscrip- 
tions "unless  two-thirds  of  tli,  qualified 
voters  of  the"  municipality  issuing  the 
bonds  "  shall  assent  tliercto."  The  Town- 
ship Aid  Act  authorized  the  issue  of 
bonds  "if  two-thirds  of  the  qualified  vo- 
ters of  the  township  voting  at  such  election 


§542 


contracts:    bonds;   special  powers. 


631 


visions  and  extent  of  the  legislative  enactments  on  the  subject.1 
Thus  where  authority  was  given  to  certain  counties  lying  north  of 


are  in  favor  of  the  subscription."  The 
Supreme  Court  held  that  there  is  a  broad 
difference  between  the  Constitution  and 
the  act,  —  the  former  requiring  thi 
of  two-thirds  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the 
municipality,  while  the  latter  requires 
the  assent  of  only  two-thirds  of  the  qual- 
ified voters  who  vote  at  the  election.  The 
same  case,  in  the  court  below,  decided  on 
another  ground,  — the  constitutional  ques 
tion  being  made  for  the  first  time  in  the 
Supreme  Court,—  is  reported  in  3  Dillon 
C.  C.  R.  150.  Post  v.  Supervisors,  105 
U.  S.  667  ;  South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins,  94 
U.  S.  260.  In  these  two  eases  an  act  au- 
thorizing the  issue  of  municipal  bonds 
which  had  been  passed  in  conformity  with 
the  requirements  of  the  Constitution  of 
Illinois  was  declared  void  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  following  tint 
uniform  decisions  of  the  State  court,  and 
the  bonds  issued  in  pursuance  of  it  were 
held  to  be  invalid  even  in  the  hands  of 
those  who  took  them  for  value,  and  in 
the  belief  that  they  had  been  lawfully  is- 
sued. 

Effect  of  constitutional  provision  adopted 
in  1870  on  existing  powers  to  aid  railways 
in  Mississippi.  Infra,  sec.  544,  note  ;  Cal- 
houn Co.  Sup.  v.  Galbraith,  99  U.  S.  214  ; 
Woodward  v.  Calhoun  Co.  Sup.  (U.  S. 
Dist.  Court  for  Mississippi ,  II ill,  J.), 
2  Cent.  Law  Jour.  396.  In  Ohio,  Cass  v. 
Dillon,  2  Ohio  St.  607;  State  v.  Union 
Tp.,  8  Ohio,  394.  In  Missouri,  State  v. 
Sullivan  Co.  Court,  51  Mo.  531  ;  Kansas 
City,  St.  J.  &  C.  13.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Nodaway 
Co.  Court  Jus.,  47  Mo.  349;  State  v.  Same, 
48  Mo.  339;  State  v.  Macon  Co.  Court,  41 
Mo.  453  ;  Smith  v.  Clark  County,  54 
Mo.  58  ;  State  v.  Greene  County,  5  1  Mo. 
540;  Thomas  v.  Sentinel  County,  3  Dil- 
lon (  .  C.  R.  7  ;  Nicolay  v.  St.  Clair 
County,  lb.  163;  Suidekoper  v.  Dallas 
County,  Il>.  171  ;  Jordan  v.  Cass  County, 
lb.  185;  Foster  v.  Callaway  Countv,  Th. 
200;  Henry  County  v.  Nicolay.  95  1'.  S 
619  ;  Callaway  Countv  v.  Foster.  93  D*.  S. 
567;  Louisiana  v.  Taylor,  105  U.S.  154  ; 
Ralls  County  v.  Douglass,  lb.  72S;  Scot- 
laud  Countv  v.  Thomas.  94  U.  S.  682; 
Macon  County  v.  Shores,   97  U.  S.  272. 


mty  v.  Gillett,  100  I  .  8. 
585,  affirming  Henry  Count} 
95  I'.  8.  619  ;  Jarrott  v.  Moberly, 
253;    Howard    County   v.    Paddock,    110 
U.  S.  384. 

The  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
which  require  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of 
the  qualified  voters  of  a  county  to  a  sub- 
scription on  its  behalf  for  stock  in  a  cor- 
poration, do  not  apply  to  cases  where 
such  subscription  is  ma  k  in  a 

railroad  company  pursuant  to  the  power 
conferred  l>y  its  charter  granted  prior  to 
the  adoption  of  that  <  Constitution,  notwith- 
standing the  contemplate!  t,  branch 
road,  the  construction  of  which,  although 
authorized  by  such  charter,  is  undertaken 
asan  independent  enterprise  under  the  ..■  I 
of  March  21,  1868,  entitled  "An  act  to 
aid  in  the  building  of  branch  railroads  in 
the  State  of  Missouri."  Cass  County  v. 
Gillett,  100  U.  S.  585;  Scotland  County 
v.  Hill,  132  U.  S.  107  (1889)  ;  ante,  see. 
540. 

1  German  Savings  Lank  v.  Franklin 
County,  128  U.  S.  526,  53S  I 
"When  the  Savings  Bank  purchased  the 
bonds,  it  was,  notwithstanding  the  n  - 
dtals  on  the  fact  of  them,  chargeable  with 
notice  of  the  Aet  of  April  16,  1869  [which 
contained  provisions  which  invalidated 
the  bonds,  but  which  Act  was  not  recited 
or  referred  to  in  the  bonds],  and  of  the 
construction  which  had  then  been  given 
to  it  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois 
prior  to  the  issue  of  these  bonds,  in  Town 
of  Eagle  v.  Kohn,  S4  111.  292."  fh.  per 
Blatchford,  J.,  pp.  537,  538.  Post,  see. 
545,  note.  "Every  person  dealing  with 
such  a  corporation  must,  at  his  p 
notice  of  the  existence  and  U  rms  of  the  law 
by  which  it  is  claimed  the  power  to  issue 
such  bonds  is  conferred.  The  power  to 
issue  sueh  bonds  is  derived  exclusively 
from  the  legislative  authority  of  thi  S 
and  the  laws  which  confer  them  enter  into 
and  form  a  part  of  the  bonds  them 
The  holler  of  a  municipal  bond  is  charge- 
able with  notice  of  the  statutory  provis- 
ions under  which  thev  are  issued."  Wal- 
lace, J.  National  Bank  v.  Si 
Fed.  hep.  216.      In  this  case  a  statutory 


.J 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  542 


:i   River,  a  subscription   made  and  bonds  issued  undei 
h  authority  by  a  county  south  ut'  the  river  arc  void  in  the  hands 
ir)  body.] 

provision  authorizing  the  city  to  call  in 
bonds  and  pay  the  same  at  any  time,  and 
pro\  iding  thai  upon  tender  of  the  principal 
the  interest  should  cease,  was  held  to  be 
effective  as  againsl  a  holder  for  value  before 
maturity.  <  iting  I  Igden  v.  County  of 
Daviess,  102  U.  S.  634  ;  Anthony  v.  Jasper 
County,  101  U.  S.  I 

Toledo  v.  Porter  Tp.,  1101    S.  608.  Infra, 
5  13. 

S  irrard  v.  Lafayette  County,  3  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  R.  236  (1875).  The  case  was 
briefly  this  :  By  an  acl  of  the  legislature 
.  a  company  was  incorporated 
with  power  to  construct  a  railroad  from 
the  town  of  Louisiana,  which  is  situated 
on  the  Mississippi  River,  north  of  the 
Misssouri  River,  to  a  point  on  the  Mis- 
souri River,  and  the  county  court  of  any 
county  in  which  any  part  of  thi  routi  of 
said  load  should  lie  was  authorized  to  sub- 
scribe stock  to  the  company,  without  a 
vote  of  the  people.  Afterwards  the  uew 
Constitution  of  Missouri  went  into  effect, 
prohibiting  the  General  Assembly  (1)  from 
co  p     il  ions  by  special  act,   ex- 

r  municipal  purposes  ;  (2)  from 
authorizing  any  county,  &c.,  to  become  a 
stockholder  in.  or  loaning  its  credit  to, 
any  company,  association,  or  corporation, 

two-thirds  of  the   qua 

'   thereto.      Subsequently   to 

this  the  legislature  passed  an  act  purport- 

d  the  charter  of  the  said  rail- 

impany,  which  provided  thai  the 
county  courl   of  any  county  in  which  any 

;  the  line  of  said  railroad  mi 
located  might  subscribe  to  the  stork  of 
said  company  and  issue  bonds,  &c.  Under 
■  t.  the  county  courl  of  Lafayette 
County,  a  county  lying  wholly  south  of 
the  Missouri  River,  issued  without  a  vote 
of  tJte  people,  the  bonds  from  which  the 
coupons  here  sued  on  were  detached,  and 
Beveral  instalments  of  interest  had  been 
paid  on  them,     ffi  'd,  1.  That  the  amend- 

ict   from   which  authority   ' 

•  •ids  is  claimed  is  a  special  act,  in 
effect  creating  a  new  corporation,  and   is 
.Hi  [ted  by  the  S1  ite  Constitution. 
2    That  it  was  not  competent  for  tl 


lature,  by  extending  the  route  of  the  pro« 
jn.M'd  road  beyond  the  point  designated  in 
iriginal  charter,  to  authorize  a  county 
south  of  the  Missouri  River  to  incur 
indebtedness  in  aid  of  the  road,  with- 
out a  two-thirds  vote  as  required  by  the 
Con  titution.  3.  That  since  there  was  an 
entire  want  of  power  to  issue  the  bonds, 
they  were  void  even  in  the  hands  of  inno- 
cent purchasers.  4.  That  the  fact  that 
the  county  court  had  paid  interest  on 
these  bonds  did  not  estop  it  from  after- 
wards setting  up  their  invalidity.  Hut 
see  Bun  v.  Chariton  County,  12  Fed.  Rep. 
848. 

Construction  of  special  power.  The  act 
which  authorized  the  issuing  of  the  bonds 
to  pay  the  county  subscriptions  to  a  rail- 
way company  directed  that  the  bonds  so 
issued  should  be  made  payable  to  "  the 
president  and  directors  of  the  railroad 
company,  and  their  successors  and  as- 
signs." The  bonds  issued  wi  re  made  pay- 
able to  "the  railroad  company  or  bearer." 
It  was  held  that  the  power  granted  was 
sufficiently  pursued,  and  that  the  bonds  so 
issued  were  valid.  Woodward  v.  Calhoun 
Co.  Sup.  (U.  S.  Dist.  Court  for  Mississippi, 
Hill,  J.),  2  Cent.  Law  Jour.  396  (1874). 
Special  act  held  to  control  general  act. 
( Ihicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Otoe  County, 
16  Wall.  667  (1872). 

Power  tn  donate  bonds  in  lieu  of  lands 
and  right  of  way.  By  various  provisions 
of  a  city  charter,  the  mayor  and  city  coun- 
cil well'  authorized  to  make  donations  of 
land  for  the  right  of  way  and  other  privi- 
leges to  a  railroad  company,  and  to  ex- 
pend money  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring 
land  to  be  given,  ami  were  authorized  to 
borrow  money  to  an  unlimited  extent, 
when  instructed  so  to  do  by  a  popular 
vote,  and  further,  to  issue  bonds  to  fund 
any  indebtedness  of  the  city,  existing  or 
t,,  be  created.  Under  this  authority,  a 
railroad  company,  by  reason  of  complying 
with  certain  conditions,  became  entitled  to 

del I  It 'he  city  the  right  of  way  and 

depot  grounds.  The  company  agreed  with 
the  ,-ity  to  accept  the  bonds  voted  to  pro- 
cure the  right  of  way  and  grounds  in  lieu 


§543 


CONTRACTS  :     BONDS  :    REGISTRATION    STATUTES. 


§    543.   Registration    of   Bonds  ;    Effect   of    Fraudulent   Antedating. 

—  The  history  of  the  issue  of  municipal  bonds  in  this  country  shows 
that  conditions  imposed  by  law  requiring  a  popular  vote,  or  condi- 
tions in  the  propositions  submitted  to  the  voters,  intended  to  prevent 
fraud  and  to  secure  the  actuaJ  building  and  completion  of  the  roads, 
have  been  often  evaded;  and  bonds  issued  without  compliance 
therewith.  Such  bonds,  when  negotiated  for  value,  the  courts,  as 
we  have  seen,  have  held  to  be  binding.     To  previ  i  improper 

or  improvident  issue  of  bonds  in  the  future,  the  legislatures  of  some 
of  the  States  have  passed  acts  requiring  all  bonds  to  be  registered 
with  one  of  the  executive  departments  of  the  State  before  they  are 
issued  or  negotiated.  Thus  in  1872  1  the  legislature  of  .Missouri,  a 
State  in  which  many  fraudulent  bunds  had  been  issued,  passed  an 
act  which  provided  that  "  before  any  bond,  hereafter  issued  by  any 
county,  .  .  .  shall  obtain  validity  or  be  negotiated"  it  must  be  first 
registered  by  the  State  auditor,  who  shall  certify  thereon  that  all 
conditions  precedent  required  by  law,  and  by  the  contract  under 
which  the  bonds  were  ordered  to  be  issued,  have  been  complied 
with.     In  the  case  of  Anthony  v.  Jasper  County,2  it  appeared  that 


of  the  right  of  way  and  grounds,  and  it 
was  held  that  the  city  had  the  power  thus 
to  agree,  and  that  the  bonds  were  valid. 
Converse  v.  Fort  Scott,  92  U.  S.  503 
(1875);  s.  c.  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  449. 

A  proposition  once  voted  down  may  be 
subsequently  re-submitted  and  adopted, 
unless  the  act  evinces  a  contrary  inten- 
tion. Soc.  for  Saw  v.  New  London,  29 
Conn.  174  ;  Smith  v.  Clark  County,  54 
Mo.  58  ;  Woodward  v.  Calhoun  County,  2 
Cent.  Law  Jour.  396.  In  Kentucky  it  is 
held  that  municipal  corporations  are  not 
restricted  to  one  subscription.  Tyler's 
Ex.  v.  Elizabethtown  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  9 
Bush  (Ky.),  510  (1872).  Second  subscrip- 
tion held  valid.     lb. 

Issue  of  bonds  before  law  authorizing 
it  took  effect.  Rochester  v.  Alfred  Bank, 
13  Wis.  432 ;  Berliner  v.  Waterloo,  14 
Wis.  378. 

1  Act  of  March  30,  1872  (Laws  of  Mis- 
souri, 1S72,  p.  5<!). 

2  Anthony  v.  Jasper  County,  4  Dillon 
C.  C.  R.  136  (1876);  s.  c.  3  Cent.  Law 
Jour.  321  ;  affirmed  101  U.  S.  693.  In 
deliverim,'  its  judgment,  the  Circuit  Court 
said:  "If  the  bunds  bore  date  after  the 
act  of  March  30,  1S72,  and  had  not  been 
registered,  it  is  plain,  we  think,  that  they 


would  have  no  'validity,'  and  hem 
not  support  an  action  in  the  hands  of  any 
person.  But  they  are  antedated  ;  and  the 
question  is,  whether  they  have  validity  in 
the  hands  of  the  innocent  purchasi  r.  Opon 
the  best  consideration  we  have  heen  able 
to  give,  our  conclusion  is  that  the  bonds 
cannot  be  enforced.  The  case;  comes  with- 
in tin'  doctrine,  which  is  well  settled,  that 
where  a  statute  declares  absolutely  and 
without  exception  that  a  contract  or  bond 
or  note  is  void,  it  is  void  into  whosesoever 
hands  it  may  come.  This  statute  declares 
that  no  unregistered  bond  shall  he  valid  or 
be  negotiated.  Bonds  must  first  he  regis- 
tered. Without  registration  they  ' 
no  validity.'  Such  is  the  statute.  A  dec- 
laration that  bonds  shall  have  no  valid- 
ity is  equivalent  to  declaring  them  to  be 
void.     Is  the  county  estopped  to  sel   it]' 

this  defei '     We  think  not.     The  case 

is  to  be  distinguished,  we  think,  from 
those  decided  bytheSupt  I  of  the 

United  States,  in  which  it  is  held  that  the 
frauds  of  th<'  officers  cannot  be  visited 
upon  the  innocent  bondholder,  and  falls 
within  the  principle  of  Bayley  v.  Taber,  5 
Mass.  236.  In  that  case  it  was  held, 
where  a  statute  enacted  thai  promissory 
notes  of  a  certain  description,    '  made  or 


M'  NICIPAL   COEPOEATIONS. 


§543 


bonds  were  si  aled,  and  issued  in  the  manner  above  appear- 

e  went  into  effect,  and  were  antedated  to  a  date 
prior  to  of  that  enactment     In  point  of  fact  the  con- 

ditions "ii  which  the  bonds  bad  beeo  voted  bad  oot  been  fully  com- 
plied with;  and  bence  they  could  oot  have  been,  and  were  not, 
Lfied  by  the  auditor  as  registered  bonds.  The  bonds  found  their 
way  into  the  hands  of  an  innocent  bolder  for  value,  who  did  not 
know  thai  the  bonds  bore  a  false  date.  The  Circuit  Court  held 
that  the  bonds  could  not  be  enforced,  and  that  the  county  was  not 
estopped  to  sel  up  the  defence,  —  a  decision  which  necessarily  im- 
plied a  distinctioo  between  such  a  case  and  those  in  which  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  had  held  that  the  county  or 
municipality  could  not  visit  the  frauds  of  their  officers  upon  the 
innocent  holders  of  the  bonds.  The  case  was  taken  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  and  the  distinction  taken  below  was  ad- 
judged to  be  sound.1 

A  municipal  corporation  issued  bonds  valid  on  their  face,  but  in 


issued'  after  a  specified  day,  should  tic 
'utterly  void,  and  uo  action  should  be 
sustained  thereon,'  that  it  was  competent 
to  the  makers  of  such  uotes,  when 
upon  notes  bearing  date  be/ori  the  day 
fixed  by  the  statute,  to  prove  thai  they 
wi  re,  in  fact,  made  and  issui  d  aft*  r  such 
day.  The  principle  of  that  ease  is  the 
same  as  in  the  ease  a1  th'e  bar,  and  if  that 
ound  principle  when  applied  to  the 
in.livi.lual  make]'  of  prohibited  paper,  it 
i  [d  applj  with  at  leasl  equal  force  in 
favor  of  public  bodies,  where  cine  or  two 
officers,  without  the  consent  of  the  others, 
may,  as  in  this  case,  combine  to  evade  the 
luw,  the  other  officers  being  innocent  of 
wrongful  pai  tii  Lpation.  The  principle  in- 
volved is  one  of  greal  consequence.  For 
illustration  :  Loose  and  general  powers 
been  heretofore  given  in  this  State  to 
municipalitie  ind  counties  to  i  i  in  a  h 
bonds.     Tl  has  been  taken  away 

by    the    i,  1 1  i- .it.     Can    the    pro- 

us  of  that  instrument  he 
evaded  and  rendered  useless  by  the  mere 
fraudulent  acl  of  the  officers  of  the  county 

in  antedating  the  b Is  I    If  so,  the  power 

to  defraud  is  endowed  with  a  fearful  vital- 
ity, which  survives  the  prohibitions  of  I  lie 
Constitution,  ami  threatens  to  become  im- 
mortal." 

'['hi  ■  '"  in  Hoif  v. 


Jasper  County,  110  TJ.  S.  53,  where  it  was 
also  held  that  innocent  holders  lor  value 
are  charged  with  the  duty  of  knowing  the 
laws  concerning  the  registration  and  certi- 
fication of  bonds,  and  of  inquiring  whether 
they  have  been  complied  with.  Northern 
Bank  v.  Porter  Township,  110  U.  S.  6 
Lewis  v.  Commissioners,  105  U.  S.  739  ; 
Menasha  v.  Hazard,  102  U.  S.  81.  Con> 
striicti"n  of  Kansas  1:<>ii<!  Registration  Act. 
January  v.  Johnson  County,  :>  Dillon  C.  C. 
R.  3!>'J;  Bissell  v.  Spring  Valley  Township, 
124  U.  S.  225  ;  Crow  v.  Oxford,  119  I'.  S. 
215;  Lewis  v.  Comm'ra,  105  (J.  S.  739. 
Nebraska  Registration  Act.  Dixon  County 
v.  Field,  111  U.  S.  83.  Illinois  Registra- 
tion Act.  German  Sav.  Bank  v.  Franklin 
Co.,  128  U.  S.  526,  540  (1888). 

1  Anthony  v.  Jasper  County,  101  TJ.  S. 
693  (1879)  ;  Douglass  v.  Lineoln  County 
(Mo.),  5  Fed.  Rep.  775.  Where  a  constitu- 
tion or  law  fails  to  give  conclu  ive  effect  to 
registration  or  to  the  certificate  thereof,  the 
certificate  will  not  conclude  a  municipal 
corporation  from  denying  the  facts  certi- 
fied to.      Dixon  County  V.   field.    111   U.S. 

83  ;  s.  o.  supra,  see.  529  a  ;  s.  p.  German 
Sav.  Bank  V.  Franklin  County,  128  U.  S. 
526,  540  (1888),  distinguishing  Lewis  v.. 
Barbour  Co.  Comm'rs,  L05  0*.  S.  739. 
See  also  Crow  v.  Oxford  Tp.,  119  U.  S 
215. 


§544 


CONTRACTS:     BONDS;     CURATIVE    ACTS. 


G35 


fact  void,  became  they  were  antedated  to  evadt  tfa  r  gistration  act,  and 
were  not  registered;  the  corporation  had  power  to  burrow  money, 
and  the  proceeds  of  the  bonds  passed  into  the  city  treasury  and 
were  used  Tor  lawful  purposes  ;  it  was  held  that  the  corporation  was 
liable  in  an  action  for  money  had  and.  received  to  the  purchaser  of 
the  bonds  or  his  assignee,  not  for  the  amount  of  the  bonds,  but  for 
the  amount  of  racney  actually  paid  for  the  bonds  to  the  corporation, 
with  simple  interest  thereon.1 


§  544.  Retrospective  Statutes  validating  Irregular  Subscriptions 
and  Bonds. —  In  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restrictions, 
the  competency  of  the  legislature  to  enact  retrospective  statutes, 
to  validate  an  irregular  or  defective  execution  of  a  power  by  a 
municipal  or  public  corporation,  is  undoubted.2     And  the  power 


1  Wood  v.  Louisiana,  5  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 
122  (1S78),  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
102  U.  S.  294  ;  Gause  v.  Clarksville,  1 
Fed.  Rep.  353  ;  ante,  sec.  461  ;  compare 
Litchfield  v.  Ballou,  114  U.  S.  190.  See 
supra,  sec.  529  a,  and  note.  The  general 
subject  of  implied  liability  of  municipal 
corporations  has  been  treated  in  another 
connection. 

2  Keithsburg  v.  Frick,  34  111.  405; 
County  of  Jasper  v.  Ballou,  103  TJ.  S. 
745  ;  Copes  v.  Charleston,  10  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  Law,  491  ;  McMillen  v.  Boyles,  6 
Iowa,  304  ;  lb.  394  ;  Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque, 
1  Wall.  220  (note  statute  there  con- 
strued); People  v.  Mitchell,  35  N.  Y. 
551  ;  Thomson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall. 
327  ;  Bass  v.  Columbus,  30  Ga.  845  (1860); 
Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  287 
(1860)  ;  Campbell  v.  Kenosha,  5  Wall. 
194  ;  Kenosha  v.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477 
(1869)  ;  Steines  v.  Franklin  County,  48 
Mo.  167  (1871);  Knapp  v.  Grant,  27Wis. 
147  (1870);  Black  v.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621 
( 1  b 7 4 ) ;  Duauesburgh  v.  Jenkins,  57  N.  Y. 
177  (1874),  overruling  s.  C.  46  Barb.  294, 
and  distinguishing  People  v.  Batchellor, 
53  X.  Y.  128  ;  Kimball  v.  Rosendale,  42 
Wis.  4o7  (1677);  S.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  421  ; 
Ritchie  v.  Franklin  Co.,  22  Wall.  67  (1874); 
Bradley  v.  Franklin  Co.,  65  Mo.  638 
(1877);  Lewis  v.  Shreveport,  3  Woods  C. 
C.  205  ;  Cooley  on  Const.  Lira.  371,  and 
cases  there  cited;  ante,  sees.  ;>,  7."*,  79, 
419  ;  post,  sec.  554,  note  ;  Bolles  r.  Town 
of  Brimfield,  120  U.  S.  759  ;  Otoe  County 


v.  Baldwin,  111  U.  S.  1  ;  Thompson  v. 
Perrine,  103  U.  S.  806  ;  approved  Same  v. 
Same,  106  U.  S.  589  ;  Dows  v.  Town  of 
Elmwood,  34  Fed.  Rep.  114;  Gardner  w. 
Haney,  86  Ind.  17.  The  legislature  may 
legalize  a  subscription  to  the  stock  of  a 
railroad,  made  by  a  municipal  corporation 
without  authority,  unless  prohibited  by 
the  Constitution,  and  if  the  subscription 
would  have  been  legal  had  it  been  dune 
under  legislative  authority.  Grenada 
County  v.  Brogden,  112  IT.  S.  261,  distin- 
guished Hays  v.  Holly  Springs,  114  U.  S. 
120,  referred  to  infra.  See  also  Otoe 
County  v.  Baldwin,"  111  U.  S.  1  ;  Cooley 
on  Taxation,   223,  232. 

In  Mississippi  it  is  held  that  where  the 
State  Constitution  prohibits  the  legisla- 
ture from  authorizing  the  issue  of  muni- 
cipal obligations  in  aid  of  corporations,  or 
lending  of  credit  therefor,  except  on  con- 
dition that  two-thirds  of  the  quali  i  1 
voters  assent  thereto  at  an  election,  the 
legislature  cannot,  by  a  mere  retrospec- 
tive act,  validate  municipal  bonds  which 
were  issued  without  legislative  authority 
before  the  Constitution  became  operative. 
Sykes  v.  Columbus,  55  Miss.  115;  Gren- 
ada Co.  v.  Brogden,  112  TJ.  S.  261  ;  Hays 
v.  Holly  Springs,  111  U.  S.  120,  refern  1 
to  in  this  section,  infra.      Sei  .  •   ;iro, 

&  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sparta,  77  111.  505 
(1S75). 

In  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  666,  where  it  appeared  that  the 
election   at   which    the   subscription   was. 


636 


M!  NICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


§544 


to  cure  defective  subscriptions  to  the  stuck  of  railway  companies 
and  to  validate  bonds  issued  therefor  has  been  frequently  exercised 


approved  was  held  before  the  passage  of 
the  law  authorizing  the  subscription,  the 
court  Baid  :  "  Argument  to  show  that  de- 
fective subscriptions  "I'  the  kind  may,  in 
all  .Msr.,,  be  ratified  where  the  legislature 
i  have  originally  conferred  the  power 

is  ,  ertaiulv  u ssary,  as  the  question  is 

authoritatively  settled  by  the  decisions  of 
the  Supreme  Courl  of  the  State  (Illinois), 
and  >>t'  this  court  in  repeated  instances." 
And  again  :  "Mistakes  ami  irregularities 
are  of  frequent  occurrence  in  municipal 
elections,  and  th.'  State  Legislatures  have 
often  had  occasion  to  pass  laws  to  obviate 
such  difficulties.  Such  laws,  when  they 
do  not  impair  any  contract  or  injuriously 
affecl  the  rights  of  third  persons,  are  never 
regarded  as  objectionable,  and  certainly 
are  within  tic  competency  of  legislative 
authority." 

The  <  institution  of/7/mowof  1848,  Art. 
ix.,  sec.  5,  declared  "  that  the  corporate 
authorities  of  counties,  townships,  school 
districts,  cities,  towns,  ami  villages  may 
be  vested  with  power  to  assess  and  col- 
lect taxes  for  corporate  purposes,  such 
taxes  to  be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons 
and  property  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  body  imposing  the  same."  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  State  (Marshall  v. 
Silliman,  01  111.  218  ;  Wiley  v.  Silliman, 
62  111.  170  ;  sec  ante,  sees.  79,  419)  decided 
that  this  section  having  been  intended  as 
a  limitation  upon  tic-  law-making  power, 
the  Legislature  could  not  grant  the  right  of 
corporate  taxation  to  any  but  the  cor}»>r,itr 
authorities,  nor  coercea  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  incur  a  debt  by  the  issue  of  its 
bonds  for  corporate  purposes.  And  the 
court  held  that  an  act  validating  an  elec- 
tion,   irregularly    called    and    QOtified,    to 

vote  upon  the  question  of  township  sub- 
scrip-ion,  and  declaring  the  same  legal  ami 
binding,  was  void.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  the  act  was  an  effort  to  confer  tic 
er  of  municipal  taxation  upon  per- 
sons who  were  not,  by  themselves,  the 
corporate  authorities  in  the  sense  of  the 
Constitution,  and  I mpel  tic  town  to  is- 
sue it-  bonds  for  railroad  stock,  by  declar- 
-  a  void  proceeding  to  hi'  a  valid  sub- 
scription.   Tic  liability  of  the  township  on 


the  same  bonds  afterwards  cane-  before 
lb,-  Supren  0  mi t  of  the  United  States 
in  Elm  wood  Township  v.  Marcy,  92  U.  S. 

I,  and  a  majority  of  the  court, 
not  vindicating,  nor,  it  would  seem, 
approving,  tic  decision  of  the  Supreme 
( '.mi  i  of  /■  \iwofi  i,  uevertheless,  as  there  b  i  I 
been  in  their  view,  no  conflicting  di  i 
sioiis  of  that  tribunal  on  tie  poinl ,  and 
as  it  involved  the  construction  of  a 
"peculiar  provision  of  the  Constitution  of 
/  iois,"  they  felt  bound  to  follow  it,  al- 
though it  was  made  after  tic  bonds 
in  question  hail  been  issued.  Clifford, 
Swayne,  and  Strong,  JJ.,  dissented,  on 
grounds  which  would  seem  to  be  strongly 
supported  by  the  previous  decisions  of  the 
court.  Marshall  Co.  Sup.  v.  Schenck,  5 
Wall.  772  ;  Tine  Grove  Tp.  v.  Talcott,  1'.' 
Wall.  666,  677  ;  Chicago,  II.  &  Q.  R.  K. 
Co.  v.  Otoe  County,  16  Wall.  667  ;  Olcott 
v.  Fond  du  Lac  Co.  Sup.,  lb.  678  ;  Quincy 
v.  Cooke,  107  U.  S.  549. 

In  Foote  v.  Johnson  County,  5  Dillon 
C.  C.  R.  281  (1878),  it  was  ruled  that  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  states,  hav- 
ing held  the  "township  railroad  aid  act" 
of  Missouri  constitutional  (Cass  County 
t;.  Johnston,  95  U.  S.  360),  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  Circuit  Court  to  follow  that  judg- 
ment, notwithstanding  the  later  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  in  The 
Stat,-  r.  Brassfield,  67  Mo.  331  (1878);  and 
that  where  negotiable  commercial  securities 
are  issued  and  negotiated  before  there  is 
any  decision  by  the  courts  of  the  State 
against  the  validity  of  the  act  authorizing 
their  issue,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  does  not  consider  itself 
bound  to  follow  a  subsequent  decision  of 
the  local  courts  invalidating  such  secu- 
rities, but  will  decide  for  itself  whether, 
under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  tic- 
State,  such  securities  are  valid  or  void, 
s.  r.  Douglass  v.  County  of  Pike,  101  1'. 
S.  677  (1879). 

The  rights  of  the  innocent  holders  of 
municipal  bonds  issued  in  aid  of  railroads 
"  are  to  In-  determined  by  tiie  I  w  as  it 
was  judicially  construed  to  hr  when  the 
bonds  were  put  on  tic  market  as  com. 
nc  ivial  paper."     County  of  halls  v.  Doug- 


§  544 


CONTRACTS  '.     BONDS  ;     CURATIVE    ACTS. 


637 


and  judicially  sustained.  Subsequent  legislative  sanction  within 
constitutional  limits  is  equivalent  to  original  authority.1  lint  the 
intention  of  the  legislature  to  validate  the  subscription  or  the  bonds 
must  clearly  appear  from  the  terms  of  the  curative  act.  An 
oblique  validation,  or  one  expressed  in  doubtful,  cover),  or  obscure 
language,  will  not  be  sufficient,  especially  where  the  .subscription  was 
made  or  the  bonds  issued  in  disregard  of  conditions  which  the  Con- 
stitution required  the  legislature  of  the  State  to  impose  upon  the 
municipality  before  the  power  to  make  the  subscription  or  to  issue 
the  bonds  should  arise  or  exist.2 


lass,  105  U.  S.  728  ;  Green  County  v. 
Conness,  109  U.  S.  104  ;  Sawyer  v.  Con- 
cordia Parish,  12  Fed.  Rep.  754  ;  Mar- 
shal v.  Elgin,  8  Fed.  Rep.  783.  This  sub- 
ject is  fully  and  instructively  discussed  in 
the  recent  cases  of  German  Sav.  Hank  v. 
Franklin  County,  128  U.  S.  526  (1888), 
and  Scotland  County  v.  Hill,  132  U.  S. 
107  (18S9).     See  ante,  sec.  542,  note. 

i  Wilson  v.  Hardesty,  1  Md.  Ch.  66  ; 
County  of  Jasper  v.  Ballou,  103  U.  S.  745  ; 
Shaw  v.  Norfolk  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Gray  (Mass. ), 
180  ;  Satterleei;.  Matthewson,  2  Pet.  380; 
Wilkinson  v.  Leland,  2  Pet.  627  ;  Wat- 
son v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  88  ;  Charles  River 
Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  420  ; 
Stanley  ».  Colt,  5  Wall.  Il9  ;  Croxall  v. 
Shererd,  5  Wall.  268  ;  Keithshurg  v.  Frick, 
34  111.  405. 

2  Hayes  v.  Holly  Springs,  114  TJ.  S. 
120  (1884).  In  this  case  it  appeared  tliat 
the  Constitution  of  Mississippi  of  1869  pro- 
hibited the  legislature  from  authorizing  any 
municipal  subscription  to  any  corporation 
"unless  two-thirds  of  the  qualified  voters 
at  a  special  or  regular  election  shall  assent 
thereto."  In  1871,  without  any  statute 
authorizing  it,  an  election  was  held  in  the 
City  of  Holly  Springs,  Mississippi,  which 
resulted  in  favor  of  a  subscription  by  the 
city  of  $75,000  to  a  specified  railroad  com- 
pany. In  1872,  the  legislature  passed  an 
act  providing  that  "all  subscriptions  to 
the  capital  stock  of  the  said  railroad  com- 
pany made  by  any  county,  city,  or  town  in 
this  State  not  in  violation  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, are  hereby  legalized,  ratified  and 
confirmed."  After  this  act  bonds  of  the 
city  were  issued,  which  recited  that  they 
were  "  issued  under  and  in  pursuance  of 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  Mississippi, 
and  authorized  by  a  vote  of  the  people  of 


the  city  at  a  special  election  held  for  the 
purpose."  But  as  the  provisions  of  the 
Constitution  are  inhibitory  upon  the  Legis- 
lature, and  not  enabling  to  the  city  ;  as 
under  the  Constitution  legislative  authority 
to  enable  the  municipality  to  issue  such 
bonds  must  provide  for  the  assent  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  voters  at  an  election  ;  as  no 
such  election  had  been  provided  for  by 
legislative  act ;  as  the  curative  act  of  1872 
made  no  reference  to  the  unauthorized 
election  of  1871,  and  did  not  ratify  and 
approve  it ;  and  as  the  language  of  the 
curative  act  was  too  vague  to  warrant  the 
conclusion  with  certainty,  that  the  legis- 
lature "  intended  to  confirm  and  ratify 
the  subscription  in  question," — it  was  held 
to  be  insufficient  for  that  purpose,  and  the 
plaintiff,  although  a  bona  fide  holder  of 
the  bonds  containing  the  recitals  of  full 
compliance  with  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  State,  was  defeated.  The  case  was 
distinguished  from  the  case  of  Grenada 
County  v.  Brogden,  112  U.  S.  261,  also 
from  Mississippi,  since  in  that  case  the 
legislature  had  in  the  curative  act  "des- 
ignated and  identified  the  voting  at  an 
election,  described  as  resulting  in  an  ap- 
proval by  the  constitutional  two-thirds  of 
the  qualified  voters,  followed  by  an  author- 
ity to  Grenada  County,  declared  to  be 
based  upon  such  approval,  to  subscribe  for 
the  stock."  Per  Blatchford,  i .,  in  Hayes 
v.  Holly  Springs,  114  U.  S.  at  p.  126. 

As  to  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  (see 
supra),  the  court  said,  "Even  a  bona  fide 
holder  of  a  municipal  bond  must  show 
legislative  authority  in  the  issuing  body 
to  create  the  bond.  Recitals  on  the  face 
of  the  bond  or  arts  in  pais,  operating  by 
way  of  estoppel,  may  cure  irregularities  in 
the  execution  of  statutory  power,  but  they 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  54o* 

'  5.    'Want    of  Power   always  a    Defence  ;     Question    of    Power 
is  the  One  of  Chief   Interest   and   Importance.  —  Touching  th<    rights 

of  the  holder  of  authorized  negotiable  municipal  securities,  it  may 
again  1'"  observed  thai  3uch  instruments  are  commercial  paper, 
and  governed  by  the  rules  of  the  Law  merchant  concerning  such 
paper,  and  that  as  respects  a  holder  for  value,  before  due,  without 
uoiicr  of  facts  constituting  a  defence  therein,  the  only  defi  nee  which 
is  available  is,  that  there  was  no  power  in  the  defendant  corporation 
to  issue  the  bonds  or  instruments  in  question.  By  want  of  power  as 
here  used  is  meant  the  waul  of  any  existing  valid  legislative  act 
authorizing  the  municipality  to  make  the  bonds  or  instrumeD 
tint  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the  power,  but  want  of  legis- 
lative power  itself.  This  principle  is  thus  expressed  in  one  of 
the  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court:  "  lionds  payable  to  bearer, 
issued  by  a  municipal  corporation,  ...  if  issued  in  pursuance  of  a 
power  conferred  by  the  legislature,  are  valid  commercial  instruments  ; 
but  if  issued  by  such  a  corporation  which  possessed  no  power  from 
the  legislature,  they  are,  invalid,  even  in  the  hands  of  innocent  hold- 
er.--."1 Irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the  power,  as  against  a  holder 
for  value,  without  notice  of  such  irregularities,  constitute  no  defence.2 
Since,  therefore,  want  of  power  is  the  only  defence  open  to  the  cor- 
porate maker  of  such  instruments,  when  they  have  been  negotiated 
for  value  to  innocent  holders,  the  question  of  power  is  the  one  around 
which  the  principal  interest  centres,  and  to  which,  in  its  various 
phases,  we  have  given  our  main  attention. 

§  546.  Bonds  void  against  bona  fide  Holders  ;  Recitals  in  Bonds 
cannot  cure  want  of  Power  to  Issue.  —  Where  there  is  an  entire 
absence  of  power,  as  distinguished  from  a  defective  execution  of  the 
power,  then  the  recitals  of  those  invested  with  the  ministerial  duty 
of  issuing  the  bonds  will  afford  no  protection  even  to  bona  fide 
holders  for  value.3     If   such  bonds    are  issued  without   legislative 

cannot  create  it.      If,  as  in  the   present  violation  of  a  constitutional  provision.   See 

nthority  is  wanting,  the  post,  chapter  on  Mandamus, 

bond  has  no  validity."  -'  Jacksonville,  N.  &  S.  R.   1!.  Co.  v. 

i  Pi                    i..  it,  St.  Joseph  Town-  Virden,  104  111.  339  ;  Bank  of  Statesville 

ahipu.  Rogers,  L6  Wall.  644,  659  (1872).  v.  Statesville,  84  X.  C.  169. 

A->   aearl]   all   the  cases   in   the  Supreme  :;  German    Bank    v.    Franklin    County, 

Court    have   turned    on    the    question    of  12*  V.  S.  526  (1888),  is  a  strong  applica- 

power,  it  is  not  deemed  material  again  to  tion  of  the  doctrine  of  the  text,   where 

them  in  this  connection,  as  the  propo-  bonds,    notwithstanding    certain    recitals 

sitions  in  the  text  are  no  longer  the  sub-  {ante   sec.    542,  note),  were  held  void  in 

ject  of  judicial    controversy.     Ante,   sec.  the  hands  of  bona  fidr.  holders.     See,  also, 

529  a,  as  to  invalidity  of  bonds  issued  in  Force  v.  Batavia,  61  111.  100  ;  Williams  i\ 


§  548  CONTRACTS  :    BONDS  ;    LACHES  ;    ESTOPPEL.  639 

authority  they  are  void,  and  the  levy  of  taxes  and  payment  of  in- 
terest will  not  render  them  valid.1  So  where  there  is  want  of  power 
the  mere  silence  of  the  taxpayer  in  permitting  the  issue  of  bonds  will 
not  create  an  estoppel  even  in  favor  of  an  innocent  holder  for  value.2 
It  is  the  duty  of  purchasers  to  examine  into  the  powi  r  of  the  muni- 
cipality to  issue  the  bonds,  and  if  no  power  exists  there  can  be  no 
recital  which  will  protect  even  bona  fide  holders  for  value.3 

§  547.  Laches;  Acquiescence;  Failure  to  enjoin  the  Issue; 
Payment  of  Interest,  and  retaining  the  Consideration,  as  Grounds  of 
Estoppel. — The  cases  we  have  heretofore  considered  were  mainly 
those  in  which  the  municipality  has  been  held  estopped  by  the 
recitals  in  the  bonds  to  show  that  conditions  precedent  had  not 
been  complied  with.  We  will  now  advert  to  other  grounds  of  estoppel, 
arising-  from  the  acquiescence  or  acts  of  the  municipal  authorities. 
It  is  undoubtedly  a  sound  proposition  that  a  municipal  corporation, 
as  well  as  a  private  corporation,  may,  in  the  absence  of  constitu- 
tional or  legislative  restriction,  confirm  acts,  not  ultra  vires,  which 
it  may  deem  beneficial  to  it. 

§  548.  Same  subject.  —  As  experience  shows  that  the  officers  of 
public  and  municipal  corporations  do  not  guard  the  interest  con- 
Roberts,  88  111.  13  ;  Lippincott  v.  Parta,  these  bonds,  and  its  statute  attempting 
92  111.  24;  Eddy  v.  People,  127  111.  to  confer  such  authority  is  void,  the  mere 
428(1889);  Sykes  v  Columbus,  55  Miss,  payment  of  interest,  which  was  equally 
115  ;  Williamson  v.  Keokuk,  44  Iowa,  88  unauthorized,  cannot  create  of  itself  a 
(1876)  ;  Aspinwall  v.  Daviess  County,  22  power  to  levy  taxes,  resting  on  no  other 
How.  364  ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall,  foundation  than  the  fact  that  they  have 
676  ;  Citizens'  Loan  Assoc,  v.  Topeka,  20  once  been  illegally  levied  for  that  pur- 
Wall.  655  ;  St.  Joseph  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall,  pose." 

644(1872).      See,  also,  Aveiy  v.  Spring-  So  where  a  county  court  was  empowered 

port,  14  Blatchf.  272.     See  supra,  sec.  529  to  issue  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $250,000, 

a,  and  note  ;  Duke  v.    Brown,  96  N.  C.  bonds  issued   in  excess  of  that  sum  were 

127  ;  Millerstown  v.  Frederick,  114  Pa.  declared  void  in  the  hands  of  a  pur- 
St.  435  ;  Ottawa  v.  Carey,  108  U.  S.  110;  chaser  before  maturity,  for  value  and 
Purdy  v.  Lansing,  128  U.  S.  557  (1888)  ;  without  notice  of  the  overissue.  Daviess 
Agawam  National  Bank  v.  South  Hadley,  County  v.  Dickinson,  117  U.  S.  657.    See 

128  Mass.  503.  supra,  sec.  529  a. 

1  Citizens'  Savings  &  Loan  Association  -  MePherson   v.    Foster,    43    Iowa,    48 

v.  Topeka,   20  Wall.    655;  Schuyler  Co.  (1874). 

Sup.  v.  Farwell,  25111.  181;  Marshall  Co.  3  One    who    purchased    bonds    from    a 

Sup.    v.   Cook,    38    111.   48  ;    Lippincott  railroad  company,  which  had  been  issued 

v.  Pana,  92  111.  24.      In  Loan  Association  by  a  town   in  its  aid,  was  held,  after  the 

v.  Topeka,  the  court  says:  "We  do  not  bonds  had   been   declared   void,  not  to  be 

attach  any  importance  to  the  fact  that  the  subrogated  to  the  rights  of  the  company, 

town  authorities  paid  one   instalment  of  if  it  had  any,  to  enforce  collection  of  the 

interest  on  these  bonds.     Such  a  payment  appropriation  voted  by  the  town.     Aetna 

works  no  estoppel.      If  the  legislature  was  Life    Ins.    Co.    v.   Middleport,    124    17.  S. 

without   power  to  authorize  the  issue  of  534. 


640  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  §  548 

fided  to  them  with  the  same  vigilance  and  fidelity  that  characterize 
the  officers  of  private  corporations,  the  'principle  of  ratification  by 
laches  or  delay  should  be  more  cautiously  applied  to  the  former  than 
to  the  latter.  But  the  principle  applies  to  both  classes  of  corpora- 
tions, as  well  as  to  natural  persons.  The  general  doctrine  is  un- 
doubted,—  that  there  is  ordinarily  no  estoppel  in  respect  to  acts 
which  are  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  or  of  an  act  of  the  legisla- 
ture, 01  which  are  obviously  and  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense  of 
the  tunn,  ultra  vires.  The  history  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires 
in  Greal  Britain  and  in  this  country  makes  it  difficult  to  affirm 
that  the  rule  is  without  exceptions  ;  and  it  is  the  part  of  prudence  and 
wisdom  to  keep  close  to  the  adjudications  without  undertaking  to 
formulate  in  advance  rules  of  universal  application.  Precision  is 
absolutely  essential  to  legal  conceptions.  A  legal  term  which 
stands  for  an  indefinite  idea  or  for  several  different  ideas  will  neces- 
sarily introduce  confusion  when  used  without  qualification ;  and 
perhaps  no  term  in  the  law  has  been  more  unfortunate  in  this 
respect  than  the  expression  ultra  vires.  We  mean  by  it,  as  here 
used,  the  want  of  legislative  power,  under  any  circumstances  or  con- 
ditions, to  do  the  particular  act  in  question.  As  to  irregularities  in 
the  exercise  of  an  express  power  to  issue  bonds,  and  particularly  in 
respect  to  steps  connected  with  preliminary  conditions,  the  failure 
of  the  municipality  or  of  the  taxpayer  to  enjoin  the  issue,  followed  by 
long  acquiescence,  especially  when  this  is  accompanied  by  affirma- 
tive acts  which  recognize  the  validity  of  the  bonds,  such  as  receiving 
and  holding  the  stock  or  consideration  for  the  bonds,  or  paying 
interest  on  them  for  a  series  of  years,  has  been  held  to  estop  the  muni- 
cipality from  defending,  on  the  ground  of  non-compliance  with  con- 
ditions precedent,  —  especially  when  the  bonds,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
have  been  negotiated  for  value.  But  the  corporation  is  in  no  case 
estopped  from  setting  up  a  total  want  of  power  to  issue  the 
bunds.  The  leading  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court  relating  to  the 
subject-matter  of  this  section  are  referred  to  in  the  note.1     It  is 

i  As  to  the  effect  ot  failure  to  enjointhe  St.  5S7.     No  estoppel   when   bonds  are 

issue  of  tin'  bonds  and  of  acquiescence  in  issued  in  excess  of  a  constitutional  limita- 

the  irregular  exercise  of   the   power,  see  tion  on  the  amount  which  maybe  issued. 

Rogers  v.    Burlington,  3  Wall.  054,667.  See  supra,  sec.  529  a. 

Compare  dissenl  on  this  point,  lb.  p.  672 ;  In  Supervisors  v.  Schenck,5  Wall.  781, 

Bissell   v.   Jeffersonville,   24    How.    300;  from  IUinois,  —  which  is  an  imTortant 

Cooley  on  Taxation,  548,  549;  ante,   see.  case  on  this  subject,  it  appeared  thai  in 

522,  note  ;   Butler  v.  Dunham,  27  111.  177;  Illinois  counties  were  authorized,  upon  a 

Steines  v.    Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  176,  popular  vote,  to  subscribe  for  stock  and 

185  ;  State  v.  Van  Home,  7  Ohio  St.  331  ;  pay  therefor  in    bonds  ;  an  election    was 

Barrett    v.   County  Court,   44  Mo.    201  ;  ordered  by  the  county  court  in  a  certain 

maker  v.   Goshen  Tp.  Trs.,   14  Ohio  county,  when  it  should  have  been  ordered 


§548 


CONTRACTS  :    BONDS  ;   LACHES  ;    ESTOPPEL. 


041 


obvious  that  a  constitutional  provision  requiring  a  public  sanction 
to  a  subscription  by  a  municipality  to  railroad  stock  prevents  the 
subsequent  acts  of  the  municipal  otticers  from  operating  as  a  ratifica- 
tion without  the  assent  of  the  voters.1 


(by  reason  of  a  change  in  the  law)  by  the 
board  of  siqiervisors ;  it  was  duly  held  ;  the 
proposition  was  carried  ;  the  supervisors 
made  the  subscription,  issued  the  bonds, 
received  the  stock,  and  ordered  the  levy 
of  taxes,  and  paid  the  coupons  for  nine  or 
ten  years  ;  and  it  was  held  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  in  con- 
formity with  the  doctrine  of  the  State 
Supreme  Court,  as  first  announced  but 
subsequently  overruled,  that  the  acquies- 
cence, conduct,  and  acts  of  the  county  au- 
thorities were  a  ratification  of  the  bonds, 
at  least  when  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 
holder,  and  estopped  the  county  to  make 
the  defence  that  the  election  had  been 
ordered  by  the  county  court  instead  of 
the  board  of  supervisors.  In  view  of  the 
facts  as  stated,  the  judgment  of  the  court 
would  appear  to  be  sound  and  open  to  no 
criticism,  as  the  ground  of  the  objection 
to  the  bonds  was  an  irregular  exercise  of 
an  admitted  power  in  the  county,  and  not 
a  want  of  power.  The  recital  in  the  bonds 
is  not  given,  but  it  would  appear  from  the 
opinion  that  the  plaintiff's  case  also  fell 
within  the  doctrine  of  Knox  Co.  Comm'rs 
v.  Aspinwall. 

In  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall. 
297  (1871),  decided  on  demurrer,  it  did 
not  appear  that  there  was  any  estoppel  by 
reason  of  recitals  in  the  bond,  or  from 
subsequent  payment  of  interest  ;  but  the 
pleadings  showed  that  the  county  had 
received  in  exchange  for  the  bonds  a  cer- 
tificate of  the  stock  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany, which  it  had  held  for  seventeen 
years  before  the  suit  was  brought,  and 
still  held.  The  county  was  authorized  to 
purchase  the  stock,  but  only  on  condition 
of  a  popular  vote.  It  was  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  that  purchasing  and  hold- 
ing the  stock  under  these  circumstances 
estopped  the  county  to  assert  against  an 
innocent  holder  of  the  bonds  that  they 
were  issued  in  disregard  of  the  condition 
of  a  popular  election,  required  by  the  act 
of  the  legislature  conferring  the  power. 
Three  of  the  judges  dissented,  probably  on 
VOL.  I.  — 41 


this  point  ;  and  certainly  the  case  seems 
to  be  an  extreme  application  of  the  doc- 
trine of  estoppel.  The  bonds  (so  far  as 
appeared)  were  without  recitals ;  no  pay- 
ment of  interest  had  been  made  ;  a  popu- 
lar vote  was  made  necessary,  and  the  plea 
alleged  that  no  such  vote  had  ever  been 
had,  and  that  the  question  of  subscription 
had  never  been  submitted  to  or  voted 
upon  by  the  people  ;  and  the  mere  receipt 
and  holding  of  the  stock  were  held  suffi- 
cient  to  estop  the  county  to  make  the 
defence.  We  have  not  been  able  to  recon- 
cile the  case,  on  this  point,  with  Marsh  v. 
Fulton  County,  referred  to  in  a  subse- 
quent portion  of  this  note. 

The  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County, 
10  Wall.  676  (1870),  decides  this  princi- 
ple, viz.,  that  where,  under  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  State,  the  county  authorities 
had  no  power  to  subscribe  for  stock  and 
issue  bonds  therefor,  and  where  (as  held) 
they  made  the  subscription  and  issued  the 
bonds  without  the  sanction  of  a  popular 
vote,  the  bonds  containing  no  recital,  such 
bonds  are  void,  and  are  not  ratified  by 
acts  of  the  county  authorities,  such  as  ap- 
pointing agents  to  participate  in  the  cor- 
porate meetings  of  the  railway  company, 
by  the  payment  of  part  of  the  bonds 
and  the  interest  on  the  others  for  a  series 
of  years  ;  and  the  reason  given  by  the 
court  was  that  no  ratification  could  be 
made  unless  it  was  authorized  by  the  peo- 
ple, the  defect  being  one  of  power.  Field, 
J.,  observed  :  "They  [the  supervisors] 
could  not,  therefore,  ratify  a  subscription 
without  a  vote  of  the  county,  because 
they  could  not  make  a  subscription  in  the 
first  instance  without  such  authoriza- 
tion." Compare  Pendleton  County  r. 
Amy,  supra, 

1  Norton  v.  Shelby  County,  118  U.  S. 
425;  following  Aspinwall  v.  Daviess 
County,  22  How.  364  ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton 
County,  10  Wall.  676,  684  ;  Wadsworth 
v.  Eau  Claire  County  Sup.,  102  IT.  S. 
534. 


;•_•  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  §  549 

§  549.    General  Summary  of  Doctrine  of   the  Supreme  Court  as  to 
Estoppel  by  Recitals.  —  In  passing  from  this  portion  of  our  subject, 
we  may  observe  that   if  we   have  not  mistaken  the  meaning  and 
■  of  th   leading  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court  which  we  have 
d  in  review,  they  establish  the  following  principles :  The  pur- 
chaser is  bound   to  see  that  then-  exists  legislative  power  not  in 
conflict   with  the  State    Constitution  for  the  issue  of  the  bonds  or 
ommercial  securities  of  the  municipal,  public,  or  quasi  corporation, 
and   i-   bound  to   notice   the  contents   and  recitals   in   the  instru- 
ments; but  if  such  bonds  are  duly  executed  by  the  proper  officii-, 
and  if  these   officers  are,  by  the  true  construction  of  the  legisla- 
tive enactment  in  that  regard,  invested  with  the  power  to  decide 
whether  conditions  precedent  have  been  performed,  and  the  bonds 
contain   a   recital   that   such  conditions   have  been  complied  with, 
or  a  recital  which  implies  such   compliance,  whether  the  prelim- 
inary  conditions    consist   of  facts  in  pais   or   facts   of  record, — 
the  issue  of  the  bonds,  under  such  circumstances  with  such  a  re- 
cital, is  conclusive  against  the  municipality  as  to  the  fact  or  facts 
recited  or  implied  in  the  recital,  and  estops  it,  in  an  action  by  an 
innocent  holder  for  value,  before  due,  to  show  the  contrary.     This  is 
the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States;  and  the 
point  in  which  it  differs  from  the  general  line  of  decisions  in  the  State 
courts  is  in  regard  to  the  evidence  of  compliance  with  conditions  pre- 
cedent.    In  all  the  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
that  tribunal  has  held  that  the  municipal  or  local  officers  were  con- 
stituted the  judges  to  decide  whether  antecedent  or  preliminary 
steps  or  conditions  had  been  complied  with,  and  that  their  decision, 
stated  or  implied  in  the  recital,  was  conclusive  against  the  corporate 
maker  when  the  bonds  have  found  their  way  into  the  hands  of  in- 
nocenl    holders.     The  view  which  holds  the  local  officers  a  tribunal 
authorized  to  make  so  important  a  decision   rests  not  alone  upon 
an  express  declaration  of  the  legislature  to  that  effect,  but  may  be 
"gathered,"  by  construction,   from   the  supposed   intent  and  pur- 
pose  of  the  legislature.     Many  of  the  State  courts,  but  not  all  of 
them,  have  taken  a  somewhat  different  view.     They  agree  that  mere 
irregularities,  no1   relating  to  the  essence  of  the  power,  will   not 
affed   a   bona  fide  holder;  bul    inasmuch  as  there  exists  no  general 
power    to    issue    such    securities,    and    as   the   fact   of  compliance 
.,r  non-conipliance  with    conditions   precedent  is  usually  a  matter 
of  which  there  is  a  record,  the  purchaser  of  such  securities  is  bound, 
to  ascertain  whether  the  power  to  issue  them  existed  or  had  arisen, 
especially  where  this  depends  upon  matters  of  which  a   record  is 
required  to  be  made.      The  subject  is  full  of  difficulties.     If  the 


§  550  CONTRACTS  :     BONDS  ;    STATE   COURT   DECISIONS.  G43 

latter  view  is  sustained,  it  lias  the  effect  to  impair  the  ready  sala- 
bility  and  market  value  of  the  securities.  If  the  former,  it.  has  the 
effect  of  enabling  the  local  officers  in  power  for  the  time  being  to 
perpetrate,  without  any  effectual  preventive  in  many  cases,  the  most 
outrageous  frauds.  On  principle,  it  would  seem  that  the  legislative 
intent  to  invest  local  officers,  by  means  of  a  false  recital,  with  a 
power  so  tremendous  ought  not  to  be  held  to  exist,  unless  it  is 
declared  or  plainly  implied,  and  that  more  caution  in  the  purchase 
of  these  securities  than  is  required  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Si 
Court  would  promote  the  interests  both  uf  the  maker  and  the 
purchaser.1 

§  550  (423).  State  Court  Decisions  relating  to  Municipal  Bonds 
and  the  Power  to  issue  them;  Conditions  precedent.  —  Some  of  the 
leading  differences  relating  to  the  law  of  municipal  railway  aid 
bonds  between  the  Federal  and  State  courts  have  already  been 
mentioned.  Having  surveyed  with  minuteness  the  course  of  deci- 
sion in  the  Federal  courts,  a  brief  reference  will  now  be  made  to 
the  adjudications  of  State  tribunals.  The  authority  to  subscribe 
to  the  stock  of  a  railroad  corporation  may  be  made  conditional  on 
certain  previous  steps  being  taken,  as,  for  example,  a  prior  author- 
ization of  the  act  by  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  muni- 
cipality or  district  to  be  affected,  or  a  recommendation  in  its  favor 
and  a  designation  of  the  amount  by  a  grand  jury,  and  the  statute 
may  be  so  framed  as  to  evince  the  legislative  intention  to  be  that 
no  foiver  to  subscribe  or  issue  bonds  shall  exist  unless  this  be 
done.2     Thus,  where  the  act  authorizing  a  town  to  borrow  money  to 

1  This  section  stands  as  in  the  last  merely  directory,  but  mandatory.  Where 
edition.  Nothing  has  been  decided  that  the  enabling  act  requires  the  amount  to 
clearly  requires  any  change  in  it.  The  be  specified,  a  vote  not  specifying  defi- 
decisions  referred  to  in  sec.  529  a,  supra,  nitely  the  amount  is,  as  to  the  immediate 
tend,  perhaps  it  can  only  be  said  that  parties,  void.  State  v.  Saline  County,  45 
they  tend,  to  show  that  there  are  or  may  Mo.  242  (1870),  following  Mercer  County 
be  certain  facts  of  such  a  nature,  of  which  v.  Pittsburgh  &  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St. 
a  public  record  is  required,  that  a  pur-  389,  and  Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439 
chaser  may  be  bound  to  take  notice  of  (see  infra),  ami  distinguishing  Knox 
them.     See  supra,  sees.  .'27-530.  County     t'.    Aspinwall,    21     How.    539, 

2  Mercer  County  v.  Pittsburgh  &  Erie  and  Flagg  v.  Palmyra,  33  Mo.  440.  It 
Railroad  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  3SD  (186 6)  ;  Mer-  should  be  remarked,  however,  that  the 
cer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83  ;  Au-  case  above  referred  to  (^tate  v.  Saline 
rora  v.  West,  22  Ind.  S3  (1864)  ;  ante,  County,  45  Mo.  242,  1870)  was  ma 
sec.  153  et  scq.  ;  City  and  County  of  mus  to  compel  the  relator  to  deliver 
St.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  4S3  the  bonds,  and  to  assess  taxes  to  pay 
(1S56).  In  this  last  case  the  provision  interest  on  bonds  which  had  been  issued, 
requiring  a  submission  of  the  question  to  and  the  writ  was  denied  because  the 
the  voters  "  bi!  criptiou hereby  amount  of  bonds  t"  be  issued  was  not 
authorized  shall  be  made,"  was  heel  not  specified;    but  subsequently,  in  The  State 


644 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  550 


pay  for  the  stuck  subscribed  expressly  provided  that  the  officers 
thereof  should  "  have  no  power  "  to  do  so  until  the  written  assent  of 
two-thirds  of  the  resident  taxpayers  had  been  obtained,  this  \\  as 
held  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  to  he  a  condition 
precedent,  without  which  the  power  did  not  exist.1 


v.   Saline  County,   18    Mo.   390  (1871),  Li 
Id   that  Buch  bonds,  when  in   the 
hands  of  an   ini  older   for  value, 

i    ...  .  ti  d.     What,  in  the  opinion 

Supreme  <  ourl  of  M  ich  a 

i-  musl  show   in  the  way  of  compli- 
ance with  precedenl  ,  in  order 
over,  see  th  iter  ''•  '"- 
habitants  of  Lathrop,  51  Mo.  483  (1873). 
This  case  seems  in  spirit,  if  not  in  effect, 
to  depart    from   the  earlier  ruses  in  that 
court   upon   this   subject.      Sec   Railroad 
Co.  v.  Platte  County,  42  Mo.  171,  where 
permissive  words  respecting  an  election  to 
:  ize   subscriptions   were    held  to  bo 
imperative.     In  St.  J.  &  D.  C.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Buchanan  Co.,  39    Mo.  485,  the  words 
that  the  county  court,  after  an  affirmative 
vote  by  the  people,  "shall  have  power  to 
cribe,"    were  held    to  leave  it   discre- 
tionary with   the   court  whether   to  sub- 
scribe or  not.     In  the  case  of  The  People, 
exrcl.  v.  Tazewell  County,  22  III.  147,   it 
was   held,   under   the  general  law  of  the 
State,   that    it   was    discret ionary  whether 
the  county  should  subscribe  all  or  but  a 
portion  of  the  amount  voted  by  the  citi- 
zens,  and  that  county  authorities  might 
impose  any  proper  conditions  they  might 
choose.    So  where  the  Legislature,  without 
conditions,  provides    for    submitting   the 
of  subscription  to  the  voters  of 
a  township,  the  electors  have  the  power 
to   vote   to    snl.  i  ribe  on   any    conditions 
they   may  see   proper  to    annex.     People 
r.  Dutcher,  56  111.  1  14    (1871)  ;  se< 
People   v.    Logan    County,    45    111.    162; 
Veecler  v.  Lima,  L9  Wis.  2S0  (1865);  Chi- 
i,  B.  &  Q.  R.  I.'.  Co.  v.  Aurora,  99  111. 
,  K.  &C.  Ry.  Co. v. Thomp- 
son,  24    Kan.    17".      But  such  conditions 
:   violate  any  express  provision  of 
law  or  any  general  rule  of  public  policy. 
C  „                      ,ia  &  M.    Ry.  Co.,  27  Minn. 
197  ;     Hovt   r.    Braden,    27    Minn.   490. 
Where    the   statute,  as   a   condition  pre- 
cedent   to   the  [ssue  of  bonds,  required  a 
vote  of  the  majority  of  the  qualified  voters, 


it  was  held  that  a  vote  of  the  electors 
red  and  voting  at  a  regular  election 
under  the  charter  was  intended,  and  that 
the  city  authorities  had  uo  power  to  order 
a  new  registration.  Smith  v.  Wilming- 
ton, 98  N.  C.  343.     Post,  chap.  xx. 

i  Statin  v.  Genoa,  23  K.  Y.  439(1861)  ; 
Gould  v.   Sterling,  lb.  439,   456  ;  distin- 
guished on  this  poinl  from  Bank  of  Rome 
v.  Village  of  Rome,  19  X.  V.  20.     Under 
the  act  it  was  held  that  the  onus  was  on 
the   plaintiff    to   show    affirmatively   the 
written  assent  of  the  requisite  number  of 
taxpayers  ;     and   the    manner    in    which 
this    must    be   shown    is    considered    at 
length.     But  see  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville, 
24  How.  2S7  ;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
21  How.  539;  Mercer  County  v.  Backet, 
1  Wall.  S3,  hereto!',. re  referred  to.      In  The 
People  v.  Mead,  36  X.  Y.  224  (1867),  the 
dei  i  ■■ion  in  Starin  v.  Genoa,  and  « lould  v. 
Sterling,  above   cited,  was  adhered  to  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  though  it  was  ad- 
mitted  that  a  contrary  ruling  as  to  the 
evidence  of  the   assent  of  the  taxpayers 
had  been  made  ly  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the    United    States,    in    favor   of    similar 
bonds  in  the  hands  of  bona  Jide  holders, 
and  the  case  was  distinguished  from  Mur- 
dock    v.    Aiken,    and    Ross  v.  Curtiss,   31 
N.  Y.  606.    Statin  v.  Genoa,  and  Gould 
v.    Sterling    have    been    expressly    disap- 
proved, as  we  have  seen,  by  the  Supreme 
I  ourl  of  the  United  States,  as  respects  tho 
bona  fide  holders  of  bonds.    Venice  v.  Mur- 
doch, 92   U.    S.  494   (1875).     See  supra, 
sec.  526,  note.     Illustrating  text,  see  lien- 
son  v.  Albany,  24  Barb.  248. 

Where  tie-  statute  gives  the  power  to 
issue  bonds  when  a  majority  of  the  tax- 
payers  whose  names  appear  upon  the  last 
-preceding  tax  list,  or  assessment  roll,  as 
owning  a  majority  of  the  taxable  property 
in  the  corporate  limits,  make  application  to 
the  county  judge,  by  petition,  &c.,  such 
a  petition  is  essential  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  county  j~«dge,  and  the  authority 
conferred  by  the  act  will,  on  certiorari,  bo 


§551 


CONTRACTS  :     BONDS  I    STATE   COURT   DECISIONS. 


645 


§  551  (424).  State  Court  Decisions;  Conditions  Precedent. — 
So,  under  an  act  providing  "that  no  subscription  or  purchase  of 
stock  shall  be  made,  or  bonds  issued,  by  any  county  or  city,  creating 
a  debt  for  the  payment  of  such  subscription,  unless  a  majority  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  county  or  city  shall  vote  for  the  same,"  it  was 
held  that  bonds  issued  without  an  election,  or  where  the  election 
was  called  by  the  wrong  authority  (as  by  the  county  court  instead 
of  the  county  board  of  supervisors),  are  void,  for  want  of  power  to 
issue  them,  in  whose  hands  soever  they  may  be,  and  are  not  vali- 
dated by  the  levy  of  taxes  and  the  payment  of  interest  thereon.1 


required  to  be  exercised  in  strict,  conform- 
ity with  the  act  in  its  letter  and  spirit. 
The  petition,  it  was  held,  must  be  that  of 
the  taxpayers,  and  it  is  erroneous  to 
count  as  petitioners  those  whose  names 
are  affixed,  in  their  absence,  under  previ- 
ous verbal  authority.  In  such  proceed- 
ings, where  there  are  no  provisions  to  the 
contrary,  competent  common-law  evidence 
of  the  facts  to  be  established  should  be 
produced  before  the  county  judge,  and 
this  officer  cannot  act  upon  his  personal 
knowledge.  The  People  v.  Smith,  45  N. 
Y.  772  (1871).     Ante,  sec.  515,  note. 

By  its  charter  a  city  was  authorized 
to  take  stock  in  railroads,  "provided,  that 
no  stock  shall  be  subscribed  or  taken  by 
the  common  council,  unless  upon  the  pe- 
tition of  two-thirds  of  the  residents  of 
said  city  who  are  freeholders  of  said 
city."  It  was  held,  in  an  action  by  the 
railroad  company  against  the  city  on 
the  contract  of  subscription,  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  common  council  to  determine 
whether  the  requisite  number  of  the  free- 
holders of  the  city  had  petitioned  for  the 
subscription,  no  other  tribunal  having 
been  provided  for  that  purpose  ;  and,  hav- 
ing passed  upon  that  question,  their  deter- 
mination is  conclusive,  unless  it  may  be 
set  aside  in  some  direct  proceeding  for 
that  purpose.  Evansville,  Ind.  &  C. 
Straight  Line  K.  R.  Company  v.  Evans- 
ville, 15  Ind.  395  (1860),  following  and 
applying  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21 
How.  539.  See  also  Bissell  v.  Jefferson- 
ville,  24  How.  287  (1860)  ;  Mercer  County 
v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83  ;  compare,  however, 
Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280  (1865)  ;  Du- 
anesburgh  v.  Jenkins,  40  Barb.  574  ; 
Society,  &c,  v.  New  London,  29  Conn. 
174;  State  v.  Saline  County,  45  Mo.   242 


(1870).  Subscriptions  to  turnpike  roads 
by  the  county  judge,  under  acts  of  the 
legislature,  were  held  unauthorized  and 
void,  it  being  admitted  that  an  amount  of 
stock  sufficient,  with  the  aid  of  county 
subscriptions,  to  complete  each  mile  of 
road,  had  not  been  taken  by  private  sub- 
scription, as  required  by  the  statutes. 
Clay  v.  Nicholas  Co.,  4  Bush  (Ky.),  154. 
Where  there  is  a  danger  of  a  misapplication 
of  funds  subscribed,  a  court  of  equity,  and 
it  seems  a  court  of  law,  should  refuse  to 
enforce  a  subscription  until  the  corpora- 
tion properly  secures  the  appropriation  of 
the  bonds,  or  their  proceeds,  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  subscription.  Cumber- 
land &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington  County, 
10  Bush  (Ky.),  564  (1874). 

Where  a  municipal  corporation  has 
power  to  make  a  donation  in  aid  of  a  rail- 
road, to  levy  and  collect  taxes  to  pay  it, 
or  to  borrow  money  to  pay  it  and  to  issue 
bonds  to  meet  the  loans,  the  railroad  com- 
pany has  a  claim  for  money  only,  and 
cannot  compel  a  municipal  corporation  to 
issue  bonds  for  it  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it 
cannot  be  compelled  to  take  bonds  in 
payment  of  the  donation.  Chicago,  P.  & 
V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Anne,  101  111.  151. 
Ante,  sec.  515,  note. 

1  Marshall  County  v.  Cook,  38  111.  44 
(1865),  commenting  on  and  distinguishing 
Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83,  and 
Gelpcke  v.  Dubuque,  lb.  175.  See,  also, 
Shoemaker  v.  Goshen,  14  Ohio  St.  569; 
Berliner  v.  Waterloo,  14  Wis.  378  ;  Veeder 
v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280  (1865);  Dunnovan  v. 
Green,  57  111.  63 ;  St.  Joseph  Township  v. 
Rogers,  16  Wall.  644  (1872):  s.  p.  as  to 
ratification,  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10 
Wall.  676  (1870);  Hancock  v.  Chic.it  To.. 
32  Ark.  575  (1877).     The  corporation  is 


646 


Ml  NICIPAL   C0RP0BAT10NS. 


l'.ut  this  view  was  denied  to  be  sound  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  tJie 
I'n  -.which  decided  that  an  innocent  holder  for  value  of 

such  bonds  was  i  Qtitled  to  recover  upon  them.     The  only  defect  in 
the  execution  of  the  power  was  that  the  election  was  ordered  by  the 
\>  rong  authority  ;  and  the  Supreme  ( lourt  held  that  the  conduct  of  the 
inty  in  r<  taiuing  the  stock,  and  in  levying  tuxes  and  paying  inter- 
ior a  series  of  years,  estopped  it  to  set  up  as  a  defence  t  hat  the 
ids  were  invalid,  and  it  refused  to  follow  the  judgment  of  the 
Supreme  ( lourt  of  the  State,  which  had  held  the  same  issue  of  bonds 
to  be  void.1 


§  552  (425).  Same  subject.  — In  a  case  in  Ohio,  where  the  legisla- 
ture authorized  "  the  county  commissioners  of  any  county  through  or 
in  which  a  railroad  might  be  located,  to  subscribe  to  the  capital 
stock  of  the  said  company,"  and,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  therefor, 


estopped  —  where  the  power  to  issue  ex- 
i  bed — from  setting  up  irregularities  in 
the  issue  of  the  bouds,  after  repeated  pay* 
ments  of  interest  thereon.  Keithsburgv> 
Frick,  34  111.  405;  Jasper*  ounty  v.  Bal- 
lon, 103  t'.  S.  745  ;  Schaeffer  v.  Bonham, 
95  111.  368;  Man.  &  St.  ■).  11.  Co.  v,  -Marion 
County,  36  Mo.  294  ;  Mercer  County  v. 
Hubbard,  45  111.  139  ;  Beloit  v.  Morgan, 
7  Wall.  619  (1868);  Schenck  u.  Marshall 
Co.  Sup.,  5  Wall.  77-  ;  compare  Marsh 
v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676.  The 
municipal  authorities,  on  mandamus  or 
other  proceedings  to  compel  them  to 
make  subscription  to  the  railroad  com- 
pany, may  show  that  the  election  was  in- 
fluenced by  it  and  its  employees,  by  bribery 
and  corruption.  People  v.  San  Fr.  Sup., 
27Cal.  655  (1865)  ;  Butler  v.  Dunham,  27 
111.  474;  post,  chap.  xx.  What  is  a  ma- 
joriti/  of  votes.  People  v.  Chapman,  66  111. 
137  (1873);  Decker  v.  Hughes,  68  111.  33 
(1-73).  Subscription  cannot  be  made 
without  an  affirmative  vote.  People  v. 
Cass  Co.,  77  III.  438  (1875).  The  pre- 
sumption 18  that  the  vote  cast  at  an  elec- 
tion held  according  to  law,  is  the  vote  of 
the  whole  number  of  legal  voters,  and  this 
presumption  cannot  he  rebutted  by  proof 
of  the  number  of  votes  cast  at  an  election 
held  in  the  preceding  year.     St.  Joseph  v. 

R re,  16  Wall.  664  :  Melvin  v.  Lisenby, 

72  111.  63  (1874). 

1  Marshall  County  Sup.  v.  Schenck,  5 
"Wall.   772    (1866);  Redd  v.   Henry  Co. 


Sup.,  31  Gratt.  (Va.)  685,  approving 
text.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  hoi. Is 
that  since  the  Constitution  of  1870  the 
onus  is  on  the  holder  of  the  bonds  to  show 
that  they  were  lawfully  issued  ;  and  that 
they  are  void  if  the  conditions  on  which 
the  issue  was  authorized  are  not  complied 
With.  Town  of  Prairie  v.  Lloyd,  97  111. 
179  ;  Town  of  Eagle  v.  Kohn,  84  111.  292; 
Bicheson  v.  People,  115  111.  450;  Eddyw. 
People,  127  111.  428  (1889).  Ante,  sees. 
530,  and  note,  539,  540.  Where  the  legal 
voters  of  a  city  voted  in  favor  of  a  railway 
subscription,  to  be  paid  in  city  bonds,  upon 
the  condition,  among  others,  that  the 
railroad  should  be  can,])!,  I,  it  vrithin  t)ie 
county  mi  or  before  a  certain  date,  and 
before  the  expiration  of  that  time,  but 
after  the  Illinois  I  institution  of  1870  went 
into  effect,  the  city  council,  by  an  order, 
and  without  further  action  by  the  voters, 
extended  the  time  for  the  completion  of  the 
road  within  the  county,  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  State  was  of  the  opinion  that  bonds 
issued  in  payment  of  the  subscription  were 
in  violation  of  the  condition,  and  were  void, 
for  the  reason  that  the  extension  was  not 
authorized  by  the  legal  voters,  and  the 
city,  under  the  new  Constitution,  had  no 
power  to  make  a  new  contract  in  regard  to 
such  subscription.  It  was  accordingly 
held  that  a  tax  levied  to  provide  money  to 
pay  interest  on  the  bonds  could  not  be 
collected,  Eddy  v.  People,  127  111.  428 
(1889). 


§  553 


CONTRACTS  '.     BONDS  ;    GENERAL   RESULT   STATED. 


647 


"  to  borrow  the  necessary  amount  of  money,  for  which  they  shall 
issue  their  negotiable  bonds,"  &c,  it  was  decided  to  be  a  defence  to 
an  action  on  the  bonds  (though  by  a  bona  fide  holder)  that  the  rail- 
road was  "  never  made  or  located  through  or  in  the  county  ;  "  that 
it  was  "  located  and  completed  so  as  not  to  touch  the  county."  The 
defence  was  held  good,  upon  the  ground  that  the  authority  to  issue 
the  bonds  never  existed.1  Other  cases  have  been  decided  upon 
similar  grounds.2  It  is  the  general  doctrine  of  the  State  courts  that 
not  only  is  express  authority  requisite,  but  that  the  substantial  re- 
quirements of  the  law  must  be  observed  ;3  while  in  the  Federal  courts 
the  failure  to  comply  with  the  requirements,  or  rather  the  decision 
of  the  local  officers,  especially  when  embodied  in  the  recitals  of  the 
bond  that  such  requirements  have  been  complied  with,  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  no  defence  against  the  bona  fide  holders  of  such  bonds. 

§  553  (426).    General  Result  stated.  —  It  may  be  remarked,  in 
conclusion,  that  this  general  survey  of  the  adjudications  shows  some 


1  Treadwell  v.  Hancock  Co.  Comm'rs, 
11  Ohio  St.  183  (1860),  reviewing  and 
criticising  Aspinwall  v.  Knox  County 
Comm'rs,  21  How.  (U.  S. )  539,  approved 
in  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  (U.  S. ) 
287  (1860).  Compare  Purdy  v.  Lansing, 
128  U.  S.  557  (1888),  cited  infra.  In 
Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280  (1865), 
Treadwell  v.  Commissioners  and  Gould  v. 
Sterling,  before  cited,  are  approved,  and 
Aspinwall  v.  Commissioners  and  Moran  v. 
Miami  County  are  criticised.  Compare 
State  v.  Van  Home,  7  Ohio  St.  327  ;  re- 
affirmed, State  v.  Union  Township  Trus- 
tees, 8  Ohio  St.  394,  401.  The  two  cases 
last  cited  (7  Ohio  St.  327,  8  Ohio  St.  394) 
do  not  intend,  probably,  to  assert  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  non-action  of  the  taxpayers 
or  inhabitants  will  supply  a  want  of  power, 
in  the  just  sense  of  that  expression,  in 
the  trustees  to  subscribe  for  the  stock, 
or  estop  the  quasi  corporation  from 
making  the  defence  of  ultra  vires,  if  it 
existed. 

Under  a  charter  authorizing  counties 
"  through  which  "  a  given  railroad  "  may 
pass "  to  subscribe  to  its  stock,  it  was 
held  that  a  county  between  the  termini  of 
the  road  might  subscribe  without  waiting 
until  the  route  was  located,  or  built  with- 
in the  county.  "Woods  v.  Lawrence  Coun- 
ty, 1  Black  (U.  S.),  386  (1861).  In  Min- 
nesota the  agreement  to  issue  the  bonds 


must  be  perfected  before  the  construction 
of  the  road  intended  to  be  aided.  State 
v.  Highland,  25  Minn.  355. 

2  Under  the  New  York  Act  of  1871, 
chap.  298,  which  requires  all  the  counties 
through  which  the  road  would  pass  to  be 
designated  and  the  road  located,  before  the 
bond  of  any  town  can  be  issued  in  aid 
thereof,  this  requirement  is  held  to  go  to 
the  question  of  power,  and  bonds  issued 
without  previous  action  of  the  board  of 
directors  of  the  company,  adopting  the 
entire  route,  and  designating  all  the  coun- 
ties through  which  the  road  would  pass, 
are  void.  Purdy  v.  Lansing,  128  U.  S. 
557  (1888);  approving  People  v.  Morgan, 
55  N.  Y.  587 ;  Mellen  v.  Lansing,  20 
Blatchf.  278. 

Bonds  issued  where  a  valid  condition 
precedent  imposed  under  legislative  au- 
thority was  disregarded,  and  there  was  no 
specific  recital  covering  the  point,  held  to 
be  void  for  want  of  power.  German  Bank 
v.  Franklin  Co.,  128  U.  S.  526  (1S88). 
See  nice  distinctions  there  drawn  in  the 
cases  on  this  subject. 

»  Lamoille,  &c.  Co.  v.  Fairfield,  51  Vt. 
257  ;  People  v.  Waynesville,  88  111.  469  ; 
Sykes  v.  Columbus,  55  Miss.  115  ;  Dela- 
ware Co.  v.  McClintock,  51  Ind.  325 
(1S75)  ;  Harding  r.  Rockford,  R.  I.  &  St. 
L.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  111.  90  (ISTl'). 


648 


Mr  MCI  PAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  553 


difference  of  judicial  opinion  (chiefly  in  eases  involving  the  rights  of 
innocent  holders  of  negotiable  municipal  securities)  respecting  the 
evidence  of  compliance  with  conditions  precedent,  and  as  to  what 
will  estop  the  municipality  from  showing  non-compliance  in  fact 
with  such  conditions.  Yet,  aside  from  these  differences,  the  courts 
all  agree  that  such  a  corporation  may  successfully  defend  against 
the  bonds  in  whosesoever  hands  they  may  he,  if  its  officers  or  agents, 
who  assume  to  issue  them,  had,  in  the  sense  already  explained,  no 
legislative  power  to  do  so.1  The  officers  of  such  corporations  possess 
no  general  power  to  bind  them,  and  have  no  authority  except  such 
as  the  legislature  confers.  If  the  statute  authorizes  such  a  corpora- 
tion to  issue  its  bonds  only  when  the  measure  is  sanctioned  by  a 
majority  of  the  voters,  bonds  issued  without  such  a  sanction  (either 
in  fact,  or  according  to  the  decision  of  authorized  officers,  or  some 
authorized  body  or  tribunal),  or  when  voted  to  one  corporation  and 
without  authority  of  law  issued  to  another,  are  void,  into  whoseso- 
ever hands  they  may  come.2  This  is  the  sound  and  true  rule  of  law 
on  this  subject,  and  the  one  which  has  had  the  uniform  approval  of 
the  State  courts  in  this  country,  and  it  has  also  received  the  high 
sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.3     The  distinc- 


1  Ante,  chap.  vi.  sec.  163.  The  provis- 
ions of  a  railroad  charter  made  it  lawful 
for  certain  counties  to  subscribe  stock  on 
a  majority  vote,  and,  on  such  vote  being 
had,  made  it  the  duty  of  the  county  com- 
missioners to  subscribe  for  stock  and  issue 
bonds  therefor.  Accordingly  a  vote  was 
had,  resulting  in  favor  of  a  subscription  ; 
after  the  vote,  but  before  the  subscription 
was  actually  made  and  the  bonds  issued, 
counties  were  prohibited  by  law  from  sub- 
scribing for  stock,  unless  paid  for  in  cash. 
It  was  held  that  the  power  to  subscribe  and 
the  vote  did  not  constitute  a  contract  within 
the  meaning  of  the  clause  of  the  Constitu- 
tion making  contracts  inviolable ;  that 
until  the  subscription  was  actually  made 
the  contract  was  unexecuted  ;  and  that 
bonds  thus  issued  were  void,  even  in  the 
hands  of  innocent  holders  for  value.  As- 
pi  n  wall  v.  Daviess  Co.  Comm'rs,  22  How. 
(U.  S.)  364  (1850);  Eddy  v.  People,  127 
111.  428  (1889)  ;  ante,  sec.  70  ;  Marsh 
v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676  ;  Hayes 
v.  Holly  Springs,  114  U.  S.  120  ;  Mer- 
chants' Bank  v.  Bergen  County,  115 
U.  S.  384,  when  a  bona  fide  holder,  for 
value,  of  bonds,  containing  no  recitals, 
issued  in  excess  of  the  number  authorized 


by  law  and  as  security  for  a  personal  debt 
of  an  officer,  was  held  to  have  no  claim 
upon  the  county  whose  bonds  they  pur- 
ported to  be. 

2  Ante,  chap.  vi.  sec.  163  ;  supra,  sees. 
529  a,  542. 

8  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676  (1870).  Speaking  of  this  subject,  Mr. 
Justice  Field,  in  the  case  just  cited,  deliv- 
ering the  opinion  of  the  court,  says  : 
"But  it  is  earnestly  contended  that  the 
plaintiff  was  an  innocent  purchaser  of  the 
bonds,  without  notice  of  their  invalidity. 
If  such  were  the  fact,  we  do  not  perceive 
how  it  could  affect  the  liability  of  the 
county  of  Fulton.  Tins  is  not  a  case 
where  the  party  executing  the  instru- 
ments possessed  a  general  capacity  to 
contract,  and  where  the  instruments 
might,  for  such  reason,  he  taken  without 
special  inquiry  into  their  validity.  It  is 
a  case  where  the  power  to  contract  never 
existed  ;  where  the  instruments  might, 
with  equal  authority,  have  been  issued 
by  any  other  citizen  of  the  county.  It  is 
a  case,  too,  where  the  holder  was  hound 
to  look  to  the  action  of  the  officers  of  the 
county  and  a>eertain  whether  the  law 
had   been  so  far  followed  by  them  as  to 


§554 


CONTRACTS  \    BONDS  I  DEFENCES. 


649 


tion,  however,  must  be  remembered,  between  want  of  power  to  issue 
the  bonds  and  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the  power,  which 
latter  are  unavailing  against  the  bona  fide  holder  without  notice  of 
the  irregularity. 

§    554.    Defences  ;   Waiver  of   Irregularities  in  Issue  of  Bonds,  &c. 

—  Defences  grounded  on  corporate  neglect,  or  technical  in  their 
nature,  are  not  favored  when  the  bonds  are  in  innocent  hands.1  The 
issue  of  the  bonds  raises  a  presumption  that  conditions  precedent, 
imposed  by  ordinance,  have  been  complied  with  or  waived.2     This  is 


justify  the  issue  of  the  bonds.  The  au- 
thority to  contract  must  exist  before  any 
protection  as  innocent  purchaser  can  be 
claimed  by  the  holder.  This  is  the  law 
even  as  respects  commercial  paper,  al- 
leged to  have  been  issued  under  a  dele- 
gated authority,  and  is  stated  in  the  case 
of  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666.  In 
speaking  of  notes  and  bills  issued  or  ac- 
cepted by  an  agent,  acting  under  a  gen- 
eral or  special  power,  the  court  says  :  '  In 
each  case  the  person  dealing  with  the 
agent,  knowing  that  he  acts  only  by  virtue 
of  a  delegated  power,  must,  at  his  peril, 
see  that  the  paper  on  which  he  relies 
comes  within  the  power  under  which  the 
agent  acts.  And  this  applies  to  every 
person  who  takes  the  paper  afterwards  ; 
for  it  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  pro- 
tection which  commercial  usage  throws 
around  negotiable  paper  cannot  be  used 
to  establish  the  authority  by  which  it  was 
originally  issued.'  "  And  in  this  case  the 
bonds  of  the  county  of  Fulton,  though 
negotiable  in  form,  and  not  disclosing  or 
reciting  their  purpose  or  origin,  were  held 
void,  in  the  hands  of  bona  fide  holders,  for 
want  of  authority  in  the  county  to  issue 
them,  having  been  voted  to  one  corpo- 
ration and  delivered  (according  to  the 
view  of  the  court)  to  another  and  distinct 
corporation.  See  also,  Lewis  v.  Barbour 
Co.  Comm'rs,  3  Fed.  Rep.  191  ;  noted 
supra,  sees.  529  a,  531,  note  ;  supra,  sec. 
524.  See  Society,  &c.  v.  New  London,  29 
Conn.  174  ;  compare  People  v.  Mead,  36 
N.  Y.  224;  Adams  v.  Memphis  &  L.  R.  R. 
Co.,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  645;  Lynde  v.  Win- 
nebago County,  16  Wall.  6  (1S72);  Steines 
v.  Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  167  (1871); 
Livingston  County  v.  Weider,  64  111.  427 ; 


s.  c.  5  Chicago  Legal  News,  265;  Burr  v. 
Carbondale,  76  111.  455  (1875). 

1  Maddox  v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.) 
56  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  43  Pa. 
St.  391  ;  San  Antonio  v.  Lane,  32  Tex. 
405. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  supra; 
Gilchrist  v.  Little  Rock,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
261  ;  Danielly  v.  Cabaniss,  52  Ga.  211 
(1874);  Black  v.  Cohen,  lb.  621. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  held,  in  an  action  on  negoti- 
able bonds  issued  by  a  public  corporation, 
that  where  the  defendant  has  shown  fraud 
in  the  origin  or  inception  of  the  instru- 
ments, this  will  throw  upon  the  holder 
the  burden  of  showing  that  he  gave  value 
for  them  before  maturity.  Smith  v.  Sac 
County,  11  Wall.  139  (1870),  Clifford,  J., 
dissenting  ;  Montclair  v.  Ramsdell,  107 
U.  S.  147  ;  Pana  v.  Bowler,  107  U.  S. 
529,  542. 

When  special  authority  to  borroiu  money 
or  to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  a  railroad 
company  will  impliedly  repeal  existing 
charter  limitations  upon  the  amount  of 
indebtedness  that  may  be  contracted  by  a 
municipality,  or  upon  the  rate  of  taxation. 
See  Amey  v.  Allegheny  City,  24  How. 
364  (1860);  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall. 
575  (1869);  ante,  sec.  162,  and  cases  there 
cited. 

Mode  of  enforcing  payment  of  municipal 
bonds.  See  chapter  on  Mandamus,  post. 
The  authority  to  levy  and  collect  special 
taxes  to  pay  bonds  authorized  to  be  issued 
cannot  be  withdrawn  or  repealed  by  the 
legislature  to  the  prejudice  of  the  holder 
of  such  bonds.  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy, 
4  Wall.  535  (1866) ;  ante,  chap.  iv. ;  post, 
chap.  xx.     Where  bonds  of  a  county  are 


650 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


§  555 


certainly  so  where  the  bonds  recite  in  substance  that  they  are  issued 
under  and  pursuant  to  the  enabling  act. 

§  555.  Where  Lost  or  stolen.  —  Having  stated  the  law  of  muni- 
cipal bonds,  it  may  be  useful  to  give  a  synopsis  of  the  principles 
applicable  to  negotiable  securities,  including  such  bonds,  when  lost 
or  stolen. 

A  aegotiable  bond  stolen  and  its  number  altered  by  the  thief  has 
been  held  to  be  good  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder,  who  pur- 
chased it  for  value.]  Negotiable  honds  or  coupons,  although  stolen, 
are  collectible  by  a  bona  fide  holder  who  took  them  for  value  in  the 
usual  course  of  business,  before  maturity  and  without  notice.2  If, 
however,  the  instrument  is  incomplete,  as  if  any  essential  part  is 
Lit  in  blank,  and  is  afterwards  filled  up  by  the  thief,  or  holder 
under  the  thief,  no  recovery  can  be  had;  as,  where  in  an  incomplete 
instrument  the  place  of  payment  was  left  in  blank,  and,  before  it 
was  tilled  up  by  the  authorized  officer,  the  bonds  were  stolen.3      A 


ly  authorized  to  be  issued  by  a  vote 
of  the  people,  and,  by  the  law  authorizing 

the  vote,  it  is  provided  that  the  bonds 
shall  be  executed  by  certain  officers,  and 
countersigned    by    the   treasurer  of    the 

aty,  it  was  held,  that  the  omission  of 
the  treasurer  to  countersign  the  bonds  is  a 
mere  defect  in  the  execution  of  them, 
which  a  court  of  equity  would,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  remedy  at  law,  ordinarily  sup- 
ply, and  that  an  injunction  restraining  the 
collection  of  taxes  for  the  payment  of  such 
bonds  should  not  be  allowed.  Brcese,  C. 
J.,  and  McAllister,  J.,  dissenting.  Melvin 
v.  Lisenby,  72  111.  63. 

To  o  iship  Railroad  Aid  Act  of  M 
held  unconstitutional.  Webb  v.  Lafayette 
Co.,  67  Mo.  353  ;  Ranney  v.  Bader,  <i7  Rfo. 
476;  State  v.  Brassfield,  67  Mo.  831.  But 
the  !' e  lera]  courts,  as  to  bonds  previously 
issued,  refused  to  follow  the  State  court 
de< asions.  Foote  v.  Johnson  County,  6 
Dillon  C.  C.  R.  281  (1878);  Douglass  v. 
Pike  County,  L01  I'.  S.  677  (1879).  The 
law  of  New  York  intended  to  legalize  the 
acts  "I'  commissioners  to  aid  railways 
was  declared  unconstitutional.  Horton  '•. 
Thompson,  71  N.  V.  618.  The  Suprer  e 
i  irt  of  the  United  States  declined  to  fol- 
low the  ruling  in  Horton  v.  Thompson, 
supra,  and  it  held  the  same  act  to  be 
itution  il  and  the  honds  in  question 
to    1m-    validated    by   it.      Thompson   v. 


Perrine,  103  U.  S.  806.      See  supra,  sec. 
544. 

1  Elizabeth  v.  Force,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  587; 
Birdsall  v.  Russell,  29  N.  Y.  22<>  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Savings  Bank,  98  Mass.  12  ; 
Diamond  i\  Lawrence  Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  353  ; 
Crosby  v.  New  London,  W.  &  I'.  R  R. 
Co.,  26  Conn.  121  ;  Myers  v.  York  &  C. 
R.  R.  Co.,  43  Me.  362  ;  Clarke  v.  .lanes- 
ville,  IBiss.  9S;  Morgan  v.  United  States, 
118  U.  S.  476  (reversing  8.  c.  IS  Court 
of  Claims  Rep.  386),  where  alteration  of 
numbers  of  stolen  honds  is  one  of  the  facts 
stated,  and  wdiere  the  court,  while  not 
directly  passing  upon  the  legal  effect  of 
such  alteration,  sustained  the  title  of  bona 
fob'  purchasers  for  value  and  without  notice 
of  the  alteration  ;    Brown,  Riley  &  Co.  o. 

United  States,  20  Court  of  Claims  Rep. 
416,  construing  opinion  of  Supreme  I 
on  this  point  in  ease  of  Morgan  ?\  United 
States,  supra  :  Jones  on  Railroad  Securi- 
ties, see.  216;  Wvlie  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
l\  s  Circuil  Court,  S.  D.  N.  V.  MSS. 
Compare  Sufifell  ».  Lank  of  England,  9 
Q.   B.   I'.  555.  ~fl^^ 

-  Evertson  v.  Nat.  Lank  of  Newport 
66  N.  Y.  14;  state  v.  Wells,  15  Cal.  336; 

SpOOnerV.   Holmes,    102  Mass.   503. 

8  Ledwich  v.  Mck'im,  53  N.  Y.  307; 
Jackson  r.  Vicksburg,  8.  &  T.  R.  R.  Co., 
2  Woods,  141. 


University  of  California  Library 
Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


MP"  r\  i  7ggj 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  772  71 


